Psychological Warfare

David Childers

Greetings,

The ability to change perceptions through cognitive means can influence or change the outcome of realities for a crowd, group, or entire nation. The use of information dominance can modify the relative perceptions of a target audience and achieve specific goals without the use of force or traumatic impact.

It is essential to understand how these methods are used and can be applied to facilitate both changes and to avoid being subjected to the adverse effects of such operations.

David Childers
Ancora Imparo
28 January 2023

People exercise an unconscious selection in being influenced.
T. S. Eliot

Cover Graphic

Naval Research Magazine
February 1967
Project Jenny - The U.S. Navy aircraft deployed in Vietnam used for radio and television broadcasting.
This was the predecessor to the U.S. Air Force 193rd Special Operations Wing Commando Solo C-130.

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Introduction

Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) convey selected information and indicators to audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.

These actions aim to induce or reinforce behavior favorable to specific objectives. They are an essential part of the range of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic activities of a country. These operations can be utilized during both peacetime and conflict.

Psychological Operations can encourage popular discontent with the opposition's leadership and, combining persuasion with a credible threat, degrade an adversary's ability to conduct or sustain military operations. They can also disrupt, confuse, and protract the adversary's decision-making process, undermining command and control. When properly employed, Psychological Operations have the potential to save the lives of friendly or enemy forces by reducing the adversary's will to fight. By lowering the adversary's morale and efficiency, Psychological Operations can also discourage aggressive actions by creating indifference within their ranks, ultimately leading to surrender.

The methods used for Psychological Operations include using various forms of printed media, broadcast multimedia (both Television and Radio), and content distributed using computer networks.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychological_operations_(United_States)



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This study examines the theory and application of psychological operations (PSYOP), with particular emphasis on contemporary military applications. Substantial historical and theoretical background is supplied, with detailed analysis of case studies. Current PSYOP applications by the United States and the Soviet Union are emphasized and include descriptions of their respective PSYOP capabilities, organizations, and goals.

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

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   D. Propaganda
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1. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

"To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."--
Sun Tzu, 4th century B.C.

Psychological operations, or PSYOP, is a form of political and military activity that is understood and defined in a number of different ways. The definition upon which current peacetime U.S. PSYOP policy is based was established in Department of Defense Directive S-3321.1, Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War (1984). That definition states that Psychological Operations are "planned political, economic, military, and ideological activities directed toward foreign countries, organizations, and individuals in order to create emotions, attitudes, understandings, beliefs, or behavior favorable to the achievement of U.S. political and military objectives." The DoD directive was formulated to establish standard guidelines for all aspects of PSYOP (planning, programming, execution, control) conducted by agencies of the U.S. Department of Defense in non-wartime conditions. But PSYOP also includes a number of other activities that fall under strategic military and political policy. Activities of that type are defined in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 as: "planned psychological activities in peace and war, which normally pursue objectives to gain the support and cooperation of friendly and neutral countries and to reduce the will and the capacity of hostile or potentially hostile countries to wage war." The latter definition reflects the expansion in scope that has occurred in PSYOP in the last fifty years. In the modern world, the scope of PSYOP is wider than ever

before, even though the basic concepts continue as they have existed for thousands of years. Reflecting this expansion, PSYOP expert Fred W. Walker notes, "We might consider the term persuasive communications to mean the same thing as psychological operations."[1] Another expert, William Daugherty, prescribes an even broader field: "PSYOP is communication and therefore covers the entire field of human action."[2] In the present political-military meaning of the term, PSYOP is a multi-stage process that uses a combination of non-coercive devices to gain influence over the actions and attitudes of a targeted group without resorting to the use of force. The first stage of the process is defining the target, the second is finding methods or agents to influence the target's perception of reality, and the third is the output of the message through selected channels. In this process, the most critical element is credibility--to retain the attention of the audience, the audience must be convinced it is receiving information that is reliable and pertinent to its interests. If the audience detects contradictions or falsehoods, credibility is lost--for a particular operation, and perhaps for future operations as well. Therefore, the cardinal motto for all PSYOP applications is "Truth is the best PSYOP." The advantage of using PSYOP has remained the same throughout its history: if an opponent's attitude can be influenced favorably, his physical resistance will diminish. This means that, when used in combination with other military or political operations, PSYOP acts as a force multiplier, enhancing the effect of those operations on the target.

The term "psychological operations" was first used in reference to surrender messages (messages offering humane treatment for enemy

personnel ceasing to resist U.S. forces) sent to the Japanese mainland in 1945. From World War I until the 1960s, "psychological warfare" was the umbrella term in common use. In the 1960s, it was recognized that much more was included in the modern concept than warfare in the conventional sense, so PSYOP became the umbrella term. Psychological warfare, or PSYWAR, remains part of the PSYOP concept. It refers to activity seeking to influence the attitudes and actions of hostile foreign groups in support of national objectives in wartime.[3] Psychological warfare is thus the type of psychological operation most closely connected with military actions: before and during engagement, to minimize the enemy will to fight, and afterwards, to underscore the impact of his losses and the hopelessness of his situation. Military actions themselves (the dropping of the atomic bomb, as an extreme example) may play a psychological role beyond their military impact, because the demonstrated ability to inflict harm has a psychological effect on the potential victim.

In the twentieth century, PSYOP applications have been broadened by the intense ideologies and systems of mass communications that have supported them since World War I. Particularly since the 1930s, the connection of PSYOP with ideology and mass communication has made it a constant strategic element of international politics. Communism and Fascism have used PSYOP in new ways, still considered unethical by much of the world, and forced the opponents of their ideologies to rethink their PSYOP procedures accordingly. The concepts of "disinformation" and "active measures" have been added to the

international PSYOP vocabulary, and the definition of "propaganda" has been expanded in this process.

Disinformation, translated from the Russian term dezinformatsiya, has been defined as "any government-sponsored communication in which deliberately misleading information is passed to targeted individuals, groups, or governments with the purpose of influencing foreign elite or public opinion." Disinformation differs from propaganda because the latter does not necessarily involve deceiving a target group, and because disinformation always has a specific foreign target.[4] "Active measures" is a translation of an umbrella Soviet term, aktivnyye meropriyatiya. It has come into English usage because our term "covert activities" does not cover the enormous breadth of activities and participants included in the Soviet concept. In addition to using conventional covert operations, active measures seek to acquire influence over an opponent's attitudes through the media, economic leverage, front organizations, and other seemingly innocent overt agencies with covert sponsorship.[5] The goal of active measures can be summarized as political influence and disruption on an international scale, to achieve a specific result. Both disinformation and active measures are weapons in what Communist dogma sees as peacetime psychological warfare. That warfare is an extension of the international military goals of the Communist movement. Those weapons will be discussed more fully in the Soviet PSYOP section of this survey. But it is important to note that these types of PSYOP have been added only to the Soviet arsenal. While the U.S. must respond effectively to them, it remains committed to the principle of truth in all information programs.

"Propaganda" is a broad term that means management of collective attitudes through communications and symbols, for the purpose of promoting or damaging a cause.[6] Among its non-PSYOP applications are commercial advertising, political campaigning, and religious exhortation. (The term was invented by the Roman Catholic Church in its seventeenth-century campaigns against Protestantism.) But in the contemporary public understanding, those aspects have been over-shadowed by the widespread political uses of propaganda in the twentieth century. Although the term had become associated with untruth, propaganda in the PSYOP context must contain large amounts of true information, because of the primary requirement that the audience believe the message. By convention, PSYOP propaganda is divided into three types: white, gray, and black. White propaganda originates from a correctly identified source, black from a completely misidentified source; the source of gray propaganda is masked by transmission through a "front" agency that is nominally independent of the actual source. "Symbolic propaganda" uses action rather than words to produce its effect. The most dramatic example of symbolic propaganda was the use of the atomic bomb in World War II to physically demonstrate the hopelessness of the Japanese position. Several years later, the first Soviet nuclear test sent a symbolic message that had a strong psychological effect on the West.

PSYOP relies heavily on correct evaluation and exploitation of the target's "capacity for self-deception."[7] What is this "capacity for self-deception," and how is it exploited? Approaches differ according to specific conditions, because target groups vary widely. Examples of such

target groups are military enemies, political rivals, indigenous populations in guerrilla and counterinsurgency operations, and domestic populations whose support is needed for military or political campaigns. Every identifiable group, society, and nation has a unique set of needs and goals, as well as a uniquely shaped group psychology. The needs and goals may be long- or short-term, military or political, real or imaginary. To cite two extreme examples, the group psychology may be shared by a small group in a short-term, tactical situation (such as a military unit occupying foreign territory), or by several nations in a semi-permanent, strategic situation (such as a group of nations strategically located between two superpowers). Between those extremes are many combinations of needs and goals. If a psychological operation is done properly, the perceptions formed by the target group can be slanted in a particular direction without immediate challenge and actions or attitudes changed accordingly. Psychological operations thus can reduce the risk and expense of coercive action. Such operations are especially useful to groups such as guerrilla forces whose capacity for coercive action is limited. PSYOPs is not to be confused with military deception, which causes an enemy to take inappropriate action by misleading his assessment of positions or intentions.

For the operating side, the immediate target is a weak point of an ultimate target, a place where psychological advantage can be gained and used as a weapon in the longer term. How would this work in the two examples given above? For an occupying force, the points of psychological vulnerability might be distance from home and prolonged exposure to an uncomfortable cultural environment. In such a case, if

the opponent's intelligence reveals discontent within the force, a psychological operation might use communications media to convince group members of the loneliness and pointlessness of their venture, and to offer easy surrender conditions. If such a message penetrates without effective challenge, it blunts the effectiveness of the occupation. This approach might be accompanied by terrorists acts that "emphasize" the alienation of the occupiers.

In the international example, smaller nations are subjected to constant superpower propaganda. The Soviet Union uses overt and covert measures in campaigns to split smaller countries from the United States and move them toward a neutral position. In Europe such efforts exploit the substantial public and official desire for peace and security, doubts about American resolve to defend Europe, and fears of nuclear war. A campaign of this sort continues over many years and is woven into the fabric of superpower foreign policy.

In modern times nations increasingly understand the need for propaganda to justify their positions to both domestic and foreign audiences. In peacetime and in protracted war, PSYOP procedures now are integrated with and parallel to measures of military preparedness. Key factors in their success are accurate evaluation of adversary psychology, secrecy, and the output of information that is consistent and credible.

A PSYOP application of particular current value is in insurgency and counterinsurgency activity in what is called "low-intensity conflict" (LIC). Geographically confined to the Third World, LIC PSYOP now is often used in confrontations of client groups of larger powers such as

Soviet Union, China, and the United States. Such confrontations occur most often in areas with weak governments, poorly developed or unbalanced economies, and valuable natural resources or strategic location.[8] In recent years, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Afghanistan have been the sites of major superpower insurgency-counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. has been on both sides of such campaigns, aiding counterinsurgency in El Salvador and the Philippines, insurgency in Nicaragua and Angola. Because guerrilla warfare relies heavily on psychological impact to complement sheer force, successful counterinsurgency must use PSYOP effectively to defeat such campaigns. Victory goes to the side that best understands and exploits the psychology of the indigenous population that is the main source of support for the guerrillas. As insurgency and counterinsurgency have developed, important PSYOP tools are community relations programs, public information, and civic action programs carried out by military personnel in the areas in dispute. Insurgency PSYOP is not limited to proxy confrontations between the United States and Soviet camps. The Ayatollah Khomeini conducted a very effective insurgency against the Iranian government. Exploiting religious fervor and dissatisfaction with the government, the exiled Khomeini smuggled large numbers of tape cassettes into Iran, spreading propaganda to stir revolutionary feeling and build a movement from an initially small number of followers.[9] In this case, no effective counterinsurgency campaign was mounted, and the government fell.

In the contemporary world, unconventional warfare is the rule, not the exception. Given that fact, PSYOP has become a military tool of

greater importance than it was in the "classic" model. This is because the element of psychology is present in all forms and levels of combat, even when some conventional aspects of doctrine become less relevant. When the clear boundaries of open combat disappear and civilian populations become an integral part of every confrontation, PSYOP no longer is a specialized, sinister weapon that can be disregarded because it does not yield spectacular results. Proper PSYOP procedure is often a critical guarantee of success; solid PSYOP approaches to an indigenous population can hold territory with minimal expense or loss of life. But under such circumstances, the PSYOP weapons must be as familiar as any other weapon to all military personnel, because it is they who carry out PSYOP in their everyday contact with the population. In places such as El Salvador, the psychological relationship between military personnel and the civilian population is a prime determinant of the government's success against guerrillas; in this case, U.S. advisers are training the host nation's forces in PSYOP applications. A key word is "integration" of PSYOP into the framework of conventional military doctrine.

Another important application of PSYOP is to rally a domestic population behind a political or military cause. In wartime all nations, whatever their political system, must inspire willing sacrifice by their people. All U.S. war efforts, from the American Revolution to Vietnam, have required extensive "selling." As Korea and Vietnam showed, the complex psychology of a democracy is not always receptive to such campaigns. In such cases, targeted propaganda is the most important tool, but covert active measures have also been useful for totalitarian governments in combating uncooperative internal elements.

The historical examples that follow will show the variety of goals, methods, agents, and target groups that have been included in psychological operations of the past. In the sections that follow, discussion of past and current Soviet PSYOP will show how that nation has refined and expanded the entire field to meet the ideological requirements of the Leninist state. And discussion of United States PSYOP, past and present, will focus on the response to Soviet PSYOP campaigns from World War II to the present, in what has become the most massive PSYOP battle in history.

2. PSYOP APPLICATIONS IN HISTORY

The Art of War, a treatise written by the Chinese military thinker Sun Tzu in the fourth century B.C., advocates the idea that an army of superior numbers can be "made not to fight." This idea was in use even before that time. An early example is the slaying of Holophernes, leader of an Assyrian force invading ancient Israel, by the Israelite Judith. Knowing that enemy troop morale depended heavily on the single figure of the commander, Judith gained the confidence of Holophernes, beheaded him, and carried the head back to her people. The symbolism of the missing head and the lost command figure totally demoralized the Assyrians, who were easily routed in spite of vastly superior numbers. The story appears in the apocryphal Biblical Book of Judith; its historical accuracy is unproven, but it remains a good example of assessing the enemy's psychological weak point and using a powerful psychological symbol to bolster the morale of one's own forces.[10]

In another example, Ghengis Khan is credited with leading huge hordes of savage horsemen across Russia and into Europe. The size of his armies was exaggerated by agents planted in advance of the army and by rumor and other forms of propaganda. To supplement his PSYOP activities, Ghengis Khan also used rapid troop maneuver to confirm the illusion of invincible numbers. Because the Mongols created an image of total, barbaric domination, target groups never believed they were the victims of astute psychological warfare. Once the image had spread, the Mongols had created a permanent weakness in enemy psychology, and thus gained a military advantage wherever the Mongol reputation was known.[11]

In another instance, during the American Revolution the rebels distributed propaganda leaflets that invited Hessian mercenaries and British common soldiers to desert. One such leaflet provided two short, contrasting lists: the negatives of life in the British Army and the advantages of deserting and settling permanently in America. Promises of leniency and surrender passes have become a staple of battlefield PSYOP. In the Revolutionary War application, the direct appeal exploited the mentality of the occupying force, class differences between officers and enlisted men, and nationality differences between the British and their German mercenaries. Thousands of troops heeded the appeal and never returned to Europe. At the same time, domestic loyalist opposition was muffled by anti-British propaganda in the newspapers of the thirteen colonies.[12]

A qualitative change occurred in PSYOP about l900, when communications became much faster and more inclusive. For the first time, entire nations could be targeted in a psychological operation by

print, radio, and film. These media provided direct, reliable transmission of propaganda messages to anyone within sight or earshot. The new media were first used widely in World War I; the British used them to spread rumors of German atrocities, including cannibalism.[13] Because the British had already developed a more sophisticated print and communications system than the Germans, they mounted a propaganda campaign that the Germans could not overcome. The British diplomatic service was also more adept at public diplomacy than its German equivalent. The British used German propaganda ineptitude to their advantage by simply disseminating many undiplomatic German statements, without change or comment; the difference in PSYOP skill between the two sides was enough to make the message clear that the Germans were uncivilized, arrogant "Huns" (a term used by the Kaiser himself for his army). German morale was deflated by having bombastic public statements made into ammunition for the enemy. This propaganda defeat was an important incentive for better performance by German propagandists in the next war.

Because of the expanded scale on which it was used, PSYOP is considered by historians as a crucial factor in the Allied victory in World War I. The Creel Committee, the first specialized U.S. agency for wartime propaganda, succeeded in building domestic support for a war that was not popular initially; it also was the model for later U.S. publicity and propaganda agencies. And the very presence of the U.S. in the war, after long neutrality, had great psychological as well as the military impact. Early in 1917, Germany began sinking all ships approaching Britain, in order to starve the British into surrender. The

Germans assumed that Britain would surrender before the U.S. could retaliate for its sunken ships by entering the war on Britain's side; when the error of this gamble became obvious, German morale fell. The German General Ludendorff named allied PSYOP the most important factor in German morale decline.

Before and during World War II, the Nazis used a propaganda machine aimed first at domestic opinion, then at world opinion. The basic psychological assumption of that machine was that public opinion is formed by symbols and images, not rational thought. If the correct symbols were presented with enough force, the public would follow. The theory worked because the audiences chosen were prone to self-deception about certain emotional topics. The charismatic figure of Adolph Hitler provided the ultimate symbol of renewed power to a nation humiliated by the results of World War I. The propaganda machine of Joseph Goebbels convinced Germans and many audiences elsewhere that Communists and Jews were the enemies; that only Fascism could provide protection from them; and that the advance of Fascism was both just and inevitable.[14] The worldwide desire for peace provided a psychological weak point that prevented rational evaluation of these messages; British and United States opposition was delayed until Europe had been conquered piecemeal. By that stage, Germany had developed effective print and broadcast media. A much older form of propaganda dissemination, the mass rally, was also used very profitably. The Germans also made extensive use of "black propaganda" and subversive pro-Nazi groups and agents in occupied territory.

After World War II, the Soviet Union raised peacetime PSYOP to new levels of sophistication as the Cold War broke out. And, as new international political conditions developed, tactical military PSYOP began to play a new role. These activities will be the subject of the following sections.

3. SOVIET PSYOP

Like other aspects of Soviet policy, the Soviet theory of psychological operations is based on the teachings of Lenin. The central concept (which sharply differentiates Soviet from United States approaches to the subject) is that the Soviet Union is in a state of undeclared war with capitalist world--a war that will not end until world Communist domination is achieved. Given the magnitude of the goal, moral constraints have had much less influence on Soviet PSYOP than on those of the United States and other countries. In the words of covert operations specialist Chapman Pincher, for the Soviet Union "politics is the continuation of war by other means."[15] On the peacetime strategic level, politics is the main arena of Soviet PSYOP. However, this approach was not invented by the Bolsheviks in 1917; it was used sporadically for centuries by the Russian tsars in domestic and foreign relations, but it has been codified and intensified in the last seven decades. Soviet PSYOP is by far the most intensive, complex and consistent peacetime campaign of its type ever launched. The Soviet political system backs its PSYOP policy with whatever resources are necessary to achieve its goals.

Soviet PSYOP campaigns are a tightly integrated combination of conventional devices, influential "legitimate" institutions such as the diplomatic corps and the press, and covert activities. On the level of open propaganda, the goal is to "out-talk" the adversary, establishing terms of international dialogue favorable to the Soviet Union. This process is constant, aimed at wearing down the West and convincing other listeners that the Soviet position is valid. A favorite message in the Soviet arsenal says that it is the West that is on the psychological offensive: with an insatiable ideological drive, imperialism uses all possible psychological means to undermine the progressive development of other nations toward the ideal, inevitable Communist order. Furthermore, Dmitri Volkogonov, the leading Soviet PSYOP theoretician, says that the imperialist powers invented psychological warfare to maintain world domination.[16] Briefly stated, his view is that imperialist PSYOP seeks to divide the communist world, disorient its people politically, and falsely portray the Soviet Union as the main threat to world peace. Volkogonov attributes virtually all the known Soviet active measures methodology to the United States and its imperialist allies. To the extent that this idea is believed around the world, Soviet PSYOP succeeds in putting the debate into its terms.

Three departments of the Soviet government supervise active measures and propaganda activities. The International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union provides liaison with nonruling Communist parties and front organizations abroad, directs their active measures, and apportions responsibility for various types of activity. This department also suggests new measures to advance the international

policies of the ruling Politburo. Overall foreign policy is often affected by activities of the International Department (I.D.), which has no equivalent in Western governments.[17] The functions of this agency appear to have been expanded and refined in recent years, especially after the abolishment of the party's International Information Department. A key figure in this development was Anatoli Dobrynin, former Ambassador to the U.S. and head of the I.D. until late 1988. The latter was in charge of the overall propaganda apparatus until l986, when that function was split between the I.D. and a second major agency, the Propaganda Department. The latter now runs all domestic and foreign propaganda efforts. Its level of sophistication rose especially fast under Aleksandr Yakovlev, who until reassigned late in l988 was an effective domestic and international spokesman for the Gorbachev reforms.[18] The third propaganda agency is the KGB, or Committee for State Security, which handles espionage and disinformation activities at home and abroad. The disinformation mission aims mainly at destabilizing and misleading the NATO alliance and Japan, while concealing actual Soviet policy aims. In addition to the three major agencies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has broad responsibility for the overt Soviet press and foreign cultural relations--which in the Soviet system are closely coordinated with less "legitimate" PSYOP functions.

Although government reform has changed some of the structure of this system, there is evidence that even more resources are now allocated to PSYOP activities. History has shown that active measures are emphasized in times of improved relations with the West because targets become more vulnerable in such times.[19]

Favorite covert devices of Soviet active measures are forged documents and planted media stories, surfacing in forms that erode the position of the ultimate target. Often, forged United States and NATO documents are used to show that the West is intent on aggression in Europe or the Third World. Active measures aim to divide the target group (most often NATO) by intensifying latent hostilities within it. Germany is a favorite target for such divisive methods because the Nazi past remains a psychological weak point for all of Europe. Print and broadcast media are nearly always used to achieve maximum dissemination of a message. The procedure is to identify a potentially sympathetic audience with political influence (for example, the leftist West German Green Party and the Labor Party in Great Britain), and tailor the message for maximum favor with that audience.[20] In recent years, this tailoring includes maximum exposure of the terms perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness), which for the Western audience indicate that hoped-for Soviet internal reforms are taking place and Cold War tension is easing. Debate flourishes on the actuality of those reforms, but there is no doubt that the terminology used to describe them has been quite successful in exploiting a Western psychological preoccupation.

A variety of agencies--from individual covert agents to client nations--carry out Soviet psychological operations. In the Third World, Cuba is an especially active agent, working on Soviet operations and independently. A major front organization for Soviet operations is the Helsinki-based World Peace Council. That organization, indirectly controlled by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, plays a major role in stirring anti-NATO feeling in Europe. Political influence

operations are a special type of active measure, using personal contacts to advance a Soviet position in foreign decisionmaking institutions. These contacts range from foreign figures (diplomats, journalists, scientists) to KGB agents "planted" in positions of influence.[21] Because the Soviet Union is the initiator, it has been able to choose its "battlefields," where chances of achieving psychological influence are greatest and opponents can be put on the defensive. In target countries, such campaigns exploit weak points such as ethnic rivalries, distrust of existing social or government systems, and class antagonism. And active measures are always used in conjunction with other devices to advance Soviet foreign policy goals.

A few examples of Soviet active measures will demonstrate their goals and methods. In 1976, a testament of Zhou En-lai surfaced in a prominent Japanese newspaper. The document spoke against the Cultural Revolution in China and advocated closer relations with the Soviet Union. It had been placed by the KGB office in Tokyo.[22] In another instance, the KGB created a pamphlet, entitled CIA Insider, purported to be a listing of CIA agents and press outlets all over the world. The pamphlet, released in Switzerland, attempted to show the pervasive CIA influence in the Western press; it is an example of the "upside-down" black propaganda ploy of attributing Soviet PSYOP methods to Western nations.[23] And in the early 1960s, a long series of items planted in the European press ruined the political career of Franz-Josef Strauss, a staunch advocate of United States armaments in West Germany. Strauss was painted as a warmonger seeking revenge on the Soviet Union for the results of World War II.[24] In another example, in 1979, Radio Ba Yi

began broadcasting into China from the Soviet Far East. Its positions on domestic, diplomatic and military issues aimed initially at discrediting Deng Xiaoping, who was also attacked directly by the station. The Soviet Union acknowledged no role in the broadcasts, which supported all Soviet positions and advocate closer Sino-Soviet relations.[25] In the recent Soviet effort for better relations with China, the station was shut down.

The Soviet Union has also found itself on the negative side of PSYOP activities. When it invaded Afghanistan, counterinsurgency efforts failed to win over the indigenous population, and the occupying force became demoralized by guerrilla psychological warfare. And in 1983 the Soviet Union shot down a Korean civilian airliner, causing an uproar in world opinion. The Soviets tried to turn press attention "upside-down" by claiming that the United States had provoked the incident--but Soviet statements were poorly coordinated and contradictory, and they failed to win the battle of world opinion.[26] The obvious fabrications and confusion in the propaganda line violated the basic principle that information used in PSYOP must be believable to the target group.

Historically, Soviet active measures have had several weaknesses. The Soviet ideology of atheism and Communism is unattractive to many audiences, so it must be concealed or glossed over in many cases. Acts such as the Afghan invasion have eroded trust in the Soviet Union as defender of Third-World liberty. And many forgeries and press placements have been poorly executed and very obvious.[27]

Most experts on the Soviet Union agree that in recent years the sophistication of Soviet propaganda and active measures has grown, and some of their weaknesses have been eliminated. First, the Soviet Union

now has a charismatic leader in the person of Mikhail Gorbachev. This is a weapon the Soviets have never had before. Gorbachev is able to send direct, credible messages to world leaders and use international media to propagate a view of the Soviet Union as a reformed, peace-loving, and benign nation. Like Roosevelt, he has cultivated a personal image of honest and moral humanity that has universal appeal. Following the cardinal principle of PSYOP, that all messages be based in truth, Gorbachev's messages utilize the actual liberalization of internal and external Soviet policy (highlighting such events as removal of Soviet tanks from Hungary and the liberation of Andrei Sakharov) to maximum effect in shaping the new image. Arms control proposals, slipshod and obviously insincere under previous regimes, now impress even Western skeptics with their scope and consistency. Gorbachev has also shown wisdom in choosing and shaping his messages to target audiences, alternating between firmness and conciliation. At the same time, there is strong evidence of continued commitment to Lenin's principle of all-out political war as an extension of military struggle in peacetime. A 1988 report of the United States Information Agency lists major active-measures "black" programs begun after Gorbachev came to power. Among the messages widely disseminated by these programs: the AIDS virus was created in an American laboratory for germ warfare; the United States developed a weapon that kills only non-whites; Latin American babies are butchered and sold to U.S. distributors for use in medical transplants; and the CIA murdered Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme. While such messages have not changed substantially since earlier years, the approach of more subtle, "gray" programs has changed. Soviet-controlled

international peace groups now seek a broader appeal by softening their rhetoric; other Soviet-influenced groups now seek wide contact with Westerners, to subtly convince them that Soviet positions are just; and the Soviets now sponsor many international peace forums, including respected professional figures, to enhance their peace-loving image. All these efforts complement the statements and actions of Gorbachev, whose programs of glasnost and perestroika seem committed to greater Soviet openness and nonmilitary programs.[28]

In summary, the Soviet Union is by far the largest practitioner of PSYOP in the world. PSYOP has been an integral part of its foreign and domestic policy since the Bolshevik Revolution. In organizational structure and function, Soviet psychological operations overlap the more conventional functions of government and diplomatic institutions. Because PSYOP is still viewed as another version of military struggle, coordination of tactical military doctrine with long-term strategic-international goals remains especially close and consistent.

4. UNITED STATES PSYOP

In the "age of communications," all nations must find ways to "explain themselves" to the rest of the world, and to their domestic populations. The more international obligations the nation has, the more vital is the process of sending messages that create desirable psychological responses in their recipients. As described in the previous section, the United States faces a sustained, multilevel Soviet PSYOP

campaign. The campaign aims to discredit the United States and its allies in the view of the world and of their own populations.

Since mass communications became a PSYOP tool, the United States has been involved in several wars requiring domestic and international justification of its position versus adversaries such as the Germans, the Japanese, the Koreans and Chinese, and the Viet Cong. In each conflict, large-scale tactical PSYOP machinery also went into motion. Generally, such efforts have been a response to the initiative of an opponent; neither strategic nor tactical PSYOP apparatus has been at adequate strength before the threat appeared. And since World War II, moral and bureaucratic questions have interfered with coordination of PSYOP programs. As the definition of the word "war" becomes less clear, domestic perceptions of military and political goals become more vulnerable to psychological targeting by adversaries. This was seen most dramatically in Vietnam, but it also applies to current low-intensity conflict situations.

In World War II, a very effective PSYOP weapon of the United States was the charismatic leadership of Franklin Roosevelt, whose inspirational radio broadcasts were admired by Joseph Goebbels, Hitler's propaganda chief.[28] The United States created two major agencies for PSYOP activities in the war: the Office of War Information (OWI, for domestic and foreign propaganda), and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS, among whose functions was direction of military PSYOP). The OWI consolidated a number of information agencies that existed before the war. Wartime urgency did not prevent friction between the two agencies, congressional interference, and diffusion of PSYOP and

propaganda decisionmaking among theater commanders of the Army and Navy--factors that hindered PSYOP missions in many cases.[29] But the propaganda of the OWI was marked by careful evaluation of target psychology, appropriate messages, and effective delivery. For example, the OWI aimed surrender appeals at the psychological vulnerabilities of fanatical Japanese soldiers, inducing large numbers to surrender in spite of a military code that seemingly precluded such behavior.[30] Although the United States PSYOP effort in World War II was somewhat cumbersome and disorganized, there were enough instances of such astute targeting to overcome the head start that the Axis powers had gained in propaganda.[31]

After the war, the word "propaganda" was associated in the United States with Fascism and Communism, the systems that had "reinvented" the device for their ideological advancement. The American public did not consider propaganda an activity to be pursued in peacetime by the leader of the free world. There followed a period of indecision about the role of PSYOP in peacetime, and most wartime PSYOP units were disbanded shortly after the war ended. When the Korean War began, only one operational psychological warfare troop unit existed. As in the previous war, a strong PSYOP effort was eventually mounted in Korea, offering mainly radio, loudspeaker, and leaflet support of conventional ground troops. But complaints of weak support often came from the PSYOP units at the front.[32] The Korean War was the stimulus for formation in 1951 of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (the first centralized agency for PSYOP) and the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg in 1952. The former no longer exists, but the

latter is now the center of PSYOP training and research for all the Armed Forces. In 1953 the United States Information Agency (USIA) was created for international dissemination of information.

In general, withdrawal from PSYOP activity after World War II was slowed by the realization that the Soviet Union was now a formidable enemy in the Cold War. This realization was based on two ideas: that the world does not automatically understand or approve of the United States; and that the Soviet Union is ready and able to exploit doubts about the morality and motives of the United States, in numerous overt and covert ways. An initial reaction to this situation was creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in I946, with authority for covert psychological and political activities. The size and scope of this organization grew very fast during the Korean War.[33]

Beginning about 1960, Communist expansionist doctrine has sought to exploit "wars of liberation" and insurgencies in areas previously under European colonial control. Soviet propaganda has portrayed the Soviet Union as defender of oppressed peoples, and the United States as an exploiting imperialist.[34] To meet this potent psychological gambit of guerrilla war, U.S. PSYOP applications in influencing the Third World and conducting unconventional warfare have become increasingly important in recent years.

How successful has the United States been in meeting postwar PSYOP challenges? The record has been mixed. A number of systemic differences prevent United States PSYOP from ever being the all-pervasive, centralized extension of foreign policy that it is for the Soviet Union. In the United States, all information cannot be officially

controlled; secrecy is difficult even in the most critical cases; and decisionmaking always involves a number of conflicting views. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs is mobilized for propaganda activities that the United States State Department could never undertake. Likewise, no American institution has the total control exercised by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The Vietnam War was the most recent large-scale PSYOP campaign of the United States. As in Korea, the main tactical devices were loudspeakers, leaflets, and radio. The Chien-Hoi (Open Arms) amnesty program stressed the strength of the South Vietnamese Army and the hopelessness of the Viet Cong position. In many respects, this massive effort fell short on both strategic and tactical levels: the first when domestic and international doubts about legitimacy were not met by United States official information, the second when PSYOP and military operations failed to complement each other, and the enemy was able to exploit the psychological vulnerabilities of both United States troops and the indigenous population of Vietnam.

However, a number of post-Korea United States psychological operations have been successful. In 1965, American troops invaded the Dominican Republic to quell what was believed to be the first stage of a Castro-type revolution. During the American presence, liaison between military and civilian PSYOP groups was quite successful in supporting the military and political aims of the occupation.[35] According to verbal reports of participants, leaflets became such a valuable source of information that they were eagerly purchased in the capital city of Santo Domingo. In the Vietnam War, the Civilian Operations and Revolutionary

Development Support centralized and focused counterinsurgency targeting of indigenous populations in some areas.[36] The Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), founded to integrate public information and PSYOP functions in Vietnam, achieved a number of successes. CounterPSYOPs activity in Europe in the early 1980s ensured timely installation of intermediate-range missiles, despite an intensive Soviet psychological campaign to exploit European peace and antinuclear groups. And in the Grenada invasion of 1983, U.S. amnesty messages and rewards substantially reduced the opposing force.

After Vietnam, overall budgetary support for PSYOP declined. Army PSYOP units in Okinawa, Panama, and Germany were disbanded. This left the 4th Psychological Operations Group (consisting of four battalions in l988) at Ft. Bragg as the only active-duty unit in the United States Armed Forces with an exclusively PSYOP mission.[37] A National Guard unit remained in the Air Force and support units remained in the Navy, but Ft. Bragg became the source of PSYOP support for all types of military operations. If medium- and high-intensity conflict should break out, support would come from a reserve PSYOP unit trained at Ft. Bragg. In peacetime, the active-duty unit builds the research base for future readiness, and it has the mission of PSYOP support for low-intensity conflicts and peacetime overt activities.[38] Because the latter type of support has growing potential for application, a number of leading PSYOP authorities have agreed that United States capability needs to be expanded, and that PSYOP expertise should be integrated into standard U.S. military training. This group includes Alfred Paddock, formerly commander of the 4th Psychological Operations Group and director of

psychological operations in the Pentagon; Melvin Kriesel and Michael Totten, former commanders of the 4th Psychological Operations Group; and Sam Sarkesian, professor of political science and former chairman of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.[39]

Since the Reagan Administration put additional emphasis on information as one of the elements of national power, overt psychological operations in peacetime have been increased. These psychological operations have included training and advice to indigenous forces allied with the United States, surveys and assessments leading to actual operations, miscellaneous support to host nation PSYOP programs, and other overt PSYOP projects. Typical of PSYOP support to host nation programs is the long-term program created for El Salvador. One trainer is assigned to the U.S. military group in the capital, San Salvador, to coordinate all U.S. PSYOP programs in the country. Over the years the U.S. PSYOP contribution has resulted in significant change not only in the PSYOP practices of the El Salvadoran Armed Forces, but also in their general approach to insurgency, including an increased respect for human rights.

Programs similar to the El Salvadoran project exist worldwide, as established by DoD Directive S-3321.1. This directive requires every Unified and Specified Commander-in-Chief to conduct overt psychological operations in peacetime as appropriate to the military mission.

Overt psychological operations are coordinated with the State Department and require Country Team approval for each operation. The operations are coordinated with the United States Information Agency (USIA) to prevent dissemination of conflicting information. DoD

operations attempt to fill the informational niches not filled by other agencies, dealing with subjects and areas of primary DoD concern but of secondary importance to the other information agencies.

At the strategic level, covert psychological activities are centralized in the Central Intelligence Agency, the latitude of whose operations has varied with the degree of oversight exercised by Congress. Meanwhile, overt propaganda is less centralized, and it is isolated from covert activity. In the 1980s, the United States has sought to bolster programs of cultural relations and positive image-making abroad. "Public diplomacy" has been used much more aggressively to correct the record about United States intentions and in counterattacking Soviet and Cuban propaganda. In 1983 a Special Planning Group was formed, including representatives from all government agencies having propaganda functions. The goal of this group was to centralize the public diplomacy effort and put forth a coherent, positive international image. The USIA has been instrumental in several specific improvements: coordinating United States explanations of Central American policy; ensuring INF installation in Europe; and increasing the budget for cultural relations and propaganda.[40] An interagency committee for public diplomacy, first used in the INF European campaign, continues low-key, behind-the-scenes coordination of policy statements and explanations.

But policy agencies still lack coordination with public diplomacy efforts; agency roles in PSYOP are not well defined; and the United States has often found itself in a reactive position in international situations requiring PSYOP applications. Because of agency

compartmentalization, messages often lack the crucial element of credibility because they are contradictory. And, in the words of Army intelligence officer and scholar John Oseth, there is an "American suspicion of the tools of psychological manipulation,"[41] which insulates American institutions from association with such activities. On the military side, this takes the form of suspicion toward peacetime support of elite, special-purpose groups, such as those that would be given exclusively PSYOP missions.

A number of separate United States agencies now disseminate propaganda worldwide. The United States Information Agency runs the Voice of America and various cultural and information programs abroad. The Board for International Broadcasting runs Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which broadcast into the Soviet bloc. And the Central Intelligence Agency continues its administration of covert PSYOP and counterPSYOPs activities abroad. DoD peacetime overt PSYOP activities have joined these groups in disseminating international information. Like the USIA, DoD disseminates international information only to foreign groups overseas.

As a result of governmental recognition of PSYOP deficiencies, in 1985 the Secretary of Defense promulgated a Master Plan to revitalize PSYOP. This plan reviewed the considerable inadequacies of PSYOP at that time, and recommended remedies for each item. Responsibility for DoD policy was given to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, which in turn created a Directorate for Psychological Operations assigned to the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy. This directorate was to be responsible for PSYOP policy and monitor response to the Master Plan.

The active duty PSYOP group was fully manned for the first time in years, and modernized equipment of all types replaced the Korean War-vintage radios, presses, and loudspeakers of the PSYOP units. PSYOP education and training were greatly improved, with a new Army functional area code assigned for PSYOP officers, and an enlisted military specialty was created. New awareness and staff training courses were created, to provide officers and enlisted personnel to meet a new demand for competent staff personnel. PSYOP staffs at all levels were created and strengthened, and they were moved out from under control of special operations staffs. The PSYOP Worldwatch Program was created, as a new, proactive body at the Joint Staff level, monitoring daily intelligence and open-source traffic for situations in which PSYOP input is appropriate. Similar bodies were created at the Unified and Specified Commands, adding a new element of proactive PSYOP to replace the traditional U.S. reactive posture. The Secretary of Defense assigned PSYOP forces to the newly created United States Special Operations Command, giving a four-star proponent for PSYOP and establishing a new support structure for Unified and Specified Command psychological operations across the spectrum of conflict. Heightened preparedness for wartime, contingency situations, low-intensity conflict, and peacetime operations resulted from the changes initiated from the Master Plan. By 1989, the response to the Master Plan had so changed the PSYOP environment that a new plan, was needed to accommodate the progress made since 1985. Because of the nature of PSYOP, these peacetime programs provide the most realistic training for PSYOP personnel. The overall effect of this PSYOP renaissance has not yet been calculated,

but many successes in peacetime and low-intensity conflict have already been ascribed to it.

In conclusion, the United States has practiced psychological operations in the twentieth century when such measures were a military or diplomatic necessity, but there has been great reluctance to organize and maintain units with PSYOP capability during peacetime. When the "rules of the game" changed after World War II, awareness of the value of PSYOP gradually increased, and a number of organizations were given distinct functions such as covert activities and distribution of cultural information. But no overall, permanent coordination structure has appeared to maximize the PSYOP potential of each organization as needed, either on the tactical-military or the strategic-international level.

On the tactical level, United States military PSYOP staffing has been low, and military personnel are not widely trained in the goals and methods of psychological operations. Writers commenting on this situation have pointed out that the potential requirement of United States PSYOP aid to counterinsurgency in the Third World seems to be increasing, without appropriate improvement in readiness. Although efforts were made periodically toward a comprehensive U.S. tactical PSYOP doctrine, the policy has been to approach each case individually after it arises, with no overall philosophical context.[42] The most recent of those efforts, the DoD Master Plan, has focused greater attention and resources on the subject.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The time-honored principles of PSYOP retain exactly the same basic value as they have always had: as a force multiplier that complements military operations by lessening the determination of the target to resist. But since the days of Genghis Khan the definition of PSYOP has come to include a much broader range of activities and methods: from organized campaigns using leaflets and speakers in conventional tactical combat, to official statements by national leaders aimed at an international audience, to the everyday interaction of non-specialized military personnel with a host population. In spite of expanded application, the basic principles still apply: the message must be credible, meaning that it must be based in truth; it must be chosen and shaped to create a positive impression on the target audience; and it must be integrated into the overall military or political program of which it is part.

Contemporary PSYOP is practiced by many countries and agencies, in many circumstances, for a variety of goals. For the Soviet Union, it is a standard part of foreign policy, an accepted method of achieving national goals. For the U.S. it retains a negative connotation, both in political and military usage, although its utility has been proven in many situations. Consistency and coordination have been missing even in U.S. wartime PSYOP. For other nations involved in low-intensity or unconventional warfare as sponsors or participants, PSYOP has become an invaluable tool in gaining the support of segments of a population. For this reason, U.S. PSYOP support of allied nations, and effective

PSYOP approaches to neutral nations, has become a vital part of the U.S. program of protecting or influencing those countries.

All of this occurs in a world where: the chief potential military opponent has a dynamic, sophisticated, multilevel PSYOP apparatus; conventional military operations are increasingly costly, while PSYOP remains relatively inexpensive; and the shadow of nuclear war puts most world conflicts into vague, quasimilitary forms. Under these conditions the psychology of conflict assumes a primary role, one that must be understood by every military commander.

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

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PREFACE

The need for manuals for use in training of personnel for psychological warfare operations was discussed in several interested agencies in the spring of 1951. Several other major requirements for research needed in relation to psychological warfare were considered at the same time. A conference held at the Human Resources Research Institute of the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base at that time was the occasion for initial consideration of ways and means of providing for these needs.

The Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare of the Army took an active interest in the problems presented, and in the upshot it was agreed that the Operations Research Office should undertake to play the coordinating role and provide major effort for the provision of training manuals, while some other projects were undertaken by other agencies.

The preparation of training manuals is not an ordinary or normal task for an operations research agency. The Operations Research Office would not regard the preparation of such manuals on military subjects in general as part of its proper mission for the Army. At the time in question, however, it was a fact that the small staff engaged in operations research in psychological warfare in the Operations Research Office was the only such staff available to undertake such a task. It was also a fact that the lack of such training manuals as were desired reflected the lack of organization of knowledge and theory of psychological warfare, which was a hampering circumstance for operations research in the subject as well as for planning and operations in the same connection.

The preparation of a training manual presents a number of problems that permit no direct and precise scientific solution. At what level of knowledge and intelligence and interest on the part of the student should the text be aimed? How far should the text take sides in matters on which leading experts are in controversy? How far should the beginning student, whatever level is assumed, be led into the technical refinements of the

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problem in an initial study course? How far should he be made an expert himself, or how far should it be assumed that he will be subject to varied assignments of which psychological warfare may be only one and a temporary one at that?

We will not claim pretentious certainty concerning the assumptions we have made as to the answers to these questions. We have tried to prepare what amounts to an intelligent and intelligible text for students of college caliber who do not have previous serious background in the subject and who are not embarking on professional careers or seeking graduate degrees in this particular field.

It should also be mentioned that we have no illusion that the present text can stand, or should stand, as too good to be improved. It should serve especially as a focus for critical consideration of what such a text should be, of how it can be improved, of tests as to its adequacy, and of improved versions based on further experience.

This volume is one of three that were undertaken at the start of the program two years ago. It is meant as a general introduction to the principles and practice of psychological warfare. The second volume will be concerned primarily with the media of communication—leaflets, radio, etc.—and the third will constitute a casebook of practical examples of psychological warfare techniques.

STAT

Chevy Chase, Md.
May 1953

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Part I

WHAT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IS

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Psychological warfare is one of the means nations use to promote their policies and objectives vis-à-vis the outside world. Nations have been waging it ever since there have been nations (although psychological warfare does happen to be a new name for it), but it has only recently come to be regarded as a distinct government activity that ought to be performed by specially trained professionals. Perhaps the most effective way to give an over-all view of psychological warfare is to sketch it briefly in action in ancient and modern times, relate it to communication theory, then define it and its terminology, classify it by missions and apparent source, and, finally, relate it to policy and command.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN OTHER TIMES

History and literature are full of examples of the use of psychological warfare (or, more briefly, psywar), many of them dating back to a time long before the term itself came into use.

One of the earliest literary accounts of the use of psywar is found in Homer's Iliad. Troy, a stoutly defended walled city, had been besieged for years by a sea-borne invasion army from Greece. The two enemies had reached a stalemate. Many of the heroes on both sides had fallen. When the impasse seemed unbreakable, the Greeks hit upon a strategem. They built a huge wooden horse and placed it before the gates of Troy. Then they boarded their ships and sailed away—ostensibly for Greece. The Trojans supposed that the Greeks had given up the seige and had left the horse as a gift of peace. With wild rejoicing they opened the gates of the city—as the Greeks had guessed they would—and brought the horse inside to be the center of a victory celebration. When the party was over and the Trojans were sleeping it off, the Greek troops who were hiding in the horse came out—for the horse had been

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made hollow, and big enough to hold a group of men. They came out of hiding and opened the gates of the city to the Greek army, which had sailed stealthily back by night. The Greeks won a complete victory. "Trojan horse" is still used today to indicate a deception, and "beware the Greeks bearing gifts" has been a common adage for 2500 years. Today, as in the days of Hector and Achilles, military commanders still use the psywar of display or planned deception.

Probably as old as the story of the Trojan horse is the Biblical account of Gideon's use of psywar in his successful defense of Jerusalem against the vastly superior forces of the invading Midianites. Gideon was aware that his army would be overwhelmed if he were to commit it to open battle with the enemy. He therefore picked 300 men and equipped each with a trumpet and torch, an earthen pitcher being placed over each of the torches to conceal its light until the appropriate moment. Under cover of darkness Gideon placed his small force in a circle around the enemy. At midnight, when the Midianite guard was being changed, Gideon ordered the pitchers smashed to expose the lighted torches. At the same time, each of the 300 sounded his trumpet. Aroused from their sleep and believing themselves under attack, the Midianites fell into panic and fought with each other in the darkness. The survivors fled in confusion, and were hunted down at will by the Jews. This use of deliberately induced panic is perhaps the earliest in recorded history.

In China the Emperor Wang Mang, when he was trying to put down some rebels, collected all the animals from the imperial menagerie and took them along in the hope that they would intimidate the enemy. The rebels attacked first, however, and in the excitement of battle the animals got loose and panicked Wang's own troops. Wang thus became the victim of one of the Communist techniques of psywar, namely, that of "depressing and unnerving the enemy commander." Says Paul Linebarger: "It undermined his health; he drank to excess, ate nothing but oysters, and let everything happen by chance. Unable to stretch out, he slept sitting on a bench." The incident also serves as a reminder of how psywar sometimes boomerangs.

Temujin, the Genghis Khan, is commonly believed to have achieved his conquests with limitless hordes of wild Tatar horsemen, who overran the world by sheer weight of numbers. It now seems certain, however, that the sparsely settled countryside of inner Asia could not possibly have produced such hordes. The empire of the Khan was conquered by bold military inventiveness

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plus the application of psywar in many forms. The Mongols used rumor, display, and other psywar techniques to increase their reputation for numbers and ferocity and thus frighten their enemies. Even today, historians still fail to appreciate the lightness of the forces, the resourcefulness of command, and the military psywar genius with which the Mongols hit Asia and Europe seven centuries ago. It remains to add that, like the Nazis, the Mongols never learned to adapt psywar to peaceful ends. They neither made friends of the conquered populations nor converted them nor replaced them. They merely ruled for a few years, and then went back where they came from. The successes and failures of Mongol psywar point up the importance of clearly understanding that, even if psywar is used efficiently and well before and during the shooting, one must still know how to use it as an implement for peace.

Much of the psywar of the American Revolution is familiar to all of us, although we have not usually thought of it as such. Davidson[1] has called attention to the extensive use made of psywar by the colonists in organizing and accomplishing the Revolution. They used songs, plays, newspapers, sermons, pamphlets, and periodicals. Even the Declaration of Independence was used, and with remarkable effectiveness, for psywar. Thomas Paine, the greatest pamphleteer of the American cause, merits careful study as a master of the written word for psywar purposes.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN MODERN TIMES

In the twentieth century the process of psywar remains essentially what it was when Gideon defeated the Midianites, but like many other human enterprises it has become infinitely more complex. The development of mass communication—broadcasting, world-wide wire news services, mobile printing presses, motion pictures—provides instruments of psywar previously undreamed of, as may be seen from the scale on which they were used in World War II as compared with previous wars.

No one who lived through or read about the collapse of France in 1940 will ever forget the Nazi development of psywar as a major weapon of attack. The Nazis' use of radio, the press, group meetings abroad, agents, display, "fifth column" terrorism, and, once violence had actually begun, screaming dive bombers—the memory of these is terrifyingly familiar to all of us. The Nazis gave the first full-dress demonstration of what psywar can accom-

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plish with the new tools of mass communication and the new weapons of military warfare. And once the meaning of what they had done came to be understood, all the major combatants who had not already done so were compelled to institutionalize psywar in their own arrangements for war.

The term "psychological warfare" came into use in the United States in the early days of World War II, largely to denote certain government-sponsored operations undertaken before Pearl Harbor. It was thought that these operations might meet with greater popular and Congressional approval unde. that name than if they had been given the name that was at that time most common, that is, propaganda. The first American peacetime psywar agency was set up in 1941 by a Presidential order establishing the Office of the Coordinator of Information. The text of the authorizing order makes, curiously, no mention of the dissemination of information. Ostensibly, for political purposes, the COI had been organized to collect information. However, it was understood (though never written down) between the President and William J. Donovan, who became Coordinator, that a foreign information service would be established within the COI to beam short-wave broadcasts to foreign countries. As a note on public and official sensitivity to the term "propaganda," it is a matter of record that the first official public document using this term did not appear until March of 1943. This was an executive order defining the respective missions of the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services. Since that time the greater inclusiveness and appropriateness of the term "psychological warfare" has been clearly recognized, and it is the term commonly used today.

A listing of some of the activities, full or part time, of American psywar personnel during and since World War II will illustrate how widely inclusive the term has become. American psywar has been involved not only in radio broadcasts, news releases, and printed publications but also in such activities as the delivery of surrender leaflets by artillery shell and bomb, the delivery of messages by loudspeaker to enemy troops, the V for Victory campaign, the sonic deception cover plan for the Normandy invasion, the making of documentary films and their exhibition on mobile projection units to liberated peoples, the exchange of students and professors with foreign countries, the erection of dummy guns and vehicles to confuse enemy air reconnaissance, and the appointment of a lieutenant general to command an invasion force made up of decoy stockpiles and false radio signals. This last activity is such an interesting example of psywar deception that the story deserves

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telling again. When Lt Gen Lesley J. McNair was brought to England in 1944, it was planned to make the Germans think he had been appointed to command an invasion base. They were allowed to hear radio messages to and from this supposed base, and to observe what looked like Allied efforts to conceal its stockpiles from aerial observation. Actually, the base was completely imaginary, merely a part of the cover plan for OVERLORD (that is, the invasion of Europe). Yet the Germans were so completely deceived by the maneuver that several divisions were withheld from countering the Normandy invasion in order to meet McNair's imaginary army when it should strike. Needless to say, this tour de force of psywar contributed greatly to Allied success in holding the beachheads.

The tactics of hostile psywar may be illustrated from any conflict situation. For example, consider a fight between two schoolboys. They threaten, swagger, and grimace, each in the hope of scaring the other out and thus winning the victory without fighting for it. You will notice that even this elementary "psywar" is closely related to direct action; it requires the threat of action before it is effective. If neither boy backs off, the boys may go from the stage of psywar to the stage of direct action. Fists fly. Even in the midst of a fist fight, however, psywar is part of the conflict. The deft motions of head and shoulders, shifting glances, side steps, jabs, and feints are communicating deliberately misleading messages to the opponent, with a view to putting him at a disadvantage. Less subtle forms of psywar are the taunting words tossed back and forth. Action is used, some of the time, as a psywar symbol rather than for its direct result. One boy eases up, backs up, protects himself. He is trying to communicate a message that he is tired and frightened. The encouraged opponent presses his apparent advantage, rushes in, relaxes his caution. When he leaves a big enough opening, the little psychological warrior suddenly steps forward and swings a punch to his opponent's unprotected nose.

There may be yet other psychological operations going on as the two boys pummel each other in the school playground. One boy may be trying to communicate messages to other boys on the lot that will persuade them to accept him as a leader. The other may be trying to impress a girl who has shown signs of liking the curly-headed lad in the front seat.

From a schoolyard scrap to the Nazi "strategy of terror" or the Communist propaganda of world revolution is a long step. Yet the principles are the same. Substitute, for the boys, nations;

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for the girl, a neutral nation whose help and friendship are coveted; for the conflict situation in the schoolyard, a conflict of aims, wants, or needs in which the fulfillment of the national policy objectives of two nations are in conflict. In such a situation between nations, as in Newtonian physics, it is impossible for two bodies to occupy the same space at the same time, and so, in one degree or another, there is war. The term "cold war" has come into our language as a recognition that war sometimes exists between two nations before "the reciprocal application of violence"—the classical definition of war—takes place. As von Clausewitz said, war is merely "politics continued by other means." Only when it has matured into reciprocal violence is it recognized by a formal declaration of war. And when the shooting war is over, action must still be taken and messages communicated for the purpose of consolidating the victory.

Thus psywar may be used in time of peace or time of war. It may be directed at one's enemies or one's friends. It is likely to be used whenever a nation's leaders believe that the communication of express or implied messages will help promote its policies or attain its international objectives.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AS COMMUNICATION

Ten years of intensive experience with psywar and the history of several thousand years of military campaigns in which, as we have seen, symbolic (that is, message) warfare invariably played a part, give us a body of practical knowledge on the methods, use, and administration of psywar. Our knowledge of the theory of psywar, however (that is, our knowledge of the body of principles by which we can predict how a given target in a given situation will respond to a given act of psywar) is derived from the human sciences.

Psywar is not a science in the sense, for example, that physics or psychology may be called sciences. It is an application of science with a strong admixture of art. The reason for speaking of it as partly art will be understood if you recollect that a large part of psywar must be written or spoken or designed or displayed. The reason for speaking of it as an application of science you will grasp at once from what it has in common with another area of military study, namely, ballistics. Ballistics is the specialized study of those physical laws that relate to the firing of weapons. It uses the basic physical formulas of mass, gravitation, distance,

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and velocity to determine the most effective construction and use of guns and projectiles. Ballistics is therefore an application of science, that is, the application of the disciplined knowledge of physics, mathematics, and chemistry to a special area of problems. And just as ballistics depends on the physical sciences, psywar depends on what we may call the "human sciences."

The basic process in psywar is communication. Its basic theory is therefore communication theory. In the last hundred years the human sciences, notably psychology, sociology, anthropology, and political science, as they have developed and perfected their own central disciplines have had to give increasing attention to the problem of communication. Education, journalism, advertising, public opinion measurement, human relations, labor relations, military morale studies, and community studies have all served as laboratories for developing a body of theory about communications. Study by study, experiment by experiment, research has analyzed what happens when people communicate with one another, formulated hypotheses about the process involved, and achieved greater and greater skill in predicting its effects and laying down rules as to how to achieve this effect rather than that one.

Increasingly complex experiments with animals and human beings have, over many decades, helped to clarify the relations of stimulus to response that lie at the heart of all communication. A special case of this is the long series of studies of human learning, out of which have come the "laws" of frequency, reward, readiness, belongingness, intensity, primacy and recency, and reinforcement; the systematized knowledge of learning and forgetting curves, and of motivations to learn; and the several systematic theories of learning that seek to combine experimental knowledge into a structure of principles. There have likewise been many studies of the symbols of communications, the "meaning of meaning," and the problems involved in communicating symbols from one culture to another or from one person to others. In connection with the growth of the so-called "mass media," there have been innumerable studies of communication behavior—which communications the recipients choose to receive out of those communications available to them, and their reasons for choosing them. There has been a long series of studies of collective behavior: the nature of publics, masses, and crowds; the processes of group consensus; the ways in which new forms of group behavior, new goals, new leaders come into being; and, especially, the kind of group behavior that is associated with social unrest, fear, in-

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security, and hostility. Parallel to this have been studies of intergroup conflicts, and especially of the position and behavior of minority groups in society. Attempts have been made, especially in military and industrial situations, to analyze the nature of morale and the reasons for "high" and "low" morale. In the course of long study of cultural change, researchers have given attention to the question of how attitudes and opinions are formed, how public opinion arises and how it is changed, and to such manifestations of public opinion as voting behavior. The way rumor operates in a society is another of the numerous communication processes that have been studied at length. Increasing attention has been given to differences between cultures, particularly the different ways things are done, the different values and symbols, and the different group relations that are characteristic of different nations and peoples. Finally, communication channels, attitude formation, group relations, collective behavior, leadership roles, and the other manifestations of communication to and within a society have been examined in their relation to the functioning of political systems.

This, then, is the body of knowledge from which we derive, as well as it can be derived in the present incomplete state of research, a theory of psywar, and it is this accumulating research that we draw on in Part II of this volume. The practice of psywar is the application of this theory in the light of all available knowledge about policy and objectives, situations, capabilities, and targets.

A word of caution is in order at this point. Although research is accumulating very fast in the human sciences, our knowledge of many problems and processes in psywar is very slender. A student or practitioner of psywar must therefore be always on the lookout for new findings and always wary of trusting too confidently in old practice. There will doubtless be many important research developments in this field in the next few years.

Having reviewed the background of psywar at some length, we are better prepared to define it.

DEFINITIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Psychological warfare is sometimes so defined as to imply that it always involves the deliberate use of "symbolic communication." The difficulty with any such definition, indeed with most definitions of psywar, is that it leaves out too many things that

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are demonstrably the business of psychological warriors—unless we use the term "symbolic communication" so broadly as to deprive it of its normal meaning. When UN airplanes roared over Korea in the months after the Communist invasion of 25 June 1950, for example, they must have been recognized, and were intended to be recognized, as tokens of the power and determination of the free world to resist Communist aggression. To the extent that they were intended to be so recognized they were, clearly, intended to communicate a message to occupied South Korea and to the momentarily triumphant invasion troops, and were flying what were, in part at least, psywar missions.

When one of those planes dropped a bomb on a Communist gun emplacement it was not, of course, waging psywar against that gun position; it was engaged in direct military action. The Communist soldier who was shot through the head in the course of the attack was not the victim of psywar, he was the victim of direct military action. But this does not invalidate our point, which is that psywar must be so defined as to recognize that almost any military action may have a psywar aspect. A bomb on a gun emplacement may help persuade another gun crew to run or surrender. Machine-gun bullets on a Communist convoy may help persuade anti-Communists in occupied territory to resist. If these things happen incidentally, without being intended by the attackers, they probably should not be called psywar. But if they are intended to be understood as conveying such and such a message, they are psywar.

The key words in any realistic definition of psywar would, on the above showing, have to be communication and message. Psywar is the communication of messages, whether expressly or (as in the instances just noted) by implication. A leaflet and a radio broadcast communicate an explicit message; a show of naval force off the coast of a small country which has been remiss about its obligations under international law is an implied message. In each case the idea is to accomplish something by means of a message that would otherwise have to be accomplished by the use of force or not at all. And in each case the something to be accomplished is behavior on the part of the recipient that, in the communicator's view, will forward his nation's policies or render more probable the achievement of his nation's objectives.

There is another pitfall into which we can easily slip when we attempt to define psywar. We might argue like this: as its very name indicates, psychological warfare is a form of warfare; nations use it against their enemies, for the purpose of weakening

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their will to fight and resist; to speak of its use on a friendly country, or to speak of its use in peacetime, is to abuse language. From a strictly dictionary point of view this may be a sound point. Practically, given certain widely accepted usages of the term "psychological warfare," it leads to all manner of nonsense. The Voice of America (VOA), for example, is a peacetime agency; its broadcasts are aimed by no means exclusively at potential enemies (besides which a potential enemy is not an enemy); it often seeks not to destroy but to build up the will to fight and resist; it thinks of itself as conducting a psywar operation, and students of psywar habitually think of it as America's major bet in the psywar field. Yet a definition based on the line of argument summarized at the beginning of this paragraph would require us to take no notice of VOA's operations in this volume.

The reader will already have guessed the general shape of the definition to which we have been leading up: psychological warfare is the whole range of functions performed by psychological warriors, whether inside or outside duly constituted psywar agencies. (The pilot of a plane flying a psywar mission is engaged in psywar and is, for the moment at least, a psychological warrior.) It is, admittedly, a "circular" definition, but it has the advantage of excluding nothing that the psychological warrior ought to think of as part of the over-all enterprise in which he is engaged. And it will allow us to give due weight to certain facts that cannot, for the reasons just mentioned, be overlooked in a working definition of psywar without creating difficulties. We can, for example, bear in mind that the normal end product of any psywar operation is explicit verbal messages, whether written or spoken, and yet give due weight to the fact that sometimes the messages are implied, as illustrated in the next paragraph. We can bear in mind that psywar is often "waged" in peacetime, "against" friends, "for" constructive purposes, and yet give due weight to the fact that one very important type of psywar is waged in wartime against enemies, mostly by soldiers, not civilians, and for purposes that are destructive or even lethal. The one thing we must be careful to do in using so broad a definition of psywar is to be clear with ourselves—and with our readers—as to the type of psywar we are speaking about at each point in our discussion.

We have said that psywar is one of the means nations use to promote their policies and objectives vis-a-vis the outside world. The other means, which we have already noticed in connection with bombing raids, are by no means always easily separable from it. They include such things as war, military aid, blockade,

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financial aid, diplomacy, and withholding diplomatic recognition. In all these—and we have deliberately moved back and forth between hostile and friendly means—we have forms of action that may or may not have an intended message content, and insofar as they do have a message content may have a greater or lesser one. We may give economic aid to France because we wish it to be economically strong or because we think the giving of it will communicate to Frenchmen a message: "The United States is rich and generous, and for you not to be its allies would be foolish and ungrateful." The US diplomat abroad may decline an invitation to a cocktail party at the Swiss Embassy because he does not wish to encounter the Belgian charge until he has had further word from Washington, or because he wishes to signal a nonverbal message to the Swiss Embassy: "We dislike certain things you are doing and propose to avoid you until you refrain from them." A good example of an implied message is "Operation Magic Carpet":*

AIRLIFT FOR ALLAH*

The Koran orders all the faithful, except slaves, women without companions and those who cannot afford the journey, to make the *hajj*, the holy pilgrimage to Mecca, at least once in their lifetime. Last fortnight, as the season of the *hajj* drew near once again, more *hajjis* (pilgrims) than ever before—*hajjis* from Turkey, Iran, Iraq and most of the desert cities and oases of North Africa—followed the Koran's injunction and swarmed into the Lebanese city of Beirut,* the usual way station on the road to Mecca. Each clutched in the voluminous folds of his *ihram* (the pilgrim's sheetlike uniform), an airline ticket to Jidda, the airport nearest the holy city.

There were good reasons for the unusually large turnout. For one thing, the ordained day of the pilgrimage's start this year fell on a Friday, and a pilgrim who makes the *hajj* on Friday (the Moslem sabbath) is seven times blessed and sure to achieve heaven. For another, Saudi Arabia's King Ibn Saud, whose oil-rich country includes Mecca, had lifted the usual tax of $52 per pilgrim. Agents of the three local airlines began selling tickets to Jidda like hot cakes. But when the holders turned up in Beirut, they found that there were not nearly enough planes to carry them. The *hajjis* began piling up in Beirut's streets, in the mosques and at the airport.

They didn't complain. They didn't protest. They just waited. Forbidden by Islamic law to wear hats on *hajj*, they sat huddled hour after hour under the broiling sun, certain that Allah, in his wisdom, would somehow get them to Mecca. Lebanese peddlers did a land-office business selling umbrellas against the fierce heat. "*Allah, hajji* [Out of the way, pilgrim]!" cried airport attendants. The huddled groups moved aside, returned and continued to wait—for once on *hajj*, no pilgrim ever turns back.

*Mohammedan legend puts the number of pilgrims to Mecca each year at a constant 700,000 but since the count of mortal visitors is usually far short of that number, the difference is believed by the faithful to be made up by a suitable number of angels.

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Miracle in Washington. On Thursday, with the holy days just a week away, desperate airline officials appealed for help to Harold Minor, able US Minister to Lebanon. Minor promptly dashed off a "night action" (most urgent) cable to Washington, pointing out that here was a real chance for the United States to make friends in the Arab world. Something of a miracle then happened: the State Department got the point. At Rhein-Main airport in Wiesbaden, Germany, at Wheelus Field in Tripoli, at Orly Field in Paris, US airmen were suddenly alerted for special duty. Three days later, the first of 13 huge US C-54s landed at Beirut's airport. Next morning Operation *Haij* was under way.

Each clutching a box lunch (bread, olives, cheese, fruit) provided in haste by the American Friends of the Middle East (organized by US Columnist Dorothy Thompson), the *hajjis* were hustled aboard the big planes, 50 to a flight. All day long the transports shuttled back and forth to Jidda. One old man, deaf and blind at 85, was led aboard a plane by his son. "This is help sent by Allah," the son told the US pilot. "We are linked together today by love and faith." Another passenger on the magic carpet provided by the United States was irascible old Mullah Kashani, Iran's bitterly anti-American religious leader. He rewarded dog-tired Pilots Captain Alfred Beasley of Atlanta and Lieut. Angelo Elmo of Washington with wet kisses on both cheeks.

Five days later the last of 3763 stranded pilgrims was loaded aboard the last flight. The airlift had traveled a total of 121,500 miles. Some of the US airmen had spent 27 out of 40 hours in the air, but the trips had been more than worth it. The pilgrims' airlift had done more good than any other act of the United State's otherwise fumbling and unimaginative action and inaction in the Middle East. It was the one success US diplomacy could claim in a week of continued crises. The Iranian oil dispute with Britain had dragged on for more than a year, while Iran slid to the edge of bankruptcy, chaos and Communism, hanging on the cliff like Pauline in her perils; last week the United States and Britain tried to settle the mess and were flatly turned down by Iran's Mossadegh.

It would take a lot before Arabs would forgive the United States for its help to Israel, but Operation Magic Carpet might well be the beginning. "Speaking for myself and 40 million Arab Moslems," Lebanon's Mufti Alaya told Minister Minor, "I would like to say that this is the turning point of American relations with the Moslem world. This aid has been not to governments, but to people. It is neither military nor economic but spiritual."

Then he issued an unprecedented order: this year, the *hajjis* were to include the American people—infidels though they are—in their prayers.

We may, in short, think of the means nations use in furthering their objectives as a continuum stretching from direct action without any message content whatever to sheer message without any direct-action content whatever. In practical terms one end of the continuum is a punch in the nose; the other is a series of words which seek to accomplish a desired aim without fighting for it. At one end of the continuum is the Communist attack on Korea; at the other is Communist propaganda about "slave labor" in the United States. At the extremes, therefore, the two kinds of action are readily distinguishable one from another; in the middle they are barely distinguishable; and nowhere on the continuum is one kind of means entirely isolated from the other. Communicated

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by news and rumor, the Communist attack on Korea served as powerful psywar on other populations in Asia. The slave-labor line was related to potential revolution in non-Communist countries.

TERMINOLOGY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Some of the vocabulary of psywar consists of words used in a sense with which you may not be familiar. It may be helpful to be sure you understand such terms as "source," "target," "message," "medium," and "symbol" before going on to Part II of this volume.

The source of psywar is simply the person or organization that originates the message. Thus the source of the material on the VOA is the Government of the United States. The purported source of the material on Nachtsender 1212, a radio station the Allies operated for psywar purposes during World War II, keeping up the pretense that it was a clandestine station within Germany, was a group of Germans, while its real source was an Allied psywar operator.

The target of psywar is the individual or group to whom the psywar message is directed. The target of surrender leaflets may be an opposing enemy unit. The target of Nachtsender 1212 when it broadcasted recipes for cooking waste materials was the German housewife, who, it was hoped, would become furious at the thought of Germans having to serve up and eat such swill. The target may be smaller than the total audience which receives the psywar material. And the effective target may be smaller still, because some who receive it may turn a deaf ear to it.

The message of psywar is always a symbol or a series of symbols that is to be communicated to the target audience with the intention of inducing (a) a specific and desired reaction that will lead to (b) specific and desired behavior on the part of that audience. The message may be as simple as the V sign of World War II or as complex as Wilson's Fourteen Points, which were powerful psywar in World War I.

By a "symbol" (and we know from the preceding paragraph that most psywar is symbolic communication) we mean something that substitutes in the communication process for an object, a process, or an idea. Obviously a dog cannot be communicated. But the idea of a dog can be symbolized by the word "dog" and communicated readily Similarly, a Bronx cheer is a symbol of an attitude that can be readily and effectively communicated. A picture of a lake in the woods may serve as a symbol to communicate the

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nature of a summer vacation, and in this case literally a picture would be "worth a thousand words." You will notice an important characteristic of symbols, namely, that they always represent the original object, idea, or experience at a high level of abstraction, or, to put it another way, at a level of reduced cues. All the sensory cues one would get from the object "dog" (shape, movement, color, sound, smell, touch, etc.) are replaced by the single visual stimulus that one gets from seeing the three letters d-o-g. This is the quality that makes symbols easy to misinterpret; that is, a symbol can mean to a given individual only what his experience has taught him to connect with it, and no two persons, certainly no two distinct cultural groups, have ever had exactly the same experience. More of that later.

By media, we mean the communicative devices for carrying a message from source to target. Among others, they include broadcasts, news, leaflets, the "slower" printed media (magazines, books, etc.), posters, meetings, motion pictures, loudspeaker operations, rumor, agitation, display, and events planned or staged with a view to their psywar effects.

These terms are all common to communication study. Other terms, such as "black" and "white" operations, and "political," "tactical," "strategic," and "consolidation" psywar, are peculiar to psywar and will be treated at somewhat greater length in the following sections.

CLASSIFICATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

By Mission

The process of psywar, of course, is a single process. There is no sharp distinction between the basic principles that should govern the conduct of psywar against enemy troops as contrasted with psywar against enemy civilians, or as between the principles governing the conduct of peacetime psywar as contrasted with wartime psywar. Nevertheless it is useful, for some purposes, to distinguish between four kinds of psywar (the fourth, consolidation, is sometimes lumped together with the third, political):

Tactical psywar is directed at specific enemy units in a specific battle situation in the combat zone and is, or should be, integrated into the tactical planning for that situation. Its distinguishing characteristic, then, is its specificity. For whereas strategic and political operations admit a considerable amount

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of generality both as to target and response, tactical psywar is just as specific as a bayonet charge or an artillery barrage. Its usual mission is to induce enemy soldiers to surrender, whether individually or collectively (that is, in units). It can also be used, however, to lower the morale or the will of the enemy troops to resist, or to mislead the local enemy command in such a way that he will take some tactical step that, particularly if we are expecting it, we can exploit to our advantage. Tactical psywar, like strategic psywar but unlike political, is almost always unfriendly. The exception would be dropping leaflets on the troops of America's allies, a regiment of ROKs, for example, that has been surrounded by the enemy and needs encouragement.

Strategic psywar is ordinarily directed behind the lines, either to civilian or to military groups. It is integrated into the over-all military plan for the war as a whole, or at least for some important phase of it, a theater for example, with a view to payoff in the indefinite rather than the immediate future and on a broad rather than a merely local scale. A typical tactical psywar operation might be leaflets directed at a unit of enemy troops, urging immediate surrender. A typical strategic psywar operation might be a series of broadcasts or leaflets dropped on the residents of an industrial section within the enemy's country, in an attempt to cut enemy war production by spreading disaffection among, for example, industrial workers.

But no sharp line can be drawn between the two. The leaflets dropped in the enemy's industrial zone might have the further purpose of immediately affecting supplies to a sector of the front where we are about to attack, which would make them partly tactical.

The term "political psywar" is best reserved for operations that are not integrated into any military plan, although they may, like many broadcasts in recent years from General Headquarters, Far Eastern Command, be conducted by the military. Their purpose, as already indicated, is at least as often friendly (to the immediate target, anyway) as unfriendly; and they are less likely than tactical or strategic psywar to call for any specific action by the target audience. Often they merely attempt to build up desired attitudes on the part of the population of the target country, or this or that political, social, or economic group. Sometimes they attempt to set group against group within the target; equally well, however, they may attempt to bring about a rapprochement between inimical groups, by calling attention, for example, to some alleged common interest th· they have hitherto ignored. Much of the "cold

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war" is political psywar. If it is related to the future military plans of the antagonists, it is not related to them so directly as tactical and stragegic psywar. Typical examples of political psywar are the broadcasts of the United States and the Soviet Union to the Near East, the Stockholm "Peace Petition," the Berlin blockade, the American Information Centers throughout the still-free countries, the program of exchange of persons between the United States and Europe, and our recently suspended Russian-language America.

Consolidation psywar (which is often, and quite legitimately, considered a part of political psywar) is needed when the shooting is over but the victory is not yet consolidated. One of the hard lessons the twentieth century has to teach is that military victory does not end a war. Often, it would seem, greater skill is required to "win the peace" than to win the war. In Japan since 1945 it has been necessary for the United States to use its psywar know-how to the full in an attempt to give new direction to the Japanese people's goals and activities. Any future US military victory will impose a similar—perhaps even greater—necessity upon our occupation authorities, probably, though not necessarily, with constructive purposes like those which have governed recent US occupations, and the occupation plans will undoubtedly call for carefully integrated psywar operations. There, indeed, lies the best reason for distinguishing between political and consolidation psywar. The latter, like tactical and strategic psywar, is part of a military plan.

By Apparent Source

Psywar operations, whether tactical, strategic, political, or consolidation, may be white, gray, or black, depending on the apparent or ostensible source of the messages communicated.

White psywar is "overt." Its source is not concealed in any way; usually, indeed, this type of psywar emphasizes its source, so that its effectiveness depends in large part on the authority and prestige of that source. The news broadcasts of the BBC during World War II are an excellent example of white operations. At the outbreak of hostilities the BBC had a long-standing reputation for objective and truthful newscasts. During the war it made every effort to capitalize on this reputation by maintaining the same program formats, call letters, and identifications, and took pains to call attention to itself as the originator of the news, commentary, and entertainment it carried.

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Surrender passes are another classical example of white operations. In the European theater in World War II, surrender passes were printed with a handsome bank-note type of border; the great seals of Allied nations were handsomely displayed; the signatures of the commanding generals were shown—all to make the passes look like official documents, backed up by the Allied governments, and cause the enemy's troops to feel that they were certain to be honored by Allied soldiers.

Loudspeaker operations against enemy units are an example of white tactical psywar.

The use made of President Roosevelt's speeches—particularly the "Four Freedoms" speech—in World War II was white psywar in its purest form. These speeches were communicated to the enemy audience by every available medium, from radio broadcasts to leaflets to phonograph records, as pronouncements by the President of the United States, in an attempt to capitalize on his popularity and prestige.

Black psywar operations are "covert" operations. The intention in such operations is to pass off the material communicated as messages from some source other than the true one. Since its true source is not revealed, black psywar can do things that white psywar could not possibly do without injuring the sender's cause. For example, here is a leaflet that was distributed among American troops on the Western Front (with the typical errors):

> Military authorities demanded a nationwide war on VICE. They got a sham battle—a polite blood testing campaign which would not alarm ladies-aid societies and parent-teachers association.
>
> Nevertheless, police raided a large number of cabarets, dance halls, and joints in 21 small, medium, and large cities. These raids showed that of the 20,000 women investigated, a staggering proportion had venereal diseases.
>
> Over 80% had V. D. 21% were prostitutes. Of the 79% nonprofessionals, 61% were pickups, 18% were girl friends. 17% were girls under 20 years.
>
> 5% were wives of men serving in the armed forces ABROAD.
>
> Both groups were mostly members of the growing band of "V" girls, who declare that they feel a patriotic compulsion to console troops.
>
> IS YOUR GIRL AMONG THEM?
>
> YOU CAN'T TALK V.D. OUT OF EXISTENCE—IT IS THERE!

The real source of this leaflet was a German propaganda unit, but the pretended source was the US Army. The leaflet had nothing to do with stopping VD among troops; its real purpose was to lower morale among American troops.

A classical example of black psywar on the air was "Operation Annie." The following brief account of its activities is by H. H. Burger:[3]

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Somewhere in Luxembourg, in a secluded house which once belonged to the Gestapo, the American Twelfth Army Group had installed a small group of men: writers, experts, speakers and radio technicians. They formed the staff of the Nachtsender 1212 (Night Radio Station 1212). Their task was to win the enemy's confidence, to gain the reputation of being a reliable and necessary source, by giving absolutely correct information about the military situation at the front.

In the course of events "Annie" became quite a girl. Slowly but surely her personality developed. She was thoroughly feminine. In innocent tones she would speak about the fact that the Reich's cartographical institute was short of maps numbered 315 to 318, which were badly needed for national defense. And suddenly you would, if you were German, find yourself asking why the institute was asking for maps of Westphalia, still more than 300 miles inside the Reich.

Then again she would turn into a good housewife and advise you on the use of the oddest waste material for cooking and eating and you would wind up by asking yourself furiously, if you were a German, why you should be forced to eat such swill.

A set of party directories and phone books, captured near Trier, provided the writers with the material for a very successful stunt:

Late one evening a small town was captured near Gladbach-Rheydt, an important party stronghold. At that time the capture was known to Annie only. At 2:30 a.m., 1212 came in with a flash: A call for help by the party headquarters of the town already in our hands. All listeners in Gladbach-Rheydt were requested to call party headquarters or all known party functionaires—phone numbers and addresses were given—and urge them immediately to dispatch five trucks, manned by reliable party men, to rescue their comrades and important party documents. They were to proceed along a prescribed route. Only Annie knew that this route was already controlled by American troops. That night the Gladbach-Rheydt local of the Nazi party lost five precious trucks and five good drivers.

The features had a widely varying character. Sometimes they were eyewitness reports, breathless stories by getaway men. Sometimes they were general observations on the course of the war, never pro-Party, but always pro-German. They were pieces full of worry, skepticism, full of ifs and buts, very much the sort of pieces a German military critic would write about the failures, the blunders, and the drab consequences. But 1212 never sneered, was never sarcastic. It was always desperately and sadly honest about every lost position, every lost division, and ultimately the lost war.*

The term "gray" is used to refer to covert operations in which the recipient is not told the source; the sender conceals his own identity, but does not "hang" what he is sending on anybody else in particular. In this area fall the propaganda of rumor, news credited to "usually reliable sources," "high military circles," "it is said that," etc. The Germans, during the Nazi occupation of France, for example, ran several magazines and newspapers in Paris. They did not describe themselves as German controlled and often took the French side of an argument, but they proved to be convenient channels through which to communicate the German propaganda line when necessary. Again, for example, unsigned leaflets, which theoretically might have been prepared either by

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the enemy or by dissident elements within the ranks of the receiving audience, are gray propaganda. Thus we see that the distinction between gray and black is not so sharp as that between black and white. Gray is perhaps best regarded as one form of black psywar.

If a theme or an idea that white is trying to get across can be echoed or reinforced or corroborated by genuinely deceptive black or gray, the target audience is more likely to give it credit. Thus a judicious combination of white and black is sometimes very effective. However, for reasons we shall see below, use of this procedure calls for great caution on the part of the sender.

RELATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE TO POLICY AND COMMAND

This brief survey of what psywar is would be incomplete without a further word concerning the relation of psywar to national policy of all kinds—military, political, economic, etc. Psywar is always a means to some end set by policy, and we shall think more clearly about it if we conceive of the ends always being set not by psychological warriors but by another group of people altogether, namely, the policy makers. Skillful psywar, on that showing, is psywar that takes the policies laid down by the policy makers and does the best possible job of implementing them by messages to the target audiences. This point is worth emphasizing because endless confusion results whenever it is ignored, as it is when, for example, people blame the unpopularity of the Nazis in the German-occupied portions of Russia in World War II on "bad" psywar, when they mean merely that the Nazis and their policies displeased the Russians. The policies that it is psywar's task to implement may be good or bad, wise or unwise, calculated to please the target or displease it, consistent or conflicting, stable or shifting. Psywar's job is to take them and do the best it can with them. (The fact that psywar personnel often do make policy, especially in the absence of directives from higher authorities, is beside the point. The fact that a surgeon often drives his own car does not abolish the distinction between surgery and chauffering.)

One reason that confusion of the kind noted above (for example, blaming Nazi psywar for decisions made by Nazi policy makers), makes the relation between psywar and policy one of the most complicated and tricky parts of psywar theory is this: Psywar personnel are, or should be, the personnel best qualified to say in advance what the psywar consequences of a proposal will be,

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or what the psywar consequences of a current policy actually are. Giving expert advice on these points is, in that sense, a psywar function, whether the policy makers ask for it or not, or, having asked for it, use it or do not use it. Policy, in other words, has a psywar aspect, just as it has an economic and/or fiscal aspect (about which the policy makers are wise to consult their economic advisers). A nation is, moreover, in a bad way if the predictable psywar consequences of a policy are not taken into account before it is adopted. It is also in a bad way if psywar personnel are not in position to inform the policy makers as to what policies would predictably produce the most favorable psywar consequences. But the real policy decisions, the decision, for example, as to whether to adopt a policy despite its probable psychological impact on psywar's target audiences, are under our system a political function that belongs to elected officials and their immediate appointees.

When a nation sets about activating policy, obviously the first requirement is intelligence regarding the target. A planner must know what are the "given conditions" that he must modify in the direction of policy goals. Psywar, like military action and all the other instruments of policy, must therefore work in the closest possible cooperation with intelligence. When policy has specified the desired goals and intelligence has appraised the existing situation, then a nation's psywar group is ready to go into action. Its psywar group must, of course, function in close coordination with the other striking arms of policy—the military, the foreign service, etc. Bold words alone, without the Nazi forces behind them, would never have made a "strategy of terror." Clearly no psywar, no matter how skillful, from the Western Allies could be counted on completely to predetermine the actions of the Soviet Politburo, although psywar coordinated with NATO, economic measures, and diplomatic policy unity may accomplish something toward that end. No psywar without supporting military power could by itself have secured the surrender of Japanese troops on Pacific islands. It is in the area of the crucial margin that psywar is likely to be effective. If psywar could not by itself beat the Nazis, it could still deceive three German divisions and thus make the beachhead invasion easier. If psywar by itself could not defeat the Trojans, it could at least get the Greek army into position to do so. In this marginal area, psywar can often tip the scales between failure and accomplishment, opposition and cooperation, reconstruction and chaos.

The distinction between policy and psywar emerges as all the more important when we ask, "How does one evaluate a psywar operation?" Like all other instruments of policy, it must be eval-

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uated in terms of its effectiveness in furthering a predetermined policy. A military campaign, an economic boycott, or a treaty is "good" if it advances policy, "bad" if it does not. No matter how brilliant the strategy, how airtight the boycott, how skillful the negotiations, still the instruments fail if they do not move events toward the desired goals. So it is with psywar. No matter how attractive the leaflet, how scintillating the radio program, how large the parade, how widespread the rumor, it is good psywar only if it shows maximum possible results in modifying the behavior of its target in the direction of policy goals. There is no other test, and if we confuse policy and psywar we are left with no test at all.

SUMMARY

Psywar has been used with considerable effect since at least the beginning of recorded history. Perhaps modern psywar operations were developed during World War I. However, the pace and scope have increased greatly since those days. From more or less optional use by amateurs, some talented, others less so, the world has progressed to a state in which self-preservation alone demands the most intense psywar pressure that a large body of trained professionals commanding immense resources can bring to bear. Unfortunately for the efficient performance of this task, important knowledge of the theory of psywar is almost entirely lacking. Applications of existing knowledge have been fairly well recorded, but relatively little effort has been made to find answers to numerous fundamental questions, and consequently the questions go unanswered or are answered provisionally by guesses.

You should remember that psywar is basically communication. Consequently, communication theory is all we have on which to build psywar theory. It follows then that psywar may be defined as communication of a message, which may be explicit or implied, in order to bring about some action. Considered more broadly, psywar may be defined as the whole range of functions performed by psychological warriors. You should remember that psywar may also be friendly rather than hostile, despite the contradiction in terms.

Besides communication of the message, psywar operators are concerned with the source, target, medium, and symbols.

Psywar may be classified first by mission and then subclassified by apparent source. According to its mission, psywar is

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said to be tactical, strategic, political, or consolidation. Any of these may be further subdivided into white, black, or gray psywar.

Finally, you should understand clearly and never forget that psywar operators do not make policy. The mission of psywar is to carry out the policies formulated by the policy makers.

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Excellent collection of articles and selections from books. General subjects: The twentieth century background; policy, intelligence, and propaganda; the organization of purpose and persons; the evaluation of propaganda effects.

———*Sykewar, Psychological Warfare against Germany, D-Day to VE-Day,* with a foreword by Brigadier General Robert A. McClure and a supplementary essay by Richard H. S. Crossman. New York: Stewart, 1949. 463 pp.

Includes bibliography and sources. Appendix A: The sykewar charter. B: The sykewar policies. C: The sykewar tactics. D: The media of print, a selection of leaflet and newspaper texts. E: The broadcast media, a selection of studio and loudspeaker scripts. F: The sykewarriors, a list of personnel.

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Mendelssohn, Peter de. *Japan's Political Warfare.* London: G. Allen, 1944. 192 pp.

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Part II

HOW PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE WORKS

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Chapter 2

THE MESSAGE

Consider the framework in which psywar operates. A policy has been stated. Intelligence has been gathered and a target has been determined upon. A directive has been issued, specifying the target, the general thematic content of the message, and the desired result. The psywar officer sits down to construct his message. But he knows that before he can succeed in arousing the kind of behavior he wants as a result of that message, he must accomplish three things:

In the first place, he must get a hearing. In psychological terms the message must succeed in getting attention. This is not easy, because there is great competition for attention. At any given time we have available to us far more than we can look at, far more than we can listen to, far more than our senses can possibly transmit, and we must make a choice. In the case of psywar the choice is often prejudiced because people distrust "propaganda," or because the target government puts a penalty on paying attention to enemy messages, or because it is hard to deliver a strong signal to a distant target. But unless this step is taken, unless the message attracts attention, then none of the other steps are possible.

In the second place, he has to get his meaning across. In psychological language, this is the problem of perception. This is not an easy step, either, because words and pictures do not mean exactly the same thing to all persons. Furthermore, people tend to read into a message what they want to read, or what they have been accustomed to, so that what the target individual gets from the message may be very diffe. ent from what the psywar operator tried to put into it.

In the third place, he must get the response he wants. He must depend on his message to arouse, in the individual who receives it, energy to push that individual in the desired direction. The desired result may be action (for example, surrender) or attitude change that underlies and affects action (for example, lowered

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morale, which makes a soldier fight less effectively). Surrender and lowered morale, of course, are only two among many possible aims of psywar and an enemy army is only one of many possible targets. But if the goal is change, the psywar operator must reckon with barriers obstructing the kind of behavior he wants to arouse. Supposing that his purpose is to accomplish surrender, he may find that group morale is very high in his target (as was found in the German Wehrmacht) or that surrender is not within the honor code of the target army (as was found in the case of the Japanese before the formula was changed from "surrender" to "cease resistance"), or that close surveillance by political officers (as in the Communist armies) makes surrender very difficult. A target can respond only through channels that are available to it and in relation to the barriers that it faces.

This is the process by which every successful act of psywar works: message; attention in relation to competing stimuli; perception in relation to the target's frame of reference, needs, and motives; and response in relation to existing attitudes, barriers, and channels. Now let us look harder at this process.

Messages are to psywar what troops and firepower are to military warfare. But when troops are committed they may be recalled, or their orders may be changed and their tactics altered. When a message is sent, there is no recalling it, no changing it. Every person who has ever written a propaganda leaflet or given a propaganda broadcast has felt the peculiar helplessness that comes when the writing or speaking is done and the message is irretrievably sent. It is out of the sender's power, operating on its own. Will it get a hearing? Will it mean to the receiver what it is intended to mean? Will it accomplish what it is designed to accomplish? Many a psywar operator has worked a little longer, expended a little more loving care on his message, because he realizes these questions can't be rethought once the message is on its own.

In terms of the psywar process, what is a message?

At the source, it is a symbol or a collection of symbols. It may, as we have seen above, be verbal or nonverbal, though most of our discussions in this book will deal with verbal messages. It may be a collection of words for print, or it may be a collection of words for broadcast. It may be the V for Victory sign, the scream of German dive bombers, nostalgic music sent to soldiers far from home, or a picture of a sexy girl distributed to troops in the front lines. It may be a controlled event. Gromyko stalking out of a UN Security Council meeting is a symbol with real meani .g in the Russian plan of psywar. Communist army maneuvers

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near the border of non-Communist countries serve as symbols of Soviet power and threat. When Theodore Roosevelt sent the American fleet around the world he was communicating a psywar symbol. As a matter of fact, nearly every weapons system has its symbolic importance quite apart from its direct and coercive effect. For example, the Communists have never let the people of Asia forget that we used the A-bomb only on Asiatics, and future uses of atomic weapons will certainly have implications beyond the amount of destruction they accomplish and the amount of retaliation they will bring upon us.

All messages, whether events, words, pictures, or sounds, have certain typical characteristics, and it may be well to review those characteristics as they are seen at the source. For one thing, a message is not directly coercive, as is, for example, a bayonet charge, an economic blockade, or a break in diplomatic relations. A message must accomplish its purpose by communicating symbols to the minds of men, not by mutilating their bodies, starving their stomachs, or restricting their movements.

Because a message operates by symbols it has great advantages and great disadvantages as compared with coercive methods. It has the advantage of being swift and portable and relatively inexpensive. A message, that is, can be sent immensely farther and faster than an armored division, at relatively little risk to life or limb, and at relatively little cost in materiel or manpower. On the other hand the effect of an armored division in action is direct and immediate and may be evaluated much more easily than the effect of a broadcast or a poster. Furthermore, because a message works by symbols rather than by direct coercion and because it must be so highly portable, it must operate as a kind of shorthand. It must use signs to represent ideas and material things. And the difficulty is, as is brought out in a later section of this book, these signs do not always mean the same to all people. There is an all-too-high probability of their being misread.

At the source, then, a message is a symbol or collection of symbols made and controlled by the sender. Whether the symbols take the form of an event, electrical impulses released in the air, or ink printed on paper, they are shaped at the source and sent out in the direction of the target.

At the target, a message presents itself as a stimulus-event. It is merely one of the countless stimulations that present themselves to the senses of the members of the target audience and compete for their attention. Whatever the message accomplishes it must accomplish through the process of stimulation and response within the human organism.

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A central problem of modern psychology has been to try to bridge the gap between stimulus and response. To do this, of course, it is necessary to understand both the so-called "situational factors" that affect the response, and the qualities or characteristics of the responding organisms that cause different individual organisms to respond to identical stimulation in different ways. We know that the process is not simple. It is not easy to separate and measure the effects of complex environment on individual behavior. It is not easy to separate out the qualities of personality that enter into a given action. Yet the basic nature of the problem is apparent. Consider, for example, the different ways in which a regular Army sergeant and a US senator will react in the presence of a full colonel. Consider the different ways in which a victorious army and a trapped squad will react to surrender propaganda. Those are relatively easy differences to explain, as compared to those that must be considered when we are devising a message that, for example, is to bring about disloyalty or subversion in persons who live in the heart of a distant country.

Yet this is the kind of thing psywar has to do. If the problem of psychology is to say with accuracy and consistency what it is about people that accounts for the differences in their reactions to common situations, then the problem of psywar is to apply that knowledge. That is, psywar must be able to predict with reasonable accuracy and consistency what kind of stimulation (what message) applied to what kind of people in what kind of situation will cause them to react in a specified way. In the following pages, therefore, an effort has been made to gather together what psychology and the other social sciences have to contribute to an understanding of that problem.

SUMMARY

A message is, at the source, a symbol or a group of symbols, verbal or nonverbal, made and controlled by the sender. It can get its response only by first communicating symbols to the minds of men; that is, it must first get a hearing. At the target a message is a stimulus-event, among many competing for attention, that can bring about an action only by causing stimulation and response within the human organism.

In brief, a psywar message, to be effective, must get a hearing, be understood, and bring about the desired response.

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Chapter 3

RECEPTION OF THE MESSAGE

ATTRACTING ATTENTION TO THE MESSAGE

By attracting attention we mean getting the recipient to do so much as look at or listen to the message. How long he looks at it or listens to it and what he thinks of it are matters that are considered in later chapters. Unless we can get his attention to begin with—and this is not easy to do from outside, which is the position from which psywar operations are conducted—the question of how long and how fruitfully we keep it does not arise.

Human beings can only sample the sensory world. So much is available to us that we can select only a tiny fraction. How much we miss we begin to realize only when we acquire a new interest that opens a different corner of experience. When we learn to fly an airplane, for example, we find ourselves noticing things about the wind, the clouds, and the sound of an engine that we had never paid any attention to before, although the stimuli had always been there if we had only selected them.

The importance of a stimulus, whatever its form, depends on how the stimulus relates (a) to other conditions or events in the external world and (b) to conditions within the person whose sense organs are being stimulated. Because of these two sets of conditions, it may happen that a small amount of stimulation may sometimes attract more attention than a very large amount. For example, a football player will listen far harder for a number spoken softly by his quarterback and react far more violently to that small stimulus than he will to the much louder sound of a truck passing a shady spot where he is drinking lemonade. When we are flying across the country, we are likely to pay careful attention to a line of distant clouds in the west that we might never notice if we were going about our business on the ground. Thus the problem of getting a person to pay attention to a stimulus is by no means solved by

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merely delivering a large amount of stimulus to him and letting it go at that.

Because of the conditions under which a psywar operator has to work, what has just been said is especially applicable to the attention-getting problem. His target, as the operator must constantly remind himself, receives a great excess of stimulation, from which it will select only a small amount. In the psywar business, competing for attention has grown more difficult as the mass media have grown larger. The growth of motion pictures, the development of high-speed printing along with the increase of literacy, the development and spread of radio, and now the advent of television have all come along within the last fifty years to fight for man's eyes and ears. The average American is said to spend about twice as much time on the mass media as he did thirty years ago; and to have perhaps fifty times as much material to choose from. The average Arab, the average Chinese may not spend so much time on them, but the competition for even their attention is much stiffer than it was.

So the psywar officer has to work within a glutted market, has to fight against the target's own restrictions on and defenses against propaganda, and has to offer his message to a rather complex selection system that depends both on conditions within the recipients and conditions about them as the message is received. What principles will be of use to the psywar officer as he tries to get his message attended to?

Availability of Message

It is obvious that the stimulus must be delivered to the target before attention can be expected. It should also be clear that, other things being equal, the more readily and easily available the message is the more likely it is to attract attention.

When studying language habits of human beings a few years ago, Zipf[1] developed the "principle of least effort," which he later applied to many manifestations of human behavior. This principle, in brief, is that human beings will try to minimize the over-all average rate of their work expenditure per unit of time and consequently to expend the least effort possible in view of their needs and expectations. You can test this on your own mass-communication habits. Are you not more likely to listen to a station which comes in with a clear signal than one which makes you strain to hear? Are you not more often inclined to read a story in a magazine at home than to walk ten blocks to the library?

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But, you will say, there are times when you do insist on listening to a faint station, or do walk a long way to the library. This also is an important fact for psywar operators. When the Communists occupied Seoul, anti-Communists who still had radios would crawl under the floors of their houses and wrap the radio and themselves in stifling bed quilts so that they could listen a few minutes a day to the UN radio. They would stealthily pick up UN leaflets, although they could pretty well count on being killed if caught picking them up. The lesson to learn here is that availability and need are relative; that is, everything else being equal, the residents of Seoul would have taken the easier way, selected the mass communication that was easily available, and taken as little risk as possible. But everything else was not equal. Zipf would say that these people were considering their future problems at the same time as their present problems and trying to minimize their effort over the long haul. By doing the more difficult thing now, they expected to be able to save effort and trouble later. Another way to say it is that these persons felt within them an urgent need to receive UN messages.

The psywar operator can usually count on at least two groups of people—his special friends and his special enemies inside the target country—to maintain a high level of attention to his messages. They need to hear what he has to say, to make use of it pro or con, the one group because it is ammunition for them, the other because they need to counter it. In Seoul, for example, both the clandestine anti-Communists and the Communist monitors could be counted on to try to listen to our radio output. From the great mass of people inside the target country, however, psywar can expect no such interested attention. For them, therefore, availability of the message is the important thing—the strength of the signal, the convenience of the hour, the place where the leaflet is dropped, the location of the picture.

Even with the interested audience of friends, of course, a readily available message is more likely to get through than one that is not readily available. For example, many of the anti-Communists in Seoul felt they could dare to listen only ten minutes a day at most. This left it up to American psywar operators to enable them to hear, and hear the needed message, without wasting precious time. If they had to spend five minutes tuning in, or five minutes waiting for the program they needed, half a day's communication time would be wasted. If there were many days when the station could not be heard, or the program was not the one needed, the effort and risk would soon cease to seem

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worth while. Hence availability is a first requirement, both with friends and enemies.

Differentiation of Message from Background

A person cannot respond to all aspects of a stimulus situation alike; if he did, his behavior would be wholly disorganized. Each of us tends, rather, to organize his attention in what psychologists call the "figure-ground relation." One part of a stimulus pattern tends to stand out clearly—this is the figure; the rest is perceived as background. We tend to respond to the figure rather than the background, although the background may influence the way in which we respond.

Thus, psywar operators need to have as clear a grasp as possible of the answer to the question: what are the qualities of a stimulus-event (for example, a message) that are likely to differentiate a figure clearly from its background?

Here are a few principles that emerge from research on the figure-ground relation:

The larger of two areas tends to be seen as the ground, the smaller as the figure. Designers of successful book jackets and advertisements make use of this knowledge by placing a relatively small amount of type on a relatively large background. In psywar terms, this means that chances of getting attention are being squandered—other things being equal—when a leaflet is nearly all text and graphic, or when a poster does not make use of ample white space to contrast with its message.

A complete and closed design is more readily seen as figure. A person will use his imagination, once his attention is fixed on an uncompleted figure, to complete it—as the well-known Rorschach "ink blot" tests show. But our concern here is with how to get attention to begin with, that is, how to get people to perceive as figure the particular thing we want to communicate. The verdict of experimental psychology on this point is that an uncompleted design is less likely than a complete or nearly complete design to stand out as figure. For psywar this means, other things being equal, that representational pictures are more likely to gain attention than abstract ones; simple closed layouts in a poster are more likely to be seen as figure than less simple, more cluttered ones; clear type is more likely to be seen as figure than dull or broken type. Remember once again that the discussion here is about attention, not about meaning and not about making people think. There may be good reason to use abstract art on an in-

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complete design for other purposes. All we are saying for the moment is that they may not be so heavily counted on to get attention.

The brighter of two areas tends to be perceived as the figure. This is usually true even when the darker area is smaller than the brighter, especially when the brighter area is toward the center of the visual field. One notable exception to this principle, of great importance to the psywar operator, is the case of black type on white paper, which does get attention, as we all know, whether theoretically it is supposed to or not. Usually, however, attention goes to the brighter area, so that a leaflet's or poster's chances of getting attention can often be much improved by putting a spot of bright color into the display. The details embedded in the darker areas will not attract much initial attention; to begin with, therefore, we attract attention to the bright area, hoping to arouse enough interest to send the reader on to examine the darker areas next.

Some colors are more effective than others in making one part of an area stand out as figure. Color will ordinarily attract attention away from black and white, as many experiments with advertising have shown, and some colors will attract attention from other colors. For example, an orange picture or sketch will be more readily seen as figure against gray or white than a red picture or sketch, and a red unit surrounded by gray or white is more likely to be seen as figure than a blue one. In other words, the psywar operator can get attention by contrasting carefully selected colors.

What colors have the highest attention-getting value? In one experiment Adams[2] exposed four colors at a time for very brief periods, and the observer was required to report which color he noted first. The results indicate that orange was seen most frequently (21 percent of the time), with red, blue, black, green, yellow, violet, and gray following in that order. However, in this experiment the brightness (absolute amount of reflected light energy) of the color samples was not fully controlled, and this somewhat reduced the reliability of the results.

What combinations of colors attract attention best? Another group sought to determine the maximum distance at which words printed in different-colored inks and on different-colored papers could be read. (Distance thus became an index of discriminability rather than initial attention-getting value. The subjects were instructed to look at the papers.) The results indicate that of 11 combinations the most effective were (in order) blue on white,

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black on yellow, green on white, and black on white. The least effective were orange on white and red on green.

Two other observations may be noted briefly: To the observer, red hues seem to be closer than others, and darker colors seem uniformly heavier than lighter ones.

Let us add a note of caution regarding the data on color attractiveness. Such differences between colors may not be common to all persons; that is, we might get different results from observers from different cultures. This remains to be seen, especially since there are some indications of consistency from culture to culture, for example from Japanese to American, which suggest that the same color-preference scale is common to all cultures. Other indications suggest that the language and concepts used in some cultures in responding to color stimuli may make it difficult for their members to discriminate colors at all, or at least may alter the color-preference scale. For the time being it would seem wise to examine any available cultural data concerning the specific target we are aiming at before committing a psywar operation to any particular colors or combinations of colors as means of getting attention.

Most of the research on the figure-ground relation has been done in the field of vision not that of sound. Yet some of the tried and tested devices of the orator for gaining emphasis are in the nature of separating figure from ground. For example, the good speaker knows when to use an increase in loudness and a rising inflection to call attention to an important phrase. He can set off with a brief pause the word or phrase to which he wishes to attract special attention. He knows how to change his rate of speech and to say the important point slowly and impressively.

The psywar planner, of course, can delegate responsibility for figure-ground problems to his producers and announcers. He can in large part delegate another set of auditory figure-ground problems to his sound engineers. The latter problems have to do with how to get speech to be heard clearly as "figure" against a background of noise. Research indicates that there must be a considerable ratio of speech energy to noise energy before speech becomes readily intelligible. Exactly how great this ratio must be is an engineering problem. But one concern of the psywar planner certainly must be to see that enough energy is gotten into the loudspeaker or the radio signal to overcome noises and jamming. Background conditions will vary the demands on the signal. For example, Miller[3] in 1947 found that speech is more readily intelligible against high-pitched sounds (900 to 4000 cycles

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per second) than against low-pitched ones (20 to 1100). This means that a loudspeaker will probably require considerably more power to be heard above artillery than above equally loud small-arms fire. There is also good reason to think that a language such as English, where the consonants are very important, will require loudspeakers that are strong in the high frequencies. This is because consonants are usually higher frequency sounds than vowels. In a language where less of the meaning is carried by consonants there would be less need for loudspeakers to be strong in the highs.

Whether in visual or auditory psywar, contrast is obviously the subject under discussion. The problem that is being posed is, how can we attract initial attention to a psywar message by causing it to contrast with the rest of the target's environment? And it is worth noticing that we really have to do with two levels of contrast: that between figure and ground within the message itself, and that between the message as figure and the target's environment as ground In general a sharper figure-ground relation within the message will serve to attract attention to the message as against competing messages; an advertisement that makes good use of white space or of color contrast will, other things being equal, attract more attention than one that is less varied. And the principles of figure-ground relation within the message will, in general, apply to the relation of message to environment as well.

The psywar planner therefore needs, and must try to get from intelligence, as nearly complete a picture as possible of the background against which his message must attract attention. He will then try to design his message so as to contrast with that background. There might, for example, be an advantage in using a psywar radio announcer with a slightly "foreign" accent; in the ears of members of the target audience this would be in contrast with the other sounds competing for their attention (although the value of attention would have to be balanced against the resistance the unfamiliar accent might arouse). A spot of bright color can be counted on to attract initial attention to a leaflet. For the same reason, music will serve as bait for radio commentaries or for loudspeaker messages, and a bright and snappy headline, perhaps one with a new twist, will serve as bait for a run-of-the-mine news story. In 1940 the Germans dropped on Paris carefully prepared leaves symbolizing the falling of French soldiers, and they were more conspicuous because they were dropped not in autumn, when falling leaves are common, but in springtime. The contrasting bait, let us notice, need not always be brighter or louder or more exciting. In some situations a calm quiet voice

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on the radio will contrast in the desired manner if the other voices being heard are excited and emotional. And it is hardly necessary to say that there are occasions when psywar must avoid any great contrast—for instance in black propaganda, which needs to be sluiced unobtrusively into the common information diet of the target.

Nevertheless the thing the psywar operator must rely on most for gaining attention for his message is sheer intensity of the stimulus. The intensity should be appropriate to the conditions in the target audience's environment. Intensity by itself contributes to the likelihood of getting attention. A loud signal on the radio, a booming voice from a speaker are examples. Both the Communists and the Nazis have made good use of this principle. The Russians in North Korea would often plaster a whole wall full of identical posters, thus creating a gigantic splash of color and mass. Huge parades and more-than-life-size statues have been used for attention-getting purposes by all totalitarian movements. (The gigantic curtains of light that served as backdrops for some of the Nazi party rallies will never be forgotten by anyone who saw them.) Yet there is not a simple 1 to 1 relation between intensity of stimulus and the effect on the target. Several other factors must now be considered.

Other Important Factors

Amount of Previous Stimulation. According to Weber's law, in order to produce an increase in the amount of effective stimulation we must not merely increase the physical magnitude of the stimulus but must increase it by an amount proportionate to the amount of the initial stimulus. Increasing a weight from 90 to 93 grams may make it noticeably heavier for the man holding it; it does not follow from this that increasing it from 93 to 96 or from 115 to 118 will also make it noticeably heavier. What matters is the ratio between the added stimulus and what it is added to, not the absolute amount of the added stimulus. With weights, experiments show that the increase must be not less than a thirtieth part of the weight being held in order to be noticed.

Weber's law has important implications for psywar even though no psywar operator is likely to be concerned very often with the weights his target audience can lift. For the principle involved can be restated so as to apply to other senses as well as the kinesthetic. It tells us that there are definite limits to the use of intensity to gain contrast. For, if each competitor for attention merely tries to talk louder or more excitedly than the others,

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before long all competitors will merely be screaming. If the competition for size and brightness is intense, soon differences in size will become imperceptible and all shades of brightness will look merely garish. The more psywar intensity is competitively increased, the farther it will have to be jumped every time in order for the jump to be noticed. And, this being the case, a smart planner learns to rely on other devices for attracting attention.

It is self-evident that psywar can be most economically waged where—or when—the mass of competing stimulation is relatively small—in psywar during the lulls between battles, for example, or in political psywar against civilians who are chronically inactive.

Repetition. One way of manipulating intensity is to accumulate it, that is, by repetition. Seldom does the psywar operator expect one or two messages to accomplish his total purpose or even catch the attention of large segments of his designated target. He knows it can't be done, no matter how strongly his messages may be delivered. He must therefore repeat his message, preferably with enough variation to avoid monotony. In short a message that would be barely noticeable in the mass of other activities if communicated only once may, if repeated many times, eventually command a high degree of attention.

The nature of the relation between repetition and attention as it applies to sensation and behavior has not yet been studied much even under laboratory conditions. There are, however, good reasons for believing that such a relation exists. Frequent and consistent, though minor, interferences with whatever a person is doing tend to build up a state of tension, and this eventually requires him to do something about it. The first thing he does usually is to pay attention to the stimulus situation that is interfering.

In order for the effects of repeating an individually ineffective stimulus to accumulate into something that does catch the attention of target-audience members, the repetitions must be closely spaced. A daily dose of a small leaflet, an idea planted regularly in a newspaper, or a suggestion artfully reiterated over the radio may scarcely be noticed in the first days or weeks. But it may well build up to something that is regularly attended to and thus become a jumping-off point for further ideas.

The effectiveness of repeating a given intensity of stimulation may be greater if there are unconscious sets, or states of readiness, that dispose the recipients to react in line with the stimulation. There is ample evidence that a repeated stimulation does

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build up a set to react to it and that this is true even if the person being stimulated is wholly unaware of it. For example, an experiment by Rees and Israel[4] made use of five-letter anagrams, that is, disarranged letters that can be rearranged into a word. A special (experimental) group was put through practice sessions where they were asked to solve 20 anagrams that could be solved only by using a word associated with nature (for example, rokbo, which can be turned around only into brook). The group members were not told of this limitation, nor did they notice it in the course of the experiment. After the initial series of 20, they were given a further 20, all of which had several possible solutions (for example, dacre, which could be rearranged to spell cedar, raced, or cared). A second, or control group, was then given this second series of anagrams, without having had prior experience with the anagrams involving nature solutions only. By comparing the two groups, it was clearly shown that practice with the nature-solution anagrams had established in the subjects of the first group a set to solve the second ambiguous series predominantly in terms of nature-related words. Other experiments by the same workers showed that sets could be established for other kinds of solutions as well, and that the occurrence of the nature set in the experiment just cited was not a chance affair. The interesting point here is that these sets had all been built up without the knowledge of the people concerned. They had merely solved the problems, without realizing that all the solutions had something in common. But as far as the point of the experiment is concerned, the enforced repetition of the nature set in the preliminary series had paid off.

The psywar uses of this device are numerous and valuable. The hint that the war was not going very well for Germany, that all was not well, and that important facts were being bottled up by the German leaders were repeated over and over again on "Annie's" radio station during World War II. The message was so sluiced into Annie's output that it would hardly be noticed the first time a listener heard it. Its purpose, which it undoubtedly achieved with many listeners, was to build up a set, and as a result of it more and more suspicion that the good news was not so good as it sounded and the bad news worse than official news releases pictured them to be. Similarly, when a Japanese ship had been sunk but the sinking not yet admitted by the Japanese admiralty, we could quietly ask—and keep on quietly asking—"Where is the (naming the ship)?" The Japanese would either have to do something about the accumulating stimulus or accept the consequences as regards the set of the radio listeners.

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Timing and Spacing. The psywar operator can manipulate his intensity factors advantageously also by varying the parts of his message within time and space. The skillful advertiser knows how to build a campaign to a crescendo, varying the emphasis frequently from point to point to avoid monotony and retain attention, and so building to a point where all the appeals and arguments come together. The skillful designer knows how to lead our eyes around a display, attracting attention first, then directing it. Research with eye cameras[5] indicates that the spot where we usually look first on a page, an ad, or a poster is slightly above the middle and slightly to the left. From there, as we scan the display, our eyes typically move upward and to the left and then in a clockwise direction around the whole thing. This is not always the case, of course. Sometimes a clever attention-getting device will make us start elsewhere on the page or scan in a different pattern. But if you look at any collection of tested advertisements or posters you will notice how many of them have the attention-getting picture or headline above the middle and to the left. The good psywar designer uses the same device in his printed display materials: he so arranges his materials on a leaflet or poster as to take advantage of the clockwise motion of the eye and thus control to some extent the order in which his reader attends to the materials included. At least that is what he does for audiences that read from left to right, for we do not know whether the same principles apply to audiences who read from right to left (like the Arab peoples) or from top to bottom (like the Chinese). Let us repeat our word of warning: most of the research we can report here has been done in America and on Americans. It should be applied to other and different peoples only after making use of all available information on their communication habits. In approaching a new target audience the psywar planner, in other words, should not take it for granted that they are like us. His best bet, if he is not certain, is to ask these basic questions: How do experts in the target country use communications to further their ends? How do they design printed materials? How do they time combinations of messages on the radio? Of course the experts in the target country might be wrong or at least less right than they would be if their social science research were as far advanced as ours, but their guess is likely to be better than ours.

One service which the psywar operator can perform by way of directing attention is that of indexing his message. All mass communication indexes its content, although not always by a

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table of contents. A newspaper, for example, indexes by means of headlines and provides a judgment of relative importance by varying their size. Radio indexes by cue words within programs and sometimes relies on "Flash!" or "Bulletin!" to rouse attention quickly. An index of this kind gives a key not only to content but also to relative importance. And the indexing, of course, is within the power of the operator to control.

Relation of Stimulus to Needs. Another way to manipulate the intensity of communicated messages is to relate them to what the person who is to receive them needs. A person who does not have a need related to the stimulus he is receiving is not likely to notice that stimulus unless it is extremely strong; a person who does have a need related to the stimulus is likely to notice the stimulus even though it is of low intensity. We shall want to talk about this later in its relation to perception and response. But it will be sufficient to point out here that advertisers have used this knowledge for years in their struggle for attention. They always try to make the headline or the illustration ring a bell by tapping one of the basic needs of the audience. That is why you often see pictures of nearly nude women attracting attention to advertisements for such not-too-closely-related things as motor oil. The needs of a person, of course, change from time to time. A sex-starved man after a full meal is more likely to notice the picture of a female form than an illustration of a beefsteak; in fact it would take a very prominent picture of a steak to attract him at all under those conditions. In any case a psywar message can immensely increase its likelihood of getting attention by relating itself to the known needs of the target. If the members of the target audience are nostalgic or bored, they can be attracted by familiar music or pictures or news from home. If they are being kept in the dark as to war developments and curious for news, they can be attracted by a battle map.

If you have any doubt that the intensity of stimulation is increased by relating a message to a person's current needs, test yourself. How do you react even to a very small reference in a newspaper to a speech you have made, to a casual reference to a fire in progress near your home, or to the name of your home town in a list of names otherwise unattended to during a newscast?

Relation of Stimulus to Target's Personal Experience. The intensity of a stimulus may be varied also by relating it to what a person knows. If he has had experience with that kind of stimulus material in the past, he is likely to have his pattern of response to it set up. For example, we have just mentioned the attention-getting value of information about one's home town, or of some-

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thing else that is close to a person's experience. An item about the enemy soldier's home town is likely to attract his attention, other things being equal, even if it is a very small item; a very large item about an unfamiliar place is less likely to attract it. On the other hand his experience with a given kind of subject matter may have led him to want to avoid it in the future. He may react to it in terms of boredom or disgust or suspicion. Thus some radio listeners at the present time seem to turn off their attention during certain painfully familiar commercials. Similarly, American soldiers listened to Tokyo Rose's disks but tended to resist or ignore what she said.

It is worth noting that, if a message does not fit into the target's educational and cultural background, the chances of getting attention for it are small. It might be difficult, even through the strongest message, to impress illiterate Chinese Communist troops with the idea that their radar equipment is not functioning well for some obscure reason. And it was discovered long ago that when we talk in rather general terms about democracy and freedom to most Asiatic audiences, we attract very little attention, because these concepts, as we use them, tap nothing within their experience.

Summary

What does all this mean to the psywar operator who wants to attract attention to his message? First of all he must try to make his message easily available. In the second place he must so design and construct the message as to make it contrast with the environment in which it is to be received. The principles of figure-ground relation will help him here. He will try to take full advantage of background space, completeness of design, brightness, and color differences. Most particularly, he will try to use a color that will stand out. The foregoing, of course, applies only to printed messages. In broadcast messages he will try to be sure that he is getting enough energy into the signal to overcome noise and jamming and that he is using the right frequencies and so making his words intelligible. He will try to see that his announcers make use of tested devices of speech for obtaining contrast and emphasis. Finally he will manipulate his messages so as to derive the advantages of intensity of stimulation without always having to use sheer physical intensity (which, he knows, requires larger and larger increases in order for them to be noticed at all). Instead of relying only on loudness and size,

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he will use repetition. He will vary timing and spacing for maximum cumulative impact. He will try to relate his message to some current need of his target, since this will greatly increase the effective intensity of the message; and he will be careful to keep his message within the cultural experience of his target for fear there will be no attention to it at all.

GETTING THE MEANING ACROSS

The World around Us and the Pictures in Our Heads

In the early twenties, Lippmann[1] introduced his widely influential book on public opinion with a famous chapter entitled "The World around Us and the Pictures in Our Heads." This chapter tried to describe man's relation to his environment. In particular, Lippmann was interested in the way man gets the information on which political decisions are made. He cited the fact that a public figure is many different things to many men, and that two nations can attack "one another, each certain that it is acting in self-defense, or two classes [can be] at war each certain that it speaks for the public interest." Then he continued with a much-quoted statement: "They live, we are likely to say, in different worlds. More accurately, they live in the same world, but they think and feel in different ones."

Lippmann came to the conclusion that every man thinks and feels in a different world from the world of every other man. Every man constructs a pseudo environment between himself and his real environment. He does not deliberately falsify his environment. But his own experience is never exactly like that of any other observer, and he interprets any new experience in terms of his previous experience. Only a small part of his experience, moreover, comes to him direct from environment. The great bulk of it filters through news services, textbooks, reports, tradition, custom, gossip, and rumor. These do not give him a full and accurate account of the things they speak to him about—not necessarily because of any deliberate choice on anybody's part not to do so but because of

> ...the artificial censorships, the limitations of social contact, the comparatively meager time available in each day for paying attention to public affairs, the distortion arising because events have to be compressed into very short messages, the difficulty of making a small vocabulary express

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> a complicated world, and finally the fear of facing those facts which would seem to threaten the established routine of men's lives.*

In an eloquent passage, Lippmann tells how man builds a picture in his head of the world beyond his reach:[6]

> The world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind. It has to be explored, reported, and imagined. Man is no Aristotelian god contemplating all existence at one glance. He is the creature of an evolution who can just about span a sufficient portion of reality to manage his survival, and snatch what on the scale of time are but a few moments of insight and happiness. Yet this same creature has invented ways of seeing what no naked eye could see, of hearing what no ear could hear, of weighing immense masses and infinitesimal ones, of counting and separating more items than he can individually remember. He is learning to see with his mind vast portions of the world that he could never see, touch, smell, hear, or remember.*

This is the state of affairs psywar is up against. It deals with a target audience that has little direct contact with its political environment but builds up mind pictures of that environment and makes decisions on the basis of those pictures. We may assume that the pictures are not precise representations of reality. Worse still, no two members of the target audience have pictures in their heads that are exactly alike. The nature of those pictures, however, and the respects in which groups of men hold approximately the same picture, are among the most important facts the psywar operator needs to know. For what he is trying to do is to modify the pictures in certain persons' heads. He knows what picture of political reality he wants them to have. But in order to get his way about that he needs to know what picture he has to change, and which persons or groups of persons have what picture in their heads, so that he can plan the changes he seeks to bring about. Most important, assuming that he can get attention for his message at all, he needs to know what happens to a message after it has been communicated and, in general, how new messages become parts of the pictures in people's heads.

We perceive the world in terms of its meaning to us. The psychologist ("perception" is his term) means by perception the interpretive response an organism makes to a stimulus. Our perception of a stimulus is the meaning that that stimulus has for us.

Individual Perception

This, then, is the first thing to remember about perception: the individual always tends to perceive the world in terms of its meaning to him. Krech and Crutchfield[7] give the example of an

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aviator who lands in a primitive country where no airplane and no white man have ever been seen before, that is, where people have had no experiences with either. The complicated machine and the light-skinned man with the parachute on his back will not, however, be meaningless to those people. Far from it; they will at once relate the new experience to whatever frame of reference they have that will help explain it. Perhaps the flying machine will seem to them a kind of bird. Perhaps the strange man who can fly through the air will seem to them a god. In any case they will somehow manage to classify and interpret the new experience in terms familiar to them. And the resultant classification-interpretation will be its meaning for them.

A flight operations officer searching for an airplane lost in the heart of Africa would, of course, interpret the event in question, both plane and pilot, very differently; it would never occur to him that the latter was a god before whom he must bow. Perhaps the point will be clearer if we ask ourselves how a garage mechanic and a physician would perceive an automobile accident at which they both happened to be present. Each would be receiving essentially the same physical stimuli as the other. But their interpretive responses would be as different as chalk and cheese. The physician might see injured people, with a smashed automobile as background. The mechanic might be seeing the broken parts of the car and turning over in his mind the problem of getting the car moving again, for his natural response puts the injured people in the background. Bring an insurance adjuster, a new-car salesman, a reporter, and a priest to the scene and we will have four more responses, four more structurings, each different from all the others and each dictated by the experiences and interest of the individual involved.

Take another example. Imagine an American tourist and a native Mexican at a bullfight. What will each perceive? The American "is likely to perceive and stress the pain to the animal, the messiness of the scene, and the flies. The Mexican fan, on the other hand, might perceive and stress the skill of the performer, his daring or fearlessness, the fine technical points involved, and even the fine spirit of the bull in putting up such a good fight."[7]

In each case, the observer is <u>selecting</u> a certain part of his immediate experience. The doctor selects the broken human bodies, the mechanic the broken cars. In so doing they <u>distort</u> the experience because they emphasize parts of it unequally. They may even <u>add</u> to the experience; many a witness to an accident,

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in his excitement, believes he has seen something that in point of fact has not happened at all. And they relate experience to their previous experience, their needs and goals. The doctor will relate it to his medical training, the mechanic to his mechanical training, the salesman to his occupation of selling new cars, the priest to his vocation of saving souls. This is the way perception works. It is functionally selective. It selects so as to structure* experience meaningfully for the perceiver. In selecting, it tends to distort, add, relate.

Take an example from psywar. During World War II this country made a series of highly expert films on the subject "Why We Fight." One of the films was "The Battle of Britain." Consider now how that film might be perceived by an Anglophobe who thought England had led us into war, by an internationalist who believed England had saved all Europe by holding the Nazis back until we could get ready, and by a pro-German who believed that we were on the wrong side. The Anglophobe would tend to select and emphasize the parts that showed England's lack of preparedness and the great stocks of supplies that had to be shipped in from America. The internationalist would tend to select the parts that showed the bravery and skill of the Royal Air Force and the stoical courage of the bombed British civilians. The pro-German, on the other hand, would probably see the picture in terms of the mistakes of the German campaign, and of what might have been. The Anglophobe would probably interpret the treatment of the British as unduly favorable, the internationalist as accurate and moving, and the pro-German as lying and propagandistic. The German air generals who appeared briefly on the screen would look fiendish to the internationalist, heroic and commanding to the pro-German, and pretty much like the British generals to the Anglophobe.

Organization of Experience

A second thing to remember, then, is that we structure experience in a meaningful and functional way. Each of these men, as he watched the film, would be selecting and structuring the experience so that it would have meaning to him in terms of what he already knew and believed. The English psychologist Bartlett said many years ago that "It is fitting to think of every human cognitive reaction—perceiving, imagining, thinking, and reasoning—as an effort after meaning." It is characteristic of

*"Structure" is a verb used by psychologists to mean "give structure to" or "organize."

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people everywhere that they want to live in an organized world, where sense data will mean something and new experiences can be related to something familiar and stable. The older people get, the stronger is this need for consistency in meaning (hence the growth of conservative political, economic, and social attitudes with age). These habits of dealing with consistencies in environment become crucially important. Thus when something new, different, strange is encountered, the easiest thing to do is to react to it in a way that will give it meaning, and let us feel we can cope with it. This dispels insecurity, makes us feel at home.

Another way to look at what was happening when different persons experienced "The Battle of Britain" or the auto accident or the bullfight is to say that each was structuring the experience functionally, that is, so that it would work for him. The Anglophobe, for example, was selecting material that would strengthen his mental set of dislike of England. Each in his own way was selecting that which would meet his needs, agree with his moods, strengthen his already existing mental sets.

There is a great deal of research evidence to back up this view of how perception works. McClelland and Atkinson[9] observed groups of sailors from a submarine school; one had been fed only 1 hour before; the second had gone 4 hours without food; the third had gone without food for 16 hours. The men were told that the purpose of the experiment was to find out what objects they could see in very poor light. They were put in a darkened room and shown a screen on which an operator projected nothing at all, although he went through the motions of operating a projector. Five seconds after each "slide" had been "exposed" the experimenter gave the subjects a broad hint that could be interpreted in a number of ways: "Three objects on a table. What are they?" or, "All the people in this are enjoying themselves. What are they doing?" When the answers were collected and checked it was seen that the longer the subjects had been without food, the more likely they were to give food-related responses. That is, the "people" were likely to be enjoying themselves eating; the three objects on the table were likely to be hamburgers, etc. Hunger also increased the size of the imagined food objects. For example, when the hint was "An ash tray and a hamburger—which is larger?", in the hungriest group 75 percent of the subjects said the hamburger was larger, whereas in the least hungry group exactly half the subjects said the hamburger was larger, and half said it was smaller.

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Bruner and Goodman[10] in another well-known experiment used two groups of children, one from well-to-do families, the other from poor families. Asked to estimate the size of coins, the children from poor families overestimated the size of common coins, and the wealthier children did not. Each group, in perceiving the coins, was deeply influenced by its needs and its sense of values.

A simple experiment by Murray,[11] which you can try out yourself, shows the effect of mental sets on perception. Groups of young girls were asked to describe the picture of a man under two different sets of conditions: before and after they had participated in a game of "murder." The two sets of descriptions were significantly different. After the game the girls saw in the picture a much more vicious, dangerous, malicious man than they had seen before.

Many experiments have been designed to show the effects of mood on perception. In one of the more complicated of them, subjects under hypnosis were asked to describe a number of pictures. First the subjects were hypnotized, then the proper mood was induced--happy, critical, or anxious—and then the pictures were shown. After describing the pictures the subjects were told that they would forget all about what had happened, were brought out of hypnosis, and then hypnotized again. This time another mood was induced but the same pictures were shown, this procedure being repeated until they had described the pictures in each of the various moods. The results? The descriptions differed amazingly under the different mood-hypnosis conditions. Looking at the same picture the same subject might give these three descriptions under the different conditions:

(Happy mood) "Complete relaxation. Not much to do—just sit, listen, and relax. Not much at all to think about."

(Critical mood) "Someone ruining a good pair of pressed pants by lying down like that. They're unsuccessfully trying to study."

(Anxious mood) "They're listening to a football game or world series. Probably a tight game. One guy looks as if his side wasn't winning."

This is what perception does to "facts." The psywar operator must keep this in mind and make allowance for it. As Krech and Crutchfield[7] say, "There are no impartial 'facts.' Data do not have a logic of their own that results in the same perceptions and cognitions for all people. Data are perceived and interpreted

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in terms of the individual perceiver' own needs, own emotions, own personality, own previously formed cognitive patterns."

Another way to say this is that individuals organize experience in terms of their established frames of reference. Lippmann[6] spoke of the pictures in our heads as "stereotypes" of experience. Today we are in the habit of calling them "frames of reference." Whichever term is used, what is being said in effect is that a new perception does not live a life of its own. Instead it promptly becomes a part of the organized framework of other perceptions that we have been building up all our lives Thus, as we have seen, primitive tribesmen see an airplane descending in their midst, and their perception of it immediately becomes a part of their organized perceptual world. They think of it as a bird. They have to interpret it in terms of what they know. That is the frame of reference within which the plan has meaning for them.

Let us take another example. A Hindu, looking at a picture of a bull, would probably classify it in terms of a religious frame of reference; a Korean farmer might perceive it in terms of the farmwork it could do; a Spaniard might put it into a sporting frame of reference; a Texan would probably see it against a framework of cattle raising.

Frames of reference have much to do with the different ways people evaluate the same psywar message. Mention of a farmer with five acres of land might bring expressions of pity from Americans, expressions of envy from most Asians. Our description of freedom of the press has repeatedly been characterized in quite different and unflattering terms by Communists, whose frame of reference involves a wholly different concept of the press. Obviously it is important for the psywar operator to learn as much as possible about the frames of reference within which his messages are likely to be perceived. However, this is often difficult to do, and many mistakes result from doing it poorly. A classical instance here is a German leaflet used in World War II. The illustration was a bedroom scene, which is theoretically good bait for frustrated soldiers. But the bedroom was depicted much more luxuriously than any bedroom the average GI had ever seen, and the leaflet lost all its force because the readers related it to fiction or the movies or the "very rich," and not to themselves.

There are four characteristics of the way our frames of reference operate that are of special importance to psywar.

One of these is that we tend to organize experience so as to group characteristics of people and events. Thus most of us have ready-made reactions for use in evaluating other racial and eth-

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nic groups. Americans tend to think of the British as stuffy, and the British to think of the Americans as crude. Americans tend to think of orientals as "inscrutable," and white Americans tend to think of Negroes as musical, carefree, irresponsible, and able to stand deprivation better than whites. These ready-made reactions save us a lot of time in evaluating people and social situations. You don't have to pause to study the new German resident down the street if you already have a picture in your head that tells you Germans are intelligent, efficient, stiff, and basically cruel and unfriendly. If you then meet your German neighbor and find that he is really kindly, friendly, and a little awkward, you simply classify him as an "exception."

The fact that these groupings are so common and so easy to establish is a fact that has been used since time immemorial for psywar. A good example is a series of cleverly contrived leaflets, available in World War II leaflet archives, in which the Nazi propagandists tried to exploit the American stereotype of Jews. The leaflets were episodes in the unpleasant career of "Sam Levy," who was back home making money hand over fist and seducing the sweethearts of soldiers. The Communists have tried to inculcate in people all over the world a stereotype of Americans as "capitalists, imperialists, aggressors," carefully devised so as to group together under the heading "Americans" all the characteristics that the Communist dictionary defines as reprehensible.

This, as the reader will recognize, is the invariable procedure in the type of propaganda known as "name calling." Understanding it will, furthermore, help us to see the role of "glittering generalities" and "transfer" in psywar. The Communists, where their propaganda has been successful, can evoke an instant and negative reaction by calling the name "Capitalist"; Americans, where theirs has been successful, can do as much by calling the name "Communist." Similarly, the word "socialism" has assumed for many Americans a stereotyped meaning that is quite different from the meaning the word evokes, for example, in England. On the other hand, Americans tend to respond very favorably whenever they hear "the American way" or "free enterprise" or "America First" or "freedom of opportunity," even if they are used with a very high degree of generality. The point is that everyone has "built in" these ready-made reactions and tends because of them to put a great many things under the same tent that do not necessarily belcng together. Everybody does it, and the process is the same whether, like the victims of Communist propaganda, we are deceived as we form the stereotype, or, like the recipients of US propaganda, we are

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told the truth. The point is to associate what you want to tear down with some hated symbol (the Nazis, for example, constantly in their home propaganda associated the American Government with Jews) or to associate something you want to build up with some favorable symbol (a lofty ideal, a revered tradition out of the past, etc.). This is making use of the phenomenon of grouping to transfer the evaluation of the known symbol to the unknown.

But the next characteristic of frames of reference, even more important for psywar, is that we tend to organize experience so as to resist any change in strong structures. Suppose that a Russian has learned through many years of Communist teaching to perceive Americans as greedy and money-mad aggressors who want to colonize the whole world. Suppose he then listens, on the short-wave radio from far away, to an American who assures him that we really seek only peace and friendship, and have no territorial ambitions. Will he promptly change his stereotype of Americans, or will he organize his perceptions of the broadcast so as to leave his previous perceptual organization intact? Almost certainly the latter. He will interpret the broadcast as "propaganda" or "lies." For once we build up a strong organization of meanings we tend to resist any change in it. We are likely to reject or distort any meanings that would be at variance with some previous perceptual structure that means a lot to us.

There is a great deal of research on this topic. For example, one significant experiment came out of an effort sponsored by the American Jewish Committee to combat anti-Semitism by means of cartoon propaganda (Cooper and Jahoda [12]). To check on the effectiveness of the effort, cartoons were submitted to a number of people, including known anti-Semites, all of whom were asked for an interpretation of the cartoons. Some of the cartoons featured a "Mr. Biggott" as the anti-Semitic villain, and others depicted anti-Jewish actions in various situations. These were intended to remind anti-Semites of their own practices, on the theory that prejudiced attitudes, thus exposed to light, could be identified and held in abeyance. The interpretations obtained from prejudiced persons, however, showed a result quite different from that intended. Take, for instance, what happened with a cartoon showing the hospitalized Mr. Biggott demanding "only sixth-generation American blood" for his transfusion. This was seen by some prejudiced subjects as a sketch of a socially inferior person striving for social status, and by others as one of a foreigner or of a Jew. In other words the cartoon failed to achieve

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its central purpose, that is, to get each of them to identify himself with the stickler for sixth-generation American blood. A cartoon showing an anti-Semitic congressman being favorably impressed by and wanting to hire for his new party an applicant with a record of window smashing, race rioting, and jail terms, likewise miscarried with the anti-Semites, some of whom said, "It might be anything crooked ... might be a new labor party. That shady character makes me think so," or "It's a Jewish party that would help Jews get more power." And so on.

A direct onslaught on anti-Jewish attitudes would doubtless have been even less successful; most prejudiced people in our society don't like to admit their prejudices; those who do admit them defend them openly. Hence the cartoons have to be subtle to have any effect whatever. We have seen that the effect was frequently not that intended. Indeed the cartoons, once distorted, seem to have served as further support for the prejudice they were supposed to expose and destroy.

The psywar moral that the above experiment should drive home is this: psywar usually wastes its time and energy when it goes directly against strong structures, and that is what psywar is doing when, for example, it tells the enemy that his motives are bad or that he has made a mistake in getting into the war or that the American ideology is a good one and his a bad one for all mankind, etc. Messages that run so directly counter to motivational trends within the target audience haven't a ghost of a chance of being taken seriously and in the manner intended. And friendly psywar can make the same mistake; a major difficulty we have been up against in building NATO is that our European friends are reluctant to accept any facts or ideas that point to the likelihood or even the possibility of a third world war. They believe that World War III, if it comes, will destroy everything they value, themselves included, and that the building of large armies somehow makes World War III more probable. Psywar planners have to learn to recognize such strong structures within the target audience, and to attack them by indirection.

An experiment by Knapp[13] some years ago required college students to recall statements they had read concerning the expansion of Communism in Western Europe. There were two assertions, represented by equal numbers of statements: first, that Communism was gaining ground; second, that it was losing ground. The students who were opposed to the spread of Communism in Europe tended to recall better the statements that were anti-Communist, and vice versa.

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Studies of preelection and voting behavior by Lazarsfeld[14] and others seem to indicate that strongly motivated Democrats tend to ignore Republican campaign propaganda, and strongly motivated Republicans tend to ignore Democratic campaign propaganda. A news story that treats the two viewpoints impartially, or presents facts favorable to both sides, runs up against a tendency on the part of each reader to seize upon the points favorable to his side and pass up those favorable to the other side.

The same behavior has been observed in rumor studies. Allport and Lepkin[15] in one study showed that people who opposed the program of rationing during World War II were much more prone than others to believe and repeat rumors alleging extravagant use of gasoline by high officials, or extravagant use of butter at army bases, etc. Such rumors were thus given a more or less favorable reception according as they agreed or disagreed with strong structures that the recipients were trying to defend.

The meaning of all this for the psywar operator needs to be repeated over and over again. A psywar operator is taking a great risk, as far as getting his message across is concerned, if he makes a frontal attack on perceptual structures that are strongly held by members of his target. Better to canalize or divert: "We can agree on most things, but let me suggest something to you," "You have done fine so far; now the next step is...." Better to make a flank attack, or enter under a friendly banner. For example, the psywar operator is much more likely to get a favorable perception if he can quote a friendly authority or transfer a respected sanction to what he has to say.

Another implication for psywar is the great importance of reliable and valid intelligence concerning the target. You need to know what structures are strong. You need to know what symbols and sanctions you can call on for help, and what names, if any, you can call. Propaganda randomly planned in ignorance of such knowledge may well do more harm than good.

A third thing to remember is that we organize experience in terms of proximity and similarity and often confuse this with cause and effect. This is a way of describing another device we have for combining experiences for easier handling. We organize together things that come to our attention about the same time or that seem to us to resemble each other in some significant way. We are not talking now about events or things that are similar, or close together physically, but rather about those that are similar or close together psychologically. Now what we select as being close together psychologically will be determined in large part

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by our needs, knowledge, and moods. Thus, as Krech and Crutchfield[7] say, a child who has just been spanked may tend to organize "fathers, bullies, and castor oil" together as sources of pain and frustration. A mechanic may tend to organize power lawnmowers, automobiles, and propeller airplanes together because they all have reciprocating piston engines. A superstitious child may organize the fact that he failed to pick up a pin together with the fact that he shortly afterward had trouble with one of his friends.

This quality of perception has two important implications for psywar. For one thing it enables the propagandist to put labels on groups of people or events—"the do-gooders," "the economic royalists," "the Cliveden set," "the station wagon crowd," "appeasement," "imperialism," etc., without going against the usual mental habits of the target audience. That is, the propagandist can use a label in confidence that the similarities or proximities he directs attention to will dispose many members of the target audience to organize the persons or events together under the proposed label, without bothering to ask questions about the label.

Equally important for psywar is the fact that similarity or proximity often lead to a perception of cause and effect. The superstitious child who neglected to pick up a pin and then had a fight is likely to say that he had a fight because he didn't pick up the pin, although to other persons the two events may seem to have no connection with each other. The President who is in office during an economic setback or a humiliation in foreign relations is likely to be perceived as having brought them about, whether he could have done so or not. This works both ways, of course, and no President is likely to deny that he brought about or maintained peace and prosperity in the way his supporters claim.

For the psywar operator all this means that people aren't able, in the complex conditions of contemporary life, to look very closely at cause and effect. They therefore tend to see cause—or more precisely, causation—where there is only association or coincidence. More especially, they are willing to believe that someone whom they perceive as "bad" has been the cause of almost any "bad" event that has happened anywhere near him; or that someone whom they perceive as "good" has caused almost any "good" event. A rather startling piece of research on this point was done by Zillig[16] in 1928. In this experiment, two groups of children performed gymnastic exercises before their classmates. The groups were carefully selected and trained. One group was made up of children almost universally liked, the other of children al-

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most universally disliked, by their classmates. The liked group had been trained to make mistakes, the disliked group to perform the exercises without the slightest error. But when the audience recorded its impressions of the two performances, it was found that the mistakes had all been credited to the disliked group. This was not malicious or dishonest; it is merely an illustration of the way perception works. Acts thought to be "bad" are much more likely to be organized with persons thought to be "bad," and vice versa. The audience really believed it had seen the disliked children make those mistakes. The same thing happens in the technique of "guilt by association" or "innocence by association," when an effort is made to encourage people to perceive someone as "bad" by associating that person in our psywar output with something already perceived as "bad," or the reverse.

The Nazis seized upon the strategic opportunity this offers to propaganda and blamed most of the ills of the world on the Jews. The Communists have used it to put the blame for everything unpleasant on "reactionaries" or on the Western powers. They have been able to convince many people of a connection between disease in Communist Asia and the "bad" Americans, despite the fact that they had to call in something as farfetched as germ warfare to explain the connection.

This does not mean, of course, that coincidence can be substituted for causality with all people at all times. As we have seen above, there may be strong structures of attitudes and beliefs on the part of the target audience that it will refuse to give up. The great majority of the Germans during World War II were committed to the notion that Hitler was "good," and it would have been difficult to persuade them that he was responsible for their ills. (It proved much easier to hang the blame on certain Party men under Hitler.) Moreover, the more a person has been taught to be critical (this usually coincides pretty well with educational level), the less he is impelled by strong needs or drives to accept an organization uncritically, and the more likely he is to look behind the label or the suggestion and study the facts as he is able to get them.

A fourth thing to remember is that we organize experience in terms of the language we have to describe it. By this time, you should have a fairly good idea of what is meant when we say that a message may not mean exactly the same thing to the target that it means to the source. It will be clear to you that this difference in interpretation is not merely a matter of differing definitions of words. Rather it refers back to differences in experi-

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ence, differences in needs, and differences in knowledge. A person tends to read into a message what he wants to, that is, what helps him to preserve his strong structures of needs, understandings, and emotions, in a word, what fits with his previous experience.

Language is, of course, the chief tool we have to use in psywar, but the psywar man cannot remind himself too often that perception of language is always affected by experience. Katz[17] points out that American civilians were at a disadvantage in communicating with returned servicemen after World War II because foxhole experience had no counterpart in unbombed America. Similarly, labor-management controversies are made more difficult by the fact that employers and employees have different ways of life. He says further:

> The employer, owner, or superintendent, through his executive function of making daily decisions, and issuing orders and instructions, acquires a psychology of management. He can understand, though he may dislike, a union demand for more wages. But when the union requests, or even suggests, changes in the conditions of work or changes in personnel policy, he grows emotional and objects to being told by subordinates and outsiders how to run his own plant. For their part the workers have little understanding of the competitive position of the employer. Since the employer enjoys a way of life luxurious in comparison with their own, they find his plea of inability to pay a higher wage laughable.

If this is the situation among people who work in the same plant and live in the same city, how wide must the gulf of experience be between representatives of conflicting belief systems and widely different cultures, for example, Russians and Americans? That is why one valuable element in the make-up of an effective propagandist is the ability to think himself into the other fellow's shoes, and why there could be no better training exercise for the propagandist than a series of assignments that would make him assume the role of a member of the target audience. For example, an American trainee might be assigned to write the best papers he could possibly write, from the viewpoint of a Soviet citizen, on "why I love Stalin," or "Americans are warmongers," or "why I love my collective farm." For that is the kind of thing he will be doing, in effect, before every piece of propaganda writing he undertakes. The psywar man must try to develop genuine empathy with the target he is trying to reach; only by doing so can he be reasonably sure of conveying the kind of meaning he wants with the words he can use. This is considered further under Empathy in Chap. 7.

Another feature of language communication that is important for the propagandist is the fact that words sometimes separate

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themselves from experience altogether. We have very little time or opportunity, what with the busy lives we lead, to check words back against experience and reality. Words thus tend to become more than symbols and acquire a reality (and importance) of their own, quite apart from the realities they symbolize. Quoting Katz again:[17]

> Viewed realistically, language as a living process has other functions than accurate communication. It did not arise in the history of the race, any more than in the development of the child, solely in the interests of precise interchange of information. Language as it exists is not the product of scientists trying to perfect an exact set of symbols; it is the product of an arena of everyday life, in which people are concerned with manipulating and controlling their fellows and with expressing their emotional and psychological wants. The prototype of language as a functioning process can be seen in the child's acquisition of words and phrases to extend his control of his environment beyond his limited physical reach. Similarly, adults use language to obtain sympathy, bulldoze their fellows, placate or embarrass their enemies, warm and comfort their friends, deceive themselves, or express their own conflicts. Language in operation is often intended to conceal and obscure meaning.

The psywar man must learn very early that psywar is not waged with "facts" but with symbols, and chiefly, as we have seen, with words. These words often acquire emotional loadings. They lend themselves to the propagandist's devices for gaining acceptance, such as the "plain folks" technique by which a message is prepared in a folksy way so as to impress the audience with its homespun and believable quality. They can tell falsehoods or fact with equal eloquence, they can illustrate a point or distract attention from it, or they can exaggerate or play down. In general, fact tends to lag behind the word, because the word is easy to use and the fact is hard to check. Therefore the words themselves can accomplish something, just as, on a different level, a series of unfounded charges in the newspaper will usually accomplish something—because the denial never quite catches up with them.

It is hardly necessary to point out that words, whatever the purpose they are being used for in a psywar operation, need to be words that will be perceived approximately as the sender wishes them to be. The magnitude of the task of choosing the right words for communication between languages (and therefore between the cultures that lie behind the languages) is illustrated by this account:[18]

> Some of the great difficulties among the diplomats sitting around the international tables here (at the United Nations) arise from the differences in languages, alphabets, and consequently, ways of thinking; and in no tongue is more ingenuity required for accurate, precise translation than in Chinese.

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The Chinese ideograph script is one of the world's oldest written media, but the talk at Lake Success is so brimful of new ideas, new concepts, and new words that to translate even the basic Charter itself into Chinese it was necessary to devise almost 2,000 new combinations of characters.

A perfect example of the troubles faced here by Chinese translators is the word "uranium," which has a persistent way of cropping up in diplomatic reports. The translators went into a huddle and came out with a decision to call the atomic base "U-metal." That, however, only started their headaches.

The symbol for "U" was found in the Chinese word for grapefruit, which in literal translation is the "U-tree." What was just as disturbing, from a purist point of view, was the discovery that the symbol for metal was contained in the first part of the word for "bell," which, literally translated, meant "metal boy."

After some cudgeling of brains, however, the calligraphers came up with the proposal to shave off the "tree" part of the "U-tree" character, discard the "boy" part of the "bell" character, and then in the best manner of diplomatic compromise, join the severed remains to form a new symbol: "U-metal" or, as we would say, uranium."

One can easily imagine the difficulty of conveying the idea of an atom bomb to a cultural group that has no concept of either an atom or a bomb.

An individual's language is, of course, the product of the culture in which he was raised. More importantly for psywar purposes, language is a tool for getting along with the world, and the meanings that a language conveys depend on the kinds of problems encountered and solved in the recipients' culture. The person who tries to communicate with a person of another language will almost inevitably use some constructions or words that do not mean what he wants them to mean. The result is poor communication, or, in black propaganda, unmasking. Note the inept choice of terms in the last phrase of this sentence from a Japanese black leaflet: "It is advisable in such cases to take full protective measures by use of condoms, protective medicines, etc.; better still to hold intercourse only with wives, virgins or women of respective character." Or this unmodern use of the adjective "sweet" in a Communist leaflet dropped on American troops in Korea: "Cast aside all anxieties! Do not hesitate to surrender to the People's Army! You will then be able to meet again your comrades who have come before you, and soon return to your sweet home."

In all psywar operations that involve different languages, but especially when the language of the target country is dissimilar grammatically to English (or other Western tongues), it is important to have genuine experts in the language on hand—not to assure an accurate word-for-word translation of the English

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message the propaganda writer turns out but rather to assure adequate communication of the idea intended. Languages differ greatly in the rules used to communicate similar ideas—witness the German use of gehen and fahren to distinguish "going-by-walking" from "going-by-being-transported." The Chinese have 17 different nouns referring to kinds of mountains—Tsou, high mountain, and Ngan, for high mountain near a river, for example. The Arabic language has more than five thousand different words referring to horses, and hence it is hard for a Westerner to make accurate horse sense to an Arab. The word "to cause" has no counterpart in the language and thought of the Trobriand Islanders, and its absence is reflected in the general lack of teleological concepts, and of purposiveness as well, in their culture; the idea of working-in-order-to-receive-pay (or other compensation) is without meaning to them, as are questions of "why?" (which they answer merely in terms of "that's the way it has always been"). In the language of the Arapesh of New Guinea, notions of time and time relations are similarly impossible to express.

What we are saying here is not merely that members of foreign cultures may lack an informational basis for understanding a communication but also that their language may lack the concepts—thought vehicles—necessary for them to learn how to understand. Thus it is clear that the propagandist's task in trying to communicate accurately and to avoid looking silly to his audience, in comparison, for example, to the American advertiser's task of choosing exactly the right word or phrase to sell a product, can be monumentally difficult.

Rumors and Perception

One of the best illustrations of how perception works, and also one of the aspects of human behavior that the psywar operator needs to understand most thoroughly, is the growth and passage of rumors. The most extensive work on rumor has been done by Allport and Postman,[19] who have studied the problem not only by observing rumors in society but by setting up experimental rumor passages in the laboratory. One of the rumors they studied during the war had to do with a Chinese teacher on vacation who, shortly before Japan's surrender, drove his car into a Maine village and asked his way to a hilltop from which he could see a view that a tourist guide had told him about. "Someone showed him the way," say Allport and Postman, "but within an hour the community was buzzing with the story that a Japanese spy had ascended the hill

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to take pictures of the region."

What had happened? Someone told the story. It was told over and over again. And as it passed from person to person, three things were happening to it. So, at least, Allport and Postman[19] concluded from their analysis of the case.

In the first place, it was being leveled. Details were being omitted:

> The courteous and timid, but withal honest, approach of the visitor to the native of whom he inquired his way; the fact that although he was certainly Oriental, his precise nationality was unknown. Likewise not mentioned was the fact that the visitor had allowed himself to be readily identified by people along the way; and that no one had seen a camera in his possession.*

In the second place, the story was being sharpened:

> Having accepted their special interpretation of the Chinese scholar's visit, the rumor agents accentuated certain features while minimizing others. The sharpening of selected details accounts for the overdrawn dramatic quality of the final story. What in the original situation was Oriental became specified as Japanese; what was merely a "man" became a special kind of man, a "spy." The harmless holiday pursuit of viewing the scenery became the much sharper, sinister purpose of espionage. The truth that the visitor had a picture in his hand became sharpened into the act of "taking pictures." The objective fact that no pictures of any possible value to the enemy could be taken from that particular rural location was overlooked.*

In the third place, the story was assimilated:

> In the Maine countryside resident natives have had little contact with Orientals. Like most Occidentals they are unable to distinguish a Chinese person from a Japanese. They had only one available rubric for Orientals, firmly implanted in their minds by wartime news and stories: the "Japanese spy." No other category was available for the classification of this unusual visitation. A Chinese teacher-on-a-holiday was a concept that could not arise in the minds of most farmers, for they did not know that some American universities employ Chinese scholars on their staffs and that these scholars, like other teachers, are entitled to summer holidays. The novel situation was perforce *assimilated* in terms of the most available frames of reference.*

This process—leveling, sharpening, and assimilation—seems to characterize the passage of all rumors. You can test it yourself, as Allport and Postman did, by playing a kind of parlor game: write a brief story; then whisper it word for word to a guest, who will whisper it to the guest on the other side of him, and so around the room. When the story comes back to you, compare it with the original. This has been done in the laboratory many times, in the transmission of both pictures (Fig. 1)[19] and words, and the same general principles of perception seem to apply.

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Consider what was happening in the incident of the Chinese teacher. The villagers were trying to give the incident a meaning. They perceived those details that added up to a meaning, selecting some details, rejecting others, distorting some, adding some (for example, the camera). The important question, of course, is this: what controlled their selection? They were obviously selecting in terms of the frames of reference available to them (which did

Henry Holt and Company[19]

Fig. 1—How the Owl Became a Cat—Visual Rumor

not include Chinese teachers on vacation in Maine), and in terms of their needs, moods, and anxieties as of that moment. The war was much on their minds. Japanese were objects of fear, distrust, and hate. Protecting their country was a high value of great importance to them. Their suspicion of foreigners was of long standing. They had been exposed to the Government's campaign for security of information, to spy movies, to the knowledge that cameras were prohibited around defense installations. And all this added up to a frame of reference, in terms of which they perceived this new event. As Allport and Postman[19] put it:

> A yellow man—a Jap—a spy—photographic espionage. One idea led to the other with almost mechanical inevitability until the final conclusion emerged . . . . The three-pronged process of leveling, sharpening, and assimilation reflects the rumor agents' "effort after meaning." The facts of the situation, but dimly understood, did not provide the meaning that the strange visitation required. Hence a single directive idea took hold—the *spy motif*—and in accordance with it, discordant details were leveled

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out, incidents sharpened to fit the chosen theme, and the episode as a whole assimilated to the pre-existing structure of feeling and thought characteristic of the members of the group among whom the rumor spread."

Rumors are clearly an important weapon of psywar. But let us look at them here only in terms of the perceptual processes they illustrate and of what they mean to the psywar operator who wants to know how a message is likely to be received. For methods of countering rumors see the next section.

Countering Rumors

If you want to anticipate how an intelligent enemy will defend himself you can look at some of America's experiences in rumor defense during World War II. A good account of these efforts will be found in Allport and Postman.[19]

In general, this country used two kinds of defense against rumor. The government agencies preferred the indirect method of smothering rumors with facts, that is, it did not repeat rumors even for the purpose of refuting them. The theory behind this defense is (a) that "rumor flies in the absence of news" and (b) that to repeat a rumor even for refutation may spread it farther. Therefore agencies like OWI, when they learned of a dangerous rumor, would release facts in answer to it without ever mentioning the rumor.

On the other hand, nongovernmental organizations and civilians put their faith in rumor clinics, which chiefly took the form of newspaper columns or radio programs in which rumors were selected for ridicule and refutation. The theory here was to bring rumors out into the open into a climate of fact and understanding, where they could not flourish. Such evaluation and study of these rumor clinics as was made indicates that (a) there was no evidence that newspaper rumor clinics, filled with ridicule and negation as they were, actually served to spread any rumors farther; (b) however, it was regarded as possibly dangerous to print a rumor in bold-face type, or to repeat the rhythms and slogan-like qualities of some of the more effective rumors; (c) it was felt that radio rumor clinics were more likely than printed clinics to spread a rumor, because of the dial-twisting habits of American listeners; and (d) there was some slight evidence that the clinics impeded the spread of rumor, and no doubt whatsoever that they succeeded in making their communities rumor-conscious.

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Along with these defenses, of course, there was a poster, newspaper, and radio campaign aimed at security of information. Typical slogans were "Think before you talk," "Enemy ears are listening," "Don't kill her daddy with careless talk." This is standing operating procedure (SOP) for any country at war.

Summary

For the psywar operator this material illustrates the problems he faces in trying to get his meaning across to the target. The fundamental idea is Lippmann's thesis that all men know their environment in terms of pictures in their heads, which are not exactly equivalent to the world outside. The question, then, is this: how do they form those pictures? That is the problem of perception.

We perceive the world in terms of its meaning to us. Thus, we structure experience—we select, distort, add—but we always structure it meaningfully and functionally. That is, we see things in terms of our needs, our previous experience, our moods. We organize experience so as to make it fit into our frames of reference—and especially so as to resist change in the structure of belief and understanding that we strongly hold. We tend to group bits of experience—people or events—in terms of their similarities or nearness. Finally, we organize experience in terms of the language we have to describe it. Evidently, therefore, different people will perceive different meanings in the same experience, so that it is essential to know as much as possible about the frames of reference, needs, moods, and language of a target if one is to predict with any confidence whether an intended meaning will get across. As one passage quoted in the chapter said: "There are no impartial 'facts.' Data do not have a logic of their own that results in the same perceptions and cognitions for all people. Data are perceived and interpreted in terms of the individual perceiver's own needs, own emotions, own personality, own previously formed cognitive patterns."

In reviewing this chapter the reader will also recall the bases in perception for many devices of propaganda, such as name calling, glittering generalities, transfer, testimonials, guilt and innocence by association, and folksy language; and for the way that rumors grow and spread, and the way rumors are countered.

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Chapter 4

RESPONSE TO THE MESSAGE

NATURE AND GROWTH OF ATTITUDES

The message has been received. It has attracted attention and been perceived, by which we mean it has been given a meaning in relation to the other pictures within the recipient's head. Now the message begins to operate within the realm of attitudes.

Psychologists list attitudes among the intervening variables. They call them "intervening" because, they say, attitudes come between stimulus and response, and help determine the way the individual responds to a given stimulus.

Attitudes are not the only intervening variables. Intelligence, habits, and motives all get between stimulus and response in much the same way that attitudes do. In point of fact, attitudes partly depend, as we shall see, on these other intervening variables, and have no particular advantage as regards determining the nature of responses. But because attitudes are the evaluators among these variables—because they serve to classify the stimuli on the scale of favor-opposition—they are often more useful than the others in predicting what direction the response will take. The internal effect of a stimulus can often be described in terms of attitudes, and attitudes can either facilitate or hinder external behavior which arises as an effect of a stimulus. Therefore it is important for psywar operators to understand something about how attitudes are formed and changed.

What is an attitude? Let us define an attitude as an inferred state of readiness to react in an evaluative way, in support of or against, a given social stimulus situation.

Look at that definition, piece by piece:

an inferred state—We cannot see an attitude. We can only infer it from a person's expressed opinions or from his actions.

of readiness—Attitudes act like a steering wheel rather than an engine. The attitude is ready, but it doesn't start things. It

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steps in to guide the direction of response after the process under consideration has been set in motion by a stimulus.

to react in an evaluative way, in support of or against—This is the heart of the definition. Attitudes are concerned with the pros and cons—the relative values—of living. They represent judgments that have grown up gradually with experience. They are the built-in measuring sticks by which we evaluate new experience. They always have two dimensions: direction, by which is meant where they stand, in relation to a particular stimulus, on a scale from favorableness to opposition; and intensity, by which is meant how strongly they are held, how energetically the holder is prepared to act in the direction they point, how vigorously he is prepared to defend them, etc.

a given social stimulus situation—This completes the picture of attitudes as tools for coping with our complex social environment. Attitudes help us to classify and respond to the great mass of stimulation that comes constantly into our nervous systems from social situations.

How Attitudes Grow

Children's attitudes are unstable. Parents and child psychologists know that. Children are fickle. The things they like to do, and the people they like to do these things with, change easily and quickly. This is not surprising. In children the neuromuscular apparatus that mediates learning is not very well developed, and there is no large accumulated backlog of habits to help in the learning of something new. What this means in effect is that it is fairly easy for one day's learnings to be displaced by the next day's. Thus a child's attitudes are constantly shifting and, along with them, his interests and even his abilities, and nothing can put a stop to the shifting except the gradual development, within the child, of a pattern that carries over from one learning experience to the next. The social and psychological conditions affecting a child vary so much from day to day that it takes a long time for him to learn to respond consistently to similar (not identical) stimuli. That is, a child's reaction to Communism or Negroes or religion may be now favorable, now neutral, now adverse, and it takes many occasions for him to learn the kind of reaction that is to be dominant and is to become a stable and generalized part of his personality.

A second reason for instability of attitudes in children is that a child's whole personality structure is rather unstable. A child

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can shift fairly rapidly from dependence to independence, from aggressiveness to submissiveness, from politeness to rudeness—and all of these in response to the same individual or situation as stimulus.

How, then, do attitudes become stabilized? The answer is twofold: (1) As other aspects of personality mature and become more integrated, as the person develops a consistent notion of himself and of the distinction between his own self and the outer world, attitudes become more consistent, and as they become more consistent they also become more completely integrated and perform more smoothly their function of supporting the rest of the personality in its complex relations with the environment. (2) As a child becomes older he adopts—by choice or by force—roles in various social structures or groups. It is through these that he gains his major satisfactions in life. Attitudes act in support of these roles and the structures of which they are a part. As he ages he becomes more closely allied with an increasingly consistent set of groups, and this helps stabilize his attitudes. (When attitudes remain inconsistent into adulthood, they often result in the development of neuroses, which reflect incompatible social needs and allegiances—a phenomenon that Horney[1] calls "the neurotic personality of our time.")

Basis of Attitudes

The Learning Process. Attitudes are learned. Indeed, the basic principles of learning apply not only to the growth of attitudes but also to the formation of the whole basic set of tools we use for living in society, that is, the personality. Thus it is appropriate to ask, How do we learn?

We learn by building up an association between a cue and a response. A cue is simply a stimulus that stands out from the rest of our environment, as, in an earlier chapter, we spoke of "figure" as standing out from background. We respond to a cue under the influence of a drive and we are, once we have learned, rewarded. That is the basic formula in terms of which practically all human and animal learning can be interpreted.

By a drive we mean a tension that impels us to action. We have biological drives such as hunger, and social drives such as the need to understand our environment. A reward is any state of affairs that reduces the drive tension. Food, for example, would reward us in terms of a hunger drive; it would reduce the drive. Without drives, people would be inert. Without rewards

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they would either die (if they failed to satisfy such drives as that of hunger) or they would live a goalless and chaotic kind of life.

Under the influence of a drive, then, we respond to a cue and are rewarded. A hungry animal in a laboratory is given the choice of walking toward a white or a black card. If he walks toward the black card, he gets nothing. If he walks toward the white card he gets food. Soon he associates white (the cue) with food (the reward), and under the impulse of the drive (hunger) he learns to make the rewarding response (that is, to orient himself and walk toward the white card).

Most human learning is more complicated than that, but the general pattern is the same. A child learns to say "please" in the presence of a complex set of cues, including his symbols for the food he wants and the sight of it in his parent's hand. He is told to say "please." If he does so, he is given the food. After a number of such trials, he learns to indicate the food, say "please," and collect his reward. In other words, he learns how to reduce his drive, and when he has thoroughly learned the response we say that he has acquired a habit

But how does he learn to say "please" to reduce other tensions, for instance, when he wants to go riding with his parents, or wants a nickel to buy an ice cream cone? This is a long step in learning. Exactly how it is thought to happen is a rather complicated and technical matter, but suffice it to say here that the process is one of generalization or habit spread, and of discrimination. After a child has learned to associate the response "kitty" with the cues from his kitten, he will probably call other small furry animals kitty also. Having learned to respond "daddy" he will probably try it on men other than his father. The more nearly similar the cue, the more likely he is to respond to it in the same way. And as a result of trial and error he will learn to discriminate or to refine his habit. That is, he will learn which adult human with trousers, shirt, and tie will reward him when called "daddy." Many trials are necessary before the child learns to discriminate even among such fairly simple cues as these. In more difficult social situations it is correspondingly more difficult to learn to discriminate the cues which stand for alternative courses of action, and to balance the rewards and punishments of related actions.

However, repetition alone is not enough to assure learning. An instance in which simple repetition was depended on without the other conditions for learning being met, for example, by rewarding the response, was recalled by Hovland,[2] Chairman of

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the Department of Psychology at Yale: "During the war a number of top advertising men developed a program which suggested every hour on the hour 'Hate the Germans,' but I could never diagram the relationship between that stimulus and the desired response to make sense in the form of a learning paradigm, and I'd predict no desired learning did occur." In this case, no matter how familiar the three words became, there was very little likelihood that they would arouse any of the desired emotion in their hearers.

You can readily see some of the implications of this learning process for the practice of psywar. For example, you want a given target audience to learn the habit of listening to your psywar radio broadcast. You know that if they listen and are rewarded, they will be likely to listen again. If the reward is fairly regular, their response is likely to become habitual. If they are not rewarded, they may not try again. If they are rewarded the first time, but not the second or third, their impulse to respond will probably be extinguished; that is, they will quit listening. But how does the operator make sure that they will be rewarded for listening? He looks for their tensions or drives. What can be done to reduce those tensions? Are they nostalgic for the old music which the Communists have barred? Are they frustrated soldiers lonely for the sound of a young female voice? Are they perplexed and in need of reliable news? The operator's job will be to plan his programs so as to meet those needs, reduce those drives.

Of course, this itself is a rather elementary piece of learning. What is really desired is to teach them more complex responses, in a more complex field of social and political cues. This is discussed in the following paragraphs.

The Developing Personality. A human infant does not exist as a person; he has no self. Even though he may be different from others in strength and loudness and frequency of crying and may be the dearest thing in the world to his parents, he still—as one psychologist has expressed it—"floats about in an undifferentiated absolute." He has learned next to nothing from his environment; he is highly nondiscriminative with respect to the cues he responds to; his behavior is quite general. But as he grows, his biological equipment becomes better organized. He is able to learn from experience, and he does so.

Slowly there develops (we can only conjecture this, for infants cannot talk and tell us about this) a vague distinction between "me" (self) and "not-me" (not-self). When he pinches his toes, there is

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stimulation in the toes and the fingers as well, but when someone else pinches his toes, there is stimulation in the toes only—a different situation. As a result of turning, crawling, and falling, the infant encounters stimulation from the environment; each stimulation has in common with all the others the fact that it comes to "self," the same place.

After about a year the child acquires language responses and can begin to use symbols to stand for things. By the time (usually around age two) he is able to respond consistently to a symbol which stands for his own body—his name—it is possible to ask some interesting questions: Where's Johnny? The child will probably point to his nose or chest, somewhere along the line of maximum stimulation. Touch the child's hand and ask: Is this Johnny? The answer is commonly No. Is this Johnny's hand? Yes. Yes it is Johnny's hand, but it is still not a part of Johnny the person. He is vague about himself; he hasn't had enough trials to learn that all parts of his body are parts of the thing to which the symbols Johnny or "I" attach. The discrimination between self and not-self is poor and is not usually very clear until about five or six years of age.

After this time, when the child knows himself, there comes often a negativistic period which is so frustrating to parents and of great interest to psychologists. Having at last learned to discriminate "I" (the self), he begins to value that self (for it brings him a good many satisfactions). He plays with this new knowledge. It never stands out more sharply than when it is resisting the wishes of his parents. The self consists now of a good many things besides the child's body; it includes the habits he uses to gain particular ends, and it includes the drives these habits serve. And, in a figurative sense, it comes to include certain external objects that are important in his habit and motivational systems—his toys, his playthings, his parents, and, occasionally, his brothers and sisters. He reacts to these as though they were part of himself; they are important and are to be defended nearly as much as the symbol that stands for the self as a whole. And the symbol, the given name, for self becomes very important; it is the object of the attentions of others and is directly involved in the punishments and rewards the ego receives. "I" can have feelings hurt at the age of five, but hardly at age three.

This is where repression becomes important. Repression is the process whereby certain responses are forgotten and kept from appearing in overt behavior. Perhaps a case summary will illustrate it best.

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An aviation cadet in pilot training was having considerable difficulty in passing his check flights, flights on which he was accompanied by an instructor. Although this was not uncommon in training, this particular case was interesting because on solo flights the cadet was observed to do very well in every respect. But when there was an instructor checking him in the other seat he flew roughly, didn't locate his check points, and performed several dangerous operations. Being strongly motivated to pass, he eventually came to the attention of psychologists at the base. About a dozen interviews finally revealed that the boy had a very strong hatred of his father. This hatred was completely unknown to him beforehand, and much difficulty was encountered in finally bringing him to recognize it. His problem in check-flying seemed to be that he was reacting with antagonism and fear to the instructor (though overtly he said he liked the instructor and got along well with him) as though he were his father. The hatred of his father had been repressed so that he for years was unaware of it; yet the emotional aspect of the hatred persisted and in a number of areas involving persons in father roles had been erratic and generally unsatisfactory to all concerned. (Notice here the operation of stimulus generalization.) After he had made the recognition of the hatred he was able to discriminate between the instructor and his father and was no longer erratic in check flights, eventually passing the course.

This is the outcome of repression. Repression is a learned adaptive response. The boy in childhood had expressed hatred for his father and was punished because our culture does not sanction father hatred. He then expressed nothing in the presence of paternal injustice and was rewarded for "being a man," "exercising self-control," and the like. When he expressed favorable attitudes toward his father, the rewards were even greater. Drive: fear. Cue: father (or symbols of him). Response: active inhibition of hate reactions and favorable verbalizations. Reward: release from fear. Hundreds of trials enabled the boy to learn a favorable attitude toward father (who undoubtedly had some redeeming features). But he could not—or at least did not—unlearn the unverbalized emotional reaction.

Why do we make special mention of repressions? Notice what happened to the cadet when repressed drives were aroused. His behavior was disturbed. If, through anthropological studies or other sources, a psywar operator can learn the nature of the strong repressed drives within the target audience—the ones that are widespread enough to be called "cultural traits"—then he has

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an area of operation par excellence. The practical problem remains then to devise the stimuli that will arouse those drives, and others, and direct them for or against the objects or conditions that it is the mission of psywar to affect.

This sort of thing was attempted in connection with World War II propaganda against the Japanese. Anthropological data were interpreted psychoanalytically to indicate that the kind of training given most Japanese males, that which produced their well-known devotion to the authority of the Emperor, was highly repressive training. Each child went through a period of comparative indulgence during his first year. Authority in the form of the father was then invoked, and the child's status was sharply altered. The antagonism thereby generated toward the father tended to generalize to other authority figures but by severe punishments was repressed, while more desirable responses were substituted for it. The basic antagonisms remained but were repressed, and the child's need for security and freedom from fear was satisfied by approval conferred by authority figures. Now the problem for psywar was to find the stimuli which would arouse antagonisms toward certain authorities without at the same time evoking the stereotype devotion to national figures and symbols.

The validity of the above interpretation of the Japanese, and the effectiveness of the propaganda based on it, are still matters of conjecture. That the mechanism of repression is important in individual behavior problems is no longer questioned. But it remains to be established whether or not propaganda programs made up of stimuli coming from outside a target country can manipulate it successfully.

Development of Social Relations. Most learning and most personality development take place in social situations. Repression is a social product. Therefore let us look at the way a child's developing social relations affect the growth of his attitudes.

Of what importance are group experiences and group membership to the developing personality?

In the first place it is only in the group that a person can encounter language. Language is a uniquely social product. The child learns symbols that stand for the things he plays or works with; he learns symbols for the other people in some group; he learns symbols for what he does and what the others do; he learns symbols that stand for himself and help him to discriminate between himself and things that are not himself. It is the presence of the language symbols that makes possible the discrimination

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of his role in the group. Through language he understands the relationship of others t. him, for example, in this form: "If I write on the wall, then Mommie will scold." This process of knowing what the next person is going to do in response to one's own action is of the greatest importance in the process by which a child becomes a fully socialized and certified member of a group, and thus in the formation of the child's self. Without language this indispensable communication, which defines roles and figuratively cements the group together, could not take place.

Another consequence of group membership is that there is assured for the child a consistent set of conditions in which the principles of learning can operate. The group provides him with consistent cues. The group provides avenues and facilities for responses to cues. And the group, most importantly, assures the operation of a fairly consistent set of rewards and punishments for responses. This is the most fundamental function of a group, speaking psychologically. It is the existence of a set of consistent cues to and consequences of motivated action that makes possible the assumption of roles and the first steps toward the learning of language.

Through behaving as a group member, then, the individual is enabled to learn three important sets of responses: (1) language responses, which allow communication and facilitate the discrimination of self from others, (2) instrumental responses, or the specific need-meeting skills the individual requires in order to perform his role, and (3) drive-producing responses. The last two classes of responses taken together embrace everything that is included under the label of "personality," and a good many other things as well. Let us emphasize the fact that in the group the person learns most of those responses and drives that outwardly distinguish him from others, and inwardly differentiate him from his others and enable him to know his "self."

Roles. Several times now we have mentioned "roles" and "role-performance." These are a natural outcome of group living. Groups, as we have seen, are organized and repetitive sets of relations between people. In order for a group to exist, therefore, it must be possible for its members to count on each other to do certain things (such as, in a family, washing dishes) and not others (such as changing the oil in the family car). The efficiency of the group and hence the mutual values derived by the members from the group's existence would be impaired if everyone did or tried to do everyone else's job and did not learn to do a particular thing well—and regularly. Family life suffers if

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the five-year-old children insist on doing the cooking and housekeeping or if the mother spends all her waking hours playing cards. Certain things must be done so that the group is able to provide satisfactions for its members and hence to exist. These things, peculiar to the various members, are called "roles."

From the standpoint of an individual the function of a role is to bring consistent satisfaction to consistent motives. From the standpoint of the outside observer of the group the function of roles is (a) to "socialize" the new members and ultimately (b) to cause the members to contribute to the continued existence of the group.

People come originally to occupy positions and to assume roles partly because they are born into an already going society and partly because they recognize roles and positions as means of satisfying motives already acquired. A child born into and growing up in a family finds roles already set up for the existing members. It is in and through role-taking that a person becomes "socialized," learns the ways and means of the group, learns a language, and "interiorizes" a set of values. In fulfilling the role prescription for "child" (whether it be "child in a family of ten," or "only child"), the young human being learns, as we have said, to differentiate himself from the others making up his social environment. And with the development of language he is better able to learn labels for himself, such as "good boy," "older brother," or "tough guy," and to use them as guides in his various role behaviors.

Roles gain in importance with time and become to some extent independent of the immediate group structure. Roles become a part of the person's ego structure, serving not only as a set of tools for providing life's rewards but also as a set of values.

Roles have also the related functions of bringing the person in contact with the cues and the incentives that trigger the motivational systems acquired earlier. At the same time they provide a channel for the satisfaction of these motives. Proper role-playing (meeting role prescriptions) ensures the maintenance of the individual in his position in the social structure, which ensures the meeting of personality needs (as for dependence or dominance), and at the same time ensures survival not only socially but biologically. Small wonder then that roles should become values in themselves. Witness how, when you ask a person who or what he is, he is likely to name some role, such as professor of olericulture, or plumber, and is likely to defend rather strongly the importance of olericulture or plumbing "in the modern world."

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Role-taking integrates the person with others in his group. In addition to providing the individual with a personality and a set of values, organized around his major roles, role-taking has significant effects in relating the individual to other aspects of his groups. One such effect is called by a sociologist "taking the role of the other," which means being able to predict what others in the group are likely to do in given situations. Thus, a child gradually learns what his mother's functions are and can anticipate mother's responses to his own behavior. Such ability to take others' roles is the basis of good social adjustment; the social world becomes more familiar, and the person isn't constantly presented with surprising and often threatening reactions on the part of others.

An outcome of knowing what others' roles are is the learning and valuing of the common behaviors of one's group. Just as one's own role patterns become the normal and true way of behaving, the values that are common features of the role patterns of one's associates become commonly valued and commonly defended. To illustrate: it is "normal" in a statistical sense for each Mohammedan child to avoid pigs. Thus it becomes a shared norm and a shared value and is meaningful as a basis of communication only to the extent that it is shared.

Special kinds of attitudes are formed in relation to roles. The storekeeper is ready to act in certain evaluative ways toward the customer. The customer is ready for certain actions toward the storekeeper. Both expect certain actions from one another, and each expects the other to have certain attitudes toward himself; the storekeeper is deferential, and the customer expects him to be so. The customer knows he has certain rights and privileges and knows that the storekeeper knows this too. Both parties thus have definite expectations about one another, and each is ready to act toward the other in particular ways.

Role attitudes are a matter of being ready to act toward others in particular ways. They are therefore very important in the operation of groups. They are actually a part of the role prescribed for the person as his part of the group process. Without them the group does not function well—as witness what happens when a new person joins a committee. There is hesitation and caution until the new person finds an appropriate role for himself and learns what the others' roles are. After that, when everyone knows approximately what to expect of others and what others expect of him, the work of the committee speeds up.

To the extent that one's roles are limited to a very few situ-

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ations or relations, one's personality tends to become standardized. There develops in bureaucrats, for example, such a pattern as one investigator has studied under the name "bureaucratic personality." The professor tends to act like a professor, the executive like an executive. They carry these action patterns even over into activities that are not occupational; for example, the professor tends to act like a professor even when he is buying groceries or on a camping trip. And with these roles go, inevitably, certain supporting attitudes. The professor carries favorable attitudes toward patience and thoughtfulness and careful attention to detail; the executive carries favorable attitudes toward quick, decisive action and forceful efficiency. These attitudes are generated within the roles that these individuals play. They act to support the individuals in these roles, and the institutions of which the roles are a part.

Summary

Attitudes are learned. They are learned, like the other personality tools that help us to adjust to our environment, by discovering which responses to which cues will be rewarded. They develop as personality develops and as we learn to play our roles in society. They develop in such a way as to help us protect or express the enduring aspects of personality, and the rewarding patterns of social relations. Thus they represent evaluative judgments on the likely results of given behavior, and they serve as signposts of responses we are likely to make. Their signs, for the most part, point toward one kind of response, that is, they predispose us to action that will reduce our biogenic or emotional drives, preserve the values we hold, support behavior allowing us to use resources we are proud of, help us structure experience meaningfully, support our role concepts, and preserve our group norms.

Therefore the process of attitude formation begins with the individual's first breath and continues throughout life. His attitude structure, unstable and shifting at first, grows increasingly firm as his personality develops and he finds his place in society. It is into this long-continuing process inside each member of the target audience that the psywar operator sluices his message. The message must go through the same process as the countless other stimuli that have entered into the formation of the audience member's attitudes; that is one reason why it is important for the psywar planner and the psywar operator to understand some-

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thing of the learning process, briefly described in the preceding pages. The new message will enter into a situation in which there are old, firm, accumulated attitudes and also relatively new and less firm attitudes. There will be attitudes that are strongly held and others not so strongly held; in general, the more an attitude tends to support the strong structures, the enduring aspects, of the personality, the more likely it is to be held strongly. But there will also be some strong attitudes that have been repressed and are never consciously expressed.

Without anticipating the subject matter of the following sections, it can safely be said here that the psywar message is likely to be accepted more easily if it follows the general direction of existing attitudes. If its purpose is to change attitudes, then it will be exceedingly difficult to change those that are old and strongly held. It will have more success if it works in the area where attitudes are new and not strongly held, though this, of course, is always a matter of more or less. If it can arouse some repressed attitudes, it may succeed in disrupting a personality or a group. If it can give protection to repressed attitudes that are about to be brought out into the open, it may prevent the disruption of a personality or a group. Whatever its purpose and its area of operation, however, the psywar message must be designed to take full advantage of the learning pattern. That is, it must present itself as a cue, a certain response to which will be rewarded. To say it another way, it must be so devised that, if the target individual responds in a certain way to the cue, one of his drives or tensions will be reduced. And if the desired response is really to be learned, it must be practiced. Once will not be enough.

But before this is discussed further, we had better talk about the kinds of attitudes that develop and how these different kinds of attitudes may enter into psywar plans should be considered.

KINDS OF ATTITUDES

We have talked about the growth of attitudes in general and have said that they tend to cluster around the basic aspects of personality, predisposing us toward action that will protect or express those basic aspects. It will be useful now to discuss some of these clusters of attitudes and to suggest how psywar planners and operators may take each of them into account.

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Attitudes Based on Biological Drives

Under normal conditions, the biological drives, such as those toward rest, food, water, air, general activity, or the elimination of waste products, do not play a significant part in determining attitudes, mostly because these drives are for the most part so easily satisfied. It is true that in infancy such drives have a relatively large hour-by-hour influence on behavior and attitudes because the very early years are concerned especially with learning appropriate ways of meeting such needs. Some psychologists and anthropologists believe that many long-run effects on behavior, including attitudes toward authority, stem from the early period during which the child learns to control eliminative functions and other biological drives. But normal living conditions in practically all cultures are such that these basic biological drives are reasonably well satisfied through habits and institutions, so that variations in them only rarely have a significant effect on attitudes.

Take, however, a battlefield, or an area which has just suffered heavy bombing, or any situation where society, or the current social structure, does not provide for reduction of the biological drives. They may suddenly become so strong and insistent that the other so-called "learned" needs are laid aside. Then attitudes may be adapted that support action tending to satisfy the now-dominant biogenic drives.

Here we may draw a useful distinction between sociogenic and biogenic needs and take note of the fact that biogenic needs usually predominate when the chips are down. A study of the effects of starvation was made at the University of Minnesota during World War II, using conscientious objectors as subject participants. Thirty-six conscientious objectors volunteered to be subjected to systematic semistarvation for a period of six months. During this time they lost, on the average, about 25 percent of their body weight, and with the resultant physical changes went psychological concomitants that are of great interest for psywar. For the subject participants knew they were perfectly safe from external harm, were being carefully observed for possible serious consequences to their health, and could terminate their participation in the experiment at will, so that in many respects they were not nearly so bad off as people in a bombed city or a prisoner of war (POW) camp. We might therefore fairly expect the things that happened to them to happen on a much larger scale in bombed cities and POW camps. (Last winter's news stories from Koje Island are worth rereading in this connection.)

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The Minnesota experiment shows how, under conditions of continued starvation, the effects of years of acquiring social habits and values rapidly drops away, exposing a core of self-preservative, biogenically oriented motivation. Keys and co-workers express it this way:[3]

> As starvation progressed they became more and more silent, apathetic and immobile. Movements were slow and restricted; stairs were mounted one at a time and the men sat or stood leaning against a wall while waiting. In discussion there was no evidence of confusion of thought or difficulty of expression but the attitude was frequently irritable and morose. Trivial incidents were productive of exaggerated annoyance and complaint. Favorite topics of conversation were food, farming and rural life, a fact which was bitterly resented by some of the men.
>
> A frequent complaint was the sensation of being "old."
>
> A number of men were bothered by vivid dreams, particularly of dreams of breaking the diet, with attendant great remorse.

Some of the men were unable to remain on the restricted diet clear through the experiment, despite the fact that considerable interest in the experiment had been aroused in various parts of the country and considerable prestige attached to being a participant in it:[4]

> This deterioration of their ethical control was all the more remarkable because these men had shown themselves to be sincere and upright throughout the two or more years of work they had performed in civilian public service before coming to the laboratory. . . .The semi-starvation pressure of hunger was, however, too much—their very beings revolted against the restriction. One of the individuals not only bought food, but also stole some from "locked" storerooms. Another individual sublimated his food cravings by stealing china cups from coffee shops. Although fasting is said at times to quicken one spiritually, none of the men reported significant progress in their religious lives. Most of them felt that the semi-starvation had coarsened rather than refined them, and they marveled at how thin their moral and social veneers seemed to be.*

The intensive preoccupation with food interfered with other activities and occupied most of their leisure time. Work efficiency was cut down, interest in their girl friends all but disappeared, and a common recreation was the planning of how best to enjoy the next meal. Cookbooks became fascinating literature for some of them.

As for their social life per se, there was a decreased interest in other persons, especially persons who were not a part of the starvation experiment. The men built up a strong in-group feeling that excluded practically everyone else, and there was little or no concern with courtesies, with consideration for others (even within the group), or with personal appearance.

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Reports by observers of other nonexperimental conditions of food deprivation confirm even more vividly the breakdown of well-established value systems with their supporting attitudes, and their replacement by the persistent striving after food. In occupied Germany, one poll of young women showed that they were too much concerned with food to be interested in love and affection. Women and girls of nearly all ages and classes prostituted themselves in return for bits of food. Careful dietary habits and long-established food tastes disappeared completely, and personal and group loyalties weakened or vanished in the quest for food.

In short, even the strongest attitudes toward the institutions of one's society will be shaken or abandoned if those institutions fail to meet such a basic need as that for food. This sometimes provides psywar with great strategic opportunities. It can step into such situations with pictures and words relating to the unsatisfied need and be sure of attracting attention. It can call upon the target audience for behavior x and be pretty sure of success if x promises satisfaction of that need as a reward.

Sex as a biological drive attains importance under conditions of deprivation but only when activities motivated by stronger drives such as hunger do not interfere with sexual preoccupations. Wars being run the way they are, it is impossible for the commanders of an army to see to the satisfaction of all the needs of their men. Even "militarily healthy" troops on full rations are likely to be sexually deprived and hence susceptible to psywar appeals stressing sexual materials. Most particularly, pornographic psywar material may have an effect on attitudes through the mechanism called "projection"; sex-hungry soldiers are highly vulnerable to hints or assertions that their women are being unfaithful, and that "4-Fs" and others not really caught up in the war, high officers, government officials, etc., for example, are enjoying their favors. Their own needs are "projected" onto others at the suggestion of the psywar leaflet.

This was the psychology behind the Nazis' use of a pornographic piece featuring a Jewish figure leading "your girl back home" astray, a double-barreled appeal for the sex-hungry anti-Semite.

Pornographic propaganda is, however, more often successful in attracting attention than in eliciting overt action. For the latter purpose the sex drive is a far less effective mechanism to play on than hunger, especially when the psywar operator is in a position to hold out a promise of early reward for the drive for food. True, men will respond, under certain conditions, to surrender leaflets emphasizing the opportunity to get back to the sexual and

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other satisfactions of a peaceful homeland. But the combat psywar operator should remember that the sex drive is likely to be dormant among hungry troops and that, in any case, other aspects of personality may oppose extramarital gratification.

For psywar purposes, then, it appears that, first, efforts to change attitudes through appeals to the biological drives of militarily healthy troops cannot be counted upon to produce great results; second, with troops or civilian populations whose food supply is very low, appeals based on hunger motivation may be extremely effective; and third, when the chips are down, biogenic needs are going to predominate over sociogenic ones; that is, it does no good to propagandize a hungry man about democracy if your rival is able to offer him food.

Attitudes Formed in Defense of the "Self"

One's self, it has been said, is "the individual as known to the individual." Each person can discriminate between his own body and its behavior and the bodies and behaviors of other people. He knows to some extent his own resources of skills and attitudes and how they can help him to get along in the world. He also has certain ways of doing specific things that are characteristic of him and set him apart from others. For example, some pay the check at a restaurant grudgingly, others take time when paying it to be friendly and "sociable," still others pay it methodically, counting the money carefully and noting and filing the receipt, etc. These resources of skills, and these characteristic ways of carrying out specific acts are variously useful to the person who thus cherishes them and moves to protect them when they are threatened. Thus the self is a value—a complex of specific values—as well as a pool of adjustive resources. And by definition, values are things that we strive to preserve.

One way the individual can preserve his values is to act in defense of the other persons, the groups, and the institutions that are committed to their preservation. That means he must hold attitudes appropriate to such action. One function of an attitude, then, is to provide a basis and guide for action through which the values of the self may be maintained. Suppose, for example, that you have a considerable dependence on religion. That means you value religion and will develop attitudes predisposing you to act in defense of certain religious institutions and their representatives (church, priest, pastor). Now suppose that enemy psywar attacks your church. Your attitudes are likely to set up a rigor-

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ous defense. But suppose on the other hand that you are a North Korean Christian, and the Communist regime has taken your church's land, arrested your minister, and made it difficult for you to worship. And then suppose anti-Communist psywar directs your attention to what has happened, denounces the Communist regime, and suggests that you take certain action against the Communists. Are you not likely to react favorably to that propaganda? Religious groups, then, are obvious friendly targets for psywar operations against Communism.

Look at it from the other side of the world. Suppose that you are an American Negro. Suppose that your "self-respect," that is, the attitudes that you have developed in support of your "self," has often been wounded by the actions and culture patterns of white Americans. And suppose that Communist agitators or Communist psywar publications come to you, speaking of "equality," denouncing the treatment you are getting, and inviting you to join a movement that promises you more "self-respect." Are you not likely to look with greater favor than you otherwise might on that propaganda? That is why minority groups in non-Communist countries are favorite targets for Communist psywar.

Or suppose you are a German, and your country is under occupation. You have developed a high skill at printing—designing a page, setting type, imposing it on paper. You have often been praised for this, and you value the skill highly. When the occupation authorities come in, you offer your services as a printer. But you are told brusquely that the printers for the occupation forces have come along from America, that no German printers are needed, and that if you want a job you can start cleaning the rubble from the streets. What is your reaction likely to be? You will be frustrated. Your characteristic skill is being denied expression. You have no opportunity to describe yourself as an artist printer. Your reaction will probably be to oppose the occupation people and resist all their consolidation propaganda. Suppose, on the other hand, they recognize your skill, use it, praise you. Then how might you react to the occupation?

We are not saying, of course, that all consolidation operations should as a matter of course employ native labor The point is, rather, that propaganda whenever possible should provide for "selfish" behavior, that is, behavior through which the major characteristics of the self can be expressed. Let us take one more example. A basic characteristic of the Chinese personality seems to be respect for the past and, especially, for the great men of the past. One device of anti-Communist psywar in China has

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therefore been to try to convince the Chinese that the present Communist regime is traitorous to the ideals and heroes of the past, particularly to such leaders as Sun Yat-sen, who has for many years been a symbol of particular importance in China. It thus gets on its side, or tries to, the attitudes the Chinese have developed in defense of the self, and action against the Communists is made to appear selfishly rewarding behavior.

Ego-involved Attitudes

"Ego" is a term used to refer to the most highly valued and protected aspects of the self, those behaviors most intimately associated with one's first personal pronouns. If "I" am a career psychological warrior, I will more highly value my skills in planning psywar operations or writing leaflets than my golf playing or automobile driving. For "I" am a psywar operator, not a golfer or cab driver.

An ego-involved motive[5] is one whose process of satisfaction evokes responses from other people that are evaluative of one's self. As a career psywar operator I should be very ego-involved about turning out a good piece of propaganda, for, in so doing, others are going to react evaluatively toward me, evaluating my competence. I will be very defensive of this competence, and it will be difficult to convince me that I have done poorly. "I" will not care so much if my golf score is surpassed or my car driving criticized.

An attitude is ego-involved, then, to the extent that it supports actions that will ensure "good standing" for one's ego. The social scientist is likely to be strongly for support of social science research, just as a parent is for his son. Why does a political candidate kiss or praise babies? Because that will help to evoke favorable attitudes from the ego-involved parents. The German printer we talked about in the previous section held ego-involved attitudes toward his printing.

Ego-involved attitudes are therefore only an intense variety of the "self"-centered attitudes we have been talking about. The psywar man should recognize that such ego-involved attitudes are very hard to change. A psychotherapist could testify that such a change requires major revision of the stablest aspects of personality. Wherever possible, then, psywar should try to direct and make use of such attitudes (as the candidate praises the babies) rather than try to change them.

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Attitudes Supporting Group Belongingness

Most of the motives under the influence of which we operate are not biological drives but are acquired (or learned) through our contacts with other people. We are scarcely aware of the great importance our group involvements have for us, or of the loyalties we develop toward our several groups and institutions. But if our group is threatened we become acutely aware of its importance to us, and our attitude toward it is manifested in the form of a strong "pro-" feeling. We develop also a parallel attitude of opposition to the source of threat. You see an example of this whenever our families or our towns are criticized and especially when our country finds itself in a tense situation with another powerful country. Consider how American attitudes, since the Communist situation has grown worse, have arisen in defense of America and against the Soviet Union. If you were a Communist propagandist, what would you do about those strong attitudes? You would probably try to divert and diffuse them, wouldn't you? You would probably try to get Americans fighting among themselves, defending their own groups within America, rather than taking out their aggressions on the Soviet Union. This is what the Communists in fact do.

Thus, the function of attitudes in relation to feelings of group belongingness is, again, to favor action in support of these needs and of the groups concerned. In making use of this kind of attitude, psywar should wherever possible try to elicit positive reactions rather than buck negative ones. For example, to tell an enemy soldier or sailor that there is something wrong with his company or his ship's crew would merely be to invite a defensive reaction in support of his group. But if psywar can get across the idea that the enemy regime is not treating the people at home right, then there is some hope of getting the strong group attitudes working on one's own side. For example, America's Far East psywar has tried to convince the Chinese troops in Korea that all is not well at home and that the Communist officials in China are taking undue liberties in the villages. America has, in other words, tried to get the home group loyalties of the Chinese troops to work against their loyalties to the Communist armies and their Communist commanders.

Attitudes Related to Need for Structure and Understanding

The best sowing ground for rumors is a situation that is vague

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and indeterminate. This you will recognize from your own experience. People get accustomed to living in fairly predictable circumstances. They like to live that way and feel uneasy when they don't know what the score is, when they can't tell with some certainty what the next hours or days are going to bring or even whether they are going to bring anything at all. Everyone needs to have some understanding of his world, even if the understanding is fleeting or is in the form of a label. (Note, for example, how some physicians give a name to an unknown condition, such as a "constitutional psychopathy" or a "systematic invasion," so that the patient may feel that he understands and thus is in control of his situation.)

People, we are saying, need to structure and understand their world, and attitudes are not-too-hard-to-erect signposts to guide their behavior and thought in that direction. If something can be shown to have "caused" an ambiguous state of affairs—a confusion of orders, or a lack of instructions—this somehow gives the state of affairs meaning for people and lets them put the blame for it on someone. The blame, furthermore, can be verbalized in the form of adverse attitudes, and these, as indicated above, then serve as guides to other action such as grumbling, complaining, writing letters, deserting, etc.

An ambiguous situation, that is, one where there is a minimum of information to help people understand their immediate experiences, thus gives the psywar operator a real opportunity to be, for the moment at least, the master of destiny. It gives him a chance to plant his own information, start his own rumors, provide his own explanations and answers, and so organize the experience of the target as he wants it to be organized.

Attitudes Related to Emotional States

Emotion has been defined by one psychologist as "an acute disturbance of the individual as a whole, psychological in origin, involving behavior, conscious experience and visceral function." Strong emotional reactions have the power to disrupt most ongoing activities, just as too much power suddenly added to a machine may strip the gears. If, for example, a person perceives a stimulus situation as threatening or very pleasing, the emotion may release in him hormones that have the general effect of preparing him for strenuous activity if such is necessary, and what he is doing at the moment may as a result be done badly or even abandoned. Psywar often deliberately evokes strong emotion in

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the attempt to undermine attitudes. For example, it evokes fear in order to break down attitudes of group loyalty and respect for authority and to cause otherwise dependable soldiers or civilians to do things they would not conceivably have done otherwise.

Fear and anger are the two emotions that are of greatest importance to psywar. These emotions, like the biological drives, can energize and sustain action. Fear certainly does so in panic situations.* There is one great difference, however, that psywar operators must bear in mind. The stimuli that arouse biological drives (for example, hunger) are inside the organism, whereas the stimuli that arouse emotions (for example, fear or anger) are outside the organism. So also are the conditions that can lead to the reduction of each. That means that the psywar operator can hope to control the stimuli that turn emotion on and off in a way that is out of the question with the stimuli that turn biological drives on or off. Playing on emotional attitudes is therefore a simpler and more promising psywar mission than playing on attitudes related to biological drives.

In some situations, of course, the psywar operator will seek not to arouse and activate emotional attitudes but rather to lull and neutralize them. He may direct emotion-terminating stimuli at the target—as the Germans did very skillfully sometimes during World War II—in order to allay truly justified fears and pave the way for inadequate action. And friendly psywar frequently attempts to combat fear in its target audience.

An emotional attitude is a strongly held position. Emotion strengthens the attitude; attitudes guide behavior in the discharge of emotional energy. Therefore an emotional attitude is likely to portend vigorous behavior. For psywar, one moral of this is to try to elicit emotional attitudes in support of the operator's themes, and to avoid themes likely to conflict with emotional attitudes. One of the most useful pieces of psywar intelligence we can have, therefore, is a reply to the question: Around what attitudes does the target tend to build emotion? In general it is safe to say that emotional attitudes are most likely to be related to and aroused in connection with ego values. Perhaps thestrongest

*The typical pattern of panic, as social scientists understand it, is (a) traumatic experience (such as the dropping of an atom bomb, or the discovery that one is surrounded and under attack), which results in (b) fear bordering on shock, for which (c) there seems no outlet. That is, there is no apparent way to escape the thing feared. *While the victim (d) looks around helplessly for something to do about his situation, he observes some other individuals (e) running or taking other action which seems relevant to the situation. (f) He follows these leaders. He and the rest of the crowd stampede. The usual pattern of action in this kind of panic situation is aimless running, often into greater danger.*

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personality structure with which psywar has to deal is the complex in which self-interest, ego motives, and emotions center. The psywar operator is likely to get maximum response when he can successfully touch this complex.

Attitudes Related to Personality Types

Are there personality types—groups of persons whose attitudes we may know beforehand, that is, persons whose attitudes we may predict, from knowledge of the type they belong to? It is no longer fashionable or technically accurate in psychology to speak of persons as types or to describe people in terms of distinctive typologies. There is, however, a cluster of characteristics different enough from the "normal" to be thought of as constituting types for some psywar purposes, though measuring instruments that enable us to say definitely what individuals belong to them are not available.

One such cluster of characteristics is that which Adorno[6] and others have written about under the name of the "authoritarian personality." What is meant here is an individual who basically, often very subtly, has a strong reverence for and dependence on some kind of authority outside himself. This person tends to be ethnocentric, that is, to identify strongly with groups in which he holds membership, and to emphasize the in-group vs out-group distinction between his own groups and others. He shows "authoritarian submission" in the form of an inability seriously to criticize or rebel against his own in-group figures and symbols. He has a highly moralized and idealized conception of authority representatives and a submissive relation to them. He is unable to look objectively at himself or others; indeed, he regards the attempt to look into deeper motives or conflicts as "prying." He likewise tends toward "projectivity," as shown in a tendency to imagine strange and sinister forces at work in the outer world. These imaginings, of course, are really projections of his own deep-lying aggressive and sexual strivings.

All this adds up to a picture of an insecure person with a closed mind, suspicious of the outer world, maintaining and often at the same time resenting a close dependence on authority figures and in-groups. To such persons the Jew, for example, may seem a symbol of strange, unknown, possibly sinister things, a force to be combated by rallying behind established symbols and sources of authority and strong in-group allegiances. Anti-Semitism, as a matter of fact, is one of the most common mani-

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festations of the authoritarian personality.

We have talked about the authoritarian personality because it is one of the few such clusterings that have been carefully studied, and because we have experienced a good deal of it in recent years. For example, Nazism was undoubtedly made possible by the high incidence of authoritarian personalities in Germany. We see such personalities at work in anti-Semitic groups in this country. And wherever they appear in large numbers we have a group that we know to be susceptible to psywar of the kind that plays on insecurity and releases the terribly disruptive forces of race or class prejudice.

Attitudes Related to Sentiments and National Culture

Looked at from one point of view, a group is a complex of leadership and followership roles. Those who perform the leadership roles direct the group activities that are valuable to the members, and because they do this come to have value for the members, who accordingly develop favorable attitudes toward them. In organizations that have been established for a long time, such as local and national government systems, companies, and religious institutions, roles themselves become valued: The Presidency, the Chairmanship of the Board, the Papacy, the Governorship. The continued existence and effective functioning of leadership roles are, in any case, matters of real concern for the group members, who rightly see them as indispensable to continuance of the group as a social structure. This explains why Hitler's position in Germany was virtually invulnerable to psywar until the very last, and why this country deliberately refrained from attacking the Japanese Emperor. Psywar against either of these leaders would have aroused strong defensive attitudes.

Along with leaders and leadership roles, the group's symbols come to have great importance to members. The American Eagle, the Stars and Stripes, fraternity pins, crucifixes, etc., become objects of great value, with which people identify strongly and which they will defend with strong attitudes and, on occasion, with strong actions. Both the politician and the propagandist therefore need to understand symbols—how they "work" and how they may be exploited for purposes of influencing behavior.

Finally, we must mention traditions, which without necessarily being directly associated with the formal aspects of the group's activity, often acquire symbolic value. Freshman hazing as a part of fraternity rituals, rugged individualism, Yankee in-

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genuity, southern courtesy, western friendliness, and home cooking are all regarded by some people as important values associated with institutions or group structures that they are determined to preserve. These also must therefore be defended attitudinally, and many a propagandist, inadequately informed about his target, has earned hostility for his whole program by unwittingly disparaging a tradition. Many another propagandist has made friends and gained acceptance by recognizing his target's traditions and conducting his propaganda with due regard for them.

Role Attitudes

We have already talked about role attitudes and noted that when a person has functioned in a particular role for some time, and derived satisfactions from doing so, he takes on attitudes and behaviors appropriate to that role. Storekeepers acquire attitudes that fit in with their storekeeping roles. Professors are widely supposed to act like professors outside as well as inside the academic role structure. Admirals are often identifiable in mufti because they continue to act and talk as if they were on the bridge of a ship.

We have also pointed out how attitudes grow up in defense and support of roles. Children develop attitudes of respect for their larger and stronger elders. Undertakers oppose burial at sea. The well-to-do oppose sliding income-tax scales. Role attitudes also serve as a device for communication with other members of one's group; expressing them often brings members of a group closer together and makes them feel at home with one another. When three NAM (National Association of Manufacturers) members meet in a club car, the fact that each hears the others expressing his own attitudes toward John L. Lewis assures them they are among friends and sharers of common norms. When a fourth traveler joins the conversation and questions the virtue of the NAM, expressing a critical or sceptical attitude, he is suspect, and efforts will be exerted to cause him to conform or remove himself, and his contaminating influence, from the group. There are numerous rituals that are wordless expressions of attitude, and participating in them gives people mutual assurance that they are members of the group, and among friends. This function of attitudes illustrates that attitudes are both self-preservative (helping one to maintain his role in the group) and group-preservative (contributing to the solidarity of the group and thus strengthening it against external forces).

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Self-other Attitudes

It is but a short step from the notion of role attitude to that of self-other attitudes. Although the notion of role attitude refers mainly to the role a man takes in a definite and recurring group siutation such as his job, his play group, his family, or his lodge, self-other attitudes refer to the characteristic way in which people relate themselves to others in nonorganized, noninstitutionalized, non-bound-by-rules interactions. The storekeeper is not bound by rules to do any particular thing at, for example, a bullfight, except pay his admission and remain seated most of the time. He can read, study the technique of the picadores, count the number of trombones in the band, or go home, as the spirit moves him. But his personality characteristics, acquired (as we know) through his roles and his role attitudes, will nevertheless influence his way of responding to the shout of "down in front," the bid of the beer vendor, and the sound and smell of the person next to him. He has characteristic ways of relating himself to others, that is, particular attitudes toward what they are doing that influence his reactions to them. These are self-other attitudes. Since they tend to be superseded in formal group structures by specific role attitudes, they are most apparent in informal situations.

The psywar operator needs to understand the function of self-other attitudes because in unorganized situations it is these attitudes, not the role attitudes, that organize and direct behavior. Thus, when enemy troops are in confusion, self-other attitudes will deeply influence their reaction to the estimate of the situation put forward by America's psywar group. In a militarily healthy situation the soldier's role attitudes will probably maintain his discipline. But if the situation deteriorates, if, for example, the soldier is isolated or in headlong retreat, then the self-other attitudes are likely to take over.

Summary

The material in this section will help the psywar operator to map out his battleground and points to some of the target intelligence he needs for his battle map. Where is he likely to find the "strong structures" of attitude in his target? What kinds of attitude in the target are likely to be emotionally involved? What is the nature of the role attitudes the target holds? What are the symbols, the leaders, the traditions around which strong

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positive attitudes have grown? Are there any areas in which the target's biological drives have been notably unsatisfied so that strong attitudes and disruptive action might be evoked by playing on the resulting tensions? In what fields of information is the situation vague and unstructured for the target so that psywar can take advantage of the strong attitudes related to the need for understanding? The psywar man needs to know things like this if he is to operate with eyes open.

Given this basic intelligence, he will be in position to make some predictions as to what kind of acceptance (or what degree of resistance) he will meet if he sends a given message or combination of messages. He knows, for example, that, when the chips are really down, biogenic drives are usually going to take precedence over sociogenic motives and attitudes, so that a hungry target is probably a poor target for conversion propaganda. He knows there is a strong cluster of attitudes around the deepest aspects of personality, that many of these are likely to be ego-involved, and many emotionally involved, and that, day in and day out, this is probably the strongest attitude cluster he will find in any target. He will try to enlist these strong attitudes on his side, or at least he will try not to arouse them in opposition to what he has to say. This does not mean, of course, that psywar should never attack strong positions. On some occasions it may be more important to do so than to undertake something easier but less promising for the long pull. But when a psywar operation does attack a strong position, it should do so in full awareness of the resistance it is likely to meet. The psywar man keeps himself reminded, for instance, that attitudes arising from the need for group belongingness are often aroused to great strength when the group is threatened or attacked. He knows that favorable attitudes grow up around national and group symbols, traditions, and leaders and that attack on these symbols will evoke defensive attitudes, as invoking their sanction will evoke positive attitudes. He knows that role attitudes are widespread, influential, and hard to change from outside the target culture. He knows that members of his target audience have a strong need for understanding and organizing experience. If he can step into an unstructured situation with a message that provides them informational structuring, they are likely to respond favorably.

This is the nature of the battleground. The next section deals with the nature of the battle itself, that is, with some of the ways attitudes may be changed.

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PROCESS OF CHANGING ATTITUDES

The goal is to change attitudes of members of the target audience. More precisely the goal is to be able to control, speed up or arrest, direct, and redirect changes in their attitudes, including the intensification of present attitudes or maintaining them unchanged in circumstances in which, if left to themselves, they would change. Psywar often defends an attitude (such as loyalty or international friendship) from change, or tries to keep a target feeling about something (such as disliking a common enemy) just as it has hitherto. The goal of the entire process as we have described it so far, that is, attracting attention, getting the meaning across, and understanding the nature of target attitudes and their clustering, is to be able to control attitude change and, through it, behavior.

Before the processes and mechanisms that enter directly into changes in attitudes are discussed, it is necessary to repeat a warning, implicit throughout the preceding pages, that must not be forgotten by any reader who intends to apply this material to the practice of psywar. We said early in this book that research in this entire field is not very far advanced. About psywar itself there has been up to now relatively little research, so that most of the principles stated in these pages have not been developed in or for psywar situations. The purpose of this book, given the present state of research, has to be to gather together the most relevant evidence and theory from social psychology and the other social science disciplines and to attempt to say how this evidence and theory—themselves not very far advanced—apply to psywar.

You should not, then, think of yourself as studying the science of psywar. Psywar is a long way from being a science. Rather, this book offers a social science background for the practice of psywar. The applications to psywar suggested in these pages are for the most part projections and extrapolations from existing evidence intended for purposes other than those of psywar. This evidence will be useful to you. It will let you proceed with more confidence and a better sense of direction. But the application of this evidence to the practice of psywar is not like applying a scientific formula to physical quantities. The application is partly science and partly (in very large part) art.

There has been considerable study of attitude change in various fields and from various points of view. You will find that much of it has a direct and evident application to psywar.

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Prognosis of Difficulty of Attitude Change

The physician is accustomed to give or use a prognosis: he predicts, on the basis of existing evidence, the likely course of an illness. We have been indicating that some attitudes are more strongly defended, and therefore probably harder to change, than others. Now let us gather some of the available material together and restate it in terms of predicting the difficulty of changing different kinds of attitudes.

The more firmly an attitude is anchored in group membership, the more difficult it is to change.

In saying "anchored in group membership," we refer back to our earlier statement that attitudes and group roles tend to support one another. For example, it might be expected that the regular Army man's attitude toward authority and discipline might be more firmly anchored than that of the young draftee. The regular's attitude has grown up out of long experience. He has learned his role thoroughly. The saluting, the obedience, the alertness have become second nature to him, because he has found that they simplify his problems. The group rewards such behavior. His role experience supports the attitude and the attitude supports the role. The new draftee is in the same situation but does not yet fully realize it; he hasn't learned the role so thoroughly, nor have the appropriate attitudes grown so strong.

Studies of religious attitudes have indicated that Roman Catholics, more than members of other churches, tend to hold strongly anchored attitudes toward religion (Katz[7]). It is believed that this is because Catholics are strongly indoctrinated in their church's beliefs and practices, and because the church normally constitutes a relatively large proportion of their routine of living. They spend a considerable amount of time with other members of their faith, who in general hold the same attitudes and have a common concept of role. The attitude therefore supports the group, and the group supports the attitude, by rewarding the individual for playing the role related to the attitude.

Attitudes toward leaders tend to be strongly held in proportion to the degree such attitudes enter into the group activities of the individual. In Nazi Germany, for example, according to Shils and Janowitz[8], attitudes toward Hitler would have been extremely hard to change: Hitler was a value-laden symbol integrated into the daily routines of a large part of the population. Lesser figures in the national structure were much more vulnerable. They may, from some points of view, have been no less important than

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Hitler to the national effort, but they were much more remote than he from the daily lives of the people. The people belonged to the Hitler Youth, listened for the voice of Hitler on the radio, kept the picture of Hitler on their walls, and were rewarded for doing as Hitler said they should and for following the example of Hitler and for cheering Hitler. Hitler personified and unified all their attitudes toward authority and leadership, which, it is sometimes said, have always been strong and idealized among the Germans. Hitler, therefore, could "do no wrong." If something went wrong, it was the fault of lesser functionaries, of bad staff work, or of disloyalty to Hitler. Any direct attack on Hitler could thus be counted on to rouse strong defensive attitudes.

It seems probable that similar strong attitudes gathered in the Soviet Union around Stalin. No matter how he looked from the outside, to many Russians he must have been a symbol of the rewards they got for playing the role of good Communists, loyal Russians. Stalin was equated with the rewards they got out of their role-playing. If there were unequal distribution of food and supplies, bad orders, unmet quotas, mistakes, then lesser officials, not Stalin, were responsible. It would be far easier for psywar to induce an unfavorable attitude toward lesser Communists than toward such a leader as Stalin.

This does not, as has been said earlier, mean that psywar should necessarily follow the easiest path. Sometimes more can be accomplished by frontal assault than by attacking on a flank or bypassing. There are, of course, situations where it would become the task of psywar to attack strongly held attitudes frontally for reasons other than the intention to change them. Psywar might, for example, have the mission of unifying the target, or of stirring up controversy within it. We cannot remind ourselves too often that there is an unlimited variety of potential psywar missions. Sometimes it is worth the effort to attack the strongest attitude in the hope of changing it. But any decision to do this must be made in the light of a clear prognosis of what it may cost in time and effort.

As a further example, note that a member of the armed forces, in a foreign country, is per se a psychological as well as a shooting warrior. For example, the behavior of American troops in Japan was closely observed and in general favorably received; it apparently helped in minimizing the general problems of the occupation. Now how should such a soldier or sailor proceed in his part-time psywar job? One principle of conduct is suggested by what we have been saying, that is, he should not openly

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or strongly oppose the important group-based attitudes of the people about him unless he knows it to be the policy of his country to do that. For example, he should be wary of attacking or belittling their religious practices or their attitudes toward the family or the customs and practices they follow in everyday contacts with one another, unless his government has indeed bargained for the unavoidable consequences. All these are likely to be strongly defended, because the attitudes are constantly reinforced by successful role experience, and vice versa.

The more isolated an attitude is from a person's other systems of belief and values, the easier it is to change.

This is seen most clearly in the case of newly acquired attitudes, which the person has not had time or occasion to integrate with the rest of his psychological make-up. Everyone has some traffic in temporary attitudes—toward facts, art objects, news items, or minor political figures of temporary prominence. These attitudes are usually subject to change through discussion or through the manipulation of prestige symbols. People are willing to "talk them over" or are willing, with respect to them, to follow the lead of an authority, for example, that of a drama or music critic. Since these attitudes are of minor importance in the individual's "psychic economy," he can afford to change them according to shifting conditions.

But let us suppose that a man who holds strong religious attitudes comes upon a new book, written by a member of his church, which advances and illustrates the doctrines of that church. That book is likely to be integrated rapidly with his other belief systems, and his favorite attitude toward it is likely to resist attack by some such prestige figure as a literary critic. This will be especially true if the church group rewards a favorable attitude toward the book, for here the force of group anchoring will come into play.

Attitudes may be more transient at some times than at others. For example, transient attitudes are likely to be encountered when a population is undergoing radical change, as during a revolution an economic crisis, or a military debacle. In times like those, old value systems, beliefs, and allegiances are being questioned. People look around for new attitudes, new ways of anchoring and securing themselves. Things are moving so swiftly that people haven't time to integrate new ideas with old, and in such periods the old ones are less dominant then usual anyway. In the French revolution, for example, attitudes shifted rapidly from support of one leader to another. In the period of Communist occupation

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of Seoul, people were bewildered by events, lacked confidence in their old attitudes, and were more receptive than they would have been in normal times to the new attitudes which the Communists suggested to them. In such situations of flux the psywar operator has his best opportunity to propose and support new leaders, new programs, new values, and new patterns of action.

The more clearly an attitude is differentiated and organized, the less likely it is to be affected by prestige suggestions or other such devices. It will yield, if at all, only to rational argument or to piecemeal attack on the beliefs that support it.

An example is furnished by an experiment by Lewis[9] which attempted to modify attitudes toward political slogans by attributing them to prestigeful public figures. Although the less-informed subjects, holding less well-differentiated and organized attitudes, were somewhat influenced, the better-informed subjects were not. In fact, they would often question the validity of attributing the quotation to the man who was credited with it. Faced, for example, with a statement attributing "America for Americans" to FDR, some answered "But Roosevelt just wouldn't say that!"

The practical problem of influencing such well-organized attitudes is great and may not be solvable at all except when psywar is being undertaken in a period of major social change. So well rationalized are they that, even if some of the supporting beliefs and attitudes are discredited to some extent, the remaining supports are likely to be strengthened. For example, a German intellectual may be made to agree that the notion of the biological superiority of "Aryans" is nonsense, but if he has a strong need to identify with and submit to authority he will probably cling to the idea that German culture is, regardless of the cause, superior to others and that therefore the Reich must be revered and served.

Observations recorded by Bettleheim[10] in German concentration camps show that only under severe conditions did the prisoners reject their previous value systems and more or less completely adapt themselves to the new life in the camp. Men who had been prisoners for several years took over the Gestapo's attitudes toward new and unfit prisoners, carried out and enforced arbitrary rules of the Gestapo long after the Gestapo had abandoned them, and often came to believe that beneath their rough exteriors the Gestapo guards were decent fellows. Such a transfiguration of personality, attitudes, and values usually required years of "reeducation." Nothing remotely approaching it can be

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expected via propaganda alone. So long as the role structures, or substitutes for them, in which personality is formed and expressed remain intact, basic attitudes will remain unchanged. In their study of group stability in the Wehrmacht, Shils and Janowitz[6] showed that the troops' loyalty to Hitler, the Reich, and their immediate superiors held up under severe military conditions even when it was felt that the war was as good as lost. Role attitudes of subservience to authorities were so enmeshed in basic personality structure that surrender leaflets and other psywar messages were largely ineffective unless primary group structures were breaking up under force of Allied arms, and threats to life were constant and immediate. There were, to be sure, many surrenders, but they were often rationalized in terms of practical ends that allowed basic attitudes to remain untouched.

The more clearly a person understands what his attitudes are and what they can do for him, the less likely these attitudes are to be changed by suggestion and argument.

The nonsmoker who opposes cigarettes because he knows that they are bad for his health is not going to be moved by the fact that 99 percent of the men who know tobacco best smoke Peachies. Nor does the scholar who holds well-documented attitudes toward cultural determinism care whether the authorities cited in opposition to his view are "eminent." It is probable that businessmen felt that Old-Businessman Bernard Baruch's recommendation for complete price controls represented a lapse of normally good judgment, and they did not support his proposal, preferring policies in accord with their well-thought-out best interests. It is difficult to make a dent in attitudes that are understood by their holders by simply criticizing those attitudes or bringing authorities and other prestige symbols to bear against them.

However, understood attitudes are likely to be open to discussion; and we must note here a practical difference between these and the integrated attitudes discussed above. For example, Hovland and others,[11] in their experiments with the effects of orientation films during World War II, found that in the case of better educated subjects a more favorable situation for attitude change was set up when both sides of an argument were presented. In general the person who understands why he holds an attitude tends to be willing to concede that there is something to be said for the other side and that his attitude may not be correct under all possible conditions. It is likely that such understood attitudes are limited to some extent to persons who are relatively well educated and have been exposed to some of the values of self-

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criticis 1. Such people are open to persuasion, to the extent that their at .tudes are of this rational kind.

Basic Pattern of Change

In this book a picture of what people are like, what makes them tick, and especially what leads them to hold the attitudes they do has been gradually built up. The human being is an organism, born with biological needs and placed in a social situation. He learns, little by little, to discriminate between the parts of experience that are himself and those that a-e not himself. As he gradually builds this awareness his basic need comes to be to preserve, enhance, and express himself, the self; that is, the enduring aspects of the personality. Experiences that protect or enhance the self are rewarding, to be sought after. Experiences that threaten the self are classified as threatening, to be avoided. Experiences that give meaning to experience, and thus enable the individual to behave more efficiently in satisfying needs, come increasingly to be sought as the individual matures. As he finds out what experiences are rewarding, he learns to repeat them, learns to discriminate among responses, learns habits. Attitudes of favorableness and unfavorableness become firmer as the habits harden. He develops favorable attitudes toward experience that reduces biological drives and unfavorable attitudes toward experience that hinders drive satisfaction. He develops attitudes to support action leading to reduction of his emotional tensions, to relieve the external conditions that bring about fear or anger, for example. He develops attitudes to guide action through which he can preserve values; for example, if fair play is one of his values, he develops unfavorable attitudes toward cheaters; if free enterprise is one of his values, he develops unfavorable attitudes toward anything socialistic. He builds up attitudes which support behavior allowing him to use resources; if he dances well, he is receptive to attitudes that support dancing in public. He builds up strong attitudes toward parts of his experience that threaten or enhance his ego involvements. And he develops attitudes that support the roles he is trying to play and the group norms he has learned. As he matures, these roles become more important to him, and the group norms become clearer. Under the influence of group sanctions, he represses some of his motives, and these subsequently enter into his behavior only without his being aware of what is happening.

Thus the personality, that is, habits, system of values, char-

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acteristic strivings or needs, and characteristic ways of perceiving relations to others, grows by constant interaction of individual and group. It is impossible to make a sharp separation between the individual factors and the group factors involved in the process. Nevertheless the psywar operator has much to gain from keeping them separate in his mind. Any psywar message clearly has to contend at any given time with psychological factors operative within individual members of the target audience and social factors operative in the target environment. If the target individual is to be persuaded to hold a given attitude, the action to which that attitude predisposes him must square more or less with his personality factors (habits, values, needs, etc.), his role patterns, and the group norms as he has interiorized them. It is likewise clear that the intended change in his attitudes may be facilitated either by something new in his environment (for example, threat of group disorganization) or by some new physical or psychological factor (for example, hunger or confusion). With all this in mind, we can suggest a kind of master pattern for attitude change, which takes account of the foregoing considerations.

1. If a person's attitudes are to be changed, if he is to be predisposed toward action of such and such a kind, then the action the proposed new attitude implies should fit the psychological pattern operating within him at the time.

For example, a very hungry man is in poor shape to entertain logical argument. A direct attack on an ego-involved attitude will be strongly resisted. On the other hand a suggestion that merely expands or diverts an existing attitude will have easier going. A suggestion that evokes emotional attitudes in its favor will have strong support. A suggestion that meets a need (for example, for clarification in a vague situation) will probably be received with gratitude.

2. If a person's attitudes are to be changed, then the action the proposed new attitude implies should be in support of present group relations or lead to other group relations that are important and meaningful to him.

For example, people normally do not adopt attitudes implying action that would result in their being read out of groups important to them. They do adopt attitudes that support the roles they play in groups or that maintain the groups in which they

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play roles. This is particularly true in the case of primary groups, such as the family. It is also true in the case of the national group, which represents the supreme effective power, includes all the groups that can be important to most people, and provides practically all the circumstances through which personal values can be expressed, attained, and maintained. Appeals based on nationalistic motives and identifications, especially when a nation is under threat from outside, are likely to be most effective. When the group situation is somewhat vague, an invitation to join a stronger group is often effective; this is a favorite Communist technique, in fact a favorite technique of all revolutionists.

3. If a person's attitudes are to be changed, the most favorable situation exists when the action the proposed new attitude implies is congenial both to the psychological pattern operative within him at the time and to his group relations and aspirations.

When an individual's personality values and the roles he has to take are not harmonious, then we say that he is "maladjusted." (Bringing this about is sometimes a goal of psywar.) On the other hand nothing is more acceptable to a person than an activity that gives expression to his interests, needs, and values and at the same time contributes to the support of his important groups or of his membership and status in them. For example, many Communists who have been studied psychologically appear to have been highly insecure, often rather lonely, individuals. By joining an organization with strong discipline, clear-cut roles, and clear-cut principles and antagonisms, such people win greater personal security and, along with it, the satisfactions of status and action in a group. What happens when propaganda does not fit the pattern of both psychological and group factors is illustrated by the previously mentioned Shils and Janowitz[5] studies of morale in the German Wehrmacht during World War II. America apparently made some telling hits with propaganda addressed simultaneously to the personal values of German soldiers and their concern for their families. Their anxiety was aroused. But so strong were the role attitudes in the Wehrmacht and the relations in the primary group structure (company size and under) that there were very few surrenders until actual military defeat had broken up the primary groups. Our propaganda, in other words, was unable to break down the immediate social structure for survival and psychological support, and as long as that remained intact our efforts were unsuccessful.

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Mechanisms of Change

The basic pattern of change is therefore the one we discussed previously under the general topic of learning, that is, responses that are rewarded tend to be learned and retained. This is the most direct way to accomplish a change in attitude, and the simplest way to put it into effect is against the background of a monopoly of communications such as the Communist states try so hard to achieve within their own borders. Indeed, so important is communications monopoly to the Soviet propagandists that during their 1950 occupation of South Korea they confiscated as many radios as possible from South Korean homes to keep them from being tuned to UN stations in Japan, despite the fact that by so doing they gave up the chance to speak to Koreans on Radio Seoul, which they had captured intact and which was the most powerful broadcasting station in East Asia except for Peiping. In other words they gave up the use of radio in return for a communications monopoly, which they exploited with print, film, and face-to-face methods. The advantages of monopoly are obvious. The monopolists can completely control what cues are presented, and, so far as communications themselves control rewards, they can determine completely what responses are to be reinforced. Propagandists from our country are seldom given so favorable a situation in which to operate. For the most part they have to operate under conditions of intense competition. When they direct psywar to Communist states they have to operate against intense and effective opposition. Therefore, although it is easy enough to say that practicing a response (such as expressing an attitude, passing a rumor, opposing an authority) and being rewarded for it is the best way to ensure that the response will become a dependable part of the person's behavior, it is quite another thing for the psywar operator to bring about this situation by means of long-range communication.

So far as the use of communications as a direct instrument for changing attitudes is concerned, then, the psywar operator must try to set up situations in which the responses he wants will be rewarded and thus reinforced. He will therefore try to build his messages around appeals and themes that are related to tensions or needs in the target and suggest responses that (a) are desirable from the point of view of the psywar mission, (b) have some chance of being expressed in the target culture, and (c) will reduce drives or other tensions and therefore be rewarding. We have already talked about areas of tension, but let us summarize briefly here:

Biological Drives. In normal times, these drives are satisfied

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by existing social patterns and do not present a fruitful field for psywar, but in case of threat, emergency, and deprivation they may become important sources of reward and reinforcement.

Normal Personality Needs. That is, needs for security, status, understanding, freedom from constraint, clear definition of role, etc., are numerous and common to all men. But they are, of all needs, the ones most likely to be satisfied within the target culture.

Deviant Personality Needs. That is, needs regarded as abnormal or deviant by a society are widely unacceptable, encounter taboos, and are more frustrated. Hence persons with deviant needs are more strongly motivated in nontypical directions than other members of society. Homosexuals are a familiar example, and we are often reminded that because they are good targets for blackmail they are poor security risks. This is not the place to discuss deviant personalities in detail, but let us note that the same needs that make them poor security risks also make them good targets for psywar. Their resentment against the society that refuses to accept them can often be channeled into behavior that fits in with the psywar operator's mission.

Transient Personal Needs. These needs also are common to all men, but usually people are able to reduce them in a socially approved way. However, there are situations in which people are subject to need-producing factors beyond their (and their society's) control. The soldier in the field, the population under bombing or siege will often have unsatisfied needs for food and for relief from pain, discomfort, stress, anxiety, and threat to life and health, which are not the less urgent for being transient. In such situations there is a ready market for psywar operations that direct attention to these needs and point a way to their satisfaction.

Group Needs. This class includes needs such as that for acceptance by others, especially in the primary group. Acceptance by others is perhaps the most important form of reward for changing human behavior If, then, the psywar operator can find a way to manipulate group pressures, he has a ready-made device for reinforcement of his message. This, of course, is one of the reasons why the Communists gear their mass media into a well-organized system of groups within any country they are trying to propagandize.

But the process of stimulus and response in society does not always follow the relatively simple and unhindered path we have been describing. Sometimes the target culture does not sanction the response that would satisfy the need or reduce the drive on which psywar seeks to play. The role attitude of the individual member of the audience, or his general value system, may inhibit

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the desired response. In such a case the path to drive reduction is often indirect. Indirect paths are of great importance to the psywar operator as he seeks, at long distance, to set up the learning system (we call it a "paradigm") in which a desired response to a given cue will be rewarded and hence reinforced and learned. He can, if he understands them, make good use of them.

We are talking now about what Sigmund Freud called "mechanisms." Freud used this term to refer to the techniques the individual employs to protect himself from the recognition that he has motives and desires that he should not have. In recent years the concept has been expanded to include not only the function of protecting the self from itself, so to speak, but of protecting the self from the outer world. Thus rationalizing the purchase of a new car in terms of "long-run economy" may protect a man from recognizing that he wants to look more important than the person next door, and regression serves to remove the person from the responsibilities thrust on him by society, by taking him back to the comfortable and safe dependency of childhood. Both are common and effective means of winning and maintaining comparative freedom from anxiety. In this section we shall describe and illustrate several of these modes of reacting to problem situations, all of them familiar to contemporary psychological research. By means of communications and carefully planned events, the skilled psychological warrior can put all of them, at one time or another, to work on his behalf.

First, however, let us clear up one possible question: Do these "mechanisms" refer only to abnormal behavior? They do not. Though they are commonly thought of as clinical symptoms, they are also very common features of normal life in society. It might be noted, too, that social living is what makes these mechanisms possible, and also what makes them necessary. The rules of social living impose numerous limitations on what people may do and what they may express as reasons for doing them. Since one is not supposed to express dislikes for rivals publicly, it is only natural to rationalize a bit of unfair business dealing in terms of the "process of competition" or "if I hadn't done it to him he would have done it to me." The frustrated housewife can get vicarious status by identifying with certain kinds of heroines of soap operas. Mechanisms like these are ways of avoiding frustrating realities. They really are needed for the smooth functioning of society; if they did not exist, if people had always to seek direct satisfaction of needs and immediate removal of frustration sources, then certainly violence would be much more

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common than it is now, and our social structures would be very shaky indeed.

Let us now look at some of these mechanisms and at the ways they may be used in psywar.

Displacement. Underlying these mechanisms is a general assumption that the individual whose needs are frustrated commonly strikes out at, that is, aggresses against, whatever he perceives as the cause of his frustration (Dollard, Doob, et al.[12]). This is a common pattern and may be made use of by psywar operators to direct aggression against governments that control and tax, officers who lead troops into necessary danger or hardship, etc. But the individual's society does not let him express aggression against the real source of his frustration as he sees it. Children are prevented from directly attacking their parents. Soldiers are prevented from showing aggression directly against their superior officers. In many countries of the world, men are not even permitted to criticize the government. The punishments are too great to make that kind of aggression worth while; the individual therefore learns to control and repress it. But very often he turns his aggression toward some other person, or object, or group, and when he does he is said to have displaced his aggression.

The individual is usually not aware that he is displacing his aggression. Either (a) he is aware of the frustration and attendant feelings of hostility but not aware of the fact of displacement, or (b) he is aware of the fact of interference but is not aware either of the feelings of hostility or of the fact of displacement. The first form is the garden variety of displacement, as when a man home from a tough day with the boss blows his top when one of the children irks him. The second form occurs in people with more severe training in the inhibition of aggression; it is not only overt acts that are inhibited but the verbalizations usually attendant on them as well. The process of repression works to prevent us from recognizing within us the tabooed aggressive thoughts. It is this second kind of displacement that, we are told, operates in habitual fire setters, consistent sadists, and the sterner advocates of "spare the rod and spoil the child." It is also likely to be operating in such strictly reared people as the Germans and Japanese, who are taught to suppress aggressive feelings against fathers and other authorities and to substitute for them verbalizations of respect. The pent-up floods of aggression in peoples like these can easily be directed against out-groups, especially when aggressive action against them is given official sanction. If all this is correct, Nazi anti-Semitism and some Japanese excesses of

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cruelty during World War II are not too difficult to understand.

Aggression is often displaced toward a substitute, that is, a "scapegoat." This term originated with the ancient Hebrews, who used to send a goat into the wilderness to carry away sins that were causing them ·c. lings of guilt. Ironically the modern Hebrews have perhaps been used as scapegoats more often than any other racial group. Leonard Doob[13] points out that, during World War II, Goebbels seemed to launch an attack upon the Jews whenever the Germans had suffered, or were about to suffer, a military reverse or a cut in food rations. He used these unfortunate people as scapegoats on whom the bitterness and disappointment of Goebbel's mass audience could be displaced. He chose for the purpose, be it noted, a single defenseless minority; this is the usual pattern of scapegoat tactics.

Under just what conditions a given person will be seen as a fit substitute is a question that needs further experimental researching. However, we have one essay in theoretical analysis of the problem (Miller[14]) and some empirical evidence (Brown,[15] Miller[14]) that the scapegoat must bear some resemblance to the real source of the frustration and be of such character as not to elicit anxiety and inhibitions strong enough to protect it from the would-be aggressor. Also the scapegoat must, as already noted, not be able to fight back. By way of hypothetical illustration, suppose a sergeant is dressed down by his company commander. The known consequences of aggression toward an officer inhibit any aggressive response by the sergeant. However, he can be cruel or rude to enlisted men without much risk, and enlisted men and their behaviors are markedly similar to the officer and his behavior, which meets the requirement of defenselessness and similarity noted previously. Hence the next time an unlucky private gets in the way of the sergeant he receives not only any rough treatment he may deserve but also the aggression stored up against the officer.

What can the psywar operator make of this aspect of human behavior? In general his aim should be to emphasize the frustrations and to suggest outlets for aggressive attitudes and actions that will reduce them. Care must be taken, however, to make sure that the objects to be used as scapegoats actually <u>are</u> likely scapegoats and not objects loaded with symbols and cues evoking deference or other attitudes that would interfere with the displacement process. For example, the best analysis of what happened in Germany during the last war indicates that it would have been ineffective to try to turn much German aggression

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against Hitler. Aggression was plentiful in that highly controlled country, especially when the war was going badly, as Goebbels recognized when he relied so heavily on aggression against the Jews. The best tactics would probably have been to try to turn the aggression against minor party functionaries, or other Nazis not so well known or so well protected as Hitler. In the Communist countries, similarly, it seems impracticable to direct aggression toward Malenkov or any of the top Communist leaders of the satellites. Rather it would be necessary to try to direct it toward some person or group less well known, farther away (in "psychological distance") from the target audience and its realm of experience. Perhaps the Communists of another country, the cultural officers from the central Party, the bureaucracy in the capital, or the unknown Party members who are thought to be growing rich on graft would be better scapegoats.

It should be obvious that in trying to capitalize on frustration and the displacement of resultant aggression the psywar staff needs the best available information on the attitudes and social structure of the enemy society. Without it the attempt to use and exploit these mechanisms will not only fail but will make American psywar look foolish.

Rationalization. Rationalization serves all other mechanisms by providing the individual with an acceptable reason for an attitude or action. In most western cultures a premium has been placed on "being rational" or having a reason for doing something; it is important to be able to say why you don't like fried grasshoppers or Democrats and not good enough to say that you just don't. The real reasons for a good many of our actions are not acceptable to others or to ourselves; it is not acceptable to vote Republican just because father did; better far to be able to explain that the GOP stands for something you believe in. We say we drink hard liquor not because it relieves tension within us but because of "sociability" or the flavor.

Rationalization is fed by two springs: ignorance and repression. Ignorance-based rationalization is necessitated by the cultural demand that behavior be explainable. Repression-based rationalization is tied up with the individual's need to keep himself from recognizing the (real) reasons for his behavior and attitudes that are socially unacceptable. Why does the anti-Semite not tolerate Jews? Because Jews are greedy and unprincipled, says the anti-Semite, and one must protect himself against them. The true reasons: repressed hostility against authority, strong (inhibited) aggressions, sexual repressions, urgent needs for

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status and power. If, given the individual's family background and present groupings and associations, these reasons appear socially unacceptable, the individual denies having them not only to others but himself, projects them on some out-group, and uses them as a rationalization for his antagonism against that out-group.

The rationalizing habits of human beings are important to the propagandist, for one reason, because they provide him with great opportunities for influencing attitudes and behavior. If he can manufacture and communicate the rationalization people are looking for, so that they will have good and acceptable reason for behaving as they wish to, the chances are pretty good they will seize on it. He can, moreover, by repeating and giving currency to it, make a rationalization about whose acceptability people are doubtful sound safer than it otherwise would. In general, moreover, the propagandist who understands the role of rationalization in people's behavior will get a better understanding of his target than one who does not; indeed, there is no more valuable psywar intelligence than that which tells us what rationalizations are current in what groups with'n the target. For rationalization fits in with so many other mechanisms to provide reasons for actions, to justify displacement, for example.

Projection. Another common mechanism is attributing to others motives the individual recognizes as undesirable in himself. The individual does this unconsciously but with spectacular results. One of the classical examples is that of the old maid who tells the police that a man is following her or has made immodest proposals to her. What apparently happens here is that she projects her own repressed sexual impulses onto the unlucky man, who in many such cases is entirely innocent. The hostility she displays toward him merely reflects the shock her own unconscious effort at repression has caused within her. This same pattern repeats itself on the group and even the national level, as may be seen in the Soviet Union, which charges its neighbors with aggressive intentions at a time when the real aggressor is the Soviet Union itself.

Projection ordinarily occurs only where two conditions are present: first having a motive or need that the individual deems socially unacceptable and second being unaware of having it because of having repressed all knowledge of it. This has been demonstrated experimentally by Sears.[16] A prime example in American history is the case of Anthony Comstock, who with the help of other persons of the same ilk pushed through Congress the "Comstock laws" against the mailing of matter referring to

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sex. Comstock's biographers have shown that as a young man he was very interested in sex and felt great guilt for his preoccupation with such a topic. Gradually, it would seem, he repressed his thoughts about sex and came to attribute them to others, against whom he then waged a vigorous campaign. The individual who has tabooed sexual impulses, in other words, can effectively combat them by seeing them in others and denouncing or punishing those others. The denunciations and punishments contribute to his self-respect and free him from the anxieties associated with recognizing the drives.

What can the psywar operator do with or about projection? At times it is well worth his while to recognize, encourage, and exploit the tendency to project on the part of members of his target audience. We have already pointed out how Russian propagandists are using this mechanism to make peoples suspect non-Communists of aggressive tendencies. Hitler and Goebbels used the same technique whenever the Nazis invaded a new country. The North Koreans continued to tell their people that the invasion of South Korea in June of 1950 was a defensive move against a South Korean attack. All these instances appear to have involved cold and calculated planning to make use of the mechanism of projection, along with other mechanisms that have been discussed. The victim of such propaganda, be it noted, actually believes the person or group on whom he projects to be guilty of the alleged crime or crimes, even in the teeth of evidence to the contrary. Countless North Koreans are today certain that South Korea invaded North Korea. Many intelligent Germans, in 1938 and 1939, believed that Germany was being encircled with aggressive intent and that enemy armies would soon move to impose their will on the Reich. Out of the total evidence available to them they selected that which fed the powerful mechanism of projection. It may be assumed, similarly, that a very large number of Communists honestly believe that the non-Communist countries are aggressive, that the Communist countries are in danger, and that every extension of Soviet power is a defensive measure. In fact it would be surprising if this point of view were not held even in the Politburo, which set the campaign of projection in motion. Projection brings satisfying relief from anxiety and guilt, and high-level Soviet bureaucrats are not less vulnerable to anxiety and guilt than other human beings.

The psywar operator, then, will be well advised to look for evidences of guilt and anxiety in the target culture and to ask how they can be mobilized on behalf of his mission. What are the

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taboos, and what motives do they refer to? What does his intelligence tell him about evidence of past or present disloyalties, graft or malfeasance, inefficiencies or failures, homosexual deviations, etc.? What strong drives have apparently been repressed because their expression is not, or is thought not to be, for the good of the State? If the psywar operator can find evidences of guilt, he can be pretty sure that people in the target can be brought to attribute them and the actions responsible for them to others. Nazi propaganda projected numerous socially undesirable motives onto the Jews. The Communists project all manner of criminal impulses onto the capitalists, "Wall Street," "feudal" landowners, etc. In the light of recent disclosures about the Russian biological warfare experiment station in North Korea as long ago as 1950, current Communist charges that the United Nations is using biological warfare are a further clear example both of projection and of playing upon projective impulses in propaganda.

There is yet another psywar use of projection, which can be used apart from repression or aggressive intent. Every propagandist at some time or other plays upon projective impulses to bring individuals into a group or a movement. The problem is to make the individual ascribe his own feelings to the group, and say to himself: "Why, these people are like me!" or "After all, we all dislike the same things!" or "We're all human beings!" or "We're all rational men," for these are the familiar responses when projection is skillfully used in this way. This is what the propagandist is doing when, for example, he uses the "plain-folks" technique. He tries, in part by echoing the projections of the target individual, to persuade him that the operator's side are plain folks, just like the target individual himself. The target individual then feels safe in joining the group, climbing on the bandwagon.

Identification. Identification is projection in reverse; instead of convincing himself that "This person is like me," the propagandized individual ends up saying "I am like him." This is a very common and powerful mechanism. It is one of the things that makes group life possible, and it helps countless lonely people to overcome some of their loneliness.

The parent identifies with the child (and suffers when the child does). The child identifies with the parent (and shares some of the parent's small triumphs and problems). The lonely woman identifies with the movie star she reads about or with the soap opera heroine; she reads her own problems into those of the star and is thus able to share vicariously in the star's sorrows and joys and travels into strange environments. The boy iden-

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tifies with the great athletic hero. A whole nation identified with Lindbergh in the twenties, and certainly a great many young women must have identified in the thirties with the woman for whom the King of England gave up his throne. Lovers identify with each other. Soldiers in a small group identify with each other and are more willing to share privations because the others are In every society, people identify with the leader, read their worries and problems into him, and are therefore the more ready to follow his decisions.

Leadership is, of course, the connection in which psywar can best exploit people's tendency to identify with others. There is some evidence that a group leader often comes to serve as a kind of substitute for parent identification. As several investigators have pointed out, it is more than a coincidence that modern totalitarian leaders use terms like "my children" and "my son," or that the father idea recurs throughout the vocabulary of religion. Certainly a great deal was done in the case of Hitler, and was also done in the case of Stalin, to build a father atmosphere around the leader.

The psywar operator can try to undermine this kind of identification with a leader. This is an extremely difficult operation when undertaken from a distance. It is easier from close at hand. You will probably remember the rumors circulated about Franklin D. Roosevelt, which, whether they were that or not, looked like deliberate efforts to break down identification with the leader of the Allies in World War II. Rumors are one of the most effective tools for this purpose. Against Hitler the rumor was circulated that he was crazy. Against Eisenhower the rumor has been circulated in this country, on the basis of a joking entry in the West Point annual, that he is a Jew.

But it is easier to build identification than to break it down. In the armed services, in civilian organizations, and in neutral countries, leaders can be built up by psywar techniques. Their strength, their humaneness, their warmth, their glamor can be brought home to the target audience, which will then identify with them and be more willing as a result to put their destiny in the leaders' hands. Identification can also be used to distract individuals from real problems toward fantasy and thus to undermine their capacity to cope with real problems. And the intensity of emotions can often be increased by identification; for example, by making the sufferings of the home folks very real to Chinese soldiers in Korea, we should theoretically be able to make them feel more anger toward the persons responsible for those sufferings.

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Regression. The moving backward implied in the term "regression" is, psychologically, a reversion to a mode of meeting problems that has been useful in similar circumstances in the past. When the individual's present attitudes and habits fail to achieve satisfaction for a drive, then his attitudes and habits of an earlier period in his life, usually less efficient ones, may be brought into play. This has been experimentally demonstrated in laboratory experiments with various animal forms and with children (Barker, Dembo, and Lewin [17]). Although the most striking examples of regression are to be found in the schizophrenia wards of mental hospitals, this mechanism, like the others, is a normal part of everyday life. In interpersonal relations, outbursts of profanity and violence are regressions toward earlier, more childish, less effective ways of reacting to frustration. In broader social contexts, regressions are evident in the juvenile antics of American conventioners in solemn conclave gathered, in sects that emphasize God as a stern and punitive father figure, and in fantasies about the "good old days."

For psywar, the most important thing to remember in this connection is that regression is most likely to occur, and easiest to bring about, in a context of anxiety, frustration, or shock. For example, men under fire, when highly skilled reactions they have learned in training begin to lose their effectiveness, begin to react less efficiently and in a more childlike manner. Under great stress many a man will turn to mechanical activities and try not to think of his troubles. Psywar can use this mechanism by enhancing the apparent difficulty of the obstacles confronting the enemy, thus making it easier for him to escape from anxiety back into regressive behavior and so to resist less effectively. And by playing down obstacles it can help to prevent regressive behavior on the part of allies and neutrals.

Withdrawal. Psychologically, the term "withdrawal" is used most often to refer to people's tendency to avoid problems and frustrations by retreating from reality into a fantasy state. Daydreaming is a common reaction to problems, and it can occupy such a large proportion of an individual's time that he becomes unable to maintain himself in a society which demands certain overt behaviors as methods of getting along. Daydreams are wish fulfillments, and they consume time; they are also habit forming, since they do give release from tension. The combat psywar operator can assist in the fostering of daydreams by providing news of home couched in nostalgic terms (the Japanese used the song "White Christmas" to this end in 1942); distributing attractive recipes and menus to hungry troops, pictures of farm

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fires to cold troops, or of cool drinks to hot troops; and in general by suggesting unattainable goals relevant to the needs of frustrated, deprived people. It is not to be expected, of course, that all the recipients of messages of this sort will spend their days in schizophrenic stupors. What can be expected is the stimulation in some of them of increased "goofing off" and fantasy play, together with heightened dissatisfaction over the present state of affairs.

Conversion and Confluence. The layman expects psywar to convert the enemy. Indeed, the most commonly expressed concept of the Voice of America has been that it should be a device to "sell free enterprise" or "convert the Communists to our way of life." Therefore we had better set down some notes on the mechanisms of conversion and confluence.

A very frequent life situation is one in which strong motives are in conflict. We say we are "torn between desires" or "between love and duty" or "between what we want to do and what we ought to do." Such conflicts may be very strong. Anxiety and frustration then develop. We look for a way out.

The case of Anthony Comstock may again be used as an example. Comstock lived a good many years in a state of strong conflict between his sexual needs and interests on one hand and the teachings of his parents on the other. The result of the conflict was a drifting from one unsatisfactory vocation to another. After some years of concern over his past and current temptations, he came to see the literature of the world as conspiring to make an immoral man of him and other young people. It occurred to him that if this source of stimulation could be removed he would be freed from his conflicts. He found such strong virtuous feeling in his initial attitudes and reactions against suggestive literature that he quickly became wildly enthusiastic over the prosecution of this new cause.

What happened to Comstock represents confluence perhaps better than conversion. That is, he found a path whereby conflicting motivations could be expressed and thereby relieved his anxiety. The Nazis deliberately provided such outlets by allowing sadistic exhibitionistic drives to be expressed under conditions of social approval. In any working society there has to be a certain amount of rationalization and displacement so that escapes can be found from conflicts of motive, or means discovered for reconciling them.

By "conversion" we mean something more than providing an outlet to relieve conflicting tensions. Comstock's story illustrates some of the features of conversion: (a) a strong per-

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sonal conflict, (b) realization of a pattern of action that will relieve the conflict, (c) intense activity in that direction, and (d) great enthusiasm over the new pattern. This is much like what happened to St. Paul on the Damascus road, and Paul's story, perhaps better than Comstock's, illustrates the essence of conversion. Every true convert "sees a vision." He experiences the blinding light. The idea he has been looking for suddenly comes to him; all at once his world falls into order, and he feels an overpowering motivation ("a call") to the new way of life. Many converts have testified to the feeling of peace (relief from anxiety and conflict) that came to them with the call, and to the new drive (a confluence of previously conflicting motives) that impelled them to convert others, to work for the new order, repudiate their old allegiances, and stand against the new order's enemies.

Conversion, then, is not simply an outlet, temporary or otherwise. It is not a gradual shift of attitude from opposition to favor. It is not a slow strengthening of belief brought about by advertisements or propaganda. It is a sudden and complete shift of position, a rejection of past belief. It occurs as an all-or-none phenomenon and involves a reorientation of all or a large part of one's personality and behavior.

Stories of conversion in a modern political context are not uncommon. Kravchenko[15] describes how he was torn by a conflict between comparative material comfort and high status, on the one hand, and opposition to Soviet inefficiency, cruelty, and cynicism, on the other. He resolved this conflict not merely by fleeing from the Soviet Union but by becoming a violent opponent of the Soviet regime. Louis Budenz is another example, now violently opposing what he formerly espoused. On the other side we have the record of General von Paulus and others of the Free Germany Committee.

Frankly we don't know much about how to achieve conversion by mass communications at long distance. Because of our experience with religious conversions, we know a great deal more about conversion face to face. Here the situation for success falls into a fairly common pattern: (a) the intense personal conflict, (b) a clear and simple pattern for resolving the conflict, (c) symbols highly clothed with emotion, (d) (usually) a leader with whom one can identify, and (e) a promise of group reinforcement. This seems to be the pattern of religious conversion and apparently also of political conversion. For example, some accounts of conversion to Communism have stressed (a) the severe malad-

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justment and insecurity, (b) the apparent clarity of the Marxist doctrine, (c) the emotional quality of the symbols of "equality" and "the working classes" and "workers of the world," (d) the influence of a highly trained agitator, and (e) the reward of belonging to a group of similarly motivated individuals. The last is very important. The Communists seldom rely on mass communications alone to accomplish any major result. In a country where they have major goals they have a major organization. In a country where they seek converts they have a well-organized group into which the convert is invited. This does not mean that we understand fully even the mechanisms of face-to-face conversion; certainly the psywar operator should study carefully the results of psychological research on political conversions as this research becomes available during the next few years. But it does mean that we can at least make some tentative suggestions to psywar planners who may some day have a mission that calls for attempts at converting Communists and Communist sympathizers.

In the first place it is evident that a great deal of conflict and tension exists among highly placed Communists. Attention has been called to the insecurity of Soviet officials over being discredited if and when the Party Line shifts and leaves them in the position of having advocated something "wrong." Certainly one thing psywar can do is to try to heighten some of these conflicts, with the hope of setting up the conditions for conversion. A second thing we can do is to present a clear alternative; this should obviously be appropriate to the target culture rather than to our culture. For example, as Charles Malik of Lebanon, a good friend of the West, warns us, we must not expect the American system (based on the needs of an industrial middle-class democracy founded on centuries of tradition) to be adopted "in countries where there is no middle class and no industry, where such tradition is wholly lacking." In the third place we can at the proper time introduce symbols with a strong emotional appeal, though these too must be appropriate to the target culture. "Free enterprise" may mean less than "land reform" to the people we are trying to convert. Finally we can do everything we can to give our prospective and actual converts the advantage of group reinforcement. Converts need this. They need, in their strange new pattern, to feel that they belong. They need to see other people doing what they are doing. They need people to identify with and project onto. They need work assignments, which usually require group organization. It is obvious, therefore, that

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the conditions for conversion are going to be much more favorable if we have an underground organization.

Summary

Early in this section, we stated what we called a basic pattern for attitude change, which was briefly this:

1. If a person's attitudes are to be changed, if he is to be predisposed toward action of a desired kind, then the action should fit the psychological pattern operating within him at the time.
2. If a person's attitudes are to be changed, then the action to which the attitude leads should be in support of present group relations or lead to other group relations important and meaningful to the person.
3. If a person's attitudes are to be changed, the most favorable situation exists when the action the attitude implies is congenial both to the psychological pattern operating within him at the time and to the person's group relations and aspirations.

Most of the rest of the chapter has been in the nature of applications of these principles. For example, we have discussed predictions as to how difficult or how easy a given attitude might be to change. We said that the more firmly an attitude is anchored in group membership and the closer it is to a person's other belief systems and values, the more difficult it will be to change. We said also that the more clearly an attitude is differentiated and organized, the less likely it is to be affected by prestige suggestions or other such devices, and also that the more clearly a person understands what his attitudes are and what they can do for him, the less likely such attitudes are to be changed by suggestion and argument.

Turning then to the practical problem of the psywar operator, we tried to illustrate some of the processes by which attitude change may be brought about. The basic pattern, of course, is the learning paradigm, in which responses to given cues are rewarded and reinforced by the reduction of biological drives, normal personality needs, deviant personality needs, transient personality needs, or group needs. However, it may not always be possible to elicit the desired response and reward it. Social sanctions, group norms, or personal values may inhibit such a response. In such cases certain mechanisms, or ways of reacting to frustration and allaying anxieties, can be brought into play. Among these mechanisms are:

Displacement—When aggression cannot be expressed against

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the person or persons responsible for the frustration that caused it, then the aggression may be directed against a substitute.

Rationalizing—Offering acceptable reasons for actions saves one from recognizing the true (usually not acceptable) causes.

Projection—One's own motives (sometimes those which one does not realize he has) may be attributed to others.

Identification—Another person's motives, qualities, and experiences may be shared vicariously or attributed to oneself. Whereas the projector says "he is like me," the identifier says "I am like him."

Regression—When one cannot meet a problem situation, he is likely to revert to an earlier, probably more childish, way of meeting such a problem.

Withdrawal—Another way of avoiding frustrating problems is to retreat into daydreams and fantasies.

Conversion—Conversion is a sweeping and usually permanent change of attitudes and values, which comes about as a means of resolving long-standing conflicts between strong sets of motives.

These mechanisms are of potential use to psywar. Some of their psywar applications have been discussed in the preceding pages. In general, they provide ways of making use of anxieties and frustrations in the target society and of bringing about attitude changes and resultant actions even when these are directly opposed by the target culture.

ATTITUDE CHANGE AND ACTION IN GROUPS

We have consistently emphasized that personality factors and group factors interact in changing attitudes and motivating action. However, so far we have rather neglected the group problems. This is a good time to try to fill the gap and put together some of the information a psywar operator needs to know about groups, how they work, and what they mean to psywar.

Now it is obvious that most psywar is planned in terms of groups rather than individuals. Only rarely can psywar permit itself the luxury of tailoring a message or a campaign to an individual. The "propaganda man" (who stands for the target in the mind of the psywar planner) usually represents a composite or average or mode of the personalities in a group—or so the planner hopes. The psywar operator looks for needs, motives, or values that seem to characterize a given target group and distinguish it from other groups. Then he designs his message with a careful eye to these distinguishing characteristics.

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Once a group has been selected as a target for the psywar planner, two questions are always paramount: (a) what is the degree and kind of like-mindedness in the group? and (b) what machinery has the group for responding to the message?

Concerning like-mindedness, he has two further kinds of question: the obvious one, What needs, motives, repressions, value systems, common interests, or characteristic ways of responding make the group members like-minded? And a less obvious one, What is the range or variation around the typical or representative or model personality pattern? In other words, how nearly like-minded are they? This is an exceedingly important question to put to Psywar Intelligence. Averages in this sort of planning are no more meaningful than the average of one horse and one rabbit, which figures out, let us say, about the size of a pig or an antelope.

If a large percentage of the members of a target group have approximately the same anxieties or needs or problems, then the psywar operator can easily devise messages for the group. But if there is a wide variation, then he either is up against a group on which psywar cannot be used profitably, or he has not yet broken it down far enough and thus is not yet ready to exploit it as a target.

As far as machinery of response is concerned, the planner wants to know how the group operates. How much interaction takes place inside it? How much discussion or implementation is a message likely to get? A message addressed to a mass audience will probably get far less discussion than one addressed to a surrounded battalion or a labor union. And what action is the group in position to take? A message addressed to the common people of North Korea, even if it had convinced many of them that the Communist regime was bad, would still have been up against the fact that they had few channels for action other than those desired by the Communist regime. Their actions were tightly controlled. On the other hand, Captain Zacharias[19] was broadcasting in 1945 to the power elite of Japan, that is, the very people who could do what he wished done, that is, surrender the islands.

Let us look at some different types of groups and how they work.

Types of Group

We know that society consists of and operates through a system of interrelated social groups. These are of many kinds

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and size, from two lovers on a park bench to a rioting mob on May Day in Tokyo, from the small primary group (such as the family) to the nation, from a crowd of spectators at a football game to the members of a religious denomination. Perhaps the most important of all groups is the primary group, because this is where most human communication takes place and where the individual learns language and his first roles and his basic concepts of group norms. Another important group is the crowd, a collection of people drawn together by an event. The crowd, properly motivated and directed, has despite its accidental character the capacity for collective action, and we shall have more to say about the crowd in this respect. Another group is the public, which for our purposes we may define as a group confronted by an issue and under some tension to reach an opinion on it. Still another group is the mass, which Blumer[20] calls "an anonymous group of anonymous individuals," that is, a large grouping of people distinguished not by contact but by some common place of residence or common interest. There are many other types of groups, but for the purpose of psywar the most useful division is into two general kinds of group: classificatory and functional.

A classificatory group is any number of people having an important feature or characteristic in common but lacking in interpersonal contacts. White-collar workers, day laborers, the audience for the Jack Benny program, Naval officers, engineers, Negroes, deaf mutes are all groups of that kind. This does not mean that no contacts take place between members of such a group but only that interpersonal contacts do not ordinarily take place between them because of their membership in the group. For example, if engineers join a national society, or work on the same job, or band together to organize a new firm, they will have interpersonal contacts, but those contacts come about not because they are engineers, but because they have formed the other kind of group—a functional group.

A functional group is a number of people whose behaviors have some predictable effect on one another. Examples are the New York Yankees, the Jones family, the fellows in the machine shop, the third platoon of Company E, the Senate of the United States, the crew of a B-47, and the Operations Research Office. In the very nature of the case the members of such a group interact with each other. The larger the group, to be sure, the less interaction. For example, the members of the Jones family or a B-47 crew will be in more frequent contact with one another

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than, let us say, the members of the 1st Marine Division.

Like-mindedness in both kinds of group may be either transitory or relatively permanent. A ship's passengers, marooned on an island, share a common problem but will throw off their commonality as soon as they are rescued. The audience listening to a radio address by a high government official has a high degree of common interest during the speech but will break up into other groups as soon as the speech is over. Likewise a cut in food rations will for the time being fuse a large number of otherwise unlike people into a group with a common source of frustration, but this will pass and other groupings will then replace it. Psywar can use such transitory groups as targets and does use them, but the majority of target groups are more stable than that. They tend to be groups organized around continuing interests and motives.

Here are some examples:

Power-interest groups

(a) Political

Classificatory: government employees in China, tax collectors in Korea, chiefs of state of Latin American countries, the "intellectuals" in a target society

Functional: the government of Iran, the Russian Politburo, the Chinese Ministry of Propaganda, the British Foreign Service

(b) Military

Classificatory: Russian submariners, soldiers in the CCF, Communist cultural officers all over the world, prisoners of war, military leaders in the Arab states

Functional: the 43d Chinese Regiment, the staff of Kim Il Sung, the Egyptian General Staff, a battalion isolated on Heartbreak Ridge, the 29th MIG-15 Squadron

(c) Industrial and technological elites

Classificatory: the managerial class in the Soviet Union, big businessmen in the Near East, owners of industry in India, scientific society presidents throughout the world

Functional: the management of I. G. Farben, the Bankers' Association of Shanghai, the Board of Governors of the Royal Scientific Society

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Economic-interest groups

Classificatory: Chinese farmers, skilled workers in Russia, Korean railroad workers, remaining private landowners in Communist countries, small businessmen in Malaya

Functional: The Communications Union in North Korea, the Chamber of Commerce in Singapore, employees of the Skoda plant, the Association of Swedish Newspaper Publishers

Common value and ideology groups

Classificatory: regional groupings (Bavarians, Muscovites, Cantonese), religious groups (Christians in China, Buddhists, Mohammedans), ethnic groupings (Jews, Negroes, Irish, yellow race), recreational and avocational groupings (golfers, stamp collectors, people who read Pravda, people who see movies)

Functional: religious groups (the Roman Catholic Church, Congregational Church members in Pyongyang, the Korean Christian University), ethnic subgroups (the Georgian Association of Moscow, the Chinese-American Club of Honolulu), recreational and avocational groups (the Philatelic Society of Germany, members of the Moscow Athletic Club, audience at a public address by Stalin)

Any group, whether classificatory or functional, tends to be organized around its own symbols and to have a consciousness of its identity. Therefore it can be appealed to either via these symbols or in terms of its members' common interest and needs. As already indicated, the members of functional groups will interact a great deal more than members of the classificatory groups. On the other hand the functional groups will be harder to reach with mass communications. For the same reason, a mass-media message directed at such a group will ordinarily spread beyond the bounds of the group.

This raises another question. Most if not all individuals belong to more than one group. That is, the individual may be at one and the same time a North Korean, a Christian, a Roman Catholic of the Pyongyang congregation, a member of the railroad worker's union, and a trombone player. (The first two of the group memberships listed are classificatory, the next two functional, the last classificatory.) Conceivably, propaganda

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messages might be addressed to him in each capacity, and perhaps by both sides in the current controversy over Korea. What will then be the effect of his multiple group membership?

From the standpoint of the psywar operator, multiple group membership puts him on his mettle as regards the consistency of his messages; if they are consistent, multiple membership may provide a channel for reinforcing them (the ones the individual receives in his capacity as Roman Catholic backing up the ones he receives as trade unionist); if they are inconsistent, the fact of multiple membership may prove very costly, since the target individual then experiences a conflict between the needs relating to his various memberships. To go back to our example, the North Korean's union is affiliated with the Communist Party, while his church is anti-Communist. The ruling regime's propaganda is pro-Communist, pro-trade union, anti-Catholic. By playing up anti-Catholic themes, it may alienate him; by playing down anti-Catholic themes, it may keep him in the boat. It defends the confiscation of his church property, praises workers who meet their work quota on the railroads; it appeals to the emotional symbols to which he responds as a North Korean patriot, but weaves into its radio programs music that he dislikes in his capacity as trombone player. Psywar operators have to give careful attention to this sort of thing, about which we have now said enough to be able to add that we are using "consistent" in a special sense. Consistent propaganda, on the above showing, is primarily propaganda that makes its bets as to how best to exploit the "lay" of multiple membership within the target, and sticks to them, at least until there are urgent reasons for making new ones. The results, of course, will be no better than the original bets, about which we will say more in a minute. The immediate point is that by switching its bets in this matter a psywar operation may well end up by alienating everyone.

What we are saying here is that a psywar operation cannot hope to produce propaganda that will please everyone, that it has some choices to make as to whom to please and whom to risk offerding and alienating, and that these choices have to be made with an eye to the fact of there being numerous groups within the target (Catholics and Protestants, Christians and atheists, Communists and anti-Communists), and the further fact of multiple membership, which means that even those whom your propaganda pleases may be alienated because of what you say to them in some capacity you have overlooked. About all we can say about the latter problem is that each individual decides for himself how,

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in reacting to propaganda, he "weights" his various group memberships, that is, what group needs he is going to treat as representing his dominant needs. We can say too that if your propaganda sets up a conflict within him between his group loyalties, he will look around for a way to resolve it. Some North Koreans have resolved the conflict aroused in them by Soviet propaganda by conversion to Communism, others by becoming refugees, still others by trying to form a counterelite. Recently the Communists in eastern Europe have provided a means of confluence for such conflicting motives by—in effect—taking over the churches and making them speak with the voice of Communism, so that for many Greek Orthodox Christians the conflict between denominational membership and Party affiliation is removed. In any such case, however, the conflict of motives and needs provides the battleground for the propagandist, and the winner is the one who can best make use of the mechanisms we have outlined and suggest a way out of the conflict that is satisfactory to the maximum possible number of target individuals.

How Groups Work: The Group and The Individual

Persons find themselves members of some groups by birth or because of some other event over which they have no control (for example, Bavarians, the white race, blue-eyed people, people who are inconvenienced by a cut in food rations). Other groups they join because those groups meet some personality need. That is, an individual joins the classificatory group listening to a broadcast by his chief of state because the broadcast promises to meet his need for structure and understanding. He joins a labor union or a chamber of commerce because that functional group helps protect his job and thus relieves some of his anxiety. He joins with an individual of the opposite sex to form a functional group of two on a park bench because it is spring and because they have biological drives that need to be reduced.

There are, in other words, specific and identifiable needs that groups come into being to meet. There are also some general needs that are common to all functional groups. These groups help to meet the need all normal persons feel to "belong" —to be accepted, to be understood, to be a part of something bigger than themselves. The primary group is therefore not the only device for satisfying the need for belongingness. The labor union and the chamber of commerce do not merely protect the individual's economic interest; they also let him belong to a

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friendly, functioning group. Even the group of two on a park bench does more than meet biological drives; it also gives the members a sense of being understood and loved and secure.

Another general need that functional groups meet is the need for power or dominance. Some persons have this need in greater degree than others. Some may be satisfied merely to identify with the group in its successes; others may get their greatest satisfactions out of acting as leaders. Groups provide different experiences for different persons. There is good reason to think that groups satisfy the current needs of their dominant members better than those of other members, but in any case there is a variety of choices of role experience, and at different times the roles within a group change in character and may even change hands. The leader dealing with one problem may not be the leader when the group faces a different problem. The expert may be the leader in one situation and a submissive follower in another.

Functional groups tend to develop, among other things, a core of common beliefs. These grow out of the needs of the individual members, and it is easy to see how a common core develops. For one thing the prospect of satisfying certain needs is the chief reason why persons join one group rather than another. Once in the group, the process of interaction operates to select the members who will stay in; those who tend to disagree with the common core of belief tend to leave the group. Furthermore most groups have a certain amount of doctrine, either handed down (as in a church) or expressed by dominant members, which serves to shape the members and their attitudes to the common pattern. And in a very real sense the members of a functional group tend to have about the same experience; they face the same problems, receive the same information, identify with the same leaders, learn the same rationalizations. This does not mean that the belief pattern of a group is necessarily static, for, although the core of beliefs arises out of the needs of the members, it in turn gives rise to new needs. An example is that of the broadcasters of this country, who came together in a group to protect their practices and found themselves in need of a new code of practices, which they devised. In any case, this may be said with confidence: beliefs held by an individual in common with a group are likely to resist change very strongly.

Why this should be the case, you can see from the description just given. The group tends to select its members, integrate them, give them the same experiences, reward the same responses,

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and build up a loyalty out of the experience of belonging. It teaches roles and role patterns, and these in particular are products of group processes and hard to change without group interaction changing them. It tends to give its members the same frame of reference on common problems, and, in this one area of their lives, at least, the same general pattern of behavior. There is a natural tendency to continue any such comfortable and rewarding arrangement. Members want their groups to go on, even in the midst of change. Members do not want to be the first to renounce the old loyalties. Thus a hard core of belief and behavior grows up around a group. For psywar this is not necessarily a discouraging fact even where psywar is called on to buck it rather than maintain it. It does point to an area where frontal attack on attitudes may prove very difficult, but it also reminds us that if the group itself can be tied into psywar's mission, if the discipline it imposes on its members can be enlisted on psywar's side, then the operator's task is greatly simplified. The great feats of psywar always consist in getting groups inside the target to take on psywar's job, or at least the later phases of it, themselves.

Thus it is important at this point to ask how groups act.

The Group in Action

The pertinent question here for psywar is, What can be said in general about the group vs the individual, that is, about the quality of group decisions as compared to those at which the individual members would arrive if left to their own devices? And what changes can be brought about via group interaction that cannot be brought about via individual action?

For one thing there is a presumption that group decisions will prevail over those of isolated individuals on questions of perceptual fact and the evaluation of perceptual materials. An individual may perceive some lights in the sky, but when he talks it over with the group they put their perceptions together; decide on the number, size, and shape; and perhaps evaluate the lights as flying saucers. Individuals in a group may have different tentative evaluations of an enemy propaganda broadcast offering peace. When they bring this subject to the group and talk it over, a consensus emerges, and the group decision helps to dispel the area of vagueness. "What do you think of this new candidate?" one member of a group asks others, and gradually a group decision comes into being to modify and integrate individual decisions. In any such decisions as these, of course, the leader is a very

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important factor, and control of leadership is in many cases tantamount to control of the group.

In the second place it is apparent that only by group interaction can group norms be modified and social change accomplished. Let us not get caught up in language here. By group norms we mean the group standards of what it is right to do and believe. By interaction we mean discussion, one-way communication (bulletins, orders, etc.), coercion if any (for example, reward and punishment), and all the other ways that members of a group have an impact on each other. Now obviously one of the great reasons for addressing psywar to groups is that groups have the power to change their norms, for instance, to change the way their members think about Communism, or their accepted attitude toward the United States of America. And one of the chief reasons for directing psywar to functional groups is that by so doing there is some hope of accomplishing interaction; for example, getting the psywar message discussed and evaluated. The question then arises, what kind of interaction is likely to change attitudes in groups?

Festinger,[21] on the basis of an experiment with changing attitudes in a housing project, developed three generalizations in answer to this question. He says in the first place that contacts help produce attitude change only if they entail transmission of evaluative statements by other persons about the object of the attitude. These may be either verbal and explicit or behavioral, but they must represent an evaluation (it is good, it is bad; it is better than this, worse than this; it is dangerous; it is what we need, etc.) In the second place, and conversely, contacts will not be effective in changing attitudes if they merely contain information about the objects of the attitudes. This kind of interaction may change the cognitive structures (knowledge) but does not appear to change evaluations of the object or emotional feelings about it. Third, as might be expected, the effectiveness of communicated attitudes varies with the many relations between communicator and recipient. For example, the leader of the group may carry more weight with his opinion. A person to whom one is strongly attracted, or whom one confidently trusts, will carry more weight.

The psywar implications of these conclusions are that if we are going to try to change attitudes in a functional group we must (a) relate the message to a strong need or an emotionally involved attitude, so as to be sure of getting it discussed, (b) relate our message closely enough to obvious rewards or to enduring

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personality structures in the group, so as to be sure of getting some favorable evaluations, and (c) if possible, try to suggest responses and rewards that will get group leaders to evaluate the message favorably.

There are other ways in which groups may be used to control social change. One we have already suggested in talking about the way a group tends to integrate its members' beliefs. A group, we said, has the power to make its members conform and therefore to prevent social changes. A group can coerce its members by reducing their status in the group, by penalizing them in terms of property (for example, fining them), or by holding over them the threat of being expelled. A group, we said further, can to a great extent control what its members learn about a given problem, what examples they see, what evaluations they are offered to choose among. And a group builds up loyalty and a desire for the group to continue, which tends to keep members in the fold even after they have ceased to believe in the old norms. There is a fairly familiar situation that Katz and Schanck[22] have called "pluralistic ignorance," a situation in which no one believes, but everyone believes everyone else still believes, and no individual wants to be the only one to question the belief.

Thus group action may be used to keep things as they are, maintain standards, keep down defiance, and hold the ground against change. Or it can be used to accomplish change, peaceably or violently. Two special cases of the way groups accomplish change—one without, one with violence—are especially interesting to psywar.

Public Opinion. We have defined a public as a group confronted by an issue and under some pressure to reach a decision on it. In any society, therefore, there are many publics and many issues. The more communication, the larger the publics can be, and the more numerous the issues. In fact the size of a public is governed by the number of people to whom a given issue is important, and by the length of the channels for intercommunications. Whether to build a new waterworks in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, is not an important issue to many persons outside Cedar Rapids; but even a nationwide issue can be confined to a very small public if, for example, a totalitarian government closes the communication lines (for instance, if the Politburo chooses to have no public discussion about who succeeds Stalin).

An issue is simply a problem that calls forth a sense of need or threat in the group. Most psywar messages therefore pose issues. The first response to these issues is almost al-

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ways on an individual basis, that is, that of persons who read or heard the message and have not yet discussed it or heard it discussed by anyone else. At this stage we may say that opinion is latent or unformed. Then, however, the group processes begin, unless they are inhibited by censorship or distraction. Intercommunication takes place. People talk the issue over with one another. Newspapers write about it. Political leaders make public speeches about it. This is the period of sharpening the issue, making clear the rewards of possible responses, simplifying the facts so that people hold practically identical information, trying argument against argument. Psywar can affect matters in this stage as well as the initial one, of course, and not necessarily or exclusively by verbal communication. It is precisely at this stage of public opinion that the totalitarian countries have always staged military maneuvers near the border of whatever country they are trying to influence.

If public opinion follows its full pattern, interaction will finally lead to a sharp question on which people can express their views and on which a decision can be taken (shall we go to war? shall we elect X or Y as President? shall we ratify the treaty?). The individual has to decide for himself what kind of action is most likely to meet the need or remove the threat the issue poses, but he also feels a need to merge into a group consensus. The larger the group, to be sure, the easier it is for minority stands to be made and minority views to circulate. But by one means or other the group has to arrive at a working understanding.

We are talking about propaganda and public opinion as though the propagandist had free access and as though the public had free expression. This is not true in the totalitarian countries to which America directs psywar. In those countries the engineering of consent is often a fine art, but it is not the art of discussion and compromise as we practice it in the United States. It is a matter of the deliberate control of information and the expression of opinion, of the use of emotional symbols and, where necessary, of coercion. In the Communist states the engineering of consent often looks to an outsider like a matter of teaching conditioned responses desired by the leaders. Even against this situation, of course, psywar is not helpless. It can interfere with the communications monopoly. It can introduce information of its own, make use of counter prestige figures, flaunt its own symbols, and suggest other responses and their attendant rewards. It can try to arouse dissatisfaction with the engineered decision. But always it must ask the realistic ques-

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tion: how much is this accomplishing? For in a tightly controlled totalitarian state, the sources of change and policy are seldom publics acting in the way we have described.

In a freer situation, of course, psywar can use all the mechanisms and processes we have been describing in this book, for public opinion is the traditional battleground of propaganda.

Let us review some of the weapons the propagandist has at hand for influencing public opinion:

(1) He knows, and will make constant use of, devices for gaining attention (novelty, contrast, color, figure-ground relations, etc.).

(2) He makes it his business to get at least enough communication time for his messages to be widely heard or seen so that he can repeat them with variations (Goebbels said, "Don't argue; just assert and assert"). The Russians, too, apparently believe in the practice of saying something over so often that the reader's or listener's original objections to it may be forgotten.

(3) He will see to it that his messages appeal to strong needs and anxieties in his target audiences, and especially to emotionally involved needs.

(4) Wherever possible he will try to make use of the target's firmly held attitudes, diverting them slightly in the direction required by his mission.

(5) Where he wants a real attitude change, he will work if possible in the area where attitudes are weakly held or where information is vague and where there is a felt need for structuring.

(6) He will try to get functional groups (religious, political, labor, business, women's, education) at work on his side.

(7) He will try to get the target to think of the propagandist's views as expressions of an in-group, and of the opposition's views as those of an out-group.

(8) He will try to get the target to identify with the leaders of the operator's side ("I can understand them; I feel like that too.").

(9) He will use prestige figures for testimonials and try to persuade the target to join the band wagon.

(10) He will introduce emotionally loaded symbols and slogans to dramatize the responses he wants the target to make.

(11) He will be on hand at the right moment with a pattern of confluence to resolve any conflict in a manner favorable to his mission.

(12) He will be ready with rationalizations for any unpopular position his side has to take.

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(13) If aggression exists, he will try to displace it onto a substitute among his opponents.

(14) He will try to appeal to ego-involved motives in his target audience (this is your battle we are waging; this counter-elite is looking out for you; you are the greatest people on earth and deserve better from your neighbors; we need you).

The Crowd. A crowd is a spontaneous grouping of people drawn together by an event. Ordinarily crowds have very little to do directly with social change. For example, the casual crowd that gathers to look in a toystore window is not going to establish any new norms or overthrow a government. Nor is the crowd at a football or baseball game likely to change anything; indeed this is one of the most conventionalized of all groups, as the cheers, the peanuts, and the traditional patterns of behavior indicate. But there are occasions when a casual crowd is transformed into an acting crowd, and then it becomes a vicious and irrational instrument. This is what we know as a "lynching mob" or a "riot." The behavior of one such acting crowd is described in the following:[23]

LION TAMER

Koje Island's new prison commandant, a first-class combat man, emerged last week as a soldier who could also use his wits in the most disagreeable of rear-area jobs. Boldly and shrewdly, Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner had chosen Compound 76, scene of the Dodd-Colson coup, as the first to be tackled in bringing order to the prison. After the bloody battle in which Compound 76's 6000 hard-core Communists were subdued (*Time*, June 16), the other tough enclosures on Koje toppled like ninepins, with no further fighting between guards and prisoners. By week's end, some 30,000 prisoners had been moved into smaller enclosures, where they were searched and fingerprinted. During the cleanup nearly 800 anti-Communists had escaped from Communist control and were safely segregated, and more than 100 ringleaders in kangaroo-court murders had been identified, dragged out and isolated. It seemed physically impossible that any further mass rebellion could occur. Reported "Bull" Boatner: "The worst is over."

Meanwhile, the prisoner death list following the battle of Compound 76 rose to 41 (plus one US paratrooper). At least twelve of these were killed by last-ditch fanatics for refusing to fight or for trying to obey Boatner's orders, some were bayoneted in the trenches by US paratroopers, and others died in buildings captured only after concussion grenades were tossed in. The Americans did not fire a shot, although the prisoners fought with spears, homemade swords, clubs and barbed-wire flails. Also found were maps which indicated that a Communist capture of the whole island had been planned.

Kangaroo Courts. When the order to move went to the next pen—Compound 78—the inmates, who had watched the battle of 76, lined up meekly and were taken away. Compound 77 was next, and it was here that Bull Boatner made his one tactical mistake of the week. He gave

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77 a day's advance notice of the move, and the Communists inside used their last night to execute anti-Communists. After the evacuation, 16 bodies were found, hacked, beaten or strangled, tossed into water-filled ditches, jammed into metal drums, and even hidden under hut floors. Compound 77's kangaroo courts had not found all of the anti-Communists, however; 95 more broke away next day.

Boatner's paratroops moved on to Compound 95. While the prisoners were being moved, interpreters passed orders for the column to turn left, but added that anti-Communists could fall out to the right. No fewer than 400 anti-Communists turned to the right. Some of these dashed their red-starred caps to the ground.

Boatner expected some trouble from the swaggering, defiant North Korean officers of Compound 66, but after he had taken representatives from the enclosure on a tour of the blood-spattered ruins of Compound 76, the officers marched out in orderly ranks, five abreast. As a reward for obedience and a mark of respect for their rank, Boatner ordered the machineguns on the watchtowers turned skyward during the transfer. Only one North Korean officer stepped out of ranks; he identified himself as an anti-Communist.

Pens and Runways. The new prison pens, intended to house no more than 520 men each, measure some 200 by 155 ft. and are surrounded by a double fence of barbed wire. They are arranged in groups of eight in larger enclosures, which are also fenced with double barriers of barbed wire. The large enclosures are traversed by a central barbed-wire runway, which makes it easy for guards to reach any of the smaller pens with tear gas. Constant and thorough searches, and floodlighting at night are expected to prevent the prisoners from cutting the wire and thus assembling in larger groups.

After being herded into the small pens, the battered survivors of Compound 76 had still not had enough. Three times in one day they disobeyed orders; each time they were brought to heel by tear-gas barrages. One anti-Communist, hardly more than four feet tall, seized his chance to scramble under the wire of his pen, lacerating his back but getting away just ahead of clutching Communist fingers. He said he had been sentenced to death, and he then put the finger on 102 members of kangaroo courts. These malefactors were dragged out by US guards for isolation.

At week's end, like a lion tamer who disdains whip, chair and pistol, Bull Boatner entered one of the new pens and walked alone, unarmed and unmolested, among the prisoners. He had cowed the unruly Communists and had done much to restore US prestige lost by previous pampering and bungling.*

How does an acting crowd come into existence? It starts with some exciting and dramatic event. Perhaps it is a report of a rape, or a threat, or some harm done to a person who should have been protected. Whatever the exact cause, the event catches the attention of individuals and builds up a high state of tension in them. They begin to mill around. This is typical acting-crowd behavior. They talk to each other, communicate their excitement, build tension in one another, and often generate a surprisingly close rapport among themselves. Then a common object of attention emerges as a focus of the crowd tension. Sometimes this is the

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event that started the whole process. More often it is a related or substitute symbol that develops during the period of milling around. For example, if they can't get at a man, they may burn his home, or a friend's home, or the jail. But someone yells, "Look, they've got him over at the jail!" Or, "Jeff just saw him down behind the coal shed; those lily-livered police aren't even going after him!" And the crowd tension spills over into mob action.

Now the question is, how by means of communication can we control the acting crowd? The crowd is nearly hysterical by the end of the milling process. It is highly suggestible, but its general direction of response is very well determined. In other words, anything we say to such a crowd will be ignored or rejected unless it falls within the general direction of the aroused impulse. It does little good to reason with a crowd or plead with them.

If a psywar operator wants to use and direct such an acting crowd, it would appear that the key time is near the end of the milling process, when they are beginning to look for an object on which to focus their aggression. That is the time when a leader or even a "plant" in the crowd can suggest a victim, or an objective, and if it is closely enough related to the original objective get it accepted.

If you want to stop an acting crowd, the earlier the better. The problem is to make a suggestion that breaks up the crowd's almost hypnotic focusing on a single object. There are three things to do: You can frighten them, so that each individual begins to worry more about his safety than about the group objectives. You can sow discord within the crowd, so that its members end up fighting among themselves, in which case also attention is diverted from group to individual problems. Or you can diffuse their attention to more than one objective, in which case the crowd loses the unity that has sustained it.

The secret of a crowd's strength, of course, is the anonymity of the members. It makes a difference when a man knows that others know what he is doing. If they know, he realizes that he has certain role patterns he is expected to follow and that anything he does will be subject to social sanctions and individual approval or disapproval. This has been demonstrated experimentally again and again. And the principle always emerges that under conditions of anonymity it is possible to do things one wants to do but dares not when his identity is known. The hysteria of a crowd and the cloak of anonymity release pent-up aggressions and repressed sadism that would never come out otherwise.

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

Fig. 2—Sociogram of Squadron A



Fig. 3—Sociogram of Squadron B

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Morale

The signs of group morale are perhaps easier to see and sense than to describe. Essentially they are cohesiveness and a sense of purpose and accomplishment. In a group that has really high morale the cohesiveness comes from inside; it is not imposed by outside authority but rather comes from mutual liking and respect, a minimum of friction between personalities, and flexibility enough to take care of little interpersonal problems without letting them interfere with the job. Some of this cohesive spirit, it is true, may be evoked by outside threat—as happened in the United States at the time of Pearl Harbor—but even so it will last for a shorter time, and the group will work less well, than if there is a true basis for liking and cooperation within the group. This group feeling shows up as loyalty, involvement, solidarity, pride in the group—indeed, members of a group with high morale will almost always prefer their own group to all others.

A group with high morale is always one with a clearness of purpose to which the individual ambitions and goals of the members are subordinated. The group must be conscious of a job to do and of doing that job. Each member must have a role in the job and a sense of accomplishment in it. And the rate of aspiration must be realistic; as Lewin and coworkers[24] say, the "next goal somewhat, but not too much, above (the) last achievement."

You will find it interesting to study some sociograms of groups,[25,26] such as those in Figs. 2 and 3. Sociograms indicate what the members of a group think of each other. These particular ones were developed by asking members of two Naval air squadrons which group members they would like to fly with and which ones they would not. A solid line indicates a positive answer, a dotted line a rejection. Notice that in Fig. 2 a large number of the men would like to fly with the commander or his executive; choices were widely distributed, and there were no signs of cliques within the structure. In the other squadron (Fig. 3), no members even mentioned the commanding officer in stating choices. A number of members mentioned the exec, but only to say they didn't want to fly with him. The incidence of dotted lines inside the group is higher than that of solid ones. And there are two cliques—two groups of four—who choose each other and no one else. In the first squadron (Fig. 2), no one said he wanted to fly with someone outside the squadron; in the second squadron (Fig. 3), four members preferred to fly with outsiders. You hardly have to be told which squadron had higher morale.

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These signs of morale are important to the psywar operator because he needs to know what kind of groups he is facing. He would like to have groups with high morale on his side, and if he finds high morale on the other side, he would like to break it down.

How would one go about attacking morale? The most effective way is to attack the interpersonal relations within the group. The Communist tactic of "boring from within" is more than a newspaperman's phrase. One agitator inserted into a group can contaminate the whole structure, as surely as a worm can contaminate an apple. The most vulnerable point is leadership, and if the agitator can undermine the members' faith in their leader he will be a long way toward destroying the group morale. Another useful trick is to turn the attention of group members from the group objective toward their own problems and objectives, that is, toward their own ambitions, toward their frictions with fellow members, toward their own worries. Still another device is to have the group goal set impossibly high, so that the whole group is frustrated. One Communist device is to insert a Party member into a group with instructions simply to do in an extreme way what the group is supposed to do. If the group is championing labor, he is the most vigorous champion; he wants the most strikes, he has the most complaints against management. Thus he builds up tension and frustration, and to the extent that he becomes a leader he can later turn the group toward his own goals.

Group disintegration is easier to accomplish from inside than from without. Nevertheless something can be done about it by communication from outside, and one of the chief weapons for this purpose is the device we call "privatization." This is simply a matter of trying to get the individual members of a group to be concerned with their own needs and problems, and to think about those rather than their group objectives and responsibilities. If, for example, we can get enemy troops to brood over their loneliness, hardships, and deprivations, they will not be very efficient group members. Similarly, if we can make them believe that they are not accomplishing their goal—for example, that they are losing the war—and especially if we can make them believe that their leaders are misleading them, then we have the situation for group disintegration.

But even in a situation like this the group may keep on functioning. The Strategic Bombing Survey[27] of 1946 showed that the German factories kept right on producing when morale was at a low ebb and when the workers thought the war was lost and bitterly

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blamed the Nazi leaders. Role hal ts were ingrained, and there was fairly habitual repression in Nazi society, just as in most other totalitarian societies we have to deal with.

Suppose you want to build morale in a target group. You will try to rearrange personnel so that frictions will be minimized. You will see that the group has a clear assignment and a goal far enough but not too far above its last achievement. You will see that each member has a job that contributes to the group job. You will try to get the members to identify with the group. Perhaps the key will be the selection of a good leader, whom the members will recognize as a leader, and follow. That brings us to talk about leadership.

Leadership

Some leaders work into the job through group interaction, for example by election or recognition. Others, such as army officers, are put into positions of leadership by outside authority. In either case, the leader has fairly definite functions in the group. Krech and Crutchfield[26] name a number of these:

He is the executive. In other words he has the final responsibility for seeing that the group assignment is carried out.

He is planner and policy maker—either himself or as custodian of plans and policies formulated by others.

He is expert. Often he gets to be a leader because of his expert knowledge. Or he knows how to use experts.

He represents the group. He is their spokesman and the man through whom outsiders speak to the group. Thus, as Lewin and coworkers[24] say, he is a kind of "gatekeeper" for communication into and out of the group.

He controls relations within the group—both role assignments and interpersonal relations. He therefore is in a position to arbitrate between members and to reward and to punish.

He serves as an example or a symbol for the group. The officer must exemplify bravery; the minister must exemplify godliness. A leader such as a general or a king comes to symbolize more than relations between persons; he stands for the tradition and continuity of the group. He may become a kind of father figure, as many leaders have become in times of crisis. Roosevelt, Hitler, Stalin, and Churchill all took on aspects of the father figure. He may become a philosopher or spiritual leader of the group as, for example, Gandhi did. And, whatever happens, he is likely to get the praise or blame for what the group does. If the group fails, if

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it loses the war, for example, the members are likely to turn savagely on the leader and project onto him all their own guilt and disappointment.

This is what a group expects of its leader, even though the importance of the duties varies from group to group, and the members may in no case analyze the job description exactly as we have done. When psywar attacks a leader it tries to undermine confidence in him by showing that he has not been carrying out these duties. For example:

As executive he can't delegate responsibility and is therefore a bottleneck for the whole group.

As planner or policy maker he consults no one except himself. The group does only what he wants it to do. Or he doesn't know what he is doing or where the group is going.

He pretends to be an expert but is really ignorant.

He is a poor representative. He doesn't speak the truth when he talks for the group or when he reports what other people say to the group. Or perhaps other groups laugh at him—is he the best you have for a leader?

He isn't fair with his group members. He plays favorities. He doesn't care about the problems of his group members.

He is a bad example. The officer really is a coward; the minister leads a licentious life in private; the political leader is really in it for the graft he can pick up. Furthermore he is responsible for the group's failures, if any. And he is leading, inevitably, toward failure.

If these lines of attack sound familiar, remember that not all the propagandists are in psywar directed at foreign targets.

Lewin, Lippitt, and White[24] and others of the group dynamics school have studied in experimental situations the difference between democratic and authoritiarian leadership. They organized groups of children and young people and assigned definite roles for the leaders to play, either authoritarian or democratic. The groups were then given tasks to do, and the results were recorded. They noticed these differences between the behaviors of the two kinds of group:

(1) There is more pent-up aggression in the authoritarian group. This seems to be the result of frustration resulting from the leader's tight control and is usually diverted to scapegoats or repressed until the leader is absent.

(2) In the authoritarian groups there is more fawning over the leader, more meekness in approaches to him, and more demands for his attention and praise.

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(3) In the authoritarian groups there is more "I feeling"; in the democratic groups, more "we feeling." Members of the authoritarian groups seem to be more aggressive and dominating toward each other.

(4) When the authoritarian leader is absent, the work level declines sharply. When the democratic leader is absent, the work level goes down only a little.

(5) When frustration is experimentally introduced into the situation, the authoritarian group members tend to take out their aggressions on each other. They blame each other for awkwardness, poor planning, etc. Democratic groups are more likely to think things out or to draw together for organized attacks on the obstacle.

These results must not necessarily be interpreted as favorable to democratic group organization in all circumstances. When faced by threat from outside the group, people often seek authoritarian leadership: "Tell me what to do," they plead. It is noteworthy that authoritarian states try to keep their people feeling a constant sense of threat from outside, as the Soviet Union has been doing for a number of years. People who are emotionally insecure gravitate toward authoritarian leaders, as all "men on horseback" have known. Finally it should be added that in many parts of the world the role patterns have grown up in an authoritarian mold, and there is little motivation to change them.

But suppose that psywar has to deal with authoritarian groups. The findings of Lewin, Lippett, and White,[24] and their associates suggest ways of going about it. For one thing the leader is such a key figure in the authoritarian structure that he is an obvious target for attack. By the same token, however, an authoritarian leader is less vulnerable to successful attack. The chiefs of state of totalitarian nations are ordinarily so protected by emotional symbolism and so accepted by the people as father figures that attacks on them may be futile. But the lesser leaders are vulnerable. And if one of these can be removed or made less effective, then we have reason to hope that the effectiveness of his whole group will markedly decline, at least until another leader is substituted.

Likewise it is safe to assume that a good deal of aggressiveness will be pent up in authoritarian groups. If this can be diverted against fellow group members or subleaders, then the efficiency of the group will decline.

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Summary

Without trying to repeat the details of the preceding pages, let us sum up the psywar operator's concept of groups in his target population.

1. They are (for him) clusters of roles and characteristics in the target population. This helps him to define his target, since such clusters in large part determine the amount and direction of possible change. For example, the relative roles of young people and their elders in China minimized social change for centuries. The competitive role patterns between men and women in the United States contribute to the high divorce rate.

2. They are custodians of morale in the target population and are consequently the chief points of attack if one wishes to raise or lower morale.

3. They are the chief determiners of how the target will react to psywar messages, because of group interaction on perceptual facts and because of role patterns and other pressures to conform within the group.

4. They are dynamic forces that may sometimes—dramatically in the case of an acting crowd, less dramatically in the case of public opinion formation—be mobilized to speed social change.

ATTITUDES INTO ACTION

The ultimate goal of psywar is action. Sometimes this goal is directly expressed, as for example when a psywar operator tries to persuade a beleaguered garrison to surrender. More often the action goal is held back, taken for granted, implied, or deliberately left unspecified (for the target to figure out for itself). If we try by means of psywar to lower the morale of troops, we are taking it for granted that as a result of lowered morale they will fight less efficiently; we don't have to say it. As we try to plant suspicion of leaders in the minds of a target population, we are taking it for granted that suspicious people may cooperate less effectively and obey less readily. (We may be holding back an action appeal for the overthrow of these leaders and contenting ourselves, for the moment, with getting the target into an appropriate frame of mind.) If we try to build friendship for ourselves in a target population, we may find it wise to do no more than simply that; given a choice involving

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policy, our friends will then make the choice in favor of us. If we are trying to influence elections in a target country, we may, to avoid a boomerang effect, not specify voting for the out-elite as the action we want; we merely attack the present elite.

Changing an attitude in the direction we desire does not necessarily mean that action in the desired direction will automatically follow. Attitudes do not cause action; they direct action. We have called attitudes "signposts," because they point the direction action will take if action takes place at all. Newcomb[28] defines attitudes as "readiness to be motivated." Other things being equal, if a person is motivated to act, he will find a built-in compass by which to steer his action. That is the significance of an attitude to the psywar operator.

Let us take an example. A person has a strong attitude in favor of beef over pork. But no action is likely to take place that brings that preference into play unless his hunger drive is aroused. Even then it may be impossible for him to find beef. He may become so hungry that his need generalizes and he may even be willing to eat pork. When he has eaten, his drive is reduced and he no longer has a strong motivation to find a beefsteak, although he may feel a certain sense of frustration over having been unable to surmount the barrier in the way of his preference for beef.

Consider another example. Psywar succeeds in developing within a citizen of a Communist country a strong attitude of disapproval for the Communist regime. Let us suppose that he is also motivated to action along the line of that attitude. Let us say, for example, that his local Communist government has confiscated his rice and kept him working long overtime hours to earn food, spied on him, and restricted his movements, and that he wants to do something about it. Will action result? This depends on a number of factors, quite independent of the attitude itself. The man may simply not have the kind of personality it takes to resist a gove nment or endanger himself by subversive action. Others of his attitudes (for example, in favor of protecting his family from harm) may conflict with the attitude that favors doing something. The response of resistance and revolution may not be in the culture pattern; its "little man" may have gotten used, through centuries of domination, to the idea that he is to be seen and not heard, that he is to be pushed around by a dominant class, that he is often to be hungry and weary, and that probably all this is for the best. More likely the police power

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and surveillance may be so strict that he cannot find an opening. What will he do? He may displace his aggression on his family or his fellow workers; he may rationalize the situation, as we suggested a moment ago: "this is bad but it could be worse, and probably things are all for the best"; he may repress his aggression —he may do any or all of these things until a way opens up by which he can act on his anti-Communist do-something-about-it attitude.

We said previously that action would take place along the compass line of the attitude, other things being equal. But "other things" are seldom equal. Therefore it is important for us to consider some of these other things that enter into the complicated practical relation of attitudes to action.

Relation of Attitudes to Action

We can suggest a few principles that seem to apply to the relation of attitudes to action:

1. For a change in attitude to be a valid indicator of action, there must be either (a) a present or impending radical change in social structuring, or (b) important changes in the personality structure of the person, or (c) both. There is always a tendency to think that the process that brings these changes about is simple. The psychotherapist, the criminologist, the evangelist all know it is not. The evangelist is accustomed to see some of his supposed "converts" doing things wholly incompatible with the new attitudes they have claimed to hold. The criminologist knows how important it is to be able to hold the threat of imprisonment over a potential criminal's head, and how often it helps to take a bad boy out of his environment and put him in a wholly new one. The psychotherapist knows that very often the medicine for an ailing personality has to be complete reeducation.

Everything we have been able to observe about the action processes of psywar indicates that ordinarily at least one of the two factors mentioned above must be influenced in a powerful manner if we are going to accomplish action. For example, if we hope to secure a real change of heart through psywar in political or consolidation situations, we need an educational process of considerable scope, which may range from textbooks and youth organizations to the indoctrination of tourists and careful treatment of visiting dignitaries—in addition to the usual devices of the long-distance mass media. To secure surrenders in a tactical situation, as we have found out by bitter experience, it

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is ordinarily not enough to deliver attractive leaflets and persuasive broadcasts. We must also display military power and restructure the environment sufficiently to threaten the target individuals.

The fact that both these factors may be influenced in most psywar situations gives us a welcome leverage. For example, in political and consolidation operations we can employ not only the devices of propaganda but also the reinforcement of economic, diplomatic, and potential military operations. In tactical psywar we can combine coercive with noncoercive measures and supplement one with another. In strategic psywar we can to some extent make up for the weakness of having to communicate at long distance by using the threat of military action; for example, bombers in the sky. Therefore we can bring about action in many instances without the long-time program necessary to secure really basic changes in personality structure.

2. The drive strength of an attitude is related to the likelihood of action resulting in the direction of the attitude. We have not defined an attitude very sharply, and indeed there isn't a very close consensus among psychologists as to the exact way an attitude works among the other components of personality. But there is general agreement that attitudes have the dimension of intensity, that is, they are held strongly or weakly. Furthermore they have a dynamic quality, a "dynamic, insistent, stirred up property," one psychologist calls it. In contrast to knowledge and beliefs, which are relatively neutral, attitudes are actively pro or anti. They "lean toward action," or, more accurately, they mediate between the fundamental psychological processes and action. They are closely related to drives and often are clothed with emotion. Therefore we sometimes say that attitudes which are closely related to basic and powerful drives, especially if they tend to call up emotion and ego motivations, have drive strength. And action is probably somewhat more likely to result from this kind of attitude than from another.

In a sense this is simply saying what we have previously said about the need in psywar to restructure personality. The object in trying to change personality is to place strong motivation behind the desired attitude. This is what happens in cases of conversion, where the attitudes usually acquire great drive strength. If the drive strength of the attitude of preference for beef over pork, which we mentioned previously, had been great enough, the individual would doubtless have resisted eating pork, even if he was very hungry. Among Mohammedan people, for example, such

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an attitude would presumably have had sufficient drive strength to accomplish this result.

3. If action in the direction indicated by an attitude is likely to get strong group reinforcement, then such action is more likely to result. This, like the preceding principle, is really a special case of the first principle. Group reinforcement is one of the means that can be used in restructuring the individual's environment. We have seen how people seek to "belong" and how they learn roles and come to know group rules and norms. If an attitude points to an action in accord with those roles and norms, then the group will reward this action. And the action will be easier to take.

The importance of this for psywar is that it gives us another variable to manipulate. We are in position not only to suggest actions that will get group reinforcement but also often in position to provide the group itself. The Communists are careful to provide well-organized groups into which to bring their converts and through which to reinforce the kinds of action expected of Party members. Practically every attempt at subversion in an enemy country includes group organization, an underground or a counterelite, not only to make action more effective but to make it more palatable for the individual. Nor is this device limited to subversive activities. Just as a well-run boys club in a tough district can help combat tendencies toward delinquency by furnishing group reinforcement for other kinds of action, so can parallel organizations be established in neutral or occupied countries. The English-speaking Union, the Committee to Help Ourselves by Helping the Allies, the Friends of the Soviet Union, and in fact many of the ethnic clubs and societies are domestic examples with which we are all familiar.

4. Action in the direction indicated by an attitude will be more likely if channels exist for its expression, less likely if barriers exist. Channels and barriers are the chief variables we can manipulate beyond the attitudinal stage itself. They may exist in the personality or in the environment. We have just given some examples. A strong motive to eat beef may be a barrier to eating pork, whereas a rationalization may clear the channel for expressing the hunger drive on a pork chop. Group censure of deviant political action may be a barrier in the way of subversion, whereas a new and subversively inclined group to which a person will be welcomed will provide a channel for subversive activity. Even after an attitude favorable to surrender has been built up among troops, the danger and unpleasantness of surrendering

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may be a barrier to the action, whereas the provision of safe and simple surrender procedures may be a channel to bring in many prisoners.

Because these devices are so important in the process of converting attitudes into action, we are going to talk about some of the chief kinds of barriers and channels, and how they may be used.

Barriers and Channels to Action

It is obvious that a channel, as we are using the term, is the opposite, in effect, of a barrier. It may be to the interest of psywar to raise a barrier and thus close the channel to a given action, or to lift a barrier and provide a channel by which to facilitate the action.

Personality Barriers and Channels. We are not going to talk here about attitudes and drives, which are obviously necessary to action, but rather about some organizations of personality which are changeable or suggestible and which operate to inhibit or encourage actions. For example, conflict or confusion will inhibit action, and it may be desirable to produce such barriers in enemy targets. An enemy power figure who is confused (for example, by conflicting information as to our strength and intentions) will not be likely to make good policy. Segments of the enemy population that are experiencing strong conflict (for example, between their religion and their politics) may be less efficient, less loyal workers. On the other hand it may be desirable to provide a pattern of confluence for such persons, by which they can bring the conflicting drives into agreement and thus find a channel of action. For example, it might be possible to resolve such a conflict by working for a new government which would be more in accord with the religious attitudes and beliefs of the people in question.

Frustration, as we have seen, will sometimes produce withdrawal or regression. The psywar man may find it desirable, by calling attention to frustrations and deprivations, to lead enemy troops to withdraw from reality into daydreams, or to regress into a more childlike state, in which case they would certainly provide less capable opposition. Or, on the other hand, if we suspect friendly troops of daydreaming or other childlike behavior, we can look for the frustration that is causing it. If that frustration can't be removed, perhaps it can be combated with another positive motivation. For example, a unit of friendly

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troops has been stationed far from home, in a theater which we control, and the need they were sent to meet has never developed. They are frustrated and lonely, they have very little to do, and their morale is low. Probably nothing can be done about their basic frustration, which stems from isolation and loneliness. But it might be possible to figure out a job for them to do, a danger for them to prepare for, a new kind of skill for them to learn, that would momentarily at least give them a channel for action and remove some of the frustration. This would be sound psywar on our part.

The displacement mechanism is really a barrier-channel process. Frustration results from the individual's finding himself up against a barrier to motivated action. As we have indicated, the psywar operator's mission often requires him to produce frustration in a target, because frustrated enemy soldiers and frustrated enemy workers are likely to be ineffectual opponents. But we know too that frustration tends to build up aggression and gives us a potential motivating force of great power to play on. The latter, however, we may be able to exploit, and keep from being turned against us, only as we provide a channel that leads it where we want it to go and that helps it to strike down the barriers that might prevent it from using that channel. If we can displace it against the enemy individual's immediate superiors, or his government, or his fellows, that is all to the good.*

Institutional Sanctions as Barriers and Channels. By "institutions" we mean the established forms or patterns by which continued group activity is carried on in society (for example, government, church, family, etc.). In each institution there are rules (express or implied), codes, and provisions for enforcement (rewards, punishment, expulsion, etc.), which make sure that the behaviors that basically distinguish the institution are forthcoming. The government has laws and police power to enforce them; the church has rules or, as the Methodists call them, "discipline," and uses excommunication and other less formal ways to keep its members in line; the family has the power to withdraw affection, company, or support, or even to exclude a member by separation or divorce. Let us call these "sanctions" or, more precisely, "institutional sanctions."

The psywar operator runs head on into institutional sanctions when he tries to direct messages to targets within a totalitarian country. States like those in the Soviet orbit severely penalize

*Where the target is an ally or a neutral, we may want to prevent frustration and keep aggression from being built up.

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resistant behavior and provide almost no channels through which deviant activity can express itself. So widespread and strong are the surveillance and police power of these states that it is almost impossible for a counterelite to raise its head. This constitutes a very powerful barrier to the types of action we are likely to want to encourage within those states.

If this represents a barrier that psywar will have to meet as best it can, there are other barriers that psywar, if it were able to erect or reerect them within the same group of states, would be able to use for its own purpose.[5] For example, the Communist regimes have done much to break down the father dominance that characterized both Korean and Chinese families and tended to slow down social change. They have tried to give equal political and social rights to women, and to encourage the younger generation to be much more independent of their parents than they used to be. One of the sad types of story that keeps coming out of the Communist countries is that of children who have denounced their parents to the Party. Breaking down the old family structure, and especially the autocratic power of the father, of course helps the Communists to take over. But it is a safe assumption that the Communist onslaught has not been universally successful, and if by psywar we could appeal to the sense of tradition and fitness in the Oriental countries, and thereby put barriers in the way of the Communist changeover, it would be to our advantage.

It is hardly necessary to say that if any country seeks to encourage subversion in an enemy country it must try to provide channels for subversive activity that circumvent the sanctions of the enemy government. This means, usually, an underground organization, careful planning, logistic support, and communication with the underground in the form that will involve least risk for the members.

A favorite way of combating the sanctions of an opposing state is to try to emphasize the channels that are not officially disapproved but are irrelevant to the main purpose of the opposing government. For example, a peace campaign is a common psywar move to keep a country from getting ready for war. Witness the Soviet peace campaign of 1950 and the years following. We lost the initiative in that case, but one possible move might have been to turn the Soviet campaign back on them and do everything possible to get Russians within the Soviet Union actually working for peace and against armament. In general, any sanctioned activity that does not increase the power or preparedness of an enemy state can profitably be encouraged. If, for example, the

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Soviet Union could have persuaded England to channel its energies into a program of social security at the cost of military preparedness, it would have been well worth the Soviet's while. If it could have persuaded this country to divert its attention from the Soviet to any one of a hundred activities not contributing to preparedness, it would have tried to do so. More accurately, that is what it did.

Another way of combating opposing sanctions is to try to arouse conflicting sanctions. We have mentioned the conflict of church and Communism, and also of the Oriental family and Communism. Such conflict makes for frustration and anxiety and may provide a basis for deviant behavior.

Role Status and Social Norms. People trained to play submissive roles in a society will not ordinarily take on active political roles. This is a situation that psywar meets in all Oriental countries and, in general, throughout the totalitarian states. The role of the follower is closely circumscribed and presents a real barrier to any deviant political action originating with the masses. It is next to impossible to change a role pattern from outside. The idea that revolution can be incited by psywar in the masses of a totalitarian state, against the police power, the role structure, and the dominating ideology of the state, is what Speier[29] calls the "democratic fallacy" of psywar. In many states the status structure is quite rigid also. People in low status have relatively little chance to rise. Against that situation psywar has a choice of action. It can try to stimulate frustration in the low-status people over their inability to rise in status; this, of course, is the basis of the Russian campaigns to the "lower classes" and racial minorities. It is possible also to stimulate gripes about low pay, slow promotions, and privilege differentials in military groups.

Another way to face the status problem is to concentrate on the leaders. Obviously it is to our benefit to have good leaders in friendly groups, poor leaders in enemy groups. If an enemy group has a poor leader, it is therefore to our advantage to keep him there. We should not try to provide a channel for attacks on him; indeed, anything we can do to keep a barrier in the way of changing status within that group will be worth while. On the other hand, if he is a good leader, then the obvious psywar attack would be in the direction of undermining confidence in him, and encouraging cliques and antagonisms within his group. This calls in many situations for covert rather than overt attack. For example, rumors about the leader can be very effective. Also, if anything can be done to disrupt the communication lines between

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leader and followers, the situation is being set for misunderstandings and tensions.

Surrender and subversion are almost always contrary to social norms. To provide motivation and channels for those activities is therefore important. It may be necessary also to rationalize the act, so as to get around the guilt feeling that arises from breaking, or thinking about breaking, the norms. One aspect of providing a channel in this kind of case is the giving of explicit directions and as much help as possible. People need to be told not only how to surrender but how to express their dissatisfaction in much less dramatic ways—how to withhold some of their crop or malinger in their work or pass around the news they smuggle in via radio or messenger.

Informal Group Censure. We have so far been talking about the more formal methods of social control. Groups, however, have their own informal ways of keeping their members in line and bringing them back into line when, from the group's point of view, they are misbehaving. These sanctions operate partly through the threat of exclusion but also through the threat of losing status and communication. Festinger[21] has advanced the hypothesis, based on experiments with small groups, that pressures toward uniformity arise from what he calls "social reality" and "group locomotion." By social reality he means the degree to which justification for beliefs, attitudes, and actions rests on common acceptance within the group. The greater the social reality, the greater the pressures for uniformity. By group locomotion he refers to the pressures toward uniformity that arise among members of a group "because such uniformity is desirable or necessary in order for the group to move toward some goal which it has."

The more cohesive the group, the more likely it is that issues are to be talked about when differences of opinion arise, and the more likely it is that members who can't adjust their opinions to the group standard are to be excluded from the group. Therefore cohesive groups have more success than others in changing the viewpoints of their deviant members. The tendency to change the membership of the group increases also with the relevance of the issue to the group's goal. These are parts of a considerable body of hypotheses advanced by Festinger and his associates[30] on the basis of their experiments.

Now what does this mean to psywar?

The power of a group to censure its members is obviously a barrier to deviant action. Whether this is a barrier to be pre-

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served or attacked depends on whether the group is friendly or unfriendly to the operator's goals.

If the psywar task is to attack the barrier, then the problem is to break down the cohesiveness of the group. This can be done much more easily in a large group where communication is relatively poor than in a small one where communication is good and differences of opinion can readily be talked out. But the principle is the same in either case, that is, to magnify differences and break down communication, emphasizing individual needs at the cost of group needs, and irrelevant issues at the cost of relevant ones. If deviance can be brought about, then more can be done with it if an alternative group is provided for the deviants.

Similarly it is possible to encourage general group frustration by raising doubts about the purpose and goal of the group. The Communists, for a long time, have been asking us why we are fighting in Korea. And whether we should be fighting there.

Another attack is to encourage potential deviants within the group to contrast social reality, as decided upon by the group, with "physical reality" which, in Festinger's terms,[30] means the reality that can be tested objectively outside the group. This is what Vishinsky does when he invites American Negroes to compare the American group idea of equality among black and white Americans with the "physical reality" of the situation.

Pluralistic Ignorance. We have already mentioned pluralistic ignorance. It is a condition in which communication has broken down in a group. The members do not know exactly what other members believe or are doing, and each is therefore highly suggestible concerning group uniformity. A situation like this exists in some families where there are a number of young children, all of whom have been taught early in life to believe in Santa Claus. Each one is reluctant to say that he has ceased to believe because he doesn't know how many of the others still believe. Thus some of the children (and both parents) act as though they still believed in the Gentleman from the North Pole for some time after they have realized that he is only a myth. A similar condition existed in this country in the late twenties and thirties, when the great majority of people apparently had ceased to favor prohibition and yet were kept from turning their attitudes into action because they believed that there was almost universal opposition to repealing the Eighteenth Amendment. Once the wets realized how many people were deviant, the illusion of universal support of prohibition disappeared, and the Eighteenth Amendment disappeared soon afterward.

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Pluralistic ignorance can operate for a time, therefore, as a barrier to action, or it can be used as a means of channeling action. As you can see, it operates with a kind of band-wagon effect. On one side it can be used to convince potential waverers that they are going against the current, failing to recognize their group obligations. On the other it can be used to create an artificial band wagon. For example, a loyal and conscientious nonhoarder can be scared into action by uncheckable reports that everyone is hoarding and supplies are running low. A potential surrenderer who is told that his friends are surrendering may come over if he can't check the validity of the assertion and prove it untrue. It is important, of course, that these assertions should not be easily contradictable.

One of the best opportunities for playing upon pluralistic ignorance lies in dealing with isolated military units or culture groups. Then the propagandist can step into the broken communication lines and utilize the ignorance for his own ends. He can persuade one group that another has turned against the government. He can persuade one military unit that it can afford to relax and feel secure "like the others."

Summary

This section will serve to remind us that attitude change is not necessarily predictive of action. In fact, action may not confidently be predicted to follow attitude change unless there are also (a) important changes in the personality, (b) actual impending radical changes in the social structuring, or (c) both. The drive strength of the attitude and the possibility of the action receiving group reinforcement are also related to the likelihood of the attitude being translated into action. And it is clear that barriers to action will lessen the likelihood of action following attitude change, just as the existence of channels will facilitate action.

Barriers and channels are therefore two of the important variables the psywar operator will manipulate if he can. Obviously there are some situations in which he will want to erect a barrier to action, and other cases in which he will want to clear a channel for action. Barriers and channels may exist in the form of personality patterns, institutional sanctions, role-status patterns and social norms, informal group censure, and pluralistic ignorance. In each of these areas there are possi-

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bilities by which the psywar operator can increase or decrease the likelihood of action by manipulating or making use of barriers or channels, and thus come nearer to being able to control change.

And now let us try to summarize very briefly how psywar works, as we have described it in Part II of this book.

Given a policy, given Intelligence support, given a specified target, and given a directive stating general thematic content and desired results, then the psywar operator proceeds to manipulate such variables as he can command. The chief variable at his command is the message.

He must construct, time, and transmit his message so that, if nothing else, it gets a hearing. He must attract attention for his message in competition with all the other cues being presented to his target.

In the second place he must get his meaning across. This means he must design and present his message in terms of his target's frame of reference.

In the third place he must accomplish a change in the target—an attitude change, preferably also an overt action. To accomplish this he must organize his message or messages so as to (a) arouse personality needs of the target individual and communicate ways of meeting those needs which will be favorable to the operator's side, and do this when the person is in a group situation where the appropriate actions have some possibility of occurring; and (b) make the actions urged or implied in the messages seem important for the target's important current and background groupings, and do this while making the action seem appropriate to personality needs. The process, as you will recognize, is more complicated, but this is the essence of it.

Finally he must do what he can to manipulate barriers and channels so that the action he desires will have the best possible opportunity, and the action he does not desire will have the least possible opportunity, for expression in the target society.

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Part III

HOW PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IS USED

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Chapter 5

USES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Psywar may be used, as was indicated in Part II, to call forth any response which it is in the power of the available target audience to make and within the power of the available symbols and media to stimulate. The range of possible uses is therefore, if not endless, very large.

In practice the range of the uses of psywar is determined by the using nation's goals: political, economic, social, military, ideological, or even religious. Psywar is one of the means by which nations seek to maintain or redistribute power throughout the world. Whatever form or nature psywar assumes, it has always basically the same purpose: one state or society is seeking by means of message warfare to impose its will on a target state or society, to influence the target's policy and actions in a desired direction, to make it weaker and less efficient as an opponent or to make it a stronger or more loyal ally, or a more prosperous and contented friend. In our time, to be sure, psywar, both hostile and friendly, tends to be closely related to the quest for victory over an enemy. But this is best regarded as a reflection of the cold war. In other times we might well use psywar techniques, for example, to strengthen democracy in Uruguay, merely because of our devotion to democracy.

The targets of psywar are consequently groups, and groups that can get things done, call or influence the calling of the tricks, and carry measures out or keep them from being carried out once the tricks have been called. In simplest terms, psywar is directed at one or another of four groups within the target society: those who have the power to make political policy (the political elite), those who have the power, within limits imposed by policy, to plan and execute military missions (the military elite), those who do the fighting (the military population), and those who produce goods and services (the working population). The responses that psywar seeks are usually responses on the part of one or

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more of these groups. And because they have to do with whether or how what things get done, they are best thought of as power-relevant, or power-related, responses.

POWER GOALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Speier[1] has developed a useful breakdown of psywar objectives. The "will to fight" or the "will to resist" in a modern state, he points out, is really a complex of functions, abilities, and wills, and there are six of these that psywar typically seeks to affect: (1) deciding foreign policy, (2) determination of military missions, (3) ability to govern, (4) ability to command, (5) will to obey, and (6) will to fight.

The power to decide foreign policy rests primarily with the political elite in office, that is, with presidents, prime ministers, congressional and parliamentary majorities, department heads, etc. As it goes about making the decisions, however, the elite is influenced by the staff advice at its disposal (for example, from foreign offices, other government departments, bureaucrats) and, especially as regards the nation's capabilities and the capabilities of its potential enemies and allies, by military advice (chiefs of staff, high-level military committees, etc.). It is also influenced, in varying degrees, by public opinion and pressure groups, including those of the opposition. The influence of opinion and pressure groups varies, more or less in proportion to the degree of democracy the nation has achieved. In a country such as the United States, for example, expressions of support or lack of support from the general public, which must be depended on to fight, work, and pay taxes, and which can turn the elite out of office at the next election, are highly influential in determining policy, and opposition opinion and pressures are carefully heeded. In a country such as the Soviet Union, by contrast, the elite is free to act with much less regard to public opinion (although the extent of its freedom in this regard is often exaggerated in contemporary discussions). Thus psywar, even against a country such as the Soviet Union, has both primary and secondary targets it can aim at in its attempt to influence the deciding of foreign policy. It can appeal directly to the political elite. It can try to influence the elite by rousing public opinion on one side or the other of a current or proposed policy decision. Given the importance of expert staff work in today's complicated world situation, it can try to get at the elite through the elite's key advisers and staff men.

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Military missions, though normally imposed by the political elite, are planned and executed by the military elite, that is, the general staffs and other high-ranking officers—plus their advisers. Here also, however, opinion and pressures, including rank and file or even opposition opinion and pressures, play a role: no general staff, even in the Soviet Union, can plan a military operation or, for that matter, military preparations, without giving some thought to mass reactions both within and without its armed forces. In a country such as the United States, for example, prevailing attitudes toward conservation of human life often affect important tactical decisions, which in some other countries might be made on strictly military grounds.

The ability to govern, like the deciding of foreign policy, is a function of the political elite. Unlike foreign policy, however, governing involves a large body of administrative and operational personnel, a considerable number of whom are spread out over the country. Unlike foreign policy, also, it conducts its daily operations in close proximity to and under more or less careful scrutiny by the public. Whereas a change in foreign policy might not have any effect on the general public for months or years, even a slight change in taxes or in the traffic laws will be felt at once. Therefore psywar can affect the public very quickly by affecting the ability of the elite to govern, and, conversely, it can affect the ability to govern through influencing the public. For example, it can undermine the ability to govern by stimulating the growth of a counterelite. In such a republican form of government as ours that would normally mean an opposition party. In a totalitarian state it would mean a secret resistance movement; in a subjugated country, an underground. As another example, it can move to undermine public confidence in the political elite, as by interfering with the efficiency of government or with the communication lines between elite and public. Friendly psywar may seek to do the opposite of these things, such as keep the present elite in power, discourage the counterelite, promote the efficiency of government, or reinforce communications between elite and public. And even hostile psywar might try to keep the target elite in power. As Napoleon said, a blundering leader is a priceless thing—on the side of the enemy.

The ability to command is related to the determining of military missions much as the ability to govern is related to the deciding of foreign policy. Like the ability to govern, it involves a large number of command personnel who come into frequent and close contact with the armed forces. And like the ability to

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govern, any change in the ability to command will affect large numbers of fighting men, just as any change in the will of those men to obey will instantly affect the ability to command. Therefore the lines of attack are the same. Anything that can be done to destroy the confidence of men in their leaders, anything that can be done to disrupt communication between commander and troops, anything that can be done to affect the intelligence on which command decisions are made will directly affect, for good or ill, the efficiency of command and the resultant efficiency of the target nation's fighting forces.

In a nation at war, the military elite must be willing to obey the policy of the political elite (in totalitarian countries, of course, these two elites are frequently hard to distinguish, as in the case of Marshal Stalin), the fighting population to obey the commands of the military elite, the working population to obey the orders of the political elite. (For some purposes it is useful to distinguish between the political elite and what we may call the "managerial elite," which stands in the same relation to production as the governing elite to government.) The will of the working population to obey appears chiefly as willingness to work, but also as willingness to reorganize daily lives and endure hardships, dangers, and deprivations. The will of the fighting population to obey represents much more than the will to fight, which we must discuss separately, for in any modern army a large proportion of the troops do not fight. Hence, obedience, that is, willingness to disrupt civilian patterns, to give up civilian rewards, and to endure hardship, danger, and deprivation are all involved. The will to obey, therefore, can be influenced through the elites, through the working population, or through the fighting population. It can be influenced by lessening rank-and-file confidence in leadership, by persuading followers to pursue their own interests rather than those of the state, or by stirring up conflicts of interest in the population and depending on them to take minds off the state's interests.

The will to fight is expected of the entire fighting population, including the military elite. Affecting it is the most direct and immediate way to affect the military potential of a nation at war. This can be accomplished either at the level of command or at the level of the rank and file. It can be accomplished in some cases even through the civilian population, who have power to influence the morale of their men in uniform. Chiefly, however, the opportunities of psywar in this field are those of persuading an enemy to lay down (or not lay down) his arms, building

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(or counteracting) dissatisfaction, increasing (or cushioning) the psychological impact of weapons, and contributing to the subversion (or stimulating the loyalty) of key personnel. For every army has key personnel; for example, the fortune of modern mechanized armies rides increasingly with their technicians and specialists.

This is the modern view of the field of psywar. As the concept of international conflict has broadened, so has the older, more limited concept of psywar (as a weapon against the will to fight) come to be replaced by a broader one. In these categories of Speier[1] we have a varied spectrum indeed. Here are two decision functions (foreign policy and military missions) by means of which a state chiefly comes into contact with other states; two operational functions (command and governing) by which a state keeps its own house in order, organizes its power, puts into effect its policies; and two basic motivations (the will to obey and the will to fight) which must pervade large segments of the population if any state is to be productive and strong. We have said that the use of psywar is to affect and influence these functions and qualities.

Here are some examples—suggestive, rather than inclusive—of ways in which psywar has been used under each of these six headings.

Deciding Foreign Policy

Supporting Diplomatic Negotiations or Political Objectives. Nations use psywar measures to affect other nations' diplomatic goals and to influence diplomatic negotiations. The Italian elections of 1950, for example, were a major battleground of Communist vs Free World propaganda. On the Communist side there were parades, posters, meetings, broadcasts, and threats and promises from Moscow; on the Free World side there were pretty much the same things, except of course the threats, plus the communication of implied messages via Marshall Plan funds. In an even more spectacular way the San Francisco conference on the Japanese treaty was a psywar battleground. For months before the conference the Communist bloc and the Western bloc maneuvered for support and for headlines. The Communist radio did its best to rouse all the old fears of Japan in the Pacific. Even as late as November 1951 a large segment of Chinese and Korean radio time was devoted to denunciations of the treaty and dire predictions as to its consequences. At the conference itself,

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most of the speeches, pictures, and planned events, whatever the immediate occasion for them, were in fact intended not for the delegates but for the psywar target audience, which in this case was world wide. The fact that the conference was televised throughout this country was, whether so planned or not, a psywar measure of great importance from the standpoint of US foreign policy, not because of its influence on opinion within the United States, but because of the dramatic way in which it called the attention of world opinion to the meaning of popular participation in government. Gromyko's dramatic departure from the conference and his news conference after leaving were psywar measures. The dignified and contrite appearance of the Japanese spokesman at the conference was, again, a psywar weapon. The Italian elections and the Japanese peace treaty provide examples of relatively short-term psywar operations intended to affect other nations' impact upon international events. What the United States does by way of strengthening the United Nations as an instrument for peace and the solidarity and friendship of the Western Hemisphere nations illustrates long-term psywar operations of this character. It is hardly necessary to mention that the Soviet Union is engaged in long-term psywar operations on behalf of world revolution and world Communism and against capitalism and genuinely popular government.

Getting Help from Neutral Countries. In any tense world situation the support and cooperation of neutral countries become especially important. In World War II special attention was given Ireland and Sweden because they were neutrals in key geographic positions. Today the Arab states and India are hotly contested targets for the psywar of both the great powers in the cold war. The attitudes at stake in such frays are not necessarily political ones; for example, it might be to the advantage of the United States, and in the interest of world peace, to change the attitudes of certain populations toward farming and fertilizing procedures, so that fewer people will be driven toward aggression or Communism by hunger. And the members of the target audiences are not necessarily dealt with at a distance, even if the target country is far away. America's huge program of student exchanges brings large numbers of students to these shores from important target countries, and the Government has, and tries to exploit, a unique opportunity to influence their attitudes while they are here. It is worth noting, as already intimated, that part of psywar's task in this connection is to counter enemy propaganda to neutral countries.

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Strengthening or Weakening Alliances. The pattern of modern warfare is that of alliances. Thus a nation uses psywar on the one hand to urge its allies on to greater efforts, and on the other to weaken unity among enemy alliances. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) program is an example of the first, and the Soviet Union's efforts to weaken NATO, by breeding distrust in Europe for America's alleged "aggressive" reasons for starting NATO, are an example of the second. The English-Speaking Union, the campaigns of friendship for France, and the exchange-of-persons program, are examples of the first; the World War II efforts to sow discord between Hitler and Mussolini and the German use of the Katyn massacres to foster distrust between the Soviet Union and Poland are examples of the second.

Preventing or Fostering Aggression. Psywar is also used as a weapon short of war to deter potential aggression or—the other side of the coin—to clear the way for aggression. The Nazi build-ups for the Munich agreement and the invasion of the Sudetenland and the way the Soviet Union prepared the stage for the attack on Finland are clear examples of psywar for aggression. What this country has done in recent years in its attempt to deter the Communist nations from further power grabs illustrates, in the same way, psywar against aggression. America has consistently unmasked Communist intentions in Indo-China, Burma, India, Iran, Egypt, Italy, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere, and warned the Communists themselves of the probable costs of carrying them out. Our actions prior to the Communist invasion of South Korea—our withdrawal from the peninsula, our publication of a map that excluded Korea from the area we would defend, etc.—are examples of failures on the part of this country to use psywar against aggression.

Inducing a Nation to Surrender. Captain Zacharias's broadcasts[2] to Japan had this purpose. So did America's end-of-the-war messages to Badoglio in Italy.

ZACHARIAS'S DECISIVE BROADCAST

> By then peace feelers were coming in to Washington in amazingly large numbers. . . .Admiral Suzuki. . .was more than willing to heed the Emperor's desire to bring about peace—but his loyalty to the Emperor made him refrain from doing anything about it until he could ascertain what the Allies had in mind regarding the future fate of the imperial house. In his plight he decided upon what in retrospect appears to have been a desperate move. In June he instructed Mr. Sato, the Japanese ambassador to the Kremlin, to make representations to Marshal Stalin and ask him to intervene with the Western Allies on Japan's behalf in order to obtain a further clarification of the unconditional surrender formula, and, if possible, peace terms. What he really

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wanted was an assurance that Japan's sovereignty would be respected even if she had to pay for the privilege with her empire.

The fact that such a peace plea had been forwarded to Stalin and Japan's plight bared to the Soviet leaders did not receive here the attention it seemed to warrant. The Soviet Union by Suzuki's move was given a clear indication of Japan's inner plight and her willingness to surrender. Thus when on August 8, 1945, the Russians joined in the war against Japan, they acted upon intelligence provided by the Japanese themselves that they were at the end of their rope. Russia joined in the war in the knowledge that Japan had admitted defeat. . . .By the end of June the plight of the Japanese had become desperate, and as Admiral Suzuki received no answer to his plea from Russia, he called an extraordinary session of the Diet in which he discussed in remarkably frank terms the entire war situation.

We recognized the significance of this move and gathered around the ticker bringing to our office the momentous speech. It was evident from the very outset that while Suzuki was talking of war, he was thinking of peace. Now, it was no longer a material consideration such as the retention of Manchuria or Korea which prevented him from saying in so many words that he would accept our terms. The only doubt which still forestalled a decision was the future status of the Emperor. "I have served His Imperial Majesty over a period of many years," Suzuki said, "and I am deeply impressed with this honor. As bold as it may seem, I firmly believe there is no one in the entire world who is more deeply concerned with world peace and the welfare of mankind than His Imperial Majesty the Emperor. The brutal and inhuman acts of both America and England are aimed to make it impossible for us to follow our national policy as proclaimed by the Emperor Meiji. I hear that the enemy is boasting of his demand of unconditional surrender by Japan. Unconditional surrender will only mean that our national structure and our people will be destroyed. Against such boastful talk there is only one measure we must take—that is to fight to the last."

With our knowledge of the background of this extraordinary session and of Suzuki's speech, I made an important broadcast to the Japanese on July 7 inviting them to ask openly for peace. "Japan must make the next move," I said in clearly accentuated words. "Japan must make her choice without delay, for reasons which Admiral Suzuki knows. I have told you before that the time is running out for Japan. You must move and move quickly. Tomorrow it may be too late."

We analyzed the speech again for future action, and as subsequently proven by events and confirmed by Suzuki himself, our analysis was accurate. Our problem now was the method by which we could reassure Suzuki on this score, and indicate that there was no decision to destroy what he ambiguously described as the national structure of Japan.

This time our answer was not confined to another broadcast. Instead, there was selected a method as devious as those chosen by the Japanese themselves. We decided to answer Premier Suzuki in an anonymous letter written to a reputable American newspaper and to bring this letter to his attention in the quickest manner possible. *The Washington Post* was selected as the vehicle with full cooperation of its editors. The letter contained all the answers to Suzuki's query. . . .The letter attracted considerable attention in the United States, and the *Washington Post* was bombarded by callers who wanted to learn the identity of its anonymous author. My telephone also rang. Washington correspondents, accurately gauging the technique, tried to make me confess authorship. . . .The letter was reprinted in many American dailies from coast to coast. We felt certain that it would be picked up in Washington by the listening posts of the Japanese government.

Simultaneously another broadside was prepared along more conventional lines. I was now called upon to prepare a radio script on the highest

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diplomatic level. I fully recognized my tremendous responsibility and devoted special attention to this one talk. We worked on the script day and night for almost a week, drafting and redrafting it, listening to suggestions, submitting it for approval, weighing every single word with the greatest of care. When at last I went to the broadcasting studio, I had its fourteenth draft in my pocket.

For this broadcast we selected a little room specially built for highly classified recording to guarantee security. As unobtrusively as possible, guards were posted around the studio to see that no unauthorized person could obtain advance information of what I was to say. But this secrecy was maintained for only a short period. When my recordings were put on the air a few days later, the text of the broadcast was released to the American press by the OWI, using this publicity as another means of reinforcing and emphasizing the message.

I was introduced as "an official spokesman of the United States government," in line with the stipulation of the operation plan. But the Japanese had indicated doubt as to my true authority. Was I "official spokesman" in fact, as well as in name? Did my statements carry higher endorsement? Or was I merely a cog in the wheel of the American propaganda mill? With the release to the press we hoped to dispel their doubts, and the reception which the American newspapers accorded to this talk surpassed our most optimistic expectations. The news of this broadcast broke on July 21, and the evening papers were the first to feature it. "U. S. Warns Japan to Quit Now, Escape Virtual Destruction," headlined the *Washington Post*, and next morning the *New York Times* gave it front-page display and reprinted the whole broadcast. Other prominent papers similarly featured it.

The broadcast reiterated the themes of my letter to the *Post*. The message it carried was incorporated in four sentences: "The leaders of Japan have been entrusted with the salvation and not the destruction of Japan. As I have said before, the Japanese leaders face two alternatives. One is the virtual destruction of Japan followed by a dictated peace. The other is unconditional surrender with its attendant benefits as laid down by the Atlantic Charter." The urgency of the situation was formulated in words which were adapted to Japanese psychology when I said: "Your opportunity to think over these facts is rapidly passing. . . .If the Japanese leaders still prefer to delay and hope for miracles, they should remember that the cemetery of history is crowded with the graves of nations—nations which were doomed to extinction because they made their decision too late."

In the midst of the domestic clamor which was manifested in editorials printed in virtually every American daily, the Japanese kept a significant silence. As I waited for their answer, I visualized the conclaves going on in Tokyo, in which possible strategy and tactics were being discussed in an endeavor to find the most propitious answer. As it was, we did not have to wait long. The Japanese answer was delivered at 12:15 A.M. (EWT) on July 24, by another Inouye, Dr. Kiyoshi Inouye this time, who was introduced as Japan's outstanding authority on international relations. I remembered him quite well as a former professor at the University of Southern California, at Tokyo University, and as delegate to various international conferences.

The message entrusted to Dr. Kiyoshi Inouye was of momentous importance. In effect, he was to indicate Japan's willingness to surrender unconditionally, if and when Japan was assured that the Atlantic Charter would apply to her. He stated: "Should America show any sincerity of putting into practice what she preaches, as for instance in the Atlantic Charter excepting its punitive clause, the Japanese nation, in fact the Japanese military, would automatically, if not willingly follow in the stopping of the conflict. Then and then only will sabers cease to rattle both in the East and the West."

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This was not the final word of the campaign. But it was the next to last. In retrospect, the Inouye broadcast of July 24 must be accepted as evidence of the Japanese decision to terminate the war then and there; to terminate it on the basis of the terms outlined in my series of previous broadcasts culminating in my twelth talk. The Japanese answer was delivered on the eve of the Potsdam Declaration in which the meaning of unconditional surrender was clearly outlined and spelled out. It was delivered thirteen days before the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, and more than two weeks before the Soviet's entry into the war. Japan was ready for surrender. To reap our harvest we had only to shake her like a tree full of ripe apples.

Subsequent investigations on the spot after Japan's surrender revealed that the Emperor was fully aware of our psywar activities and had access to the monitoring service. He felt that we understood clearly the situation inside Japan and that at the end of June 1945 the time had come to seek peace.

Several Japanese in high positions who were in constant touch with the Emperor were thoroughly interrogated. One official of the Foreign Office said: "The Zacharias broadcasts were influential especially in government circles," and added, "The outstanding feature of the Zacharias broadcasts was the difference between unconditional surrender and dictated peace. The Japanese knew how Germany was being administered under such a peace. Zacharias promised that if Japan accepted unconditional surrender they would have the benefit of the Atlantic Charter. The people began to look with favor on such terms, claiming that it was not what the militarists had said. It seemed to the people that Zacharias's explanation of unconditional surrender offered a way out."

Mr. Toshio Shigatori read the copies of my broadcasts at the Foreign office. At first he was somewhat skeptical, then became a thorough believer. A copy of each broadcast was taken to the Emperor by Mr. Matsuda. He stated that the information in these talks influenced those in the Emperor's circle as well as the Emperor himself."

Determination of Military Missions

Design of Enemy Strategy and Tactics. The typical instance of psywar against an enemy military elite is the message intended to influence its strategic or tactical decisions. A common objective here is to influence his timetable—to induce him to do such and such (make an attack, commit a reserve regiment) earlier or later than he would have in the absence of the message. An example of this kind of thing is the campaign in World War II that centered around the taunting question, "Where is the Luftwaffe?" This was undoubtedly of some influence in leading Goering to send up the fighters he was saving for later and critical battles, and to send them up at a time when the odds were against them. Or, leaving time to one side, psywar might try to induce the target to do X in preference to Y, X being something it would presumably have avoided but for the message.

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The United States, at the present time, for example, would of course like to slow down the pace of Soviet rearmament and is presumably saying things over VOA that, if effective, would move the Soviet Union in that direction and thus influence its strategy.

Speier[1] expresses doubts that psywar by itself can do much by way of surprising or deceiving the enemy in a combat situation. The point, presumably, is that tactical decisions are made and tactical expectations formulated by taking into account only what the enemy commander learns from his intelligence and his (and his patrols') observations but not messages from the other side. That, of course, is perfectly true. Goebbels went to great length in June of 1941, for example, to create through psywar the impression that Germany was going to invade England. An article in the Volkische Beobachter described what had happened in Crete as a rehearsal for a great airborne invasion. A "leak" occurred. The censors ostentatiously clamped down on outgoing dispatches dealing with the matter. From first to last, however, it was known to the military in Britain, and to the newspapers, as well, that more than 100 German divisions were massed on the Soviet border. These divisions naturally spoke louder by far than Goebbels's words.

Enhancing Military Deception. This is not to say, however, that psywar cannot be used successfully for purposes of surprise. Certainly it is not to say that surprise and deception measures cannot be strengthened with psywar support. It might indeed be argued that all deception is psywar. We could not, on that showing, speak of psywar "support" for a deception measure; the correct distinction would be between deception psywar and propaganda support for it. When psywar is combined with other evidence—for example, when materiel is deployed as a hoax, as in the preparations for McNair's "army" at the time of the Normandy invasion—it can surely increase the likelihood of successful military deception. Often, moreover, the enemy commander has no intelligence he can rely on: if our Air Force drops leaflets on civilians in area A, advising them that they are about to be bombed and should flee, the enemy G-3 would be foolish to take it absolutely for granted that the real bombing raid would be elsewhere; that is, he must take precautions. If the leaflets do turn out to have been a deception measure, he will have wasted his energies and will be taken by surprise where the raid actually does occur.

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Affecting Will of Command. Psywar has been used many times in an attempt to reduce or increase the will of military command to begin or continue fighting. Goering's display of German air power to Lindbergh and other visitors was obviously an attempt to reach military commanders through these representatives. He wanted to discourage the military elite of other countries from giving warlike advice to their political elite.

In a different sense, psywar has been used to persuade enemy commanders to surrender their units. Sometimes such measures have succeeded (some of the variables that affect success or failure have been discussed by Herz and others). One or two principles seem to emerge from America's experience with them, in France, Germany, and the Pacific islands. For one thing, psywar is not likely to bring an enemy unit over unless the latter's military situation is pretty bad. Again, an ultimatum is less often effective than an approach that saves the commander's face by appealing to his reasonableness and consideration for his charges in the face of a hopeless tactical situation.

Arousing Public Opinion or Political Pressures. The Soviet peace balloon of 1951 illustrates a further use of psywar to influence military planning. At that time it was unquestionably to the advantage of the Communists to get our "killer offensive" called off in favor of truce talks. Therefore the campaign was planned to take full advantage of our wish for peace. As another example, before the Soviet Union got the A-bomb there was a widespread Communist campaign to rouse substantial segments of public opinion against the use of atomic weapons.

Ability to Govern

Interference with Control Systems or Communications. The illustrations that come most readily to mind here have to do with psywar operations against Communist states, where close control over and surveillance of the general population are the major instruments the government uses in imposing its will. If its capacity to exercise control and surveillance can be weakened, therefore, the door will be thrown open to a great many psywar measures that would otherwise be pointless. When Radio Free Europe broadcasts the names of Communist informers in East Germany, what it is really attacking is the Communist control and surveillance system. The communication systems of Communist states are targets of great importance for this very reason. Anything that can be done to interfere with communication between political

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leaders and followers will obviously lessen the former's control and also encourage suspicion and frustration. It is not often possible to attack communication lines with wire cutters or any other physical means. But psywar can accomplish some of the same ends by starting rumors, inserting false information in the communication channels, or encouraging withdrawal and other troublesome types of behavior on the part of the general population.

Helping Build Counterelites. The oldest technique of attack on government is the building up of counterelites. This has been the Communist technique throughout all the present Soviet orbit and also throughout the countries which are marked but not taken. The Soviet Union, for example, gave propaganda and organizational support to Mao in China for a long while before he came to power. Its support of the Communist movements in France, Italy, Egypt, Iran, Burma, and Indo-China are examples of presently continuing operations aimed at the overthrow of the governments of target countries. Conversely, much of the surveillance in the Soviet states is aimed at making sure that no counterelite shall ever raise its head. It is therefore not easy for an outside country to give support and encouragement to opposition groups, particularly those behind the Curtain. Indeed, any overt encouragement given to such a group would at once reveal its existence to the control and surveillance officials and result in hurting it.

Strengthening Friendly Leaders and Weakening Enemy Ones. One purpose of psywar in the area of governing is always to strengthen friendly leaders and weaken enemy leaders. Our psywar policy in World War II was, as a matter of course, to build up confidence in the allied leaders, especially FDR and Churchill, and wear down confidence in Hitler and other enemy leaders. The Communists have always given vigorous psywar support to their chosen leaders, such as Mao in China, Kim Il Sung in Korea, and, in other days, of course, Tito in Yugoslavia.

Supporting Resistance and Gaining Support. Another use of psywar that assumed great importance in the last war was the strengthening of resistance among subjugated peoples. The US support, logistic and propaganda, given to, for example, the French underground and the Philippine resistance between 1941 and 1944 are examples of this psywar objective. As soon as we moved back into the countries in question, psywar took on another assignment—that of winning and keeping friends and supporters among the liberated populations. Later psywar had the same task to perform in Germany and Japan.

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The Ability to Command

Producing Dissension in Enemy Military Forces. One of the commonest psywar missions is that of producing cleavages in the ranks of the enemy forces. In Korea the Communists have tried to foment mutual suspicion and dislike between the ROK troops and the American troops, and between American and British Commonwealth troops. America, for its part, has tried to encourage distrust between Chinese and North Koreans, between military and cultural officers, and between cultural officers and their charges. A familiar theme for this purpose is the idea that group A is carrying the brunt of the fighting, while group B is having it easy. The real purpose of such propaganda, of course, is to make things difficult for the enemy command, by countering its effort to work its units together like a team.

Strengthening Friendly Leaders and Weakening Enemy Ones. In military as in civilian affairs a continuing objective is to strengthen friendly leaders and weaken enemy ones. That is one of the reasons why this country has given medals, recognition, and publicity to the leaders of its allies in the Korean war. Of this same general character is propaganda designed to call attention to ruthless use of troops and playing of favorites on the part of enemy commanders.

Misleading Enemy Intelligence and Disrupting Communications. Every army, of course, tries to see that its opponents get false intelligence and erroneous information on which to estimate capabilities and intentions. Psywar's easiest opportunities for doing this come when an enemy unit is isolated or disorganized, since psywar can then plant false information about unit locations or the battle situation or even give the unit spurious orders purporting to come from its own command, without normal interference by the enemy's communication network. Here, however, we must repeat our word of caution on military deception in general: a field commander will always trust his own intelligence and observation reports rather than enemy psywar.

Supporting Military Government. Military government needs and uses psywar to support its programs. American military governments in both Germany and Japan made broad and continued use of psywar of many kinds—broadcasts, posters, printed materials, films, meetings, demonstrations, libraries, schools, exchange of persons—and found them very helpful.

Eliciting Information of Military Value. Psywar is used by military commands for "fishing." By broadcasting assertions or

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asking well-chosen questions it is sometimes possible to force the enemy to reveal (or trick or inveigle him into revealing) the true location of a unit or the economic statistic sorely needed for planning purposes—or, more important still, the premises and expectations on which he is acting. The development of what is called "content analysis," by which it is possible to learn things from the enemy's propaganda that he does not intend to reveal, has enormously increased the potentialities of fishing expeditions and made them easier to bring off.

Will to Obey

Creating Difficulties between Military and Political Elites. Cleavage between military and political elites is perhaps more prevalent and easier to encourage than is generally realized. Gorlitz says that out of a total of 36 lieutenant generals in the German army, 21 were dismissed by Hitler, 2 were expelled from the army, and 3 were executed. Out of 800 officers of the German general staff, 150 are believed to have lost their lives as opponents of the regime. Russian purges, as is well known, have frequently struck hard in army circles. In 1941, indeed, many people believed that the purges had seriously weakened Russia's Army.

Disrupting Communication between Leader and Followers. Anything that can be done to keep the needs of followers from being communicated to leaders, and the orders and explanations of leaders from being communicated to followers, will result in disorganization and, at the margin, in suspicion and distrust. Psywar can seldom hope to accomplish this kind of thing by striking at the communication channels themselves, but the communications can be virtually disrupted by affecting what goes into the channels or by influencing attitudes toward what emerges from them. If, for example, psywar can convince the followers that their needs will not be heeded by the leaders even if communicated to them, it will to all intents and purposes have interrupted communication in that direction. If, similarly, it can undermine the followers' confidence in the explanations handed down by the leaders, the effect is again much the same as would be achieved by blocking off the channel. An example of striking at the channels themselves by psywar would be propaganda calling upon literates in a country with a high incidence of illiteracy not to serve as secondary communicators for official orders.

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Undermining Confidence in Leadership and War Aims. This is one of the commonest aims of psywar operations. One of the chief objectives of recent Communist psywar has been to wear down confidence in leaders and war aims among the populations of the United Nations fighting in Korea. In World War II, Goebbels struck again and again at Roosevelt and Churchill in a vain attempt to persuade Englishmen and Americans that they lacked military judgment and political acumen. We have already discussed the difficulties in the way of direct attacks on such totalitarian leaders as Hitler and Stalin The democracies are undoubtedly more open to this kind of psywar measure than their enemies.

Reducing or Increasing the Incentive to Work. Nations at war usually provide some sort of incentive program for industrial workers. In Communist Korea the workers were persuaded to give many hours of free overtime labor in honor of special causes and occasions—for example, Kim Il Sung's birthday, Stalin's birthday, the success of the People's Army, etc. Therefore UN psywar had the task of trying to persuade the North Korean workers that they were being misused and should work less hard, and the farmers that they should withhold some of their crops from the Communist collectors.

Willingness to Sacrifice and Face Danger. Work is not all that is expected of a nation's population in wartime. It must also make sacrifices, and psywar is often used to reduce (the enemies') or increase (the friends') willingness to give up things that they value in order to help the war effort. Such propaganda is the psywar equivalent of the domestic "blood, sweat, tears, and toil" program with which Churchill appealed to the iron in the British temperament. Examples are the broadcasts of "Annie" to the Germans and Tokyo Rose to the Americans in the Pacific, the purpose of which was to make the listeners nostalgic, remind them of the things they were giving up, and reduce their willingness to do without those things any longer.

A people at war must also be willing to face bombing raids and other types of physical danger. Psywar, if it can get through to them from outside, can play upon their anxiety, counteract domestic efforts to minimize the dangers, plant questions and doubts as to whether further sacrifices are worth making, and encourage people to attribute their hardships to the government's incompetence, negligence, or lack of foresight. If it succeeds in evoking the desired attitudes, the effect will be to reduce people's

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willingness to carry on and, in all likelihood, to reduce the effectiveness of the government's civilian defense program.

Causing Panic. Psywar is sometimes used, usually in connection with military operations, in the attempt to create panic. The Germans did this in France in 1940, with the result that panic-stricken French people, many of them men and women without whom public utilities and other necessary services could not operate, poured out of the cities, blocked traffic on the highways, and created overnight vast refugee problems. The Chinese, when they used fireworks and bugles before their attacks in Korea, were employing a centuries-old psywar device for inducing panic in the enemy's army.

Feelings of Discrimination and Unfair Treatment. Both in armies and in civilian populations there are sure to be individuals who can be brought to feel—correctly or incorrectly—that they are getting a raw deal. This is an open door for psywar. For example, casualties and dangerous assignments are inevitably distributed unevenly among fighting forces. About 70 percent of American casualties in World War II were among the infantry, which accounted for no more than 10 percent of American armed forces. It is psywar's business to call attention to such apparent inequities, especially if the unevenness can plausibly be linked to alleged favoritism on the part of the enemy leaders, or to their class, national, or ethnic loyalties. Among the working population of the target country, similarly, it is easy to show that some groups are doing better out of the war than others, that some are being worked harder than others, etc. Rationing systems, and no country can now fight a war without one, offer psywar similar opportunities for making people aware of grievances that they might otherwise overlook. Rationing causes ill feeling even if the rationers have the best and most equitable intentions—if for no other reason than because they cannot take the individual case into account. And normal western standards of fair play give psywar the rationalization people need in order to justify their resentment of the system.

Encouraging Minority Groups. Much of the propaganda directed at the Austro-Hungarian empire in World War I was intended to bring about a majority-minority cleavage between its two components. Russian propaganda to the United States now tries to set Negro against white, Puerto Rican against continental American, Filipino against American. In Japan the Communists are today making skillful use of a Korean minority, which has already assumed an importance quite out of proportion to its numbers.

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What Is She Thinking NOW?

FOUND ON THE BODY OF A DEAD AMERICAN SOLDIER

Very darling, please be careful. Please come back. I want to without you. Just come back. I'll have a chance. Each night I lay here looking at your picture wishing you were here. Do you suppose this to get you you'll be out of the service. Already seems like a million years doesn't. Love you too much honey care of yourself. I'll see your loving always

EVERYONE HAS SOMEONE TO LIVE FOR



You CAN get out of this profiteers' war

STOP FIGHTING FOR DUPONT AND MORGAN

SAFE CONDUCT PASS

投 Tow Shong 降

Safety and good treatment of bearer are guaranteed

THEN WHAT?

You'll go to the rear to safety and get home in the end. Turn over see what your buddies say.

HOW THEY WRITE TO YOU:

From relatives of Americans in Korea

"Now my hopes of you being here when our baby is born look mighty glum. My darling, please be careful. I want you and no one else. I'd go without my sleep if only you had a dry place to sleep and did not have to fight. Your loving wife . . ."

•

"I soon gave up hopes of your being back by Christmas. That sure was a lousy trick, building up our hopes like that. It must be cold there. Every time I turn on the radio I get the goose pimples thinking you are in there too. Daring, I only ask one thing of life. Come back, come back. I cannot face the thought of life without you."

•

"My Darling son . . . but we were all sad to hear you were soon going out into all this. Be careful and take care of yourself for Jane and Mom and all of us. Your dear Mom."

•

"Honey, I cry for you. Does it help any? Everyone here is talking about war. They're scared. I wish old Truman had to fight the next war by himself. I didn't think I'd ever find anyone I would love and then it happened. I miss you so bad tonight. Hurry home to me, my darling, always for you alone."

•

"Bill, Dad loves you more than anyone [illegible] tell you. Sunday he was all heart-broken. He said you wouldn't come back and began to cry. I tried to cheer him up [illegible] but I felt too bad myself. Love you always . . ."

•

"Johnnie. This war makes me so dam mad I don't know what to do. Is there anything I might do to help you out. Don't be afraid to tell me . . ."

•

"I've been so worried about you the past week. I'm so lost without you. A daddy means everything in a family. Mamma and daughter are so lonely for their loving daddy."

HOW YOU WRITE TO THEM:

From Prisoners of War

From Sergeant William E. Elliott to his wife at Route 2, Vaiden, Missouri

"Dearest Sweet Wife and Children, I am now a prisoner of war and am being treated very good. So please don't worry about me as I shall be OK. They are giving us plenty to eat and guess that is the main thing. Kiss the kids every day for me, your husband and daddy, Ernest."

•

From Major John C. Harlan to his wife at 1701, Caroline Street, Baltimore City, Maryland

"My Dearest Wife Mildred, This is my second letter to you since my capture to let you know that I am well. The Chinese people's voluntary forces are very kind to me. They share their food and tobacco with me. Take care of yourself and the children. Help me to pray for lasting peace and a safe return home. John."

•

From Charles L. Gill to his wife at 7418 Jefferson Street, Kansas City: "I'm a POW but I'm all right. I have a bullet in each arm and one in the leg but they are taking care of them for me. I pray that soon they take me for an exchange prisoner and I'll get back to America. Please don't worry. They aren't bad to us and give us food and cigarettes. They also say we will not be harmed."

WHO ARE THE SMART GUYS?

Those who fought for mad MacArthur and died?

Their letters from home are on the left hand column.

Or those who got out of this dirty war by coming over to us?

Think it over, Soldier.

YOU'RE WELCOME, TOO.

Reverse

Fig. 4—Chinese Communist Surrender-Mission Leaflet

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Contributing to Subversion of Key Personnel. Key personnel such as engineers, top scientists, top pilots, and commanders are targets that psywar dares not neglect in modern warfare. Churchill testifies that the elimination of three expert German submarine commanders in 1941 made a substantial difference in the war at sea. The subversion of Klaus Fuchs, the British atomic scientist, which was apparently accomplished without any coercion whatsoever, may turn out to have been more important to the Russians than the winning of a great battle. And undoubtedly the Russian pilots who have defected in recent years by flying their planes outside the Iron Curtain have dealt blows to the Communist regime out of all proportion to the value of the planes or the need for their individual skills. Key men, simply because they are key men, set an example that is likely to be imitated on lower echelons; they are, again merely in virtue of being key men, in the know and have valuable information to impart to the enemy. Therefore the command setup that cannot keep them in line and count on their loyalty is heading for trouble and, what is equally important, knows it is heading for trouble and must take corrective action that is sure to prove costly. Indeed, one of the major purposes of this type of propaganda is to give command the jitters and cause it, perhaps unnecessarily, to increase security precautions.

Will to Fight

Encouraging Surrender and Reducing Last-ditch Resistance. The typical form of surrender-mission psywar is the surrender pass, which has been dropped by the hundreds of millions in World War II and the Korean operation (see also the next section, Submission). It is the commonest form of military psywar and has been much written about. Reducing last-ditch resistance is merely a special form of surrender-mission psywar. Brick and stone cities, jungles, mountains, etc. are hard to clear of enemy troops, even after they are beaten militarily; often they can be mopped up only at great cost, so that the military places a high value on measures calculated to persuade isolated pockets of enemy troops to give up. The caves of Okinawa, the mountains of Korea, and the city of Stalingrad all testify to the success of such measures. And, as has been mentioned above, it is often possible to deal with the enemy commander and arrange the surrender of an entire unit.

Figures 4 and 5 are enemy psywar leaflets dropped by the Chinese Communist Forces among UN troops. Figure 4 i. not

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SECURITY RESTRICTED INFORMATION

"The Big Shots . . . Don't Have To Suffer . . . "

One of the wealthy Rockefellers and his bride at a recent party. They're happy. They — and the Duponts, Morgans and other big businessmen—are simply coining money out of this war! You won't find them risking their hides in Korea.

(Picture from The EVENING POST, January 1951)

Believe it or not, this is your president. He's on holiday at Key West. Do you think he worries about YOU?

(Picture from TIME Magazine, March 12, 1951)

Think it over! What are you fighting for?
Don't sacrifice your life for the big shots.
Do yourself and your family a good turn.

COME OVER AND GET OUT OF THE WAR!

THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEER FORCES

Obverse

HELLO DEAREST FAMILY:

. . . I am alive and well. And someday when this foolish war is over I will be returning to my loved ones. All this war over here has caused is heartache and sorrow. I don't think that we ever had any business over here. And I think we should withdraw all foreign troops out of Korea and let the Koreans themselves decide what kind of government they want. For after all, this is their country, not ours.

Now, mother, I know you and Dad are worried about me for you have read about the Korean People's Army and the Chinese Volunteer Forces killing war prisoners. Well, don't believe this. They take good care of us and keep us healthy so we can return home. I am disgusted with war and want no more of it. I only want to return home and lead a peaceful and happy life. The big shots that sent us to war don't have to suffer. It is us little men that suffer.

How is my sweet daughter? I dream of her and my other loved ones every night. It is pitiful to see these people homeless and destitute over here. It has sure woke me up to the fact that war and warmongers are enemies of all people.

Don't worry about me. I am in good health and some sweet day I will be home and what a wonderful time that will be. I love you dearly.

(signed) Just Ken.

From Sergeant Otis K. Thomas 38003871 to Mr. and Mrs. G. F. Thomas of Box 23, Somerton, Arizona dated February 11, 1951.

Reverse

Fig. 5—Chinese Communist Surrender-Mission and Distrust-of-War-Aims Leaflet

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only a surrender-mission leaflet but also attempts to arouse feelings of privatization, unfair treatment, and distrust of war aims.

Inducing a Sense of Unfair Treatment. A sense of being unfairly treated can be created in troops as well as in civilians. Troops can be made less willing to face casualties or deprivations, and encouraged to privatize, withdraw into daydreams, or regress into more childlike behavior. This is the purpose of much psywar addressed to tactical units. Where it is successful, it results in a notable reduction of the enemy's will to fight. Figure 5 subordinates the surrender-mission theme to the unfair-treatment and distrust-of-war-aims themes.

Increasing the Impact of Weapons. Armies have experimented with ways of using psywar to increase the tension and shock of military operations. Some variety of warning has been the usual pattern. The German blitzkrieg built up fears long before any bullets came, and there is good reason to believe the fears then made the bullets more effective. A common tactic in strategic bombing is to warn a group of cities that one of them will be bombed, in the hope of disrupting activities in all of them. Another experiment has been the use of successively stepped-up bombardments, always with the warning that the real bombardment is yet to come.

A promising new development in thinking about psywar has to do with taking account of the psychological effect of weapons in deciding what weapon to use in achieving a given tactical purpose (for example, artillery vs. air-dropped napalm). This we might call using psywar to increase the impact of the weapons system.

Contributing to Subversion of Key Personnel. We have mentioned the subversion of key personnel in connection with the ability to command. What we said about it in that connection is, however, equally relevant here, since the reason that propaganda to subvert key personnel is a good way of striking at ability to command is, in large part, derivative from its being a good way to strike at the will to fight. Such personnel are, for the most part, technicians and extremely necessary to smooth operation of the military machine. In America's Asian campaign great responsibility has rested on interpreters. Intelligence personnel has become increasingly important as warfare has speeded up and extended its scope. Communications personnel can sway the tide of battle by performing their functions badly. Thus, purely aside from what the subversion of key personnel does to the ability to command, it cuts down fighting efficiency. And an army

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TRANSLATION OF ZG 108

ONE MINUTE

Read the following six points carefully and thoroughly. They may mean for you the difference between life and death.

1. In a battle of material, valour alone cannot offset the inferiority in tanks, planes and artillery.

2. With the breaching of the Atlantic Wall and of the Eastern front, the decision has fallen; Germany has lost the war.

3. You are not facing barbarians who delight in killing, but soldiers who would spare your life if possible.

4. But we can only spare those who do not force us, by senseless resistance, to use our weapons against them.

5. It is up to you to show us your intention by raising your arms, waving a handkerchief, etc., in an unmistakable manner.

6. Prisoners-of-war are treated decently, in a fair manner, as becomes soldiers who have fought bravely.

You must decide for yourself. But in the event that you should find yourself in a desperate situation, remember what you have read.

EINE MINUTE

Lies die folgenden 6 Punkte gründlich und aufmerksam! Sie können für Dich den Unterschied zwischen Tod und Leben bedeuten.

1. Tapferkeit allein kann in diesem Mater eschlachten den Mangel an Panzern, Flugzeugen und Artillerie nicht wettmachen.

2. Mit dem Fehlschlag im Westen und dem Zusammenbruch im Osten ist die Entscheidung gefallen: Deutschland hat den Krieg verloren.

3. Du stehst keinen Barbaren gegenüber, die am Töten eine Vergnügen finden, sondern Soldaten, die Dein Leben schonen wollen.

4. Wir können aber nur diejenigen schonen, die uns nicht durch nutzlosen Widerstand zwingen, unsere Waffen gegen sie einzusetzen.

5. Es liegt an Dir, uns durch Hochheben der Hände, Schwenken eines Taschentuchs usw. deutlich Deine Absicht zu verstehen zu geben.

6. Kriegsgefangene werden fair und anständig behandelt, ohne Schikane - wie es Soldaten gebührt, die tapfer gekämpft haben.

Du Entscheidung musst Du selber treffen. Sollst Du aber in eine verzweifelte Lage geraten, so denke, was Du gelesen hast.

Fig. 6—American World War II Surrender-Mission Leaflet Linked with Tactical Situation along Entire Front

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that knows it is not fighting efficiently speedily loses its will to fight.

CHIEF RESPONSES SOUGHT BY PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Another way to look at the uses of psywar is in terms of the chief responses it seeks from its target audiences. It is customary to say that psywar, in different forms and different situations, may be used to bring about submission, subversion, confusion, cooperation, privatization, or panic. Let us say a word about each of these, reminding ourselves, to begin with, that under our broad definition of psywar we are interested not only in these responses but in their opposites as well, and not only in how to achieve these responses but also in how to prevent someone else from achieving them.

Submission

As mentioned in the preceding section, Will to Fight, most tactical psywar has this response as its goal, because most tactical psywar is surrender-mission psywar. And surrender-mission tactical psywar is, or at least has been until now, the commonest form of psywar with submission as its goal. Other forms, of which we may have more experience in the future, would be propaganda looking to submission on the part of an entire country or on the part of the rural population of a country in which we had occupied only the cities and the arterials.

The tactical psywar officer must do more than convince his enemy of the futility of continued resistance; he must make the life of a prisoner of war sound as attractive as possible; he must clearly explain the procedure for surrendering and make it sound as easy and safe as possible. It is now common psywar practice to saturate the enemy lines at times with surrender leaflets (Figs. 6 and 7), which usually contain detailed instructions to "throw away your weapon, and come in with your hands clasped behind your head," and an official pass signed by the theater commander. [The World War II form of this pass read: "The German soldier who carries this safe conduct is using it as a sign of his genuine wish to give himself up. He is to be disarmed, to be well looked after, to receive food and medical attention as required, and to be removed from the danger zone as soon as possible. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary

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TRANSLATION OF 2 G 66

You are now cut off!

In order to avoid needless bloodshed, this leaflet is being delivered to you.

You are now cut off. Allied units are already far in your rear. You have fought bravely, but from now on it would be senseless to continue fighting. You must give up or die — shortly before the end of the war.

You realize your situation. Now you must act accordingly. Every one of you must decide for himself. There is no time to be lost.

The Allies want to spare your lives and guarantee you decent treatment. But you must clearly indicate that you are quitting the fight.

ACT IMMEDIATELY!

Ihr seid jetzt abgeschnitten!

Um nutzloses Blutvergiessen zu ersparen, wird Euch dieses Flugblatt zugestellt.

Ihr seid jetzt abgeschnitten. Alliierte Einheiten stehen bereits weit hinter Euch. Ihr habt tapfer gekämpft, aber von jetzt an ist ein Weiterkämpfen nutzlos. Ihr müsst Euch ergeben oder knapp vor Kriegsende sterben.

Ihr erkennt die Lage. Es gilt jetzt, dementsprechend zu handeln. Jeder muss für sich selbst entscheiden. Es ist keine Zeit zu verlieren.

Die Alliierten wollen Euer Leben schonen und sichern Euch anständige Behandlung zu. Ihr müsst aber klar zu verstehen geben, dass ihr aus dem Kampf scheidet.

HANDELT SOFORT!

Fig. 7—American World War II Surrender-Mission Leaflet Linked with Local Tactical Situation

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Forces" (Fig. 8).] Sometimes the passes carry reproductions of one or more flags, sometimes they bear official seals, sometimes they are printed so as to resemble a bond or certificate—anything to make them look authoritative and impressive. Such



Fig. 8—Eisenhower World War II Surrender-Mission Safe-Conduct Pass

passes, and most of the leaflets urging their use, are intended for dissemination to enemy soldiers all along the line, and in both forward and rear areas. Sometimes, however, leaflets stating the case for surrendering are addressed to a particular unit in the enemy line or to the troops involved in a particular

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tactical situation, or else loudspeakers (on the ground or airborne) are used to speak directly to the enemy, thus adding the persuasive appeal of the human voice to the arguments of the leaflets.[4,5]

The Capture of Willingen

An opportunity to observe the battle conditions under which propaganda appeals for group surrender are able to succeed was presented by a loudspeaker address to the German troops defending the town of Willingen, situated six miles south of Trier on the Saar River. This Sykewar mission was able to issue precise instructions, completely coordinated with artillery and infantry fire, so as to convert the defeatist predispositions of most of the garrison into a successful group surrender.

Willingen is situated in a valley of the Saar River and is traversed by a north-south railroad. A US infantry battalion was approaching the town from the south as part of the coordinated attack northward toward Trier. Armored elements had already outflanked Willingen on the southeast and were well on their way to penetrating into Trier. Earlier in the morning of the attack, elements of a tank destroyer battalion, located across the river on the high ground of the valley's western slope, had been engaged in reducing pillboxes lining the river and the railroad in preparation for the infantry assault. The German garrison was composed of a security battalion, which had been stationed in the town for about three months, as well as elements of a German infantry division which had been retiring northward toward Trier under American pressure. These troops were in a hopeless tactical situation but still in a position to delay the American drive. It was therefore decided to issue a loudspeaker appeal to these troops before launching the infantry assault.

The loudspeaker apparatus was installed on the high ground of the west slope of the valley, near the American tank destroyers. The tank destroyer fire against the pillboxes was interrupted and instructions in English were issued over the loudspeaker to the American infantry unit. They were told to hold their fire for a period of five minutes since an appeal to surrender was about to be issued to the German force in the village. The lull in the firing was necessary to enable enemy troops to hear the message and to ensure them an opportunity to surrender.

The broadcast to the German troops was simple and largely in the form of an order to surrender or be destroyed. They were informed that their position was hopeless owing to their encirclement by American armored units, supported by artillery and infantry units on the other edges of the town. They were given five minutes in which to throw away their weapons, leave their positions, and move southward along the railroad track toward the American infantry positions. After each minute the directions to leave the town or be destroyed were repeated. At the end of the third minute, a white flag appeared over one of the main bunkers, and a small group of men left their positions and walked southward. Soon other units within the town began to do likewise. Some soldiers, perhaps confused, began to leave the town in a northward direction, that is, toward the main German positions. The surrender instructions were again repeated by the loudspeaker, addressed particularly to those soldiers moving northward. This second message caused nearly all of them to change their direction as instructed. However, two men intent on escaping from the town continued northward. Artillery fire from a tank destroyer eliminated these two, who had not been impressed by psywar. This incident provided copy for an additional loudspeaker broadcast, which was made immediately,

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pointing out the uselessness of further resistance. An immediate response was additional surrenders from positions along the hill-side outside the town and in a second, smaller village further to the east, which was still completely in the enemy's hands.

Thereupon the American infantry commander, using the loudspeaker, ordered his troops in the valley to move in and take over the town, which was surrendering. It also became necessary to issue directions to the remnants of the town's civilian population who, as could be seen from the hillside, were becoming alarmed and were attempting either to show their neutrality by waving white flags or to surrender with German soldiers. Since the American commander did not wish to be encumbered by civilian movements along the road, an order was issued to the population to assemble in the town's main church. The order was scrupulously obeyed and the civilian population remained there until the MG officer arrived later in the day. When he arrived, he found them still conveniently assembled and was able to issue curfew regulations and other instructions to them.

The basis for success of the mission was the perfect coordination between fire and appeal. Interrogation of many POWs captured during the operation indicated that their defeatism was pronounced. An overwhelming majority had seen our leaflets pointing out the strategical hopelessness of Germany's military position. Most had been demoralized by the Allied pressure during the last few days, which had forced them into the town. A further sense of hopelessness developed early that morning, according to some POWs, when most of their commissioned officers withdrew.

Despite such a level of defeatism and even loosening of command, mass surrender was physically impossible as long as pressure was being placed on the town. Interrogations revealed that the security battalion stationed in the town had frequently discussed their plans to surrender once the American troops arrived at the outskirts of the town. But when the troops actually came on the scene, no one seemed willing, or knew how to face the physical dangers of bringing about such a surrender. As soon as an opportunity to surrender, and direct instructions on how to do so, were presented, the overwhelming majority of troops complied. Others in the town seemed to be swept along with the tide.

Loudspeakers have also proved highly effective against isolated enemy units ("pockets") and against enemy troops or guerrillas who have taken refuge in forests, underbrush, caves, etc. For example, they were sometimes used with spectacular success to accomplish the surrender of Japanese troops holed up on conquered or bypassed Pacific islands.

Subversion

As submission is the chief goal of tactical psywar, subversion is the usual goal of strategic psywar. By subversion in this sense we do not refer only to the spectacular cloak and dagger activities of paid agents. We mean any activity that is contrary to the best interests of the state, most particularly to the conduct of its war effort. The psywar operator's favorite instrument for encouraging such activity on the part of civilians behind the

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battle lines is propaganda calculated to evoke mutual suspicion, dissatisfaction, and resentment. The theory underlying such propaganda is that if it is successful some civilians will obey orders less quickly and work less hard. They will write lonely, depressed letters to their sons in the army. They will stay home from the factory oftener or contribute less freely to war loans or cheat when they turn in their crops for state use. They will help spread rumors against the political leaders. A few—a very few at best—will perhaps become so bitter in opposition to the policy of their leaders that they will resort to spying, sabotage, or assassination. But these few can be very useful, especially in the later stages of the war; it is they who will work with this country's agents when they can be gotten in. The major function of subversion propaganda, in other words, is to start people down the road that leads to actual cooperation with the United States.

In a country at war, subversion takes a form anywhere along the continuum from dissatisfaction to violent revolution. In Germany during World War II it ran the gamut from jokes about the Nazis to the plot to murder Hitler. In occupied France it ran all the way from insults chalked on the walls to the guerrilla activities of the maquis. In occupied South Korea it went from the human chains that passed news to the organized sabotage that kept telephone lines out of repair. This is the complex of responses that the strategic psywar operator tries to evoke with subversion propaganda.

The general population is not likely to be drawn into subversive activities. Thus the psywar operator is on the lookout for specific groups that have reason to be disaffected or which have the organization and, above all, the opportunity for subversion. By working with and through such groups, instead of trying to subvert the whole population, he will at the same time protect his friends and avoid the risk of antagonizing large numbers of people and so increase their "will to obey."

Confusion

Confusion is one of the oldest and most common of psywar goals, and any type of psywar, whether tactical, strategic, or political, may have the task of achieving it as part of its mission.

When a boxer famed for his lasting power feigns weariness early in a fight, part of his purpose is to leave his opponent wondering whether he is really weary or merely setting a trap,

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that is, to confuse him. The same thing is true of the army commander who puts his troops through motions evidently calculated to cause his opponent to expect an attack at a point in the line at which he does not intend to attack at all, and of the strategic psywar operator who pyramids the threat of a bombing attack into a work stoppage in 12 enemy cities. As all these examples show, confusion-producing psywar often has in it an element of deception. More precisely, it often confronts the target with a choice between assuming that an attempt is being made to deceive it, assuming the contrary, or recognizing that it does not know what to expect. But not all psywar measures intended to confuse are of this character. When Litvinov was removed as Commissar of Foreign Affairs it really did mean that the Soviet Union was adopting a new, anticollective-security foreign policy. But its immediate effect, no doubt intended by Soviet political warriors, was to leave other countries guessing and thus throw them diplomatically off balance. Some observers believe that many of the most dramatic Soviet démarchés in foreign affairs have as their main purpose the sowing of confusion—confusion for its own sake—in foreign chancelleries. The proposal for peace negotiations in Korea many months ago may, for example, have been of this character. The democracies apparently do not play this game. But it is something they may have to learn in order to cope with the Soviet Union.

Conflict, hot or cold, requires continuous prediction and planning—calling the tricks as to the enemy's present intentions and present and future capabilities and planning one's own campaign so as to win. The wider, the more complex the conflict, the more difficult it is to make correct predictions and change one's plans accordingly, and the more important it is that the predictions be made promptly. The central purpose of the kind of psywar here in question is to do things to the enemy that make it difficult for him, at the moment anyhow, to make any prediction at all that he's sure enough of to treat as firm. (Leading him to make a wrong prediction is deception psywar, not confusion psywar, though as we have noted the two shade into one another.) The result will be to delay his planning, which gains us an advantage in time, and get him worried about the delay, thus maximizing the likelihood of his planning badly. The perfect example is the practice, attributed by some observers to the Communists, of simultaneously playing both sides of the political market; for example, both supporting and opposing the UN, or supporting a strike and urging policies sure to make it fail.

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One further p' nt is that the feasibility of confusion psywar varies with the e: ent to which the enemy, in making predictions, must rely on data that he can get only or mostly from his opponent's official releases. If he has independent sources of information as to the opponent's capabilities and intentions, in other words, the opponent's attempts to confuse him will merely amuse him. This, of course, is why the totalitarian states are in a better position then the democracies to achieve the goal of confusion.

Cooperation

Cooperation is the chief goal of consolidation psywar and also the chief goal of political warfare directed at allies or neutrals. In the very nature of the case, therefore, it offers the operator a wider choice of media than the other goals we have been discussing and lends itself much better than they to, for example, the slower printed media, the poster, the meeting, and the motion picture, which usually cannot get through to an enemy target audience.

When a psywar operator plans a campaign aimed at cooperation he is trying to win friends for his country and influence people to believe as he does. For example, it has been one of the continuing tasks of America's political warfare to keep the friendship of the nations of Latin America. Both sides in the cold war have been directing cooperation psywar at neutral areas like India and the Arab world, in the hope of winning the friendship of those rich and powerful countries and, ultimately, making allies out of them. Since the end of World War II, both the Soviet Union and the United States have completed extensive consolidation operations—the Soviets in the European satellite states, East Germany, and North Korea, and this country in its zone in Germany and in Japan. The Russian techniques and political goals have, of course, been quite different from this country's. The Russians have fastened a rigid control on the sources and processes of power; they have imposed a communication monopoly and used every channel of communication and every possible hour of time to drive their teachings home. The United States, by contrast, has tended to let the Germans and Japanese work into the patterns of democracy in their own way and has opened the channels of communication to and from them by helping to restore their newspapers and educational systems. But regardless of the difference in technique and in political master plans, the object on both sides has been cooperation.

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Privatization

By privatization we mean the directing of a person's thoughts to his own troubles and needs, with a resulting decrease in his attention to his country's problems and needs. The soldier who gives himself over to thoughts of his own discomfort and homesickness is not likely to be an efficient soldier, or a good member of a working military team. The civilian workman who gives himself over to thoughts of his own discomfort and the injustices being done him in war work is not likely to be an efficient war worker or to help morale in his war plant. Privatization may therefore be the goal of either tactical or strategic psywar, but it is seen most commonly in tactical operations. Examples of this tactic are Figs. 4 and 5 and the frostbite leaflets of the Korean war, the leaflets and broadcasts about what the Communists are doing to the villages and farms back home, and the material about lack of medical care and scarcity of food. All these were designed to encourage the soldier to privatize, to turn his attention away from his military job toward himself and his nonmilitary connections, and thus to win all or part of his effectiveness away from his army.

Panic

The response Gideon desired and got from the Midianites was panic. The German blitzkrieg across France and the Lowlands was, in part at least, a psywar measure of this type and depended for its tactical success, in large part, on its success as psywar. The screaming dive bombers, the terrific destruction in Rotterdam, the careful propaganda build-up, that is to say, were all calculated to arouse panic; paralyze transportation, supply, and communication systems; and disorganize the opposition. Panic was also one object of many Nazi bombing raids and of the flying-bomb attack on Britain. Such measures are based on the notion that an enemy ridden by panic will not produce and that in a closely organized operation like modern warfare even a small center of panic may seriously weaken the whole. A factory center where production notably falls off may handicap a nation's entire war effort. A single unit that abandons its place in the line may lose a battle for a whole army.

It is hardly necessary to say that the atomic bomb provides a new and overpowering reason for understanding not only the offensive use but also the defensive control of panic in warfare.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AS PART OF A TOTAL OPERATION

The uses of psywar are therefore as broad as a nation's ability to implement its policies and programs by the communication of messages. But if the question is asked the other way—What can psywar be counted on to do? —then it becomes important to enter a word of caution.

Psywar per se is not a mighty weapon in the way that much contemporary discussion assumes it to be or in the way that the atomic bomb is a mighty weapon. A single atomic bomb may kill thousands of people, lay waste miles of countryside, and force a nation to its knees. A single act of psywar (a leaflet, a radio broadcast) is not likely to bring about the submission, subversion, cooperation, confusion, privatization, or panic of even its target audience, much less a target country; even the cumulative effect of a series of acts of psywar, a whole propaganda campaign, for example, is likely to be very small. At most it will change the attitudes of a numerically small group of people; it is likely to change even their attitudes not very much; and, for reasons we have already seen, not all of those whose attitudes are changed by it will act in the desired manner. But this is not to say that psywar cannot change the course of events. The Communist psywar that enlisted Klaus Fuchs as a Soviet spy did not necessarily work any sea change in his attitudes, but there is reason to believe that its end result was to cut down America's time advantage in atomic warfare by several years. Psywar, in short, may well supply the nail without which the kingdom would have been lost. And no stronger claim need be made for it.

Besides being less than mighty, psywar is not a sure-fire weapon. It calls, as we shall see, for great skill, great imaginativeness and empathy, and great resourcefulness on the part of the operators; it calls for good current intelligence about the target; and like most human activities it calls, at the margin, for a bit of luck. Any of these things may be missing in any psywar operation; to the extent that any are missing, psywar will be proportionately less mighty. If many are missing, it may accomplish nothing or even hurt the cause it is intended to support. This, of course, is more or less true of all weapons. We do not know beforehand, in any given situation, what any weapon will accomplish. The nation's bets, we must remember, are on its combination or "family" of weapons, any member of which may fail it in any given situation without the family as a

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whole failing it. And all we need claim for psywar is that it is a member of the family that has grown to be mighty enough and predictable enough that we dare not leave it at home when we go forth to do battle.

We must notice also that psywar is most likely to yield dividends when it is used in combination with the other weapons in the family. A psywar sound truck drawn up alone before the city of Willingen, Germany, without the threat or appearance of force, could not have achieved the surrender of the garrison. But a psywar mission supported by an American army was able in a few minutes to accomplish the surrender of the garrison, prevent hundreds, perhaps thousands, of casualties, and save days or weeks of fighting, thus freeing some resources for other military uses. Likewise Captain Zacharias,[2] broadcasting to Japan, would not have been able to sway the Japanese war policy to any great extent without the presence of the US Air Force over Kyushu and Honshu, the US Navy in the Pacific, and the Allied army poised on Okinawa and the Philippines. But when Zacharias's persuasive broadcasts were added to these factors, the broadcasts were able to contribute significantly. Wilson's Fourteen Points, one of the most effective pieces of psywar of all time, represent another case in point. By themselves they were merely lucid and rational. With the power and integrity of the United States and the Allies behind them, they were a powerful weapon that undoubtedly changed men's minds and helped bring the war to an end. And look at the other side of the present world conflict. How much more has Communist propaganda accomplished in Europe and Asia-outside-Russia because it had Communist organizations and the threat or promise of Soviet power behind it?

This principle is important. Psywar is used with greatest effect always when combined with other measures—actions, policies, military force, threats of force, etc. So used, it can broaden and increase the impact of the action, the policy, the force, or the threat, which in turn broaden and increase its impact. And thus it becomes a matter of first importance how psywar is fitted into other measures, how it is blended with other weapons to implement policy, and how its use is coordinated and timed with military, economic, or political operations.

Used well, coordinated well, psywar can often substitute to some extent for military or political force. In a situation otherwise close, it can often sway the balance. Built into a campaign, political or military, it can contribute not only to victory today but also to an easier battle tomorrow.

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SUMMARY

Our topic has now moved from the process of psywar to its use, and you will recognize that we are no longer talking in the vocabulary of social psychology but increasingly in the language of politics and power. For, although psywar may be used to call forth any response which is in the power of the available target audience to make and within the power of the available symbols and media to stimulate, in practice its use is restricted to the political and military goals of the nation that uses it.

Its broad targets are therefore groups that can exercise or implement or at least affect power relations, that is, the political elite, military elite, military population, and working population. You will find it useful to remember Speier's classification[1] of the power areas that psywar seeks to influence: the deciding of foreign policy, determination of military missions, ability to govern, ability to command, will to obey, and will to fight.

In the area of foreign policy, psywar may have, among other purposes, those of supporting diplomatic negotiations or political objectives, gaining the support and cooperation of neutral countries, strengthening or weakening alliances, deterring a nation from aggression or clearing the way for aggression, and bringing about the final capitulation of an enemy nation.

In the area of military missions, psywar may be used to influence the design of enemy strategy and tactics, to enhance military deception, to affect the will of command to begin or continue fighting, and to rouse public opinion or political pressures for or against a military operation.

In relation to the ability to govern, psywar may be employed to interfere with control systems or with communication, to help build counterelites, to make friendly leaders stronger and enemy leaders weaker, and to support resistance movements and gain support in newly liberated areas.

In the area of ability to command, psywar may be used to produce dissension among enemy forces, to strengthen friendly leaders and weaken enemy ones, to convey deceptive intelligence and to disrupt communications, to support military government, and to elicit information of military value.

As a weapon against the will to obey, psywar may be used to stimulate dissension between military and political elites, to disrupt communication between leader and followers, to undermine confidence in leadership and war aims, to reduce the incentive to work, to affect willingness to make sacrifices and

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face dangers, to cause panic, to encourage a sense of inequality and unfairness, to encourage the self-interests of minority groups, and to help in the subversion of key personnel.

Against the will to fight, psywar can be used to encourage surrender and especially to reduce last-ditch resistance, to induce a sense of unfair treatment, to increase the impact of weapons, and to contribute to the subversion of key personnel.

You will recognize, of course, that these are merely examples and not inclusive lists.

You may also want to remember the list of the chief responses psywar is used to seek, as given in this chapter. These responses are submission, subversion, confusion, cooperation, privatization, and panic—and their opposites. Moreover, psywar is often called upon to counteract enemy attempts to produce these responses.

Finally you will want to remember that psywar derives its chief effectiveness from being a part of a total operation. It is not by itself so mighty a weapon as, for example, the atom bomb. But used well, coordinated well with other instruments of power, it can often sway the balance between victory and defeat.

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CHAPTER 6

BACKGROUND OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DECISION

The use of psywar requires a series of managerial decisions. On the highest echelons these are closely related to policy. On the lowest echelons they are concerned with technique. Across the continuum from policy to technique, however, the basic questions are the same: What shall we try to accomplish with psywar? With what target? When? How?

No psywar decision, however, can be properly made in terms of purely technical considerations, as if psywar were an isolated activity. Psywar planning must work, at all echelons, not only (1) within the framework of policy and objectives but also (2) within limits set by operational plans and capabilities, and (3) within limits set by intelligence, both basic and current. Otherwise, it would leave out of account much essential information about potentials, capabilities, and vulnerabilities; cut itself off from the reinforcing power of events; and, worst of all, commit its government—in other peoples' eyes at least—to promises that cannot be redeemed, policies that cannot be carried out, etc. Indeed, the three limiting considerations of psywar planning are so important that they may well be restated: The psychological warfare decision must be made (1) within the framework of policy and objectives; (2) in conjunction with operational plans, and with an eye to operational capabilities; and (3) in the light of the fullest possible intelligence about the target.

These three requirements for the sound psywar decision will be discussed in the following sections.

POLICY AND OBJECTIVES

By policy we mean what Lerner[1] has called "the continuous effort to shape the future by decisions in the present." A confused policy, then, is simply one in which clear and unambiguous and

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consistent decisions about shaping the future fail to get made. A faulty policy exists when present decisions are of such character that they will not shape the future in the way the policy makers intend. A "sound policy," on the other hand, is one that uses all available means and instruments to produce decisions that will make future events develop according to our stated goals. Hence the soundness of any policy decision is "to be judged by its effectiveness in modifying given conditions toward desired goals."

Now it is apparent that psywar is one of the instruments just mentioned. Its assignment is to modify "given conditions toward desired goals." It must also be apparent that psywar can never be better than policy. If policy is confused, can psywar be any different? If policy is faulty, can psywar hope that its efforts will forward national objectives? The answer, clearly, is no.

The layman's stereotype of the propagandist or the psychological warrior is that of a magician who moves men around with word-wizardry and reshuffles world events to suit himself. We know it is not so. We know that if our Asia policy is confused, no psywar, no matter how brilliant, can keep our affairs in that area from going badly. We know that if our policy in regard to resisting Communism turns out to be faulty, then God pity us, for no psywar operation is going to be able to save us. In fact, that stereotype is one for both the psywar student and the political leader to put out of their minds—the former because he needs to get rid of any lingering suspicion that his task is to make foreign policy, and the latter because he needs to get rid of any lingering suspicion that if he fails to clarify policy goals, or chooses wrong, then his psywar man can straighten things out for him, or cover up his mistakes.

Psywar, then, is an instrument of policy and a means toward accomplishing objectives. The responsibility of the policy maker is to present the psywar operator with a clear and a sound policy. The responsibility of the psywar man is to implement that policy with effective messages. He has, no doubt, a further responsibility to give advice, when asked for it, as to what the psychological effect of a policy will probably be, and what the psywar implementation of a policy will call for in the way of resources, modified directives, etc. But chiefly he is presented with a policy, and he translates it—at the level of his echelon—into directives, campaigns, media choices, and messages.

The various types of psywar differ in their relation to national policy. Into the planning of political psywar, for example, national policy enters directly; it enters somewhat less directly into the

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planning of strategic and consolidation psywar and least directly into the planning of tactical psywar. No psywar planning, however, can leave it out of account or go against it. Take, for example, the policy stated clearly by the President during World War II, that the only terms to be offered our enemies should be unconditional surrender. This national policy reached down even to the tactical level, greatly restricting what could be said to the Nazi armies by way of persuading them to lay down their weapons—partly because of uncertainty as to what could be said and what could not. General Eisenhower tried unsuccessfully to get a clarification from higher authority of what unconditional surrender actually meant, so that enemy troops could be told clearly what to expect if they were to give up the fight. Some observers believe, indeed, that the policy seriously handicapped our psywar effort in Europe, and this is a good place to repeat the objection to which such statements are open. What is meant by this one is that more Germans would have surrendered, after seeing our leaflets, if the latter had not had to stress unconditional surrender. But since our national policy makers did not want surrender on terms other than unconditional capitulation, any surrenders psywar might have got on other terms would have forwarded no US objective and would have been pointless or even harmful.

Military objectives enter most directly into the planning of tactical psywar, less into strategic and consolidation, least into political; but they must be taken into account in the planning of every kind of psywar. For example, the fact that the United States is not able or eager to undertake certain military commitments in far places sharply limits what Voice of America (VOA) can say or imply, by way of threats or promises, in political psywar.

The planner of psywar will therefore work within the blueprints of policy and objectives, and the planning priorities will be congruent with the priorities for goals and objectives. Even with that understood, however, there are some aspects of the relation of policy and objectives to planning which continue to cause confusion in psywar circles.

For one thing, every psywar situation involves some combination of short- and medium- and long-range policy goals and military objectives. Policywise, for instance, a current operation might involve an immediate political goal of this or that character, the medium-range goal of victory in an international conflict, and the long-term goal of such and such a kind of international reorganization after the conflict. In a military psywar operation the goals might be a successful strategic retreat in a

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particular sector, victory in the campaign, and unconditional surrender by the enemy in the war as a whole. Psywar planning is likely to be at its best when the long-range objectives, political or military, have been as clearly defined as the medium- and short-range goals. Otherwise there is likely to be waste motion, even motion at cross-purposes. General Robert A. McClure has told how our psywar in Europe came a cropper by widely publicizing to the enemy our strict adherence to the Geneva convention—a policy that seemed obviously safe in the absence of policy statements to the contrary. "It was a good 'selling point' to prospective prisoners of war," General McClure[2] says. "Very late in the Normandy campaign it was discovered, by chance, that we would not necessarily adhere to the provision of 'early return to your homes.' The decision to use prisoners of war for reconstruction labor did not reach the psychological warriors until after we had committed our Governments to a course of action they did not intend to follow."

It is probably easier for a government that has come into power through revolution, and has thereby learned the lesson of waiting and looking far ahead, to plan in long-range terms. A totalitarian government, where power is centralized, has a considerable advantage in this regard over a democracy, where public opinion must enter into every basic decision and where policy may vary with the shifting winds of politics. Again, it is notoriously more difficult for a wartime coalition of governments to make and state clear long-range policy than for a single power to do so. And it is a truism that if policy and objectives are short-range and opportunistic, then not only psywar operations but military and political operations also may be wasteful or harmful.

The planner of psywar must therefore use to the full such long-range policy directives as he can get. America's psywar messages addressed to occupied Europe in World War II furnished an interesting example of this problem when it came to deciding what should be said to the French people. One of the objectives was obviously to strengthen and encourage the French resistance movement. At the same time, political exigencies led the US Government to the decision that it must work with the collaboration government of Petain. Thus, although the Resistance was actively opposing the Petain government, it was decided that none of the US propaganda should attack Petain, on the theory that, whereas the United States would aid anyone who opposed the Nazis, long-range policy did not indicate the wisdom of aiding Frenchmen to fight Frenchmen.

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The solution, however, lies only in small part with the planner of psywar. It is the policy maker himself who is obligated not only to plan in as long-range terms as possible but also to state long-range policy clearly and fully for his psywar operators and to consider the potential effect of an intended policy on his world relations. Even short-range military action should, in future more often than in the past, be designed with an eye to its psychological effect on longer-range military and political objectives. The short-range goals may be deceptively clear. Thus it seemed desirable at the time to bomb the monastery on Monte Cassino. But the use the Nazi propagandists were able to make of that action on our part, and its powerful effect throughout Italy and the Catholic world, lead us to believe now that a second look at that objective might have been indicated before the planes were dispatched by our commanders.

In practice, policy usually presents itself to the psywar operator as a directive, an official statement by a government or theater command, a public address by an official able to state policy (Roosevelt's and Churchill's speeches proved the best sources of policy for SHAEF psywar), or an act of a congress or parliament. Short-range military objectives usually appear in the form of a briefing or a command request for aid. Long-range objectives and timetables tend to be available in direct proportion to the degree of confidence in which high command holds psywar. In any case, before the psywar operator turns any policy or objectives into messages, he should drop in at Operations and Intelligence.

OPERATIONS

Psywar's problem with operations is a problem of integration. This is a two-level problem. On one level, that of fitting psywar into a local situation, the field operator can do much toward solving the problem himself. This, equally in military and nonmilitary psywar, is in large part a matter of cultivating good personal relations with operating personnel (the -3 people—A-3, G-3, S-3—and the local embassy), and bringing them to see how psywar can help them, and, finally, of conducting psywar operations with a minimum of inconvenience to and interference with operations in general. Psywar, for example, must not monopolize local printing facilities or expect leaflets to take precedence over ammunition when a truck is going up to regiment. On a higher level, however—that of integrating psywar into the total national program—there is

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not much the psywar operators can do. And yet this is far and away the more important of the two problem levels.

We have said that psywar is one of several instruments of policy that every nation has at its disposal. According to Harold Lasswell,[3] we may distinguish four such instruments: diplomacy, propaganda, economics, and arms. There is good reason to believe that three of these instruments of policy are, on the highest levels of policy in the United States, integrated pretty well into the national program. If a diplomatic action is to be taken—for example, if diplomatic recognition is to be withheld from Red China—there are reasonably good guarantees that the things the diplomats will do to that end will support and not weaken other US policies, will themselves be backed up by other US government action, and will not be decided on in the first place without careful study of how they fit into the total picture. Similarly with international economic decisions—for example, when money is to be allocated to prime the economic pump in Europe—there is a reason to believe that top-level officials in all departments concerned will enter into and affect the planning. When an important military decision is to be made—for example, when it was decided to resist Communist aggression in North Korea—the decision was undoubtedly coordinated not only with numerous nonmilitary programs in the US but with the policy makers of other nations as well. With all three of these weapons, in other words, there are prior guarantees of support for the weapons from other quarters when it is needed, and prior guarantees against actions being taken without regard for their implications for other programs, and thus against the Government's left hand acting at cross-purposes with its right hand.

But what happens to the fourth weapon at the top level?

Bruce Lockhart,[4] chief of British psywar in World War II, writes thus of his own government's attitude: "No serious impetus was ever given to our propaganda efforts from on top. It was due, I think, partly to the pressure of graver events and partly to ignorance of the subject in Whitehall. The ignorance bred skepticism, and together they were a formidable hurdle."

Daniel Lerner,[5] in his account of European psywar operations, speaks regretfully of "the lack of interest in sykewar displayed by most top American officials responsible for the policies and conduct of the war."

Carroll[6] testified:

> It was a curious fact—and I had confirmation of it later—that the President, who established the OWI, never knew what it was doing, and sometimes, apparently, confused it with the Office of Censorship. He had been opposed to the creation of the propaganda service and had

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> established OWI with considerable reluctance, under pressure from his advisers, whose primary aim was to provide an adequate flow of information to the American public. Once the organization was established, he did not want to be bothered about it. In his own right Roosevelt was a great propagandist. . .but he did not understand the systematic use of propaganda in total war.*

Carroll adds that Cordell Hull "knew even less than the President about OWI and cared about as much."

General McClure,[2] who commanded the psywar operation at SHAEF, writes ruefully: "An understanding of the proper source of Government policy, its actual communication to the field by a reliable, rapid channel, a feeling of belonging to a properly organized team owing allegiance to the commander under whom it was serving, and not to several independent Government agencies, would have solved most of the Psychological Warfare difficulties in SHAEF."

This matter of integrating psywar into the total international operation of a nation is the most important operational problem that psywar faces. It was not solved in World War II, as the preceding quotations indicate, and almost certainly has not been solved since. Yet until psywar is integrated into planning at the highest levels, the full potentialities of the weapon will never be exploited.

Need we say that the Russians have no such difficulty? Both their doctrine and their tradition give propaganda a conspicuous place in carrying out policy. They have never forgotten, as Lasswell[3] points out, that the revolution of 1917 was prepared by years of activity during which Party members devoted most of their energies to propaganda. Since 1917 they have seen propaganda help to knock off one after another of their neighbors. Essentially psywar means to them a highly effective and fantastically inexpensive instrument for achieving world domination. It is as much a part of their over-all operational plans as is the Red Army. With us, however, this lesson seems not yet to have been learned.

This, we repeat, is a problem for the chiefs, which psywar operators can affect only by gradually getting across to the chiefs how much easier their task would be if this country imitated the Russians a little in this regard. In local operations, however, the principle is the same—psywar, as one striking arm, must synchronize with the other striking arms—and psywar personnel can, we repeat, to some extent take the initiative. How necessary this is America learned the hard way in places such as Aachen, where leaflets and loudspeakers, improperly coordinated with

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military force, failed to bring about the surrender of the city's garrison, and where, consequently, more lives were spent than should have been required.

Properly used, political, military, and psychological effects can interact to make each other immeasurably stronger. An example of this was flying the Hump into China. The military effects of the supplies American planes were able to deliver to Chungking were significant. But even more important was the political effect of encouraging the Chinese government to resist. Perhaps most powerful of all—and immensely influential on Chinese resistance—was the demonstration of America's strength, skill, and determination to enemies and Allies.

Another convincing demonstration of the power of coordinated political, military, and propaganda actions was the Nazi campaign in Europe which Taylor[7] so aptly called a "strategy of terror." The political pressure from Berlin, the screaming Stukas, and the threatening radio all drove toward the single goal of Nazi conquest.

In the practical sense, therefore, psywar is always dependent on operational capabilities in two fields. One is for political, military, and perhaps economic action of a given kind at a given time. It is, of course, essential to know operational capabilities and intentions before making promises and threats in psywar output. It is equally important to time and phase psywar with the operational schedule. The airlift into Berlin was an example. Even without a word of propaganda the lift was a magnificent piece of psywar. On the other hand, if our intentions and capabilities had been made known before the lift began, if our psywar operators had been able to tell the world what the Free World was prepared to do to resist aggression in Berlin, then the effect would have been still greater. For the audience would have been able to watch the whole action develop, like the plot of a story, with the conflicting intentions clear and the action clearly demonstrating a victory which counterpropaganda would have had a harder time befogging and belittling.

In the second place, psywar is dependent on operational capabilities for delivering a message in a given way at a given time. If, for example, no qualified psywar personnel are available when and where they are needed, the psywar weapon simply cannot make its contribution to the achievement of the national purpose. If none of the short-wave stations reach country A, then radio psywar to that country is, for the moment, out of the question. If no loudspeakers are available, obviously that method is impossible. If

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it takes a week to print and disseminate a leaflet, the capacity of psywar to affect tactical situations will be smaller by far than it might have been if facilities were available for getting leaflets out on short notice. If an airplane is available only on Tuesdays to drop psywar materials, then other methods of dissemination must be used on the other six days unless, from psywar's point of view, they are to be wasted.

The extent of operational support now required by, for example, strictly military psywar, may be judged by a simple set of figures. In World War I all belligerents dropped a total of about 20,000,000 leaflets. In World War II the Western Allies alone dropped 1,250,000,000 leaflets. Approximately that same number were dropped by this country alone in the first 21 months of the Korean operation.

The extent of coordination required of a combat psywar officer is illustrated by a study made by the Army psywar training school. A combat psywar officer is expected to be responsible for effecting coordination with various military agencies concerning the following matters:

Individual or Group	Activity
G-1	Procurement of psywar specialists
	Obtaining information concerning prisoners of war
G-2	Provision of intelligence material for psywar purposes, including intelligence of the enemy in general and of the forces in contact in particular, and intelligence of enemy propaganda principles, organization, and technique
	Assistance in the planning of psywar operations
	Estimating effectiveness of friendly and enemy psywar operations
	Designating prisoners of war and others with information of value for psywar purposes, and those suitable for use in broadcasting, writing leaflets, and other activities of psywar interest
	Assistance in the planning and supervision of training and other activities concerning defense against enemy propaganda
G-3	Obtaining information concerning current and future operations

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Individual or Group	Activity
	General staff coordination and supervision of the planning and conduct of psywar operations
	Surrender technique to be given to the enemy
	Training troops in psywar, to include defense against enemy psywar
	Allocation of ammunition for propaganda dissemination
G-4	Procurement of special supplies
	Transportation
	Storage areas
Civil Affairs or Military Government Officer	Obtaining information concerning displaced persons
	Reestablishment of information services
Signal Officer	Assignment of radio channels
	Provision of communication equipment, maintenance, and repair
	Provision of communication facilities
	Obtaining photographs suitable for propaganda purposes
	Effective signal security
Artillery Officer	Recommendations concerning allocations of ammunition for propaganda purposes
	Selection of units to fire propaganda missiles
Ordnance Officer	Obtaining information on technical matters relative to communications and weapons suitable for dissemination of propaganda
Engineer Officer	Maintaining reproduction equipment
Surgeon	Caring for wounded prisoners
Public Information Officer	Obtaining press and photography releases
	Preventing conflict and contradiction between information released to the general public and the armed forces, and propaganda directed toward the enemy

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Individual or Group	Activity
Troop Information and Education Officer	Suggesting effective indoctrination of troops against enemy propaganda Preventing serious conflict between propaganda directed toward the enemy and information supplied to the troops
Air Force Personnel	Leaflet and airborne loudspeaker missions Bombs and aircraft for propaganda missions

This listing, of course, applies specifically to an army psywar officer, but something like this relation must exist between the psywar planner and his related operational units not only in the other two services but also, with, however, very different entries, between the civilian operator and his embassy. In fact the relation should be even closer than that described, because the channels are not, as the listing might seem to imply, one-way streets. As the psywar officer gets help and advice from the officers named, so also should he be responsible for giving advice and information to them—opportunities he sees for the use of psywar, ways in which combat operations might be scheduled or directed for maximum psychological effectiveness, facts that fighting personnel at all levels should know about the use of psywar in general and his use of it in particular, information that should be given to troops by way of counteracting enemy propaganda. In other words the relation ideally is much more than support of psywar by operations. It is really integration of psywar into operations toward a common objective.

INTELLIGENCE

Psywar intelligence is the only thing that keeps psywar from being an absorbing but exceedingly dangerous game of blindman's buff. Every other condition of the game conspires to make it just that—the distance over which the psywar operator must operate, the effort of the enemy to keep the true facts and situation hidden, the barriers of international suspicion, the difficulties of intercultural communication. The mission of intelligence is to see through

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barriers like these and to maintain a continuing flow of information and evaluation, on the basis of which policy can be translated effectively into operations.

Actually, psywar needs two kinds of intelligence, which have sometimes been called "basic" and "output" intelligence. The purpose of the first of these is to provide, on a day-to-day basis, the clearest and most objective possible picture of the target. This includes its strengths and vulnerabilities, psychological and physical needs, attitudes and morale, programs and expressed policies, and the existing channels for reaching the target. The major requirement here is the highest possible degree of accuracy.

Output intelligence, on the other hand, is concerned not so much with accuracy as with verisimilitude. This is the flow of material from which the writing and production staffs of psywar are able to construct leaflets, scripts, and other messages. It includes incidents, names, statements, descriptions, maps, and other details that can be used directly to make psywar materials sound real. Output intelligence may even include such details as telephone numbers; in fact the British political intelligence division in World War II was several times asked to provide telephone numbers of German citizens for use in radio broadcasts.

These two kinds of intelligence are not always good neighbors. The kind of mind that is most useful in gathering basic intelligence is the social science mind, able to sift and weigh and evaluate. The kind of mind that is most useful in gathering output intelligence is the imaginative mind, able to see facts as a writer does, and fasten on the details which, given creative treatment, will make a psywar message. These two approaches may be good for each other. That is, the sober, careful attitude of the basic intelligence man will keep the output intelligence man from going off half-cocked. On the other hand, the constant pressure of the output man will tend to keep the basic intelligence man aware of the practical uses of his results. So it is in theory, at least. In practice, it has usually been found necessary to separate the two functions. In SHAEF, during World War II, two officers were separated from the main intelligence unit and assigned full-time to providing output intelligence; in addition the writers themselves gathered a good deal of such intelligence from prisoners and documents. In FEC, Tokyo, during the Korean operation, the basic intelligence function was assigned to an intelligence unit reporting directly to the commanding officers of the psywar section. Output intelligence —for example, preparation of background memoranda by means of which the writers could handle the specified themes for the

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relatively unfamiliar Chinese and Korean targets—was assigned to an intelligence unit of the operational group.

There are two general sources for intelligence material of these kinds. One is the broad background of relatively unchanging fact which is represented, in a psywar operation, by previous training in the culture and physical nature of the target area, by reference books, and by psywar personnel who have lived in the target culture. This is chiefly a matter of previous preparation. When a psywar operation begins, it is too late to do much toward filling this gap except by drawing on what has been done before. When the Korean operation started, for example, we were short of psywar personnel trained and experienced in the Korean culture, although we did what we could by gathering reference materials and hiring Korean natives. The same situation will exist in future operations unless we meet it with a program of training, here and abroad, and an extensive program of fact gathering with a view to psywar needs.

The other source of material is the day-to-day input by which the picture is kept detailed and up-to-date. This comes from documents, from prisoners, from exiles and refugees, from observation, from our own secret agents, and from the publications and broadcasts of the target and related states. In a military operation it comes in large measure from prisoners. As Hertz[8] said of the operation against Lorient in World War II: "Our existence as a functioning tactical unit depended on intelligence from prisoners. We ate, slept, and drank with prisoners. Many nights I was awakened by members of our crew dragging in deserters, who sat on my bedroll, dripping the waters of the river Scorff as they told us the latest Winchell dope on what went on inside the fortress." Hertz was interested mostly in output intelligence. Prisoners were also a source of basic intelligence. As a matter of fact, interviews with prisoners were used during the European operation in 1944 and 1945 as a source from which to make up a constantly changing index of Wehrmacht morale, which was invaluable in timing psychological operations.

The outline of topics on which SHAEF interrogators questioned prisoners for psywar purposes is interesting as an illustration of the kinds of subject on which information is needed. After getting basic information on the prisoner's name, rank, unit, personal history, etc., the interrogator went through the following 19 topics:

(1) Contacts with and reactions to Allied propaganda
(2) Contacts with and reactions to German propaganda

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(3) Attitude toward last-ditch warfare
(4) Expectation of outcome of war
(5) Attitude toward possible Allied occupation
(6) Specific concerns with possible postwar situation (revenge against civilian population; looting, destruction of property, rage; unemployment; lack of food)
(7) Postwar expectations for Germany
(8) Attitude toward National Socialism
(9) Attitude toward Hitler personally
(10) Attitude toward other Nazi leaders, including lower Party functionaries
(11) Ideas on war guilt
(12) Feeling of political responsibility (who should be held responsible?)
(13) Fear of ill treatment as POW
(14) Attitude toward senior leaders
(15) Attitude toward immediate officers
(16) Reactions to Allied weapons
(17) Service conditions (food, health of unit, mail, types of reserves encountered, etc.)
(18) Rivalries in Wehrmacht
(19) Home-front situation (underground opposition, attitudes of and toward foreign workers, family life, morale effect of air raids, etc.)

This is, of course, not the only kind of POW interrogation. There are many other kinds of information which military intelligence can extract from prisoners—for example, on the movements, equipment, and training of their military units; names of officers; precise information on location of factories, transportation lines, and other bombing targets; etc. But questions like those are bound to be asked anyway, and the problem of psywar is to get its kind of question asked along with the others. That is why the SHAEF structured interview is worth study. Notice that it begins with an attempt to get a general picture of how many and what kind of leaflets and broadcasts were reaching the POW's unit, then asks a series of questions about expectations. There follow questions on the POW's feeling toward his leaders, toward the party, and toward the subject of war guilt and the kind of Germany that should come into existence after the war. Then the questions turn to more direct Wehrmacht experiences: service conditions, rivalries in the army, and reactions to the quality and effectiveness of Allied weapons. Finally, there are questions about what the soldier has heard of conditions on the home front. Thus the

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interrogator should be able, if he gets good cooperation from his POW, to estimate what the prisoner knows about the war, the needs in him to which psywar might have appealed successfully, the main structure of his political attitudes, and his strong group loyalties and alliances. Furthermore, by finding out these things for a large number of prisoners, it is possible to plot the change over a period of weeks or months (for example, who they think is winning the war, their attitudes toward a possible occupation, their service conditions, and their attitudes toward their superior officers and toward the top men) and thus obtain a curve from which both morale and response trends can be deduced.

A basic problem, of course, is always the "thousand yards," that is, what happens to a soldier when he has ceased to be a fighting man and become a prisoner. It is very difficult to estimate what allowance to make in projecting a prisoner's attitudes to enemy soldiers still fighting. It is sometimes difficult, also, to know how much credence to put in prisoners' answers. Sometimes they lie to please their interrogators, sometimes to misinform them. An experienced interrogator can often tell when this is happening and minimize it with well-asked questions or allow for it in his estimates of the prisoner's reliability. Furthermore there is some safety in numbers in a case like this; one prisoner's report can be checked against others, and all against other evidence.

Other information, as we have said, comes in large quantities from documents. After D-Day we realized how much documentary material had not been available to us previously. As soon as we began to move into Brittany, we captured a wealth of personal letters, Army and civilian orders, textbooks and manuals, newspapers, magazines, and diaries, which proved to be a mine of intelligence information for psywar. The psywar man ordinarily has at his disposal one or a number of intelligence digests, and either he or some other agency monitors the enemy radio and examines such enemy leaflets and other publications as can be obtained.

The breadth and variety of questions put to psywar intelligence is startling to a person unfamiliar with it. For example, here are samples of the questions put to psywar intelligence in the Far East theater during the Korean operation:

Is the Chinese attitude toward surrender like that of the Japanese?

What percentage of the Chinese fighting in Korea are former Chinese Nationalist troops, and are they specially vulnerable to surrender propaganda?

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What do the Chinese now think of Sun Yat-sen? (The intention was to make propaganda use of the way the Communists had put aside the principles of Sun.)

What keeps the guerrillas fighting?

How much is our radio being heard in North Korea?

What do the Koreans think of what the Communists have done to emancipate Korean women?

These are only samples. If we try to analyze more systematically what intelligence should know in order to fill out psywar's picture of its target, we come out with something like this:

Physical aspects of the target

Population figures, appearance of the country, climate, seasons, size and plan of cities, transportation system, plant life, crops, what the people especially value about the physical nature of the country, etc.

Social background

History of the country; group structure of the society; role habits of the people; values and beliefs; traditions and symbols; institutions; distribution of wealth and income and ways of earning money; leaders in different fields; their quality, reputation, and biographies (and their present whereabouts and habits, which often make good output intelligence); typical ways in which business, industrial, professional, farm, and labor families live; educational system of the country; recreational patterns; how social change is accomplished in the country; etc.

Communications

What is the literacy level in the country and how widely are the mass communications distributed through the population? What kind of mass communications are the people used to? How do experts in the target country use the communication system to change attitudes and bring about action? What special communication patterns such as color symbolisms ought we know about? In general what do the people in the target know about given events? How and to what extent does the target government isolate its people against foreign propaganda? How can America get its propaganda in at least risk to its recipients?

Propaganda line

What is the target telling (a) its own people, (b) its allies, if any, (c) US Allies, (d) the United States?

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Political situation

What is the political philosophy behind the target state? What is the organization of the government, nature and strength of the control system, relation of the government to everyday lives of the people? What are people's attitudes toward the government and different groups of government officials, the apparent long-range goals of the state, the apparent immediate goals, the capabilities of the government-in-power for suppressing deviant opinion, the groups or individuals that have political power and those that have power to inconvenience or overthrow the government, etc.?

Military situation

Nature and organization of the military service, its traditions, its equipment, the care it takes of troops, kind and amount of training, living conditions in the services, what troops think of US weapons, relation of military to civil power, attitudes of soldiers toward military leadership, evidence of cleavage if any in the services, heroes of the services, whereabouts of given units or of ships, apparent military plans and capabilities, etc.

Personality needs and group relations

Evidence of personality needs to which psywar might appeal, signs of frustration, indications of group tension or of significant deviance, general pattern of attitudes as nearly as it can be inferred from opinions and actions, evidences of strong attitude structures characterized by ego involvement and emotional bias, state of morale in armed forces and among civilians, groups which have power to reinforce deviance, etc.

General assessment of target

Strengths—points where attitude structures and action patterns are most likely to resist change but which, if changed, would represent substantial deterioration in enemy position.

Vulnerabilities—points where attitude structure and action patterns are most likely to be susceptible to change in a desired direction but which may or may not represent worth-while goals for attempted change.

Trends—of policy, propaganda line, public opinion, morale, deviance, and other factors of psywar importance.

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General assessment of US psywar's effect on target

What groups is US psywar reaching, and what are the known responses? (Some ways of arriving at information of this kind will be discussed in a later chapter.)

Obviously this outline is neither complete nor tailored to any particular kind or location of psywar. For tactical psywar, on a mountainside in Korea, one part of it would be much more important than others; for political broadcasting, as by the VOA, other parts would be important. However, this is not the place to go into the problem of how to expand these sections or how to gather the information.

And perhaps in a chapter like this, which must treat a great mass of material in a suggestive rather than inclusive way, we tend to be too general and not practical enough. Intelligence is extremely practical. It may help you to think of material like this in practical terms if you think of what a minister needs to know about one of his parishioners with whose beliefs and values he is concerned, or what a teacher needs to know about one of his pupils with whose social knowledge and attitudes he is concerned. Obviously, he needs to know as much as he can. To begin with, he is thoroughly familiar with the social milieu in which the parishioner or the student lives; if he himself has grown up in that milieu, so much the better. He even knows the person's history, and how his home looks, and probably the heroes he holds and the symbols he is used to hearing and seeing. He knows, or soon finds out, what the individual knows and believes about the subject under discussion, and he is in position to find out very soon how he can appeal to the individual; what inner needs and outer group relationships will have to be involved in any changes that are made. Furthermore he can watch the results of anything he says. That is what the preacher or the teacher needs to know as a minimum. But now move the preacher or teacher a thousand miles away and let him talk to persons he has never seen and who are not particularly anxious either to hear or see him. That is more like the situation of the psychological warrior. And intelligence, by one means or other, has to fill in the gap.

What, in practical terms then, does the psywar man need from intelligence? Obviously, the best and most complete picture he can get. Anything intelligence can do to help him along toward the kind of knowledge and understanding the minister or the teacher either has to begin with, or easily acquires—anything intelligence can do in that direction will be valuable. If intelligence can fill in the outline we have just given, then it will be doing its job well.

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But s ppose we have to cut the information to bare essentials: what are the essentials? For the answer to that, let us go back to the psywar process as we described it in Part II of this book. The psywar man needs to know from intelligence, more than anything else:

First, how he can get attention for his message, that is, what medium, what timing, what approach, what treatment, and perhaps what segment of a target?

Second, how he can talk to the target, that is, how can he clothe the subject with the right symbols so as to get his meaning across?

Third, what he has to change, hat is, what are the attitudes and action patterns of the target with reference to the particular subject under discussion?

Fourth, what are the conditions of change, that is, what are the personality needs of the target to which a message can be made to appeal; and what are the group relations which can be made to reinforce the desired change or from which the target individuals will have to deviate?

And finally, when he has sent his messages, what are the results, that is, are the messages being received, and what kinds of responses are they eliciting?

As an example of the specific use that can be made of this kind of intelligence consider the accompanying leaflet message. This much-admired British leaflet of World War II was written in German but still retains its beauty and effectiveness in English translation. Many critics have remarked how well the leaflet fits the spirit of the German soldier, and Speier says that when you study this leaflet carefully, in the light of its situation and its intended audience, you will come to the conclusion that you will be hard put to find more vicious propaganda anywhere.

TO THE SOLDIER WHO MARCHES WEST

You are still alive. It is wonderful. Everything that lives is wonderful, even the green grass and the birds.

The dead and the rocks and the soil and the dung—they are nothing, for they have no life.

We who have life have everything; we possess fabulous wealth.

The rocks, the dead and the soil have nothing, are nothing.

Where will your road lead you, soldier? Are you going West? Are you going to Paris?

Do you know what is in the West, soldier? I shall tell you, soldier; listen.

In front of you are the English, you know that. The French and the Americans are behind them. You also know how they fire into the lines of your comrades. Perhaps they will retreat and new regiments will march ahead. Then they will fire again. Then the Allies retreat again.

But the firing never ceases . . . .

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There is something else in the West. I shall tell you what this "something" is. Nobody can tell you exactly where it is, but it surely is in the West.

Your grave lies in the West.

If you march West, you can't help finding it. Possibly it is far ahead of you, behind the mountains. But possibly it is very near you, perhaps you can see it. Today or tomorrow—nobody knows. But surely, the grave lies there, as surely as does the sunset.

Do you march West, soldier? Then, we say good-by to you. All of us who live say good-by.

There are only two things on earth, the living and the dead. The difference between these two things is greater than that between friend and foe, greater than that between man and animal. It is the greatest difference in this world. With the dead one you cannot marry, to the dead one you cannot be a friend, you can't talk with him, you don't touch him. If you march West, soldier, we say good-by, we who are alive.

Men and women, dogs and birds and insects—they shall not be with you any more . . . .

Soldier, farewell.

Today, you are one of us; you are one with men and women and everything that lives. You are master of the rocks and the woods and all inanimate things.

Tomorrow you march West.

Soldier, farewell.

Do you hear our voice?

Farewell.

On a mountain in Korea or in the New York studios of the VOA these questions will still be the same.

One final word of warning should be said. Intelligence must continually be reevaluated in the light of accumulating evidence. Target information from behind the screen of war or the Iron Curtain of uneasy peace is scanty at best, often slow to come, confused, or concealed. The best, the latest, the most complete intelligence is none too good, as every psywar operator has found at times to his sorrow. As von Clausewitz said, "A great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part somewhat doubtful." Those are the conditions under which psywar asks its intelligence units to perform their daily miracle.

SUMMARY

This chapter is a spelling out of the postulate with which the chapter began, that is, that psywar requires a series of managerial decisions and that these decisions must be made (1) within the framework of policy and objectives, (2) in conjunction with operational plans and in view of operational capabilities, and (3) in the light of fullest possible intelligence about the target.

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It is well to remember that psywar can never be better than policy. If policy is confused, psywar can hardly expect to be clear. If policy is faulty, psywar can hardly expect to make up for the deficiencies. If policy is short-range and opportunistic, psywar can hardly be otherwise. It is the obligation of policy makers to make sound policy, and in the longest practicable terms, and to make that available to the psywar unit; and it is the obligation of the psywar operation not to make foreign policy but to take the policy already made and translate it into symbols, messages, campaigns.

Psywar has an operational problem on two levels. The more serious problem is on the level of top planning, and it centers around the question of whether political and military planners in a country such as the United States can understand psywar and integrate it into their plans of action along with the other weapons available to them. On the more familiar level it is the problem of coordinating psywar with going operations and getting logistic support—a complex problem, but one about which the psywar operator is better able to do something than he is about the high-level problem.

Psywar needs two kinds of intelligence: basic, which aims at the most accurate possible picture of a target, and output, which is a culling of materials about the target for use in psywar messages. Likewise, there are two broad sources of psywar intelligence: the broad background of relatively unchanging fact which comes out of previous training and experience in the target area, and out of such experience distilled into reference books and files; and the day-to-day input by which the picture is kept detailed and up-to-date, this input coming from documents, prisoners, exiles and refugees, observation, secret agents, publications, and broadcasts. Let us say again that gathering and use of intelligence are topics for a separate book. We have only tried to suggest some of the special relevance of intelligence to psywar. One special caution should be repeated here: psywar intelligence, which is scanty at best and withheld as much as possible by the enemy, must be continually reevaluated in the light of accumulating evidence.

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Chapter 7

FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DECISION

We have remarked that the range of possibilities for psywar is not endless but certainly very large. There are always more campaigns to be waged and more targets to be hit than any nation can effectively wage or hit at any given time. A selection, often a highly difficult selection, must be made. Further selections must be made among themes, among media, among possible ways of expressing the message, and among the countless permutations and combinations possible in timing a group of messages.

All these decisions are complex and difficult. Each involves a large number of variables, each of which must be estimated and assigned a value despite the fact that there is not much experimental evidence or theory to which the operator can turn for guidance. Psywar, as we have said, is at the same time something less than a science and something less than an art, although it has elements of both science and art. Insofar as it is science, it puts its bets on the best and most complete evidence available, tries to function in terms of cool objective interpretation of such evidence, and looks forward to the day when laboratory and field studies will provide it with the developed theory it sorely needs. At present, however, the making of psywar decisions is mostly a matter of impressionistic or intuitive balancing of plusses and minuses of quite uncertain value. And here the experience, the skill, and the "art" of the old hand at the psywar game play an important role.

The chief decisions that enter into the planning of psywar are what campaign (what specific act, as part of that campaign?), purpose (that is. what specific response from the target audience is the objective of the campaign? of the specific act of psywar?), target, channel or channels, message (which means, how should the psywar man try to accomplish the desired change?), timing, and means of evaluation? These will be discussed in the following pages.

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DECIDING ON THE CAMPAIGN

Psychological warfare, like military warfare, is for the most part organized into a series of campaigns. These employ a group of related themes for long enough to get the greatest cumulative effect without a significant loss of interest.

Leonard Doob[1] has made an ingenious effort to develop a systematic, semimathematical way of estimating the relative desirability of different campaigns. A mathematical weighting of the kind he has in mind is perhaps not feasible in all circumstances, but when the operator goes about deciding on a campaign he must ask himself questions such as the following, and be clear in his mind as to how he is answering them:

Priority of Policy Points

What particular points of our policy and program hold highest priority at any given time? This is obviously a fundamental question, one that must be answered at the very highest levels. The obligation of the psywar officer is not to decide it but to seek direction on it.

Applicability of Psychological Warfare to Policy Points

Which of these high-priority points is it possible to reinforce with psywar at this time? Certain policies make better psywar than others. For example, Wilson's Fourteen Points made better psywar than Roosevelt's policy of unconditional surrender. For some policies and programs the timing, as of a given moment, will not be right. For example, there may be more reason to maintain secrecy on a forthcoming military movement than to build up psychologically to it. This is partly a high-level policy decision, partly an expert operational decision. But it is clear that at any given moment certain high-priority items in a nation's military and diplomatic program will lend themselves better to psywar treatment than others, and some will not lend themselves to it at all. The operator, insofar as his directives leave him free to choose, will naturally want to allocate the scarce resources to those items that promise the biggest pay-off for the smallest expenditure of time, energy, and material.

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Number of Campaigns Possible

How many of these possible and desirable campaigns can be successfully maintained at once? This again is an operational estimate, which should be made in terms of the importance and probable size of the campaigns, the facilities available for conducting them, and the capacity of the target audiences to absorb them. Skilled propagandists are always careful not to attempt too much at once. The Russians have maintained their peace campaign for two years, keeping it alive by varying the treatment; for example, petitions, international meetings, charges, counter-charges, and offers. While this campaign has been in progress, it has apparently dominated all Soviet psywar. In the meantime, however, they have developed and concluded a number of minor campaigns; for example, the charge that the UN Forces were using bacteriological warfare. The Soviet practice of concentrating on a few themes or campaigns at a time is, of course, part of the Leninist teaching, which affirms that agitation (communication to the many) should shoot the works on only a few ideas so that the masses may master them completely. The good psywar planner always has up his sleeve some possible and desirable campaigns that he is not using at the moment but will use when the moment is ripe or when the current campaigns have accomplished their objectives. The decisions as to when to taper off on one campaign and when to launch or step up the pace of another are among the most critical he is called upon to make. The following are some of the criteria in terms of which such decisions should be made.

Availability of Tools and Channels

For which of the possible and desirable campaigns are the necessary tools and channels available, and the targets exposed? The question here is, is the psywar operator in a position to deliver a campaign to the target he wants to hit? How complete, for example, is the communication monopoly in the target country? If a campaign requires airplanes, are planes available? If it requires radio, is there a signal into the country, and some evidence that it is being heard? If a campaign requires events (for example, supporting raids, or Point Four funds), is the psywar operator's government in a position to supply those events? If a campaign requires the operator to reach a special group within the target country (for example, policemen or telephone workers), has he a channel by which he can be sure of reaching them? Will there,

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if he uses such and such a channel, be a spillover that will weaken his other campaigns (for example, will trade unionists hear and dislike what he is saying to policemen)?

Most Promising Campaigns

Of the possible and desirable campaigns, which ones are most promising in terms of their likelihood of (a) gaining attention, (b) gaining acceptance, and (c) finding conditions favorable for the desired attitude change or action? Having decided that he can reach the target, the psywar planner must now put together the best intelligence he can get regarding the target with what he knows of the proposed campaign and of his own capabilities, and estimate the chances of making the campaign a success. What has the enemy been telling the target? What does the target population know and think about the topic of the proposed campaign? If the campaign is launched at moment X, is it likely to get a fresh hearing; to interest people by touching some of their needs and wants; to gain the propaganda initiative (for in psychological as in military warfare the advantage lies with attack)? Has the enemy succeeded in building up a resistance to this particular argument or this kind of campaign? Has the psywar operator the tools it will take to gain acceptance for the message? For example, has he a spokesman who will be accepted by the target, and evidence that will be believed? And, finally, is the prognosis favorable for the attitude change he wants to bring about? In view of the present beliefs and attitudes of the target, will the desired change be a small one (ordinarily, the smaller the easier) or a great one? Will the change require a short or a long campaign? (Panic, for example, can be brought about, if at all, in a relatively short time, but habits of cooperation can be instilled only by a sustained effort over a long period. Is the psywar operator in a position to reinforce the desired change with events? Is the desired change merely a matter of canalizing existing attitudes (in which case it may be accomplished easily), or will it require a fundamental reversal of stoutly held beliefs and attitudes? (In the latter case it will be extremely difficult, perhaps too difficult to be worth trying.) Will it be reinforceable by group attitudes, or require deviance from group norms and role patterns? (In which case, again, it will be extremely difficult.) Does the desired response lie within the limits set by the culture of the target audience? Is it inhibited by surveillance?

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Risks

In the case of possible and desirable campaigns, what is there to lose (a) in future credibility, (b) in risk to our friends, and (c) in terms of giving the enemy an opening? These are the crucial negative questions. Credibility is a valuable asset in any propaganda operation and one that is to be bartered away only when there are extremely convincing reasons for thinking that the pay-off will be big. Concretely, the operator must be sure that the advantage to be gained by fooling the enemy will overbalance the loss involved in depriving the audience of grounds for trusting our propaganda in the future. Similarly, if a campaign makes it necessary for agents, friends, or potential friends in the target population to reveal themselves, or exposes them to the risk of retaliatory action by the enemy (imprisonment, confiscation of property, execution), then the planner must think a second or third time about whether it is worth undertaking. The presumption, of course, is always against such a campaign, although here, as with credibility, we must not think, as some current writing on psywar urges us to do, in terms of absolute prohibitions: never misrepresent the truth; never expose a friend to retaliatory action. The most we can say is this: Calculate carefully the probable costs and the probable gains and be mighty sure the latter are big enough to justify the former; if they are, go ahead and do it. This applies equally to the supposed rule of never giving the enemy an opening for his counterpropaganda. If by the time his counterpropaganda can be got under way this country can pick up the blue chips, the psywar operator needn't worry about the counterpropaganda.

The selection of a campaign is rarely so systematic as the preceding questions perhaps make it appear. Yet the questions to which we have directed attention do have to be raised and answered if psywar planning is to make sense. The planner is informed that campaigns A through J enjoy the highest priority in the minds of the nation's policy makers. Of these he knows that all except J will lend themselves to psywar treatment. At the same time he feels that he can maintain no more than four campaigns, say one major and three minor ones, at this time. Somehow, therefore, he must reduce his nine campaigns to four. He eliminates campaign I because the indicated target is not readily exposed to the kind of channels and facilities he has available. He then estimates the remaining campaigns in order of the likelihood of their succeeding. Campaign H he eliminates because it would lose him the credibility of the target audience, which he expects to need in later and more

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important campaigns. Finally he selects campaigns A, B, C, and D as the most promising among the survivors.

The difficulty of this decision, as you will readily see, is that it must be based (a) on intelligence that is always less than a complete picture of the audience, (b) on a body of communication theory that is far from complete, and (c) on a balancing of elements that are not always strictly comparable. The last is especially bothersome. The planner must decide whether the fact that he has better channels and facilities for campaign X does or does not overbalance the fact that the target audience for campaign Y is likely to be more receptive. He must decide whether the somewhat greater ultimate importance of campaign M overbalances the considerably greater likelihood of success in campaign N. He must decide whether success in campaign R is worth losing the trust of the target audience, to which he might later want to direct campaigns S and T.

It is here that the experience and art of the planner tend to come to the fore. When the decision is close he will have to make the same kind of leadership decision that Dwight D. Eisenhower faced on June 4, 1944, when he sat alone on the coast of England with an invasion army ready and a weather forecast that was unpropitious for a seaborne invasion, and had to decide whether to postpone D-Day for a month or risk possible disaster.

DECIDING ON THE PURPOSE

The process of planning psywar is a matter of a progressive sharpening of a plan in terms of given goals and objectives. High-priority national policies tend to have very broad objectives, such as the military defeat of country A or the counteracting of Communist influence the world over. Within such a policy, existing military plans may call for the capture of island B, for example, so that a highly desirable psywar campaign might be aimed at reducing the will to resist of enemy soldiers on island B. Within that campaign, addressed to a subordinate objective, there may well arise a number of objectives subordinate to the subordinate objective. One such objective might be the privatization of enemy soldiers. The psywar operator might try, that is to say, to turn their thoughts to their own hardships and problems, by way of softening them up for attack or invitations to surrender. Or he might try to encourage subversion, and to that end he might try to turn the soldiers against their immediate officers. Late in

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the game, but only late in the game, he would presumably invite them to surrender. Further sharpening occurs as messages bearing upon these objectives are tailored to particular targets within the target. Let us suppose that once the invasion is under way a large group of the enemy is isolated in a strong defensive position. They can't hope to fight out of it, but they can hold up the US advance a long time and cause many casualties. The momentary goal of psywar planning must be to secure the submission of these men, with, of course, minimum losses for this country. But let us suppose further that discipline in the surrounded enemy unit is strict and group morale high. There is reason to think that only the commander has the power to surrender his garrison; at least for the present, then, it will be useless to appeal to the men individually. The message, therefore, must be addressed to the commander, although if this is not successful the psywar operator may have to try to bring about subversion among the men. He assigns a loudspeaker—perhaps a "talking tank"—to speak to the isolated enemy unit. And as he prepares the series of messages for the talking tank, he has in hand a problem that has assumed very sharp outlines indeed. For the objective of the messages he is preparing is now to stimulate target C within the target (the enemy commander) to make response D (surrender of such and such men) for enemy unit E on island B at specific time T.

When we speak of purpose in psywar, therefore, we usually mean the specific objective, that is, the actual response we want from the particular individuals who are to receive a given message or related series of messages. The message, be it noted, cannot be constructed without a clear definition of purpose, and purpose, on this level, is dictated in large part by the peculiarities, situational and/or cultural and/or psychological, of the particular target. And there is further sharpening as regards the medium or media that will carry the message to the target. Thus, operational planning for psywar is a fourfold operation, in which none of the four elements—purpose, target, media, message—is completely master. It may be helpful to look at some of the interrelations of these elements. Let us, for example, consider the matter from the standpoint of purpose.

To begin with, purpose is restricted by certain limits set by the response that may be expected of the target. It would be futile to expect a grass-roots revolution from a people whose culture has taught them only submissiveness, and whose power elite ruthlessly eliminates every potential counterelite as soon as it

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appears. Or the response may be a possible one, but the time may not yet have come for it. Surrender responses can hardly be expected from, for example, a victorious army, even if it is known its individual members are capable of surrendering when the going is tough. For the moment, all the psywar operator can do is plant the seeds of surrender, in anticipation of the day when his country shall have turned the tables on them militarily.

Similarly, purpose is limited by what may be said to a given target in a given message or series of messages. This limitation may be physical and have to do with length (for example, an airborne loudspeaker can hope to get across a sentence but not a paragraph or, for that matter, even a very long sentence), or it may be a limitation on subject matter imposed by policy makers topside. For instance, during World War II the policy restrictions on what might be said about the Japanese Emperor made it impossible to implement any purpose that had to do with destroying the Japanese people's faith in their highest leadership. Or the limitation may have to do with the ability of the target to receive a given kind of message; for example, a primitive people could hardly be expected to respond to complicated ideological conversion propaganda.

Purpose is also limited by the media available for reaching a projected target with a given message. For example, during the last war the inhabitants of certain concentration camps and forced labor groups would often have been ideal targets for psywar with a revolutionary purpose. But often also there was no way to reach those prisoners by mass communications.

Similar intereffects may be observed in connection with the other elements as well. Thus, choice of target is obviously governed by purpose. If the purpose is to foment dissatisfaction with leadership, the psywar message is aimed at those followers who are most likely to be receptive to such material and most likely to respond in the desired way; or to the leaders, with the intention of encouraging them to act in a way that will dissatisfy their followers. Choice of target is likewise governed by the availability of media to reach a given target: the moment may be ripe, according to psywar intelligence, to hit an enemy unit on such and such a hilltop, but if the psywar operator cannot, for whatever reason, get at it with his leaflets and loudspeakers, and leaflets and loudspeakers are all he has, then he must pass this target up in favor of some other one for which the moment is less ripe. Choice of target is restricted also by the possibility of constructing a suitable message to a given target, which is a

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matter of its literacy level, customs, symbolism, and frame of attention.

Each message, in the same way, is put together with a constant eye to the fact that it is an arm of purpose. One of the commonest failings of inexperienced psywar practitioners is to permit themselves to be drawn away from their main purpose, into arguments with the opposition's psywar. Thus, early in World War II some Allied broadcasters boasted gleefully that they had made Goebbels "furious," although if pressed they would have had to admit that their real purpose was not with Goebbels at all and that, as far as real accomplishment was concerned, most of their cleverness had been wasted. But if the message is constructed to fit the purpose, it is also tailored to fit the target. It must gain their attention, must be expressed in symbols they understand, and take advantage of their predispositions. And, finally, it must fit the medium or media to be used. Radio imposes restrictions on a message different from the restrictions imposed by print. A poster or a magazine can carry some messages that would be out of the question in a loudspeaker broadcast. Leaflets ordinarily cannot carry up-to-the-moment news, but radio can.

And as the availability of media influences purpose, target, and message, so do purpose, target, and message influence choice of media. For example, the decision to use medium A rather than B or C should reflect a judgment that A is better adapted to the purpose in hand than B or C. If, for example, the purpose is to persuade a surrounded enemy unit to surrender, loudspeakers or leaflets or both will ordinarily be used, not books, magazines, or motion pictures. And there are, of course, medium choices much more subtle than that, as, for instance, the choices between the explanatory power of a picture or a diagram, the analytical power of straight printed prose, or the emotional and suggestive power of speech, and the reinforcement these can give each other when used in various combinations. Media are chosen, furthermore, with a view to getting the fullest and most economical coverage of the immediate target. An illiterate populace calls for pictures and the spoken media, not print. A submissive populace must be reached, in the main, through channels that lead first of all to an elite. A given group of leaders like any other audience will have a frame of attention that some media will be more likely than others to penetrate. The problem is to find the right channel or right combination of channels. Finally, media are chosen so as most effectively to carry the desired message. As the nature and requirements of the medium affect the way the message is

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constructed, so the intended nature of the message affects the choice of medium. If the message is to be long, it can't be put on a leaflet or spoken over a loudspeaker. If it attempts to explicate a tactical situation, it will probably require a map and therefore have to be in print. The more timely and urgent the message, the more likely it is to be communicated by radio or speaker.

The interrelations the operator has to consider have merely been suggested in the preceding paragraphs. The points to grasp about them are that they are highly complex and yet derived from a single basic idea: the psywar planner must drive a four-horse team, every horse of which must pull its weight. In psywar it cannot be supposed that a message will necessarily be effective with target A because it has worked on target B, or effective via medium C because it has been communicated effectively via medium D. Target E, though ready to explode, is not the right target, for the moment anyhow, unless channel F is available for igniting the explosion. Message G would go best by ground loudspeaker but must be printed because no skilled loudspeaker team is available. Purpose H, though laudable, may be inappropriate, untimely, and even dangerous when viewed in the light of target, message, and media possibilities.

CHOOSING THE TARGET

Purpose, then, derives from objective and objective from policy, but it should also be thought of as inseparable from target. The question that should always be in the back of our minds when making decisions about both purpose and target is this: What process of attitude formation or action within the target society would have to occur in order for us to accomplish the desired objective? This is the crux of the whole process of planning psywar. From his available intelligence, from his basic knowledge of the political and social structure of the target state, the planner must construct the best possible working model of how decisions are made and how change takes place within the given society. If, for example, his objective is to bring about surrenders by enemy troops (as in the previous example), he must decide whether discipline in the enemy army is so tight, and the particular unit of the enemy army so cohesive, that surrender can be accomplished only by the opposing commander. If the target is a whole society, and thus made up primarily of civilians, the psywar officer must

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decide what segment or group of the populace has it in its power to make the desired change, or cause it to be made. In a totalitarian state, for instance, the chances are that only the top elite can do either: a dictator can formulate policy, even on life-and-death matters like peace and war, even if he has only a small part of the population really behind him. In Hitler's Germany, according to the estimate of H. V. Dicks,[2] which is given in detail later in this section, a bare 10 percent of the population were real Nazis, and only about 35 percent were even so much as actively sympathetic with the Nazi cause. The same percentage figure, or even a smaller one, turns up repeatedly in analyses of Soviet satellite states (Gromyko once boasted to a US diplomat that only 6 percent of the population of Romania were supporters of the people's democracy, and that that was enough—in the twofold sense that the Soviet Union neither needed nor desired more extensive popular support). The reason is, of course, that in a totalitarian state it is almost impossible for a counterelite to come into being, and much more nearly impossible for one to come into power. Where the target is a genuine police state, the psywar operator must face clearly the question whether anything at all can be accomplished by psywar addressed to the general population, or even to potential counterelites. He must, that is to say, arrive at a hard-headed calculation as to what groups are in position to receive psywar messages and to do something about it. Where, in the given state, does the power of change lie—not necessarily right now but at least within the foreseeable future? What are the groups whose interests most noticeably diverge from the interests of the party in power? Within leadership itself, what are the interests and divergences that are most likely to lead to change in the desired direction? Where, within the groups that have some power of response and action, can the rewards of a desired change be convincingly presented? There will be found the targets.

Targets may be enemies, friends, or neutrals, according to what kind of psywar is being planned. The purpose may be to make the target population better friends or weaker enemies, or to direct their action in a way advantageous to us.

Targets may be the entire populations of countries; more often they are groups within those populations. In selecting targets within targets, the psywar planner deals with societies that are capable of being "broken down" in several ways. Any society will have its formal and institutional groups, some of which have been mentioned in an earlier section. These are the power groups (for example, the political elite, military officers), the economic-interest groups

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(for example, farmers, air force), and the common-value groups (for example, religious groups), many of which are institutionalized into churches, unions, associations, etc. This is the breakdown most often used in psywar, whose operators have long since learned the value of the most detailed breakdown that can be had. For some purposes, to be sure, it is sufficient to distinguish the elite from the mass, or the farmers from the city people. But psywar has some missions that begin to be feasible only when we have separated out minority religious and ethnic groups and divided up the population in terms of its skills and responsibilities. In a modern war, specially skilled groups such as engineers and technicians may, as we have noted above, prove highly rewarding targets. In Korea, for example, the invading Communists paid special attention to, among others, communications workers, social science teachers, and physicians.

Another important kind of grouping, as we indicated in Chap. 4, is into classificatory and functional groups (for example, farmers as a classification, the National Grange as a functional grouping).

The psywar operator must think of his target population as also organized into a complex system of interpersonal relations. Among these the relation of opinion leaders to the rest of the population is especially important. When a communications specialist studies a community he always asks, "What are the authority points?" by which he means, Where do the people go for leadership in making up their minds on key issues? What newspapers do they trust? More important, what individuals do they seek opinions from? In consolidation psywar especially it is important to identify these opinion leaders; theoretically the primary target of such an operation might well be a single individual, who, once he was convinced or persuaded, would bring the rest of the target over as a matter of course.

The most obvious of the various breakdowns of target audiences that psywar can use is that into local communities, or, in military psywar, into units. Psywar may address a message to a single city that is in the path of an advancing army or a bombing run, or to a single military unit that is defending a desired objective. The population of a local community, of course, has a common interest stemming from the mere fact of living in the same spot; if one of them is bombed the chances are all of them will be bombed; if the local high school it totalitarianized, it means impoverishment of an educational institution to which all of them send their youngsters. A local community can, of course, be broken down into the formal and informal groupings mentioned

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above. It has its power groups, its interest groups, its value groups, and its functional groups. It has its opinion leaders. Any given individual in the community may belong to any number of these groups. Perhaps he belongs to an economic-interest group, to a value group, and to two functional groups, whereas his next-door neighbor's memberships fall into an entirely different pattern. He will have certain persons with whom he usually talks over political problems, and there are identifiable persons or institutions on whom he relies for guidance in making up his mind. For example, one receiver of psywar might be an individual who belongs to no identifiable elite, is a member of the unskilled laborers group, is a staunch Roman Catholic, confines his talking about politics to his place of work and the neighborhood tavern, and depends chiefly on his parish priest and his union newspaper to guide his political decisions.

The fact that communities are so organized is highly important to the psywar operator, since it means that several channels lead to every individual in the target audience. The hypothetical man we have been talking about may be reached first of all through general propaganda directed to the community, then through propaganda directed to the special attention of the laboring group, then through his church group, then through the religious leaders and labor leaders, and perhaps through yet other channels that we have not mentioned. This means, among other things, that propaganda messages sent through these various channels must be planned in recognition of the fact that two messages intended for different groups may well reach the same individual, who if he hears very different things from the same source will quickly learn to distrust it. It also means that there are endless possibilities of reinforcing psywar effect by repeating and timing messages through different media to different though related targets. It means, finally, that a skillful psywar operator can supplement his generalized mass propaganda with specific propaganda addressed to key groups and opinion leaders and thus achieve an effect far beyond that to be expected from a shotgun approach.

In tactical psywar the choice of target may be somewhat simpler than the above example suggests. Military targets, as noted above, are often defined by sheer geographical location. The desired response may be simple and common to all members of the target, as is the case in surrender-mission psywar. There may, that is to say, be no need to take into account groupings and relations within the military unit. But even in tactical psywar to a single unit, such breakdowns as will permit directing messages that will

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exploit tensions and jealousies between officers and men, or between groups which feel themselves unequally treated, or between groups with different ethnic or religious or regional backgrounds often prove useful.

Wise selection of a target for a particular message, then, is always a matter of the operator's coming to an understanding with himself as to what grouping within the audience can and should be reached with it. This group's members will have certain common characteristics, and it is in terms of these that the psywar addressed to it will appeal, and seem important, to all of them. And it will have been selected, in part, because of their common ability to respond, if the psywar is successful, in the way designated by the purpose. Hence in order to be as sure as possible that the psywar will succeed, the psywar operator will try, at the planning stage, to delineate his target clearly and fully.

Careful delineation of the target is more necessary in psywar than in, say, domestic propaganda, because of the target's very remoteness. To take the other extreme, in face-to-face communication the operator can watch every reaction of the target and constantly readjust his aim to it. In communication mediated through newspapers, magazines, or radio in the operator's own country, the sender has numerous opportunities to establish actual contact with his audience, and has, at least in the United States, Britain, and a few other countries, a highly developed system of audience research. The latter's function is precisely that of spanning the gap between the sender and his listeners or readers (which, we repeat, is much narrower than that which confronts the psychological warrior); it tells the editor or program director who are in his audience, what they select from the material he gives them, and what they think of what they select. In psywar, however, such machinery or indeed anything remotely like it is seldom available. The communication is to a foreign culture, to which the communicator is, in many cases, denied access of any kind, and with which he is likely to be less than fully familiar. If the target is an enemy country, every effort is made by its government to keep the psywar communication from reaching the intended recipients to begin with and, in any case, to conceal or even misrepresent the reactions of those who do receive it.

Thus every slightest bit of information about the target is precious to the psywar operator, which is why both knowledge of the target culture and adequate day-by-day intelligence from within the target are indispensable to a sound psywar operation.

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In the course of choosing his target, constructing a message, and selecting media to carry it, the psywar planner will therefore make every effort to piece together a "profile" of his target, or what Linebarger[3] calls a picture of the "propaganda man." Here are some questions the profile must answer: What kind of person is the psywar message going to? Who is the man at the other end of the circuit? What does he want out of the message he listens to? What are his reasons for listening? What are his attitudes on the topic under discussion? What does he believe in? Whom or what does he trust? What in general are his motivations for doing what he does? In what ways do his needs and wishes diverge from the pattern his government has set for him? What symbols are emotionally meaningful and moving to him? What are his group relations? What roles has he learned to play? What is he capable of by way of response? Can he be expected to take action against his leaders or even to develop negative attitudes toward them? (It was the general consensus of informed persons in World War II that the German people could not be expected to develop negative attitudes toward Hitler, or the Japanese against Hirohito.) What response, then, can he be expected to make (for example, suspicion, malingering, complaint, defection, surrender) that will be to the advantage of the communicator? Information like this is, of course, the result of continuous gathering and interpreting of intelligence. The psywar operator will therefore comb the intelligence available to him and make every effort to fill out his picture of his audience, to assess the strengths and weaknesses of his targets, and to discover ways and means of exploiting them.

Here, for example, is a section of the standing directive for psywar against members of the German armed forces, prepared in June 1944 by Richard H. S. Crossman,[4] then deputy chief of the psywar division of SHAEF. Crossman, of course, had had the assistance and advice of General Robert McClure and other key men in Allied psywar. The document is of great interest to us at this point not only because it is an excellent example of sound psywar staff work, but also because it is essentially a delineation of the propaganda or target man. The directive reads:

> Note: Except where specifically stated, the following generalizations apply to the German Army, not to the Air Force or Navy. *(Note: A distinction is made between the targets within the target.)*
>
> 12. *Strong points*
>
> (1) *The Habit of Discipline.* The habit *(Note: "Habit" as clearly a cultural and not situational peculiarity of target.)* of uncritical obedience to authority, rather than any ruth-

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less enforcement of discipline from above, remains the strongest factor in German morale today. This factor may not decrease sharply until the German Army as a whole is broken on the battlefield *(Note: Prediction of future target reaction)*, since the retreats and defensive battles to which the Wehrmacht is now committed automatically place greater reliance on higher authority than offensive campaigns of the 1940 type.

(II) *Comradeship.* The ideal of comradeship has been keenly cultivated in the German Army, particularly since 1933. The German NCO forms a transitional stage between soldier status and officer status, a fact which strengthens this sense of comradeship. It has furthermore been immensely deepened by the Russian campaign. *(Note: Data evidently obtained from current intelligence, not previous knowledge of culture.)*

(III) *Professional Pride.* The average German's conviction that the best life is the soldier's life, plus the social fact that the highest calling in Germany is the soldier's calling, constitutes a great source of strength. *(Note: A further cultural datum.)*

Added to this *(Note: Further drafts on current intelligence)* the German soldier, and often the non-German soldier serving in the Wehrmacht, is convinced:

(a) that he is privileged to be serving in the finest army in the world, permeated with a code of soldierly honor which rules him and his officers alike;

(b) that the Wehrmacht is the embodiment of the highest physical and spiritual attainments of German culture;

(c) that the Wehrmacht is therefore the *nonpolitical* guardian of the future of the German race;

(d) that, as a fighting machine, German "quality" can *probably* succeed in throwing back both Anglo-American and Russian "quantity." *(Note: Emphasis on axioms characteristic of mentality at which psywar messages must be directed are emphasized.)*

(IV) *Material Interests.* The German Army represents, for the reasons stated in subparagr. (III) above, an honored career with considerable material benefits. *(Note: More current intelligence.)* (Pay allowances and especially food are good compared with civilian standards in Germany.) Thousands of officers (especially those of junior and field rank) and tens of thousands of NCO's (particularly in specialist trades) have signed on not simply for the duration, but for periods varying from 7-14 years, or longer, and are fighting not only to preserve the German Army as a war machine, but as a means of livelihood.

(V) *The Bolshevik Bogey.* The guilty fear of Russian vengeance, linked with the Teuton dislike of the Slav and general fear of Bolshevism, has convinced the average German soldier that "anything is better than the defeat in the East." *(Note: Emphasis on guilt feelings, as mechanism relevant to psywar's task, and on a high-priority need of target audience.)*

German propaganda has deliberately enlarged and intensified this fear, in the following ways:

(a) It has largely succeeded in persuading the soldier that the Anglo-Americans are so dominated by the

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Bolshevik Colossus that they would be powerless to save Germany. *(Note: Current intelligence again, with further clarification of propaganda man's attitudes.)*

(b) It has filled the gap created by the absence of specific United Nations policy on Germany with atrocity stories of forced labor in Russia, castration, deportation, etc.

(VI) *The Rewards of Victory in the West.* Learning from Mr. Churchill in 1940, the High Command has deliberately capitalized the threat of invasion from the West. It has:

(a) argued that, if the Anglo-American threat can be frustrated or confined, the German Armies can be switched to the East. This argument has been used to justify the retreats in the East.

(b) argued that a defensive victory in the West will form the basis for the speedy conclusion of a "compromise peace" either with the West or with the East, which would in fact be a German victory. *(Note: Sketching in of domestic propaganda context into which messages will be sent and further delineation of profile are sketched in.)*

(c) exploited the bombing of Germany to persuade the soldier that his only hope of regaining what he has lost lies in a German victory in the West.

(d) succeeded in convincing the German soldier that for these reasons one last tremendous effort must and can be made.

(VII) *Summary*

(a) Taken by and large, it must be accepted that the German High Command has rendered the Army largely immune to the two Psychological Warfare campaigns which proved effective in 1918, i.e., Bolshevist propaganda, leading to soldiers' and workers' councils; and democratic propaganda, leading to a revolt of the civilian under arms against the professional soldier. *(Note: Emphasis is on attitudes sure to be highly resistant to change.)*

We should assume that the German Army in the West will, like von Arnim's Army in Tunisia, fight on *as a whole* until it collapses *as a whole*. *(Note: Emphasis is on difference in attitude between the elite and the rank and file.)* Indeed defeatism is more widespread at the top than at the bottom.

(b) The High Command has succeeded in actually raising fighting morale during the winter. *(Note: More current intelligence.)*

(c) For the reason outlined in subparagr. (I) above, no propaganda directed at the frontline German soldier is likely to be effective unless it sounds and looks more positive and authoritative than his own Army Order forbidding him to listen to it. *(Note: Recognition that special effort is needed to overcome strongly held attitude backed up by group sanctions and leadership.)*

(d) For the reasons outlined in subparagrs. (II) and (III) above, there is little prospect of dividing the German Army *internally*—i.e., setting men against

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officers. *(Note: Emphasis on attitudes likely to resist change altogether.)* Furthermore, no propaganda aiming at inducing the surrender of German troops is likely to succeed unless it meets the fundamental objection that by surrender the individual is letting down his comrades.

13. *Weak Points*

(1) *The Shaken Myth of Invincibility.* The long series of defeats suffered by the Wehrmacht in the Mediterranean and in Russia have shaken—but by no means shattered—the German soldier's faith in the mystic invincibility of German arms which carried his fighting morale up to a high tide of fanaticism in June 1940. *(Note: Emphasis here, and in following sections, is on anxieties of target audience.)* Within this general uneasiness are other specific doubts:

(a) *Doubt about the Führer.* Allied propaganda that disasters such as Stalingrad, Tunisia, the Ukraine battle, and the Crimea were largely due to the prestige policy of hanging on too long to too much, has gone home. Many German soldiers today feel that military operations are being dictated by political and often party considerations. The permeation of the OKW, and of the General Staff with party generals (notably the C. of S. Zeitzler) is largely blamed for this. *(Note: Use of scapegoat mechanism.)*

Note: At present, the average soldier, despite an awareness that he has made serious mistakes, is not inclined to blame Hitler, as the generals and other informed persons already do. *(Note: Implied warning that propaganda attacking Hitler is unlikely to be effective.)* Hitler is still his lucky talisman. Goering is also to some extent shielded. Of the German leaders, Himmler, Goebbels, and Ley are the most unpopular. Generally speaking, "The System" or the "Party bosses" are the commonest scapegoat.

(b) *Doubts about Equipment.* German Army equipment is good and the German soldier knows it. But his battle experience since 1941 has given him painful proof that, in some respects at least, Allied equipment is not only more plentiful, but better. (Allied MT in Africa, Russian PAK, Russian medium tanks in the East and Allied fighter planes on all fronts are examples.) *(Note: Anxiety.)*

The present "*Wunderwaffe*" vogue is in part a wishful-thinking reaction to this.

(c) *Doubts about the News.* Despite intense efforts by the High Command, it has not succeeded in making the German soldier accept unquestioningly its interpretation of events. Most German soldiers, when they get the opportunity, read or listen to Anglo-American propaganda and try to find a truth half-way between their own communiques and ours. They assume that "everything is propaganda" and that they, as intelligent people, can read between the lines. Without knowing it, they are of course steeped in Nazi propaganda. They regard as "propaganda lies" such facts as that Germany invaded Poland, or that England has some highly developed social services. They have the useful faculty of forgetting any facts inconvenient to their superiors, and believing they were invented by Anglo-American propaganda. Their outlook is formed,

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however, not by the direct output of the Propaganda Ministry, but by the educational and propaganda activities of the Wehrmacht. Nevertheless they are open to any propaganda which does not sound or read like "propaganda," and does not offend their sense of "soldierly honor." Unconsciously still, but actively, the German soldier craves for an excuse to stop the useless slaughter which leaves his honor as a German soldier unscathed, and puts the blame on someone or something outside the Wehrmacht. *(Note: Emphasis on search for rationalization and for a new scapegoat.)* He needs, in brief: (I) facts which seem to him to be objective showing that, despite the courage of the Wehrmacht, someone at home has lost the war for Germany; (II) a picture of the future which portrays death and destruction for "the betrayers of Germany" and survival for the German people.

Evidence for the above analysis is provided by the growing success of: (a) Free German Committee broadcasts from Moscow, headed by General Seydlitz, and (b) Radio Calais. Both these transmissions seem to assume an analysis of German fighting morale similar to that above.

(d) *Doubts about the Luftwaffe.* Moreover, the *Air War* brings with it a cause of friction between the Air Force and the Army. German soldiers are beginning to talk like many British soldiers in 1940. This friction, and the resulting blame on "the authorities" is a real if minor chink in German fighting morale. *(Note: Emphasis on potential dissension among German armed forces as psywar vulnerability.)*

All these factors are important, in that they provide the soldier with scapegoats for his decline in fortune, and when things go wrong the German's natural reaction is: "I have been betrayed."

(II) *Manpower.* This is perhaps the main *operational* worry of the German soldier. He is disturbed by the enormous losses in men and material which he knows the battles in Russia have cost the Wehrmacht. *(Note: More anxieties.)* This uneasiness is heightened by the Allied propaganda barrage on this theme, contrasted with the silence of his own authorities, a silence all the more significant when it persists even under the new OKW policy of simulating complete frankness on operational matters. This general manpower worry breaks down into other specific ones:

(a) The worry that, because of manpower troubles, the ranks of the Wehrmacht are being increasingly filled with foreigners of some twenty nationalities, and that the quality of the army is therefore in danger of "pollution."

(b) The worry that, with almost every one of its field divisions committed already to actual or potential battle-fields, the German Army has no effective central reserve to sustain it.

Both (a) and (b) above apply with particular force to the target of this paper--the German forces in the West. *(Note: Sharpening of target.)* These troops have in their own formations large numbers

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of foreigners; and most of these divisions have had proof, by their own experience of being switched from West to East and back, that no uncommitted central reserve exists. The great volume of German counterpropaganda on this point is further evidence of its importance.

(III) *A War Gone Wrong.* In building up the picture of the chivalrous Wehrmacht in deadly battle against Bolshevism, the High Command inevitably raises in the German soldier's mind the question why Germany is fighting Britain and America, especially since Hitler denounced in *Mein Kampf* the fatal mistake of the two-front war. The High Command seeks to answer this question by denouncing Anglo-American impotence and arguing that the Jews of Wall Street and the City of London are in conspiracy with the Kremlin. But this argument does not quell a deep uneasiness.

There is also a feeling in the German soldier's mind that the defensive battles which he is now forced to fight are not the battles for which he was trained, nor the battles for which his equipment was designed. There is evidence that the OKW had great trouble, during 1943, in converting officers and men to the technique of the defensive battle which their previous training had largely neglected.

The fear of isolation, a feature of what the Germans used to ridicule as "Maginot-mindedness," is likely to be at its strongest among coastal formations in the West. They are particularly liable to the anxiety lest they be sacrificed as "human landmines." *(Note: Further sharpening of the target.)*

(IV) *Loss of Honor.* An increasing number of soldiers are aware of, and uncomfortable about:

(a) atrocities, especially in Russia. They naturally want to push the blame onto the SS, or simply "those in authority."

(b) the hostility of the occupied territories, including "Nordic" countries like Norway. The German wants to be liked, and the German soldier is puzzled why, despite the correctness of the Wehrmacht, he is so coldly received. He wants to have an explanation which blames someone outside the Army for this failure of the "New Order." *(Note: More emphasis on scapegoat mechanism.)*

(V) *Respect for Western Powers.* The German has a sense of inferiority to both Britain and America. *(Note: More cultural data.)* Many Nazis, for instance, regard National Socialism as the method of making Germany a ruling race "Like the British." The German feelings for Britain are a confused mixture of envy, respect, and contempt for the old-fashioned. Their feeling for America is different, since they do not feel toward it a racial unity like Britain or Germany, and are suspicious of its "capitalist imperialism." They profoundly respect its riches, production capacity and "smartness," and regard it as the continent of unlimited possibilities.

Intensive propaganda has failed to modify these traditional feelings. *(Note: More current intelligence.) In particular, nearly all German soldiers are confident that*

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they will be treated well as prisoners of war and hope for (if they do not expect) an Anglo-American occupation if the worst comes to the worst. Furthermore, they are feverishly anxious for Anglo-American appreciation of "the chivalry" of the Wehrmacht.

(VI) *The Shadow of the Two-Front War.* It is improbable that German fighting morale in the West will be seriously undermined before a successful Anglo-American landing, provided there is no great German disaster in the East. But the moment we can announce a decisive breakthrough will be a moment of profound psychological crisis, greater even than the shock of Mussolini's collapse last year.

Meanwhile, the advance of the Russian troops *into Europe* must reduce the persuasiveness of the argument that Hitler is deliberately yielding space in the East to ensure victory in the West. Gradually the German soldier begins to ask whether Hitler's strategy is not precisely what United Nations strategy desires, and whether the Second Front is not having its effects even before it starts.

The Allied psywar officers were able also to make use of a penetrating analysis of German political attitudes, made on the basis of POW interviews and related sources by the British psychiatrist H. V. Dicks.[2] This analysis dealt with German males of military age, but from it the Allied officers could make a fairly confident extrapolation to the older people and to the female population. Here is Dicks's breakdown, as revised and developed by the authors of this volume:

Hard-core Nazis (about 10 percent of the population of this age group)

- Idealistic zealots—the Rudolf Hesses and Alfred Rosenbergs of the Party
- Party toughs—the gangster types such as Julius Streicher and Robert Ley, devoted more to the excitement of gangster activities than to Party ideas
- Concealed fanatics—the Heinrich Himmlers, who found in Nazi ideas and brutalities a release for their own private frustrations and fantasies

Modified Nazis (about 25 percent)

- Pseudo doubters—who take the authoritarian pattern for granted, defend the regime as a whole, but condemn certain acts such as atrocities and anti-Semitism
- Idealists—the Baldur von Schirachs of Germany, who thought of Hitler as a glorious leader, and of Naziism as a glorious vision which mortal men had not quite been able to carry out
- Cynics—those who have profited by association with Naziism, and thus feel they must sink or swim with it.

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but are likely to become renegades when they see the prospects are hopeless

The Unpoliticals (about 40 percent)
- Rural people—including most of the rural population of Germany, who were concerned with their own land and living
- Village artisans—the old-world German, sticking to his work, largely unconcerned with politics
- Minor officials—professional public servants, willing to work for any regime, playing it safe with the Nazis
- Professional soldiers—who shared the concern of the minor officials for job and pension, and in many cases showed a far deeper loyalty to the Wehrmacht than to the Nazi state

Passive Anti-Nazis (about 15 percent)
- Disillusioned idealists—attracted at first by the fine words and sentiments of the Nazis, later repelled by the violence, broken pledges, and losses
- The middle-aged—who wanted peace and security more than anything else, and had turned hopefully to the Nazis after the difficulties of the Weimar Republic, but had found only unrest and war
- The very young—who had missed the excitement of the first Nazi years, and had found Hitler Youth monotonous rather than romantic
- The opportunists—who had accepted Naziism out of career-making motives, then found themselves in danger of losing all status, and acted thereafter out of self-interest and caste-loyalty

Active Anti-Nazis (about 10 percent)
- Political Anti-Nazis—ranging from the National Conservatives to the Communists
- Religious Anti-Nazis—some Roman Catholics and Evangelicals
- Individuals—who for reason of family background, intellectual training, or foreign experience, could not accept the tenets or policies of the Nazis

On the basis of these and other analyses, the Allied psywar campaigns could be directed with some confidence at specific targets within the target (that is, the Reich). As the war drew to an end, the picture of the German publics was constantly revised on the basis of changing intelligence and disillusionment, political

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apathy, weariness, and fear on the part of the people at home began to loom ever larger in the target sights of the psywar officers. The Wehrmacht began to display the characteristic of most modern armies, that is, the lack of training for and inability to adjust to defeat. Thus a decline in morale presented better and better targets for psywar, and in each group the momentum of the decline could be accelerated by appropriate themes, themes to convince the modified Nazis that they were supporting a lost cause, themes appealing to the unpoliticals' wish for renewed security and order, themes to convince the passive anti-Nazis that they had been betrayed, to give the active anti-Nazis hope and an outlet, to encourage in these ways the desired responses.

A study of Communist personality types in Czechoslovakia, made in 1948 by an anthropologist, is another illustration of the kind of target analysis that the practitioner of psywar will find useful. It was estimated that the active Communist groups represented less than 10 percent of the total Czech and Slovak adult population. In general the Communists had apparently joined the Party for reasons linked with their personal needs for security, status, and emotional satisfactions. Their unwillingness to merge themselves into the population as a whole and to identify themselves with their fellow human beings was impressive. They wanted not merely approval but adulation. It appeared that most of them disliked the so-called capitalist class, as represented to them by the Communists, only somewhat more than they did the Russians themselves. They were said to have had less self-confidence than most non-Communist Czechs and hence would find it easier to adjust to a Communist society in which they would have status than to a competitive one in which there would be little interest in them as individuals.

Most of them got a good deal of satisfaction out of their identification with the Party and, through it, with Russia and Communists all over the world. They felt, as Communists, a sense of importance, an identification with a numerically large group, a feeling of riding the waves of human destiny, and of having a body of answers as to what is wrong with the world.

The Czech Communists inevitably became strongly hostile to the United States. Because the Communists could enjoy a feeling of well-being only so long as their hopes of Communist world domination were going smoothly, the constant frustration of these hopes brought about by US foreign policy, Marshall Plan, and military actions induced powerful resentment against the cause of these frustrations. This resentment was expressed in unceasing exaggeration of American faults and belittling of American virtues.

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The Communists identified themselves so completely with totalitarian aims that every hindrance to the "legitimate aspirations of progressive mankind" became for them a personal humiliation.

Even within the 10 percent of the population who were Communists, five distinct groups could be identified. These were:

The "fanatics," the ultra-loyal core.

The "idealists," who remained loyal despite misgivings, hoping that Communism would build a better world.

The "pan-Slavists," who tended to subordinate Party policy to pan-Slavic solidarity.

The "economists," who had little interest in Communist ideology and little patience with the class hostilities encouraged by Communist leadership, but were loyal because they believed Communism could raise the general living standard.

The "intellectuals," who were willing to serve as propagandists because of the importance it gave them.

Target delineation may, of course, be carried much farther than this. Given adequate intelligence, it would be perfectly possible to delineate the pertinent characteristics of Christians in North Korea, or of a specific union of communications workers, or of the students at a given university. Let us conclude here with one caution: the intended target audience for any given psywar message is rarely coterminous with the actual audience for that message. Psywar channels are rarely so sharp and well defined that they will cut off at the borders of the intended target. A radio signal will not pick out the receivers owned by Christians in North Korea. Leaflets cannot be made to fall only on the homes of trade unionists. A loudspeaker broadcasting to an isolated enemy unit will not be heard only by the commander of that unit; his men will hear it too. Indeed, only in person-to-person communication can one be fairly sure of the limits of his audience, and even then he cannot control the secondary audience. Thus the psywar planner needs to consider the extra audiences listening or looking over the shoulders of his intended audience. Will his message contradict what other messages have told this "extra" audience? Will it expose his intended audience to suspicion or risk? On the other hand, can he so design the message that the extra audience will be a "bonus" audience; that is, can he take advantage of the curiosity of the eavesdroppers to plant some useful facts and ideas?

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SELECTING THE CHANNEL

The layman tends to think of psywar in terms of short-wave radio, or of radio and leaflets. Actually, of course, any channel by which man communicates to man may be a medium for psywar. The number of media available to a psywar planning officer are likely to be limited as much by his ingenuity as by his facilities.

Three Neglected Channels

Three kinds of channels are especially likely to be neglected by the psywar operator who thinks of channels mostly as mass-media channels. One of these is the face-to-face channel. The Communists have developed to a very high point the technique of the mass meeting (for example, peace congresses) with vast preparations, parades of distinguished men and women from many lands, and a dramatic backdrop of publicity. They have also used face-to-face methods extensively in their consolidation operations within their satellite states. By far the most numerous of all psywar employees of the Communist states is the agitator, who works individually as an evangelist for the cause, as an organizer, and as a channel for information both to and from Party headquarters. In a state like North Korea before the current war hardly a person got through a day without going to at least one political meeting, which might have been in his place of business, his trade or professional association, his school, or his neighborhood. The variety of meetings was almost endless. There were lectures, readings, discussions of current events, confessionals, political dramas, and parades. The largest parade in the history of Seoul was one organized by the occupying Communists in September 1950 as a final attempt to boost morale in the face of the Inchon invasion. The parade was supposed to celebrate the fact that the invaders had been thrown back into the sea, although a few days later the US Marines came in over the route of the parade. So far we have been speaking about face-to-face psywar in Communist-controlled territory. When Communist psywar is operating in countries that are still free, there are sharp limits on the number of meetings and parades that can be held, so that more emphasis goes on other face-to-face methods. Their covert agents, for example, over and above collecting information to send back from the place where they are stationed, plant rumors, make contact with dissident elements in the target population, and help plan and support subversion. Whether, or on what scale, the United States is using covert

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agents abroad in this way, we shall probably not know until many years hence.

Another kind of psywar channel sometimes neglected is the use of events to communicate a message. We have already said that events have symbolic meaning beyond the immediate frame of reference, and it is apparent that military commanders and statesmen alike should think of the implications of their actions before they freeze their plans. But the psywar planner has it within his power to plan and use events with this purpose in mind. For example, no one would maintain that the success of the German blitz required, speaking in physical terms, the large-scale use of divebombers that accompanied it. Rather, they were intended to spread panic and disorganize resistance, and did serve admirably as a psywar weapon.

In South Korea at the time when large portions of it were occupied by the invading Communists, the appearance of an American plane in the sky, even at the low ebb of UN fortunes, was regarded by the South Korean people as a message of hope and encouragement from us, urging them to continue resistance. So, similarly, a bombing raid, an artillery barrage, a shipment of food to a neutral country, or the appointment of a certain person to a position of importance may be used as part of a well-conceived campaign of psywar and may serve to reinforce the part of the campaign that moves through mass-media channels.

A third kind of psywar channel often used during World War II was "gimmicks"—small articles that symbolize or carry with them a psywar message. For example, small bars of soap, tea bags, false ration cards, counterfeit money, and other useful items were dropped over occupied Europe, usually with wrappers carrying a printed message. A less formal version of the same technique was put into effect voluntarily and spontaneously by some of the Berlin airlift pilots, who often dropped small bags of candy where they would be picked up by German children. Gimmicks may either serve as a bait to get people to read or think about a psywar message or be a message themselves. They may arouse an emotional state or a series of memories that even the most skillful words could not be counted on to evoke. The actual effectiveness of gimmick operations is not well known as yet, and in the absence of good research evaluation the psywar planner will do well to pick his gimmicks carefully and think twice about where they are to be used. They are expensive, relatively slow, and are capable of backfiring if poorly adapted to the target, as, say, luxury items of dress would do if dropped on a population whose

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food supply was near exhaustion. But they offer a real challenge to the planner's imagination and ingenuity.

The mass media, for psywar purposes, may usefully be broken down into three distinct groupings or categories: We may think of motion pictures, books, magazines, pamphlets, etc., as slow media, of radio and loudspeakers as fast media, and of leaflets, posters and newssheets, and newspapers and news operations as in the middle category, neither slow nor fast. News evidently requires the fastest media available to reach the target; if radio and loudspeaker are not available. newspapers or leaflets are at least more satisfactory for the purpose than books or pamphlets. Sometimes, in other words, the character of the material to be communicated clearly dictates the category the operator must use. However, other considerations than speed enter into his choice. For example, is it possible to get news in a satisfactory form into the newspapers of a target country? If not, is it practicable to drop newspapers or news leaflets on the target population? What kind of defense has the target country against news broadcasts beamed in its direction? What special advantages does this or that medium offer as a carrier for this message? Studies by some investigators suggest, for example, that auditory media more easily arouse emotionally held attitudes, whereas printed media work better in the case of difficult material because the reader can set his own pace and repeat at will. This illustrates the kind of questions the psywar planner must answer in choosing his medium.

The following pages are given over to a few notes on defenses that may be erected against each of the media, the strength and weakness of each as psywar channels, and the chief uses of each in psywar.

Fast Media

Radio. (a) Defenses. The Communist countries have taken most of the actions against psywar radio (this country's and that of its Allies) that can be taken. They have confiscated radios. They have sealed radio receivers to the wave length of a Communist station or restricted radio listening to loudspeakers that can be fed only from a central and controlled source. They have decreed punishment for listening to the enemy (that is, capitalist-imperialist) radio. And they have struck at the enemy signal itself by jamming, that is, by interfering with it so that it becomes unintelligible. Russia is thought to have more than 100 transmitters used for jamming.

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(b) Strengths and Weaknesses. Despite the fact that such defenses can be set up against radio, it remains the quickest and most dependable way to get messages into any target country where there are receivers. It can jump border controls and iron curtains. It does not require mediation between communicator and receiver by any third party (for example, the man who drops leaflets from a plane, the man who tacks up posters, the secondary communicator who reads a leaflet aloud to illiterates). It is the swiftest of all media. Because of its speed, and because of the entertainment it furnishes at low cost, it is vastly popular with a wide variety of audiences, and psywar by radio can thus hope for access to many kinds of homes. As a matter of fact, one of radio's great strengths as a psywar medium is that it combines wide coverage and great speed. On the other hand, and for the same reason, it is not always an effective medium for reaching a select audience. It does not let the listener set his own pace, or stop to reread difficult material, or stop to think; it does not, therefore, lend itself to difficult or technical material, material that calls for reflection on the part of the recipient, or even material that depends upon accurate reception of names or statistics. The human voice, to be sure, gives a personal quality to the messages broadcast and lends itself to persuasion. Even so, a good part of radio listening is undoubtedly done at a relatively low level of attention. That is why American commercials use the formula of shock and repetition as they do.

(c) Uses. Radio has seldom been used in tactical psywar because the target audiences do not, except, for example, in the siege of a fortress city, have receivers. Along with leaflets, however, it has been the chief channel for strategic psywar. It has been used to good effect in consolidation operations and, as the development of the VOA illustrates, it is one of the main channels for political psywar. In actual psywar practice it is for the most part a news and news commentary medium. In the Far East theater, more than half of psywar radio time has been devoted to news, the usual formula being just enough entertainment to bait the hook, a relatively small amount of persuasive material, and the remainder news and other information important to the target audience. Psywar radio is therefore mostly "talk" radio. The more rigorous the controls on radio listening in the target country, the more the broadcasts must be in short segments, often repeated, so that listeners who are able to use the radio for only a short time will still be able to get the essential message.

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Loudspeakers. (a) Defenses. Defenses against loudspeakers are counternoise or attack at the source, that is, shooting down the airplane, blasting the tank, or otherwise putting the loudspeaker's carrier out of action.

(b) Strengths and Weaknesses. One strength of loudspeaker operations is obviously that defense against them is difficult. They have, moreover, the advantage of speed and immediacy, and that of being able to select a specific target and talk to it, which cannot be done by radio. But this strength is, from another point of view, a weakness. The coverage of loudspeakers is usually restricted to a radius of somewhere between a half mile and a mile. Where speakers are used in tactical psywar, moreover, the teams operating them must cope with all the dangers, inconveniences, and distractions that naturally arise in a combat zone, and the messages, besides being directed at men who have their hands full, can often hardly be heard over the noise of the battlefield. Loudspeakers, like radio, have the advantages that attach to communication via the human voice but even less than radio can count on accuracy of reception.

(c) Uses. Loudspeakers are chiefly useful in tactical situations where the target is specified and what is required is a timely message tailored to its peculiarities. An example of this would be psywar addressed to an isolated enemy unit in the hope of persuading it to surrender without further casualties. Another example would be directions broadcast to civilians from a "talking plane" in the hope of keeping them out of the way of advancing troops. In consolidation operations speakers are usually mounted on trucks and have proved extremely useful. Loudspeaker messages must be brief, simple, and often repeated. The greater the distractions against which they must compete, the more important this quality of the message.

Medium-speed Media

Leaflets. (a) Defenses. The chief defense against leaflets dropped from an airplane or delivered by artillery is to establish a penalty for picking them up and/or reading them. The defender may also attack the point of dissemination, that is, the airplane or the battery.

(b) Strengths and Weaknesses. Leaflets are usually small, the size of a page in the average book, or even smaller. This makes them relatively easy to conceal, and at the same time enables distribution in great quantities (in Korea, upward of 100

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million per month). The small size, of course, restricts the amount of copy and supplementary maps, pictures, and diagrams they can carry. Leaflets, unlike radio and speaker broadcasts, can be retained and reread, studied, passed about, etc. For example, a large number of Communist troops who surrendered in Korea were carrying surrender-pass leaflets. Since, however, leaflets must be designed, printed, packaged, and delivered, they are much slower than radio and consequently not an effective medium for news except in situations where the recipients have no alternative source. In combat psywar, for example, leaflets with brief news summaries are fairly common. In general, leaflets are less useful against targets in which there is a high incidence of illiteracy, unless the message can be embodied in readily intelligible graphics.

(c) Uses. Leaflets are used mainly in tactical and strategic operations. They lend themselves much better than radio to tactical psywar because receivers are seldom available to combat troops, and in strategic psywar they offer the easiest means of communicating messages to regions where radios are scarce. They are restricted, however, to places where US airplanes can fly or US artillery can fire and therefore are normally unusable in political psywar. They are little used (except as handouts) in consolidation. Psywar operators in the past have employed them primarily for persuasive messages aimed at submission, subversion, privatization, or panic and capable of being expressed in a few words plus a drawing, photograph, or map.

Newspapers and Other News Operations. (a) Defenses. Censorship and control are the commonest defenses against enemy news. For example, the Communist countries have their own wire news service, Tass, which feeds their newspapers and is itself under constant surveillance by their censoring apparatus. The defense against newspapers or newssheets dropped on enemy territory is the same as that against leaflets, that is, punishment for picking them up and or reading them.

(b) Strengths and Weaknesses. Newspapers are slower than radio but have, so to speak, higher specific gravity. If the psywar operator can get his news into the customary news channels of the target country, so that it appears there without notable distortion, his messages can often get through free of some of the stigma that attaches to propaganda. In many countries, moreover, printed news has a certain prestige that radio news still lacks. Printed news can be effectively combined with illustrations and with entertainment (for example, cartoons), and can

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be read at the reader's own pace, reread if necessary, and filed away.

(c) Uses. Use and control of the news media is of course one of the basic procedures of consolidation psywar. The political psywar operator tries especially to get his news into the wire services and papers of target countries. This is next to impossible if America is at war with the target country, but in this case newspapers are sometimes printed in the target language and dropped from airplanes or otherwise smuggled in. Such publications are, of course, harder to deliver than news leaflets or radio news, although it was felt in World War II that German-language newspapers distributed by the Allies were quite effective. One variety of this technique is to print "black" newspapers, deliberately tear them up, and leave fragments around where the target population is likely to see and read them. A surprising amount of communication is sometimes accomplished by this method.

Posters and Newssheets. (a) Defenses. The defense against posters and newssheets is to police the bulletin boards and walls on which they can be posted. The rules and understandings of international relations for the most part discourage psywar use of this medium except in Allied countries, where the operators can count on cooperation from the authorities. In territory being consolidated, the chief defense against the consolidating power's posters is to deface them.

(b) Strengths and Weaknesses. Posters have the advantage of providing an ample space for display. They can carry illustrations and often present themselves very dramatically to the viewers. On the other hand they get rather brief reading and usually therefore must carry quite brief copy.

Even the newssheet type of poster must ordinarily be in large type, so as to be read by a number of people at the same time, and its news content is therefore scanty. On the other hand each poster can cover, as compared to a leaflet, a very large number of readers. Often, moreover, there is an advantage in encouraging the kind of discussion and group feeling that occurs among a cluster of persons reading the same poster.

(c) Uses. Posters are restricted mostly to consolidation operations and political operations in very friendly countries. The Russian Communists especially have used them with great effectiveness in their own and satellite territory. One of their favorite techniques is to present a great bank of identical posters, so that the passer-by is presented a dramatic invitation to read.

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Slow Media

Books, Magazines, Pamphlets. (a) Defenses. These media, for the most part, must pass through border controls and through commercial distribution systems. Thus a target country defends itself against them by controlling what passes the border and by owning or controlling the means of distribution. For example, no American books get into the Soviet Union except those that the Russians feel will not damage their own cause—for the most part, technical books and left-wing fiction. American magazines that reach the Soviet Union are similarly restricted.

(b) Strengths and Weaknesses. The slower media can, of course, treat their subject matter more fully than other types of printed matter. Their appeal is often to the intellectuals and idea men of a target. Their influence, therefore, is normally exerted over the long term; for example, Marx, Lenin, and the Communist Manifesto have operated as psywar in slow printed form for many years and continue to be effective. On the other hand it is easy to control the distribution of these media, and their use is restricted in any case by the literacy and educational level of the target population, as also by the fact that they cannot be absorbed in brief intervals as, for example, can radio and leaflets. One of their great advantages, especially evident in the case of magazines, is that color and illustration may be used, and fast color printing has recently made possible a new and highly promising printed medium, namely, cartoon books, which both the major contestants in the cold war have printed and distributed on a large scale. This gives psywar at least one slow printed medium that can be made to appeal to the lower educational groups and to the young, rather than to the educated and grownups alone. Not the least of its advantages is that it can be mass-produced and therefore costs relatively little.

(c) Uses. The slower printed media are used chiefly in political and consolidation operations. There is, however, a certain input of books into countries at war, and there have been several cases of clandestine distribution of cartoon books during 1950-1952.

Motion Pictures. (a) Defenses. Any target country can control the exhibition of motion pictures within its frontiers merely by restricting entry and requiring permits for the use of projectors. When the Communists took over North Korea, for example, they eliminated the showing of all motion pictures that originated in capitalist countries. In certain other controlled areas they

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have kept out all American films except those they regarded as reflecting badly on American civilization.

(b) Strengths and Weaknesses. Motion pictures have the advantage of great popularity with their audiences. They can reproduce an event or scene with lifelike fidelity, explaining a process or action via the simultaneous use of words, pictures, and movement. They are ordinarily shown to groups, and therefore have the power to arouse crowd reactions and stimulate discussion. On the other hand, as noted above, they are exceedingly easy to control and therefore lend themselves almost exclusively to friendly psywar operations.

(c) Uses. Motion pictures as psywar tools are limited almost entirely to political and consolidation operations. There is very little likelihood that one of our pictures could penetrate the Iron Curtain, for example, unless the Communists believed that its exhibition would be to their advantage.

Media Questions

The planner typically asks a certain group of questions in selecting the media for his campaign. Among these are:

Which media are prominent in the target audience's focus of attention? The basic question is, Where do the people in the target audience go for their information and guidance on the subject matter with which the psywar message is to deal? In the absence of a full knowledge about this, the psywar planner can make useful deductions from statistics on literacy, newspaper circulation and distribution of radio receivers, reading and listening patterns, and, if the target covers up all these facts, the way its own propagandists use communication media for their own purposes.

To which of these media does the United States have access? Pravda is an excellent channel to the Russian people, but Americans haven't much chance of using it. It would doubtless be effective to drop leaflets on such and such a Russian province, but to send American airplanes over the Soviet Union would, within the present pattern of international practices, be regarded as a belligerent act. There may be relatively few short-wave radios in that same Russian province, but there are some, and Americans do have access to radio.

Which of the possible media are most suitable to the purpose and the message? A cartoon book would not likely be suitable for a dignified message signed by the Supreme Commander. A leaflet would furnish too little space for a refutation of Marxist doc-

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trine; if the latter is the purpose in hand, what is indicated is a book. Explanation of a complicated process will probably require print, not radio. An announcement for which time is of the essence will usually require radio or loudspeaker.

Which media can be used with least danger to friends within the target country? Friends inside the country are as anxious to receive the psywar operator's communications as he is to send them. How can he minimize the risk they run in receiving his messages? Can he, for example, by dropping leaflets at night, make it easy for friends to pick them up unobserved? Can he make radio safer for them to listen to by repeating short segments of program again and again? In what situations should he use covert agents to make contacts with friends?

How can the United States use media so as to reach the largest percentage of the target? Coverage is only one consideration here, since secondary communication is, if anything, more important. In any tactical or strategic psywar except loudspeaker operations, the psywar operator is likely to reach only a tiny fraction of the target. Thus the question arises, how can America get its listeners or readers to pass the message on to others? It is known, for example, that the few anti-Communists who were able to retain radios in occupied Seoul formed little circles of known friends who acted as chains for relaying the news from Allied broadcasts around the city. In every society there are patterns by which such information circulates. The problem is to learn about and then stimulate those circulatory patterns—organizations, informal groupings, republication, rumor, gossip, etc.—and thus multiply the audience.

This brings us again to mention organizations, which are certainly one of the powerful media of psywar, although many people are not in the habit of thinking of them as such at all. It is the Russians, above all, who have shown Americans the importance of organizations in changing attitudes and affecting the exercise of power. Indeed, you can hardly think of a Russian campaign in which organizations have not played a significant part: the study groups in which intellectual converts are sought; the Party, which rewards and reinforces the converts; the unions, educational organizations, and social improvement groups into which Party members try to infiltrate in target countries; the political fronts, through which the Party works in trying to take over power; the mass organizations that regiment the life and thought of a people when the Communists have taken over. Organizations are useful psywar media to the Russians, and can

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be to Americans, because (a) they will discuss and pass around any information planted in them, even by a single one of their members, (b) they can enforce conformity on their members, (c) they can reinforce the hesitant attitudes of their members, and (d) once convinced and won over, they have the power and numbers to act. In fact, it has been said that a map of the organizations of a target country is more important for propaganda purposes than any other single map intelligence can possibly obtain for psywar operators. Be that as it may, when the psywar operator chooses his media, he should always ask, how can I plant this message in the organizations that can do something about it?

DEVISING THE MESSAGE

The most important moment in psywar is the moment when the message is turned loose to seek its target. We have already spoken of that peculiar but characteristic quality of communication that divorces a message from the communicator the moment he has spoken the words or written them on paper. Thereafter he can do no more about the message because everything that happens will have to happen between the message and its recipients. Thus all psywar decisions—the specifying of purpose, selection of target, choice of channel, timing and relation of one transmission to others, and, of course, the devising of the message itself—lead up to the crucial second at which the message is turned loose.

Let us recall now what it is we expect of that message when we let it go. A message is expected to (a) attract the attention of the target we have specified, (b) get its meaning across to that target in about the way we understand its meaning, and (c) start a response in that target in the direction we want it to move in.

A message designed to accomplish these things may be words, spoken or printed. It may be pictorial—a drawing, a photograph, a chart, or lights and shadows on a screen. It may be an event. It may be nonverbal sound, such as the Chinese bugle calls early in the Korean war or the roars of the wild animals that some ancient people used to take along to battle—a primitive but sometimes highly effective kind of psywar. It may be any combination of these. But whatever it is—whether a leaflet, a shout, a broadcast, a book, a motion picture, a plane overhead, an army maneuvering on the border, or a bugle call—

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it must still be so devised as to go out by itself and accomplish the three tasks we have named.

For example, here is a Communist leaflet dropped on American troops in Korea. It offers you a chance to look at a psywar message through the eyes of its target rather than its source. How effective do you think this leaflet would have been? How could it have been made more effective? Is there anything in the copy that does not sound like common American idiom? If so, does that detract from the potential effectiveness?

DO YOU NOT MISS YOUR PARENTS, WIVES AND CHILDREN AT HOME?

Surely you have aged mothers at home who spend their days and nights weeping and sighing for you, and dear wives who fondle the youngsters crying for their absent fathers!

To those dear ones awaiting your letters and your homecoming, a news informing of your dog's death must prove not only a shock but also an arrow of keen pang.

What an unworthy death it is that you should be sacrificed in a battlefield that has no personal interest whatsoever for you and in a war that has been staged by the Wall Street warmongers!

For what infernal cause are you wandering in this valley of death, when you have your flowering youth shining before you in all the ray of hope?

Cast aside all anxieties! Do not hesitate to surrender to the People's Army!

You will then be able to meet again your comrades who have come before you, and soon return to your sweet home.

Wave this handbill high in the air and come over to us! That is the only way of saving your precious lives and of enabling you to return to your families.

The Korean People's Army never shoot at those who surrender. Come over to us in full confidence!

Symbols

And let us remind ourselves of one other feature of a message. Whatever it accomplishes, it must do by means of symbols. We have said in Chap. 2 something about the symbolic nature of psywar, but let us expand this statement a bit here and apply it more directly to the preparation of a message. The making of a message really involves a series of steps in using shorthand. The pictures in our minds are shorthand for the world of reality around us. For example, we have in our minds the symbol "mountain," which is shorthand for all the mountains we have ever seen or heard about. This symbol is very useful to us because it makes the world of experience and imagination both maneuverable and systematic. To make this world of experience transferable between indiv. uals we develop the word mountain, which stands

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for the picture of mountain we have in our heads. As we call the picture a "symbol," so we can call the word (which is another level of symbol) a "sign," and we recognize that it is shorthand one degree farther removed from reality. When we print the word "mountain" or speak it, we can call the sound waves or the ink marks a "sign-vehicle." We are then using shorthand three degrees removed from reality. And this is what a psywar message consists of. By themselves they mean nothing, these ink spots or sound waves. To a person who does not know English or to a person who has never seen or heard of a mountain, the ink spots or sound waves that make "mountain" will be meaningless. But we hope that the person who sees or hears our word "mountain" will have that word in his language and that it will stand for a picture in his mind not unlike the picture of a mountain in our minds. The question is, will it? On that, much of the success or failure of the message will depend.

Different individuals, different cultures, tend to use different shorthand systems. For a man who has lived all his life in New Hampshire the sign-vehicle "mountain" may call up a different picture than it calls up for a man who has lived all his life in the Colorado Rockies. In the case of different countries, and especially in the case of abstract words, the differences may be dramatic and striking. This poses great problems to the psywar operation.

An airplane flying over Korea at the present time symbolizes UN control of the air in the Korean war. This symbol is close to reality as ordinary Koreans experience it day in and day out, so that there is little chance of its being misinterpreted. Mountain is a symbol that is relatively close to reality for persons who have lived among mountains, or studied geography, or traveled. But take such a word as "democracy," which is as much a part of America's psywar as the airplanes this country flies over Korea. Whereas most Koreans grasp the meaning of the airplane, and the very meaning intended, do they get the American meaning of democracy when we speak of it to them? Does "democracy" symbolize to them the same system of values and pattern of behavior it symbolizes for Americans? American spokesmen in Korea very soon found that it does not.

The higher the level of abstraction, the greater the danger of the shorthand being misinterpreted. The farther apart the cultures, the greater the likelihood that the shorthand systems will not be the same.

We have been describing this relation in terms of cultures. We could also describe it in terms of personalities. Our target

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will consist of persons, moving within a framework of social heredity that we call a "culture." These persons will, however, have had different experiences and will have established different patterns of needs, values, and attitudes. The relation between psywar source and psywar target, hanging as it does on a tiny thread of symbols, is therefore even more tenuous than we have described it; even within the same culture different persons may interpret a given psywar symbol differently.

Now what does this tenuous relation mean to the psywar man who has to devise a message? It does not mean that he should address all his targets in baby talk. It does mean that the unit that builds the message should have within it the highest possible concentration of knowledge of the target culture and language that its country can supply. So much is axiomatic. But it means even more than that. It points to the one indispensable quality of good psywar.

Empathy

We call this quality "empathy," that is, the ability to arrive at a sympathetic understanding of other human beings. You can see this quality in some of your friends. They are understanding, whereas some others of your friends are not; they seem to know how you feel and how and when to talk to you, in a way that your other friends somehow do not. You yourself probably have great empathy for some persons and less or none at all for others, and greater empathy for any particular person at some time than at others. There are times, that is, when you feel that you can put yourself in that person's place and understand how he is feeling and why he is reacting as he is, and other times when you find him quite incomprehensible.

This is one quality above all others that the successful propagandist must have. It is learned rather than inherited at birth, and to some extent it may be learned consciously, through conscious effort at trying to think oneself into the position of someone else. The student of psywar can, for example, set himself the task of writing a propaganda leaflet as his target audience might write it, and confidently expect to grow and develop as a propagandist by repeating the experiment again and again. As has been suggested in Chap. 2, the American psywar student, for example, might make himself write the kind of paper a convinced Russian Communist might write on "Why I love Stalin," or "Why our system is better," or "Why I like the collective farm"—any-

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thing, in other words, that would require him to imagine himself as knowing only what his target individuals know, feeling and thinking only the way they feel and think, about some of these key subjects.

The quality of empathy is so basic that it may be said to underlie everything we can say about how to write a message. Writing a message is not a matter of rigid rules, such as that psywar writing should be conversational, or that psywar writing should never be above ninth-grade difficulty, or that psywar writing should follow the rules of good advertising. The goal of psywar is to motivate a certain behavior; the test of psywar writing is therefore whether it will in fact do so. We are working here, in other words, with a practical, not an aesthetic, question. We know we have to gain the attention of our target, and in Chap. 3 we learned certain general ways of attracting attention. We know we have to get our meaning across, and we have learned some of the things we need to know about patterns of perception. We know what response we want to motivate and something about how that is done. But the specifics of the process—the application of this knowledge to a specific task and a specific target—require from the psywar operator the greatest possible empathy with the target he is trying to reach. The better he can think himself into the target individual's shoes, the better he will know what will attract attention, how to say it so that the meaning will be clear, and what devices and appeals will get the response he wants.

This is not intended to suggest that empathy is anything mysterious and mystical or that it can substitute for knowledge. It is not and cannot. Before the psywar operator decides on what level of difficulty he is to write, he must, for example, know something about the educational level of his target. He must know what the target is used to reading or listening to. Perhaps a conversational style will seem unduly familiar or a ninth-grade reading level too condescending. Whom would the target be likely to believe? The psywar operator, we are saying, has to know these things before he quotes authorities or attributes the message. Similarly he has to know whether the target has any particular color symbolisms or other symbol patterns that limit what can be said to its individual members. In short the communicator must know the culture and, preferably, also the language very well. The psywar process has one cylinder missing unless this kind of knowledge enters deeply into the preparation of the message.

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Elements of an Effective Message

What happens in a message? We usually say that the writer of a psywar message is manipulating the symbols of propaganda. But what exactly does this mean in terms of what goes on in a message?

It means, in the first place, that the writer must arrange his symbols in a way he thinks will attract the target's attention to them. There is a simple rule for that which you can add to what was said in Chap. 3 about novelty, contrast, and figure-ground relation, namely, invite attention, early in the auditory message or at a conspicuous place in the visual message, to a personality need.

This is what the advertisers are doing when they lure you to an ad by indexing it with a picture of a bathing beauty. This is what the radio commentator is doing when he introduces an item with "Flash!" or "Bulletin!" That is what the poster does in virtue of its pungent headline. In other words, these devices really index a message for us by classifying it under the needs it might meet for us. Thus the wise psywar operator will put in a headline or picture or cue phrase to stimulate interest by pointing out a need to which the message relates, and will thereby attract attention to it.

In the second place the writer of a message will use his symbols in a way that, he has reason to believe, will lead the recipient to accept its contents. Here we may suggest two additional rules:

Try to establish an atmosphere of authenticity and authority.

The psywar operator uses prestige spokesmen. He names names and cites figures. He tries whenever he can to include some item by which the audience can easily check his veracity. He uses pictures that will be recognized (the Communists, for example, have made good use of pictures of their American POWs). Above all, he tries to find out what sources and evidence the target's mind regards as credible.

Try to establish an atmosphere of consistency.

This means simply that the writer tries to avoid real or seeming contradictions. He tries to be sure that neither little slips in words nor big slips in policy or reporting shall creep into what he writes. He does this usually by establishing central policy lines that he must follow and constantly checking content against them.

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The tone of the usual psywar message is friendly. The writer tries to draw his listeners with him into an in-group (on some basis) a opposed to some out-group. The Communists talk to our soldiers as one fighting man to another—"none of us want to fight this war; you are being 'used' by Wall Street and your politicians; don't stand for it; join us for peace." Commander Norden talked to the German sailors as one navy man to another. Sometimes it is necessary to adopt other tones, but generally acceptance is sought via a friendly approach and a relatively informal style.

In the third place, and most important, the writer will so manipulate symbols as to—let us recall Chap. 3—(a) arouse personality needs of the target individual and contribute ways of meeting those needs that will be favorable to the operator's side, and do this when the person is in a group situation where the appropriate actions have some possibility of occurring, and (b) make the actions urged or implied in the message seem important from the standpoint of the target's important current background grouping, and do this while the action seems appropriate to personality needs.

This is the heart of a message because it is here that the writer must call on all his knowledge of and empathy for the target and work out a paradigm that will lead to the kind of attitude change and action he wants.

Suppose, for example, that the target is a North Korean Catholic who has obvious frustrations because he is not allowed to practice his religion, and yet is caught up in a Communist union and a series of Communist groups that are pouring their dogma into him. This man will have urgent personality needs that we need not try to describe here, and he will need above all to resolve the conflict between his religion and the political philosophy and practice of his state. We can guess that his religious attitudes will be emotionally involved and that his memory of his church will be warm and nostalgic, but we can guess also that it will be practically impossible for him to take overt action against the Communist government without running the risk of severe punishment, even loss of life. The psywar operator can guess also that a number of symbols of the church will be for this man highly charged with emotion.

Now the question before the psywar operator, chewing his pencil in Seoul or Tokyo, is, How can he devise a message that will begin with these personality needs and suggest some desirable ways of meeting them, some things that will help America and that

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the man can nevertheless do without being shot by the security police or landing in the People's Jail, thereby eliminating himself as one of America's friends behind the Curtain? It is an intensely practical problem and a grim one since it involves life and death. The writing of a psywar leaflet or script is not merely "expressing oneself" or "selling Americanism."

The message writer might decide that for the time being his goal should be merely to keep up the hope of such a target individual, so that he will not entirely give up Christianity and, without doing anything about it for the moment, remain psychologically prepared for future messages from us. Or the writer might decide that he should encourage the target individual to get together with other Catholics, hold secret church meetings, and form together a little island of anti-Communism. Or he might give the target individual a means of resolving his conflict by passive resistance to Communism, or sabotage, or malingering. Whatever he decides on as a goal, his task in the message will be (a) to identify and stimulate certain personality needs in his target and (b) to suggest some means of satisfying those needs that will be desirable from our point of view and yet within the limits set by that individual's social relations and personal values. That, essentially, is what happens in a message.

But there are certain additional proved rules of propaganda that the writer may very well wish to follow. For example:

Manipulate the words of propaganda in a fashion that will make people remember them.

He will use hard-hitting easily remembered slogans ("Make the world safe for democracy") and labels ("Huns"). He will manipulate stigma. That is, he will try to build up the enemy and his leaders (recall our pictures of the Japanese and of Hitler in World War II) into symbols of hate and rejection. He will not hesitate to write in terms of the two-valued orientation that the followers of Korzybski so much deplore; that is, he will describe the choices before his target audience as bad (the enemy program) and good (America's program), black and white rather than shades of gray.

When possible, try to provide targets for aggression. He knows there will be some frustration in the target audience, and indeed he may try to build more (for example, by tantalizing enemy troops with reminders of the pleasures and comforts they are missing). His problem will then be to displace the resultant aggression against targets within the enemy structure, rather than against the opposite side. For example, he may try to

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turn the aggression against enemy officers for having led the troops into such a situation, or against more favored groups within the army or the civilian group, or against the government for not having spared the target this frustration, or against special minority groups.

When possible, try to provide targets for identification, emulation, and love. He will try to get his target audience to identify themselves with well-known persons who have done something like what it is desired that the target audience should do, such as surrendering or becoming defectors or opposing the government in power or having in previous eras been friendly with the propagandist's government. He will try to encourage the target to emulate these persons, admire them, and even love them.

Try to arouse emotion where it will be to your benefit. The writer will seek to appeal to emotionally and ego-involved attitudes, to use rich symbols, and to stimulate the kind of emotionality under which propaganda seems to work the fastest change.

Repeat—with variations. For this the writer has the time-tested example of the advertiser, and the precept of every propagandist who has discussed the subject. "Don't contradict," says one of them. "Just assert and assert and assert." "The measure of a propagandist or a politician," says another, "is how many ways he can say the same thing."

Let us hasten to say that there are many kinds of psywar messages. Some straight news, for example, will have less need for some of these devices than will, let us say, a persuasive leaflet or an appeal to an enemy unit by radio. Whatever the kind of message, however, ultimately it has the same kind of purpose and the same need to be attended to, understood, accepted, and acted on.

Hitler's Rules. Comparison of the suggestions we have made in this book with Hitler's propaganda rules should be of great value. The rules may be summarized as follows:

1. The proper objective of propaganda is to indoctrinate, that is, to inculcate convictions.
2. Political propaganda must be addressed to the broad masses of the people.
3. Propaganda, in order to move people to action, must be supported by organization.
4. The opponent's attention must be engaged before he can be convinced.
5. The level of propaganda must be adjusted to the mental capacity of the most limited among the intended recipients.
6. Propaganda must concentrate on a few crucial points and repeat them endlessly.
7. Propaganda creates convictions by emotional appeals.

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8. Propaganda must be cast in terms of simplified affirmation and negation.
9. Propaganda must have a flavor of aggressive strength.
10. Propaganda must not conflict with the actual needs and experiences of the recipients.
11. Propaganda must not be confined to words but must include corresponding action.
12. Propaganda must play on the powerful motives of hope, rooted aspirations, and fear of destruction.
13. The effectiveness of propaganda does not flow from the truth of its content.[5]

There is another respect in which all messages are alike. In one proportion or other, every message is a combination of entertainment, information, and persuasion. We speak here of entertainment in its widest sense, to include shock, surprise, and the aesthetic pleasure to be derived from appearance and sound over and above the entertainment come-on familiar to, for example, the American radio listener. Entertainment's function in psywar is usually to bait the hook and attract attention and interest for the message itself, as Tokyo Rose, for example, played popular tunes as a bribe to get Americans to listen to her propaganda. Entertainment may, however, also be used indirectly for persuasion. Tokyo Rose's music was calculated to make American soldiers homesick and warsick. And when the Communists broadcast music on their radio they try to make sure that if their listeners relax it is to a Red Army song, or an ode to Stalin, or a symphony by a solid Soviet composer; "purposeful relaxation" they call it. Likewise information may be used indirectly for persuasion—news, for example. And sometimes persuasion becomes merely instructions: how to do something the listener is assumed to have decided upon already. But this is the general pattern of all psywar messages: an eye-catching leaflet informs you that certain of your buddies have been captured and are receiving good treatment, and tries to persuade you that you too will be well treated if you join them; an impressive bomber in the sky over Korea in the summer of 1950 informs South Korean watchers that the United Nations is still in the war and still powerful, and tries to persuade them that if they stay loyal and hold out they will be rewarded.

Here are some questions that commonly come up in or just before the stage of devising the message:

Black or White?

The psywar with which the readers of this volume will be concerned for the most part will be "white," that is, overt

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propaganda. The choice as to when to use white and when to use black is nevertheless one of the fundamental decisions in the planning of psywar, and we pause now to consider some of the advantages and disadvantages of each form.

The strength and the weakness of white propaganda both derive from its essential characteristic, that is, the fact that its origin is openly avowed and that it acts as the official voice of the sender.

In some cases this is a notable advantage. In the psywar campaign built around Wilson's Fourteen Points, every effort was made to drive home the official nature of the messages. The Points, as you will remember, were a blueprint for a postwar world that offered the hope of peace and a better life to all Europe, to the vanquished nations as well as the victors. The psywar, in other words, was designed to exploit the full prestige and authority of the Allies. Wilson's own voice was recorded and used, as were the statements of other Allied leaders. The Points were released officially to news services and printed in official-looking leaflets. The intention, of course, was to assure the people of Central Powers that this attractive plan really represented Allied policy, and thus weaken their will to resist.

Likewise, surrender leaflets are so designed as to take full advantage of their whiteness. The Allied European surrender pass in World War II carried the flags of the Allies and the signature of their commander. The Korean surrender pass bears the symbol of the United Nations and the signature of the UN Supreme Commander. The purpose, of course, is to persuade the enemy soldier that the pass is a sure-enough official document, which will help him safely through the dangerous and distasteful process of surrender.

White propaganda also stresses its official character when it strikes back at the psywar output of the opposition. At the time of the landings at Anzio in World War II, the Allies attempted to arouse insecurity among certain German troops with a leaflet pointing out that the Allied armies were now in their rear. The leaflet, however, used at a crucial point the word "kesselschlacht," which means not landing in the rear but encirclement, another idea altogether (a reminder of the need for having leaflets written by experts in the language!). The German command at once seized on the mistake by printing a highly official-looking leaflet that carried a reproduction of the Allied leaflet and described the true position. This white counterpropaganda action did much to destroy the credibility of Allied propaganda in Italy.

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The limitation of white propaganda is, as intimated above, just what we would expect from its being avowedly the voice of the sender nation. The target audience regards it ipso facto as "propaganda" in the less pleasant sense of the word, and accordingly resists it. It is, in other words, distrusted for being what it proclaims itself to be, and the target government naturally tries to build up this distrust (as the preceding example from Anzio shows). It can be swamped by the magnitude of the propaganda resources available to the target government. Its radio signals can be jammed; it can be counteracted by laws forbidding the picking up of its leaflets and, in peacetime, by curbs on the importation of its printed material, on its information centers, and on its exchange of persons program; it can find itself up against blank-wall censorship. In short, white propaganda must always fight on its opponent's grounds and on its opponent's terms, and with the added disadvantage of having to conduct the fight from a distance.

We must bear in mind also that white propaganda, because of its official nature, is unable to employ many of the devices open to black propaganda. No government would be likely, for example, to place its imprimatur on some of the pornographic leaflets used in World War II, if for no other reason than because exception would be taken to them by its own supporters. (Also, of course, they would prove embarrassing if reproduced or even described in the press of neutral countries.)

Black propaganda, on the other hand, poses for the operator numerous thorny problems of its own. It must channel large amounts of energy into merely concealing its source. It is easy for an operation to start out black but extremely difficult for it to stay black. One slip, one piece of information that can be traced, one printed phrase that does not ring true, and black propaganda turns white as a sheet. Furthermore, its operators, in order to maintain secrecy, must cut communications with planners to a minimum; thus it is hard to coordinate with white but is useless or even self-defeating if it is not coordinated. Effective black operations require highly skilled and trained personnel, able to work effectively while under constant danger of being located and attacked by agents of the enemy.

On the other hand, black propaganda has the great advantage, if successful, that it sluices its material directly into the communication stream of the enemy. Gossip, rumors, planted jokes (which, incidentally, do not have the instability of rumors while being circulated), and planted slogans and visual symbols can all be started on their course by covert operators within the heart

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of the enemy country. Occasionally, black leaflets can be used (as in the examples of black propaganda quoted in Part I of this book), and there have been excellent examples of black radio (Operation Annie and Gustav Siegfried Eins). Both leaflets and radio, of course, have to be sent from a distance, as does white propaganda, but often have a better chance of acceptance—at least until their origin is discovered. Becker,[6] in his review of black propaganda in Europe, says that one of the most effective black printed operations consisted of printing black newspapers and then tearing them up and scattering them. This was done at relatively little risk for the distributor, and, Becker says, a surprising amount of the material thus disseminated got itself read.

In most black propaganda, no holds are barred. Pornography, scandal, rumor, gossip—all the devices of informal attack can be used. Black is also somewhat more difficult than white to strike back at with counterpropaganda. As a matter of fact, the enemy is constantly torn between the wish to answer and the fear that by answering he may spread the offending propaganda. Furthermore, black propaganda can spread the impression that dissatisfaction exists in the heart of the enemy's homeland and thus encourages dissidence and insecurity. This kind of attack is extremely difficult for the enemy (most black is what we have called throughout this book "hostile" psywar) to handle.

In general, black is a less formal kind of psywar than white. It can operate on a large scale with less red tape, less organization, and less equipment. Indeed, a rumor can be spread widely by a single agent in the enemy country. In World War II, Goebbels's own slogans were turned against him. "For this we have the Führer to thank" was scrawled, with damaging effect, on many a bombed German building between dusk and dawn. Such operations require no elaborate organization or equipment, and would, indeed, be less likely to succeed if they had them. Black radio, though it naturally requires a certain amount of formal organization, is more likely to be effective if it sounds informal. Gustav Siegfried Eins was supposed to be a station operated clandestinely by a dissatisfied German officer who represented the professional German military man's opposition to the Party. Gustav's voice was rasping, his humor was pornographic, his broadcasting technique was amateurish, and he pretended to move his transmitter around one jump ahead of the Gestapo. But he sounded real. And this is perhaps the greatest strength of black operations that depend on informality.

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One other generalization is perhaps in point here. It seems fairly certain, on the basis of experience up to this time, that black operations are more effective in strategic than in tactical psywar, because the communication channels that black requires tend to be unavailable in combat situations. It may also be true that black propaganda is more useful in political psywar conflict than in consolidation psywar. Convincing evidence on this point, however, is not yet available.

True or False?

A vast amount of unnecessary heat has been generated over the question of whether this country should always tell the truth in its psywar output. The question has been given emotional overtones by the argument that a democracy, founded as this form of government is on eighteenth century rationalism and dedicated to the discovery of truth by the self-righting process of public discussion, does not dare to stand before the world as a proponent of falsehood. And the "strategy of truth" in World War II is cited as an example of successful practice along this line.

Yet deception is an instrument that no nation can wholly dispense with if it wishes to affect attitudes and behavior in the outside world. It has, for example, been practiced by this country in every war it has fought. Furthermore the "strategy of truth" in World War II was paralleled by an extensive black propaganda operation, conducted by the Office of Strategic Services, dedicated to the strategy of victory rather than the strategy of truth.

Every country, to be sure, dictatorships as well as democracies, tries to keep its white propaganda as credible as possible. Goebbels insisted that the Nazis always told the truth in their propaganda, and even the Russians—in whose hands the Big Lie has become an omnipresent psywar weapon—pose virtuously as truth tellers.

No country, however, is above occasionally using its white propaganda media for deception when it can thus achieve a success that will not imperil other operations. It is simply a question of balancing the ledger. If white propaganda can be used for deception in a tactical situation and an important success won without impairing the credibility of subsequent output, then it had better be used. The success that can be gained must be balanced, in other words, against the dangers that must be skirted. Certainly no quality of white propaganda is so valuable as its reputation for credibility. If a given use of white propaganda will damage this

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reputation in the future, then the deceptive use of white propaganda must promise great gains in order to be worth attempting. That is why white propaganda, as a general proposition, is and must be kept reliable and credible. This principle does not, of course, apply to black operations at all, nor does it exclude white operations like the sonic deception plan that covered the Normandy invasion, given their enormous prospective gains.

The further generalization may perhaps be offered that the longer the time range of white propaganda the greater the need for credibility. In tactical situations, deceptive white propaganda is usually a mere feint; it is addressed chiefly to the opposing military command, is regarded as a normal act of war, either succeeds at once or fails at once, and has no aftereffects except on the military situation itself. Strategic and political psywar are another matter. Promises made during battle and not kept after victory will rebound against the promiser. Even the Big Lie is not wholly successful in a conquered territory, unless accompanied by a ruthless disregard of human rights, a communication monopoly, and large-scale surveillance and coercion. This is perhaps the chief difference between American use of deceptive white propaganda and the use of it made by opponents of America, and brings us to the greatest argument for a strategy of truth. If America's enemies make promises they do not expect to keep, and by so doing secure the downfall of a people, they can still maintain order by police-state methods and a monopoly of propaganda. The United States does not employ police-state methods or set up propaganda monopolies. Thus America must be very careful about the long-range implications of its day-to-day white propaganda.

Even the most vigorous proponents of the strategy of truth do not insist on a strategy of the <u>whole</u> truth, of course, and this is really where the two viewpoints come together. In World War II and in Korea the United States omitted some unflattering truth and emphasized some more favorable truth. American operators told the truth they thought would contradict some of their opponents' allegations and ignored other truth that might not. They felt then, as most psywar planners feel now, that they are under no obligation to help America's enemies win the propaganda battle. Moreover, the target sometimes won't believe the truth anyway, as is illustrated by the following:

> What the Voice of America has to say about workers' housing conditions is no less phony and unconvincing . . . He (the commentator) wants to assure that Americans—all Americans!—live like princes. Here is the rosy picture he paints: "The American worker," he says, "lives either in a sep-

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rate house or in a separate apartment with kitchen and bathroom. Very many married people prefer to live in the suburbs in a detached cottage with a garden." And he further asserts that the 25 percent of earnings paid in rent includes gas and telephone and even carpet-cleaning. Carpets, of course, are mentioned here not by chance. The Voice of America wants to insinuate that carpets are as common a thing in America as gas rings."

Although it was true that prisoners in American POW camps received eggs for breakfast, further testing showed us that this notion was so preposterous to the Germans on the other side of the firing line that they simply laughed at the idea. Since this discredited the balance of our message, it became another favorable truth which we learned to suppress. The same, incidentally, applied to an important strategic propaganda theme, that of war production. We had to refrain from telling the Germans that Henry Kaiser put ships together in five days. Although this spectacular fact was true, we had to stress the less spectacular and more general fact that we were building several times the tonnage sunk by the U-boats. Intelligence on what the Germans believed, and what they could be expected to believe, forced us to do this.

Eventually, as the result of extensive prisoner interrogations, a basic theme on POW treatment was worked out, which found its widest application on the Western Front. Instead of picturing captivity in the U.S. as the outrageous idyll which it really was, we used the slogan: "It's no fun being a prisoner-of-war!" and went on to show that it was a grim but tolerable fate for anyone who had fought hard but who nevertheless had been unable to evade capture. We did point out, however, that being a prisoner had certain redeeming features. The punch line to this type of appeal was: "Better Free Than a Prisoner-of-War, Better a Prisoner-of-War Than Dead." That line proved highly effective. Understatement, in this instance, was probably the only viable means of communicating with the enemy.[8]

Security

Security poses a major problem at the stage of constructing the message. The psywar officer must, as we know, have access to current intelligence, but if he is always forbidden to use the information he obtains from it, he cannot carry out his purpose effectively.

Linebarger[9] gives a classic example of what happens to psywar when security gets too much in the way. The following are actual instructions given to US psywar officers in the Pacific during World War II:

". . . Use the occasion of the Sacred Banyan Tree Festival to needle the Provisional President. Make a dramatic story of the President's life. Undermine his use of religion to bolster the dictatorship.

"Caution: do not mention religion. Do not engage in scurrilous personal attacks. Material concerning our information of the President's biography is highly classified and must not be used."

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Now obviously, in the face of such instructions, the assignment ought never to have been given at all. Yet this is not an isolated case or an atypical one. Any experienced psywar operator can recall times when security kept from him the information he needed to wage a successful campaign. The problem is worse because much actual propaganda writing is done on a fairly low echelon, from which much classified information is automatically withheld. The theory of psywar can only point out that whenever a psywar objective has been chosen, one of the first questions must be whether sufficient security-cleared information can be made available to construct an effective campaign.

TIMING THE CAMPAIGN

One of the greatest and most admired skills of the successful propagandist is his sense of when to speak and when to remain silent, when to answer and when not to answer, when to start and when to end a campaign in order to get maximum effect from it. This is partly a matter of his art, as described in earlier sections. But it is usually the result also of excellent intelligence concerning the target, plus experience in interpreting the intelligence so as to know when "the time is ripe," plus skill in exploiting the opportunity when he sees it.

We have referred several times to the Russian peace campaign of 1950 and 1951, which featured the Stockholm petition and numerous public utterances, including the talk by Malik that brought about armistice negotiations in Korea. This was a long campaign, carefully planned and spun out. Most important, it was timed with great skill. It began when some distraction was needed in order to turn the eyes of the world away from the Russians' own operations in Korea. It served both to displace the aggression of Russian and satellite subjects away from their own governments toward "capitalist-imperialist warmongers," and also to capitalize on the nationalistic anxieties of the people of Asia. Furthermore it seized the initiative from the Western Powers and threw them off balance. What more brilliant and audacious maneuver could Russia make than to cover up its own aggressive behavior with a peace movement that pulled all the stops of world anxiety about war? Operations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had begun as defenses against potential Soviet aggression, but by a single, well-timed stroke these defenses against Russia were themselves made to appear aggressive and

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threatening. The Western Powers never fully recovered the initiative during this campaign.

Another example of excellent Russian timing was their proposal for a united Germany. This came at the time when it was best calculated to disrupt European rearmament and drive a wedge between France and the other Western Powers and between Western Germany and the other Western Powers. It so rocked the Western Powers back on their heels that they made no answer to the proposition for a number of days and then spoke only cautiously and defensively. In the propaganda battle for Germany this one move completely transferred the initiative and the favorable position to Russia.

Still another example of good timing, in this case in tactical psywar, occurred in Korea in the winter of 1950. Primitive psywar though it was, and reminiscent of Gideon's victory over the Midianites, still it was effective. The UN forces knew, of course, that Chinese armies were present in North Korea, but the numbers and intention of these armies were unknown. The Chinese maintained a complete nocturnal blackout until the night before the scheduled attack. At that time our reconnaissance planes returned with the report that all Communist-held Korea was afire. Chinese campfires were burning on every hill and mountain. "The country is full of Chinese," said the troops. Next morning came the attack.

What are the decisive questions a psywar planner asks when he studies his intelligence and decides on the optimum moment to begin a campaign? Usually he asks such questions as these:

Is the iron hot? Does intelligence show that the target audience is ready for such a campaign? A campaign that reaches an audience predisposed toward the desired change will have easy going. Propaganda that can canalize and direct existing tendencies in an audience will always work faster than propaganda that must completely change and convert an audience. Therefore the "optimum time" is the time when the audience promises to be most receptive, and when the proposed messages are most likely to be successful.

Will striking now beat the enemy to the punch? In the symbol war as in the bullet war, the advantage lies with attack. "Whoever speaks the first word to the world is always right," Goebbels said. This, of course, is not always true, but the characteristics of mass communication are such that a denial or rebuttal never completely catches up with the original message. Furthermore the facts learned first in a new situation are apt to be better

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remembered. Therefore many psywar strategists often prefer to launch a new attack rather than to defend themselves against the enemy's. And the experienced propagandist always tries to get there first; for example, he tells the world about a new move before the enemy has had time to report, distract, and discredit it.

Is the way open? In this respect the optimum time is whenever the campaign is likely to get adequate attention from the target audience. Is the audience distracted by other campaigns or events? Are the channels, for one reason or other, closed or clogged?

Is help coming up? The time is optimum when the first statements of the campaign themes can be reinforced in the near future, by events, by varied repetition, by related propaganda.

How much will a campaign at this time contribute to the master timetable? Whether or not the present is the optimum time will, of course, depend in part on political and military plans to which psywar is to contribute. The timetable of the responses to be expected from a campaign at this time must therefore be anticipated, and the campaign undertaken only if it fits into the timetable for the American master plan. If you will remember some of the occasions on which an advertisement has played an important part in your purchase of a new automobile or some similar article, you will probably recall that you saw the ad at a time when you were ready to consider the purchase of a new car, and probably several weeks or months before you actually made the purchase. That time interval was an important one, for it gave you a chance to absorb what you had learned, gather together a related group of attitudes, and prepare action responses for the time when you and the dealer would actually stand before a demonstration car. Similarly, Goebbels began in 1939 to soften up France and Belgium for the blitz of 1940. Tactical psywar officers feel that it is worth while to plant the seed of surrender in enemy troops even when they are far in the rear and there is no immediate likelihood of their surrendering.

An often-used trick of timing is to release a psywar communication at the precise moment that the target audience can best check its authenticity against an event that will be readily observable within the target and thus will be widely known among the target audience. The purpose, of course, is to establish the target's faith in the operator's psywar. If the audience consciously checks even a single communication and finds it to be true, then they are more likely to believe future communications.

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One of the classic questions in psywar, then, is this: When is it wise to answer or refute enemy propaganda? Some of the most interesting passages in Goebbels's diary deal with his reasons for speaking or keeping silent in the face of an enemy propaganda campaign. He tried continuously to estimate the effectiveness and the purpose of the enemy propaganda. If he felt the enemy output on a given issue was relatively ineffective, he kept silent. Likewise, if he felt that the enemy was fishing for information, he did not answer. And he did not answer if he felt he had no really effective answer, or if he felt that his reply might give greater circulation or credence to enemy claims. On the other hand he did regard it as necessary to deflate any prestige the enemy gained from claims of military successes, and to expose "blatant falsehoods" (such, he said, as the claim that the Germans had bombed Rome). Though bothered by enemy propaganda and by his inability to insulate his people from it, he still preferred, as a general proposition, to initiate his own attacks rather than defend himself against the enemy's. In this, most successful propagandists would agree with him.

How long should a campaign continue? Here intelligence about the target is really essential, for the only possible answer is, of course, that it should go on as long as it continues to be effective. In practice, several campaigns are usually in progress at the same time. As soon as one campaign begins, the psywar planner studies his intelligence from the target and begins to estimate how long he can continue to vary his campaign (in themes, messages, and media), maintain interest, and extend his effective audience. At the same time he is making plans as to what campaign should follow the one just begun. He spins out his existing campaign, gets his new campaign ready to go, and keeps a careful eye on intelligence reports concerning target response. Usually he starts the new campaign before the old one ends. In any case the time comes when the intelligence reports say to him pretty clearly that any further extension of the campaign will bring insufficient return for the effort required. Even if it would still reach a few more people, change a few more attitudes, it would do so at the cost of losing the attention of others, and taking time and energy that would now better be devoted to a new psywar purpose. There he ends his campaign.

Study of the campaigns to be described in another manual consisting of cases studied will yield some valuable suggestions on timing.

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EVALUATING THE PRODUCT

No psywar campaign can be considered really well planned unless it includes provisions for evaluating the content and the effect of the product.

Evaluation of the content is fairly simple. At the least, informed critical judgments should be secured on the messages in their various stages. They should be criticized for their thematic and propaganda quality, for their applicability to the target culture, and for their use (in translation or production) of the target language. In addition to this, it will be helpful if analysis of the output can be made week by week, using quantitative methods, in order to measure the proportion of time or space given to different themes, different subjects, and different devices, and to compare the output with the intention of the policy planners.

Evaluation of the effect is not at all simple. The only really satisfactory way to test the effect of psywar is to go into the target audience and find out, by interviews and observations, exactly what attitude change took place and what action was motivated. Even then, it is sometimes hard to determine just what was the "cause" of a given "effect." As was indicated in Chap. 4, attitude change is a complex process, and action may have many sources. Thus it is not always possible to estimate exactly how much credit should be given to a specific psywar operation even when the target audience is accessible.

In consolidation operations the target audience is accessible, and opinion surveys and other community studies will give the psywar operator a running record of what his material is accomplishing. In political operations it is occasionally possible to go into the target audience and make such studies, and it is sometimes possible to get opinion data that have been assembled in the target country itself, perhaps even by the target government. But the more delicate the relations between countries, and the more important it consequently becomes to evaluate the effect of a country's propaganda, the less likely the operator is to have access either to the target audience or to data obtained by others concerning it. For example, America should now have very little chance of getting such access to the Soviet Union or such data on the Russian audience. And in tactical and strategic operations the psywar operator is of course cut off even more sharply from the target he should like to study.

Thus the problem, in all types of psywar operations, is to predict or estimate the effect of a psywar operation without being able to measure freely the actual responses of the target audience.

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There are, in general, three ways to evaluate the effect of a psywar product in this difficult situation. Admittedly each one is only an approximation. None of them is as satisfactory as an uninhibited study of the target audience itself would be. Yet an evaluation of what psywar is accomplishing is so enormously important to planning and practice that any psywar operation stands to gain tremendously from whatever it can learn from these methods.

Experts

The simplest of these methods is the jury of experts. These should be persons who are thoroughly acquainted with the target country, its culture, and its people. They should preferably have lived in the target country for a long time and should have left it only very recently. Ideally they should be natives of the target country. Their absolute loyalty to the country that wants to use them as jury members must, however, be beyond question.

The procedure is for this jury to be asked to read or listen to the psywar material being directed at the target in question and predict what its effect will be within the target. Will it attract attention? Will it be understood? What reaction will it produce? Will it be accepted and believed? Will it change any minds or lead anyone to take the action desired? How could it be made more effective?

The jury, of course, can be asked to pretest as well as to posttest the psywar output. That is, a leaflet designed for the target can be shown to the jury before it has been disseminated, and the criticisms and predictions of the experts can be used either in revising it or in deciding when and where to disseminate it. This is also possible, though less convenient, in the case of radio broadcasts.

The report of the jury will be valid only to the extent that the jury is truly expert, that is, to the extent to which it can put itself in the place of the target audience and anticipate the processes by which the audience will respond to the psywar material.

Sample of Persons

A second method of evaluation is the use of a sample of persons as similar as possible to the target audience. These can be refugees, defectors, POWs, or other natives available to the psywar planners. Continuous effort should be made to match the sample as closely as possible to the actual target audience. For

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example, if there is any reason to think that different groups within the target might react in different ways to the propaganda, then representatives of each of these groups should be included in the sample. Thus if three-fifths of the target population is illiterate, a sizable proportion (ideally, three-fifths) of the sample should be illiterate, so that their reactions will be reflected more prominently in the results than the reactions of literates. If there is a powerful trade union group in the target, with opinions and probable reactions of their own, then trade unionists should be represented in some such proportion in the sample.

Ideally, then, the sample should be a perfect miniature of the target audience. The picture as regards sex distribution, age distribution, geographical distribution, occupation distribution, economic status, educational levels, political viewpoints, etc., should be the same, in other words, as within the target. Practically, this is very hard if not impossible to achieve. It is considerably harder to put together a reliable miniature sample than to put together a panel of experts, for the miniature sample is only as good as it is really representative.

But if a representative sample can be obtained, then very useful results can be expected. The procedure is simply to expose the panel to the psywar material, and find out, from responses to before-and-after questions, what happens to the readers or listeners. Did they read or listen to all of it? What did they think of it? Did they understand it? Did they change any opinions as a result of it? What made them believe it, or kept them from believing it?

There are some real dangers involved in both methods, even when the experts using them are really expert and the sample is really representative. One of these dangers is that the members of the jury or the sample may give the opinions they think the questioner wants to hear. This is especially likely when the respondents are impoverished and insecure (for example, refugees, defectors, and prisoners highly dependent on the income or preferment promised them for their cooperation and perhaps reluctant to criticize the questioners' propaganda unfavorably). It is still more likely when prisoners of war are used for the jury or the sample, since they may give deliberately false answers in the hope of making the propaganda ineffective. The evaluators must therefore investigate potential jury or sample members as carefully as possible before retaining them, and subsequently test them from time to time with, for example, deliberately planted propaganda that is known to be poor or to differ in some important

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way from the material previously given them, so as to find out whether their answers change with the changing material.

Enemy Sources

The third kind of evaluation consists of a number of techniques all of which in one way or other belong under the rubric of intelligence. The psywar unit should use every available avenue of intelligence in its attempt to find out about the effects of its propaganda on the target. Here are some of the ways in which intelligence sources can be used:

Undercover Agents. These can be used as participant observers to report on the way psywar material is being received in their areas, and on the effects it produces. This is perhaps the most reliable single device, since the agent can discuss the psywar with members of the target audience, listen in on conversations about it, and observe any actions that appear to result from it. All this calls, of course, both for an able agent and a good channel through which he can report.

Prisoners of War. These can be interviewed soon after capture, and they can be asked what psywar material has come to their attention, what their own reactions are to it, what are the reactions of their fellow soldiers and superior officers, and what is the general state of opinion and morale in their military units.

Routine Intelligence. News, intercepted letters, captured documents, statistical reports, and information from defectors and other persons interviewed can and should be screened for information bearing upon the effectiveness of our psywar.

The Enemy's Actions. These often tell us something about the effects of our psywar messages. For example, variations in the number of surrenders are often revealing. So are the enemy's countermeasures. His counterpropaganda, monitored and analyzed, sometimes tells us which of our campaigns are proving especially bothersome. In the case of broadcasting, the programs he joins may tell us what we are accomplishing with what messages.

No psywar unit will rely on any one of these methods exclusively. Not to use all possible evaluative information out of available intelligence is inexcusable. Any operation will be able, without too much trouble, to set up a small jury of expert observers; a representative sample is not beyond the resources of most field operations. But the information obtained from any

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one of these methods ought to be checked against what comes from the others; for example, what the jury says about a leaflet ought to be checked as often as possible with POWs who are being interviewed, and also with the information that comes out of the target country. When the judgments from the various methods tally, the presumption in favor of their validity is greatly increased.

SUMMARY

You are aware by now that the large number of variables affecting psywar make psywar decisions immensely difficult. Although what are required above all by the operator in making psywar decisions are the skill and judgment that come with experience, the beginning or student psywar operator can acquire a framework in which to organize any experience he may acquire in this phase of the work by keeping clearly in mind the major variables that must be weighed and considered. If necessity requires it, this knowledge may even permit him to make the decisions for any operation he may be performing. These variables are choice of campaign, purpose, target, channel, message, timing, and means of evaluation.

Affecting the choice of campaign are priority of points of policy, applicability or inapplicability of psywar to particular policy points, the number of campaigns possible, the availability of tools and channels, the probable effectiveness of the various possible campaigns, and the risks that any campaign will bring to friends in the target country or to future credibility in the target country.

Affecting the choice of purpose are the situational, cultural, or psychological peculiarities of the target and also the interrelations between purpose, target, media, and message. Purpose derives from objective, and objective derives from policy, but purpose is also inseparable from the target.

Affecting the choice of target are determination of the specific attitude formation (or change) and action desired and determination of the individuals or groups within the target capable of bringing about the desired response. The latter may require vast and detailed knowledge of the target's social structure.

From this information the psywar operator will construct a complete statement of the characteristics—a target analysis—of the "propaganda man" he is trying to reach.

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Affecting the choice of the channel for the message is, first, a knowledge of all the various media that might be used, that is, face-to-face public speaking or private conversation, use of events to communicate a message, gimmicks, fast media (radio and public-address loudspeakers), medium-speed media (leaflets, newspapers, and posters and newssheets), and slow media (books, magazines, pamphlets, and movies). Given the message, the target, and a complete knowledge of the media, the operator usually need only answer the media questions (Medium prominent in target's focus of attention? Accessible to operator? Suitable to purpose and message? Dangerous to friends in the target country? Able to reach largest percentage of target?) to make obvious the appropriate medium.

Affecting composition of the actual message are an understanding of the nature of symbols, an empathic approach, choice of black or white, true or false, and security considerations. You have seen that an effective message invites attention early to a personality need; establishes an atmosphere of authenticity, authority, and consistency; stays in people's minds; provides targets for aggression or identification, emulation, or love; arouses emotions beneficial to the objective of the message; and repeats, with variations.

Affecting the timing of the campaign are answers to such questions as: Is the iron hot? Will striking now beat the enemy to the punch? Is the way open? Is help coming? What will the campaign contribute to the master timetable?

And, finally, evaluation of the product is effected by a jury of persons expert in the target country, culture, and people; by samples of persons similar to the target audience; and by such enemy sources as undercover agents, POWs, routine intelligence, and the enemy's actions.

Clearly, this is one of the crucial chapters of this book, one that will bear not only study and restudy but also numerous practical exercises on the points it covers.

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TRENDS IN PROPAGANDA, 1914-1945

1. Propaganda during World War II exhibited, on the whole, a higher degree of sobriety than propaganda during World War I; the incidence of highly emotionalized terms was probably lower.
2. Propaganda during World War II was, on the whole, less moralistic than propaganda during World War I; the incidence of preference statements as against fact statements was probably lower.
3. Propaganda during World War II tended to put a moderate ceiling on grossar divergences from presently or subsequently ascertainable facts, divergences that were more frequent in propaganda during World War I. Also, propaganda during World War II tended to give fuller information about relevant events than propaganda during World War I. . . .

The use of emotionalized language was, at the outset of World War II, almost completely absent in British propaganda. When, in the autumn of 1939, Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, referred to the Nazis as "Huns," thus using the stereotype current during World War I, he was publicly rebuked. Basically, that attitude persisted throughout the war in Britain and the United States. "We don't want to be driven into hate" was the tenor of opinion. There were modifications of this attitude: in the United States in regard to Japan, in Britain after the severe onslaught of bombing. However, hate campaigns remained largely unacceptable. In Germany, a similar attitude persisted: attempts of German propaganda to brand the bombing of German cities by British and later by American planes as barbarism, to speak of the crews of these planes as "night pirates" and of German raids against Britain as retaliatory largely failed to arouse indignant hate.

The waning power of moral argumentation in propaganda is best illustrated by the fact that one of the predominant themes of propaganda during World War I played no comparable part in World War II. The theme "Our cause is right; theirs is wrong" was secondary in the propaganda of the Western powers; its part in German propaganda was limited; only in Russian propaganda was its role presumably comparable to that it had played in World War I propaganda. In the democratic countries and in Germany, the moral argumentation was replaced by one in terms of indulgence and deprivation (profit or loss): "We are winning; they are losing;" and "These will be the blessings of victory; these the calamities of defeat." There is evidence indicating that both in the democracies and in Germany this type of appeal was eminently successful. In other words: success of propaganda was dependent on the transformation of superego appeals into appeals to the ego.

The third area of difference, the increased concern for some agreement between the content of propaganda and ascertainable facts, and the increased concern for detailed information was to some considerable extent related to technological change. Thus, during World War I, the German people were never explicitly (and implicitly only much later) informed about the German defeat in the battle of the Marne in September 1914. A similar reticence during World War II would not have proved expedient, since in spite of coercive measures, allied radio transmissions were widely listened to by Germans. However, technological progress was not the only reason for the change. The concern with credibility had increased, independently of the technology of communication. The tendency to check statements of one's own against those of enemy governments existed both in Germany and in the democracies; while it was limited in Germany, it was widely spread in Britain and the United States."[10]

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Part IV

CODA

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Chapter 8

A FINAL WORD

You have by now noticed that the type of decision we have been talking about in these pages is not unique to psywar. In greater or less degree such decisions lie behind all communication and in particular all communication that seeks to change attitudes or bring about action. The advertiser trying to control buying habits, the football coach trying to bring his team "up" for a big game, the revivalist trying to sway religious attitudes, the public relations counsel trying to bring about a favorable situation for his client, the political campaigner trying to sway votes, and even the teacher trying to create favorable attitudes toward learning and discrimination may each use many of the devices we have talked about, face many of the same decisions, and may even have his own type of policy direction, operational capabilities, and intelligence sources with which he must coordinate his messages if they are to accomplish as much as possible.

Yet in our political system, psywar is something distinct and different from all these activities which it resembles in so many ways. Perhaps the difference can most easily be made clear by pointing out that in a Communist state such as the Soviet Union, for example, such a distinction does not exist, or at least is much less definite. In the Soviet Union psywar outside the state merges with hardly a noticeable break into psywar within the state. The Communist educational system is merely an arm of the Party's over-all program of propaganda and agitation. In the Soviet Union the state readily uses psywar techniques to control buying habits, voting, attitudes toward the central government, and interest in sports. This merging of uses is hard for Americans to understand. For Americans, education is in large part the responsibility of the state, but it is used not to change attitudes in a state-determined direction but rather to give practice in solving problems and to impart facts and discriminative skills

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which will enable the student to decide for himself what his value patterns should be. Advertising, public relations, political campaigning, and football pep talks are, except in rare instances, not the province of the US Government at all. They are private programs within the framework of commerce, politics, or play. Psywar is in a different category altogether. It represents to Americans a state imposing its will on another state. And this is why psywar has been so foreign to us, why we have been vaguely ashamed to talk about it and slow to train people to use it, and why we consider it in general a messy business, the sooner gotten over with, the better.

It is a messy business, in the same sense that war is, or economic sanctions, or any of the other weapons of international power. It is something we Americans do not practice on our own people. It is something we do not confuse with education. It is something we should prefer not to use even internationally, and indeed we look forward to the time when the nations of the earth can elevate their conflicts to the level of discussion and when it will be unnecessary to use the power weapons. But meanwhile we are caught up in a tense world situation in which a ruthless and powerful aggressor threatens peace and security. Like Nazi Germany, Communist Russia and her allies use psywar with skill and put very large resources in money and manpower into it. Even in "cold" war we are placed in the position of having to defend ourselves against psychological attack in many parts of the world. Whenever the cold war has turned hot, psywar has been used by both sides as one weapon in the power arsenal.

Therefore, no matter what our wishes and feelings about psywar may be, we are in the position of having to use it. If we Americans use such a weapon, it behooves us to know how it works and how to use it as well as possible. The purpose of this volume is to help us along toward such knowledge.

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Psychological Operations



Air Force Doctrine Document 2–5.3

27 August 1999

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations* .

BY ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2–5.3
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FOREWORD

The history of armed conflict amply demonstrates the efficacy and value of psychological operations (PSYOP) across the range of military activity. Performing the critical tasks of preparing and influencing the battlespace psychologically, PSYOP are an integral part of today's aerospace strategy, especially in relation to broader information operations (IO).

Air Force PSYOP forces support US national and military objectives through planned operations to convey information to target audiences. PSYOP provide a low-cost, high-impact method to deter adversaries and obtain the support of friendly or neutral target audiences. The effective use of PSYOP can provide asymmetrical advantages by exposing and exploiting adversaries' resistance and psychological weaknesses to create uncertainty and ambiguity, thereby lowering their morale and will to fight and win. In combination with military operations, PSYOP can encourage popular discontent with the adversary's leadership and degrade the enemy's ability to conduct military operations.

Psychological operations are an effective and integral component of information warfare and provide a vital contribution to the Air Force core competency of information superiority. When integrated with other activities, PSYOP maximize effects on the enemy and on their ability to make decisions.

TIMOTHY A. KINNAN
Major General, USAF
Commander, Air Force Doctrine Center

27 August 1999

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INTRODUCTION

A wise man learns from his experience; A wiser man learns from the experience of others.

Confucius

PURPOSE

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5.3 provides Air Force doctrine for psychological operations (PSYOP). It supports basic aerospace doctrine and basic information operations (IO) doctrine contained in AFDD 2-5, *Information Operations*. It replaces Air Force PSYOP doctrine outlined in AFDD 2-5.5, dated 22 February 1997. This AFDD implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-13, *Air and Space Doctrine.* This document is consistent with and complements Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, but its purpose is to promulgate the Air Force perspective on psychological operations. As such, it focuses on how Air Force assets can be organized, trained, equipped, and operated to conduct and support PSYOP.

APPLICATION

This AFDD applies to all Air Force military and civilian personnel (includes AFRC and ANG units and members). The doctrine in this document is authoritative but not directive; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. Therefore, commanders need to consider not only the contents of this AFDD, but also the particular situation when accomplishing their missions.

SCOPE

This document discusses PSYOP organizations, command and control relationships, air campaign planning, and support considerations. It also covers how aerospace assets can support and conduct joint PSYOP across the range of military operations.

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL

PSYOP are an integral part of military operations and, as such, are an inherent responsibility of all military commanders.

JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*

BASIS

A 1983 National Security Decision Directive began the revitalization of a US military PSYOP capability, as well as directing the development of a PSYOP Master Plan. The 1985 PSYOP Master Plan, in turn, required the Armed Forces to develop both joint and Service PSYOP doctrine. The updated 1990 PSYOP Master Plan directs each Service to evaluate and, if necessary, amend its PSYOP doctrine to ensure it supports and is compatible with joint PSYOP doctrine. In 1993 (updated in 1996), the Joint Staff published JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, which requires each Service to develop PSYOP doctrine for assigned primary functions. Since then, numerous documents including joint and Service doctrine manuals, Universal and Joint Mission Essential Task Lists, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instructions and Department of Defense (DOD) Directives were released directing each Service to develop, train, equip and employ PSYOP as a mission essential task.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines psychological operations (PSYOP) as

> Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.

The Air Force may attain United States (US) national and military objectives through PSYOP designed to convey selected information to targeted audiences. *PSYOP are systematically employed to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to US objectives.* While the Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) are assigned primary PSYOP responsibilities within the Air Force, almost all aerospace forces have the inherent capability to support PSYOP. Because PSYOP are an integral part of US military operations, US Air Force forces must be prepared to support PSYOP objectives in support of global engagement across the range of military operations.

PSYOP APPROVAL PROCESS

PSYOP campaigns are initiated and conducted under strict guidelines. Policy approval authority for peacetime PSYOP rests with the National Command Authorities (NCA) or the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and is delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. *During war, this approval authority may be delegated to the warfighters;* e.g., theater commanders in chief (CINCs) or joint task force (JTF) commanders. *This authority may not be further delegated* and must be followed by all forces employing or conducting PSYOP.

FUNCTIONS OF PSYOP

JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations,* indicates each Service has the following functions for PSYOP:

- Provide civilian and military personnel with appropriate PSYOP training and planning skills, as needed.
- Provide organic capabilities to execute PSYOP actions to include forces and equipment.
- Develop Service PSYOP doctrine relating to the primary functions assigned to that Service.
- Provide PSYOP forces or detachments (not assigned to Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command [USCINCSOC]) to combatant commanders.
- Request additional PSYOP support from the CJCS PSYOP executive agent (USCINCSOC).

- Provide departmental intelligence and counterintelligence assets who are trained, equipped and organized to support planning and conduct PSYOP.
- Train and educate departmental personnel to counter and neutralize the effects of hostile foreign PSYOP.

Air Force PSYOP support national and military objectives by conveying specially tailored information to target audiences. PSYOP provide aerospace forces a considerable advantage by exploiting the adversary's psychological weaknesses to create uncertainty, fear, and confusion, thereby lowering the opposition's morale and the will to fight.

PSYOP provide a low-cost, high-impact tool to deter adversaries and obtain the support of friendly or neutral target audiences. Air Force doctrine also recognizes that PSYOP are integral to information operations—and, indeed, can have a synergistic effect on the battlespace when used in combination with other information operations. PSYOP can encourage popular discontent with the opposition's leadership and, by combining persuasion with a credible threat, degrade an adversary's abil-

Aerospace assets are versatile. They can quickly spread information over large areas and through many channels.

ity to conduct or sustain military operations. They can also disrupt, confuse, and protract the adversary's decision-making process, undermining command and control.

PSYOP RELATIONSHIP TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Information plays a vital role in warfare, particularly in relation to command and control. Successful commanders understand the critical need to maintain the flow of information up and down the chain of command while at the same time influencing the perceptions, attitudes, and reasoning of the adversary. IO strategy includes both lethal and nonlethal means of enabling friendly aerospace forces to operate more quickly and effectively than their adversary. *A basic objective of IO is to lessen the ability of the opposing force to assess and respond to a battlespace situation while preserving, and perhaps enhancing, the ability of friendly forces to do so.* The object, generally, is to interrupt or protract the adversary's decision cycle (defined by Colonel Boyd, Air Force officer and military theorist, as the observe, orient, decide, and act, or OODA, loop). *By using IO effectively, in a manner that influences or even controls the adversary's perceptions, commanders can shape the battlespace.* A strategy of fully integrating IO operationally can result not only in information dominance but can maximize combat power and deter hostilities as well.

The Air Force believes that dominating the information spectrum is as critical to conflict now as controlling air and space or occupying land was in the past and is seen as an indispensable and synergistic component of aerospace power. Information superiority—the degree of dominance that allows friendly forces the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information without effective opposition—is an Air Force core competency upon which all the other core competencies rely. In order to gain and maintain information superiority, the Air Force conducts robust IO and executes its two major aspects: information-in-warfare (IIW) and information warfare (IW). IO comprise those actions taken to gain, exploit, defend, or attack information and information systems. IIW involves the Air Force's extensive capabilities to provide global awareness throughout the range of military operations based on its integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; its information collection and dissemination activities; and its global navigation and positioning, weather, and communications capabilities. IW consists of the function of counterinformation (CI) and its two subsets, offen-

sive counterinformation (OCI) and defensive counterinformation (DCI). As figure 1.1 depicts, PSYOP issues fall within both OCI and DCI.



Figure 1.1 PSYOP are part of Information Warfare

Although PSYOP is a component of offensive counterinformation, it is important to understand that its purpose may be offensive or defensive. Choosing to strike targets that demoralize an opponent and shorten a conflict is an offensive use of PSYOP. Informing a foreign populace that US military forces are removing old land mines to build support for those forces and aid force protection is a defensive use.

PSYOP are one type of military action that supports IO goals. Employed independently, PSYOP can have a measurable effect on the adversary. If their military potential is to be maximized, however, *PSYOP cannot be conducted in a vacuum; rather, they must be woven into the strategies and operations of joint and multinational forces.*

CHAPTER TWO

AIR FORCE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK

The supreme excellence is not to win a hundred victories in a hundred battles. The supreme excellence is to subdue the armies of your enemies without even having to fight them.

Sun Tzu

GENERAL

PSYOP are a vital part of the broad range of US political, military, economic, and informational activities. Psychological operations are guided by certain enduring principles and objectives. This chapter provides the framework which guides Air Force participation in PSYOP.

CATEGORIES OF PSYOP

As an integral part of US military response options, PSYOP are effective at all levels of warfare. Air Force aerospace forces can support and conduct PSYOP activities across the range of military operations. *Just as it is important to understand the differences between the PSYOP categories (strategic, operational, tactical, and consolidation), it is also important to understand that they may overlap.* There are no clear divisions between the start and end of a particular category of PSYOP. Actions in each category may start, stop, and restart during a campaign. These categories are intended to convey capabilities rather than outline employment guidelines. *Determination of the appropriate category, type, and method of PSYOP is the responsibility of the PSYOP planner.* With the narrowing of space and time due to technological advances, one cannot simply state that an action is strategic or tactical. For example, a target selected in part for its psychological impact on a tactical situation could have a more strategic effect on the adversary's will to fight; if a "tactical" leaflet is picked up and broadcast by an international news agency, the message may take on strategic significance.

Strategic

Strategic PSYOP are conducted on a global or regional basis in support of US goals and objectives. PSYOP may take many forms, to

include diplomatic positions, announcements, or communiqués. An increase in US military presence provides a powerful psychological message. Accordingly, the US may send an aerospace expeditionary task force (ASETF) to convey a message of US resolve and act as a powerful deterrent to foreign aggression. Strategic PSYOP are conducted predominantly outside the military arena but can utilize DOD assets and be supported by military PSYOP and other air operations (e.g., bombers were deployed to Guam and Diego Garcia to influence Iraqi leadership to allow on-site inspections.)

Operational

Operational PSYOP in Operation DESERT STORM

During Operation DESERT STORM, Air Force C-130s dropped leaflets and broadcast radio messages warning Iraqi soldiers that they would be bombed by the world's largest conventional bomb. The next day, the joint force commander (JFC) employed a series of BLU-82 airdrops. Shortly thereafter, the C-130s dropped leaflets announcing additional BLU-82 airdrops. The combination of the leaflets, radio broadcasts, and bombs were subsequently credited with directly causing a significant number of Iraqi desertions

Operational PSYOP are conducted in a defined geographic area to promote the effectiveness of a theater commander's objectives as well as theater campaigns and strategies. These operations are designed to strengthen US, allied, or coalition capabilities to conduct military operations in the theater and accomplish particular missions during crises and open hostilities. *They are conducted prior to and during war or conflict, and at the conclusion of open hostilities.* At the operational level, aerospace PSYOP can identify targets or centers of gravity with the greatest potential for psychological impact. Additionally, aerospace efforts may include leaflet drops, loudspeaker broadcasts, and airborne radio or television transmissions designed to encourage enemy forces to defect, desert, flee, or surrender, or undertake any other activity supportive of US objectives. *Additionally, if potential adversaries can be favorably influenced by PSYOP, confrontations may be avoided.* These efforts may also enhance force protection by influencing the local populace to report terrorist, sabotage, or other plans to attack US or friendly forces, thereby enabling the US to counter those plans. Persistent offensive attacks can have a synergistic effect with PSYOP accelerating the degradation of morale and encouraging desertion.

Tactical

Tactical PSYOP are normally conducted in conjunction with other tactical operations against opposing forces or audiences. *At this level, PSYOP are normally targeted for individual engagements.* Planners tailor persuasive communications, in a variety of media formats, for the foreign target audience. During Operation JUST CAUSE, Air Force aircraft supported tactical ground forces by broadcasting radio and television messages urging the Panamanian populace to remain in their homes—and out of harm's way. In similar situations, Air Force assets can be employed to broadcast radio, TV, and loudspeaker messages which may influence a wider audience.

Consolidation

Consolidation PSYOP aim to strengthen, or consolidate, US efforts in a given region. *Conducted in foreign areas where United States forces are operating and where an enemy or potentially hostile populace is also present,* consolidation PSYOP help influence the foreign populace to support US local objectives and allow the supported commanders operational freedom. Consolidation PSYOP may be particularly effective during foreign internal defense operations. For example, if US forces are helping a foreign government to remove land mines, PSYOP could publicize the effort to gain support from the local populace, hence

Air Force assets conduct and support all four categories of PSYOP.

creating a safer working environment for US personnel. Additionally, this would gain support for the foreign government as they are seen working to benefit their people.

PSYOP PRINCIPLES

Certain principles should be adhered to for effective employment of Air Force forces in support of either long- or short-term PSYOP. While the methods may vary with the target audience, the basic considerations are the same.



Figure 2.1. PSYOP Principles

- **Define clear PSYOP objectives** corresponding to the supported commander's vision of how the campaign should proceed. The objectives should be consistent with concurrent diplomatic, economic, political, informational, or multinational efforts. *A key PSYOP objective is to decrease the enemy's will to resist.* The psychological dimension of warfare affects those fighting the battle, their political and military leaders and staffs, and the civilian population. During military operations, US personnel prefer facing enemies who are unsure and confused about their cause and capabilities and certain of an impending defeat. Even if the enemy is unwilling to surrender, they may be influenced not to engage in combat. This goal may be difficult but, if possible, pays high dividends for US forces.
- **Base PSYOP themes, activities, and symbols on a thorough analysis of targets,** including friendly and adversary PSYOP capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses.
- **Use transmission medium or media which are reliable and readily accessible by target audiences.** US forces must ensure message media are tailored for the local populace. Media can range from leaflets, to posters, to radio, television, and digital broadcasts. E-mail, mass e-mail, and web page postings take advantage of newer technologies and may also be used to influence an audience. *Planners should ensure transmission media can reach and be understood by the target audience.*

- **Evaluate results for their relevance to the overall campaign objectives.** The commander's decision to terminate or revise PSYOP programs should be linked to the analysis of all-source intelligence. All friendly actions should be thoroughly evaluated for psychological implications, and where necessary, should be supported by deliberate PSYOP actions to offset potentially negative effects or to reinforce positive effects. To the extent possible, PSYOP should be tested in advance of use to determine possible outcomes.

PSYOP OBJECTIVES

Effective PSYOP provide the NCA and joint force commander (JFC) unique leverage by influencing targeted foreign groups, key political and military leaders, and governments to act in a manner compatible with US goals and objectives. *PSYOP are low-cost, high-impact tools which allow the JFC to directly communicate with and influence an adversary or selected foreign audience.* By implanting the correct message in an enemy's mind, PSYOP may preclude the need to employ additional combat forces. When combat is unavoidable, effective PSYOP can reduce the period of conflict. PSYOP, a nonkinetic weapon within the IO arsenal, can magnify the political, military, and economic instruments of national power. PSYOP objectives can be categorized into three main areas: general, military operations other than war (MOOTW), and war.

General

- Reduce the efficiency of opposing forces.
- Advance US or multinational efforts by modifying or influencing attitudes and behaviors of selected audiences.
- Obtain the cooperation of multinational partners and neutrals.

Military Operations Other Than War

- Support the elements of US national policy objectives, national security strategy, and national military strategy.
- Modify the behavior of selected target audiences toward US and multinational capabilities.
- Support the theater CINC's regional security strategy objectives.
- Support the objectives of the country team.

- Promote the ability of the host nation to defend itself against internal and external threats.
- Gain and sustain foreign popular belief in, and support for, US and multinational goals and objectives.
- Deter adversary powers or groups from interfering with friendly operations or initiating actions detrimental to the interests of the US or its multinational partners.
- Increase foreign popular support for US and multinational military operations.
- Support other IO elements.
- Diminish the legitimacy and credibility of the adversary political system.
- Shift the loyalty of adversary forces and their supporters to friendly powers.
- Diminish support and increase reporting of terrorist, sabotage, or other attack plans against US activities and resources outside the continental United States.
- Publicize beneficial reforms and programs to be implemented after defeat of the adversary power.
- Support and enhance foreign humanitarian assistance, foreign internal defense, and foreign nation assistance military operations.
- Facilitate reorganization and control of occupied or liberated areas in conjunction with civil-military operations.

War

- Project the image of a strong, technologically superior, well-prepared US military force that will win on the battlefield and protect the US, its friends, and multinational partners whenever necessary.
- Foster an understanding of US political policies, aims, and objectives.
- Foster support for multinational operations.
- Arouse foreign public opinion or political pressures for (or against) a military operation.
- Undermine confidence in adversary leadership.

- ✪ Lower the morale and combat efficiency of adversary forces.
- ✪ Increase the psychological impact of US and multinational combat power.
- ✪ Support other elements of IO.
- ✪ Counter hostile foreign psychological operations and propaganda efforts.
- ✪ Influence the development of adversary strategy and tactics.

Powerful Effects of PSYOP

...incessant aerial pounding can break a unit without destroying all, or even a majority, of its parts. The real limit is the ability of the troops to absorb the pounding, since individual decisions to cease fire will eventually render the unit useless tactically. Soldiers may desert (leave their unit and go home), defect (present themselves as prisoners), or, if unable to leave the killing ground, desert in place, that is, consciously or unconsciously cease to be a functioning member of the unit. Backing up the aerial bombardment by specific suggestions through psychological operations radio, leaflets, and loudspeakers can speed up the process if the bombardment is perceived as personally threatening by the members of the unit. ...Iraqi prisoners were very specific about the effect the bombing of other units within earshot had on their combat capability and morale. ...They also confirmed the importance of random bombing in inducing helplessness and surrender among enemy troops before launching a ground assault.

Gulf War Air Power Survey, 1993

- ✪ Amplify economic and other nonviolent forms of sanctions against an adversary.

COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

As an integral part of the joint team, air commanders should be aware of the unique contributions aerospace power makes to PSYOP. *Commanders need to recognize that although they may not command dedicated PSYOP units, they possess aerospace, communications, and computer equipment that may prove extremely valuable in achieving PSYOP objectives.* Commanders need to evaluate the potential psychological effects and implications of all contemplated courses of action, addressing both intended and unintended consequences of military operations. Commanders should also ensure their staffs understand how PSYOP support can be

obtained from national and theater resources, and how they are applied to Air Force mission objectives. Finally, commanders should realize that PSYOP are most effective when planning is done early and in conjunction with broader information operations planning and the overall air campaign planning process. *Early planning and employment of PSYOP is essential.*

CHAPTER THREE

COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND ORGANIZATION

The courage and morale of an army have always increased its physical strength, and always will.

Carl von Clausewitz

GENERAL

Air Force PSYOP command and control arrangements should be flexible to adapt to different requirements. Because of its strategic and operational importance, PSYOP planning is normally centralized at the combatant command level. Similarly, when the combatant commander activates a subordinate joint force (subordinate unified command or JTF), PSYOP planning is normally centralized within a joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF) at that level. Air Force PSYOP planners on the theater PSYOP staff should coordinate closely with the theater joint force air component commander (JFACC) staff to enhance effectiveness, ensure compliance with NCA direction, and to coordinate and deconflict PSYOP messages.

COMMAND

JFCs delegate the appropriate level of authority in accordance with guidelines in JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces. JP 0-2 details the assignment and purposes of the different types of command authority, including combatant command (command authority) (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), support, and coordinating authority.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS

Joint force commanders normally exercise OPCON of assigned and attached PSYOP forces through the subunified or component commander best suited for successful mission support and execution. *US Air Force conventional air assets are normally under the OPCON of the Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR), who should normally be designated the JFACC. Special operations forces (SOF) aviation assets, including PSYOP-dedicated assets, normally remain under the OPCON of the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) or the commander of the joint spe-*

cial operations task force (JSOTF). OPCON of SOF aviation is exercised through the joint special operations air component commander (JSOACC). The commander of the JPOTF normally exercises TACON of US Air Force assets when performing the PSYOP mission.

ORGANIZATION OF PSYOP FORCES

The organization of PSYOP forces is generally dictated by the nature and scale of the joint PSYOP mission. The organization may vary depending on the nature of the mission, the availability and qualification of assets and personnel, and the supported commander's assess-



1. Theater CINC exercises COCOM of assigned forces through the JFC.
2. The information warfare specialty team, which is embedded in the JAOC, has Air Force PSYOP personnel assigned.
3. Multipurpose Air Force PSYOP assets normally remain under the OPCON of their functional component commander and are only placed under the TACON of the JPOTF commander, if designated, when conducting joint PSYOP (e.g., F-16s can drop leaflets but normally remain OPCON to JFACC; COMMANDO SOLO can support PSYOP, but normally remains OPCON to JFSOCC).

Figure 3.1. Typical command relationship for a JPOTF

ment of the PSYOP requirement. To assess the situation, the supported commander may request a PSYOP assessment team. This team confers with the commander, develops the PSYOP objectives, and recommends the appropriate component mix of personnel and equipment to accomplish the mission.

If the team determines that additional PSYOP forces are required to accomplish the JFC objectives, a JPOTF may be required. *The JPOTF normally remains under the control of the JFC to provide a centralized PSYOP focus* (see figure 3.1). If a JPOTF is established, Air Force planners should be prepared to advise JPOTF personnel on Air Force PSYOP capabilities to ensure smooth planning, coordination, and mission execution. Targeting and the application of aerospace forces to achieve PSYOP objectives are key aspects of Air Force PSYOP.

AIR RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES

The majority of US PSYOP capability is maintained in the reserve components. *When mobilized (selective, partial or full mobilization), a significant portion of the Air Force's PSYOP capability becomes available for employment by the supported combatant commander.* Early identification and activation of Air Reserve Component (ARC) PSYOP forces is essential to ensure forces arrive on time, fully prepared to conduct required PSYOP. Both active and reserve forces which provide PSYOP capability should be identified in the theater time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) to ensure theater PSYOP objectives and operations are not delayed.

Air Intelligence Agency

The Air Intelligence Agency is the "functional manager" for psychological operations in the Air Force. Headquarters (HQ), AIA has responsibility for PSYOP activities not already assigned to HQ USAF/Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (XOI) and HQ Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). AIA will assign PSYOP-trained IO specialists to the information operations flights at selected numbered air forces (NAFs), theater air component commands, or standing AOC organizations. AIA will also make available a PSYOP reach-back capability.

USAF MAJCOMs/Theater Air Components/NAFs

Selected MAJCOMs with in-garrison or active AOC organizations, selected theater air components, and selected NAFs will have a

PSYOP-trained IO specialist, normally assigned to an information operations flight. In times of conflict, the PSYOP-trained personnel should be assigned to the information warfare specialty team in the AOC. PSYOP officers ensure PSYOP targets supporting the CINC's theater PSYOP campaign and recommended by the JPOTF are integrated and sourced as part of the daily air tasking order.

CHAPTER FOUR

AIR FORCE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLANNING AND EXECUTION

> ***PSYOP contributed significantly to the collapse and defeat of the Iraqi army.***
>
> ***Conduct of the Persian Gulf War***
> ***Final Report to Congress***
> **April 1992**

GENERAL

The Air Force has unique characteristics that allow application of aerospace power in a broad range of mission areas. Although PSYOP messages have traditionally been associated with written and verbal communications, aerospace power can support theater PSYOP efforts in three primary ways. First, *psychosocial criteria can be part of the target development process,* ensuring that aerospace power achieves maximum psychological effect. Second, *specially equipped Air Force aircraft can transmit messages* over communications media such as radio and television or can airdrop leaflets. Third, *US aircraft, by their dynamic presence and actions, transmit an unmistakable psychological message* to most adversaries. The mere threat or presence of superior Air Force aircraft can ground an enemy's air force and demoralize their army and civilian population or promote stability. Air Force satellites and aerial reconnaissance photos can also be used to support PSYOP targeting and discredit adversary claims or intentions. Finally, *aerospace power can be used to "bomb for effect."* Examples include: use of massive and persistent bombing of military targets; use of the BLU-82, precision-guided munitions to destroy specific targets; as well as use of unopposed high-speed, low-level ingress or egress flights for noise and shock value. Aerospace power is versatile—using it to further theater PSYOP objectives is one valuable application of that power.

CENTRALIZED PLANNING

PSYOP, like other information operations, rely on a synergistic application of all tools to gain the desired effect. **Planning joint air support for PSYOP should be conducted by the information warfare specialty team integrated into the joint air operations center (JAOC).**

This is accomplished through extensive coordination by Air Force PSYOP planners working with the JPOTF, if established. PSYOP messages must be coordinated with other elements of IO (such as public affairs, counterintelligence, deception, and operations security [OPSEC]) and with information warfare planners to ensure consistency to achieve the desired effects. When developing strategies and long-range plans, air campaign planners should consider PSYOP when employing aerospace power to achieve theater objectives. Lethal use of airpower may have a resulting significant psychological impact, but this by-product of air operations should not automatically be considered PSYOP. PSYOP are approved operations with the express purpose to influence the attitudes, emotions, motives, reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of a targeted audience. *Anything we do to an opponent, intended or unintended, may have a psychological effect, but—PSYOP are planned applications of action to achieve or exploit a desired effect.*

PSYOP AND THE AIR CAMPAIGN PLANNING PROCESS

The JFC should consider conducting PSYOP using aerospace power to achieve theater objectives. Theater PSYOP will be planned by the JPOTF and integrated into the air campaign by air planners. PSYOP planners must be aware of deception operations, electronic warfare, and other information operations that could negatively affect PSYOP (or vice versa) on the same target, target area, or target population. *As with other Air Force capabilities, air campaign planners should consider and integrate PSYOP throughout planning and execution of the air campaign.*

Air campaign planners employ Air Force PSYOP capabilities to exploit culturally-based values, symbols, and behaviors; historical themes; past war experiences; military doctrines; and the personal idiosyncrasies of leaders to target an adversary's political, economic, and military systems. Ultimately, campaign planners employ PSYOP to defeat the enemy's strategy. Part of the air campaign planning process involves determining the centers of gravity (COG). *Enemy COGs can be attacked directly or indirectly.* Direct attacks physically attack a COG and engage it in decisive combat. Indirect attacks cause the downfall of the COG by attacking its supporting elements until the COG collapses of its own weight or is rendered ineffective. *Because PSYOP target adversary's attitudes, emotions, reasoning, and behavior, and are not necessarily intended to destroy the enemy, these operations are normally considered indirect operations.*

COMMANDO SOLO is dedicated to PSYOP and civil affairs broadcasting.

The ultimate goal of the air campaign planning process is an effective air campaign which achieves theater objectives. The air campaign plan harmonizes and integrates joint air operations in support of joint force objectives. The planners identify COG targets, prioritize them, indicate the level of effort, and phase required missions in relation to the JFC's plan (and in relation to each other). The plan typically contains traditional Air Force missions such as strategic attack, counterair operations, interdiction, close air support, and maritime support operations. However, *this is also an opportunity to integrate Air Force assets fully in support of other uses of airpower, such as PSYOP. Trained PSYOP planners ensure psychological factors and objectives are considered when developing the air campaign plan.*

INTEGRATING AIR FORCE PSYOP INTO THE JOINT PSYOP CAMPAIGN

Air Force PSYOP must be closely coordinated with the joint PSYOP planning staff. The JPOTF, if activated, is responsible for managing and integrating theater PSYOP and for ensuring component operations are consistent with theater PSYOP objectives. If a JPOTF is not formed, a clearly identifiable and empowered PSYOP representative should be present and active in all planning activities. *Independent operations could*

undermine theater PSYOP objectives, and degrade overall JFC objectives. Once JFC objectives are known, Air Force PSYOP opportunities and options will be identified and recommended to the JPOTF or the joint PSYOP staff. *Air Force or air component planners may develop PSYOP products, but the JTF commander or the commander, joint psychological task force (COMJPOTF) must approve the products prior to use.*

Air Force PSYOP planning is conducted within the information warfare (IW) specialty team assigned to the JFACC staff. The team has expertise from all major IO disciplines and is responsible for integrating IW, including PSYOP, into an overall JFACC air campaign. The IW team is the JFACC's conduit to both the special operations liaison element (SOLE) for EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO expertise, and to the Air Force liaison officer to the JPOTF.

The Psychological Impact of Airpower

Coalition strategy also benefited immensely from psychological operations, the success of which is evidenced primarily by the large number of Iraqi soldiers who deserted Iraqi ranks or surrendered without putting up any resistance during the ground offensive. Our efforts built on, among other factors, the disheartening effect on Iraqi troops of the unanswered and intensive Coalition aerial bombardment, the privations they suffered due to the degradation of the Iraqi logistic system, and the threat of the impending ground campaign. Radio transmissions and leaflets exploited this demoralization by explaining to the Iraqi troops how to surrender and assuring them of humane treatment if they did. More specific messages reduced Iraqi readiness by warning troops to stay away from their equipment (which was vulnerable to attack by precision munitions) and induced desertions by warning troops that their positions were about to be attacked by B-52s.

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War
Final Report to Congress
April 1992

PSYOP FORCES IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Aircrew members and support personnel trained to conduct or support PSYOP for combat operations normally do not require additional training to conduct PSYOP for MOOTW. *However, there may be requirements for unique support capabilities, such as intelligence personnel, political military affairs personnel, and other area specialists.* Through humanitarian operations, PSYOP can align foreign governments with the US, thus averting possible future confrontations.

Employment of PSYOP is not only a wartime option. Aircrew members and support personnel hone their wartime skills through training, exercises, and other "peacetime" activities. PSYOP may be employed, either overtly or covertly to gain support, prevent hostility or support long term national objectives. *To be most effective, PSYOP must be exercised and employed frequently in all environments.* It should become almost an unconscious act to employ PSYOP in all activities involving any sized military force.

Specialized training allows PSYOP personnel to understand a potential adversary's thought process and to predict possible enemy and friendly actions to manipulate favorable outcomes. As during war, personnel participating in MOOTW must have a thorough understanding of the rules of engagement (ROE). Tightened ROE further challenge military support during peacetime engagement. Rules may be so constrained that use of conventional forces and means are not possible. Judge advocates advise personnel on legal issues, including rules of engagement—PSYOP participants should seek advice from assigned judge advocates regarding applicable ROE. AFDD 2-3, *Military Operations Other Than War*, provides detailed guidance on employing aerospace assets during MOOTW.

CHAPTER FIVE

AIR FORCE PSYOP SUPPORT AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

> ***True economy of force is using the indirect approach to effect a psychological defeat without engaging in actual combat.***
>
> **Liddell Hart**

INTELLIGENCE

Effective PSYOP actions depend upon timely and accurate intelligence information. Although intelligence personnel may be assigned to and deploy with dedicated PSYOP units, they rely heavily on external intelligence sources and systems. Air Force units which may be tasked to support PSYOP objectives should be cognizant of the intelligence required and available to achieve those objectives. *Because the threat situation and PSYOP requirements are constantly changing, intelligence personnel need access to near-real-time, all-source intelligence* from Service (Air Intelligence Agency), theater (joint intelligence centers), and national (Defense Intelligence Agency and National Air Intelligence Center) intelligence components. Forward deployed expeditionary forces must have sufficient communications connectivity with these supporting agencies to ensure responsive reachback and timely information exchange. *More importantly, intelligence participation in PSYOP requires an extensive peacetime or precrisis/conflict commitment to intelligence preparation of the battlespace.*

Air Force human intelligence (HUMINT) personnel with target country language capability may be available to assist in the planning, deployment, and execution of a PSYOP mission. HUMINT personnel provide cultural understanding, foreign area expertise, and language skills which are necessary to work with coalition forces and foreign nation government and civilian entities.

Simply put, PSYOP require a broad array of military, political, social, and economic intelligence on potential adversaries. The rapid nature of warfare presents a significant challenge for collecting, analyzing, and displaying this intelligence during the crisis or conflict phase of an operation. In addition, "damage assessment" presents an equal or greater challenge to intelligence personnel in the PSYOP arena than to those en-

gaged in strategic attack, interdiction, or close air support operations. Intelligence personnel should identify in advance the sources of information they can call upon to help assess the effectiveness of PSYOP. Collection, analysis, and reporting procedures should be developed, coordinated, and practiced until they are institutionalized and personnel are proficient. For additional intelligence information, see AFDD 2-5.2, *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations*.

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTERS

Command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems facilitate the execution of command and control (C2) and its supporting functions. C4 systems are essential for planning, mounting, and sustaining successful joint PSYOP. Rapid, reliable, redundant, and secure communications between staffs and components are required for planning and conducting successful joint PSYOP. PSYOP communications should be structured to support centralized control and decentralized execution. *Air Force PSYOP communications should be integrated with the joint PSYOP secure voice, data, and satellite networks.* Communica-

Space-based capabilities make our PSYOP forces more effective. Voice communications and data transfer provided by this MILSTAR satellite are only one example.

tions and computer resources (information technology including visual information technology) must be designed to support electronic generation, distribution, and dissemination of PSYOP information against selected targets as an extension of information warfare.

By their nature, PSYOP demand high capacity, secure command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems to gather, analyze, prepare, staff, and distribute PSYOP products. Although they possess sophisticated PSYOP support and communications systems, *PSYOP forces rely on other agencies and systems for essential information and intelligence.*

LOGISTICS

Air Force PSYOP planners should provide sustainment requirements to Air Force logisticians during both deliberate and crisis action planning. Before any PSYOP plan is executed, planners need to coordinate all aspects of logistics supportability. *Logistics planners work closely with joint operations planners to bring operating supplies, repair parts, and major end-items for PSYOP-peculiar equipment into the theater.* This should ensure continuous sustainment and support of the PSYOP plan; it also will ensure requirements are included in the operation plan or operation order TPFDD.

Since most PSYOP involve operating from deployed locations, **dedicated Air Force PSYOP units develop mobility packages by establishing unit type codes (UTCs)** consisting of operations, intelligence, maintenance, and other support personnel required to manage deployed Air Force PSYOP. These UTCs should be built to respond to requirements across the range of military operations.

To ensure timely notification of Air Force PSYOP units and assets, MAJCOMs with dedicated PSYOP assets should ensure resources are identified in the appropriate TPFDD. While UTCs are normally placed in regional TPFDDs, forces should be ready to respond to all requirements. Air Force PSYOP forces should be able to execute time-sensitive deployments. Dedicated PSYOP units can deploy with minimal organic logistics support, contributing to their mobility, flexibility, and responsiveness. Additional maintenance and support personnel, as well as associated equipment, normally require airlift support or surface transportation for deployment. Air Force PSYOP assets should also be adequately supported by readiness spares packages for extended deployments.

OPERATIONS SECURITY

Air Force PSYOP forces should be prepared to respond to sensitive taskings and to maintain the strictest OPSEC requirements. *Security of information is vitally important to PSYOP forces from initial deployment through the recovery phase.* OPSEC denies the enemy valuable information about friendly capabilities and intentions, including advance notice of mission unique training, joint preparations, deployment, and employment. Air Force personnel do this by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators and actions associated with planning and conducting military operations and activities. *Failure to implement an effective OPSEC program could result in mission compromise and loss of personnel and resources.*

MILITARY DECEPTION

> ***All warfare is based on deception.***
>
> **Sun Tzu**

In a sophisticated battle environment, the JFC will use the necessary tools to accomplish the mission. One effective means of gaining an advantage over the enemy is to build military deception into battle plans and individual missions. **Air Force PSYOP forces must ensure military deception does not adversely affect the credibility of PSYOP.** PSYOP and deception both can create significant holes in the enemy's morale and fighting capability. PSYOP and military deception can be employed separately; however, military deception plans can take advantage of PSYOP themes to enhance planning opportunities. *Therefore, coordination is imperative between military deception and PSYOP planners.* Imaginative application of deception principles, coupled with aggressive training and execution, can result in improved combat effectiveness at all levels, particularly when employed synergistically with PSYOP.

LEGAL

PSYOP personnel will seek the advice of the assigned judge advocate in connection with the political and legal implications of their operations. Commanders at all levels must consult their legal advisors on the legal aspects of specific operations. *Commanders must keep*

their legal advisors informed on all aspects of plans, policies, directives, and doctrine.

TECHNOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

As potential enemies become increasingly sophisticated, their levels of technology, communications, and mass media will mature. **The Air Force dedicated PSYOP capability needs to keep pace with future threat environments** by ensuring its forces are equipped with state-of-the-art acquisitions and upgrades. These new technologies should enhance the joint PSYOP capability, ultimately degrading the enemy's fighting capability. *Effective integration of new Air Force PSYOP technologies will reduce the number and severity of future lethal engagements.*

PSYOP forces need to defend their critical information and support systems. Alternate production and delivery methods must be identified. PSYOP personnel should be capable of switching quickly from sophisticated (high technology based) to unsophisticated (manually produced) products if required.

METEOROLOGICAL AND OCEANOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS

Timely and accurate meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) information is important for success of PSYOP missions and must be considered and implemented during all phases of planning and execution. *METOC conditions can degrade or enhance PSYOP* depending upon the extent of effects and how well they are considered in the planning process. Air Force units participating in PSYOP should have ready access to METOC information required to plan and conduct PSYOP and to achieve theater PSYOP objectives. PSYOP should be supported by a single coordinated mission forecast produced by a centralized METOC unit that is tailored to the specific mission needs by METOC personnel at the mission execution level. Timely and accurate launch, recovery, and target area forecasts will enhance the decision-making process by allowing PSYOP personnel to use the weather to minimize exposure to threats. *Key forecast elements include (but are not limited to) weather hazards to air operations, target wind profiles, atmospheric and space environment effects on electromagnetic propagation, atmospheric effects on acoustic propagation, and target area precipitation.* Rapid, reliable communications for conveying information between METOC units and PSYOP forces are essential.

TARGETING

PSYOP planners should understand how campaign plans are implemented through targeting and the daily ATO process. Since Doolittle's raid on the Japanese homeland, it has been clear that the targets of aerospace power should be considered for psychological impact as well as destructive effect. Otherwise, attacks upon an adversary are not optimized. Access to the targeting planning process allows PSYOP planners to analyze all targets and determine possible PSYOP impacts and effects. PSYOP must be quick to respond to changes on targets and to develop tailored products to exploit opportunities. When possible, combining lethal and nonlethal targets will greatly improve effectiveness.

To be effective, PSYOP must reach their intended audience. Although some means involve indirect contact, many other PSYOP actions or products require direct contact. To this end, PSYOP planners must be familiar with the various means of tailoring and delivering the PSYOP message. Chief among these are standoff broadcasts and hardcopy products that have traditionally represented the art of persuasive communication in the battlespace. Air Force assets are essential to deliver these PSYOP products. With the explosion of electronic media, however, new and perhaps more efficient applications will emerge.

Each Air Force PSYOP planner must understand the requirements for PSYOP targeting. Knowledge of leaflets and leaflet delivery containers as well as the delivery characteristics of bombs is important; all are part of normal target planning. Weather planning is another important consideration. As new methods and systems are developed, PSYOP planners, along with other Air Force targeting personnel, must practice planning and procedures.

Reaching an Audience

Leaflets and other forms of printed PSYOP proved especially effective in terms of audience penetration. Of the targeted audience—300,000-plus Iraqi troops—calculations based on enemy prisoner of war (EPW) interviews suggest that approximately 98 percent read or were otherwise exposed to the 29 million leaflets dropped in theater. Most EPWs were found clutching leaflets in their hands or hiding them somewhere in their uniforms.

***Gulf War Air Power Survey*, 1993**

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL CONSIDERATIONS

PSYOP assets are not equipped to conduct sustained operations in nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environments. Planners must consider the effects of NBC environments and plan for limited operations, or select alternate locations for PSYOP product production and delivery.

CHAPTER SIX

PREPARATION FOR PSYOP

> ***If we should have to fight, we should be prepared to do so from the neck up instead of from the neck down.***
>
> **Jimmy Doolittle**

COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

Commanders of units that routinely conduct or support PSYOP should ensure their personnel are familiar with the principles, objectives, and responsibilities outlined in this document. Airmen and support personnel need to understand how their operations contribute to the JFC's overall PSYOP campaign. Additionally, commanders should continually evaluate their training programs to ensure realistic aircrew training meets known operational taskings and supports joint PSYOP interoperability concepts. AFDD 2-4.3, *Education and Training*, provides guidance on training and educating aerospace forces.

TRAINING

Air Force units should participate in joint training which emphasizes command and control arrangements and joint interoperability, as well as joint tactics, techniques, and procedures required to conduct the PSYOP mission. As an example, Air Force units tasked to conduct leaflet operations should be familiar with joint coordination procedures, ballistic information (provided by requester), computer procedures, and dispersion characteristics for leaflets they may airdrop. In addition, these units should conduct training airdrops to evaluate their capability.

It is important to point out that PSYOP training is not only for PSYOP units. All mission planners should understand PSYOP objectives and consider how their missions can best support those objectives. This does not imply that PSYOP are all-important, but rather that all effects must be weighed when selecting courses of action.

EXERCISES

Air Force PSYOP personnel and assets should be scheduled to participate regularly in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and other PSYOP-related exercises. *The top priority should be to participate in exercises providing realistic training for aircrew, staff, and support personnel.* Participation in exercises with insufficient PSYOP participation or without realistic training wastes valuable time and resources and may unnecessarily limit the availability of scarce PSYOP resources for real-world requirements. Exercise planners need to consider participation in command post exercises to train PSYOP staff and liaison personnel. Liaison personnel should be employed not only for individual training but to advise other staffs of Air Force PSYOP capabilities and limitations.

WARGAMING, MODELING, AND SIMULATION

Wargaming, modeling, and simulation can be used to examine and demonstrate the utility of dedicated PSYOP forces and conventional forces supporting PSYOP objectives to affect the outcome of joint operations. These useful tools save thousands of dollars in deployment costs and are also valuable for training staff and liaison personnel.

As with other indirect effects, PSYOP are diffucult to assess in wargames.

Accurately modeling the effects of PSYOP is difficult. Cross-cultural, personalities, and other human factors must be considered. Continued development of these models is needed to predict effectiveness of specific PSYOP measures on differing individuals under varied conditions.

EDUCATION

Air Force personnel who plan, coordinate, or conduct PSYOP should attend specially developed PSYOP courses. Responsibility for joint PSYOP training belongs to the Joint Staff and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as the executive agent. Certain MAJCOMs conduct courses specifically aimed at meeting these training requirements. Personnel who may be involved in PSYOP support should receive a general orientation on PSYOP execution and capabilities.

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Army Field Manual 33-1, *Psychological Operations.* 1993

Joint Publication 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations,* 1996

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Glossary

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFDD	Air Force doctrine document
AFRC	Air Force Reserve Command
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
AIA	Air Intelligence Agency
AOC	air operations center
ARC	Air Reserve Component
ASETF	aerospace expeditionary task force
ATO	air tasking order
C2	command and control
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CI	counterinformation
CINC	commander in chief
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
COG	center of gravity
COMAFFOR	Commander, Air Force Forces
COMJPOTF	commander, joint psychological operations task force
COMSOC	Commander, Special Operations Component
DCI	defensive counterinformation
DOD	Department of Defense
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
HQ	headquarters
HUMINT	human intelligence
IIW	information-in-warfare
IO	information operations
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IW	information warfare
JAOC	joint air operations center
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFLCC	joint force land component commander

JFMCC	joint force maritime component commander
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
JP	joint publication
JPOTF	joint psychological operations task force
JSOACC	joint special operations air component commander
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JTF	joint task force
MAJCOM	major command
METOC	meteorological and oceanographic
MOOTW	military operations other than war
NAF	numbered air force
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
OCI	offensive counterinformation
OODA	observe, orient, decide, and act
OPCON	operational control
OPSEC	operations security
PSYOP	psychological operations
ROE	rules of engagement
SOF	special operations forces
SOLE	special operations liaison element
TACON	tactical control
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USCINCSOC	Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UTC	unit type code

Definitions

battlespace. The commander's conceptual view of the area and factors that he must understand to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and complete the mission. It encompasses all applicable aspects of air, sea, space, and land operations that the commander must consider in planning and executing military operations. The battlespace dimensions

can change over time as the mission expands or contracts according to operational objectives and force composition. Battlespace provides the commander a mental forum for analyzing and selecting courses of action for employing military forces in relationship to time, tempo, and depth. (AFDD 1)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (JP 1–02) *[They exist at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.]* {Italicized portion in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called **COCOM.** See also operational control; tactical control. (JP 1-02)

consolidation psychological operations. Psychological operations conducted in foreign areas inhabited by an enemy or potentially hostile populace and occupied by United States forces, or in which United States forces are based, designed to produce behaviors by the foreign populace that support United States objectives in the area. (JP 1-02)

doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02)

EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO. An airborne electronic broadcasting system utilizing the EC-130E aircraft. COMMANDO SOLO conducts PSYOP and civil affairs broadcasts in the standard AM, FM, HF, TV, and military communications bands. (Special Operations Forces Reference Manual)

information-in-warfare. Involves the Air Force's extensive capabilities to provide global awareness throughout the range of military operations based on integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; its information collection/dissemination activities; and its global navigation and positioning, weather, and communications capabilities. Also called **IIW.** (AFDD 2-5)

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called **IO.** (JP 1-02) The Air Force believes that in practice a more useful working definition is: *[Those actions taken to gain, exploit, defend or attack information and information systems and include both information-in-warfare and information warfare.]* {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity}. (AFDD 2-5)

information superiority. The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. Also called **IS.** (JP 1-02) The Air Force prefers to cast 'superiority' as a state of relative advantage, not a capability, and views IS as: *[That degree of dominance in the information domain which allows friendly forces the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information without effective opposition.]* {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.} (AFDD 2-5)

information warfare. Information operations conducted during time of crises or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Also called **IW.** (JP 1-02). The Air Force believes that, because the defensive component of IW is always engaged, a better definition is: *[Information operations conducted to defend one's own information and information systems, or to attack and affect an adversary's information and information systems.]* {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity}. (AFDD 2-5)

joint air operations center. A jointly staffed facility established for planning, directing, and executing joint air operations in support of the joint

force commander's operation or campaign objectives. Also called **JAOC.** (JP 1-02)

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force special operations component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called **JFSOCC.** (JP 1-02)

joint psychological operations task force. A joint special operations task force composed of headquarters and operational assets. The joint psychological operation task force assists the joint force commander in developing strategic, operational, and tactical psychological operation plans for a theater campaign or other operations. The joint psychological operations task force may have conventional or special operations psychological units assigned or attached to support the joint task force commander. Also called **JPOTF.** (JP 1-02)

joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called **JSOTF.** (JP 1-02)

military deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The five categories of military deception are: 1. strategic military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of senior military commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator's strategic military objectives, poli-

cies, and operations. 2. Operational military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and conducted in a theater of war to support campaigns and major operations. 3. Tactical military deception— Military deception planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator's objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support battles and engagements. 4. Service military deception—Military deception planned and executed by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems. 5. Military deception in support of operations security (OPSEC)— Military deception planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called **OPCON.** See also **combatant command (command authority); tactical control.** (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **PSYOP.** (JP 1-02)

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called **PA.** (JP 1-02)

special operations forces. Those active and reserve component forces of the military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called **SOF.** (JP 1-02)

special operations liaison element. A special operations liaison team provided by the joint force special operations component commander to the joint force air component commander (if designated) to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations air and surface operations with conventional air operations. Also called **SOLE.** (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called **TACON.** See also **combatant command (command authority); operational control.** (JP 1-02)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 31 August 1979

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

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FOREWORD

Psychological factors are an integral part of all battlefields. Each unit movement and every conquest of terrain psychologically affect the battlefield participants and an audience of friendly, neutral, or hostile groups. The psychological effect of combat actions can be seen in the heightened morale of a successful unit or in the discouragement and fear of a defeated unit. Properly manipulated attitudes can modify the behavior and the combat effectiveness of the soldier and the unit.

This manual provides information and guidance for the conduct of psychological operations (PSYOP) in general, limited, and cold war. The doctrine, techniques, and procedures found herein are applicable to conventional warfare, unconventional warfare (UW), and foreign internal defense (FID) operations. This manual should be used in conjunction with other official manuals and publications that provide staff organization procedures and guidance for doctrine, field operations, and maintenance of equipment.

This manual is divided into two parts:

Part One is an easy-to-read, ready reference for the combat commander and tells what psychological operations can do and how they can be used to achieve a quicker victory, conserve valuable resources, and save the lives of US and friendly personnel.

Part Two is for the PSYOP commander, unit, and staff personnel and others with an interest in or need for the details of psychological operations.

Definitions of PSYOP basic terms are in appendix H.

Users of this manual are encouraged to submit comments and to recommend changes for its improvement. Comments/recommendations should be keyed to the specific page and line of text and be fully explained. Forward your comments to the **Commandant, US Army Institute for Military Assistance, ATTN: ATSU-TD-TS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307.**

The use of the pronouns "he," "his," "himself," etc., in this manual includes both masculine and feminine genders. Any exception to this will be so noted.

PART ONE



PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND THE COMBAT COMMANDER

Chapter One

1

INTRODUCTION

Psychological operations used for the purpose of creating a favorable image, gaining adherents, and undermining opponents have become a major weapon of 20th century warfare.

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BACKGROUND

MAJOR PSYOP EFFORTS SINCE WORLD WAR II

Since World War II, the major PSYOP effort of the United States has been by the Department of State (STATE); subsequently, the United States Information Agency (USIA) which included the Voice of America (VOA); and now the International Communication Agency (ICA) which replaced USIA.

During the Korean conflict, organization and techniques for tactical PSYOP improved. In the Vietnam action, much PSYOP activity was initiated, emphasized, and refined.

The Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was created by the National Security Council (NSC) in 1965 to centralize PSYOP policy and insure control of PSYOP activities in Vietnam. Formed at the counselor level in the Embassy, this joint office included representatives from civilian and military US Government agencies. In addition to carrying out the normal mission of the United States Information Service (USIS), the JUSPAO provided PSYOP policy and direction to the US and Free World Assistance Forces in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

To insure unity of effort, PSYOP plans of the United States and Vietnam were coordinated at the national level (US Embassy and Government of Vietnam). Coordinating committees were also formed at the region and province level.

As the result of the adoption of a central manager concept (centralized guidance and decentralized execution), all policy stemmed from one source--JUSPAO at the Embassy--with operational discretion permitted at lower levels of command.

Technical advances which increased the PSYOP potential included:

Standardized propaganda developed by JUSPAO was available to tactical units by air delivery to major distribution points.

Printing facilities out of country produced mass printings of leaflets and newspapers.

Master catalogs of themes were distributed. (Upon request, these themes were made into leaflets.)

Television was first used as an instrument of strategic propaganda.

A small adapter named "Early Word" made it possible for airborne transmission of PSYOP appeals directly through an aircraft-mounted loudspeaker system. A radio signal received by the aircraft could be simultaneously taped in the aircraft for further replay.

Tactical limitations depended only on the range of the ground transmitter and the enemy air defense system.

Support to tactical operations was modernized. Loudspeaker support was readily available to ground commanders who could easily adapt themes to their particular situation (i.e., search and destroy operations, among others).

PSYOP TODAY

Today US Army Reserve (USAR) PSYOP units furnish PSYOP support and expertise to the active army. Several Army commands have established mutual support agreements with specific USAR units to augment active army units for combat.

PSYOP RESPONSIBILITIES

THE ARMED SERVICES

Each of the military services provides forces to accomplish its assigned PSYOP mission. Although the US Army has the principal US military PSYOP capability, other services can support the PSYOP efforts. Coordination among all military services and government agencies is required to insure unity of effort, uniformity of policy, and adequacy of coverage.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as advisers and military staff in the operational chain of command for unified and specified commands. They provide a channel of communications for the President and Secretary of Defense to unified and specified commands, and coordinate all communications in matters of joint interest addressed to these commands. Under this authority, US Army PSYOP forces assigned to theater army or corps in times of crises or during a state of hostilities are placed under operational control or in support of the commander of the unified command. Through the JCS or the unified command, US Army PSYOP units may be tasked to assist other US military or civilian agencies.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Department of the Army develops PSYOP resources to support general, limited, cold war, and foreign internal defense. In DA, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations

(DCSOPS) has staff responsibility for PSYOP. US Army PSYOP resources include command and staff personnel, units, advisers, and equipment. The flow of PSYOP policy from the Chief Executive to the US Army elements is depicted in figure 1-1.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Although the Department of the Navy does not have forces dedicated to PSYOP, it can support psychological operations with conventional forces and equipment.

OTHER SUPPORT

Other government and private agencies can assist and cooperate in PSYOP activities, particularly during foreign internal defense operations. Private organizations engaged in education, health, disaster relief, cultural, and missionary work can be of great assistance.



FIGURE 1-1
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS POLICY FLOW

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY (USIA)

In 1953 the USIA was established as an independent arm of the Government's Executive Branch, and most of the functions previously vested in the Secretary of State were transferred to the Director, USIA. Later acts expanded the duties and responsibilities of USIA. Title V, Section 501, Public Law 402, designated the USIA as the agency responsible for the preparation and dissemination abroad of information about the United States, its people and its policies, through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information centers and instructors abroad. Thus, the USIA was the foreign information arm of the US Government, particularly in time of peace. As a part of its mission, the USIA aimed to:

Promote understanding, acceptance, and respect among foreign audiences for the United States and its policies.

Advise the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies of government on public attitudes in other countries and their implications on the formulation and execution of foreign policy.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY (ICA)

On 1 April 1978, the International Communications Agency was established. It consolidates the functions of the United States Information Agency and the State Department's Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs. The core management of ICA consists of a Director, a Deputy Director, and four Associate Directors, with designated responsibilities for broadcasting (VOA), programs (PGM), educational and cultural affairs (ECA), and management (MGT).

The internal structure of the Voice of America remains essentially unchanged, but the elevation of the VOA Director gives recognition to the importance of the broadcasting service and is intended to preserve the integrity of its news operation.

The operations of the two other media elements--Press and Publications, and Motion Pictures and Television--come under the direction of the Associate Director of Programs. International exhibits, which have been shown principally in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, are a separate element in the same division.

In the new structure for educational and cultural exchange, a major objective is to provide clear lines of responsibility for enhancing, on the one hand, foreign access to American experiences and, on the other hand, American access to foreign experiences and culture.

Aside from the White House, ICA's relationships are primarily with the Departments of State and Defense and the Agency for International Development:

It acts in an advisory capacity toward STATE, and in turn, receives foreign policy guidance.

It works closely with DOD, particularly with the Offices of the Secretary for Public Affairs and of International Security Affairs. By agreement, ICA and DOD exchange liaison personnel at the national level and at joint commands. ICA advises on the impact of overseas public statement and actions in the defense field and cooperates directly with DOD in Washington and major commands abroad to increase support for US policies.

The Agency for International Development, under the supervision and guidance of STATE, administers economic aid abroad. ICA supports the AID mission by publicizing AID programs and accomplishments. Conversely, AID accomplishments reinforce ICA efforts.

Chapter Two

2

PSYOP RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ARMY

Psychological operations derive their major effectiveness from being an integral part of a total operation. **They are neither a substitute for power nor a panacea.** When skillfully and closely integrated with actions and other instruments of power, PSYOP act as a catalyst and can often make the difference between success and failure in military operations. Psychological operations can be effectively employed throughout the entire spectrum of conflict.

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THE ARMY PSYOP ROLE

Within DOD, the Army--because of its established psychological operations training base, assigned missions, and land-based operations--has the primary military role in PSYOP. As the service with the principal assets, the Army has the major role in assisting commanders of joint task forces and unified, specified, and combined commands to achieve PSYOP objectives.

The Army develops PSYOP resources to operate in general, limited, and cold war. In the field PSYOP elements are responsible for:

Planning and conducting PSYOP in support of military operations.

Developing in all Army personnel an appreciation of the role and value of PSYOP and an understanding of the psychological implications of military operations.

Planning and conducting PSYOP to support US national objectives abroad.

Interallied PSYOP policy is determined at the highest levels of government and command. At combined levels, PSYOP may be guided by standardization agreements; e.g., NATO. Where operational control of designated US Army PSYOP forces is transferred to allied commanders, directives governing the use of US PSYOP forces and equipment will be provided to the appropriate commanders.

Psychological operations are conducted by military forces under the operational control of the theater or unified command. The Army PSYOP element is commanded by the theater Army commander. PSYOP support may be initiated by PSYOP units in either CONUS or at an in-theater site, normally outside of the combat zone. Operations may be conducted concurrently from both areas. When initiated in CONUS, the theater commander provides input for the development of appropriate programs.

THE ARMY PSYOP MISSION

The Army PSYOP mission is to support US national policy; to conduct PSYOP in support of military operations; to be prepared to conduct PSYOP unilaterally in support of, or in coordination with, other military services and US Government agencies; and to give PSYOP training, advice, and assistance to US forces and friendly nations.

Specifically, Army PSYOP forces:

Assist in formulating PSYOP doctrine, tactics, techniques, and operations of Army forces, other US military services, unified commands, and other US Government agencies.

Develop Active Army and Reserve Component (RC) forces to support plans and operations of Army forces, other US military services, unified commands, and other US Government agencies.

Undertake research and development programs to further the Army's capabilities for PSYOP.

Furnish PSYOP-qualified personnel for liaison and military training teams (MTTs).

Must be prepared to conduct these operations unilaterally in support of, or in coordination with, other military services and US Government agencies.

Must be prepared to provide equipment and area-oriented, language-qualified PSYOP personnel to train, advise, and assist allied/friendly nations in developing their PSYOP capabilities; and must be prepared to provide PSYOP assistance in support of the operations of a host country.

Provide information and generate intelligence for PSYOP.

Develop, procure, issue, and stockpile PSYOP materiel and equipment; must be prepared to provide logistical support to US Government agencies and allied/friendly nations.

Conduct PSYOP training for members of all branches of the US Armed Forces and personnel from friendly/allied nations on a mission basis.

LIMITED WAR

Limited war, with its complex and unwritten national policy objectives, is merely an active continuum of cold war. PSYOP, therefore, require a continuation of policy and execution with a broadening of psychological objectives.

The International Communication Agency (ICA) country plan and theater military plans must be coordinated under the guidance of the US Ambassador; and the psychological operator, the policy advisor, planner, and executor, must have an "up-to-the-minute" knowledge of these plans.

GENERAL WAR

If cold or limited war progresses to general war, the US Army PSYOP elements may be required to increase their PSYOP activities. This may include use of organic equipment and facilities to replace damaged or destroyed civilian mass communications equipment and facilities.

The role of US Army PSYOP in general war is established by National Security Council (NSC) directives channeled through the Department of Defense to the Department of the Army. The role is further defined and coordinated by interagency agreements.

PURPOSE OF PSYOP

The purpose of all psychological operations is to create in foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior to support the achievement of national objectives. In this endeavor, PSYOP influence policy, decisions, the ability to govern, the ability to command, the will to fight, the will to obey, and the will to support.

Psychological operations can increase the relative combat power of friendly forces and adversely affect the combat power of the enemy. This is accomplished, basically, by attacking the identified weaknesses of the opposing forces through a planned and coordinated PSYOP campaign.

PSYOP field teams are placed in direct support (DS) of the maneuver elements and travel with them to exploit opportunities as they arise. The forward teams provide a constant flow of information to the PSYOP command element at the higher headquarters. The PSYOP unit constantly updates the PSYOP estimate, keeps the commander informed of the psychological impact of the operation, and makes recommendations for the conduct of combat operations.

As the attack progresses, the bypassed, isolated enemy elements are targeted by the field teams. The field teams use all available media to induce their surrender, thereby conserving the combat resources of the attacking force.

Tactical deception plans are supported by using misleading sound effects and by disseminating misinformation. During this time PSYOP support can enable the maneuver commander to concentrate his maneuver units while giving the appearance of maintaining normal dispersion. Operations, such as the feint or ruse, are primarily psychological since the intent is to confuse the enemy and have him react in a desired manner.

Planners, operators, and intelligence personnel require access to all available intelligence that pertains to their mission and area of operations. Effective reporting channels are necessary to insure that the flow of information reaches the PSYOP unit on a timely, uninterrupted basis.

PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT

Offensive Operations

The mission, enemy, terrain, weather, populace, and availability of troops influence PSYOP support.

PSYOP effectively support combat power.

Under certain conditions, offensive operations are conducted for their psychological impact.

PSYOP exploit the effects of friendly nuclear fires.

PSYOP increase the psychological impact of conventional operations.

PSYOP support subordinate units by facilitating exploitation of targets of opportunity.

PSYOP are coordinated with higher and adjacent units when the effects are expected to influence enemy actions outside of the unit's boundaries.

PSYOP are coordinated with the tactical fire support elements in the operational area to enhance the effectiveness of both systems.

PSYOP support tactical deception operations and other facets of the OPSEC program.

Defensive Operations

PSYOP units supporting combat units in the defense continue to maintain a PSYOP offensive. The defensive situation provides an excellent opportunity to establish credibility by factual news reporting. PSYOP missions in support of the defense include those required to:

Prepare to resume the offense.

Discourage an enemy offensive.

Support forces delaying an enemy advance.

Support the planning and conduct of counterattacks.

Support rear area protection operations.

Conduct PSYOP against bypassed and isolated enemy units in rear areas.

Support tactical deception operations and other facets of the OPSEC program.

Retrograde Operations

Retrograde operations are characterized by limited offensive, defensive, and delaying tactics. PSYOP teams with heavy printing, broadcasting, and other relatively immobile equipment positioned well to the rear are able to provide uninterrupted support. PSYOP are able to support retrograde operations by:

Publicizing civilian control measures.

Supporting tactical deception operations and other facets of the OPSEC program.

Exploiting the psychological effects of nuclear and nonnuclear firepower.

Supporting counterattacks by placing emphasis on the large number of enemy casualties.

Relief Operations

PSYOP will:

Support tactical operations and other facets of the OPSEC program.

Remain in place to support the incoming unit.

During a forward passage of the lines, support the attacking unit.

During a rearward passage of the lines, remain with the covering forces.

Support of Other Types of Tactical Operations

When supporting other types of tactical operations, the basic PSYOP principles apply; however, the techniques and manner of application may vary.

Civil Affairs

PSYOP support civil affairs in offensive, defensive, retrograde, relief, and consolidation operations.



FIGURE 2-1
PSYOP SUPPORT OF A THEATER

TYPES OF PSYOP SUPPORT

Psychological operations support is type-classified according to the level of employment, location, and the physical scope of the operation. The classifications overlap. There are no clear-cut lines as to where support stops for one type operation and begins for another. A PSYOP unit may support all types of operations simultaneously. The three major classifications are:

STRATEGIC SUPPORT

Psychological operations in support of strategic operations are designed to exploit vulnerabilities in foreign military forces and populations. They are designed to **advance broad or long-term objectives**. General support (GS) forces are generally used in this role.

TACTICAL SUPPORT

Psychological operations in support of tactical operations are planned and conducted in the combat area to **achieve immediate and short-term objectives**. Normally, direct support (DS) PSYOP units are used.

CONSOLIDATION SUPPORT

PSYOP supporting consolidation operations assist in the reorientation and education of the civilian population in liberated or occupied areas. The purpose is to **facilitate military operations and obtain maximum cooperation of the inhabitants**.

PSYOP IN SUPPORT OF STRATEGIC OPERATIONS

Psychological operations in support of strategic operations are directed at large segments of the target nation's population. These psychological operations exploit economic, military, sociological, psychological, and political vulnerabilities. They are an integral part of the overall strategic scheme.

PSYOP policies and objectives are approved at the national level. Effective interagency coordination is established at all levels of government and command to insure that no conflicts exist between military PSYOP and other government activities.

Guidance for the support of strategic operations usually emanates from the National Command Authority (NCA). Psychological operatons are coordinated with general strategic plans and are directed against forces, people, or areas in their entirety.

Psychological operations supporting strategic operations are normally conducted in support of the unified or specified commands. The unified command issues directives to implement the national policy and establish command policy. These operations are not limited to the area of influence of individual subordinate commanders.

Planning is a continuing process. PSYOP personnel continually evaluate the results of current operations, update current plans, and continue long-range planning to insure adequate support for future operations. Contingency plans and supporting pretested propaganda are prepared and held ready for implementation on order. It is during the planning phase that the psychological impact of a contemplated course of action must be considered. (See chapter 12, Psychological Operations Planning, for more detailed information.)

MAJOR OBJECTIVES

Deter enemy forces from initiating hostilities or intervening in existing conflicts.

Create concern in the enemy concerning the futility of war.

Arouse public concern, political, and economic pressures for or against a military operation.

Stimulate dissension among enemy rival power groups.

OTHER OBJECTIVES

Project a favorable image of the United States.

Foster understanding and gain acceptance of US goals and operations.

Convince the target that the United States can fulfill its aspirations.

Explain US policies and objectives to allied, friendly, and neutral nations.

Strengthen determination of friends and allies.

Build confidence of allies in the objectives of the alliance.

Gain support of neutrals.

Support resistance personnel.

Gain support in liberated areas.

Strengthen friendly leaders; weaken enemy leaders.

Influence enemy strategy and tactics:

- Identify and exploit enemy weaknesses.
- Develop modifications in the character and policies of the enemy to favor the United States.

Stress enemy racial and religious intolerance.

Publicize and exploit enemy, racial, ethnic, and religious prejudices and intolerance.

Build or create enemy political disunity.

- Stimulate support of opposition elements of the enemy.
- Undermine confidence in enemy leadership and war aims.
- Interfere with control systems and communications.

Support and foster economic and other nonviolent sanctions against the enemy military forces and civilians.

Encourage disaffection in enemy nations among religious, ethnic, social, political, economic, and other elements.

Support tactical operations.

CONDITIONS THAT MAY BE EXPLOITED

Military successes of friendly forces.

Shortages of food, housing, clothing, or other necessities in enemy territory or enemy-occupied areas.

Enemy manpower shortages.

Enemy country inflation.

Unequal and exorbitant taxation by the enemy government.

Lack of resources to support the enemy economy and war programs.

Enemy police state practices to include terrorism, midnight arrests, travel restrictions, and censorship.

MEDIA

The most desirable media for strategic operations are radio, television, and leaflets.

PSYOP IN SUPPORT OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS

Psychological operations are an integral and coordinated part of the overall tactical plan. They provide the tactical commander with an additional weapons system, a system that can weaken the enemy soldier's will to fight, thereby reducing his combat effectiveness, and that can prevent civilian interference with military operations. They are designed to exploit individual and group susceptibilities.

Psychological operations in support of tactical operations are planned and executed for specific operations. Targets of opportunity are exploited as they arise.

The theater Army commander, in addition to providing resources to the theater commander to conduct PSYOP in support of theater plans, provides PSYOP resources to support tactical commanders, civil affairs operations, and rear area protection.

CORPS SUPPORT

The PSYOP resources available at corps include staff officers and direct support units required to plan, develop, and execute psychological operations. The corps PSYOP staff officer, with his knowledge of the tactical operations, may be called on to provide specific recommendations to be included in theater plans.

Each corps is normally supported by a direct support battalion. The divisions, separate brigades, and regiments are normally supported by a direct support company from the corps direct support battalion. When limited PSYOP units are available, the combat elements may be supported by specific teams tailored to fit the mission.

DIVISION SUPPORT

The direct support mission of PSYOP units is to provide close, continuous, and priority support to the division and its maneuver elements; these units remain under the centralized control of the higher PSYOP commander.

The division is supported by a direct support PSYOP company consisting of a command and control team (AA); command assessment (AD); supply and maintenance (BA); propaganda development (FA); current intelligence (FC); light printing (GA); platoon headquarters, audio and visual (HA); loudspeakers (HB); and an audiovisual team (HC).

Support During Movement to Contact

During movement into a hostile area, the AD team deploys into a hostile area and analyzes and evaluates the psychological warfare possibilities to:

Make recommendations to the ground force commander in the area of PSYOP.

Determine what psychological functional teams should be deployed into the area.

Evaluate the results of any psychological campaign that had been conducted prior to insertion.

Plan the use of themes in a PSYOP campaign.

During movement to contact with enemy forces, psychological operations also focus priorities to:

Provide a detailed and systematic examination of processed intelligence to identify and locate target audiences, identify conditions, pinpoint vulnerabilities, establish objectives, and obtain pertinent information to guide PSYOP exploitation.

Advise on the psychological implications of planned and executed courses of action.

Assist in tactical deception operations to support OPSEC.

Give information and directions to friendly elements operating in the enemy combat area.

Assure exploitation of PSYOP targets of opportunity.

Evaluate enemy PSYOP efforts to identify psychological weaknesses, friendly and enemy.

Promote support for short–intermediate–and long-term US and allied goals:

Create a favorable image of US and allied soldiers and leaders. Help control friendly and enemy civilians in the combat area.

Counter enemy propaganda (if appropriate) and retain the psychological initiative.

Support the strategic PSYOP mission by furnishing detailed and timely information of local vulnerabilities and susceptibilities for use in strategic plans and operations of the division commander's higher headquarters.

Assist in rear area protection to:

Gain the willing, active cooperation of the populace.

Strengthen friendly leaders; weaken enemy leaders.

Support in the Attack

In the attack the PSYOP direct support company uses its propaganda development and dissemination capability to lower enemy morale and efficiency by:

Inducing attitudes of futility and defeatism in the enemy.

Inducing the enemy to defeat/surrender.

Assisting in tactical deception operations to support OPSEC and other measures to confuse the enemy.

Exploiting the psychological effectiveness of US and friendly firepower.

Support During the Exploitation

When the division enters the exploitation phase of the offense, the PSYOP direct support company can:

Provide PSYOP support to subordinate units to facilitate exploitation of targets of opportunity.

Identify and locate new target audiences, identify conditions, pinpoint vulnerabilities, establish new objectives, and obtain pertinent information to guide PSYOP exploitation.

Conduct PSYOP against bypassed and isolated enemy units in rear areas.

The success of the division's pursuit can be magnified by the ability of the PSYOP direct support company to:

Facilitate the occupation of enemy areas by delivering ultimatums and defect/surrender appeals and directions.

Lower enemy morale and efficiency by emphasizing:

Numerous enemy defeats and high casualties.

Lack of civilian support.

Heavy and effective artillery and air bombardment.

Insufficient or inferior enemy supplies and equipment.

Precarious enemy situation.

Inexperienced or unqualified leadership.

Excessive periods of hardship.

Lack of medical supplies and treatment facilities for enemy sick and wounded.

The forcing of enemy minority groups into combat.

The enemy draft into its combat forces of the overaged, underaged, physically unfit, inexperienced, and totally untrained personnel.

Support in the Defense

To support the division commander in the defense, the PSYOP direct support company can utilize printing, loudspeaker, and audiovisual equipment and call in radio, guided by personnel skilled in current intelligence and propaganda development, to:

Support forces delaying an enemy advance by tactical deception operations to support OPSEC.

Support rear area protection operations:

Gain the willing, active support of the population.

Strengthen friendly leaders; weaken enemy leaders.

Breed uncertainty in enemy troops.

Influence enemy strategy and tactics:

Arouse public opinion and foment political and economic pressures against enemy operations and in favor of friendly forces.

Stimulate support of opposition elements to the enemy, particularly those within its territory.

Lower the morale and efficiency of enemy military forces and civilians by encouraging disaffection among religious, ethnic, social, political, economic, and other potentially dissident elements.

Advise on the psychological implications of planned and executed courses of action.

Identify and locate target audiences, identify conditions and pinpoint vulnerabilities, establish new objectives, and obtain pertinent information to guide PSYOP exploitation.

Evaluate enemy PSYOP efforts to identify psychological weaknesses, both friendly and enemy.

Support in the Retrograde

During retrograde operations, PSYOP teams (using heavy printing presses, radio transmitters, appropriately positioned, as well as semimobile equipment, and highly mobile loudspeaker teams) are able to provide uninterrupted support to the division commander.

Support During Delaying Action

In the delay the PSYOP direct support company supports tactical deception operations in support of OPSEC by disseminating information that supports or confirms the tactical operation and its objectives.

Support in the Withdrawal or Retirement

During withdrawal and retirement, the PSYOP direct support company focuses its attention on:

Publicizing civilian support measures.

Exploiting the psychological effects of US and friendly firepower.

Supporting tactical deception operations.

Supporting counterattacks by identifying and locating target audiences, identifying conditions, pinpointing vulnerabilities, establishing new objectives, and obtaining pertinent information to guide exploitation by psychological operations.

PSYOP IN SUPPORT OF JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) OPERATIONS

A PSYOP battalion under the operational control of the joint task force (JTF) commander is adequate to support a JTF provided the JTF strength is not greater than that of a corps. As a minimum, the following teams are recommended:

AB (Command and Control Battalion)

FA (Propaganda)

FC (Current Intelligence)

FD (Research and Analysis)

GA (Light Printing)

Others may be added if the situation dictates. When the JTF is larger than a corps, an augmented PSYOP battalion or possibly two battalions are required.

THE JTF PSYOP STAFF OFFICER

The greatest efficiency and effectiveness can be gained by having the PSYOP battalion commander serve in the dual role of JTF PSYOP staff officer and PSYOP battalion commander, except when operating with an amphibious JTF. In this case, with the JTF Headquarters operating from aboard ship, the PSYOP battalion executive officer should remain aboard and serve as the JTF PSYOP staff officer. The PSYOP battalion commander could then exercise command and control of his troops while operating with the senior ground force commander.

THE PSYOP STAFF OFFICER AND THE J2/J3 OPERATIONS CENTER

It is also desirable that the JTF PSYOP staff officer function as a part of the J2/J3 Operations Center, regardless of the joint staff section under which he is assigned on the Joint Table of Distribution (JTD). This can serve as a highly effective method of integrating psychological operations into both intelligence and tactical functions and operations.

To serve as the JTF PSYOP staff officer is a full-time job requiring complete concentration on and dedication to psychological operations. Therefore, it is recommended that the officer filling this position not be called upon or tasked to perform duties other than PSYOP. (See USREDCOM Manual 525-4.)

PSYOP IN SUPPORT OF CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS

Consolidation operations are those operations directed toward populations in either liberated or occupied areas to facilitate military operations and promote maximum cooperation with the liberating or occupying power. They are a responsibility of the theater commander. The theater Army commander is assigned the task of administering and rehabilitating occupied or liberated territory.

The psychological objectives vary with the area, the population, and the mission of the supported civil affairs unit. The primary objectives are to:

Obtain support for military operations.

Orient and reeducate the population in accordance with command policies, objectives, and missions.

ORGANIZATION

If the Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) covers a large area, it may be subdivided for ease of control. Corps commanders conduct consolidation operations in their areas of responsibility with resources provided by the theater Army.

PSYOP units supporting consolidation operations are placed under the operational control of the Civil Affairs command support units. They supplement organic civil affairs elements, such as civil information sections or teams. Special purpose PSYOP units composed of the K-series consolidation teams (shown in table of organization and equipment (TOE 33-500H) are normally assigned the mission of supporting consolidation operations. These teams are organized to:

Conduct PSYOP through mass media and face-to-face communications.

Supervise or advise indigenous personnel on the use of PSYOP through local communications media.

Provide PSYOP support for rear area protection operations and civil defense.

SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS

The following factors must be considered in planning and conducting consolidation operations:

Continuity

Psychological operations in liberated and occupied areas are carried out as a unified, continuously evolving program from the time the area is occupied to the time the military occupation ceases. The plans for PSYOP in support of consolidation operations are prepared as early as possible--the overall plan, prior to occupation; subordinate plans, as soon as the tactical situation permits.

Consistency with Postwar Aims

Consolidation operations planning must be consistent with postwar aims. The PSYOP planner must avoid making commitments for short-term gains that may not fit long-term policies.

Relation to the US Information Program

Consolidation operations must be correlated with the US Government's information program and must follow directives guiding that program.

Relation with Friendly Underground

Every effort should be made to obtain the cooperation of friendly governments-in-exile and friendly guerrilla and resistance organizations in order to coordinate all PSYOP programs being implemented. This will help to eliminate counterproductive PSYOP and to achieve common objectives effectively and efficiently.

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

PSYOP resources are used to transmit information and directives to the population. However, there are fundamental differences affecting consolidation operations in liberated and occupied territories. In liberated areas psychological operations tend to be persuasive whereas in occupied areas they may be arbitrary and directive. The demands of combat and the need for control, however, may require that people in both areas be treated alike.

Liberated Areas

US activities in liberated areas will be governed by the military situation, US policy, and international and interallied agreements. Agreements will normally require that US forces not target the inhabitants of liberated areas with PSYOP beyond the period of time dictated by military need. The agreements may include a proviso that US forces train, advise, and assist the friendly government and its forces. In these circumstances US PSYOP elements will not actively engage in PSYOP directed towards the indigenous population in the friendly territory. US Army PSYOP doctrine, techniques, and procedures will be used as a basis for advising, training, and assisting the friendly government or its forces.

Occupied Areas

In occupied areas PSYOP assist in implementing civilian reeducation and reorientation programs. The process of eradicating unacceptable ideological practices and influences continues throughout the occupation.

PSYOP ASSISTANCE

Whether implemented by US PSYOP elements, the host country government and its forces, or other allies, PSYOP can assist the commander in the following ways:

Establishing Law, Order, and Discipline

Organization of populated areas involves the judicious use of propaganda designed to calm the fears of the populace, prevent aimless panicky movement, and direct their activities into useful channels. PSYOP help to create a state of mind conducive to the establishment of law and order by conditioning the population to willingly accept imposed controls and restrictions. This reduces the number of troops required for population pacification and control.

Securing Lines of Communication

Modern warfare requires force mobility. It is essential to keep main lines of communication open for the flow of military forces, equipment, fuel, and other supplies.

Control of Refugees, Evacuees, and Displaced Persons

Refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons frequently clog military arteries, hindering the movement of combat units and equipment. By publishing and broadcasting information and instructions, PSYOP units assist the area commander in keeping his lines of communication and supply open.

Marshaling Labor

PSYOP units, under civil affairs direction, assist in publicizing labor needs among the civilian population and directing potential workers to appropriate labor offices.

Intelligence

Through close contact with friendly and hostile persons, PSYOP personnel gain information of value to the G2/S2 (to include intelligence and counterintelligence programs) and the PSYOP effort. It is important that PSYOP personnel insure that such information is placed in intelligence channels. PSYOP also develop and disseminate appeals to the population encouraging them to report information on enemy activities.

Rumor Control

Psychological state of inhabitants in a combat zone makes them vulnerable to rumors which may stimulate undesired actions (or inactivity) that may interfere with combat operations. Rumors must be countered with a timely, accurate, and well-managed information program.

ORIENTATION AND REEDUCATION

The second major objective of PSYOP supporting consolidation operations is the orientation and reeducation of the population. Under policy guidance and direction from higher headquarters, PSYOP personnel advise and assist in the preparation of plans, programs, and operations to indoctrinate and reeducate the local population in areas under US and allied control.

The objective of these programs is to develop understanding and favorable attitudes in the local population toward our military forces, gain local support for the military effort, and aid in the accomplishment of all allied aims and objectives.

Orientation and reeducation of the population begins as early as possible and may run concurrently with the combat support mission. These programs are assisted by publicizing activities which benefit the population and by explaining US and allied intentions vis-a-vis the liberated or occupied areas.

In both liberated and occupied areas this involves eradicating doctrines and practices hostile to US objectives and eliminating the influence of individuals and groups identified with hostile doctrine. This continues throughout the period of occupation. One of the major tools of orientation and reeducation is psychological actions.

US PSYOP elements will not activate or implement PSYOP against an indigenous population when US, allied, or host country agreements prohibit such activities.

These actions, intended to influence the actions and attitudes of the target, can be effectively employed in conjunction with propaganda and information programs. Combined, the effectiveness of each is increased. Planned psychological actions properly publicized are more effective than the word alone.

OTHER PSYOP OBJECTIVES IN CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS

In consolidation operations, there are a number of objectives other than orientation and reeducation that do not involve the dissemination of propaganda:

Search for Media and Personnel

PSYOP personnel may be called upon to assist in locating indigenous communications media, equipment, supplies, and personnel. Equally important is locating key communicators and influence groups within the society.

Dissemination of News

The people of liberated or occupied areas must be kept informed. Credible information transmitted by press, radio, and television is useful for political indoctrination under an orientation and reeducation program. PSYOP elements may assist in this program.

Collect Information

Much information obtained from local people is valuable in evaluating the "temper" and attitudes of the populace. This information will help to determine the nature and content of the consolidation PSYOP program.

Gain Willing Cooperation

Intimidation stemming from the presence of strong military forces may temper hostility and make the populace more responsive to authoritative direction. Positive, well-publicized psychological measures (actions and propaganda) must be taken to transfer intimidation into long-lasting, willing cooperation.

In occupied or liberated areas feelings of inferiority will often be found among minority groups who, because of race, religion, ethnic background, or socioeconomic status, have humbled themselves for a long time. Thus, they may tend to offer little resistance to propaganda. Advantage should be taken of this situation to gain the assistance of this target group.

In an area recently subjected to total war, civilians are generally in a state of shock, weary, and apathetic. This often renders them unable to resist authority, thus easing control through PSYOP.

In a newly liberated or occupied area a normal characteristic of civilians is to depend upon the occupying power because it supplies vital goods and services. For reasons of self-interest, therefore, these people may be willing to assist the propagandist.

Make The Military Situation Known

Knowledge of the favorable military situation of the occupying forces tends to make the civilian population more cooperative. PSYOP can and should be used to exploit this tendency.

Capitalize on Existing Habits

People are accustomed to receiving news and information through specific, well-known, and established sources and media. They more readily believe and follow information and directives received through these sources and media. The consolidation propagandist capitalizes on these existing habits by using familiar sources, media, formats, and style.

OBSTACLES

Some conditions which may hinder consolidation operations are:

Resentment Against Occupying Forces

Antipathy toward occupying forces may cause resistance in the form of disruptive behavior, even rebellion.

Ideological Differences

The consolidation propagandist may find himself dealing with staunch adherents to ideologies hostile to his own. In conquered territory these hostile ideologies may stimulate the formation of resistance groups; in liberated areas, dissident elements may undermine the occupation. To be effective, the propagandist must understand existing ideological differences. Then he must develop his campaign to deal with the realities of the situation.

Military Misconduct

Occupation forces who lack dedication and understanding of their mission often engage in acts that discourage cooperation by the people. To eliminate misconduct and improve understanding of the mission, the individual soldier must be oriented toward attainment of the mission objectives. His actions and attitude must win the favor of the people.

Although PSYOP cannot be directed at US personnel, PSYOP personnel may make commanders aware of specific tension-producing conduct and the reasons for the public attitude.

Devastation and Disruption of Communications

Consolidation operations depend upon communication. When communications are destroyed or disrupted, informing and controlling civilian populations become difficult. Due mainly to the lack of current information on the situation, disrupted communications affect face-to-face communication as well as mechanical forms such as radio and newspaper. PSYOP units with their equipment and expertise may alleviate the problems caused by disrupted facilities and installations.

Enemy Propaganda

Although forced from the area, the enemy may continue to direct propaganda toward the population, holding some members and perhaps gaining new adherents to his cause. PSYOP personnel are a vital force in countering the effects of enemy propaganda. The best program is one that combines proaganda of the word with propaganda of the deed.

Attitudes

The initial consolidation effort is perhaps the most difficult since the attitudes of the population may not be fully known. Understanding these attitudes helps the operator in planning consolidation operations and increases the potential effectiveness of the operations. These attitudes can be uncovered by target analysis. The following attitudes should be examined.

Attitudes toward occupying forces. Liberated populations normally have more friendly attitudes toward the liberating forces than occupied-area populations have for the occupying forces. The propagandist must ascertain the tenor and intensity of the attitudes of the population to deal effectively with them.

Attitudes toward accepting discipline or control. People accustomed to totalitarian methods may respond favorably to authoritarian controls. Those familiar with a democratic way of life may require persuasion rather than discipline.

Attitudes shaped by proximity of the enemy. When enemy forces are located relatively near occupied or liberated areas, the population will fear their possible return and give minimal cooperation to consolidation operations authorities. On the other hand, if the enemy is remote and unlikely to return, both friendly and hostile persons are more likely to cooperate in the consolidation effort.

Attitudes based on enemy propaganda. In liberated and occupied areas the enemy will seek to advance his own ideology through intensive propaganda. The consolidation propagandist must ascertain the source and effectiveness of enemy propaganda so that he can make his own more effective.

Attitudes created by organized resistance groups. When organized resistance groups exist in liberated or occupied areas, their presence and actions against occupying forces greatly influence the population.

PROPAGANDA IN CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS

The same principles and techniques discussed elsewhere in this manual apply for the conduct of PSYOP in support of consolidation operations. The attitudes and environment of the target audience must be analyzed before a psychological campaign can begin. Themes and messages must be credible and easily understood, and the target audience must be given reasonable courses of action. Many themes can be developed based on the present situation and designed to pursue specific objectives.

News

News is valuable to support consolidation propaganda objectives. Local news of the military occupation and the progress of the war and world news on political, educational, religious, economic, and scientific matters are relevant and are of increasing interest to the population.

Themes in Liberated Areas

In liberated areas consolidation units primarily use themes concerning the aims of the United States and its allies, emphasizing unity.

Themes in Occupied Areas

In occupied areas consolidation operations may stress the theme that the old order has been replaced and that for their own best interest the people should cooperate with the occupying forces.

Entertainment

In either liberated or occupied areas consolidation units can provide entertainment, such as motion pictures, to people lacking such diversion due to the devastation of war. Whether pure entertainment is presented or mixed with messages, any momentary relief from the realities of the situation will aid greatly in obtaining the cooperation of the people and in creating an atmosphere within which progress toward US objectives can be achieved.

PSYOP IN SUPPORT OF REAR AREA SECURITY

The duties of US PSYOP elements in friendly rear areas generally consist of supporting military or politico-military activities in other areas. Except when required for security or to accomplish the military mission, PSYOP will not be aimed at the indigenous population. Under no circumstances will US PSYOP staffs or units undertake any campaigns, programs, or other activities that will infringe upon the sovereignty of the host country over its populace or lessen such ties between the host country and its populace.

The delineated role of PSYOP units in friendly rear areas must be meticulously adhered to. To avoid embarrassing the US Government or jeopardizing the host country's position with its populace, US PSYOP units will strictly adhere to proper channels in implementing requests for advice, training, or assistance.

Chapter Three

3

PSYOP RELATIONSHIP WITH COMMAND AND STAFF FUNCTIONS

Psychological considerations and operations--basic components of all military activities and operations--are command responsibilities. They are factors to be included in the planning and execution of all military activities and operations. In fact, psychological objectives may be more important than physical objectives in some instances. Tactical operations can be conducted for psychological reasons as well as physical objectives.

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COMMANDER

The commander provides PSYOP guidance consistent with policy received from command authority. His command responsibilities include:

Assessing the psychological impact of the military presence, activities, and operations.

Integrating PSYOP with other politico-military activities and operations.

Planning and conducting operations and activities to achieve specific psychological objectives. This must be done even though he does not have PSYOP personnel to assist him.

Supervising, guiding, and directing his staff to insure that:

Essential PSYOP objectives inherent in the unit mission are identified.

Subordinate commanders and staff officers are provided guidance concerning PSYOP objectives and plans.

PSYOP staff responsibilities are assigned.

PSYOP staff personnel are fully integrated into all intelligence and operations staff activities.

All subordinate commanders and staff personnel are alert for PSYOP targets of opportunity and other situations where PSYOP will help to achieve the unit mission.

A PSYOP training program emphasizing the vital responsibilities of the individual soldier in influencing the opinions, attitudes, and behavior of others is integrated with all instruction and training.

PSYOP elements in exercises are encouraged to simulate and distribute friendly and aggressor propaganda.

PSYOP field teams are used in field training exercises (FTXs) so that they may gain valuable field experience.

STAFF

At joint levels, psychological operations are governed by joint publications.

The **Joint Chiefs of Staff** have the responsibility to:

Plan for the conduct of PSYOP.

Furnish PSYOP advice and assistance to allies, and assist other US agencies.

Formulate joint PSYOP doctrine and specific policies for joint PSYOP.

Provide intelligence support for PSYOP.

Coordinate PSYOP matters with civil affairs, public affairs, and other related activities.

Through commanders of unified and specified commands, plan and conduct combined PSYOP with allied governments and international commands.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Civil-Military Operations (CMO) Officer is the principal staff assistant to the commander in all psychological, ideological, political, economic, and social aspects of military operations. He is also responsible for the PSYOP techniques used to support the command objectives. The CMO has the following PSYOP-related functions:

Advises, assists, coordinates, and makes recommendations concerning civil-military operations, to include the psychological aspects of proposed operations.

Responsible for the preparation of the PSYOP Estimate of the Situation. (See appendix D and appendix E, PSYOP Annex/Appendix to the Operations Order.)

Provides technical advice and assists in the development of educational programs for prisoners of war.

Maintains close, continuing relations with other US agencies having PSYOP responsibilities.

Coordinates with all personnel, units, and agencies to assure that the PSYOP effort is integrated and adheres to policy.

Exercises staff supervision over PSYOP units that are attached or under the operational control of the command.

Evaluates enemy PSYOP efforts to identify psychological weaknesses and to measure the effectiveness of friendly propaganda.

Uses the knowledge and expertise of his PSYOP staff officer to achieve psychological objectives.

Coordinates the acquisition of local resources--equipment, material, expendables, and personnel.

Assures that civil affairs and PSYOP units mutually support each other.

For additional details, see FM 101-5 and FM 41-10.

The Psychological Operations Staff Officer works under the G5/S5, CMO officer at corps and below. If there is no G5/S5 in a unit, he works under the G3/S3. Above corps level, PSYOP activities are managed by a separate PSYOP staff officer. At theater headquarters, the PSYOP staff officer has the responsibility to:

Develop theater PSYOP policy.

Develop long-range PSYOP plans.

Advise on the PSYOP implications of planned and executed courses of action.

Prepare and coordinate PSYOP requests and estimates.

Develop plans, orders, and campaigns to support the following activities and operations:

- Combat--conventional and unconventional warfare.
- Foreign internal defense (FID).
- Civil affairs--rear area protection.
- Civil internee and PW programs.
- Any action involving the military presence, activities, or operations.

Evaluate enemy PSYOP efforts to identify PSYOP weaknesses and to measure the effectiveness of friendly propaganda.

Exercise staff supervision to assure execution of the commander's directives.

Assure exploitation of psychological operations opportunities.

Coordinate PSYOP intelligence needs and collect reports (including raw field reports), information, and intelligence from various sources. Some sources are G2/S2 reports; PSYOP personnel in the field; the media--press, radio, TV, etc.; professional politicians and political scientists; cultural anthropologists; sociologists; historians and historical documents; the "man in the street"; battle reports; government, business, social, and labor leaders; soldiers of all ranks; captured and interned enemy military and civilian personnel; refugees; etc.

Furnish the information/intelligence to the G2/S2 to insure integration of the PSYOP and combat efforts.

Use the PSYOP Automated Management Information System (PAMIS). (See chapter 15.)

Coordinate the development, update, and use of basic PSYOP studies (BPS).

Circulate information, area studies, and research papers.

Assist the CMO in preparing PSYOP estimates. (See chapter 15 and appendix D.)

Coordinate the analysis of effectiveness of PSYOP campaigns, themes, messages.

Train, advise, and assist friendly PSYOP personnel.

Coordinate the PSYOP aspects of tactical deception operations.

Psychological Operations Intelligence Personnel should maintain liaison with the G2/S2 office of the supported unit. Liaison with the G2/S2 is vital because PSYOP planners and operational units must have immediate, detailed, PSYOP-relevant intelligence if they are to operate effectively. PSYOP personnel may assist in interrogations, make known the intelligence needs of supporting PSYOP teams, and extract intelligence for PYSOP use.

Chapter Four

4

METHODS OF EMPLOYMENT

Support responsibilities of PSYOP units are designated by the assignment of missions by the force commander (higher authority) on the recommendation of the PSYOP force commander (the Theater PSYOP Group Commander) and of the ACofS, G5, or G3/S3 if there is no G5/S5. A subordinate PSYOP unit commander has the authority to issue to his subordinate elements orders that are necessary to accomplish his assigned mission. This includes task organization and assignment of missions, provided this does not reduce the degree of control retained by the commander who originally assigned the mission.



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Psychological operations units may be assigned general support (GS) or direct support (DS) missions or both. When so employed, the supported unit furnishes common facilities and items (i.e., messing, paper, ammunition, etc.). PSYOP units may also be assigned or attached to military commands.

A cellular organization, which has been augmented from other TOEs, is the most practical for PSYOP units to perform their various support missions, whether they be strategic, tactical, consolidation, or others.

PSYOP MISSION

The PSYOP unit mission may be general or specific. The mission statement is the restated mission determined by the PSYOP commander's mission analysis. **Each mission must be clearly defined and not so broad as to be meaningless.**

The PSYOP unit mission normally is to support a force or other commander or commanders. It is given in orders and instructions from higher authority, or it may be deduced from knowledge of the situation and of the intent of the supported commander.

When paragraph 1 of the Estimate of the Situation gives a PSYOP unit a general mission of supporting a force commander, the commander of the PSYOP unit includes the course of action of the supported command, or commands, if known.

Specific missions should normally be within the general support mission. A specific mission may be contained in orders or instructions from higher authority, normally the force commander being supported, or it might be arrived at from knowledge of the situation and intent of the supported force commander. (See FM 101-5, Sequence of Actions in Making and Executing Decisions and Combat Service Support Commander's Estimate of the Situation.)

CONTROL AND COORDINATION

It is likely that a number of agencies will be engaged in PSYOP within a theater of operations, including those representing countries other than the United States. Unless control of all PSYOP is centralized within one body, under a single command, duplication of effort, contradictory propaganda, propaganda contrary to national policy, and propaganda of more use to the enemy than the United States and its allies will result. The net result will be confusion and ineffectiveness.

No less important is close coordination at all levels, from the highest to the lowest. It is of the utmost importance at the tactical operating levels. For not only may uncoordinated PSYOP activities result in an unnecessary duplication of effort, they may also be contraindicated and, at best, confusing.

STAFF CHANNELS

Employment of PSYOP units may not be standard within a theater of operations due to the situation, which may be different in various areas or zones. There should, however, be a continuous and uniform staff channel from the highest level down to the lowest unit to insure an integrated and coordinated PSYOP effort and to avoid a confusing network of cross-channel communications.

GENERAL SUPPORT (GS)

A PSYOP element in general support supports an entire force and not any specific subordinate unit or subdivision. Units with this mission remain under the control of the PSYOP force commander and provide the force commander with a means to direct the PSYOP effort in his area of influence.

DIRECT SUPPORT (DS)

A PSYOP element assigned a direct support mission provides close, continuous support to a specific maneuver element or other force. A PSYOP unit with a direct support mission remains under the command of the higher PSYOP commander. It responds directly and gives priority to requests of the supported unit. The DS PSYOP unit is responsible for establishing liaison and communication with the supported unit.

ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

PSYOP units may be assigned or attached to military commands or civil-military agencies. Assigned PSYOP units are under the command, control, and administration of the commander of the unit to which they are assigned. Attached PSYOP units and elements are subject to limitations imposed by the attachment order. The commander of the receiving unit exercises the same degree of control over the attached PSYOP element that he does over units or persons organic to his command. Responsibility for transfer and promotion of personnel, however, is retained by the parent PSYOP unit commander. Attachment is usually maintained for the duration of a mission or task.

CELLULAR ORGANIZATION

PSYOP units, organized under the cellular TOE 33-500 series, are tailored to perform missions that may be given to any command. The use of cellular teams permits balanced units to be formed with minimal personnel and administrative procedures. This type of unit may add or delete teams

without affecting its organic structure or requiring unit redesignation. (See appendix B for team designations, capabilities, basis of allocation, and mobility.)

AUGMENTATION

The TOE 33-500 series provides for augmentation with cellular teams from other TOE for administration, mess, signal, and medical services. The TOE has no provision for PSYOP unit personnel to augment corps or division staffs. The chief or commander of the supporting PSYOP team or unit can, however, fill the dual roles of commander and staff officer.

USE OF LOCAL RESOURCES

Psychological operations units, for practical reasons, make maximum use of local resources. In addition to economic advantages, the use of local resources, when given voluntarily, gives the local population a vested interest in the operation; in effect, it creates a partnership between the target audience and PSYOP units. This adds a degree of authenticity to the operation and contributes to the success of a campaign.

AIRBORNE

In order to be able to perform any PSYOP missions, designated teams are airborne qualified when supporting airborne commands. Their organic equipment can be transported in US Air Force aircraft.

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS

Because strategic operations have long-range military and political objectives and frequently require coordination with other government policymaking agencies and friendly governments, PSYOP units supporting strategic operations generally will receive their instructions from the National Command Authority. Such PSYOP units generally do not operate in the combat zone.

TACTICAL OPERATIONS

Units supporting tactical operations of combat units in combat zones use mobile loudspeakers and audiovisual and printing equipment to achieve immediate and short-term objectives.

CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS

PSYOP units supporting consolidation operations assist civil affairs commands in orienting and reeducating populations. The primary purposes are to make combat operations easier and quicker by gaining the willing cooperation of the populace.

LIMITS ON PSYOP

The limits imposed on psychological operations depend on several factors, such as the rules of land warfare, US Government policy, treaties and agreements to which the US is a signatory power, types and phases of conflict, the mission, and the availability of the target audience(s). For example, PSYOP elements on a training and advisory assignment in a friendly country, may do no more than train and advise. In addition, they must base their training and advice on US Army doctrine, techniques, and procedures.

ORGANIZATION OF PSYOP UNITS

(See TOE 33-500H, Psychological Operations Organization, for general organization, detailed breakdown of teams, capabilities, basis for allocation, personnel and equipment allowances.)

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

When a PSYOP group is assigned to a theater, it is normally task organized to furnish PSYOP support to the theater of operations. Usually, general support battalions are retained to provide PSYOP support to the theater (see figure 4-1).



NOTE 1: Heavy printing and radio as required.
2: One per corps.
3: One per division.

TYPE PSYOP UNIT ALLOCATION

UNIT		THEATER	UNIFIED COMMAND	CORPS	SEPARATE DIVISION	TASK FORCE/ SEP BDE	MAAG/ MISSION
GROUP		1 or more	1				
BATTALION	GS	1 or more	1				
	DS			1			
	PW SPT	1					
	CONSOLIDATION	1					
COMPANY					1	1	1

FIGURE 4-1

A TYPE THEATER PSYOP SUPPORT ORGANIZATION

GROUP HEADQUARTERS, TEAM AC

Group Headquarters, Team AC, is the highest level and largest PSYOP command and control unit. It consists of a staff and a supply and maintenance element. This group headquarters team commands and controls two to five PSYOP battalions. It also provides limited administrative and logistical support to its subordinate battalions. Team AC, with suitable operational teams, is normally assigned to theater Army or to a unified command when two or more PSYOP battalions are assigned or attached (figure 4-2).



FIGURE 4-2

A TYPE ORGANIZATION PSYOP GROUP

COMMAND ASSESSMENT, TEAM AD

Command Assessment, Team AD, is deployed with a corps deployment package into a hostile area to analyze and evaluate the psychological warfare possibilities, to make recommendations to the ground force commander in the area of psychological operations, and to determine what PSYOP functional teams should be deployed into the area. It is also used to evaluate the results of any psychological campaign that had been conducted prior to insertion and to plan the use of themes to be used in a PSYOP campaign.

The basis of allocation is one per corps deployment package. This team is normally attached to a PSYOP DS battalion. It may, however, be made a part of a PSYOP group should circumstances so dictate (figure 4-2).

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS, TEAM AB (SUPPORT)

Battalion Headquarters, Team AB, with appropriate teams attached, may support all types of military operations. In performing its mission, the PSYOP battalion may be in GS or DS to:

A major component of a unified command, or a subordinate unified command.

A separate corps or unit of equivalent size.

A separate division or equivalent size unit.

A military police prisoner-of-war (PW) command.

Others, as needed.

GENERAL SUPPORT (GS) BATTALION

A PSYOP battalion in support of the theater force as a whole consists of an AB team with attached research, intelligence, development, production, radio, and printing elements. A basis for allocation is one or more per theater, as required. A GS battalion normally does not have subordinate companies (figure 4-3).



FIGURE 4-3

TYPE ORGANIZATION PSYOP GENERAL SUPPORT BATTALION

PSYOP DIRECT SUPPORT (DS) BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

A battalion headquarters in support of a tactical force consists of a staff, supply and maintenance, and a research and analysis element. This headquarters can command and control two to five PSYOP companies. It can provide logistical and PSYOP developmental support to subordinate companies. The basis of allocation is one per corps, separate division, or equivalent command.

When a PSYOP battalion is in direct support of a corps, the battalion HHC is retained at corps headquarters to provide general support to the corps. The other companies are placed in direct support of major subordinate headquarters. (See figure 4-4.)

PSYOP PRISONER-OF-WAR (PW) SUPPORT BATTALION

A PSYOP prisoner-of-war command support battalion works under the PW commander. It consists of an AB team with intelligence, research, propaganda development, and printing elements. This unit assists in planning and supervising PW education programs. It also acquires and disseminates intelligence and analyzes data received. The PW support battalion also pretests and post tests propaganda media. The basis of allocation is one per theater. (See figure 4-5.)

PSYOP CONSOLIDATION BATTALION

A PSYOP battalion supporting consolidation operations consists of an AB team and personnel qualified in motion picture, radio, television, printing, and display operations. The basis of allocation is one battalion per theater. (See figure 4-6.)

PSYOP DIRECT SUPPORT COMPANY

A PSYOP direct support company consists of an AA command and control team with supply and maintenance, propaganda, current intelligence, light printing, audiovisual, and loudspeaker teams. The basis of allocation is one per division, separate brigade, task force, or equivalent size command. (See figure 4-7.)



FIGURE 4-4

TYPE ORGANIZATION DIRECT SUPPORT PSYOP BATTALION



FIGURE 4-5

TYPE ORGANIZATION PSYOP PRISONER-OF-WAR SUPPORT BATTALION



FIGURE 4-6

TYPE ORGANIZATION PSYOP CONSOLIDATION BATTALION



FIGURE 4-7

TYPE ORGANIZATION DIRECT SUPPORT COMPANY

PSYOP BATTALION OPERATIONS

MISSION

The mission of the PSYOP battalion is to:

Plan and conduct psychological operations.

Develop, produce, and disseminate propaganda.

Advise as to the psychological impact of planned and executed operations and actions.

In planning, executing, and coordinating the battalion effort, the psychological operations planner must:

Adhere to national policy **for the area of operations**.

Insure that psychological operations and propaganda produced conform to directives from higher headquarters, Department of State, or the ICA.

There is a serious danger that propaganda developed at the lower echelons will not conform to policy from higher headquarters. A commander cannot interject personal or "gut feeling" propaganda that violates policy. **It is the duty of the senior PSYOP officer with the command violating policy to advise against this course of action and to recommend a conforming course.**

Normally, the major tactical headquarters is granted approving authority to initiate PSYOP campaigns and introduce themes. They must, however, conform to the guidelines in the PSYOP section of the plan or order. **Propaganda may be disseminated only in the command area of responsibility.**

CAPABILITIES

The mission of the supported element determines the type, size, and mix of cellular teams that form the battalion. These factors determine the PSYOP unit's capabilities.

Battalion headquarters commands, controls, guides, and coordinates subordinate teams. Each battalion has an AB team. Each company has an AA team. The G5 office and the tactical operations center (TOC) are the points of contact for external coordination.

Intelligence Operations

Current intelligence is received from the G2/S2, the IB (Mobile Radio Monitoring) team, and other intelligence channels. Each battalion has one or more FC (Current Intelligence) and FD (Research and Analysis) teams working under close supervision of the FA (Propaganda) team. These teams process current and background intelligence for the battalion and provide the FA team with the information it needs.

Propaganda Development—Propaganda Development Center (PDC)

The FA, FB (Audio and TV Production), FC, FD, and FE (Graphic Production) teams are generally combined to form a PDC (located near the G5) whose members have routine access to information about current and planned operations.

$$\left.\begin{array}{l} \text{FA} + \text{FB} + \\ \text{FC} + \\ \text{FD} + \text{FE} \end{array}\right\} = \text{PDC}$$

With the information it receives from the FC and FD teams, the FA team develops campaigns, propaganda themes, and messages and determines the media to be used and the amount of propaganda to be disseminated in a given area (density of dissemination).



PDC Guidance and Information. In addition, the PDC guides and informs forward teams by:

Informal staff coordination.

Command visits.

Published orders and plans.

Target Analysis Worksheet. One of the major tools used by the PDC is a Target Analysis Worksheet which is a working summary of all intelligence collected relative to a target audience (see appendix F). The completed worksheet indicates:

The target.

Conditions affecting the target that are important to the psychological operator.

Audience weaknesses (susceptibilities) that can be exploited.

The extent to which the target group can help to accomplish the PSYOP mission.

Campaign Control Sheet. The FA team uses the Target Analysis Worksheet to develop a Campaign Control Sheet (appendix G). This document, in chart form, indicates the concept and execution of a PSYOP campaign. It is used to control a PSYOP campaign.

Production

FA team produces rough copy for all forms of propaganda.

FB team prepares radio, loudspeaker, and television scripts.

G-series teams print copy in final form; e.g., leaflets, posters, handbills, newspapers, magazines, etc.

ID team prepares and produces radio programs.

Spreading the Word

The distribution and dissemination of all propaganda is coordinated with the PSYOP battalion S3. The battalion may make personnel available to assist in aerial delivery of printed propaganda and loudspeaker messages.

HB team makes loudspeaker broadcasts.

HC team makes audiovisual presentations.

IC team transmits radio programs.

GA, GC, and GE teams print, package, and distribute printed propaganda to dissemination points.

PSYOP TEAMS IN THE FORCE REAR AREA

The printing, radio, and television teams are normally located in the rear areas of the major forces they support. The printing teams should be located where paper stocks can be properly stored and readily moved, and the final product can be easily distributed.

The graphics, printing, and audiovisual teams support a command on a mission basis. Work priorities are established by the PSYOP battalion S3 based on the needs of the supported force commander. Based on PDC guidance, scripts, graphics, and printed copy are prepared by local illustrators and writers or others intimately familiar with the target audience.

The Printing Cycle

The PSYOP battalion S3 gives the chief of the press section printing priorities and suspense dates. The organic teams--light GA, medium (mobile) GB and GC, and heavy (fixed) GD and GE--produce camera-ready copy and printed propaganda.

> **The final product must be approved by the originator of the propaganda request before it can be disseminated to the target audience.**

The press team packages the final approved product for the selected method of dissemination and delivers it to the airfield, artillery unit, ammunition supply point, or other distribution point.

Air Support

Requests for aircraft to drop leaflets or make aerial broadcasts are normally made through the G3/S3 Air. The type of aircraft used, whether manned or remotely piloted vehicles (RPV), is determined by the Air Force or Army aviation element delivering the propaganda.

The density and effectiveness of enemy air defenses are major factors in determining whether air support will be available. There may be times when a valid request for air support cannot be met due to the extreme effectiveness of enemy defense measures. Use of aircraft exclusively for PSYOP missions is rarely possible.

Radio and Television

Radio and elevision programs are broadcast over available local and organic facilities. Qualified local personnel are used as much as possible, particularly scriptwriters, directors, actors, engineers, and stagehands.

FORWARD TACTICAL HB AND HC TEAMS

The HB (Loudspeaker) and HC (Audiovisual) teams normally **support forward tactical combat units**. These teams, which also collect intelligence, need qualified linguists. HB teams broadcast from the ground (mounted and dismounted) and from the air. HC teams present slide and motion picture shows, make loudspeaker broadcasts, and produce small amounts of leaflets.

LANGUAGE-QUALIFIED PERSONNEL

In order to be effective, the battalion must be augmented with a local, professional, language-qualified staff to assure that the final product is:

The best that can be produced.

Appropriate to the target audience.

Relevant to their interests.

Credible and persuasive.

Chapter Five

5

PSYOP IN SUPPORT OF FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

The primary responsibility for preventing or defeating an insurgency rests with the host country (HC) government--not with the United States or any other assisting government. As a first step, the host government must recognize the existence of an insurgency and fully understand its political nature. Once the HC government understands the cause of the insurgency, it must show interest in the well-being of the people by developing and implementing programs that meet their needs.

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ROLE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATOR

The psychological operator has a major role in PSYOP support of FID. He must:

IDENTIFY DESIRABLE PROGRAMS

First, he must identify the objectives of the HC programs, the HC institutions that have a PSYOP impact, and the programs that HC PSYOP can accomplish.

PARTICIPATE IN POLICYMAKING

Then, he must participate in policymaking at all levels of command. In fulfilling this role, he must assure that the greatest possible consideration is given to the psychological aspects of all policies, programs, and operations.

COMMUNICATE

His next role is that of communicating. In HC PSYOP one of his major roles may be to assist in making known and "selling" the positive programs of the government to its major internal targets. Unexplained government programs breed rumors and suspicion. The communicated program promotes public awareness and appreciation of the government's interest in its people.

THE HOST COUNTRY SOLDIER

Host country armed forces personnel must be indoctrinated with the importance of the civilian population in internal defense and development operations. The individual soldier must understand that his actions toward the population may spell the difference between success or failure.

HOST COUNTRY PSYOP SUPPORT

A unified communications organization is needed for FID activities. An established bureaucracy may tend to become isolated and unable to communicate with the public it is supposed to serve. PSYOP must be closely coordinated with the government information services to avoid contradiction in output.

The criteria for selecting PSYOP personnel should be ability and skills rather than military versus civilian status; neither category has a monopoly on imaginative skill or the ability to influence people. The admixture of personnel takes into account the fact that the political and military aspects of insurgency are interwoven. In order to have any chance of success, the guidance and operations of the integrated PSYOP organization must be accepted by all military and civilian sectors of the population.

US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO HC PSYOP

US Army participation in PSYOP is initiated **on request of the host government and upon approval of the appropriate US Government agencies.** US Army PSYOP elements may be developed and deployed as mobile training teams (MTT), technical assistance teams (TAT) as part of a US security assistance element, or in direct support of US combat units. They may be attached or under operational control (OPCON) to an in-country Joint US Security Assistance Training Group (JUSSATG).

In order to cope with misunderstandings, delayed actions, or inaction brought about by differences in stages of development and sophistication, culture and language, concepts of time, orientation to mission accomplishment, etc., the US psychological operator must have patience. Differences in patterns of behavior, ethics, pace of life, concepts, sense of obligations, loyalties, concern with adherence to rigid time frames and schedules, and so on may lead the US psychological operator to become impatient and try to do the job himself. This effort is generally doomed to failure. When he has failed to do the job himself, the US psychological operator may try to have host country personnel do it all; this, too, will fail.

The US psychological operator cannot insist that HC personnel attempt to communicate with US equipment and techniques as he does (i.e., as American substitutes). The communications that will result will be neither US nor HC but will combine the worst characteristics of both, with equally disastrous results.

US PSYOP forces can best assist the host country with hardware and advice. This subsidiary role of US forces does not lessen the responsibility of the host government to communicate with its own people, using its own tools and techniques, in its own image.

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US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO HC PSYOP

US Army participation in PSYOP is initiated **on request of the host government and upon approval of the appropriate US Government agencies.** US Army PSYOP elements may be developed and deployed as mobile training teams (MTT), technical assistance teams (TAT) as part of a US security assistance element, or in direct support of US combat units. They may be attached or under operational control (OPCON) to an in-country Joint US Security Assistance Training Group (JUSSATG).

In order to cope with misunderstandings, delayed actions, or inaction brought about by differences in stages of development and sophistication, culture and language, concepts of time, orientation to mission accomplishment, etc., the US psychological operator must have patience. Differences in patterns of behavior, ethics, pace of life, concepts, sense of obligations, loyalties, concern with adherence to rigid time frames and schedules, and so on may lead the US psychological operator to become impatient and try to do the job himself. This effort is generally doomed to failure. When he has failed to do the job himself, the US psychological operator may try to have host country personnel do it all; this, too, will fail.

The US psychological operator cannot insist that HC personnel attempt to communicate with US equipment and techniques as he does (i.e., as American substitutes). The communications that will result will be neither US nor HC but will combine the worst characteristics of both, with equally disastrous results.

US PSYOP forces can best assist the host country with hardware and advice. This subsidiary role of US forces does not lessen the responsibility of the host government to communicate with its own people, using its own tools and techniques, in its own image.

Within the context of an insurgency, US PSYOP have five major objectives:

Assist the HC government in gaining the support of its people.

Assist the HC government in defeating the insurgent movement.

Assist the HC government in providing a psychological basis for rehabilitating returnees from the insurgent movement.

Establish and maintain a favorable US image in the HC.

Influence neutral groups and the world community.

Target Audience Considerations

Although the physical situation is important, the social environment of the target is generally more significant. One major consideration is the diversity of target audiences. Each target audience is composed of individuals and groups living under diverse constraints, having diverse interests, levels of education and intelligence, occupations, beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions.

Campaigns, themes, and messages must be designed to influence the various groups within each major audience category; propaganda produced must be based on the culture of each major target group and appeal to the personal sensitivities and interests of that target group.

In an FID situation, the government must convince the populace of its concern. Government activities must reflect government programs that are effective, attractive, and beneficial to the population.

HOST COUNTRY TARGET GROUPS

THE INSURGENT

The major PSYOP objectives are to discredit the insurgents and to isolate them from the population. The insurgents include the guerrillas and their supporting elements--the auxiliary and the underground. The insurgent's infrastructure is invisible. This gives the insurgent an advantage over the government as any damage done to the government is highly visible and has an immediate effect.

An insurgency is determined and gains morale and physical strength in direct proportion to its effectiveness and the attractiveness of its ideology. The cadre and highly motivated members may not be vulnerable to propaganda. Below them, however, there are usually a number of vulnerable individuals and groups; these, though tightly controlled, can be propagandized effectively. The most important direction of attack is against insurgent unit morale.

The insurgent must be destroyed physically and psychologically. Psychological destruction is extremely important because without it, the insurgent force may simply disappear underground to surface at a more opportune time.

Programs should publicize and exploit differences between cadre, recruits, supporters, and the local population. Other themes might emphasize lack of support, isolation, homesickness, or hardship suffered by the guerrillas.

THE POPULATION

Since popular support of the people is essential to victory, the population is the major psychological target of the insurgent and the government. The people are the source of intelligence, manpower, and logistical support for the insurgents.

The major PSYOP mission is to build national morale, unity, and confidence in the government, its leaders, and programs. There should also be an effort to win popular acceptance of the presence of US Armed Forces and to convince the people that:

Government programs serve the interests of the people.

The government forces will protect the people and defeat the insurgent.

Ultimate victory is assured. This need to stress ultimate victory is paramount because if the insurgency enters the second stage, the people's immediate concern will be survival, and they will support the apparent victor.

Voluntary reporting of antigovernment activities is in their best interests.

The insurgent is being misled by questionable promises of a foreign power and is the lackey of that foreign power.

Identification of insurgent leadership will shorten the life of the insurgency and hasten return to a way of life that fulfills the perceived needs of the people.

The people have a major active role in essential counterintelligence activities.

GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL

Host country government personnel are a major internal target. The military, paramilitary, civil services, and other elements of the government make excellent target audiences because:

They have a vested interest in having the government remain in control.

The established chain-of-command or organizational structure facilitates communications and local response.

The PSYOP mission in dealing with this target group is to maintain loyalties and develop policies and attitudes which will result in members of the group:

Realizing the importance of the population and the necessity for popular support.

Promoting the public welfare and justice.

Taking actions within their sphere of activity that will eliminate the basic causes of the insurgency.

Protecting the population from the insurgent.

NEUTRAL AND NONHOSTILE ELEMENTS OF THE POPULATION

The emphasis in communication to the friendly or uncommitted population should be positive and constructive. PSYOP efforts should publicize the tangible and visible accomplishments of the legitimate government. Part of the communication effort should discourage public apathy and activity that will help the insurgent.

The population should not be asked to undertake any action that is contrary to its own direct interest. The most obvious example is action which leads to physical jeopardy or death. If the population takes such action, not realizing the consequences, and the outcome is harmful, the authority that sponsored the communication will lose credibility and its audience.

POPULATION COMMITTED TO SUPPORT THE INSURGENT

The audience supporting the insurgent may do so either out of conviction or involuntary involvement. The PSYOP mission in this case is to achieve a withdrawal of support for the hostile effort and defection in place or in person to the host government. A surrender or return program is recommended as the core effort toward this target.

FOREIGN AUDIENCES

Foreign audiences range widely, geographically, politically, and in their relationships with and attitudes toward the legitimate government and the insurgents. For neutral nations, the purpose of PSYOP is to achieve a friendly neutrality or active support. For external hostile powers, the major objective of PSYOP is to influence public opinion within such nations. An active minority within such nations can change the course of national policy and action. Plausible communications are needed to influence foreign audiences.

Communications to foreign audiences can have a favorable effect on domestic audiences, particularly urban intellectuals and mass media communicators who may be influenced by the foreign reaction.

INSURGENT PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATION

The insurgent has recognizable psychological objectives, methods, and organization. His themes appear rational and, therefore, are difficult to neutralize or discredit.

THEMES

Insurgent themes typically stress government weaknesses and the gap between government programs and policies and the perceived needs of the people. The primary theme stresses the idea that the objectives of the insurgent coincide with the needs and aspirations of the people. They try to convince the people that the interests of the populace are not served by the government. Themes about government corruption, nepotism, scandal, and other corruptive factors are used to convince the people that their government is unfit to lead them. Other themes used are anticolonialism, nationalism, and land reform.

Insurgent leaders try to make everyone a propagandist. However, the driving force is the hard core cadre.

THE INSURGENT ORGANIZATION

A major technique of expanding control is by means of a vertical shadow political organization--a shadow government. The primary function of the vertical organization is to insure centralized and responsive direction of the insurgent component, either covertly or openly, as circumstances permit. In an insurgent-controlled area, the organization is headed by the local party secretary. The other local personnel report to him.

At the same time, horizontal organizations act as propaganda agencies. These agencies stress the use of face-to-face PSYOP. All other types and media of propaganda are also aggressively used--propaganda of the deed, radio, TV, leaflets, and rumor.

The horizontal organizations organize the populace into functional and "window dressing" groups that meet the needs of the insurgent leaders to control the population through organized groups and that meet the needs of the people to participate. These groups, because they appear and allege to be independent and acting on their own, are extremely deceptive. Individuals within these groups (farmers, women, students, young people, etc.) are closely supervised and criticized. Through such organizations, the insurgents cultivate, indoctrinate, recruit, and manipulate a variety of social groups under their control and through them bring in new adherents. Gradually, these organizations take over all social, political, economic, cultural, public safety, and military institutions.

PSYOP TRAINING, ADVISORY, AND ASSISTANCE EFFORTS

The major security assistance role of US military personnel may be to train, advise, and assist a requesting government threatened with insurgency. In this capacity PSYOP personnel/units would have the missions to:

Improve the ability of the HC to conduct PSYOP in support of its own internal defense and development program.

Improve HC command and staff understanding of the PSYOP role in internal defense and development and implementation of PSYOP in HC internal defense and development operations and related programs.

Recommend and provide, when not otherwise obtainable, essential materiel which can be used and maintained by the host country.

These missions may require US PSYOP personnel to train, advise, and assist:

Host country armed forces.

Host country paramilitary and public safety forces.

Other elements and agencies of the HC government.

The US military mission within the host country.

An organization should be structured to perform these unique multiple missions. As a minimum, it should contain these elements:

A headquarters element (company, battalion, group). In a small country, a command and control team should be sufficient.

Training elements, such as detachments, teams, or individuals.

Local augmentation, such as:

Professionals and technicians.

Interpreters and translators.

Secretarial and clerical personnel.

Service personnel.

US military personnel providing security assistance do not conduct psychological operations in a host country. The Joint US Security Assistance Training Group (JUSSATG)--the senior US military headquarters--and subordinate advisory units and activities should give active advisory attention to PSYOP and alert HC counterparts to the psychological impact of all military actions, operations, and individual acts of the HC armed forces.

In order to centralize control, the commander of the US PSYOP unit within the HC may be designated as the US command PSYOP staff officer, or he may provide a representative who can support the G5/J7 staff (CMO) mission in accordance with FM 101-5. The duties of this officer should include those of preparing annual PSYOP training, advisory, and assistance plans.

Budgetary restraints will limit the extent of PSYOP training, number of persons receiving training, and training areas. Monetary restrictions will also set limits on fulfillment of PSYOP equipment needs and procurement sources; i.e., in-country, CONUS, offshore.

Chapter Six

6

PSYOP IN SUPPORT OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Unconventional warfare (UW) involves a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-denied, or politically sensitive territory. It includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, special operations, and other low-visibility covert or clandestine operations. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel.

US unconventional warfare forces, augmented by psychological operations personnel, may support and direct the indigenous personnel effort during all conditions of war or peace.

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ROLE OF PSYOP

US UW forces operating within the UW environment have a thorough knowledge of the national and regional social, economic, political, and cultural characteristics of the populace. They have a working ability in the language, communication patterns, and psychological sensitivities of the local populace. The US Army PSYOP element deployed by the US command assists US UW forces in meeting PSYOP requirements.

During UW operations, psychological operations are used to strengthen a weak cause and to make a strong cause even stronger so that its followers, by word and deed, become its dedicated propagandists. More specifically, PSYOP can create unity, maintain or boost morale, renew the resistance force's determination, and develop sympathy for the resistance among uncommitted segments of the population.

PASSIVE ROLE

The mere presence of US UW forces--their operations, official activities, and individual conduct--has a psychological impact on indigenous military and paramilitary forces and the civil population. Official activities and individual conduct in particular help to offset possible unfavorable attitudes of neutrals and uncommitted segments of the population.

US Army PSYOP personnel advise and assist UW forces in developing a favorable image, an image that will win the support of the neutrals, the uncommitted segments, and the resistance movement, its underground and auxiliary forces.

ACTIVE ROLE

With the backing of the United States and its allies, PSYOP policy guidance is directed by the US Ambassador, by the theater military commander, or by a higher level official. These policies, in conjunction with those of local leaders or a government-in-exile, are issued in the form of joint directives. These directives give the authenticity and momentum required to implement an active PSYOP campaign. Within these directives, US PSYOP personnel can actively support UW forces by:

Publicizing successful ambushes and raids, sniper campaigns, interdiction operations, and civil assistance such as sharing medical services and supplies and giving sanctuary to civilian supporters of the resistance.

Publicizing that UW forces are providing manpower and skills to assist the populace in repairing or building needed structures, harvesting crops, maintaining schools and places of worship, and organizing social activity groups. Only structures and activities that the civil population can and will maintain should be assisted. In addition, it is preferred that the idea for a project or other activity and the major input of labor therefore come from the local people.

Warning the civilian population of impending aircraft or missile attacks. These warnings give the impression that the guerrillas control the operation and strengthen the belief of the population in the might of the guerrilla force.

Encouraging some or all of the civilian population, as appropriate, to resist laws, regulations, and restrictions imposed by enemy authorities.

Organizing support elements in all target groups by conducting and supporting intensive education and indoctrination programs.

Meeting face-to-face with local civilians when a specific objective cannot otherwise be fulfilled. These meetings give tangible evidence of US support and appreciation of the objectives and problems of the local guerrilla force. The impact can be strengthened during all stages of UW organization and development.

Assisting in the development and perpetuation of front groups within the populace.

It is crucial that supporting PSYOP personnel have a thorough knowledge of the UW commander's operations environment. Successful employment of psychological operations will win the assistance of supporting resistance elements and build a viable organization.

PSYOP SUPPORT IN UW

PSYOP personnel will plan the type of campaign, themes, messages, media, and methods employed based on an analysis of the target audience. These plans must be integrated in the seven phases of guerrilla warfare--from the psychological preparation stage through the linkup with conventional forces to demobilization. (See PSYOP in the Seven Phases of Development of US-Sponsored Resistance Forces, page 6-6).

PSYOP ASSETS

Theater Command. US Army PSYOP facilities, external to the UWOA, are set up in the theater communications zone by US Army PSYOP units.

Theater UW Command. To support the seven phases of guerrilla warfare, the theater commander attaches a portion of the theater PSYOP resources to the theater UW command. The UW command headquarters coordinates with and supervises US PSYOP support within the UWOA, and coordinates this support with the unified command. Requests for additional PSYOP support are submitted to the unified commander.

Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF). During hostilities, a psychological operations staff officer from theater headquarters should coordinate with the JUWTF to assist US UW detachments in their respective areas of operations.

Special Forces Operational Base (SFOB). Detachments receive appropriate PSYOP guidance prior to infiltration and are prepared to advise the SFOB commander on psychological opportunities as they arise, to train selected resistance members to apply PSYOP, and, if required, to initiate PSYOP campaigns in coordination with the JUWTF. If additional PSYOP support is required to accomplish tasks beyond the capabilities of the supporting PSYOP element, the SFOB must initiate the request.

Initial PSYOP facilities within the unconventional warfare operations area (UWOA) are austere. Reliance is based primarily on face-to-face communication, but printed media can be produced in enemy-controlled areas by auxiliaries and the underground if indigenous facilities exist. Radio and television coverage may be achieved in the UWOA by transmissions originating from adjacent secure areas.

In later phases, additional PSYOP facilities may be placed in secure areas within the UWOA.

PSYOP TECHNIQUES IN SUPPORT OF UW

Psychological operations techniques such as intelligence collection, target analysis, media selection, propaganda development, and feedback are generally applicable in a conventional or unconventional warfare environment. The task of the psychological operations personnel supporting the UWOA is to employ imaginatively and decisively these techniques in an unconventional warfare environment. To assist in this transition, the PSYOP personnel must be aware of those UW perspectives which differ significantly from conventional PSYOP techniques of employment (See chapter 3, (C) FM 31-20.)

INTELLIGENCE FOR PSYOP

Intelligence is the lifeblood of successful PSYOP. Without intelligence about the feelings and persuasions of the UW target audience, a PSYOP campaign is not likely to succeed. (See chapter 14.) UW forces, by virtue of their mission, deployment, training, and contacts, are able to gather intelligence relevant to the attitudes, allegiance, activities, vulnerabilities, and susceptibilities of the local population, guerrillas, underground, and auxiliary.

MAJOR TARGET AUDIENCES

Using the information supplied by UW forces and other intelligence agencies, four major target audiences may be identified (see pp. 196-198, section V, chapter 3, (C) FM 31-20, and pp. 5-6 to 5-7, chapter 5, this manual):

The Uncommitted

In the initial stage of hostilities, the general population may be neutral or may actively oppose the resistance effort because of fear or uncertainty about the aims of the movement and its success. PSYOP support, therefore, must stress that the resistance shares the political and social goals of the population; that the United States and its allies, in supporting the guerrilla (the military arm of the resistance), support these same goals; and that the resistance movement will be successful.

Enemy Sympathizers

Enemy sympathizers include those civilians in an operational area who are:

Willing enemy collaborators.

Unwilling enemy collaborators--those who collaborate under duress.

Passive enemy sympathizers.

A PSYOP campaign aimed at this target instills doubt and fear. It may be conducted in conjunction with positive political action programs--programs which identify and discredit the enemy collaborator or weaken his belief in the strength and power of the enemy military forces.

It must be noted that punitive action against such collaborators may result in enemy reprisals and, consequently, in a loss of broad civilian support for PSYOP objectives. However, overreaction by the enemy can, when skillfully exploited, build popular support for the guerrilla cause.

Enemy Military Forces

Enemy military forces may be of the same nationality as the population, or they may represent an occupying power or one assisting the enemy government.

PSYOP campaigns are directed against these groups to make their members:

Feel isolated.

Improperly supported.

Doubtful of the outcome of the struggle.

Distrustful of each other.

Doubtful of the morality of their cause.

By focusing on the enemy soldier's frustrations, PSYOP can lower his morale, reduce his effectiveness, and create feelings of inadequacy, insecurity, and fear, increasing his susceptibility to PSYOP and making him more vulnerable to persuasion to surrender, malinger, show disaffection, or desert.

Resistance Sympathizers

Resistance sympathizers include those civilians who are sympathetic to the goals of the movement but who are not active members of some element of the resistance force.

Psychological operations campaigns directed at this target audience stress appeals for the populace to actively (though generally covertly) support or passively cooperate with the resistance forces in achieving common objectives. Inherent in these appeals is a rigid personal code of conduct by resistance members which insures that the people, their sensitivities, culture, customs, and needs are strictly respected.

The words and deeds of the resistance must assure the people that the movement can always be counted on to help protect them from all enemies, and that it is the instrument of political, social, and economic progress--as visualized by the populace.

PSYOP IN THE SEVEN PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT OF US-SPONSORED RESISTANCE FORCES

PHASES	CHARACTERISTICS	PSYOP ACTIVITIES
I-Psychological Preparation	Inhabitants of the area are prepared psychologically to receive US forces.	A PSYOP campaign is planned and executed to prepare the inhabitants of the proposed operational area(s) for the presence of US UW forces. The campaign is planned at the highest levels of a government preparing to support a resistance movement. Citizens-in-exile; other popular, respected, and influential people; and key in-country sympathizers are used. US PSYOP units, under the guidance and supervision of the force/theater commander, have a major role in the campaign.
II-Initial	US nonmilitary agencies in coordination with the allied government-in-exile have verified that the populace is willing to accept sponsorship for their resistance efforts. Initial contact has been made with the resistance force (RF) whose leader requested assistance and sponsorship. The Special Forces Operational Base (SFOB) has been established and is fully operational. Operational elements are in isolation receiving extensive briefings and conducting studies.	The emphasis of the PSYOP campaign is changed to support planned RF operations. The SF Group S5, with supporting PSYOP elements, is responsible for preparing the PSYOP plan. The S5 must: With SFOB commanders and indigenous assets which have exfiltrated to accompany US UW elements, develop PSYOP campaigns for areas of operations. Conduct PSYOP orientation and training on target groups, communications characteristics and dynamics, themes, symbols, messages, propaganda production, use of media, and dissemination. Provide US personnel with an understanding and appreciation of the mutual relationship and interdependence of US and resistance forces. Develop themes, symbols, and PSYOP actions to support each phase of operations from infiltration to demobilization. Brief all operational elements on propaganda to be disseminated and PSYOP actions to be conducted in each area of operations. Coordinate with area specialist teams (ASTs) on PSYOP plans for each operational area.

PHASES	CHARACTERISTICS	PSYOP ACTIVITIES
III-Infiltration	Operational elements have been briefed on PSYOP. Infiltration is complete and contact has been established with resistance leaders.	PSYOP is conducted in support of US UW forces/resistance force contact and development. The area assessment and a PSYOP program through face-to-face communications are initiated. Operational elements establish rapport, having been advised and briefed by the S5 and supporting PSYOP personnel prior to infiltration. Propaganda is supported by tangible evidence of sponsor support in the form of weapons, ammunition, medical supplies, and money provided to resistance leaders. PSYOP themes stress: The ultimate success of the resistance movement. The need for mutual support, confidence, and working rapport.
IV-Organization	The operational element has succeeded in establishing rapport with resistance leaders. Tangible proof (money, weapons, medical supplies, etc.) and supporting propaganda have convinced the resistance force that with mutual support, confidence, and working rapport, fundamental goals and objectives can be achieved. Area and guerrilla organization is developed and training begins. Small-scale combat operations may be conducted. The requirement exists for the operational elements to implement unity programs.	The PSYOP effort is expanded to assist in increasing and developing the resistance force. A major objective of the PSYOP program is to insure close cooperation between all resistance elements. Resistance leaders participate in the formulation of PSYOP objectives and are persuaded NOT to take any action which contradicts or interferes with the accomplishment of these objectives. Motivational campaigns targeting the guerrilla forces are initiated. They cover: History of the country. History of the enemy and his objectives. The significance of and need for proper personal conduct of the resistance force toward the civilian population. PSYOP indoctrination programs will cover: Political, economic, and social objectives of the resistance movement. Ideological indoctrination of the resistance cadre. The practical impact of tactical operations on the population.
V-Buildup	Small-scale combat operations increase local support and attract recruits for the resistance force. Operational elements increase their activities to establish rapport, to promote cooperation and unified action, to provide tangible proof of support, and to motivate the resistance force.	PSYOP campaigns (propaganda and actions) are conducted to support the expansion and full development of the resistance force. PSYOP must: Encourage young people to join the resistance elements. Encourage and win general civilian support for the resistance movement.

PHASES	CHARACTERISTICS	PSYOP ACTIVITIES
V (cont)- Buildup		Themes, directed to the resistance force, emphasize the rules of engagement. The rules should call special attention to targets whose destruction would impact adversely on the civilian population. The PYSOP campaign continues to stress and assure the success of the resistance force and allied operations. PSYOP must impress resistance leaders that producing favorable reactions among the populace is vital. (This PSYOP program must strongly impress upon them the need to indoctrinate their followers with the need for proper individual and official conduct toward the population. It must also point out the need for stringent disciplinary action against offenders.)
VI Combat Employment	Successful small-scale combat operations have attracted many recruits. The resistance force is now fully developed and full combat operations planned. Due to enemy propaganda, disruption of daily life, and destruction of property, many members of the populace do not understand the reasons for the resistance force's operations. The enemy is actively engaged in reprisals and counterguerrilla operations.* This phase continues until linkup with conventional forces or until cessation of hostilities.	PSYOP must support and exploit the combat capability of the resistance forces. Current propaganda efforts continue. Themes and symbols are directed at various target audiences. **Resistance Movement**: Assurance of resistance force success over the enemy is stressed. Emphasis is placed on the inevitability of complete victory. **Populace**: The major themes are nationalism and the support of the resistance movement. **Guerrilla Forces**: Motivational and indoctrination campaigns are increased. Emphasis is placed on the ability of the guerrilla forces to defeat the enemy; the enemy's frustration in counterguerrilla operations is exploited. **Enemy Forces**: The inevitability of the enemy's death and defeat by the resistance force is emphasized. The fact that the enemy is not safe in any area is stressed.
VII Linkup and Demobilization	Conventional forces have moved into range of designated UWOAs and linkup operations are imminent. Liaison parties (which include PSYOP personnel) from the SFOB have been attached to the conventional force headquarters with plans for PSYOP to support the linkup and demobilization of the resistance force. SFOB prepares and coordinates plans with the conventional tactical ground commander. Because of its extreme sensitivity and importance, plans for demobilization must begin in the early phases of operations and be continuous. When the resistance force is no longer needed, higher headquarters will order its disposition, to include demobilization. The practical problems of nationalization, i.e., political, economic, social, ethnic, racial, religious, and military, are surfaced.	PSYOP propaganda and actions (campaigns) support the linkup and the subsequent demobilization. **Linkup**: Information is widely distributed in the UWOA to prepare the populace to cooperate fully with the conventional tactical forces. The public is urged to remain in place in order not to hinder operations that will bring hostilities to a successful end. Resistance leaders are briefed on the importance of close cooperation with tactical force commanders. The resistance force is psychologically prepared to be incorporated into the national army or to be demobilized. Resistance leaders and guerrilla force commanders are psychologically prepared to accept new leadership from the conventional force on linkup. Troop commanders and staff officers inform the troops of the importance of proper individual and unit conduct. **Demobilization**: A PSYOP campaign is implemented to explain the demobilizaton process. The campaign provides for the orderly transition of the resistance force to peaceful civilians, preventing the formation of quasi-military or political groups in conflict with the objectives and policies of the recognized government. Loyalty to the post-hostilities government is stressed.

***NOTE: PSYOP are offensive; they are not defensively reactive to enemy reprisals or actions designed to discredit the resistance force.**

Chapter Seven

7

PSYOP IN SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

COVERT OPERATIONS

Covert PSYOP are normally not a function of US military PSYOP elements due to their political sensitivity, extensive required compartmentation, and normal execution as a component of higher level special operations and planning. Covert PSYOP require exceptional coordination, integration, and direction. They do not disclose their source. The operations are planned and conducted in such a manner that the responsible agency or government is not evident, and if uncovered, the sponsor can plausibly disclaim any involvement.

To achieve maximum impact and to preclude compromise of the overt PSYOP effort, covert and overt operations should be totally separate operations. Personnel engaged in one type of operation must not be engaged in or exposed to the other. Black and gray propaganda are employed in cover operations. (Black, gray, and white do not refer to anything inherent in the content of the propaganda itself, but indicate methods used to carry out an operation.)

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BLACK PROPAGANDA

Propaganda which purports to emanate from a source other than the true one is known as black propaganda.

Black propaganda is best used to support strategic plans.

Advantages

Black propaganda may originate within or near the enemy homeland, or enemy-held territory, and may provide immediate propaganda messages for a specific audience.

The presumption of emanating from within an enemy country lends credibility to black propaganda and helps to demoralize the enemy by suggesting that there are dissident and disloyal elements within his ranks.

Through the skillful use of terminology, format, and media, messages appear to be a part of the enemy's own propaganda effort, making the enemy appear to contradict himself, and forcing him to mount an expensive, difficult, and exploitable counterpropaganda campaign that highlights the original black propaganda message.

The covert nature of black propaganda and the difficulty of identifying the true source also hinder the enemy's counterpropaganda efforts.

Disadvantages

Stringent and compartmented precautions are required to keep the true identity of the source hidden.

As covert PSYOP seldom use regular communications channels and must copy enemy characteristics, they are difficult to coordinate with the overall PSYOP effort.

Covert operations may be difficult to control because covert PSYOP operating agencies are decentralized.

Stringent security requirements and long-term campaign plans limit flexibility.

These operations are extremely vulnerable to discovery, manipulation, and elimination (of equipment and personnel) when operating within enemy territory.

These operations normally require special personnel, procedures, and equipment available from US agencies outside the US Army.

GRAY PROPAGANDA

Propaganda which does not identify with and cannot be identified with a source is known as gray propaganda.

Advantages

Skillfully used, gray propaganda can:

Gain acceptance by avoiding the stigma of being "propaganda."

Use unusual themes without reflecting on the prestige of the originator.

Introduce new themes based on assumed vulnerabilities without identifying the true source. It can, therefore, be used for "trial balloon" purposes.

Disadvantages

It is limited by the difficulty of keeping its origin unknown yet authoritative.

It may be vulnerable to critical analysis, thereby losing effectiveness and making it highly susceptible to counterpropaganda.

COVERT RADIO OPERATIONS

Clandestine radio is a major medium for dissemination of black and gray propaganda. The radio transmitter is normally operated by indigenous personnel of the target country or by third country nationals. As US military personnel may have an advisory role in covert radio operations, they should be aware of the inherent vulnerabilities of this medium:

All radio communications are susceptible to detection, identification, and location by enemy direction-finding equipment. Consequently, when operating in enemy territory, the operation must be flexible enough to allow displacement of the transmitter.

Mobile transmitters are normally low-powered and so must be near the target audiences, or a higher powered conspicuous antenna system may be required. In addition, their power source, whether AC or DC must be maintained.

TACTICAL DECEPTION

Psychological operations have a major role in supporting tactical deception operations, which essentially are unique psychological operations. The basic targets of tactical deception operations are commanders and their staffs, whose perceptions and subsequent actions will determine the success or failure of these operations.

PSYOP support tactical deception operations by disseminating information that supports or confirms the deception story and its objectives. In order to lend effective support, it is essential that PSYOP personnel coordinate at all levels of command in the planning and execution of these operations, primarily with the G5, G2, G3, and commanders.

Propaganda supporting tactical deception operations is disseminated by a mix of all available and appropriate media and means. Support is rendered by employing tactics, techniques, and procedures that mislead the targets. For example, in night operations this can take the form of using loudspeaker teams to mislead or confuse the enemy by producing sound effects simulating battlefield noises and movements. PSYOP units can publish leaflets, pamphlets, posters, and newspaper items, and use a mix of all other media and means, including interpersonal communications and rumor, that will assist in achieving tactical deception objectives.

The national unit aspect of tactical deception operations can be assisted by judicious use of PSYOP media.

Chapter Eight

8

PSYOP IN SUPPORT OF PRISONER-OF-WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEE PROGRAMS

RESPONSIBILITIES

In accordance with US policy and international law, care and custody of prisoners of war (PW) and civilian internees are command responsibilities. The Staff Judge Advocate is responsible for providing guidance and staff assistance concerning the application of treaties and the law of war. The Provost Marshal at each level of command is responsible for the development of policies, plans, and procedures. The PW camp commander is responsible for all activities conducted within the PW camp.

The degree of PSYOP support required in the conduct of PW activities may be minimal or more extensive, dependent upon DA policy and other factors attendant on a specific conflict and PW attitudes in a given camp.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

The general objectives of PSYOP in support of PW and civilian internee programs include:

Conditioning individuals to accept camp authority and regulations during internment. The resultant smooth operation of the camp:

Supports the basic custodial mission of the camp.

Minimizes diversion of combat troops for guard duty.

Minimizes disruption of operations by activist pro-enemy prisoners.

Provides a useful basis for surrender appeals to enemy troops.

Denies the enemy opportunity to make unfavorable propaganda claims of US mistreatment of prisoners-of-war and internees arising out of incidents resulting from suppression of PW disturbances.

Supports US policy of encouraging the enemy to treat US prisoners well (at least according to the Geneva Conventions).

Persuading individual PWs or internees to understand and accept US goals. Achievement of this objective may lead the PW or internee, in accordance with US policy and international law, to:

Assist the in-camp PSYOP program.

Aid PSYOP aimed at other populations.

Contribute to the maintenance of order and discipline within the camp, and nullify hostile activity by pro-enemy activities.

Become, after repatriation, a supportive element of US objectives.

OPERATIONS

PSYOP personnel should work with interrogation teams. When applicable, interrogation personnel assigned to PSYOP FC (Current Intelligence) teams may be used to conduct interrogations and gather intelligence needed for media and operations. Timely intelligence for PSYOP use should be obtained as soon as possible after capture of prisoners of war. Prisoners of war, internees, defectors, and line crossers are representatives of broader target groups. They are, therefore, sources of intelligence for target research and analysis and can be used to pretest PSYOP material.

PRISONERS OF WAR

International law determines who will be given prisoner-of-war status. This category (PW) does not include all hostile personnel detained by US forces, but it does include many kinds of personnel other than members of the regular armed forces. A detailed definition is given in AR 633-50.

Treatment of prisoners of war is governed by the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (GPW). The GPW is a matter of international law. It is a treaty to which the US is a party, and, as such, it is a part of US law binding on the US Armed Forces.

Certain provisions of the GPW directly affect psychological operations by setting limits for permissible treatment. Pertinent articles are quoted below:

> **Article 7**: Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention.
>
> **Article 13**: Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated... Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.
>
> **Article 14**: Prisoners of war are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons and their honor.
>
> **Article 38**: The detaining power shall encourage the practice of intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits.

Beside observing the prohibitions of GPW, PSYOP should exploit compliance with the requirements and proscriptions of GPW for specific kinds of treatment, including, but not limited to:

> Healthful living quarters (Art 25, 29).
>
> Clean messes and adequate rations (Art 26).
>
> PW clothing suitable to the climate; that is, clean and in good repair (Art 27).

Camp canteens where PW may secure foodstuffs, soap, tobacco, and ordinary articles of daily use (Art 28).

Medical facilities and medical care (Art 30, 31).

Freedom of religious observance (Art 34).

Gainful employment of PW in suitable working environments at work having no military character or purpose (Art 50, 51).

Pay for work performed (Art 62).

For further information concerning handling of prisoners of war, consult Standardized National Agreements (STANAGs) 2033, 2044, and 2084.

POLICY AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Specific policy guidance governing the establishment, objectives, and conduct of PW and internee PSYOP programs is contained in Department of the Army directives published with the outbreak of hostilities. Appropriate guidance is forwarded through command channels to the PSYOP unit committed to the program and to the camp commander for implementation.

Prisoners of war, particularly after extended internment, constitute a highly volatile and sensitive security problem of a nature which is completely unique to PW camps. All PW doctrines and camp activities must therefore be evaluated critically in the light of this problem.

Procedures and programs which have been generally successful may have unexpected and undesirable results if applied without appropriate adjustment to special circumstances and individual target audiences.

GUIDANCE TO IMPLEMENT ADJUSTMENTS

Guidance at all levels of command to implement adjustments should be clear enough so that consistency is maintained, and there is no misunderstanding at subordinate levels. At the same time, guidance should be flexible enough so that subordinate operators are not overly restricted in adapting command guidance to the characteristics of the particular target population. Operations and procedures must be responsive to changes in the situation, to new information, and to lessons learned.

LIMITATIONS

Strict attention must be given in the planning process to limitations (explicit and implicit) in national policy and international law pertaining to the treatment of prisoners of war. United States policy is to place a broad interpretation on the Geneva Convention pertaining to prisoners of war, and to establish protection in excess of the minimum required by a narrow view of GPW.

PROHIBITIONS

Prisoners of war will not be used, even voluntarily, to contribute directly to PSYOP in such ways as preparing signed statements or tape recordings. Individual identifiable photographs implying active contribution to propaganda will not be used.

PROGRAMS FOR PRISONERS OF WAR

Subject to security considerations and camp discipline, PWs and internees are encouraged to participate in information, education, and recreation programs and activities. Programs include formal and informal instruction in basic educational subjects and vocational training.

INFORMATION PROGRAMS

Information programs are a sound basis from which to initiate other types of programs. Straight news reports may be the best first step in a phased operation aimed at pro-enemy and activist PWs and internees. Reports of enemy failures or losses should be published, posted, and broadcast. When possible, use enemy news sources without commentary. Permit the PWs to draw their own conclusions.

EDUCATION PROGRAMS

From a PSYOP point of view, appropriate courses for a PW and internee education program include:

A history of the war and its causes.

A comparison of the origins and developments of a democracy as opposed to a totalitarian form of government and ideology.

Life in the free world.

Leadership development and skills in group action.

Reconstruction plans and the way they affect prisoners of war.

VOCATIONAL TRAINING

Vocational training, e.g., technical, agricultural, etc., is an important part of the education program.

Such training will assist the PW or internee in preparing for repatriation. This may motivate him to perform well and give him more favorable attitudes toward the United States.

At the same time, the program may supplement the camp food supply, contribute to camp construction and maintenance, and reduce the costs of internment to the United States.

Some nationalities or groups may resist many types of vocational training. To insure success, programs must be based on target analysis.

INFORMAL PROGRAMS

The informal program reaches into all phases of PW everyday life. Subject to the limitations discussed earlier, and the wishes of the PW compound commander, PSYOP informal programs should be carefully designed and conducted to achieve the objectives of the camp commander and the PSYOP program. These programs are continuous throughout internment. The general treatment of the PW and internee is a major part of the informal psychological operations program.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PSYOP PROGRAM

In general war, a PSYOP battalion (prisoner of war) may support the theater military police prisoner-of-war command.

The battalion advises and assists PW camp commanders in planning, implementing, and supervising the PW education program. It also assists in:

Interrogating PWs for information essential and peculiar to PSYOP.

Pretesting PSYOP material for possible effect before dissemination.

Determining the effectiveness of selected PSYOP programs.

USE OF CIVILIANS, PW AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES

Where languages other than English are spoken, language-qualified teachers from allied countries are normally employed. This may, however, be undesirable when the available nationality is resented by the target population.

Carefully selected, qualified PW and civilian internees may be used as instructors as long as they are under the supervision of camp authorities and their use is in accordance with US policy and international law. This is desirable psychologically, because it involves the target population in the program. However, security considerations and lack of supervisors may curtail this type of program.

ANTI-ENEMY ORGANIZATIONS

In inclosures classified as "political defectors," "probable anti-enemy," or even "nonpolitical," formation of anti-enemy groups should be encouraged, but their activities controlled. Such groups make it easier to channel the energies of the PWs or internees to US purposes. Such groups also tend to counter the activities of pro-enemy groups and agitators.

Anti-enemy PWs and internees can be used as advisors in the administration, education, and exploitation of neutral and pro-enemy PW and internees.

The training and performance of PW and internee instructors and other cooperating personnel must be closely monitored to insure that hostile elements in the group are not subverting the effort and using training sessions and facilities to harm US interests and to disrupt camp discipline.

Active pro-enemy PWs may deliberately destroy equipment, waste supplies, sabotage projects, subvert camp authority, and undermine US influence and control.

Educational and PSYOP equipment and facilities, such as classrooms, meeting rooms, and reproduction and sound equipment, must be secured to assure that they are not being used for anti-US activity. Sports and vocational training equipment should be controlled so that it cannot be converted to weapons.

PSYOP officers participate in contingency planning for control of disturbances in camp compounds. Designated PSYOP units participate in rehearsals and disturbance control.

PART TWO



PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS FOR THE PSYOP COMMANDER/ UNIT/STAFF

Chapter Nine

BEHAVIOR FACTORS

The psychological operator's key to success is knowledge--knowledge of why people behave as they do and how to persuade them to behave in a more desirable manner. This chapter presents a treatment of this subject. Technical terms, which are not self-explanatory, are found in appendix H.

The target audience is guided and limited by social and psychological factors. The psychological operator must recognize the factors influencing individual/group behavior, use these factors to gain the attention of the target audience, and communicate with and motivate the target audience to alter their behavior and attitudes. The principal psychological factors to be examined are **perception, motivation, frustration, and attitude**.

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PERCEPTION

The perception of the target audience is influenced by biological (or physical) capacities, frames of reference, learning, past experiences, and cultural and social environments. Knowing these influencing factors helps in determining the stimulus which will affect the target audience.

The individual is in contact with his environment through the general sensory systems. The sensation acquired by stimulating the sensory systems is influenced by cultural preferences. For example, as the result of his cultural background, an individual will exhibit a preference for a given color (visual), a particular style of music (aural), a certain odor (smell), a special taste, and/or a particular touch. These sensory preferences enhance group unity and individual identification with the group. They have the power to act as a stimulus, causing desirable behavior to occur.

In determining the influencing stimulus, the psychological operator has two approaches. The first approach involves defining the behavior to be changed and identifying the cause of that behavior. By closely examining the target audience's language, customs, mores, tradition and habits (folkways), laws, and values, the behavior and its cause are properly interpreted within the target's culture.



The stimulus may not be found in the above cultural variables. To overcome this problem, a second approach suggests the behavior be observed and numerous stimuli be presented to an individual or group to determine which stimulus causes a desirable response. By providing medical care, food, or other stimuli after an individual or group has defected, other potential defectors will be prompted to defect, expecting medical care, etc.



BEHAVIOR: Defection

STIMULUS: Individual/group provided with medical care and food

STIMULUS: Persuasive message

RESPONSIVE BEHAVIOR: Defection of other individuals/groups

In some instances neither the stimulus (cause) nor the behavior are observed, leaving the responsibility of presenting a stimulus and inferring a responding behavior to psychological operations personnel. The stimulus (cause) must be consciously evaluated (perception) after it is received by one or more of the sensory systems.



The key to influencing the evaluation process is found in the presentation of an attention-gaining sensory image. The attention-gaining factors may be categorized into those perceived externally and those perceived internally. The external attention-gaining factors are intensity and size, contrast, movement, repetition, and novelty. These factors when employed by the psychological operator may stimulate the target audience to a more desirable behavior.

The **intensity** of a loudspeaker or leaflet operation can strongly affect those near the loudspeaker or see the leaflet. The attractiveness/repulsiveness of the sound or the appealing/shocking color of a leaflet gains attention. **Size** is relevant. The fundamental principle is that the most stimulating intensity or size is defined by the culture of the audience.

Perception of a stimulus is often influenced by the degree of **contrast** between an object and its background. The conspicuous difference may be used to gain the attention of a target audience. Contrast may be created through differences in color, shape, or intensity between the propaganda and its background or between the propaganda and other disseminations. For example, orange leaflets are attention gaining when the operation is conducted in green jungle foliage. The factor of contrast is easily employed, but an effective contrast is dependent on the cultural definition of the degree to which contrast is tolerable.

The factor of **movement** involves the stimulation of the visual and aural senses. To gain the attention of a target audience, a perception of motion must be created. The best possible attention-gaining situation is the creation of movement against a motionless background. This factor may be employed for the visual sense by a television production, or by movement on printed matter created through suggestive eye direction or mechanical eye direction. Movement can be created for the aural sense by the use of a loudspeaker to duplicate the movement of a troop unit (cover/deception).

The attention-gaining factor of **repetition** is one of the most difficult to employ. The target audience's probability of perception is increased by repetition as well as their sensitivity to a particular sight or sound, but prolonged repetition may reduce the attention-gaining potential of the stimulus. The prevent this, an intimate knowledge of the culture must be available to sense when a stimulus is losing its potential.

A stimulus may be quickly perceived if it is a new sight or sound and is markedly different from the old, more familiar stimulus. It is the innovative approach of the psychological operations personnel that forms the bounds of **novelty**, for a new, markedly different stimulus may be the one perceived by the target audience.

The internal attention-gaining factors are motivation and set. In contrast to the external factors that attempt to create a predisposition, these factors concentrate their attention-gaining potential on the target audience's predisposition to a behavior.

The factor of **motivation** relies on the target audience's conscious, learned, and goal-directed predisposition. Members of a target audience may be predisposed to acquire security for their families. By explaining the benefits of defecting in a persuasive message, the attention of members of the target audience may be gained and this predisposition reinforced.

The **set** is an unconscious vague awareness that focuses the attention of the individual or group. For example, refugees wandering aimlessly along the main line of communications, suffering from cold, hunger, and other physical discomfort, will be attracted to a persuasive message that offers warm clothing, lodging, food, and medical care and will not be attracted by appeals to return to their homes or to conduct sabotage.

MOTIVATION

The psychological operator by utilizing the guiding components of perception can create **motivation** toward more desirable behaviors (i.e., individual defections or group surrender).

Research must begin with a close study of the target audience's culture. The research provides detailed knowledge of their needs, whether the needs are unconscious predispositions to sustain life (drives) or drives consciously learned (motives). The needs may not be perceived by the target audience, or its members may not know how to satisfy them. Psychological operations personnel are responsible for guiding and/or stimulating perception of the needs that are found in the form of drives to more desirable behaviors and for redirecting and/or stimulating perception of needs/motives to other more desirable behaviors. A behavior to relieve hunger may be stimulated and guided by a persuasive message. The message may state where and how food can be acquired if the individual or group surrenders. In each instance the need creates a behavior that is goal directed; an individual or group is driven or motivated toward culturally defined goals; i.e., a soldier is persuaded to surrender and receive food to satisfy his hunger.

The needs of an individual or group are continuously appearing in the form of drives and motives to stimulate behavior toward a goal and the simultaneous satisfaction of a need. As a need is satisfied, other needs may appear to be guided; redirected, and/or stimulated. The appearance of other needs begins the motivational cycle anew as shown below:



Motivation begins with a need. This gives rise to instrumental behavior which, if successful, leads to a goal. This, in turn, relieves the need.

FRUSTRATION

The target audience is not always successful in attaining its goals. When a desired objective/goal is not achieved, an individual or group tension/inner conflict is created: **frustration**. It is the task of the psychological operator to recognize the sources and results of frustration. With a deep understanding of these factors, frustration can be used to channel the target audience into more desirable behaviors.

The individual's or group's frustration comes from three sources: environment obstacles, physical and/or mental limitations, and motivational conflicts.

The individual or group may perceive, unconsciously or consciously, a need for food, ammunition, and medical supplies. The psychological operator may utilize environmental obstacles to block access to these needs, such as communicating that friendly troops have captured the target audience's supplies or are otherwise preventing the target audience from satisfying its needs. The environmental obstacles are of benefit only if the obstacle channels the target to other need-satisfying behavior; i.e., defection or attacking a planned ambush site.

Members of the target audience may perceive a need but be physically and/or mentally unable to achieve satisfaction of the need. The persuasive approach to achieve needs must be physically and mentally accessible to the target audience to channel need-satisfying behavior. This implies a psychological operations message must be composed of the culturally determined language and words. The message presented must be culturally acceptable, it must be presented on the target's intellectual level, and any action required must be within its physical capabilities.

The internal tension or motivational **conflict** of the individual or group arises when two or more equally important needs are incompatible with its goals; when two or more undesirable but necessary needs are incompatible with its goals; or when one need is desirable and the other is not and the goals are incompatible, yet each need requires simultaneous satisfaction. These conflict conditions are categorized as approach-approach conflict, avoidance-avoidance conflict, and approach-avoidance conflict.

Under the condition of **approach-approach conflict** in which the needs are equally desirable with incompatible goals, one **need** must be presented as more important than the other, or one **need** as undesirable while channeling the target audience's need-satisfying behavior. Similarly, the incompatibility of goals can be brought to the attention of the audience to reinforce the need selected for a persuasive message. A group, for example, may desire to totally commit itself to fighting for its country and equally desire to survive. Both needs are equally important to the group, but the psychological operator may imply the goal of fighting is incompatible with the goal of surviving and suggest the group survive by defection rather than die fighting.



The condition of **avoidance-avoidance conflict** presents two undesirable needs and incompatible goals to the individual or group. For example, the individual may find it undesirable to fight (need) and undesirable to die at the hands of a firing squad for cowardice (need). Likewise, the goals of not fighting and not dying due to cowardice are incompatible. A persuasive message may imply that the individual should defect and avoid fighting; if he decides not to fight, he will die.



The **approach-avoidance conflict** is a condition in which there is a desirable need, an undesirable need, and a desirable goal. The individual may desire to fight (need) for the honor of his country but finds dying to be an undesirable aspect of fighting. The goal to survive brings fighting for honor and imminent death as a result of fighting into conflict. The psychological operations personnel may appeal to the individual's desire to survive, building up the need to survive and downgrading the need to fight.



By channeling need-satisfying behavior toward defection as a means to survive and avoid fighting, the PSYOP mission is successful.

The results of frustration can be constructive for our forces, disruptive for the individual or group, or manifested in defense mechanisms which draw the individual away from persuasive approaches.

The constructive results of frustration are:

If an individual or group is persuaded to perceive needs which neither he nor his group can satisfy, the individual may **intensify** striving to escape from the group or to make changes in the group.

The individual or group may be persuaded to such an extent that **the means are changed to goals**. Defection may have been a means to survive, but the persuasive argument may be so strong the individual or group may defect not for survival but to defect.

The frustration may cause the individual/group to **substitute goals**. This is a key result for the psychological operator if the substitute goals are provided by him (i.e., defection or surrender).

The individual or group may be persuaded by the psychological operator to **redefine the situation** (i.e., battlefield environment) to one that is undesirable, if not untenable. In which case, the target may be persuaded to defect or become subversive.

The disruptive results of frustration are:

If the individual is not given a means to satisfy his need/goal within his own culture, his frustration may be channeled **against himself**, his group, or into aggression against our forces. It is the responsibility of the psychological operations personnel to provide a means to satisfy his need/goal and thereby subvert the individual or group.

The individual or group may be blocked from satisfying needs/goals to such an extent **escape** is the only alternative. By knowing the needs of the individual or group, a persuasive message may offer to satisfy needs/goals as additional motivation to escape/defect.

The frustration of the individual or group may result in an increase in **anxiety/conflict**. By recognizing anxiety-producing situations, a means of relieving the conflict can be provided and a more desirable behavior acquired.

As anxiety/conflict increases, the group will unconsciously constrict its environment to protect itself from dangerous instinctual demands and conflicts. The protection is offered in the form of defense mechanisms which repress some aspect of reality and reconstruct that aspect in a manner helpful to the group's enhancement and approval. The objective of the psychological operator is to eliminate the reasons to develop mechanisms or to guide defense mechanisms to more desirable behavior. The most common mechanisms of defense are repression, displacement and sublimination, fixation, regression, projection, denial, reaction, formation, identification, and rationalization.

The individual/group may receive stimulation to perform a certain behavior. Due to the defense mechanism of **repression**, the stimulus and its associated behavior are forgotten and held in the individual's/group's unconscious memory. A defection message may be received, ignored (behaviorally), and held unconsciously due to the dangerous demands and conflicts defection implies.

The defense mechanism of **displacement** is characterized by repression of a source of anxiety/conflict and attributing the tensions to another source. A closely related mechanism, **sublimination**, applies the characteristics of displacement and the characteristic of anxiety/conflict being expressed in other than the routine manner. Displacement could be employed by an individual/group blaming the intolerable living conditions on other individuals/groups rather than the real source, the individual's/group's leader. The mechanism of sublimination could depict the target audience as physically striking out at other individuals/groups rather than using their routine verbal manner of expression.

In another anxiety/conflict ridden environment, the group may defend itself by **fixation**, a temporary or permanent halt to the group's development. This may mean the group will no longer follow the progression of persuasive messages due to the anxiety/conflict they produce.

The mechanism of **regression** results when anxiety/conflict cannot be reduced, forcing the individual/group to suppress the anxiety/conflict and return to a time when the tensions were not present. For example, the individual/group may be subjected to persuasive messages that stimulate the individual/group to think back to more pleasant times and block out the intolerable conditions the persuasive messages revealed.

The tendency of the individual to attach to others the motives which he senses within himself, but might be painful to acknowledge, is labeled as **projection**. A persuasive message could point out the benefits of defecting. The individual may not believe the message; if he were writing a similar message, he would use the same tricks to draw other individuals/groups out of hiding. The individual has, in this example, attached his devious motives to the persuasive messages of others.

The group may attempt to deny the existence of an anxiety/conflict-producing source. By employing the **denial** mechanism, the group may deny the need to defect; to it the problem of poor medical attention no longer exists. This feeling is in opposition to the reality that medical attention remains poor.

The anxiety/conflict produced is often repressed and new behaviors are developed to reflect an opposite side of the individual/group. This defense mechanism, **reaction-formation**, is characterized by extreme behavior inappropriate to the situation. This protective mechanism, when expressed in a persuasive message to defect and live for another day, may be met by an increase in aggressive resistance. The individuals want to

defect, but this is so foreign to their comitment that they must repress the desire and fight with renewed resistance.

The defense mechanism of **identification** leads the individual to repress his anxiety/conflict and model/imitate someone who is feared, loved, or admired. These factors could portray an individual/group repressing his inadequacies and imitating the successful approach of a feared leader.

The individual/group can protect itself by **compensation**; that is, failure is repressed and overachievement in a related skill is pursued. Failure to be a marksman could lead to the individual's/group's overachievement in the skills of supply, first aid, or communications.

By using the defense mechanism of **rationalization**, the group attempts to justify its behavior and presents itself to be righteous to both self and other groups. Through this protective mechanism, the group can defect honorably if the justification is accepted as best for the group or country.

ATTITUDE

The individual/group is so structured by culturally determined sensory perception, stimuli, motivation, and frustration that the psychological operator must find an influential key to their culture. This key is attitudes which positively or negatively orient the individual's perception, motivation, and frustration.

Attitudes are important for they influence reactions, are reflected in behavior, exert a consistent influence, are subject to change, and subsequently influence behavior. More specifically, attitudes influence an individual's/group's orientation to his/its culture. By closely observing the orientations, a consistent influence can be observed in a wide variety of behaviors directed toward someone or something. Conversely, as attitudes are reflected in behaviors, behaviors reflect the attitudes of an individual/group. A primary objective is to identify the key attitudes of a group that when changed will make it vulnerable and susceptible to a persuasive message.

The influence of attitudes can be distinguished on three major levels: the cognitive, the emotional/affective. and action/behavioral.

1. The **cognitive level** is the inner orientation of an individual/group which serves to construct a picture of someone or something. The orientation is particularly concerned with the perceptions, beliefs, and the common traits attributed to someone or something. The individual/group may picture others as lazy, mentally inferior, unpatriotic, treacherous, ruthless, bloodthirsty, or cowardly.

2. The attitude may orient the individual/group to express certain feelings when a given stimulus is presented. The feelings, found on the **emotional level**, may be presented by fear, anger, hatred, contempt, envy, pity, sympathy, or love. The appearance of a massive force may stimulate the individual/group to invoke the emotions of fear, anger, or hate.

3. The **action level** for the individual/group refers to the tendency or disposition to act. A persuasive message which exposes the intolerable living conditions may create a tendency for the individual/group to defect.

Having explained the concepts of perception and its attention-gaining factors, motivation and its origin and goal, frustration and its sources and results, they must be applied to influence foreign

policy decisions, the determination of military missions, the ability to govern, the ability to command, the will to obey and support, and the will to fight. Despite the magnitude of the task, the principles can be expressed in a single term, attitude change. This collective term represents the relationship between the psychological operator's desired attitudes (and more desirable behavior) and the individual's/group's attitudes as well as the degree of receptiveness between the individual/group and the psychological operator (change agent). The psychological operator may bluntly suggest the individual/group accept defection as a reasonable alternative to fighting, an action for which the individual/group has a negative orientation (attitude). In this situation, receptiveness has not been cultivated in the individual/group and an attitude change has been suggested that is in direct opposition to the individual's/group's orientation.

The more subtle approach to attitude change is expressed by the concepts of compliance, identification, and internalization.

The psychological operator may frequently employ coercion or force to imply the individual/group will be rewarded or will gain approval and avoid punishment/disapproval if his behavior complies with that specified by the psychological operator. The **compliance approach** allows the desirable attitude to replace the more traditional attitude; if a reward is not provided as implied or punishment does not cease, the individual/group will change back to the traditional attitude and behavior. This approach insures short-term behavior compliance but may produce a negative attitude in the target audience.

The **identification approach** depends on the receptiveness of the individual/group and the gratifying relationship between the psychological operations personnel and the individual/group. Under ideal conditions, the individual/group models itself after the psychological operator due to the desirability of the relationship. The willing commitment involved in this approach to change is more likely to persist for it is not dependent on reward or the avoidance of punishment.

The most significant attitude change, yet the most difficult to achieve, is internalization. The **internalization approach** identifies attitudes that can be used to accomplish our goals yet be consistent with the accepted attitudes of the individual/group. If consistency is gained, long-lasting individual/group attitudinal and behavioral changes will result.

In support of the approaches to attitude change, social support, support of experts, and support of experience can be used to lend credibility to attitude-changing messages.

The social pressure brought by **social support** forces the individual/group to conform to a more desirable attitude if a reward of social acceptance, prestige, increased status, esteem, praise, achievement, and recognition is expected. It is the psychological operator's objective to amass social support and build on that support; i.e., persuading a group to defect and using their name to illustrate to others the rewards received for their behavior.

The **support of experts** that are knowledgeable or powerful provides the stimulus for individuals/groups to change their attitudes. The psychological operations personnel can quote these experts or enlist their assistance as key communicators (see chapter 10) to bring about persuasive attitude changes.

The **support of experience** is the most powerful tool available to use in attitude change for it calls upon individual/group perceptions to point out their attitude is consistent with the attitude and behavior sought by the psychological operator.

Chapter Ten

COMMUNICATING

Communications can arouse needs and emotions and persuade a target audience to change attitudes and subsequent behavior.

This chapter will provide an understanding of communications and their importance to PSYOP.

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10

THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS

Communications, the exchange of information and ideas, is possible only to the degree that individuals have common knowledge and interpretation of the language used. It is the primary PSYOP method for arousing needs and emotions, and changing opinions and attitudes.

Social communication is the process of exchanging ideas, sentiments, and beliefs, usually by use of language, but also by visual representation and imitation. In human groups, it is largely a process of social interaction.

Words, the basic component of language, permit the expression of ideas and play a basic role in changing the environment, thus affecting culture and society. The planned use of words can bring about lasting changes in behavior, concepts, attitudes, and emotions.

Language, as the means of communication, performs three vital functions in every culture:

The most basic function is informing individuals and groups by using the stable and commonly agreed upon meanings of words, symbols, or actions.

The psychological effect of language is an extension of the informing function. By informing, it arouses the emotions of the target audience and produces a psychological effect on others. It influences them to react with a desired activity or attitude, such as fear, apathy, sympathy, pity, dissatisfaction, verbal confrontation, or aggressive action.

The ritual function creates and reinforces the attitudes strongly associated with particular institutions, such as the church, mosque, temple.

In practice, it is almost impossible to separate the functions of language. The difficulty arises when language has the primary function of arousing emotions and stimulating actions, while the target is led to believe that it is being given the facts about actual events. This is best illustrated in the fields of political and economic discussion where terms such as "liberty," "democracy," "imperialism," and "free enterprise" perform all three functions simultaneously.

In **persuasive communications**, attention must be paid to three important factors: transmission, interpretation, and the communications situation.

Communications must be transmitted and interpreted within the framework of a particular society or culture. Too often, an operator erroneously uses the most readily available means of communications, even though it is not the most effective channel for reaching a particular target audience. Each society is affected differently and in varying degrees by mass media, interpersonal communicators, and the numerous formal and informal groups, such as the family, church, occupational clubs, gangs, and cliques; work, pub, and cafe cronies; professional, art, and cultural societies and colleagues. Each serves a communications purpose within a society, differing in its credibility and impact according to subject matter.

The communications situation must be closely examined. The psychological operator must know who is listening to his appeals, who is looking at his visual and audiovisual propaganda, and who is reading his message. He wants to be certain that the target he wants to affect can be affected by the **communications channel** he intends to use. It is a waste of resources to use radio when newspaper or magazine articles have the greatest impact, or to use printed media when radio has the greatest credibility and effect.

Not only must the communication be based on facts and reality, and the media be appropriate to the audience, but the message must also be appropriate to the situation in which the audience finds itself. The psychological operator must also give thought to the options to act available to the target. The most effective message will be that which makes sense (is rational) to the target audience, furthers the target's self-interest, and is to it moral and ethical. The psychological operator should present his appeals in that light.

The communications process involves four steps: gain attention, hold attention, have an acceptable message, and acquire feedback.

GAIN ATTENTION! Prior to launching a persuasive message, the analyst must be sure the message will gain the attention of his target audience and stimulate perception. This demands a message that will successfully compete against other events, appeals, persuasion, threats, demands, etc. The impact of the message must focus attention on the message and be appropriate for each target. The opening that will gain the interest of the farmer may be completely ignored by the school teacher. The opening that will enthrall the religious leader may leave the union organizer apathetic. If the persuasive message has the desired attention-gaining quality, it will be evaluated by being read, listened to, and being looked at.

HOLD ATTENTION! Once gained, attention cannot be permitted to waver. The target must read it all--listen to it all--or view the entire visual presentation. This requires that the communication be couched in the common language of the target, the language which affects its emotions (individually and collectively). A basic means of accomplishing this is to use words, symbols, and actions similar to those associated with persons whom, in memories of youth, the target recalls as loved and respected authorities; i.e., parents, teachers, friends, clergy, etc.

HAVE ACCEPTABLE MESSAGE! Having been listened to, looked at, or read in its entirety, the message must be accepted. It must appeal to the dominant interests of the target audience, offering THE SOLUTION to the most urgent problems of its members. This requires that the message delineate lines of action appropriate to the target in his or her situation. Propaganda will be most readily accepted when it refers to feasible actions that the target can perform with integrity. The test is a simple one: The propagandist must put himself (figuratively) in the target's situation and ask himself (as the target), "What would I do under these conditions? Accept the message or ignore it?"

Use media that the target trusts and that has the greatest impact. The target will not readily accept messages in media that he or she does not trust nor consider authoritative.

The message must be credible (believable) to the target. But it need not be unbiased in fact. Credibility is in the mind(s) of the individual or group who judge the message in terms of their own experiences, not solely on fact. The message that does not focus on the important interests of the target; does not offer the best realistic solutions to their problems; and is not presented in the appropriate language, in media and format, familiar to and respected by the target, will suffer from a lack of credibility.

The psychological operator cannot know whether his propaganda was incredible, credible with no impact, or credible to the point of affecting the actions and attitudes of the target, as desired, until he receives feedback.

FEEDBACK! Feedback is information that reports the effects, or discrepancies between the intended and actual effect, of a PSYOP campaign. Analysis of feedback should lead to modification of a campaign to improve its effectiveness.

Feedback must be target oriented, considering differences in the subgroups that may constitute a major target group and situational changes which occur with drastic rapidity in time of conflict.

Feedback requires systematic research:



Interviews conducted with carefully chosen members of the target groups should determine campaign results, and if possible the reasons for those results, by seeking factors such as morale, attitudes, overt behavior, and other indicators of the impact of the psychological operator and its propaganda. If the target cannot be reached, informed persons, e.g., refugees, exiles, scholars, reporters, and others intimately connected with and having in-depth knowledge of the area and target, should be interviewed, keeping in mind that each has a subjective point of view. These points of view may be justified, but, nonetheless, they are the basis for biased judgments and statements.

Although other types of feedback indicate success or failure, they will not always tell why a campaign, theme, or message failed or was a partial success. Posttesting will uncover the reason(s) for audience reactions. The techniques of posttesting and pretesting are the same. However, the same persons must not be used.

The propagandist must have total empathy with his target. This does not involve sentimentality nor sentiment. It involves the ability to understand people--the ability to project oneself into the other person's situation and be able to think, see, feel, and reason as he does. This ability is one of the most important requirements in giving common meaning to the message.

The US psychological operator has his message to communicate, but successful communications depend on certain basic requirements:

Personal contact. The success of personal contact with the target audience establishes the effectiveness of communications.

Identifying target audiences. The psychological operations personnel must employ skill in identifying target audiences; in determining their needs, attitudes, vulnerabilities, and susceptibilities; and in selecting the means of communication.

Selecting PSYOP personnel. The criteria for selecting PSYOP personnel should be capability and skill rather than their military versus civilian identification. Neither category has a monopoly on imaginative skill or the ability to influence people.

While the empathetic psychological operator has the skill to put himself into the "role of his target," he must also have the facts to enable him to do so under prevailing conditions. This intelligence must relate to the environment affecting the target. While the physical environment is important, the social attitudes and environment of the target are more important.

To fully understand the process of standardizing and exchanging subjective meanings using words, symbols, or actions, the psychological operator must analyze the components of communication. A means of analysis is a **communication process model** (figure 10-1).

A typical model consists of a stimulus, sender, receiver, message, transmitter, encoding, decoding, feedback, and noise component.



FIGURE 10-1

COMMUNICATION PROCESS

A **stimulus** is any change agent that causes a response.

A **sender** (encoder) is the initiator of the message.

The **receiver** (decoder) is the intended addressee of the message.

The **message** is a word, symbol, or action or a grouping of words, symbols, or actions used and controlled by a sender.

The **transmitter** is the means used for presenting the message; i.e., writing or the human voice.

The **encoding process** is the structuring of words, symbols, or actions to form a message having a shared meaning among individuals/groups.

The **decoding** process is the translation of a message to give it meaning. The ideal situation is to have the receiver translate the message with the shared meaning the sender used for encoding.

The **feedback** is the information returning from the receiver to the sender by the same communications process mode, signaling an acceptance, rejection, or noncommittal response to the message.

The **noise** factor is anything which interferes with the transmission or reception and subsequent perception of the intended message.

If psychological operations personnel are to be consistent in their efforts to form a persuasive communication, they must be concerned with the reasons for the success or failure of the message.

A persuasive message must incorporate variables of policy, intelligence, a general theme, and the command's desired results.

The target must be motivated to perceive a persuasive PSYOP communication (message), in spite of interference with its transmission, reception, and subsequent perception. To meet the challenge, an attention-gaining, stimulating, timely message must be transmitted.

The message is important to the target audience **only if it can be understood.** It is the objective of the psychological operator (encoder) to guide understanding by using words, symbols, and actions that have a known and accepted meaning to the target. For example, figure 10-2 shows the difference of meaning for terms given in standard American and Soviet dictionaries.

Word	Soviet Meaning	American Meaning
Individualism	The individual as a member of a collective.	The pursuit of individual rather than common or collective interest.
Freedom	The recognition of necessity.	Exemption from necessity, in choice and action; as, freedom of the will.
Charity	Help granted hypocritically by representatives of the dominant class in societies of exploiters to a certain fraction of the disinherited sectors of the population in order to deceive the workers and to divert their attention from the class struggle.	An act or feeling of affection or benevolence.
Initiative	Independent search for the best way to fulfill a command.	Self-reliant enterprise; self-initiated activity.

FIGURE 10-2

DIFFERENCES IN MEANING

The immediate goal is to cause desirable behavior which will satisfy **perceived needs**, arouse a perception of **dormant needs**, or stimulate a perception of **new needs**. To accomplish these, the persuasive message must stimulate an awareness of the behavior required to satisfy perceived needs, dormant needs and their satisfying behaviors, or new needs. If stimulation is successful, the individual or group may change their attitude(s) and behaviors as urged or implied by the message.

MASS COMMUNICATIONS

There are two types of message carriers: mass communications and face-to-face communications. **Mass communications** are directed toward selected target audiences with specific needs; the level of communication, the languages and dialects, and the content of the message are tailored to the society addressed; e.g., the blue collar worker versus the executive. Regardless, the individual or group retains the option to select the mass communications it accepts.

It can be looked upon as a two-step process as shown in figure 10-3. **Step one** occurs when the persuasive message is transmitted by mass media to the key communicator. **Step two** occurs when the persuasive message is transmitted from the key communicator to the individuals and groups composing the society.



FIGURE 10-3

TWO-STEP FLOW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS

The reason for the two steps is that mass media does not reach, nor is it internalized by all people. Many who receive the message do not have the desire to internalize it. The key communicator has the time, desire, and ability to receive a persuasive message. It is the intent of the psychological operator to exploit this receptiveness, enlisting the key communicator's help to reinforce mass media and face-to -face communications.

The key communicator furnishes the average individual secondhand information and interpretation concerning that which they have heard, seen, or read. He persuades the individual or group to change or reinforce their opinions, attitudes, emotions, and behavior. The key communicator can reduce the uncertainty of bringing about the desired behavior. He is the one to whom PSYOP messages should be directed.

INFORMAL COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS

The communications process merely starts with the transmission of the message by way of the mass media. The important step is the penetration of the informal societal communications channels; i.e., the beauty parlor group, the women washing clothes on the river bank, the barbership coterie, the student clique, the luncheon club, the tea (coffee) house, etc. Discussion within these groups keeps the ideas of the propagandist alive and hopefully leads to acceptance and action.

A man's behavior, attitudes, and opinions are most strongly influenced by the groups to which he belongs. The stronger his attachment to the group, whether out of fear, awe, respect, or intellectual or sentimental attachment, the greater the group influences his lifestyle.

The most important institutionalized channels of social communication that must be penetrated are the family, religious center and school, and in totalitarian countries, the governing political party. These institutions are the centers of authority and social control, charged with the responsibilities relating to the primary functions of life; i.e., child rearing, education, companionship, marriage, morality, and death. They evoke the deepest sentiments, loyalties, and expectations.

ADVANTAGES OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS

Mass communications have many advantages:

The **instant** a persuasive message is constructed it can be transmitted great distances and received by a large number of people, individuals, and groups.

Mass communications can be **intensely emotional and unrelenting** to dramatize and lend credibility to needs and the desirable behavior to satisfy them.

Despite the selectivity of a mass communication target, numerous nonselected people are subjected **indiscriminately** to the message transmission.

The mass communication, due to its purpose of reaching wide ranges of audiences, is constructed to be perceived by the common denominator. Thus, a persuasive message may be constucted for transmission to the middle class with the calculated objective of gaining the attention of the lower upper class and the upper lower class.

People band together in a society to satisfy self-preservation and self-maintenance needs. Through mass communications, attention can be focused on these **broad societal needs** to change the attitudes of mass audiences as opposed to the limited individual face-to-face approach.

The psychological operator **must not assume** that audience needs are limited. Few societies exist whose needs are not expanded through exposure to mass communications.

INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION

Interpersonal, or face-to-face, communication is person-to-person contact within the range of

activities by which people communicate orally in direct face-to-face situations; e.g., rallies, groups, group associations, and social activities. It enables the psychological operator to select the target, rapidly disseminate the appeal, and immediately assess its effectiveness.

ELEMENTS OF FACE-TO-FACE COMMUNICATION

To be effective, the communicator must know specifically what he desires to say, how it should be said, to whom, and where and when to say it.

The Message. The communicator must be certain of the message he wishes to convey. In most situations themes for face-to-face communication seek to generate cohesive behavior. The themes or line of persuasion should be preplanned and questions anticipated.

Presentation. The manner of presentation is of utmost importance. The presentation must be in terms and language which the target audience understands and can relate to its own experiences. It is essential that the communicator know the audience, be fluent in their language, and be able to identify with them.

Audience Selection. Key personnel who influence the opinions of a wider audience are the more useful in spreading the message.

Time and Location. The time and place a message is delivered must be convenient for the target audience. The psychological operator is trying to sell the target audience; therefore, the audience's convenience has a higher priority than the communicator's.

METHODS OF EMPLOYMENT

Controlled face-to-face communication is best used when military forces are in direct contact with the target audience. In most cases, the face-to-face communications network already exists. In some circumstances, the communicator may or must create a situation conducive to face-to-face communication.

Rallies. People gathered to be informed and entertained are susceptible to persuasion and may be stimulated to support a cause. They are usually drawn to rallies by a common interest and a feeling of participation or belonging. Under such conditions, propaganda messages may be accepted by many people of different social and economic levels. Skilled use of rallies and meetings can involve the audience emotionally.

Groups. Small, tightly organized groups are highly effective in spreading appeals. By organizing such groups or exploiting existing ones, the communicator can extend his appeal to larger groups.

Group Associations. Associations, such as youth groups, religious organizations, women's clubs, etc., provide opportunities to expand the impact of the message.

Social Activities. Social activities appropriate to local customs and patterns can stimulate cohesiveness. Such gatherings may serve a propaganda purpose, as well as offering opportunity for social communication.

Person-to-Person Contact. There is no substitute for the intimacy of individual contact. A person is more likely to believe and accept what he hears in the course of a conversation than what he reads or otherwise learns. The propagandist can tailor his appeal to fit the individual's experiences and needs. This tailoring is more likely to achieve results than a mass appeal dependent on an approach targeted at the average intelligence level of the target audience.

Other media reinforce face-to-face communications. The leaflet, pamphlet, or magazine handed to a participant in a mass rally, the poster reminding all of a positive action program, the motion picture or television program to illustrate the speaker's purpose, the printed material given to the individual after an ideological discussion contribute toward the success of the PSYOP program.

TECHNIQUES

Some Tips to Remember

Make each meeting contribute to the entire PSYOP program.

Choose areas free from interruptions and distractions.

Set a time limit. Allow enough time for the meeting.

Choose topics important to the target.

Ask questions. Questions give the audience a chance to actively participate. The audience merely listens to statements. Questions encourage them to listen and speak. They cause action.

Understand responses. Be certain you understand any comment or answer. Repeat, in your own words, what you thought the other person said. If he agrees, you understood him. Do not discuss the point unless it is clear to you.

Be explicit. Explain precisely and make clear to the target audience the problem, the point of discussion, and the required action.

Use concrete words. Avoid words that the audience can or is likely to misinterpret.

Stress all points on which you agree with the target audience.

Avoid minor disagreements. If you disagree on important points, do so politely. Do not antagonize or make the audience sympathetic to the other side. The following techniques will help:

Politely point out that the other side is wrong about some important points. List them.

or

Politely point out that the other side is uninformed. Then make the point: If they had the information, they would change their opinion and agree with you. Give the correct information.

or

Prove the other side is reasoning illogically; and give the right idea.

or

State the other side's reasoning may be partially right but that it does not consider some factors. Then give the facts to support the point you want to make.

Know the subject thoroughly. If you cannot answer a question, **do not lie** no matter how minor or major the issue. Lying destroys credibility.

Make no promises you cannot or do not intend to keep.

Be confident. Control your emotions. Do not give way to emotions that will antagonize the audience.

Reinforce your point. Select evidence that supports your position. In order to avoid charges of bias, you may introduce minor points to support the opposing view.

Encourage the audience to think along lines that lead to the conclusions you want.

Present conclusions to the audience. Sometimes you may have to disguise them. The type of audience determines the extent to which you must do so. Emphasize conclusions on subjects that are unpopular with the target audience.

For the unfriendly or suspicious audience, disguise or present the conclusions as questions, making the desired answer or action appear to the audience to be the logical one. You must present clear, concise, and coherent conclusions to a less educated or apathetic audience. You will insult a well-educated audience by openly presenting conclusions to them. Use carefully phrased questions, making the response you want the only logical one.

Arouse the audience's emotions, but keep them under tight control. Attention-getters may make your appeals more attractive. The attraction must, however, be moderate to reinforce your message and not divert attention. Examples are attractive or popular persons--men or women, depending, among other things, on the culture--presenting a message, the political picnic, entertainment troupes at rallies, and background music.

Have the audience participate. The most effective appeal is that which requires audience participation, if participation verifies the message. For example, if you, the propagandist, tell an audience that a nearby area has been completely destroyed by our firepower, and this is verified by members of the audience, your future credibility will be enhanced.

Generate discussion. A frequent way to get audience participation is to generate discussion, either through questions to the audience or questions or comments from people planted in the audience. Once the discussion begins, the

psychological operator knows that he has awakened an interest, which is encouraged. The psychological operator is successful when the audience is moved from discussion to action.

Present new material or change style. An audience may become bored or resent hearing the same appeals or arguments. The chance of success for an appeal may be increased by presenting new material or by changing the style of presentation.

Rumor

Rumor can be spread by any medium. It can best be controlled or eliminated in face-to-face situations. Rumor thrives when general knowledge of the facts is limited and the conditions or situation which are the subject of the rumor may be subject to ambiguous interpretations. Rumor feeds on the hopes, fears, and desires of a population.

MASS AND FACE-TO-FACE COMMUNICATIONS

The psychological operator must view mass communications as a supplement to interpersonal communications, but he must understand they are **not a substitute** for a lack of knowledge of the culture and society. This dictates:

The absence of equipment must not be used as an excuse not to communicate.

The use of equipment to transmit a persuasive message must be proven necessary.

He must also understand that overdependence on equipment can result in the failure of a message. Success, on the other hand, can be assured if alternate face-to-face (interpersonal) communications are available as contingencies; i.e., rallies, meetings, show-and-tell demonstrations, rumor campaigns, social gatherings, etc.

While mass communications offer the most rapid means to reach the greatest number, the personal touch of face-to-face communications is the most effective way to "clinch the argument" and sell the product. It can be said, "There is a direct correlation between mass communications and face-to-face: The closer mass communications approximate face-to-face, the more effective they become." This is the major reason why famous, noted, popular, widely liked, admired, respected, or loved persons and personalities are widely used in mass communications selling campaigns--particularly in selling ideas.

COMMUNICATIONS BARRIERS AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATOR

Barriers

Barriers to effective communications develop due to differences in the meaning of the words, symbols, and actions transmitted among individuals and groups within a culture (intracultural) and between individuals and groups of different cultures (intercultural).

One of the most critical aspects of working cross-culturally is **recognition of differences in cultural values and assumptions**. There are certain experiences

shared by most individuals within a society, so common reactions to an event can be anticipated. These values and assumptions are so much a part of the individual that the target audience will be unaware of how much their behavior is influenced by them.

Words, symbols, and actions being created within a cultural context create communications problems between people from different cultural backgrounds. They do not know the meanings attached to each other's words, symbols, and actions. The cultural influences act as constraints upon cross-cultural communication and can be analyzed as differences in cultural values and assumptions, objectives, and behavior patterns.

Psychological Operator

The psychological operator has learned to work for certain culturally-oriented life goals. His goals may vary significantly with the life goals of those persons selected as a target audience. For example, the objectives of one culture may be oriented toward achievement of harmony with the environment, while another may be oriented toward changing the environment. Such differences are obstacles to understanding and, therefore, to effective PSYOP.

The psychological operator provides the means to interpret only the behavior within his culture. He expresses this interpretation through words, symbols, and actions which, if transmitted by message, may not be acceptable in another culture. A clenched fist, for example, may be a gesture of anger in one culture and a salute in another. Innocuous words in some countries become foul vulgarities in others. In some societies, asking about the well-being of the female members of a friend's family is proper and desirable; in others, it is a serious breach of etiquette.

A possibility of being **culturally biased** must be recognized and every effort made to interpret behavior in terms of the target audience's culture.

In developing messages which will be meaningful to the target audience, the psychological operator must take into account both his and the target audience's cultural backgrounds. He must acquaint himself with the established customs and social taboos of his target audience to prevent inadvertent disparaging remarks or actions. Phrases, comments, expressions, and actions that are normal in our society may be offensive in other cultures.

A problem that deserves special attention is communications with the nonliterate or semiliterate audience. Collectively, this audience represents great potential power, constituting 60 to 80 percent of the population of some countries. The psychological operator must not assume that people identified in other cultures as literate meet his standards. A large number of people who are considered literate in their culture possess such a limited reading ability that they should be classified as semiliterate. In view of their numbers and low status, nonliterate and semiliterate groups are fertile for support of ideas and actions (insurgencies, civil war, revolutions) which promise to alleviate their suffering.

Knowing what this audience considers valid evidence and how they can be convinced is particularly necessary. And identifying individuals they accept as leaders or status people is extremely important. These leaders or status people, who can get the populace to accept an idea, should be the first target of the PSYOP

communication. However, consideration must be given to their traditional methods of decisionmaking. In many cultures, the leader may have no control over the final decision. He can only vocalize the decision reached by the group as a whole.

The psychological operator must recognize that the target has its own language to transmit cultural meaning. It may, therefore, be advisable or necessary to use members of the target audience to assist him in various ways; i.e., as propagandists, translators, advisors, etc. He may also use them, by means of discussions and social activities, to gain an intimate knowledge of their language, values, culture, goals, folkways, mores, customs, and laws. He must realize that for communications purposes the target audience is distinct from other individuals and groups, due to varying demographic, cultural, individual, and sociological characteristics.

Demographic characteristics provide statistics such as age and sex distributions, birth and death rates, race, religion, occupation, income, language, social class, and political affiliations of members of the target audience.

Cultural characteristics consist of all behavior that is learned, shared, and transmitted by words, symbols, and actions. To communicate effectively with the target audience, the psychological operations personnel must have a command of such target audience characteristics as language, customs and traditions, norms, values, ethics, mores, folkways, attitudes, opinions, the social system, the religious system, the political system, the kinship system, the education system, and the economic system.

Individual characteristics that may be available to the psychological operator for analysis and employment are individual and group stimuli, sensation, motives, needs, drives, perception, and frustration.

Sociological characteristics deal with those aspects of the group which can enhance or inhibit communication. These include, but are not limited to, demographic, cultural, and individual characteristics mentioned above.

It is through the group and group processes that attitudes and behaviors may be changed. Therefore, by using a group approach, a successful persuasive message that will be accepted by group members can be rapidly disseminated. Such acceptance will be greatly enhanced if the key communicators within the group are convinced of the importance of the message and convince others within the group.

The psychological operator must give continued attention to message feedback to determine the meanings given to his message by the target audience.

Translations and the Translator

The ideas to be included in a persuasive message must be thoroughly discussed with the translator. The translator must be given ideas and allowed to translate them into the language of the target audience.

By avoiding word-for-word substitutions, in translations, meaningful ideas are presented in the logical order of the target audience's language, as opposed to the fragmented meaning that word-for-word translations can create.

This approach allows the translator to use language that holds the most meaning for the target audience. It also makes easier the construction of persuasive messages in language that arouses the emotions of the audience.

Chapter Eleven

11

PROPAGANDA AND COUNTERPROPAGANDA

Propaganda is the sales pitch. It's a message with a point of view. It is the deliberate spreading, by any means of communication, of doctrine, ideas, facts, argument, information, allegations, or appeals to advance a friendly cause or injure an enemy cause. This may be done by words, symbols, public action, or other deeds. For a formal definition, see appendix H.



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11

PROPAGANDA

The purpose of propaganda is to bring about behavior that the propagandist desires and to reinforce that behavior with favorable opinions and attitudes. In order to accomplish its purpose, propaganda must fit within the cultural context of the audience. It should also avoid direct attacks on the core beliefs and traditions of the target audience.

EFFECTIVE PROPAGANDA--CRITERIA

The tests for effective propaganda are simple:

Does the propaganda fit within the cultural context of the audience?

Has the propaganda avoided direct attacks on the core beliefs and traditions of the target audience?

To what extent did it influence the target audience to follow the course of action desired by the propagandist?

To what degree did it help the tactical commander? How? Why?

How successful was it in helping to defeat an insurgency and gaining the willing active support of the population? The armed forces?

To what extent did it succeed in enabling the United States to achieve its national policy objectives?

CLASSIFICATION

Propaganda is classed on the basis of source:

White: Its source is openly stated.

Gray: No source is given.

Black: Attributed to other than the true source. This type is normally used to support strategic objectives. It generally emanates from the highest levels of command or government and is disseminated by designated specialists.

White, gray, and black do not refer to the content of the propaganda message. **The terms merely refer to the methods used to carry out the operation**. See "white propaganda," "gray propaganda," and "black propaganda," JCS Pub 1.

BASIS FOR DEVELOPMENT

The following elements are basic to the development of propaganda:

Psychological Operations Objectives

One of the basic factors that determines what is said, how it is said, and to whom it is said is the psychological objective that the psychological operator wishes to achieve. The psychological objective is a statement of a measurable response expected of the target audience as the result of PSYOP.

Target Analysis

Target analysis seeks to identify, locate, and gain psychologically relevant insights about target audiences by a detailed analysis of intelligence. A detailed analysis of target analysis is found in chapter 14.

Target Audience Interests

In order for propaganda to appeal to an audience, it must be pertinent to the interests of that audience. It must satisfactorily answer the questions, "What do you want me to do?" "What's in it for me?"

Detailed Current Intelligence

Detailed current intelligence is needed for successful propaganda. For a discussion on the use of intelligence in PSYOP, see chapter 14.

Production

An important question facing the propagandist is the availability of media facilities; for example:

Are press, inks, paper, and other printing supplies available?

Are radio and television production facilities available?

Can audiovisual material be locally processed?

Dissemination

Not only must propaganda be produced, it must also be disseminated. The psychological operator must determine whether he has the means available to effectively disseminate propaganda. For example, is radio and television transmitting equipment available?

Credibility and Impact of Media

In planning propaganda campaigns, themes, and messages, the psychological operator must know the credibility attached to each medium by its target audience and the impact of that medium. He must also know media patronage profiles. Credibility and patronage vary with the target audience and the media used to spread the message. The psychological operator must also know the type of audience each medium attracts and its characteristics.

Suitable Language

Frequently the audience may take great risks to hear or read a message, and must do so quickly. The message must be worded to permit them to do so.

Priority of Interests

Not only will the language vary, but priority of interests must be considered. For example, the priority of interests of peasants are not the same as those of city merchants; nor are those of city merchants the same as those of university students; and none of these are the same as those of a soldier under artillery bombardment.

Pretesting

All propaganda must be pretested before it can be disseminated. Pretesting gives the psychological operator a good idea of the potential credibility and effectiveness of his message. The selection and use of a particular pretest method must be based primarily on the accessibility of the target audience to PSYOP personnel.

Survey sampling is the most reliable method of pretesting propaganda. This method requires personal solicitation of the members of the target audience. In this way, empirical data is obtained from the intended recipients of propaganda. The two major methods of obtaining specific information by survey sampling are the use of questionnaires and personal interviews. The primary purpose of using an interview is to present items of interest personally to the respondent, thereby precluding errors in interpretation, and to obtain replies from other individuals so that generalizations can be made.

Most personal interviews follow a prescribed pattern; both the wording and order of questions are decided upon in advance and rigidly adhered to. A less formal type of interview uses a detailed list of subject matter to be covered. It permits the interviewer to vary the wording and order of subject matter so that the maximum amount of information concerning specific topics can be obtained.

Survey sampling requires personnel trained to collect data, personnel skilled in its interpretation, and accessibility to the target audience.

When the target audience is not reasonably accessible, panels of representatives of the target audience may be used. These may include prisoners of war, refugees, defectors, and other available typical representatives of the potential target audience. Panels must be as closely representative of the target audience as possible. Pretests with such groups can indicate what appeals are likely to be effective, what to emphasize, and what to avoid. By being familiar with the backgrounds of panel members, the results of pretests can be interpreted in the light of differences between respondents and the intended target audience.

Panels of representatives may be configured in a number of ways. A panel may consist of as few as five representatives or as many as a hundred. The guiding consideration is that the number of representatives must be sufficient to provide an adequate cross-section of the intended target audience, and the number of responses must be sufficient to provide a reliable indication of effectiveness.

Pretesting may be done by using the following methods:

Group consultation. This method allows representatives (5 to 15) to observe and study an item of propaganda and exchange views among themselves. It requires the pretester to direct the discussion along prearranged lines to obtain information and preclude extraneous comments. Use of this procedure enables the respondents to exchange ideas; sets the respondents at ease, since they are among peers; and enables the pretester to utilize large numbers of representatives in a relatively short time. The disadvantages are that the respondents may tend to agree with the majority to avoid peer-group criticism. In addition, discussions may become long and extraneous unless carefully controlled. Care must be exercised to assure that comments which are relevant in the sociocultural setting of the respondents are not excluded by overcontrol.

Individual interview. This method allows respondents to observe and study a series of preranked, prearranged items of propaganda. By use of this method, several items of propaganda previously used on actual target audiences are given a decreasing effectiveness rating ranging from very effective, through moderately effective, to not effective. The new item is matched with the prescaled propaganda. The respondents are asked to indicate which items of propaganda material they feel are most effective and why. Choices are compared. If a majority indicate that the new item of propaganda is likely to be more effective on the actual target audience than the prescaled items of propaganda rated "not effective" or "moderately effective," the new item of propaganda may be used.

On the other hand, if a majority of the panel indicate that the new item is not likely to be as effective as the prescaled propaganda rated "not effective" or "moderately effective," the new propaganda material should be revised to conform with panel recommendations. The pretester must determine why each respondent makes his choice.

When using panels of representatives, it is essential that the individual conducting the pretesting give very explicit instructions. Some of the more important points to cover and actions to perform include:

Pretest instructions and actions:

Explain reasons for and the nature of the pretest.

Put the respondent at ease.

Inform the respondent that his identity will remain anonymous, if he desires.

Inform the respondent that his cooperation with the pretest will not affect his status.

Inform the respondent that he should consider himself to be in the status and position of the target audience he represents.

Convince the respondent to answer according to his convictions--that the purpose of the pretest is to identify weak as well as strong points--and explain the reasons.

After the pretest:

Express appreciation for cooperation.

Reaffirm that the respondent understands that he will receive no reward, financial or otherwise, for participating in the pretest.

Reaffirm that the respondent understands that his identity will remain anonymous.

When the target audience, or representative personnel, are not available, panels of experts can be used to pretest propaganda. These individuals, who need not be representative of the target audience, should possess current knowledge and be expert in pertinent areas of knowledge or learning; i.e., order of battle, sociology, politics, communications, etc.

Experts may be located near any PSYOP unit. They may be found in the United States Information Service, United States Agency for International Development, intelligence agencies, business firms, etc. These individuals should be used whenever the need for them arises.

Posttesting

This difficult but essential step in development of propaganda determines the next or new propaganda message. The questions that posttesting must answer are:

What did the propaganda achieve?

Was it effective?

How effective?

Why not totally effective?

What propaganda will achieve total effectiveness?

It is extremely difficult for the psychological operator to measure changes in conduct and intangibles, such as attitudes, opinions, and emotions, upon a physically inaccessible audience. The effects of propaganda upon such an audience may be gleaned from the reaction of the enemy government as determined by its actions and made known by various media. Prisoners of war, defectors, line crossers, and sometimes, press correspondents may assist in the process.

Evaluation of all factors influencing propaganda and the results must be objective. All propaganda must be evaluated on the basis of the results desired and the results achieved, but must be measurable by comparing the results desired with the actual change in conduct, attitudes, opinions, and emotions.

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF US ARMY PROPAGANDA

Success in PSYOP is impossible without credibility. Even in the most underdeveloped areas, or under the most adverse conditions, the truth becomes known to a target audience. If lies have been told, credibility is lost. Once lost, it can never be totally regained.

US Army propaganda is based on a strategy of truth. It seeks to strengthen or create a favorable image by emphasizing the credible truth. This is so because the complete truth is frequently not believable (is incredible) to the target audience. For example, in World War II it was incredible to the enemy that the prisoners of war we had captured were receiving regular rations of cigarettes (with tobacco in them), fresh oranges, chocolate bars, coffee, and other items not available to the general populace in enemy countries.

Dedication to the truth does not imply that a full recounting of facts is required or advisable. Facts to support certain themes may be selected while others may be excluded. The propagandist reports those facts that present his side in the best light. However, to maintain objectivity, he may present some views (generally minor) from the other side. This is done, in many cases, to reduce the impact of enemy propaganda and to increase the credibility of US/friendly propaganda, since people tend to believe a source if both sides of a position are presented, even when one side is dominant.

KEYS TO SUCCESSFUL PROPAGANDA

The first requirement for successful propaganda is a national policy that meets the needs of the target audience. The role of the psychological operator is to communicate that policy. Not only must the propaganda be credible and persuasive, it must also not be recognizable by the target audience as being propaganda:
News--commentary--discussion--instructions--facts--entertainment
--YES! Propaganda--NO!

Propaganda must be **based on reality**. Any gap between reality and propaganda will be quickly noticed. It does not require mass communications systems to reveal discrepancies. The jungle drum and the bamboo telegraph will do that quickly enough. With the transistor radio and even television reaching the most primitive areas, the time gap is even shorter.

Messages to different groups of people will vary according to their different interests, but the underlying themes--the substance of the messages--must be **consistent.**

Messages to different audiences may be different, but **never contradictory. The credible truth must be consistent to all audiences.**

Propaganda must gain attention--IMMEDIATELY open minds. It must be presented so that the target audience will open its mind (individually and collectively) to receive the message. Insults, harassment, and messages degrading the target audience have the unwanted effect of closing the mind.

After the mind is receptive to the message, **it must be held open**. This is done by appealing to the interests of the audience and by presenting better solutions to their problems than those presently available. If possible, the propagandist must create or awaken an awareness in the target audience to needs that only he, the propagandist, can satisfy.

The psychological operator must take into consideration the fact that not only does each target audience have its own specific interests, but these interests have a priority of importance. Propaganda will hold the attention of its target audience only so long as it appeals to the most urgent interests and needs of the audience, and so long as the solutions offered are realistic and safe.

The same factors that apply to overcoming resistance to propaganda also apply to **gaining and holding an audience**. With good propaganda, however, it is easier to gain and hold the attention of a new audience than one that has turned away from previously disseminated material.

The degree to which actions are influenced and the permanency of actions (when free from coercion) measure the success of the message. The most successful propaganda, with the longest effect, is that which **reinforces the actions** brought about by creating favorable opinions, emotions, and attitudes in the target audience. The favorable opinions, emotions, and attitudes give **permanency to the actions**.

ROLE OF THE ENEMY

The psychological operator must always bear in mind that the enemy government, with its civilian and military agencies, has a major effect upon the target audience. This effect places the US/friendly propagandist at a disadvantage which he must overcome. The following factors are of primary importance.

Enemy Control Over Audience

An enemy government generally has physical control over the target audience. This gives it the power and ability to punish those whom it considers to be criminals or nonconformists. Fear of punishment is a major deterrent to actions that the propagandist might desire; e.g., having a target audience listen to his radio broadcasts when listening is punishable by death.

It follows that a government that has physical control over a designated target audience also controls the total welfare of that audience. Aside from incarceration and the power to inflict death, the enemy government has lesser but, nonetheless, highly effective means of interfering with the propagandist trying to reach those within its jurisdiction.

The government might prohibit criminals and nonconformists from working. It can restrict travel, a serious penalty for those who must travel to work but who may be prohibited from doing so by government edict.

Those within the power of an enemy government are aware that their welfare depends upon compliance with the wishes of their government. They will hesitate to jeopardize their well-being and that of their families.

Enemy Interference With Friendly Propaganda

Propaganda does not flow freely into enemy territory. The enemy has the physical power and means to restrict the flow of communications within any territory it controls, even where there is an effective shadow government.

Enemy-Imposed Sanctions and Rewards to Informers

Not only can and will the enemy government impose sanctions upon those who defy its wishes, laws, and edicts, but it will also offer substantial rewards to those who inform on lawbreakers and nonconformists. These rewards may take any number of forms: money, jobs, rank, land, business opportunities, power, fame, etc.

Generally, the fear of being reported is as great as being caught transgressing by police or other security agents. This fear often inhibits individuals, groups, or even societies from freewill actions, such as listening to foreign radio broadcasts and speaking with strangers, nonconformists, or members of outgroups.

Enemy Popular Support

While it may be your enemy, a government or armed force is someone else's friend. The psychological operator who works on the premise that his enemy is everyone's enemy is deceiving himself. Every government has some degree of popular support. It has those who will take the necessary steps to support it. For example, the bureaucracy of government employees has a vested interest in aiding the government that employs it. There are also a great number of people who would fear change, and there are always those who believe in their government, right or wrong. None of these will assist the propagandist. In fact, they probably will actively oppose his efforts.

Enemy Propaganda Campaign

The last, but not least, effective weapon of the enemy will be its own offensive propaganda. This propaganda will strengthen the resolve of those who favor the cause of the enemy and will tend to weaken the resolve of those who are neutral. The enemy's propaganda may require the US/friendly psychological operator to divert time, energy, money, personnel, facilities, and other resources to counter it.

The psychological operator must not downgrade enemy PSYOP efforts; he must be aware that he does not have a monopoly on effective psychological operations and credible persuasive propaganda. **Never underrate your enemy** is as true for psychological operations as it is for combat.

The way to success is not a one-way street. The psychological operator must expect that his successful propaganda efforts will bring about an **enemy counterpropaganda campaign**. The results of the counterpropaganda campaign will depend on the effectiveness of US/friendly efforts. An enemy's irrational overreaction may work to the advantage of the US/friendly propagandist.

While US and friendly military, economic, and political sanctions will lessen the will of some members of the enemy forces to fight or the will of civilians to support their government, these same sanctions may strengthen the will of others to resist our efforts. Our propaganda may incite some members of a selected target audience to greater antagonistic effort.

Authoritarian governments are prone to overact; this may work to the benefit of the US/friendly propagandist. Overaction by blanket prohibition will generally help the US psychological operator. It will lead people who are naturally curious to take risks to satisfy their curiosity.

Prohibition from listening to US/friendly radio broadcasts or watching TV may, in spite of the risks, whet the desire to hear and see what we may have to say or show. Prohibition from reading leaflets, circulars, newspapers, and magazines may lead to a black market in these items.

The propagandist must make the target audience's risks worthwhile by disseminating propaganda that appeals to their needs and interests and helps them alleviate their situation.

If US actions are honorable and humane and its accompanying propaganda credible, acceptance by a few may lead to a bandwagon effect, and hostility may decrease. The effects of a sound, complete message (actions and words) can be contagious.

Resistance to Propaganda

The first step to overcoming resistance to propaganda is to determine the reasons why it is resisted. This may require thorough background research into the history of the target audience whose values, culture, and present conduct have a historical basis. All groups, cultures, and societies have events in their history that are particularly significant and are categorized by key slogans, phrases, events (e.g., Bastille Day in France), and religious ceremonies.

A basic ingredient in overcoming resistance to propaganda is a logical PSYOP plan that is **culturally accurate**. The most detailed PSYOP plan in the world is utterly useless if it is not appropriate to the environment, conditions, and culture of the target. Each target group is susceptible to specific appeals. A plan that considers the uniqueness of its target will, when implemented, more readily overcome resistance by the target audience.

While words may make promises, actions concretely prove intentions. A major role of the psychological operator is to communicate word of the **implementing efforts**.

Everybody likes a winner. This works to the advantage of every psychological operator. Success and victory have a bandwagon effect in that they bring more adherents to the cause. The greater the success or victory, the greater and more assertive the PSYOP campaign should be to **exploit the success or victory**. The uncertain and wavering will join the victorious cause. The ties of the strongest adherents to the losing side will weaken. Good PSYOP enhance the effects of victory and success.

PROPAGANDA LIMITATIONS

The following factors place limitations upon the effectiveness of PSYOP and propaganda:

Political

Political situations and conditions may be such that the aspirations of the target audience cannot be fulfilled. National policy may preclude offering even token fulfillment. Complete agreement among allies is seldom attained on policy affecting their goals, national interests, and courses of action. Conflicting needs of other agencies of government operating abroad and military necessity may make policy uncertain. This may result in courses of action that reduce credibility and good will below the level desired in psychological operations.

Military

The military situation may be adverse, thereby stringently limiting the use of effective propaganda. Even static military situations restrict the possible effectiveness of PSYOP. Military security may limit the use or timing of potentially sound and effective themes and messages.

Audience

Target audiences are suspicious. Under the adverse conditions in which they generally exist, they have every reason to be. Being suspicious, they are not disposed to believe that the propagandist really has their interests at heart, or even that his interests are compatible with theirs. Because of historical, social, cultural, and language differences, the target audiences may not respond to the propagandist's line of reasoning. Because the enemy regime has greater access to the people under its control, it can interpose barriers that will limit or destroy any chance of communication between the propagandist and his intended target audience. In addition to technical communications barriers, extensive political and security police organizations that control communications can impose sanctions on the intended audience.

Personnel

Ultimate success depends upon dedicated, proficient personnel who can do the job. Unfortunately, due to scarcity and great demand, they are frequently not available in time of conflict. Equipment is not a substitute for these people.

COUNTERPROPAGANDA

Counterpropaganda is propaganda directed at the target audiences of enemy propaganda; it is designed to counteract enemy or other foreign propaganda and to capitalize on vulnerabilities in their campaign. Through the use of counterpropaganda, enemy campaigns can be either neutralized or minimized. While counterpropaganda is basically defensive to limit the effectiveness of enemy propaganda, it is not so in a negative sense. Using imagination, a psychological operator can, and should, initiate a well-planned, aggressive, and effective counterpropaganda offensive.

USE OF COUNTERPROPAGANDA

The use of counterpropaganda must be based on intelligence, propaganda analysis, and the answers to the following questions:

How will the counterpropaganda affect the overall PSYOP campaign?

What is the current and potential impact of enemy propaganda?

What is the probability of success of counterpropaganda?

The psychological operator must be aware of the danger of becoming so involved in a counterpropaganda campaign that he loses the initiative.

COUNTERPROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES

The technique used will depend upon the current situation and the possibility of success. Some of the most common techniques are:

Conditioning

This involves the use of education and information programs to condition the target audience and thereby reduce the shock effect of anticipated enemy propaganda. This technique reduces susceptibility.

Forestalling

This technique is akin to "immunization." It is the process of counteracting or capitalizing on a subject potentially exploitable by enemy propaganda before the enemy uses it.

Minimizing the Subject

A subject may be minimized by the following techniques:

Emphasize its favorable aspects to the target audience.

Insinuate the entire story cannot be told at present, while suggesting that the full facts will prove the enemy story either inaccurate or totally false.

Briefly mention the enemy story and drop it.

Direct Refutation

This is a point-by-point rebuttal of enemy propaganda. A danger of direct refutation is that it may, by keeping the subject in the "public eye," add strength and possibly credibility to enemy propaganda. Therefore, care must be taken to counter the enemy's story so completely and effectively that publicity will not give it credibility.

Indirect Refutation

Indirect refutation introduces new, relevant themes which refute the enemy propaganda by implication and insinuation. By using this technique, the psychological operator is less likely to reinforce the credibility of enemy propaganda than if he directly refuted it.

Diversionary Propaganda

This is an attempt to divert the attention of the target audience from the enemy propaganda by using new themes or by intensified use of themes that have proven effective.

Imitative Deception

This technique involves the alteration of enemy propaganda so as to give it a different slant, a slant favorable to the United States and its allies.

Silence

The best technique may be to ignore the enemy propaganda, particularly when active counterpropaganda measures may be dangerous or the effect is uncertain. In the event that the enemy theme does not lend itself to successful exploitation, or the subject is not important enough to warrant rebuttal, IGNORE IT--REMAIN SILENT! Before using this technique, the effect of silence upon the public must be weighed.

Restrictive Measures

Restrictive measures may be used to deny the target audience access to enemy propaganda. This, however, calls attention to the enemy output and whets the desire to learn the enemy's story. It thereby encourages the target audience to listen to and read the denied propaganda covertly. Restrictive measures, generally used by authoritarian governments, are never completely effective. Total enforced isolation is virtually impossible. Restrictive measures are not recommended.

Chapter Twelve

12

PSYOP PLANNING

The key to the success of PSYOP, as with any military operation, is adequate planning. The need for detailed, long-range imaginative planning is critical.

To be successful a psychological operation requires:

A complete, detailed, accurate data base arranged for ease of use.

Detailed, timely intelligence.

Centralized control.

Sound and timely planning.

Decentralized execution.

Optimum use of available resources.

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Psychological operations planning is a continuous process requiring imagination and determination. It must be responsive to immediate change brought about by any new condition or circumstance affecting the target audience or the psychological objective. The resulting plan is also subject to change.

The PSYOP **planning process must be flexible**. Targets of opportunity should be exploited as they arise. Opportunities to exploit a vulnerability may be lost by inflexible insistence on implementing the original plan. Vulnerabilities, conditions, target audiences, objectives, and themes often change rapidly due to shifts in events and policies.

Planning may precede or follow the decision to carry out a course of action. Whether the planning precedes or follows the decision, the ingredients are essentially the same for any PSYOP plan. For example, contingency plans follow the same pattern; they cover a variety of situations, such as the end of hostilities, intervention by other nations, the use of new weapons, changes in political conditions, and changes in the military situation. Contingency plans are designed to be implemented immediately upon order when the anticipated and prepared for event occurs.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Realistic objectives that can be achieved within policy limitation.

Analysis of the existing military and political situation.

Sources of information.

Delineation of the target and its accessibility.

Themes to be used to achieve PSYOP objectives.

Themes to be avoided.

Media to be employed.

Formal staffing and coordination required to effect the plan.

PSYOP PLANNING SEQUENCE

The sequence of steps taken to plan a psychological operation will vary with the situation; however, the same steps apply to any PSYOP planning. The flow and sequence of major PSYOP actions which occur in both PSYOP units and staff sections are shown in figure 12-1 to guide those involved in planning and supervising psychological operations.

As a first step, PSYOP personnel constantly gather information relevant to the area of operations. This intelligence focuses on subjects of PSYOP interest. The material, gathered from numerous sources and analyzed, is placed in a Basic PSYOP Study (BPS). (For a detailed discussion, see chapter 14 and appendix C.)

Target analysis is a major action in campaign development. It is an examination of intelligence to permit the analyst to establish a list of psychological objectives to guide PSYOP personnel in conducting psychological operations. (For a detailed discussion of target analysis, see chapter 14 and appendix F.)

Mission Assignment

A PSYOP support mission can be given to a PSYOP unit at any time during the PSYOP planning sequence prior to the initiation of campaign control. Upon receipt of a PSYOP mission, the PSYOP personnel follow the routine decisionmaking steps outlined in FM 101-5.

PSYOP Estimate of the Situation

The ACofS, G5 is responsible for the preparation of the PSYOP estimate of the situation (appendix D). The commander's decision regarding PSYOP support of the mission is made from this document. The estimate should, above all else, make clear the psychological impact of the commander's proposed courses of action.

Plan Preparation

After the commander announces his decision, the ACofS, G5/S5 prepares plans/annexes tasking the major subordinate elements with the responsibility to accomplish the PSYOP tasks. The same plans provide the commander with sufficient PSYOP support to accomplish the tasks. The PSYOP unit commander makes recommendations for the employment of the PSYOP assets.

Media Selection

Selection of media to transmit messages is based on the information revealed during target analysis. The analysis determines the type of media that is acceptable and credible to the target audience. (See chapter 17 for further discussion.) The planner must also consider the availability and mechanical capability of the media to deliver the message. For example, if television is selected, the audience must have access to compatible receivers. Early in the planning stage, consideration must be given to the time required for production and delivery. The message must be delivered at the needed time.

Propaganda Development

Propaganda development is the process of taking information, knowledge, and material available, visualizing it all, and expressing it as artwork, words, symbols, texts, manuscripts, and actions.

Pretesting

A pretest to determine the probable impact of PSYOP material upon the target audience and unintended audience should be accomplished using the appropriate techniques. The best sounding board for pretesting is a cross section of the target audience. If these people are not available, a panel of those most similar to the target audience should be used. (See chapter 11 for techniques.)

Campaign Control

Campaign control involves the production and dissemination of PSYOP material. For a discussion of campaign control see appendix G.

Posttesting

Posttesting and pretesting techniques are the same, but the same personnel must not be used on both testing procedures. In addition, posttesting discussions must be concerned with the reasons for audience responses.

Feedback

This is the basis for modification of plans and operations.



FIGURE 12-1

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS FLOW

IMPROVING THE PRODUCT

Successful propaganda is both credible and persuasive. Building credibility requires consistency and time. Of the many factors entering into the establishment of credibility, one of the most important is an accurate target analysis. Credibility will be enhanced when the themes relate to the needs and wants of the target audience and are kept within their frame of reference. Experience indicates that the persuasiveness of propaganda to a hostile audience is increased when the propaganda is objective and indirect--the more hostile the audience, the more objective and indirect the propaganda.

Personal messages for delivery or transmission to individuals or groups in a target audience by a former associate or relative should contain intimate details known only to the source. They should be a means of identification to the intended audience.

In addition, the source must be clearly identified with sufficient information so there is no doubt as to his identity. This reinforces the credibility of the message.

AVOIDING THE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

The following statements apply in limited, general, and cold war:

In a foreign internal defense situation, avoid propaganda that places the host country in a secondary position. US Army psychological operations support host country efforts.

Do not use terms, weights, or measures that are foreign to the target audience.

Do not translate directly from English to a foreign language. Instead, give the linguist an idea or concept and have the concept phrased in the local language.

Do not add credence to enemy propaganda through words or actions.

Make definite positive statements. Avoid the negative. Do not appear uncertain.

When preparing messages for dissemination, follow the rule **any statement or action that can be misinterpreted will be misinterpreted**.

Do not distribute propaganda that can be easily altered by the enemy to their advantage.

Avoid themes to which host country and enemy troops are equally vulnerable.

Do not insult or anger the target audience. Keep their minds open and their emotions friendly.

Do not use strong threats. Use threats only to meet or arouse a need, and present them as facts.

Do not give free publicity to enemy atrocities in the host country.

Use enemy atrocities to gain sympathy abroad.

Keep all promises; if uncertain of ability to deliver, don't promise.

Security permitting, warn civilians of impending artillery fires, naval gunfire, and aerial bombardment.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES

A psychological objective is derived from the mission. It may be a single step or a series of steps designed to lead the target audience toward the behavior or attitude desired to accomplish the PSYOP mission. Changes in conditions may bring about changes in psychological objectives.

Psychological objectives are classified as:

Cohesive. Those whose achievement would strengthen or more closely unite the society or target group.

Divisive. Those designed to separate the individual from his group, separate a group from other groups or a society, or disorganize a group or society.

THEMES

A theme is a subject, topic, or line of persuasion used to achieve psychological objectives by exploiting existing vulnerabilities. Themes are the bridge between propaganda opportunity and the response which the psychological operator is trying to elicit.

Each theme should stand alone. It must, however, be coordinated with all relevant agencies to insure consistency and support for national objectives and policy.

Each theme should deal with only one subject. Do not complicate a theme by trying to achieve several objectives. Use separate themes for each objective.

Themes should be selected to persuade the target audience to adopt the course of action wanted by the psychological operator. The audience is motivated by telling them what action is desired, why it is desirable to them, and then showing how it fulfills their needs. Do not use negative themes to achieve positive action, as they tend to be counterproductive.

Make surrender/defector appeals on safe-conduct passes. Insure that the leaflets on which the appeals are made state that they are safe-conduct passes.

State that surrender may be made without a pass.

Stress that surrender may be made to any unit.

Inform all US/friendly units of the surrender/defection policy, so that those enemy who try to surrender or defect are not shot in the attempt.

Defection and desertion appeals are used to encourage individuals or groups among enemy forces to place personal considerations above group interests. Desertion/defection appeals should give absolute, specific assurance of good treatment, and cite honorable and worthy reasons for desertion or defection. When appropriate, use defectors to criticize their own government and military forces. Their message is personal and will have a greater effect than that of outsiders.

Family appeals are very effective, but should be disseminated in the enemy area only; if they are circulated where friendly troops prevail, they may cause desertion among host country troops.

Explaining the presence of foreign troops in the country is a major task. Items prepared to explain this presence should be pretested extensively to insure they cannot be misinterpreted as boasting. Similarities of culture and national goals between the host country and the US should be stressed. Differences between the host country/allies and the United States should be deemphasized.

THE MESSAGE

A propaganda message is a communication with the purpose of bringing about an action and an attitude. Before it can accomplish its purpose, it must get a hearing by the designated receiver (target). In brief, **a message must be received, be understood, be believed, offer a solution, and bring about a desired result.**

Given a policy, intelligence, a target, themes, and appraisal of the desired results, the propagandist composes his message. He must construct, time, and transmit his message so that, even though in competition with considerable other material being presented to the target, it gets a hearing. The target must understand the message and give it the interpretation intended by the propagandist.

A propaganda message must arouse or stimulate needs. It must cause an action or bring about an attitude desired by the propagandist. This requires that the message tell the target how to satisfy its needs--by following the course of action desired by the propagandist. This, in turn, requires that the actions (urged openly or implied) be appropriate and important to the target. In order to get the action or attitude desired, the message must, in the opinion of the target, offer the best solution (or the only logical one) toward solving the problem addressed or in fulfilling target needs.

In essence, the propagandist must take all necessary steps to assure that the action he desires will succeed and that the action he does not desire will have the least opportunity to appeal to the target; i.e., that the undesired action will fail.

MESSAGE STRUCTURE

The propaganda message should be clear, concise, and coherent--a precise item without extraneous material; everything in it must contribute to the whole message, providing a coherent flow without the use of filler material.

In preparing a message or line of persuasion, avoid abstractions if possible. Make maximum use of specific and factual examples and photographs.

If abstractions are used, define them in the simplest terms.

Relate the message to the everyday life of the audience.

Since the target is suspicious and will look for hidden unfavorable meanings, insure that only one interpretation, the intended one, can be given each sentence.

Since the target has a different background and frame of reference, do not use unfamiliar idiomatic expressions or jargon.

Use clear and complete statements.

Develop thoughts in the logical sequence of the language used by the target audience. Do not leave any thoughts for the target to fill in. The key question to ask is, "Does the audience understand what it means?"

Use the level of language that is correct for the literacy level of the target audience. For semiliterates, it is best to use their regional dialects and idiomatic expressions.

Chapter Thirteen

13

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

In war, the side which most effectively influences the psyche of man will have the strategic advantage, fight the better fight, and win the victory and the peace.



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ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Psychological operations are interrelated with national, ideological, economic, foreign, and military activities. They establish, maintain, and reinforce the effect and credibility of these integrated functions. Concerted, systematic, and comprehensive psychological programs support US military services and the government agencies and departments concerned with national security.

US ARMY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

PSYOP personnel support and complement planned operations. They also assure that the psychological impact of planned and executed operations and military activities are made known to the commander. These might include stationing of forces, deployments, official and personal troop expenditures and conduct, and storage of munitions and weapons.

PSYOP are aimed at three major foreign target groups:

Enemy

Psychological operations attempt to demoralize the enemy soldier or hostile civilian, undermine his cause, obtain favorable behavior, and develop opinions, emotions, and attitudes to reinforce that behavior.

Uncommitted

Psychological operations must develop favorable behavior in the uncommitted and reinforce favorable opinions, emotions, and attitudes.

Friends

Psychological operations must keep friendly groups and individuals assured of the eventual victory.

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES ABROAD

In the area of foreign policy, psychological operations may have the mission of supporting political objectives, gaining support and cooperation of neutral countries, strengthening or weakening alliances, deterring nations from aggression, and bringing about the final surrender of the enemy.

MAJOR MILITARY OBJECTIVES

Joined with the persuasive psychological pressures generated by combat situations, PSYOP can help to lower enemy morale, reduce combat efficiency, encourage defection and desertion, participate in deception operations, and add a multiplier effect to existing forces to bring about more efficient accomplishment of the mission.

Lower Enemy Morale

Sustained use of PSYOP stressing unfair treatment of ethnic, economic, social, political, and regional groups or minorities can produce a divisive and depressing effect upon the morale of enemy units and the civilian population. Exploitation of a deteriorating enemy military and political situation can also accomplish this.

Reduce Combat Efficiency

Steady psychological attacks upon morale, integrated with other military operations, can lower the combat effectiveness of enemy troops. This may be done by emphasizing the growing strength of allied forces, the lower civilian morale, enemy combat defeats, and destruction of enemy industrial capacity.

Encourage Defection and Desertion

Enemy soldiers subjected to psychological operations over extended periods can be induced to malinger, desert, defect, fail to perform their duties effectively, fight dispiritedly, and surrender.

Deceive

PSYOP can support tactical deception plans of the commander; e.g., convey deceptive information. But no deceptions which are contrary to the law of war (e.g., broadcasting falsely that an armistice or cease-fire has been agreed upon) will be conducted. Use of deceptive information requires that subsequent effects on the future credibility of PSYOP information be carefully considered.

These objectives are attained by propaganda and deliberate actions with planned psychological impact. Any means of communication may be used to deliver the message. Whether used singly or combined, the entire communications effort must be centrally coordinated and integrated. Messages may be transmitted overtly or covertly.

LIMITATIONS

The psychological operator must be aware of and overcome the limitations of PSYOP. These include:

Enemy Countermeasures

The effectiveness of PSYOP is limited by the enemy's ability to use political and military sanctions against people within its territory and its ability to intercept

communications, emanating both within and beyond its boundaries, aimed at people within its territory. Enemy counterpropaganda will also act as a damper against US/friendly psychological operations.

Incomplete Information

Lack of or incomplete information will limit the number of vulnerable targets.

Difficulty Evaluating Effects of Own Propaganda

Stringent enemy restrictions on news, public discussions, and travel limit accurate assessment of US/friendly PSYOP efforts.

Lack of Coordination

A lack of planning and operating coordination between military units, headquarters, and services and between civilian and military agencies will limit and adversely affect US/friendly PSYOP.

Lack of Qualified Personnel

Effective PSYOP require dedicated, imaginative people who know the language and customs of the target audience and are familiar with the political, economic, social, psychological, and ideological conditions of their society. Such people are scarce.

Law of War

The psychological operator is limited in his actions and words by the proscriptions (listed in FM 27-10) of the laws of war set forth in the Hague Conventions, Hague Regulations, and Geneva Conventions of 1949, and other sources. These proscriptions constrain the actions of the United States in conflict situations and must be observed by US military personnel.

MAJOR OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN STRUCTURING A PSYOP FORCE

MISSION

The PSYOP mission is derived from that of the supported force; therefore, the mission of the supported force is the major factor in structuring a PSYOP force.

Realistic appraisals must be made of PYSOP capabilities within the limits of national policy and command directives, and available personnel and material resources. The ability to plan and execute a PSYOP campaign may be limited by a number of factors, such as:

US/friendly nation national policy.

The realities of unit, service, or agency priorities.

United States vis-a-vis friendly nation priorities.

Deficiencies in number and quality of personnel.

Lack of and deficiencies in material resources: facilities, equipment, parts, and supplies.

TARGETS

The primary targets of PSYOP are groups: political, social, economic, cultural, ethnic, racial, religious, military, intellectual elites, farmers, laborers, government employees, white collar workers, etc. But knowing your target is not enough; the type of media through which the target audience can be influenced must also be known.

Accessibility of the target will determine the type of campaign to be implemented and the propaganda mix. The major factors determining target accessibility are political, geographic, literacy rate, and communications media available to the source and to the target. These factors play a key role in determining the type campaign to be implemented and the media mix.

MEDIA

Among the major factors determining the proper media mix are the present or anticipated political situation, geographic restraints, the literacy rate, and the availability of a particular medium. National sovereignty, national policy, international relations, the location of the target within political boundaries, and whether the target is under US, friendly, enemy, or neutral political control must be considered.

The geographic area of operations is as important in planning and executing a psychological operation as it is for all other operations. The location, climate, physical features (large bodies of water, high mountains, extensive desert, swampland, vast plateaus, low mountain ranges, great prairies, etc.) not only determine the type of propaganda that can be disseminated and the means, but, more important, the type, density, and availability of target audiences.

The psychological operator must keep in mind that within a geographic or political area, the literacy rate of target groups may vary from almost complete illiteracy to complete literacy. The literacy rate of the target audience will determine whether printed material should be distributed, and, if so, what type. It will determine the type of radio, television, audiovisual, and theatrical programs to be presented as well as the level and type of interpersonal (face-to-face) communications.

While the most effective medium is face-to-face communication, major reliance must be placed upon use of mass media in PSYOP campaigns. Logistical considerations and message authenticity and credibility force the PSYOP planner and operator to look to "on-the-ground" facilities, equipment, personnel, and supplies.

Use of local media: Policy, agreements, and legal contracts must permit the use of local mass media resources, and funds must be available to obtain their use.

Except for normal business agreements and contracts, use of local mass media resources in foreign areas requires joint US/HC approval. Legal clearances must be obtained before planning for, or attempting to use, local media.

Availability of receiving equipment: Two of the major mass media, radio and television, require both transmitting and compatible receiving equipment.

It is not enough to know that radio and television equipment are available (and perhaps in widespread use). The planner and operator must also know whether they are compatible with his transmitting equipment. He must know whether the equipment in the hands of the target will receive the message. For example, radio communications

may be under strict, closely policed government control, which limits radio receivers to a single government channel. It may not be feasible nor economical to slide into this channel. Thus, radio cannot be used.

Television: Throughout the world, there are several television transmission systems requiring specifically designed receivers: the receivers compatible with one particular system are not compatible with others.

LOGISTICS

Use of locally available supplies not only lends authenticity to propaganda, but also alleviates the logistical burden of transoceanic or transcontinental shipment. The best sources for locating local material are indigenous people who have worked in the communications field. US and host government and private personnel and agencies can render great service in locating facilities, equipment, and supplies.

In an overseas operation, the breakdown of a simple part may put a vital piece of equipment out of operation for months. If locally produced equipment is used, parts are usually readily available for installation, thus reducing the downtime. Maintenance is always a factor in using complex mass media equipment. Use of locally manufactured equipment that can be readily repaired by indigenous mechanics who have been factory or dealer trained simplifies maintenance problems and eliminates the costly, nonproductive process of training local mechanics to repair unfamiliar US-produced equipment.

CONTROL

The missions and location (geographic spread) of supported units must be considered in determining the management responsibilities of PSYOP command and control personnel. Supported forces may be so widely spread out that additional PSYOP command and control personnel are required. Due to the nature of PSYOP management (central policy guidance with decentralized execution), the span of control must not be strained. An overly wide span of control can result in an uncoordinated policy that is counterproductive to psychological operations.

LANGUAGE

Spoken and written languages must be authentic. The final product of propaganda reaches the target as language, written or spoken. It is not enough that the language be scholastically accurate. It must also be currently authentic for each target group. This is particularly true of dialects. The target subconsciously weighs the language used; if it isn't authentic, the message fails.

FOREIGN NATIONAL AUGMENTATION

Augmentation is the rule rather than the exception. The US soldier who can get the message across to a foreign target audience is a rarity. Communications, even between people having a common language, heritage, and way of life, are less than perfect. The problems of communicating are compounded in intercultural communications with differing basic concepts of time, divergent core values and objectives, and different interpretations of phenomena and meanings of words. The job can best be done by local nationals or persons formerly resident in a target area (or among a target group) long enough to acquire the cultural traits of the target.

Knowing the language of the target audience does not mean a person has a thorough understanding of the target. For effective PSYOP, the psychological operator must have complete empathy with and be totally immersed into the total current environment (life) of his target audience. His background must enable him, intellectually, emotionally, and culturally, to visualize the circumstances of the target audience from their point of view, situation, and condition. He must know what is most important to the target audience at the particular time his message reaches them. **He must know his target thoroughly.**

The spectrum of requirements for foreign personnel augmentation ranges from idea men, researchers, writers, professional communicators, administrators, artists, and announcers, through translators/interpreters, technicians, artisans, and skilled personnel, to maintenance and service personnel, skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers. It may be difficult to find a sufficient number or any persons who have the required education, ability, expertise or skills to meet the needs of the unit. One possible means of overcoming this deficiency is to break the requirement or job into simple components as is done on industrial mass production lines.

Foreign social scientists required to learn the psychological characteristics of a target audience may be unavailable. In this case, empirical observations may be taken from policemen, reporters, political figures (mayors, village or tribal chiefs, etc.), doctors and other healers (shamans, witch doctors, nature healers, etc.). Use of this technique enables the psychological operator to meet a practical need by practical means, with realistic feedback having a practical use.

The idea man must have an intimate, firsthand knowledge of the target people. He must project himself into the target area. He should be well educated by practical experience and background. If he does not have a better than normal education, he must be well read and have an intimate contact with a broad spectrum of the target. Above all, he must know how to put ideas into words, symbols, pictures, and action. In addition:

He must know how to write.

He must be able to make people react.

He must anticipate the reactions of his target.

He must be politically aware.

He must be fluent in the language or dialect of the people.

He must have empathy with the target.

FOREIGN PERSONNEL AVAILABLE

There are three basic sources of foreign personnel:

Local hire.

The majority of foreign personnel employed will be locally hired civilians.

Seconded government personnel.

Another source will be host country government employees whom the host country makes available for use.

Host country military personnel.

A third, excellent source is indigenous military personnel. These individuals who may function across the entire spectrum of PSYOP skills can be more readily deployed and be used in more dangerous areas than civilians.

Another source of foreign personnel is third country nationals. Use of these people may be limited because of potential friction with host country nationals and possible legal problems. They may be limited to a few otherwise unobtainable experts and used for only short periods. In some cases, third country personnel could be nationals of close allies of the host country, and their use would thus pose no particular problem.

Authorization for use of host country personnel is generally proscribed in US/HC agreements and by theater directives. The agreements and directives spell out the precise details of employment--how, when, and where the personnel may be used; wages, bonuses, and other compensation; vacations, leaves, health, and fringe benefits; meals and other privileges; and termination compensation.

ROLE OF FOREIGN PERSONNEL

Almost all propaganda material will filter through the foreign augmentation personnel--from the raw material received as unprocessed information, through the processing stage, to final dissemination and presentation to the target audience--whether as propaganda acts or deeds, interpersonal communications, audio, visual, audiovisual, or printed propaganda.

This is true throughout the entire spectrum of conflict and psychological activities--in pursuit of strategic or tactical objectives; in consolidation operations, FID, UW, or PW operations; or in advisory, training, and assistance missions.

Security Clearances

Ideally and normally, foreign augmentation personnel must be investigated and cleared by appropriate host country and US security agencies. (This is also by US/HC agreement.) Circumstances may arise, however, when personnel may be hired who do not have the desired personnel clearance. The US psychological operator must be aware of the security requirements and procedures and must adhere to the letter and spirit of directives and regulations covering this facet of his responsibilities.

Allegiance of Foreign Personnel

Foreign augmentation personnel owe primary allegiance to their own country, political entity, region, ethnic group, culture, and self-interest. Such allegiance will undoubtedly take precedence over that given to the United States. Normally, allegiance to the United States will extend to those areas and to the extent that the US interests coincide with those to which the foreign personnel give primary allegiance. This may best be summarized by a statement of a foreign employee: "... after all, you Americans must realize that I must live and work here after you are long gone."

Conversely, some local augmentation personnel take on a US orientation (coloring), identifying primarily with their US employer. In so doing, they lose their local perspective (so vital to the success of the operation), perceiving the local target audience from a pseudo-US point of view. The work of such personnel loses its original, essential authenticity and accuracy. This situation sometimes cannot be avoided, and it is difficult for the person(s) having assumed this point of view to regain their original perceptions. Members of host country minorities and of outgroups are particularly prone to this type of identification.

A third, not uncommon, situation is that in which foreign augmentation personnel attempt to "please" the US Army psychological operator, by producing work or a propaganda product which they believe he desires, regardless of its authenticity, accuracy, or potential effectiveness.

Constant Evaluation Required

Because of the problems inherent in intercultural production of propaganda, and the absolute need for authenticity and accuracy, the work of foreign augmentation personnel requires continuous, objective evaluation and cross checking. This must be done to assure that themes are appropriate, symbols correctly interpreted, cultural and social factors accurately evaluated and placed in proper perspective, and that messages are relevant to the interests and frames of reference of the target audience and the psychological objectives.

Duties and Responsibilities of US Personnel

The use of foreign augmentation personnel in the most sensitive and important positions and duties, and in the most menial, does not relieve the US Army psychological operator of any of his supervisory responsibilities or duties; of his responsibilities for assigned tasks, objectives, or missions; nor of his security responsibilities.

On-the-Job Training

Among the major responsibilities, and one whose fulfillment will pay great dividends, is that of implementing an on-the-job training program for local employees. Not only does it build esprit de corps, but it also results in greater efficiency, a better product, and less downtime equipment. It builds a cohesive organization that gets the job done.

Chapter Fourteen

INTELLIGENCE FOR PSYOP

14

Effective psychological operations are dependent on the availability of timely, continuous, accurate, detailed intelligence at all levels of command. Only with timely, accurate intelligence can target audiences be identified and analyzed, effective PSYOP campaigns implemented, and persuasive messages prepared and disseminated. The major areas of intelligence activities in support of psychological operations are:

Research

Target Analysis

Propaganda Analysis

Effects Analysis

Improperly conducted intelligence activities can cause PSYOP campaigns to fail. Target groups may be incorrectly identified, vulnerabilities not properly perceived, inappropriate themes selected, incorrect media chosen, and improper dissemination techniques used.



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TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE FOR PSYOP

PSYOP require information concerning or affecting the attitudes and behavior of any target group, military or civilian. This includes information on the social, political, economic, psychological, and ideological environment within the target area. PSYOP have the same combat intelligence requirements as other elements of the force.

CATEGORIES

Intelligence required by PSYOP is divided into two categories: area, special, and basic PSYOP studies; and current data.

Area, Special, and Basic PSYOP Studies: The area, special, and basic psychological operations studies of countries represent an established data base.

Area studies are descriptive in nature and are written for the specific purposes of the proponent agency (e.g., unconventional warfare, civil affairs, etc.). They are usually updated periodically.

Special studies are conducted in response to special requirements and generally contain information of greater depth than other studies. By focusing on one aspect of a country or society, special studies can identify communications patterns and potential target groups, and may contain indicators of the effectiveness of previous PSYOP. They are usually updated on an as-needed basis.

Basic PSYOP studies (BPS) are oriented toward issues of PSYOP relevancy in given countries or areas. They are updated periodically according to priorities established by JCS. A basic PSYOP study, in conjunction with the National PSYOP Policy, is then used as a basis for tactical PSYOP programs. Potential target groups are identified in the BPS.

Current data is used to analyze and select specific target audiences and to determine their susceptibilities. Current tactical intelligence is the information needed to conduct day-to-day operations successfully. It is used to:

Determine PSYOP essential elements of information (EEI) and other intelligence requirements (OIR) which will later become part of the overall collection plan in conjunction with the operational plans and needs of the supported commander.

Select themes.

Provide a basis for developing messages.

Supplement and amplify existing background data to pinpoint vulnerabilities.

The intelligence required to conduct PSYOP is generally obtained from **unclassified** material. Most of it comes from newspapers, magazines, books, academic journals, studies, and foreign broadcasts. Information obtained through military channels is often classified, not because of the sensitive nature of the material but to protect sources or to conceal the fact that military intelligence personnel are interested in certain unclassified, easily obtained information.

Most of the information in intelligence reports classified for the latter two reasons can be found in unclassified references, and these references should be used as much as possible. Although classified information cannot be used, it is useful as background and reference material.

THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

The intelligence process is generally the same for PSYOP as for any other activity requiring intelligence data. PSYOP intelligence needs are integrated into the intelligence efforts of the command by the staff intelligence officer (G2/S2). The PSYOP staff officer and PSYOP units use established intelligence channels to obtain intelligence. They also collect information for the command.

A PSYOP unit has an organic research and analysis (R&A) section to process information. It also collects intelligence during operations when teams are engaged in face-to-face communications. **There is no fixed PSYOP organization to collect intelligence.**

For PSYOP to be effective, qualified PSYOP and intelligence personnel must work together as a team. Individuals with a social science or political science background are ideal; however, training and experience are often more important than educational background.

PSYOP ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Intelligence is needed to form a realistic PSYOP estimate of the situation. This document (or thought process) is designed to determine the best course of action. The estimate of the situation is the end product of the R&A process. It gives a current picture of potential vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, and the psychological impact of the proposed courses of action. The estimate may be written or presented orally. It is normally prepared after receipt of the commander's mission and is based on the commander's planning guidance.

The PSYOP estimate of the situation is valid only for the specific area for which it is prepared.

Since conditions change with events and time, it must be continuously updated as changes occur. Also, different estimates will be needed for operations in different areas. (See appendix D.)

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE BASIC PSYOP STUDY AND THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

The Basic PSYOP Study

The BPS is a detailed background document which describes the PSYOP-relevant vulnerabilities, characteristics, insights, and opportunities that are known about a country susceptible to exploitation.It contains all known political, social, military, and economic factors relevant to PSYOP, the psychological implications, and possible ramifications. It provides sufficient information on a country to prepare and conduct a PSYOP campaign. It is a source document for preparation of the estimate.

The PSYOP Estimate of the Situation

The PSYOP estimate of the situation portrays the current situation in the target country and considers any specific tactical mission or planning guidance.

ORGANIZATION TO SUPPORT PSYOP

To perform adequately the intelligence research and analysis functions required to conduct PSYOP, the intelligence personnel assigned to PSYOP units should be functionally organized. A suggested type organization could include:

Research desks, each staffed by one or more people, with primary responsibilities for areas or regions. Activities include propaganda analysis, preparation of BPSs, target analysis, and furnishing information to support media output. Desk personnel should perform quantitative and qualitative propaganda analysis and establish research files.

An Effects Analysis Section, which is generally concerned with analyzing the effects of US PSYOP on the enemy. It may also be concerned with the effects of enemy PSYOP. Some specific duties should include pretesting and posttesting, review of intelligence reports for signs of enemy reaction to US PSYOP, analysis of captured directives and documents, and the conduct of attitude surveys.

An Editorial and Production Section, which prepares PSYOP material for printing.

A Collection and Publication Section is recommended. It would function as a reference library and distribution center, acquiring, storing, routing, and disseminating all documents in the unit.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI) AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (OIR)

(See FM 30-5)

Essential elements of information are the critical items of information regarding the enemy and his environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate to other available information and intelligence in order to assist him in reaching a decision.

Essential elements of information consist of a series of specific and pointed questions designed to get the information needed on target groups. These questions should cover the basic psychological, sociological, politicomilitary, and economic environment of the area and target, such as:

Attitude of target toward present situation.

Complaints.

Ethnic origin.

Frustrations.

Languages used.

Problems.

Tensions.

These are just a few of the areas about which definite information must be obtained before the vulnerabilities and susceptibilities of the target group can be determined.

Other intelligence requirements derive from command requirements which do not qualify as EEI and from staff requirements. OIR consist of information (other than EEI) on other capabilities, vulnerabilities, and characteristics of the area of operations which may affect the accomplishment of the mission.

Many of the EEI and OIR are of a recurring type, even though the subject (target group) may vary. The areas above can and should be broken down into subelements when developing EEI and OIR.

The intelligence officer developing the requirements should not assume that the collectors know the situation and what information to seek. For example, the EEI/OIR needed on a hostile civilian population will differ from the EEI/OIR needed on enemy troops. The requirements should be explained as clearly as possible and coordinated with other sections involved. Coordination should be effected with the PSYOP sections involved in planning operations, preparing and disseminating media, and developing PSYOP campaigns, to insure that their information needs are included. (For formulation of EEI and OIR, see p. 4-1, para 4-2; p. 4-2, para 4-5; and index, FM 30-5.)

Vulnerabilities and susceptibilities of the target are identified from target analysis, which is a combination of information gained from the EEI, OIR, and R&A.

Vulnerability

A vulnerability is a condition which can be exploited by the psychological operator. Vulnerabilities can be developed from either strengths or weaknesses. They exist within friendly, enemy, and neutral targets. They may be based upon situational or cultural factors.

Susceptibility

Susceptibility is the degree to which the target can be influenced to follow the course of action desired by the psychological operator. Susceptibilities determine the lines of persuasion (themes) which can be used to influence the target. Susceptibilities are determined through the use of intelligence, information, and objective reasoning.

If susceptibilities and vulnerabilities are not properly assessed and identified, themes (the basis of successful PSYOP campaigns) will be inappropriate to the target audience, resulting in inappropriate, ineffective campaigns.

Using all of the above properly, intelligence personnel must develop and recommend specific themes that will have the desired effect on the target groups. Themes must conform to US PSYOP policy and be timely, consistent, and credible. Appropriate symbols (visuals signs or objects used to convey a message or idea) increase the impact of themes.

The decisions on the media and techniques to be used will be based on the initial research and the intelligence gathered. Media development and dissemination are discussed in chapters 17 and 18.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Basic Psychological Operations Study (BPS)

The BPS, a basic source of valuable information, is a systematic description of the factors that affect PSYOP in a country. The format and guidance on what to include in a BPS are presented in appendix C.

When either reading or writing a BPS, certain terms pertaining to the BPS must be kept in mind:

Relevant event. An observed behavior of a type which can be described in terms of "who does what to or with whom." It has implications affecting the behavior of a large segment of the country's population or the political system. A relevant event has five essential components: an actor, a target, some activity, an issue area, and time. It does not ordinarily, by itself, constitute an issue.

Relevant issue. A highly emotional issue, deeply rooted in the country's history, customs, fears, and foreign policy, which, under certain circumstances, could cause either change or resistance to change in the population or political system.

Relevant data. Events of importance to large segments of the population because they are sources of conflict.

Intelligence Analysis

Collected information must be analyzed before it is intelligence. The analytic process relies heavily on mechanical devices and quantitative techniques so that all information on related subjects can be identified and compared. Some frequently used aids are charts, maps, tables, periodic digests, cataloging, and filing systems.

Completeness and standardization are essential because the collected information must be categorized and carefully evaluated against other related information. Each piece of information is scrutinized to determine its relationship to the whole picture and the extent to which each bit of information confirms, supplements, or contradicts others. If the analyst has any doubts about the truth or relevance of any information or reports, he should state these doubts clearly. No analyst will ever write a perfect report, completely accurate and unbiased. To make allowance for human error, as many independent reports as possible should be gathered on each item to either confirm or deny its probability.

In interpreting information, an analyst must always consider:

What is the relationship of this information to what is already known?

Does it alter, confirm, refute, or add to the information previously received?

Does it tend to confirm or refute the existing estimate of the enemy situation?

Target Analysis

Target analysis supports the development of PSYOP estimates, plans, orders, and directives. It is covered in detail on page 14-10.

Propaganda Analysis

Propaganda analysis supplements the more conventional forms of intelligence. It is valuable because it indicates conditions or attitudes that exist within an area of operations. Conclusions based on propaganda analysis should be checked out by other intelligence methods before being fully accepted. See chapter 16 for a detailed study of propaganda analysis.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PSYOP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WITH THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICER, G2/S2.

Since PSYOP is a user and producer of intelligence, the PSYOP intelligence officer must work closely with the G2/S2 both in collecting intelligence for the command and in acquiring data which specifically support EEI and OIR of PSYOP interest.

Some PSYOP abilities and factors that the commander and his staff must be aware of and take into account while planning their operations are:

The ability of PSYOP personnel to forecast situations which may be exploited by either US and friendly forces or by the enemy. If a proposed course of action will create a situation or event that could serve as the theme for an enemy propaganda campaign, the commander and his staff must be aware of this before they make a decision.

The ability to explain US objectives, goals, and policies to the enemy and to hostile civilians.

The ability to contribute knowledge of the psychological vulnerabilities of enemy units and populations to meet order of battle, combat, and strategic requirements.

Some specific tasks which can be levied upon PSYOP in support of intelligence operations are:

Determine if war weariness exists among the military and civilian population, and, if so, how to exploit it.

Identify and exploit enemy mistakes with propaganda.

Find PSYOP opportunities to support the command.

Identify enemy propaganda, its approaches and themes.

Identify differences and hostilities in enemy groups.

Determine how to overcome the effects of enemy indoctrination.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Collection Requirements (ICR)

Information and intelligence needed on a continuous basis, over a long period of time, can be designated as an intelligence collection requirement (ICR) to be automatically added to

all future collection plans and sent to collection elements.Unless a specific termination date or event is given, this will continue until the ICR is cancelled by the originator.

Interagency Document Request

The Interagency Document Request, DD Form 1142, is a convenient and common way to request information or intelligence, in documentary form, from components of the US Government. When this form is used to request classified information, it is sent through intelligence channels for proper validation and transmittal. This is done to give higher intelligence authorities a means to keep aware of intelligence and information requests from lower level units. If the requested document is not held in a repository at a lower level, the DD Form 1142 will go to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) library. A PSYOP unit must have a DIA customer number before such a request will be honored. The Interagency Document Request must cite the particular document wanted and length of time wanted.

DIA Dissemination Center

The DIA Dissemination Center mails documentary materials directly to its customers. Materials are accumulated according to the stated subject interest and periodically mailed directly to DIA customers. All DOD components conducting or involved in intelligence research and analysis, collection, processing, and storage are entitled to become customers of the DIA and to be mailed documents that meet their interests.

Need for Specific Information

If a specific item of factual information is needed and not available,the PSYOP unit may fill out an Intelligence Collection Requirement form, DD Form 1365, in accordance with DIA Instruction 58-1. This request must go through the staff intelligence officer and through intelligence channels to an approving official. The ICR will then go to all those intelligence collection agencies able to collect such information. This is a time-consuming process appropriate only for information of strategic value.

In all dealings with the intelligence community, PSYOP personnel must realize that intelligence is collected on a combat priority basis, and generally, PSYOP is not given the highest priority. For this reason, documentary information obtained from the intelligence community on issues of interest to PSYOP may be incomplete or perhaps nonexistent.

Written and Human Intelligence

The PSYOP researcher can evaluate and determine the current issues of primary concern to the target from newspapers and magazines. Since they are published regularly, changes in attitudes and issues can be recognized and incorporated into propaganda campaigns.

Bibliographies, such as the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature and Public Affairs Index, list articles appearing in magazines and other publications. For a current topic, or for one with depth in time, the researcher can use these bibliographies to compile a list of publications on a particular subject. Some publishers issue bibliographies which deal only with one publication. For example, the New York Times Index permits the researcher to search out and locate articles on a particular topic that have appeared in the New York Times.

Captured documents, official and unofficial, are a good source of information on enemy plans, weaknesses, policies, and needs. Official documents are plans, orders, maps, manuals, government studies, and other such items. Unofficial documents include diaries, pictures, and personal letters.

PSYOP personnel conduct interviews and interrogations to obtain information peculiar to PSYOP.

Prisoners-of-war and defectors are normally able to provide information on the attitudes and conditions within their units. This includes such information as the quality of leadership, personnel policies, disciplinary problems, medical conditions, and other facts and opinions which can be used in PSYOP planning. It is important that the PSYOP interrogator has early, direct access to these individuals (the interrogees). If possible, it is best to sit in with the intelligence interrogator during his briefing. This saves time since the intelligence man will be interested in many of the same areas as the PSYOP interrogator.

Refugees can give a grass roots view on conditions and attitudes of the populace and the area they come from.

Civil administrators, aware of the needs and attitudes of the people for whom they are responsible, can give information on the plans and means to solve local problems and can identify problems which have not yet been solved.

Civil and paramilitary police are knowledgeable of the area, its people, their habits, political leanings, and every aspect of community activities.

Liaison

Liaison with agencies and groups outside of the Department of Defense to make them aware of PSYOP information needs often can produce much needed information. Some agencies which can assist PSYOP in obtaining information about local conditions and the situation in a target area, or among target groups, are:

Treasury Department

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Central Intelligence Agency

Political Section, US Embassies

International Communication Agency

US Agency for International Development

Drug Enforcement Administration

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Library of Congress

Publication Procurement Officers

PSYOP AUTOMATED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (PAMIS)

PAMIS is covered in chapter 15. It is a source of information which can be used in PSYOP for

various purposes. It can help the PSYOP unit to:

Prepare PSYOP estimates.

Prepare PSYOP annexes.

Analyze enemy target groups.

Identify enemy vulnerabilities.

Analyze media from the target area.

Analyze propaganda received from friendly areas.

Insure propaganda appropriate to the target.

Prepare Basic PSYOP Studies.

TARGET ANALYSIS

Target analysis is a detailed and systematic examination of processed intelligence to identify and locate target audiences, identify conditions, pinpoint vulnerabilties, establish objectives, and obtain pertinent information to guide PSYOP personnel. It is the basis for the development of PSYOP estimates, plans, orders, directives, and campaigns. It is also the basis for selection of themes, symbols, and media and for the development of persuasive messages.

Identification and Location of Target Audiences

The initial step which is undertaken by the research and analysis teams is the identification of tentative target audiences. After selection, each one is systematically examined to determine its suitability. This profiling of each target is the core of the target analysis process.

To aid the analyst in identifying and locating potential target audiences, a general guideline has been established:

Target audiences are collections of people who share the same predispositions, which, when successfully manipulated, will lead to the accomplishment of the desired psychological objective.

Of particular importance is the phrase "share the same predispositions." For PSYOP purposes, target audiences are classified as groups, categories, and aggregates.

Groups. Groups are the preferred target audience because they normally are functional, with members bound together by common activities and goals. Since there is a specific reason for its existence, the group can be studied more precisely than any other collection of people. Moreover, more valid and definitive statements can be made concerning group conditions and attitudes.

Categories. Often it will be necessary to direct persuasive communications to large collections of people not classified as groups. To satisfy this requirement, the target analyst may identify a category as a target audience. Unlike groups, members of categories have no clearly definable reason for gathering and normally would carry on no personal interchange, thus limiting the persuasion possibility.

When studying categories, the analyst may find only very tenuous common interests, such as economic, education, social mobility, and ethnic identity among the members. Therefore, information obtained about categories will be more general than that obtained about groups.

Aggregates. A collection of individuals identified by a common geographic location may also be used as a PSYOP target audience.

Possible Results of Persuasive Communications

Persuasive communications should cause the members of a category or aggregate to form common points of reference. Should these people develop sufficient interest, however, they will technically become a group. As a group, this assortment of people will make a better PSYOP target.

As a general rule, the target analyst should attempt to analyze both categories and aggregates precisely by seeking to identify primary and secondary groups within each collection.

Selection of target audiences. Target analysis is conducted to determine if each tentative target is susceptible and will be effective in the achievement of specific psychological objectives. Even though several target audiences may be vulnerable, they may not be equally susceptible and effective in this respect.

Target analysis worksheet. To assist in deriving specific and useful information for the conduct of PSYOP, a systematic procedure has been devised. This procedure calls for the use of the target analysis worksheet (appendix F). The worksheet is a guide for systematically analyzing data relative to tentative targets: the national objective, mission, target audience, target conditions, attitudes, susceptibility, psychological objective, target effectiveness, and impact indicators.

The national objective is obtained from US policy statements and documents. Sources for US objectives relevant to US Army PSYOP might be unified command military plans, ICA Country Program memorandums, Departments of State and Defense policy statements, and other related command and PSYOP guidances. The PSYOP mission may be directed or derived from a stated mission, or, for planning purposes, it might be deduced from operational objectives.

STEPS IN TARGET ANALYSIS

Step 1: Select a tentative target for analysis.

Select one tentative target from those identified in the Basic PSYOP Study. This selection should be based on:

The supported tactical commander's needs and plans.

The PSYOP mission as directed by the supported tactical commander.

The factors which indicate the tentative target's vulnerabilities which can be breached with persuasive communication.

The target's predispositions relative to a mission.

Other situational factors which indicate the suitability of the group as a susceptible and effective target audience.

Step 2: Determine conditions affecting the target.

Conditions of the target refer to the external elements which affect the target but over which they have no control. These circumstances are the result of social, economic,

political, and military pressures and the physical environment.

Each condition selected must be considered in view of the target audience's awareness of the condition. The analyst must surface positive and negative influences to insure that a biased image of the target audience is not formed. The analyst must also consider the PSYOP task to be accomplished.

Step 3: Analyze attitudes of the target audience.

Attitudes may or may not coincide with behavior. They are the determinants of noncoerced behavior. For this reason, a major goal of a campaign is to reinforce or develop attitudes which support US psychological objectives. In addition to determining positive and negative attitudes, the psychological operator must determine their intensity; i.e., how strongly the target audience is predisposed to respond to the conditions which affect it.

Step 4: Determine target susceptibilities.

Susceptibilities vary with each PSYOP objective because the target responds in different ways and intensities to different appeals. Susceptibility will depend in large measure upon the values, needs, motivations, and drives of the group.

Values which must be taken into account when dealing with susceptibility include:

By whom do they expect decisions to be made? Do they accept decision from a single, all powerful source and believe that this is the way things should be done? Is there individual decisionmaking in the target group without regard for external authority, or is the democratic approach used?

How does the target regard man's relation to the physical and supernatural elements of nature? Is he superstitious, a stoic, or a fatalist?

What regard do members of the target audience have for time? Are they preoccupied with the past, present, or the future? If the time perspective is oriented toward the past, appropriate appeals might stress the need to preserve the customs and practices of the past.

Step 5: Formulate the psychological objective.

The psychological objective is based on the specific and implied tasks obtained from the mission and from target analysis. A psychological objective might be a single step or a series of intermediate steps designed to lead the target audience towards the desired behavior or attitude.

Should it be necessary to have a series of intermediate objectives, each one must be measurable and must accurately define the specific behavioral or attitude change desired. Each intermediate objective must be completed in logical order.

When establishing measurable activities for the target audience to accomplish, present activity levels must be determined and changes brought about by the psychological operations noted. Changes in attitude are more difficult to measure quantitatively than changes in behavior.

Attitude changes cannot be measured directly; they must be inferred through changes in the observed behavior of the individuals who constitute the target group. The psychological operator must, therefore, identify the relevant behavior indicators, determine the existing pattern of such activities, and establish methods by which to measure subsequent changes.

Psychological objectives are classified as cohesive and divisive.

Cohesive objectives: Cohesive objectives, whose successful achievement would strengthen or more closely unite the total society or particular target groups, encourage the individuals of the target audience to place the collective good above the individual good. Example objectives are good will, encouragement, compliance, and cooperation.

Good will is used to promote feelings of friendship toward the country or agency sponsoring the PSYOP effort and to convince the target audience of the desirability of the programs and goals of the sponsoring country.

Encouragement is used to foster confidence in the target audience in the success of the policies of the sponsoring country or agency and its allies, to sustain the morale of elements in the friendly country, and to identify the aims of the sponsoring country or agency with the popular or national aspirations of the people.

Compliance and cooperation are used to win acceptance of the policies of friendly authorities and the sponsoring country's military, paramilitary, and public safety forces; to encourage and stimulate support and participation in national programs; and to attract support of the country's aims and programs.

Divisive objectives: Divisive objectives are designed to separate the individual from his group, to separate a group from other groups, to separate a group from the society, or to disorganize a group or society. These objectives encourage the individuals in the target audience to place their self-interest above the interests of the group. Examples of divisive objectives are discouragement, defeatism, apathy, hostility and non-cooperation, discord, withdrawal, panic, subversion and resistance, surrender, defection, and desertion.

Discouragement, defeatism, and apathy are used to depress the morale of the target audience in order to reduce the degree of effectiveness of groups supporting popular or national aims dangerous to the interests of the sponsoring country.

Hostility and noncooperation are used to promote disbelief in the policy and ideology of the local and national authority hostile to the sponsoring country.

Discord is used to stimulate dissension and conflict within or between specific groups.

Withdrawal is used to intensify concern of the individual with his personal situation in order to reduce his support of group and national goals.

Panic is used to promote disorganized or confused behavior.

Subversion and resistance are used to encourage divisive and antipolitical acts, thereby undermining the political structure of the country, and to promote and support resistance movements against authorities hostile to the sponsoring country.

Surrender, defection, and desertion are used to encourage individuals or groups, among enemy military forces, to place personal considerations over group interests, thereby undermining military authority.

Step 6: Determine target effectiveness.

If it is determined that the target audience can be persuaded, its relative ability to implement a psychological objective must be assessed. The most obvious consideration pertains to the environment of the target audience. The constraints on the target audience which limit its ability to attain a significant objective must be determined. The analyst must also evaluate the ability of the target audience to act on suggested solutions.

In determining the effectiveness of the potential target audience, its relative power to influence other groups must be assessed. This requires a study of the power structure and of the relative positions of the potential target audiences within this structure; that group to which the potential target audience responds and under what circumstances it responds are given particular attention. Other groups in the area that respond to the dictates and desires of the potential target audience must also be noted. Any circumstances under which the standard relationships between the potential target audience and other groups in the area may be altered should also be determined.

The use of key communicators to reinforce the propaganda message and influence members of the target audience must be considered. In the military, especially among hostile military targets, key communicators are most likely to be political officers or the most courageous or aggressive members of the unit. When selecting key communicators, certain characteristics must be identified; among these are prestige, numbers, dispersion, and power.

Prestige: The individual who has prestige is called upon for guidance and leadership by virtue of his position. The prestigious person may rise to power or position because of age, influence, title, or other factors. Because other members of the group expect the prestigious positionholder to provide guidance and make decisions, they are prepared to follow him.

Numbers: There must be enough key communicators within the target audience to influence the audience. If there are only two communicators in a group of 500, their influence may be nullified by the will of the majority.

Dispersion: To be effective, key communicators must be adequately dispersed among the target audience. Dispersion insures maximum influence over the majority of the audience.

Power: The most critical characteristic of the key communicator is power which must be viewed from several perspectives of power: coercive, reward, legitimate, and referent.

Coercive power is the influence that an individual or group exerts over another, based on the ability of the persuader to punish. **It is effective only so long as the power to punish exists.**

Reward power stems from the persuader's ability to reward desired responses. **Reward power provides more satisfactory results over an extended period of time than does coercive power.**

Legitimate power refers to the mutually acknowledged right of an individual or group to control others. It is exemplified by platoon leaders, elected political officeholders, kings, parents, and supervisors.

Referent power is that influence carried by a particular social status, usually based on wealth, political position, birthright, and other factors that have no legal status. It is a common factor in day-to-day life, stemming primarily from the efforts of individuals to identify with a group.

When selecting key communicators, PSYOP personnel must keep in mind that key communicators are not supposed to interrupt the flow of communications. Their job is to receive the message and, by their interpretation, reinforce it among the people in the target audience.

If a potential target audience is not effective, the best course of action is to maintain a link with the group for future utilization.

Step 7: Determine campaign impact indicators.

Before the target analysis is complete, the target analyst must record the behaviors which indicate changes from existing activity levels. The specific behaviors (events) are referred to as campaign impact indicators. Campaign indicators assist in evaluating the effectiveness of PSYOP.

A PSYOP campaign is designed to produce a desired effect (some action, behavior, or perhaps, inaction) upon the targt audience. The success of a campaign can only be judged by its effect. Effects analysis determines the impact of a propaganda effort on an audience. It assesses the relative success of propaganda and the reasons why a particular effect was achieved.

Propaganda effects analysis is a difficult task. Even under the best circumstances, it is hard to judge whether attitudes and opinions have been changed by propaganda. During limited or general war, analysis is even more difficult because the effects of propaganda often cannot be seen until the area becomes accessible. In a cold war situation, internal defense and development (IDAD), or consolidation operations the task is somewhat simpler and results are more accurate because the audience is generally more accessible. (See chapter 16.)

FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO THE FAILURE OF PSYOP

Information may be difficult to find and requires a subjective (personal) evaluation. Failure to search all sources thoroughly for this information and lack of experienced personnel to make the required seasoned judgments will contribute to the failure of PSYOP campaigns.

Target groups frequently are not properly identified. PSYOP personnel must continuously study information to identify and define target groups clearly. This information is acquired through the submission of good intelligence requirements (EEI/OIR) to the appropriate collection agencies and repositories.

Chapter Fifteen

15

THE PSYOP AUTOMATED MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (PAMIS)

One of the day-to-day problems which can directly affect the quality of work is the massive amount of information that must continually be processed. Without electronic assistance, the information is limited to the content of a file supplemented by personal knowledge. Therefore, an electronic, systematic means of accumulating and presenting large quantities of relevant information is of value to PSYOP personnel.



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The PSYOP Automated Management Information System (PAMIS) is designed to assist the PSYOP staff officer, intelligence officer, propaganda analyst, propaganda officer, and others in obtaining, maintaining, and using large amounts of information. It is a set of three interrelated information handling systems:

The PSYOP Foreign Area Data (PFAD) System - An automated means of storing and retrieving textual information, such as analyses, abstracts, extracts, and summaries about a country or region.

The PSYOP Foreign Media Analysis (PFMA) System - An automated means of storing and retrieving coded content analysis data about the mass media of countries of interest to the PSYOP unit or staff.

The PSYOP Effects Analysis System (PEAS) - An automated means of storing, processing, and presenting information pertaining to the effectiveness of PSYOP campaigns, media, themes, and programs.

These three systems are interrelated in that information from one can aid in analyzing data from the other systems.

PAMIS is managed and maintained by the Officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in conjunction with the Department of the Army. It utilizes computers and peripheral data processing equipment located in the Pentagon.

PSYOP FOREIGN AREA DATA (PFAD) SYSTEM

The PFAD System provides uniform procedures for the collection, storage, and automated retrieval of PSYOP-relevant information about a country or region of the world. Its purpose is to provide the PSYOP planner with information on which to base plans and estimates, and to provide the psychological operator with information and intelligence on which to base target analysis, propaganda development, and campaign planning.

The PFAD System does not duplicate area handbooks, intelligence annexes and estimates, or other similar materials. Rather, it supplements these with PSYOP-specific information, concentrating especially on facts and data which lead to the discovery of PSYOP vulnerabilities and opportunities.

Sources of material for the PFAD System

The PFAD System accepts material from a variety of agencies or sources: active and reserve PSYOP unit personnel, individual researchers and research institutions, and experts obtained specifically to meet PAMIS intelligence needs. The material references a source (e.g., a book, intelligence report, newspaper, cable, etc.).

PFAD System Contents Records

The PFAD System contains two basic computer records:

Source description record--the essential facts needed to describe adequately the nature of the source publication or document.

Subject narrative record--summary narratives of information about specific PSYOP subjects.

The purpose of the source description is to present to the user a brief overview and description of PSYOP-relevant material, such as books, periodicals, dissertations, government documents, cables, and the like. The user of the PFAD System can evaluate the source description printout (see figure 15-1) and determine whether to obtain the basic source document or to request the appropriate subject abstracts from the computer. He can request a computer printout (bibliography) that contains information on a given country, political group or movement, ethnic, social or religious group, or definitive subject or subjects.

The purpose of the subject narrative is to provide the social, cultural, economic, political, communication media, and other special information needed to make decisions on all aspects of PSYOP. Each entry is a short one-page abstract. Each narrative record, consisting of one or more abstract entries, is coded so the user can request subject data from the PFAD file in any combination of information elements. For example, the user can retrieve all subject information about a given nation or region of a country; he can select those subjects about electronic media relevant to specific population groups; or he can retrieve all PFAD data records on a given PSYOP target. Figure 15-2 is an example of a subject narrative record. In the case of translations into English, the entries may be larger than in the original language. The location and date of publication of the original source will be included, permitting further research.

Information for PFAD System

The agency which does the original research on a given subject provides the information by typing it in specific format on a magnetic typewriter tape. This tape cartridge is then mailed to the National Military Command System Support Center (NMCSSC); there it is converted and transferred to computer tape, and the information is checked and stored in one or two PFAD files: BIBLIOGRAPHY and SUBJECT.

Electronic data processed reports are provided on request. They consist of selected retrievals of key information used to prepare PSYOP estimates of the situation and basic PSYOP studies. Figure 15-3 is a coversheet for a PFAD System output report.

Using the PFAD System

The PFADS programer is able to review and upgrade the data base by removing information of little or no value. In addition to the review process, the data base is structured to indicate areas in which information is missing so that research and intelligence priorities can be assigned to fill out these areas. By these two processes, the PFAD System provides a means for increasing the quality and quantity of information available for PSYOP uses.

UNCLASSIFIED

PSYOP DESCRIPTIVE SOURCE BIBLIOGRAPHY

COUNTRY - LEBANON

ARTICLE

TITLE - POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF A MIDDLE EAST COMMUNITY
CLASSIFICATION - UNCLASSIFIED
AUTHOR - AYOUB, VICTOR F.
DATE OF PUBLICATION - JAN 1, 1955
PLACE OF PUBLICATION - CAMBRIDGE, MA, USA
SOURCE - LOCATION HARVARD LIBRARY
PAGES - 149
RELEVANCE - APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT PSYOP RELEVANT

DESCRIPTIVE ABSTRACT OF SOURCE

THIS UNPUBLISHED DOCTORAL THESIS DESCRIBES AND ANALYZES THE SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF ONE TYPE OF DRUZE VILLAGE IN LEBANON AS IT WAS IN THE EARLY 1950'S. MANY OF THE BASIC SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND RELATIONSHIPS DESCRIBED ARE COMMON TO OTHER VILLAGES IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST. HOWEVER, THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN BOTH HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL GROUPS ARE CHANGING, AS THE AUTHOR NOTES, AND THUS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED NECESSARILY TO REFLECT THE 1973 CONDITIONS IN THIS OR OTHER VILLAGES IN LEBANON AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

SUBJECT(S) EXTRACTED FROM SOURCE DOCUMENT

LOCAL RURAL GOVERNMENT, STRUCTURE AND ACTUAL OPERATIONS	PAGE(S) - 109-122
FAMILY, KINSHIP, OR HOUSEHOLD GROUPS--DEFINITION	PAGE(S) - 48-90
FAMILY, KINSHIP, OR HOUSEHOLD GROUPS--BASIS INCLUSION/EXCLUSION	PAGE(S) - 48-90
UNIFYING FACTORS IN FAMILY, KINSHIP, OR HOUSEHOLD GROUPS	PAGE(S) - 48-90
CURRENT RELIGIONS OR SUBORDINATE GROUPS	PAGE(S) - 91-104
PRINCIPAL TYPE OF ECONOMY--DESCRIPTION	PAGE(S) - 32-43

UNCLASSIFIED

FIGURE 15-1

UNCLASSIFIED

PSYOP SUBJECT REPORT

SUBJECT - MODERN HIGHER EDUCATION AND SCHOOL SYSTEMS (UNIV/GRAD LEVEL)
COUNTRY - GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
CLASSIFICATION - UNCLASSIFIED
DATE OF LATEST - UPDATE FEB 4, 1975
RELEVANCE - APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT PSYOP RELEVANT

SUBJECT NARRATIVE

(STUDY IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES)--SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GDR, ABOUT 10,000 GDR CITIZENS HAVE COMPLETED THEIR EDUCATION AT UNIVERSITIES AND ADVANCED SCHOOLS OF THE USSR, THE CSSR, THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THESE GRADUATES ARE NOW RESPONSIBLY FULFILLING IMPORTANT TASKS IN VARIOUS BRANCHES OF OUR SOCIAL LIFE. MORE THAN 600 GRADUATES ARE EMPLOYED AS PROFESSORS AND LECTURERS IN THE GDR ADVANCED SCHOOL SYSTEM. IN 1974 THE NETWORK OF STUDY LOCATIONS WAS CONSIDERABLY EXPANDED. THUS, AT THE PRESENT TIME, ABOUT 5,000 GDR STUDENTS ARE RESIDING AND STUDYING IN 18 CITIES OF THE USSR, IN 9 CITIES OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, AND IN 5 CITIES OF THE USSR.
(TEXT) (EAST BERLIN ARBEIT UND ARBEITSRECHT IN GERMAN JAN 7 P 16)

SOURCE

TITLE - JPRS (JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE)
CLASSIFICATION -
DATE OF PUBLICATION - FEB 4, 1975
PAGES - 021

UNCLASSIFIED

FIGURE 15-2

UNCLASSIFIED

JCS--J3--SPECIAL OPERATIONS

PSYOP FOREIGN AREA DATA SUBSYSTEM (PFADS)

SUBJECT COUNTRY FOR THIS REPORT IS -- LEBANON

THIS REPORT CONTAINS INFORMATION ABOUT THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS

PERTAINING TO -- LEBANON

--GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND AUTHORITY	PAGE -- 2 --
--DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL POWER	PAGE -- 4 --
--POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION, PARTICIPATION	PAGE -- 7 --
--POLITICAL GROUPS	PAGE -- 9 --
--SOCIAL STRATIFICATION	PAGE -- 13 --
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THIS REPORT DOES CONTAIN AN ANNOTATED (DETAILED) BIBLIOGRAPHY

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THE MOST RECENT DATA IN THIS REPORT IS -- MAR 01, 1973

PRINTED AT NMCSSC -- OCT 28, 1975

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FIGURE 15-3

FOREIGN MEDIA ANALYSIS (FMA) SYSTEM

The Foreign Media Analysis System provides a means of storing, retrieving, and processing information obtained from analysis of foreign communication media. Selected media are analyzed by foreign language coders (normally part of a PSYOP unit) to determine the amount of media space or time devoted to significant subjects or propaganda themes.

The basic unit for the FMA System is the dominant subject (or propaganda theme) of the printed article or news broadcast related to a specific country or government. The coder/analyst is required to follow established conventions and rules in classifying and coding each input unit according to the following queries:

What is the main thrust or manifest content of the printed article or news item?

What governments, international organization, or political movements are the subject of the article or news item?

What is the tone of the article toward the governments or institutions, or international organizations?

How much space (in square centimeters) or time (in minutes) is devoted to the subject?

Does the article or news item contain information of significant personalities, events, or subjects important to PSYOP? Such articles or news items are summarized for the FMA textual file.

This information is checked to insure validity and uniformity of coding and is then keypunched on 80-column cards. The data are transmitted by AUTODIN to the NMCSSC computer site in the Pentagon where it is audited, edited, and stored.

The FMA System provides both standard and special request reports. The standard reports are identified as:

PSY1-01 - Major Subject Categories by Source

PSY1-02A - Report About Theme Countries

PSY1-02B - Report About Other Countries

PSY1-03 - Coverage by Rank Order of Foreign Governments by Tone

PSY1-04 - Coverage by Regions of the World

PSY1-05 - Subject Index to FMA Media

PSY1-10 - Clear-Text or Narrative Abstracts

The purpose of the PSY1-01 printout is to give the analyst a knowledge of:

The square centimeters of space or time (measured in minutes) allocated to broad FMA domestic subjects by each medium over a designated period of time.

The percentage of total coverage allocated by the media to foreign events, governments, and institutions.

The purpose of the PSY1-02A and PSY1-02B printout is to provide analysts with:

A statistical analysis of the amount and tone of media coverage for each country or international organization.

A statistical analysis of communication trends by subject and tone.

A correlation analysis of these data with each of the 700 FMA subjects.

A comparative analysis by content and tone of media directed at the domestic as compared with international audiences.

Hypotheses and inferences from trend data confirming or denying other intelligence.

The purpose of the PSY1-03 printout is to sort by media and tone (critical, neutral, favorable) FMA data on foreign countries. A comparison of three time periods can be processed for any one PSY1-03 report. Any combination of these time periods can be specified by the user.

The purpose of the PSY1-04 printout is to summarize foreign media data about all foreign governments in specific geographic regions. The PSY1-04 printout provides the analyst with a one-page summary of media coverage of foreign governments in relation to other governments according to geographic regions.

In order to adequately analyze foreign communications media, it is necessary to examine the qualitative aspects of a news item or feature article, as well as the quantitative data. In other words, the actual story or news item must be read to obtain the "flavor" of the presentation or arguments in a qualitative sense. The PSY1-05 provides information about the location of articles in the source document or audio tape. It provides a "library" index similar to the New York Times Index for each FMA source. Another purpose of the PSY1-05 printout is to provide analysts with a consolidated listing of FMA data about a particular country or government.

The purpose of the PSY1-10 printout is to provide users with a synopsis of those articles or news items of major interest to PSYOP programs.

In addition to the PSY1-series reports that have been described above, statistical data can also be processed by using the Online Data Processing System (ODPS) available to users of the FMA system. A variety of data processing routines, such as histograms, line graphs, trend analysis, and tabular reports, are avilable at NMCSSC. Also, special processing can be requested in order to use data contained in FMA computer records concerning a particular inference or hypothesis. (See figure 15-4 for a schematic of the FMA system.)

PSYOP EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM (PEAS)

The PSYOP Effects Analysis System is designed to collect and process data on a target audience to measure the impact or effect of US and allied PSYOP. In addition, PEAS will store and process data about friendly and hostile PSYOP activities and actions. Figure 15-5 presents the relationship of the PEAS with the PFAD and FMA Systems.

Data Worksheets

Data worksheets are used to collect and organize the data in accordance with an 80-column punch card format. Data are organized in PEAS by:

Units or activities responsible for initiating US/allied propaganda and PSYOP activities.

Units or activities delivering or disseminating US/allied PSYOP messages and actions.

Military intelligence, civilian, PSYOP, and other interrogators.

Units or activities responsible for monitoring hostile propaganda and actions.

PEAS Worksheets

The PEAS worksheets have been designed so they can be completed in two stages:

Initial data collection by non-PAMIS-trained personnel.

Coding by personnel trained in PEAS methodology and coding conventions.

The data are compiled by answering a series of questions on appropriate worksheets. The worksheets are then sent to a PSYOP unit for insertion of punch card transcript data codes, verification of data, preparation of data cards, and submission to an electronic data processing (EDP) support facility for processing and storage.



Who says what, how, to whom, under what circumstances, for what purpose, and with what effect?

FIGURE 15-4

THE FMA APPROACH TO CONTENT ANALYSIS



FIGURE 15-5

RELATIONSHIP OF PSYOP EFFECTS ANALYSIS SYSTEM WITH PFAD AND FMA SYSTEMS

Storage and Retrieval

Following validation, transaction cards are converted into a format suitable for digital storage and retrieval and stored on one of several PEAS data files. (See figure 15-5.)

File ACTIV (Activities). Data from this file provides information about the effort devoted to the various mass media channels and other methods of communication. Information about other types of action is also available; i.e., those that are designed primarily for psychological effect, such as show of force, supply drops, medical relief, etc. File ACTIV also provides PSYOP commanders with uniform procedures and methods for reporting and analyzing US and friendly PSYOP activities. It provides data on the effort supporting:

Specific campaigns.

Various PSYOP objectives and tasks.

Propaganda themes.

Target groups.

Military units and civilian agencies.

PEAS Impact File. The PEAS Impact File provides PSYOP commanders, target analysts, and others with systematically collected feedback about US and allied propaganda messages and PSYOP actions. Data collected for the Impact File is only one element in determining the overall effect of PSYOP. It does not replace the collection of data about propaganda messages from panels or data collected by means of in-depth interrogations.

Use of PEAS Worksheets (Impact Data Records). The PEAS data collection format is useful for prisoners-of-war interrogations at the brigade and division levels of command. Each PEAS impact record pertains to a respondent's reaction to an electronic or printed PSYOP message. In the interrogation process, the respondent is required to select or identify the PSYOP message(s) that he has seen or heard.

PEAS impact data messages (worksheets) are then completed for those US/allied propaganda messages identified by the prisoner or other respondent. A combination of casual statistical data and clear-text narrative information is used to evaluate the impact of PSYOP campaigns, objectives, tasks, and themes. The PEAS computer program can correlate that portion of the PSYOP record containing effect data with information about target groups, PSYOP objectives/tasks, PSYOP themes, and other actions. These data should provide commanders with indicators about the success or failure of military PSYOP.

The PEAS POLWAR File. The POLWAR File of the PEA System provides uniform procedures and methods for reporting and analyzing hostile propaganda and actions directed at US and allied populations. Data from the file allows continuous monitoring of the hostile POLWAR at the tactical command level. This file of the PEAS interfaces with the Foreign Media Analysis System of PAMIS.

The POLWAR File is concerned with those communications and actions that take place in a combat environment. This contrasts with the FMA System whose interest is primarily strategic and is concerned with those media directed to the domestic audience. The operational objectives of the POLWAR data file are to:

Pinpoint those military units that are the target of hostile propaganda and psychological actions.

Highlight and quantify enemy propaganda objectives, tasks, and themes.

Highlight enemy propaganda to friendly ethnic groups and other special targets.

Provide indicators of the impact of hostile PSYOP on US and allied military populations.

In addition, a systematic analysis of hostile POLWAR activities provides valuable clues concerning the impact of our own PSYOP programs on the enemy. Standard practices and operating procedures should be established by the theater commander to monitor hostile propaganda and to collect data. An 80-column punch card format is used to collect and organize the POLWAR data. It can be completed by military PSYOP teams, military intelligence, radio monitoring teams, special police, national information agencies, and others.

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Chapter Sixteen

PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS

The psychological operator uses propaganda analysis to:

Reveal opportunities for PSYOP exploitation.

Assess the effects of enemy and friendly propaganda.

Collect intelligence related to PSYOP.

Obtain intelligence for other uses.

Supplement other intelligence.



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TOOLS OF THE ANALYST

The propaganda analyst works primarily with foreign mass communications that attempt to influence the conduct, attitudes, opinions, and emotions of groups. A foreign country's daily output of official printed media, radio and television broadcasts, and wire service releases provides the greater portion of material. This material assists in analyzing:

Morale.

The level of morale of a nation may be determined by its domestic propaganda. For example, domestic propaganda quietly and unemotionally delivered generally reflects high morale, while silence, bluster, or strident propaganda suggests low morale.

Involuntary Information.

Propaganda may contain news, opinions, and entertainment. Valuable information can be obtained from a careful analysis of this material. For example, the space a government gives to its leaders in its propaganda is often a measure of the relative power of individuals within the hierarchy.

Biographic Information.

Events may provide biographical information on particular individuals. For example, the presence of a new personality at a publicized ceremony may indicate a shift in the power position of that person.

Economic Data.

Economic information may be derived from statistics reported in propaganda, even if the statistics are false. Comparisons with previous data often give valuable clues about industrial or agricultural output, manpower shortages, or other economic conditions.

Propaganda Inconsistencies.

Any inconsistency in propaganda may provide insight into conditions in the source's homeland, including the condition of its combat forces.

Intentions.

Propaganda may be used to conceal the real intentions of the source. An example is an attempt to convey the impression that any future outbreak of hostilities will be the fault of the other nation.

SCOPE OF PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS

Propaganda analysis is the detailed examination of the source, content, audience, media, and effects of propaganda. Propaganda analysis permits the analyst to arrive at valid conclusions that will result in effective PSYOP campaigns. These elements are interrelated and cannot be analyzed independently. In short, propaganda analysis provides answers to the basic questions: WHO says WHAT, to WHOM, in WHAT MANNER, for WHAT REASON, and with WHAT EFFECT.

A word of caution: To distinguish minor, transient themes from those that are basic (major) and continuing, the analyst must collect sufficient information over an extended period of time.

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

The first step in the propaganda analysis process is to analyze the communication system. At the basic level, a communication model consists of a source, message, and destination. The relationship of the items for analysis (source, content, media, audience, effects) to the basic elements of the communication system (source, message, destination) are illustrated in figure 16-1.

COMMUNICATION ELEMENT	SOURCE	MESSAGE	DESTINATION
COMPONENT OF PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS (ANALYTIC FUNCTION)	**SOURCE ANALYSIS**	**CONTENT ANALYSIS MEDIA ANALYSIS**	**AUDIENCE ANALYSIS EFFECTS ANALYSIS**

FIGURE 16-1

RELATION OF COMPONENTS OF PROPAGANDA

ANALYSIS (ANALYTIC FUNCTIONS) TO

COMMUNICATION MODEL ELEMENTS

Each type of analysis (source, content, audience, media, effects) has its own procedure. For example, when the audience is accessible, it is possible to analyze effects by the use of personal (structured) interviews and questionnaires. If not accessible, less direct procedures must be employed. On the other hand, source and audience analyses are more dependent on specific information about the source and the target audience than on procedures.

Once the universe of communications has been defined and the analytical categories selected, quantitative analysis can be performed. This is done by counting the number of entries in each analytical category from each unit of analysis of the media. Statistical comparisons and analyses can be performed from these counting operations. Qualitative or interpretive analysis is required to illuminate or supplement these quantitative findings.

Source analysis. The source is the individual or organization sponsoring the development and dissemination of the propaganda. Analysis of the source gives the analyst an understanding of the credibility of the source and its proximity to the center of government, military command, and other important persons.

Actor and authority.

Actor refers to the persons or entity apparently initiating the propaganda. Authority, on the other hand, refers to the person or entity in whose name a statement is made. Sometimes the actor and the authority are the same.

Author.

One of the major reasons to analyze propaganda is to establish authorship--to determine where in the spectrum of power the propaganda originates. The author and authority may be the same, especially if the author is well known to the target audience; e.g., Winston Churchill.

Content analysis. Content analysis, the most important element of propaganda analysis, depends on sound analytical methods and reliable, accurate information. It is the analysis and evaluation of statements to determine the motives and objectives of the source. It reveals the meaning and reasons why the message(s) was disseminated. Because content (what is said) is the major element of communications, content analysis constitutes the major effort of propaganda analysis. Direct access to the target audience is not required.

Procedures for content analysis range from the application of objective, quantitative techniques to the application of entirely subjective techniques. Objective techniques systematically analyze content over a period of time by classification systems and statistical tables.

Subjective content analysis is based on the background, "gut feeling," and judgment of the analyst.

A combination of both methods is required for a valid product; statistics, equations, and tables must be interpreted.

How it's done:

STEP 1

An assumption (hypothesis):

Whichever approach is taken (objective, subjective, or a combination), the first step is to set up an assumption (hypothesis) to be proved or disproved. The hypothesis is actually an educated guess as to what the analyst believes to be the motive for some psychological action or propaganda message. It may be necessary to change the hypothesis as the analysis develops. In some cases it may be necessary to repeat the entire process.

STEP 2

Sampling:

The next step is to decide which specific items to examine for content. The analyst will seldom have free access to all the propaganda produced by a source, so he must take samples of the source's propaganda. The sample must be large enough to provide an accurate indication of the propaganda produced. It must also be representative, having the characteristics of the propaganda output. Sampling for content analysis involves the following operations:

The analyst must determine which communications (publications, commentary, etc.) to examine--which newspapers, which magazines, which radio or TV stations.

Having decided which titles he will examine, the analyst must next decide which issues he will analyze. For example, having decided to examine a particular newspaper, he must decide which issues--Monday? Tuesday? etc.

Having made these decisions, the analyst must decide what part of the publication or broadcast he will examine--the front page? editorials? evening newscasts? etc.

Next the analyst determines the unit of analysis for counting the content elements. The original assumption will help to determine which are appropriate. Major units of measure are:

Words. The word is the unit of analysis. Use of this unit results in a list of relative frequencies of selected words.

Phrases. A variation of the word is the phrase. Phrases generally fall into the categories of cliches, idioms, or slogans.

Sentences. This category is an extension of phrases.

Topics and themes. Topics are appropriate when only the subject matter is considered without any embellishment by value judgments. Lists of topics can be prepared without any reference to actual propaganda content. Themes are more appropriate when the subject matter and the value judgments (positive or negative) associated with the subject matter are addressed. Themes tend to be derived more from the actual content than do topics. **A theme implies a topic, but a topic does not necessarily imply a theme.**

Examples:

TOPIC	THEMES
Military maneuvers	The unbeatable division
Farm production	Five percent feeds the world
The farmer	The backbone of the country

Item. An item is a complete unit of a medium devoted to a specific subject. The item will differ according to the medium used. It may be a news story, an editorial, a magazine, a book, a radio or TV program, or any other complete, self-contained expression of ideas. Items are convenient units when using broad, general content categories covering a large range of subjects over a relatively long period of time.

Space-Time Units

Number of lines, paragraphs, pages, chapters, square centimeters.

Column inch.

Footage (film or videotape). This translates to time measure (minutes).

Minutes; e.g., broadcast time (loudspeaker, radio).

When using units of count or measure, more than one unit can be used for any given analysis. The purpose of the analysis determines the units to be used.

STEP 3

Basis for classification:

The next step is to consider the characteristics of propaganda messages that can be used for classification or category formulation. Message content may be broken down into two major categories: what is said and how it is said.

On the basis of what is said, the following breakdown is appropriate.

Subject matter.

Most information is classified on the basis of subject matter.

PAMIS FMA.

The PAMIS Foreign Media Analysis System categorizes propaganda on the basis of subject matter (among other categories).

Values of the message originator as reflected in content.

Values are the ideals and goals of a society or other group; they affect the behavior of members of that society or group. Themes such as "freedom of

speech," "freedom of religion," and "freedom of press" are examples of content categories which represent values.

Direction--pro or con.

Propagandists are either for or against something. This is apparent in the content of their propaganda. The directional approach (pro or con) may be combined with the subject matter category, or it can be used alone. In this approach, the subject matter is indicated and judgments are made as to how the subject matter was treated by the propagandist; i.e., positively, neutrally, negatively.

Regionalism.

Propaganda may be classified on the basis of its geographic origin (regionalism). This classification and analysis depend upon the ability to monitor regional publications and broadcasts. The emphasis is on associating subject matter and its treatment with geographic areas.

On the basis of how a message is stated, the following categories may be used.

Form or type of communication.

Forms or types in newspapers include editorials, news, features, comment, letters to the editor, fiction, etc. Radio and TV content may be classified as music, news, commentary, special features, drama, variety, and talk.

Form of statement.

Much propaganda consists of arguments or appeals; i.e., a conclusion with supporting rationale.

Intensity.

From the strength of an appeal or argument, an analyst might determine the potential impact on audiences as well as how strongly the source feels about a specific issue. One technique is to measure intensity involved by identifying emotion-laden terminology, classifying the expressions in terms of direction (i.e., positive, neutral, negative), and counting the frequency of such terms.

Propaganda tricks of the trade.

In those instances when the logic of an argument or appeal is weak, propagandists revert to techniques known as tricks of the trade. These techniques may also be used to bolster valid arguments and appeals. In many cases, certain techniques may be used to address specific target groups or subject matter areas. A good reason for analyzing tricks of the trade is that they may give the first indication that the material being analyzed is propaganda. (See appendix I for more complete coverage of tricks of the trade.)

Language used.

The language and dialects used, the most obvious features of propaganda, are the best indicators of the intended target audience and its characteristics.

Mode (as a reflection of intent or purpose).

A particular manner or style can sometimes be used as a basis for classifying propaganda output. Four possible categories (others may also be used) might be image enhancement, image destruction, persuasive, and threatening.

As in all intelligence analyses, the results must be presented to the users. Normally, a tabular chart indicating totals for each category for each period of time would be used to permit comparison of coverage. These totals can be converted into charts, bar or pie graphs, etc. In the case of pure qualitative content analysis, the results are primarily word pictures based on impressions rather than numbers.

STEP 4

Analysis of results:

The analyst takes the results of his study and examines them in the light of his hypothesis. Using quantitative content analysis techniques, the analyst reviews any charts or graphs depicting the final results of the count and decides whether the hypothesis (original assumption) is supported or not. By this means the analyst determines trends in a time series and relative emphasis in comparative studies, depending upon the hypothesis.

STEP 5

Final inference:

The final step, based on the proof or lack of proof of the hypothesis, is drawing the inference which can be used by the analyst to reach useful conclusions on current conditions or future actions.

Audience analysis. Audience analysis is the study of the total audience that the propaganda reaches or seeks to reach. An audience may include those persons who were not the intended target for propaganda but who have received the message. Audiences may range from a highly general category, such as the Russian people, to a specific category, such as a rifle company. They may be defined as specific groups in terms of income, nationality, geography, ethnic, political, religious, social, economic, classes or castes, etc.

Should propaganda content be classified according to audience, decisions must be made as to whether the apparent or inferred audience (or both) should be considered. In case of inferred audience, stringent specific criteria must be spelled out for making the inference. Tables and matrixes may be constructed to make the analysis more valuable.

Media analysis. The analyst is interested in the specific medium used, why a particular medium was chosen, what media capabilities an adversary has, and how consistent the message content is in the various media.

A minimum requirement for message effectiveness is that it be received and perceived by the intended recipient. The sensory mechanisms required to perceive a message are used as the most fundamental classification of media. Briefly, messages can be perceived visually, aurally, or aurally and visually. The breakdown of receptor mechanisms and corresponding media are as follows:

VISUAL	AUDIO	AUDIOVISUAL
Books Magazines Pamphlets Leaflets Posters Handbills Calendars Novelties Photographs Newspapers Signs (fixed and mobile) Banners	Radio Loudspeakers (carrying live or prerecorded messages)	Sound motion pictures Tape and slide combinations Cassette and filmstrip combinations Television Activities (e.g., military civic actions, show of force, rallies, demonstrations) Interpersonal (face-to-face communications)

Periodicity.

Time or periodical patterns of operation can be used as a basis for classification. Printed media are generally classified according to their periodicity; e.g., daily, weekly, biweekly, monthly, etc. Radio and television programs can be classified on the basis of their broadcast times within a broadcast day or on other time schedules; e.g., a daily feature, a weekly feature, a morning or evening feature, and a feature at 1800 hours, etc.

Placement of content.

The physical position or placement of content within a medium may be used as a basis for classification. Printed material might be classified as lead stories, cover stories, center spreads, front page news, etc.

Place of origin.

Sometimes origin is openly acknowledged, and other times it must be inferred. The origin of radio and television broadcasts may be established by direction-finding techniques. The precise source of material contained in other media may be more difficult to pinpoint.

Technical characteristics.

Radio and television broadcasts can be classified on the basis of the frequencies or channels employed, modulation, and the strength of the signal (the likely power at which the signal was transmitted).

Printed material (also signals) can be classified on the basis of methods used to reproduce the material. The number of pages, quality of paper, and typography might be used as a basis for classification.

Printed media and television may also be classified on the basis of color or black and white.

Media are sometimes linked with delivery systems, which also serve as a basis for classification. For example, loudspeakers can be stationary, hand-carried, truck-mounted, tank-mounted, or aircraft-mounted. Leaflets may be delivered by fixed or rotary-wing aircraft, balloons, sea floats, artillery, bombs, and mines, or they may be disseminated by hand.

Mode of transmission.

Media can be classified as overt or covert. Covert transmission would include surreptitiously delivered leaflets, handbills, posters, and broadcasts from clandestine radio stations.

Acknowledgement by source.

The extent to which a source acknowledges its output may be used as a basis for classifying media (and content). White, gray, and black propaganda fall within this classification category.

Legal status of disseminator.

By international convention, countries broadcast on assigned frequencies and power output. Not all broadcast facilities adhere to this convention. Thus, broadcast stations can be classified on the basis of their registration and the extent to which they adhere to regulations. Some clandestine stations are clandestine only because they do not adhere to international broadcast codes.

Some indicators of problem areas.

Supply shortages may be indicated by poor grades of ink or paper used in the source's printed propaganda. Weak radio signals, interrupted programs, poor program production, or a lack of operating stations suggest a lack of signal equipment, facilities, supplies, and trained personnel.

Effects analysis. In analyzing hostile and friendly propaganda effects, the analyst attempts to determine the effect of the source's propaganda upon the target audience and the reasons why it was effective, partially effective, or totally ineffective. Four general types of evidence help to ascertain if propaganda has or has not been effective. These are responsive action, participant reports, observer commentaries, and indirect indicators.

Responsive action is behavior which can be more plausibly attributed to propaganda than to any other stimuli in the environment of the target audience. In the ideal case, a one-to-one ratio can be established; e.g., immediate surrender of troops precisely as directed by a combat loudspeaker broadcast. Rarely, however, can responsive action be attributed to propaganda appeals alone; often the appeal, at best, has crystalized an existing tendency for action.

Participant reports are accounts received from members of the target audience on how they were affected by the propaganda. These reports may be emotion laden and are less reliable evidence than responsive action; they may not truly reflect the individual's response. In accessible areas, participant reports are valuable because a great variety of participants can be asked how they felt about the propaganda.

Observer commentaries are reports by witnesses to a situation in which they were not involved. Depending upon the perceptiveness of the observer, his assessment of the situation may or may not be accurate. Information from observers may be taken at face value. Observer commentaries may be taken from such persons as agents stationed within the target area, PWs, escapees, defectors, reporters, businessmen temporarily in the area, etc.

Indirect indicators are the events that occur in the area of operations and appear to result from PSYOP although not directly suggested by PSYOP. Indirect indicators fall into four major categories:

Physical actions barring reception. These are actions taken by the enemy to prevent the audience from receiving external communications. Barring of entry of printed material and jamming of radio stations are examples.

Psychological conditioning. A government or military commander might initiate actions which, while not physically preventing reception of external communications, are designed to cause the audience to avoid them. For example, the government or military commander might try to convince the audience that the source cannot be believed, or harsh penalties might be enforced for listening to, viewing, or reading communications from external sources.

Persuasive efforts. If the audience did receive the communication in spite of the efforts of its government or command, a counterpropaganda program might be initiated. Content analysis could reveal this effort.

Apparent related events. Events may occur that can logically be inferred to be associated with the psychological operations or propaganda although they were suggested. Before these events can be accepted as indirect indicators, all causative external factors other than propaganda must be accounted for.

Several techniques are available to analyze the relative effectiveness of US Army propaganda campaigns. These often indicate effective and ineffective themes and the principal concerns of specific audiences.

Public opinion polls, if properly used, present a fairly reliable index of propaganda effectiveness. Do not assume, however, that the results of polls precisely mirror the views of the people.

Prisoner-of-war interrogations and surveys can furnish valuable data regarding US Army propaganda effectiveness. Selected prisoners should be given specific written or oral questions regarding themes, format, color, appropriateness, programing, location where seen or heard, steps taken by recipients, actions taken by local authorities, and other feedback information to be used to improve the overall program.

Prisoner-of-war panels are valuable in determining propaganda effectiveness. A planned message is presented to the panel, and members are questioned as to the credibility or validity of the message. Weak propaganda may be detected and corrected

before it is used. The panel may point out poorly composed propaganda messages caused by a lack of full understanding of enemy psychology, terminology, and customs. This technique may suggest ways to strengthen particular themes into account previously unknown factors.

Other sampling techniques may be employed. One technique involves sampling of opinion leaders; i.e., those persons whose positions enable them to influence public opinion. This technique is particularly useful in occupied areas. Analysis of personal letters and captured personal documents is often rewarding because the writers usually express their true sentiments regarding their immediate environment, conditions at home, enemy propaganda techniques, and other pertinent factors.

Disintegration of enemy groups suggests low morale. An enemy group which was subjected to intensive propaganda attack and which is now disintegrating may provide clues to the effectiveness of propaganda operations. The number of enemy soldiers who surrender is generally not an accurate measure of propaganda effectiveness because of the many factors involved which actually induce surrender.

Current information on enemy morale--number of defections, increase in political arrests, strikes, mutiny, etc., as determined from PW reports, monitored radio reports, and other information--should be used by the psychological operator.

Chapter Seventeen

17

FACE-TO-FACE/AUDIOVISUAL/ VISUAL/AUDIO COMMUNICATIONS

Media are categorized by methods of dissemination: face-to-face (interpersonal), audiovisual, audio, and visual.



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Face-to-face (interpersonal) communication is the most effective means of transmitting a persuasive message. It is employed in rallies, rumor campaigns, group discussions, lectures, show-and-tell demonstrations, social organizations, social activities, entertainment, and individual person-to-person contact, all providing a participating experience for the individual or group to recall later.

Audiovisual media such as television, electronic tape recordings, and sound motion pictures are the second most effective means of communication available to the psychological operator. Effectiveness is based on seeing and hearing the persuasive message. These media are an excellent means of transmitting persuasive messages and eliciting a high degree of recall.

Audio media (loudspeakers and radio) lend themselves to the transmission of brief, simple messages and to personalization by use of the human voice. They require little or no effort by the audience, and generally, they have more appeal than visual media. Also, the barrier of illiteracy may be more easily overcome with audio media than with visual media (printed material).

Visual media can transmit long, complex material. Animated or still cartoons may be used to convey themes to illiterate and preliterate target audiences. Visual media generally have the least amount of popular appeal.

Themes are reinforced and the target audience given broad coverage by using several media to deliver the same basic message. For example, radio and television can augment leaflets; face-to-face communication can support newspaper circulation.

CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF MEDIA

Acceptability and credibility.

A complete target analysis will indicate how acceptable and credible a particular medium is to the target audience.

Availability.

The availability of media, the mechanical capability of message production, and the capability to deliver the message, as well as the ability of the audience to receive and understand it are important.

Timeliness.

Production and dissemination lag for each medium must be considered. For example, a medium requiring a long production or dissemination time would not be suitable for a message exploiting a target of opportunity.

Quantity.

The media selected should be mixed, one medium reinforcing the other, and delivered in sufficient volume to insure that the enire target is exposed to the message. Care, however, is required to prevent counterproductive oversaturation of the target audience. This requires analysis of intensity and timing of propaganda dissemination.

Themes.

The theme to be conveyed will have a bearing on the selection of the best media to transmit the message.

Suitability.

The media selected must be suitable for the target. The language selected, vocabulary,and level are also important factors. For example, it would not be appropriate to use newspapers or other printed text to deliver a message to an illiterate audience. A professional journal might be the most suitable means of reaching a professional audience.

CATALOGING

PSYOP units should prepare catalogs of media material which applies to recurring themes and general audiences. These catalogs should include printed material, loudspeaker and video tapes, motion picture films, and specialty items available to PSYOP.

FACE-TO-FACE COMMUNICATION

Face-to-face communication ranges from two or more individuals in informal conversation to planned persuasion among groups. The credibility of the PSYOP messages delivered by face-to-face (interpersonal) communication is increased when the communicator is known and respected.

Advantages

Relationship	It employs an interpersonal relationship.
Audience selection	The audience can be deliberately selected and the appeal directed and tailored for it.
Assessment of impact	Feedback is immediate. The communicator can immediately assess the impact of his message and adjust his approach to obtain the desired response.
Limited support required	Limited technical and logistical support are required.
More credible	It can be more credible than other methods because the target audience can evaluate the source.

Presentation — Complex material can be presented in detail. Frequent repetition and slight variations can be readily used to influence the audience.

Expeditious — In some instances, particularly in primitive areas, it may be the most expeditious method of disseminating propaganda.

Disadvantages

Limited use in tactical situations — Use is limited in general war due to the inaccessibility of the target individual or group. It has limited use in tactical combat since the psychological operator has little face-to-face communication with opposing forces until they are captured or defect.

Close control necessary — It must be controlled, especially at the lowest levels where each communicator has the responsibility to interpret policy and objectives. The control factor is best illustrated by trying to pass an oral message, one person at a time, throughout a group. By the time the message reaches the end of the group, it does not resemble the original message. Reinforcement by other media is necessary to eliminate this problem.

Limited by insecure areas — Security considerations limit the conduct of face-to-face communications. As the security situation improves and more areas are secure, area coverage can be extended.

Requires able communicators — It requires knowledgeable, orally persuasive individuals who can convince the target audience that the program and policies are irresistible and inevitable.

Normally require indigenous personnel — For effective communications, indigenous personnel are normally required.

Range of voice limited — The range of the human voice and the need for visual contact limit this method to relatively small audiences.

TELEVISION

Television, including video tape recording (VTR), is one of the most effective media for persuasion. It offers many advantages for PSYOP, and its wide application in other fields contributes to its acceptance and use. It is appropriate for use in limited, general, and cold war and is particularly effective in FID and consolidation operations.

In places where television is not a common communication medium, receivers may be distributed to public facilities and selected individuals. A possible limitation in enemy countries, however, is that television receivers may be set to allow reception on only one or two channels under government control.

Television is an all encompassing-mass communication medium. Like radio, it makes use of the sense of hearing to convey an idea. Like printed material, it makes use of the sense of sight, adding the element of motion. And like the motion picture, it combines sight, sound, and motion. Television is immediate; in effect, it places the viewer in two locations simultaneously, creating the illusion of participating in a distant event.

Advantages

Speed — Television programs can reach large segments of the target audience rapidly. The transmission of events can be instantaneous.

Overcomes illiteracy — Illiteracy is not a barrier; an audience need not be able to read.

Unifies — Television brings people in widely separate locations closer together by exposing them visually to the same ideas and concepts.

Aural-visual — Television appeals to two senses, each reinforcing the other. This gives the viewer a sense of involvement.

Disadvantages

Range — Geography and atmospheric conditions affect the strength and range of the signal. The signal may, however, be boosted with relay stations, airborne transmitters, or satellite relay to increase the transmission range. Airborne antenna relay domes extend the range of a central transmitter but at great expense.

Reception — Television sets are unevenly distributed throughout the world. Messages disseminated by television will normally be received only by those within an above-average income range and economic class in many areas of the world, particularly in developing nations. In some developing nations, however, group listening/viewing centers may be available, negating the link between income and access to television. The association should be carefully determined for each target country.

The fact that receivers in the target area may not be compatible with the transmission equipment is another disadvantage.

Power — Most television receivers require an outside source of electric power. Many areas of the world lack this power. The introduction of self-contained power packs partially eliminates this problem. If broadcasts are to be made from areas lacking power facilities, special generators and a fuel supply may be needed.

Vulnerability	Equipment and parts are fragile and extremely vulnerable to damage. Stations are easily identified and make excellent targets. Receivers are difficult to hide.
Program requirements	A substantial production staff and supporting equipment are required to produce daily programs. Each day's operation requires a large amount of film, video tape, and live programing to sustain a program schedule.
Maintenance	Maintenance is highly technical, requiring trained and skilled technicians and engineers; such people are difficult to find.
Personnel	Television is a complicated communication medium, demanding specialized personnel with a wide range of scarce skills.
Audience accessibility	Although TV is excellent in friendly or neutral areas, it will not reach audiences in hostile areas unless a means is found to enter sets in these areas. Incompatibility of receivers, extreme distortions caused by two transmitters on the same wavelength, jamming, and censorship limit the use of TV broadcasts to hostile areas. Community viewing provides an opportunity to present TV programs which help the people identify with the sponsor (generally the established regime). If it is necessary to provide receivers, one technique is to place them initially in urban centers, extending them to rural areas as equipment and power become available; or vehicles equipped with power generators and TV sets may be moved into and out of areas as required.

VIDEO TAPE

Video tape, an offshoot of television, is an excellent means of recording and projecting messages. It can replay a scene from the camera immediately after it is recorded. The tape can be used in either portable or studio recording systems, being processed electronically as it moves through the video tape recorder.

Although most commercial tape is 5 centimeters (2 inches) wide, the US Army primarily uses 1.875-centimeter (3/4-inch) cassette tape. The scenes from each size tape can be readily dubbed on to the other.

Advantages

The results of the "take" can be seen immediately; if editing is necessary prior to release to the audience, it can be done electronically as the material is being produced. There is no time lag as with film which requires chemical processing.

The tape can be reused a number of times, erasing itself as it is run through the recorder, or it can be quickly erased on equipment made for that purpose and then reused.

Video tape is virtually indestructible and can be used in almost any environment in which humans live.

The tape can be placed on readily available video cassette players which feed directly into commercial television receivers. With special equipment, video-taped scenes can be projected onto large motion picture viewing screens. The requirement for special projection equipment is not unique, as special equipment is also required to project filmed scenes on television screens.

Video tape can instantaneously project scenes in black and white or color, with natural or dubbed sound, on open (public) or closed (limited audience) circuits.

With the use of video tape, scenes may be recorded for a permanent record or for future use.

Disadvantages

The disadvantages of video tape are those inherent in the television medium.

MOTION PICTURES

Motion pictures combine many aspects of face-to-face communication and television by creating a visual and aural impact on the target audience. Since US Army PSYOP units are not able to produce motion pictures, appropriate films may be selected from available sources; effects on the target audience must be carefully considered.

Four general types of motion pictures are adaptable for psychological operations:

Entertainment. These are standard commercial productions, including animated cartoons. Entertainment films developed specifically for propaganda purposes can be very effective as the themes may be woven into the plot of the movie. These films can be very effective in gaining attention for other propaganda.

Newsreels. In the developing nations, newsreels are still a major attraction. They are on the scene and show exactly what is happening or, with good editing, give that impression. By careful, skilled editing and arrangement of sequence, news events can be used as propaganda.

Documentary. This type of film--ostensibly an objective presentation of a scene, place, condition of life, or a social or political problem--is a prime

means of propagandizing a target audience. This is done by careful selection and sequencing of scenes and events.

Training films. Themes can be hidden in the presentation. A number of US Government-produced films are available for use by the military psychological operator. They must, however, be selected with care, as many exploit particular situations and viewpoints in a biased manner.

Advantages

Themes and objectives may be dramatized to create realism. The dramatic quality tends to cause the viewer to identify with the characters being portrayed. Thus, skillful application of production and editing techniques, such as having a central character act the behavioral patterns desired, can be very effective. The tendency to identify with the actors aids in developing a high degree of audience involvement in the PSYOP appeal.

Motion pictures gain attention, especially among illiterate groups, as illiteracy is not a barrier to understanding and use.

Most children and a high percentage of adults accept without question presumably factual information presented in films.

Sight, sound, and color reinforced by moving images elicit a high degree of interest and recall.

The motion picture is a universal communications medium, combining audiovisual features, mass distribution, and ease of presentation.

Complicated events or complex ideas can be thoroughly explained. Cartoons and other special effects can be particularly effective.

Scenes can be rehearsed and perfected prior to filming.

Newsreels that show events known to the target audience enhance the credibility of the entire PSYOP program.

Motion pictures can be rerun.

Disadvantages

The production of high-quality motion pictures is extremely expensive and requires skilled technical production personnel.

Relatively lengthy motion picture production time makes it difficult to capitalize on targets of opportunity.

Films are rapidly outdated by events, clothing, vehicles, equipment, location, or dialogue.

Viewing by target audiences may be restricted because of security considerations, local regulations, or equipment capabilities.

Diverse language differences are a major problem; these can, however, be partially overcome by use of subtitles.

Projection equipment requires electric power which may not always be available.

Film is fragile and extremely susceptible to changes in temperature and other climatic conditions.

LOUDSPEAKERS

Microphones and sound amplifying equipment transmit messages up to a distance of 800 meters. In a civilian setting loudspeakers are used to communicate with assembled groups and in localized street broadcasting. They effectively extend the range of face-to-face communications.

Loudspeakers are the most responsive medium that can be used to support tactical operations. Unsophisticated loudspeaker messages can be developed on the spot and delivered live in fast-moving situations. PSYOP loudspeaker broadcasts are usually prerecorded to insure accuracy. Occasionally, standard tapes are developed, mass produced, and distributed from the theater or national level.

Advantages

Targets of opportunity can be exploited.

Persuasive messages can be transmitted to the target as the situation changes.

Loudspeakers can be an extension of face-to-face communication.

The operator can pinpoint his target.

The target audience can be illiterate.

The loudspeaker can be used to undermine enemy morale.

Operators can be easily and readily trained.

PSYOP personnel can move to and operate anywhere a potential target audience is located.

Large, powerful, fixed loudspeakers can broadcast messages considerable distances into enemy territory.

Loudspeakers may be mounted on either wheeled or tracked vehicles.

Loudspeaker systems can be mounted in either fixed or rotary-wing aircraft. This broadens the areas accessible for loudspeaker operations. Since both types of aircraft must operate at low altitudes for the message to be understood on the ground, the sophistication and intensity of the enemy air defense are prime considerations.

Small portable loudspeaker systems may be backpacked by dismounted troops.

Disadvantages

Range is limited by humidity, wind, precipitation, vegetation, terrain, and manmade structures.

The enemy can readily take countermeasures; i.e., concentrate artillery or other weapons on loudspeaker personnel and equipment.

Messages may be forgotten and distorted with the passage of time.

PLANNING AND COORDINATION

Loudspeaker operations are conducted in coordination with and in support of tactical operations. The loudspeaker team leader must advise the commander of the supported unit as to the support the team can give. The team can then obtain essential operational information and coordinate security with the leader of the tactical unit.

For maximum results, loudspeaker messages in support of tactical operations must have shock effect. A tactical broadcast should be no longer than a few seconds, as prolonged broadcasting from a fixed position will draw indirect enemy fire. The message should be carefully prepared, so that each sentence constitutes a single, complete thought that will not be misunderstood. The key sentence should be short and repeated for emphasis.

The size of the target area, the character and loudness of competing sounds, the terrain, and climatic conditions (humidity, wind, temperature, etc.) affect reception of loudspeaker messages. Sound travels better at night in low temperature and humidity. In hilly or mountainous terrain, echoes may interfere with clear reception. Jungle and heavily vegetated areas absorb sound. Sounds projected over water or low-lying coastal plains travel great distances.

The announcer, generally indigenous to the operational area, must have idiomatic language fluency. Defectors may be used. They will know the current slang, topics of interest, and the problems of the enemy soldier. Their messages, however, must always be prerecorded and checked prior to being broadcast. The announcer must have—

An intimate and detailed knowledge of the customs, folklore, and speech habits of the audience.

The ability to adapt script and presentation to the changing situation.

A vigorous, unemotional delivery.

An understanding of the military situation and its implications.

Broadcasting messages from aircraft is an effective way to reach an otherwise inaccessible audience. Some general considerations are:

The PSYOP unit is responsible for the premission briefing of the aircrew. This briefing covers target location, current intelligence, total time required over the target, the length of the message, and the number of repetitions desired.

The loudspeaker message should be no longer than 20 seconds so that the entire message is audible to the audience.

Rotary-wing aircraft use banks of speakers mounted either internally or externally on the aircraft. The most effective altitude for a hovering rotary-wing aircraft is between 900 and 1,200 meters (3,000 and 4,000 feet) above ground level (AGL). The banking or orbiting course is effective at altitudes from 600 to 900 meters (2,000-3,000 feet) AGL. The presence and capabilities of enemy ground fire will determine whether to use these patterns or whether to use aerial loudspeakers at all.

The US Air Force has primary responsibility for aerial loudspeaker operations from fixed-wing aircraft.

An adapter system has been developed that permits the connection of the airborne loudspeaker system with the intercommunications and radio system of the aircraft. This allows a signal received by the aircraft from a ground radio transmitter to be rebroadcast to the target audience. The use of this system permits a language-qualified speaker in a central location to support widely dispersed ground elements. The device can be connected to a tape recorder to record the message for future use.

RADIO

Radio broadcasts can be transmitted to local audiences, or across national boundaries, and behind enemy lines. Political boundaries or tactical situations may hinder radio broadcasts, but they are not complete barriers. Since radio can reach mass target audiences quickly, it is useful for all types of psychological operations. Where radio stations are not common and receivers rare or nonexistent, receivers may be airdropped or otherwise distributed to key communicators, public installations, and selected individuals. Public listener systems may also be set up.

Advantages

Speed — Radio programs can be quickly prepared for broadcast. This is important when attempting to capitalize on targets of opportunity.

Wide coverage — Radio programs can reach members of large and varied audiences simultaneously.

Ease of perception — It requires little or no effort to visualize the radio message. Illiteracy does not prevent the listener from forming his individual image as he listens.

Versatility — Radio is easily adaptable to drama, music, news, and other types of programs.

Emotional power — A skilled radio announcer can exert tremendous influence on the listener simply with pitch, resonance, inflection, or timing.

Availability of receivers — Where availability or ownership of receivers is common, listening to radio is a habit. Ownership of receivers has increased greatly with the invention of transistors.

Disadvantages

Enemy restrictions — The target group may be subjected to severe censorship, thereby reducing the effectiveness of radio broadcasts.

Some countries have only single channel radios with the frequency set to the government-owned station.

	In some areas central receivers are connected to household receivers to control listening.
Jamming	Jamming may prevent the target group from receiving radio broadcasts.
Technical	Signal may be made inaudible or distorted by fading or static due to unfavorable atmospheric conditions.
Lack of receivers	In certain areas, so few receivers are available that radio may not be an effective medium.
Fleeting impressions	Oral media do not have the permanency of written media. Messages may be quickly forgotten or distorted.

PROGRAMING

Radio programing consists of planning the schedule, content, and production of programs during a stated period. Words, music, and sound effects are put together in various ways to produce the different kinds of programs. Some of the major types of radio programs are:

Straight news reports (without commentary).

Musical (popular, folk, classical).

Drama.

Speeches, talks, discussions.

Sports.

Interviews.

Special events; i.e., on-the-spot coverage of an election or the arrival of an important visitor, etc.

Religious.

Variety, a combination including music, skits, comedy, vaudeville, etc.

Announcements.

PRINCIPLES

Regularity	Regularity is an essential element of programing. The radio programer must create habitual program patterns in order to build a regular audience. Content, style, and format should follow an established pattern.
Repetition	Repetition is necessary for oral learning; therefore, key themes, phrases, or slogans should be repeated.
Suitability	The radio program must suit the taste and needs of the audience. Program style and format should follow the patterns to which the audience is accustomed.

Exploitation of censorship	Discussion or presentation of banned books, plays, music, and political topics is readily received by the audience. The same is true for news withheld by censors. In breaking censorship, the psychological operator must be certain that the reason for censoring the items was political and not moral.
Voice	Having announcers with attractive voice features is essential to successful radio operations.
	The emotional tone conveyed by the voice may influence the listener more than the logic of arguments.
	Announcers whose accents are similar to those of unpopular groups should not be used.
	Female voices are used to exploit nostalgia, sex frustration, or to attract female audiences. However, in some parts of the world, due to the status of women, female voices are resented.

CLASSIFICATION

Programs are classified according to content, intent, and origin.

Content	The most common and useful radio program classification is by content. News reporting, commentaries, announcements, educational or informative documentaries, music, interviews, discussions, religious programs, drama, and women's programs are the most common examples.
Intent	Classification by "intent" is useful in planning to obtain a desired response with a particular broadcast(s).
	Programs are produced to induce such emotional reactions as confidence, hope, fear, nostalgia, frustration, etc.
Origin	Classification by "origin" pertains to the source of the message; i.e., official, unofficial, authoritative, high military command, political party, etc.

FORMAT

Format is the arrangement of the various segments of a program. A fundamental principle in preparing scripts for broadcasting is to standardize as much as possible without losing flexibility. A standard or familiar manner of presentation identifies a program for the viewers, helping to gain a regular audience. The format for a series of programs is usually established before the first program is broadcast. Radio station personnel, when establishing the format, should bear in mind that they must adhere to the highest professional standards of scriptwriting.

PROGRAM BUILDING

The essential factors of program building are:

Purpose

The writer's first concern is the purpose of the program. What is it to accomplish? Careful construction of the purpose statement of the program will aid in structuring the program and provide a measuring device to determine if the goals are being met.

A credible program requires extensive research. Thorough research of a subject uncovers and provides hidden color and details which add a note of authority to the narrator.

Testing

The script is not completed when the last page is written; the announcer (or actor) must read it aloud (rehearse it) to determine how it sounds.

SCRIPTWRITING

Principles

Aural medium

The special characteristic of radio is that it is entirely an aural medium. Radio depends entirely on the ear and must work completely on the image inspired by the sound waves coming from the speaker system.

The sound of a voice (or music) in a radio presentation raises a particular image in the listener's mind. Radio scripts must make clear to the listener the scene or idea desired by the psychological operator.

Power of suggestion

The mind of each listener is a vast storehouse of scenery. The radio writer, through speech, music, and other sounds, enables the listener to visualize each scene.

Freedom of movement

The radio scriptwriter can change scenes as frequently as desired. He can rapidly take his listeners from one event or point on earth (or in space) to another--its all in the mind.

Conflict

Conflict is the attention-getter in a radio script, gaining and increasing audience interest. Conflict is the hero against the villain, good versus evil, the struggle for survival, etc., with the psychological operator offering the solution by way of his script(s).

TECHNIQUES

The imaginative application of techniques is a way to success. The writer must be constantly alert for new ideas and be willing to experiment with variations of old established techniques. The techniques discussed below apply equally to the preparation of scripts for television and loudspeaker operations.

Simplicity	Use simple sentences and words commonly used by the target audience. However, sentence length should be varied to avoid a singsong or monotonous effect.
Conversational style	Write news in a popular, informal, relaxed style. The listener should not be aware that the news is being read to him.
Speech speed	The normal rate of speech will vary among announcers. The scriptwriter should time the rate of speech of each announcer in the language used and tailor the script to gain maximum impact in the allotted time.
Initial attention	As the listener may be running the risk of severe punishment for listening to a forbidden broadcast, the broadcast must gain instant attention. The initial part of the script should convince the listener that the program will be of interest to him. Therefore, the essential facts need to be in the first few sentences to gain interest and to insure that nothing of importance is lost if the program is jammed.
Pacing and timing	Pacing refers to the changes in quality, emotion, thought, or feeling written into the program by the scriptwriter. Timing is controlled by the director and is a shift in the speed of message delivery.
Tongue twisters	Avoid words that successively begin with the same sounds, such as "In providing proper provisional procedures . . ." Avoid words ending in "ch," "sh," "th." These sounds generally produce a hissing noise.
Numbers	Round numbers off, unless the specific number is important. For example, 20 thousand may be used instead of 20,158. Large numbers should be written in the manner easiest to read: one billion 200 million 50 thousand instead of 1,200,050,000.
Unfamiliar names	Avoid beginning a news item with a name that is unfamiliar to the target audience. Introduce the names as "The chief of police, Mr. Jones . . ."
Quotes	The listener cannot see quotation marks. By voice inflection, the announcer can make it clear when a quotation begins and ends. Other methods may be used to indicate a quotation: In Smith's own words . . . To quote Smith . . . As Smith states . . .
Punctuation	Ordinary punctuation marks are ignored in scriptwriting. They can, however, be used as a guide for the announcer. For example, parentheses may be used to set off a phrase. Key words should be capitalized for emphasis. Phonetic spelling may be used to help the announcer with difficult words.

Profanity and horror — The announcer, speaking as a representative of his government and in keeping with the image of the serious, sincere spokesman, will not use profanity in his broadcasts. He will not use horrible descriptions of human suffering, although objective reports have a legitimate place in radio.

Abbreviations — Conventional abbreviations are seldom used. In scriptwriting "Mister" is used instead of "Mr." Any abbreviations used must be familiar to the target audience.

MONITORING

Radio monitoring provides information to the PSYOP current intelligence team on:

The enemy's domestic and foreign propaganda programs.

The propaganda the enemy aims at his own military forces in the field.

Propaganda directed at our forces, and the necessary countermeasures which can and should be taken.

Radio monitoring also provides information for evaluating the effectiveness of US and allied PSYOP. The frequency band is scanned on a random basis to intercept other broadcasts of interest to the US and allied forces.

Operational rules require monitoring personnel to:

Be objective when giving the monitoring reports.

Be familiar with the names of persons and places likely to appear in the monitored broadcast.

Monitor only the station(s) to which assigned. Scan the frequency band only when directed.

Record the identity of the monitored station, the date and time, and other relevant information pertaining to the monitored broadcast.

Bring significant information to the attention of superiors immediately. Do not wait to make a scheduled report.

Use phonetic spelling when in doubt as to the spelling of strange names and places.

TEAM IC, MOBILE RADIO ENGINEER (RADIO TRANSMISSION)

Using the AN/TRT-22, with a general broadcast radius of about 100 miles (160 km), the IC team transmits radio programs in support of psychological operations. The team also performs direct support maintenance on organic communications-electronic equipment. It is capable of multishift operations.

The first consideration in placing the radio transmitter is operational effectiveness. In a wartime environment, consideration also must be given to enemy destructive operations, particularly local actions; e.g., placement of satchel charges, bangalore torpedoes, etc. This requires that not only must antennas be placed where they will operate effectively, but they must also be reasonably near transportation, sources of supply, and troops who will assist in affording protective security.

Reasonable nearness to transportation, engineer, and signal units merits priority consideration because:

The IC team is only 40 percent mobile with organic vehicles.

Movement of equipment--e.g., generators--may require use of heavy vehicles and equipment, such as cranes, wreckers, lowboys, or mobilizers, not available in PSYOP units.

Engineer and signal personnel are needed to erect, maintain, and dismantle the 250-foot (76 meters) antenna used with the AN/TRT-22 radio transmitter.

There is a recurring need for generator fuel, spare parts, and maintenance in addition to other recurring requirements.

Gaining the attention of a PSYOP target audience, building its interest, and ultimately influencing its emotions, opinions, attitudes, and behavior, is not done quickly. Thus, the transmitter must remain on site for an extended time. In fact, in a conflict environment movement is so infrequent as to pose no burden on units needed to transport equipment.

Chapter Eighteen

PRINTED MATERIAL

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Printed material, which includes leaflets, newspapers, posters, handbills, books, magazines, and such items as novelties, trinkets, and gifts with messages printed on them, is major means of conveying propaganda. A propaganda message printed on substantial material is a relatively permanent document. Once printed and delivered, it can be retained and readily passed from person to person without distortion.



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A properly developed and designed message (shape, color, format, texture, and other physical characteristics have been duly considered) can have a deep and lasting effect on the target audience.

ADVANTAGES

The printed word has a high degree of acceptance, credibility, and prestige.

Printed matter is unique in that it can be passed from person to person without distortion.

It allows for the reinforcing use of photographs and graphic illustrations which can be understood by illiterates.

It is permanent and the message will not change unless it is physically altered.

It can be disseminated and read or viewed by a larger, widespread target audience.

It can be reread for reinforcement.

Complex and lengthy material can be explained in detail.

It can be hidden and read in private.

Messages can be printed on almost any surface, including useful items.

Printed material can gain prestige by acknowledging authoritative and expert authors. This is particularly important in those societies where the printed word is authoritative.

DISADVANTAGES

A high illiteracy rate reduces the effectiveness and usefulness of the printed message.
Printing operations require special, extensive, continuing logistical support.
Dissemination is time-consuming and costly, requiring the use of special facilities and complex coordination.
As printed material must be physically delivered to the target audience, the enemy can prevent or interfere with its dissemination.
It is less timely than other means of communication.
It can be collected and destroyed by the enemy.
It can be altered by overprinting.
Where prohibited, it can readily be uncovered by search and stringent penalties imposed for possession.
Development and design of effective printed material requires trained and knowledgeable personnel.

PRINTED MATERIAL TECHNIQUES

Do's

Compile catalogs of printed material and make known their existence.

Use illustrations. They increase the attractiveness of the item, arouse the attention of the target audience, and convey meaningful information in a relatively small space. Illustrations are valuable when they enhance the printed message. The best illustrations are clear and appropriate. Use illustrations that show action.

Use photographs instead of sketches whenever possible (except when a sketch, e.g., a cartoon, a caricature, etc., will best evoke a desired emotion within the target audience). People regard photographs as positive proof of events being depicted. Thus, credibility can be markedly enhanced by using photographs of the actual scene or person rather than an artist's conception. Use sharp photographs; out-of-focus or blurred photographs reduce audience interest and the credibility of the message.

Use letters. Letters obtained from defectors, prisoners of war (always adhere to the Geneva Conventions), and other former enemy personnel can be extremely effective. There are, however, a few rules that should be followed:

> Do not write letters for someone else. A letter that sounds as though it were written by other than the signing party has no credibility.
>
> You may suggest possible themes and specific details, but the letter must be written by the signator.

Among some audiences poetry can be an effective medium for emotional and sentimental appeals. Good poetry elicits highly favorable reactions, but bad poetry elicits unfavorable reactions. In order to assure quality, well-known, popular poets should be employed.

Don'ts

Do not use long text (particularly in leaflets, posters, and handbills). People in enemy-controlled territory may have to read the printed item surreptitiously. A lengthy text increases the possibility of discovery and reduces the likelihood that people will risk reading it. Long texts discourage the average reader, and the poorly educated may not even try to read lengthy items.

Avoid small print; it discourages readers. Size of print must permit the message to be read immediately.

Avoid duplication of material. Issue only the superior product.

Do not distribute obsolete propaganda. Many printed items have a period of maximal impact. If distributed after the time for which they were meant, the impact may be minimal, nil, or adverse. Therefore, carefully watch for and do not reorder obsolete items (leaflets, posters, etc.).

LEAFLETS

A leaflet is a written or pictorial message on a single sheet of paper. It has no standard size, shape, or format. In selecting the size, shape, and weight of the paper, the primary consideration is that the paper accommodate the message and be easy to distribute. The recommended size, provided the message can be accommodated, is a 15.24 centimeters by 7.72 centimeters (6 by 3 inches) on 7.25- or 9.06- kilogram paper (16- or 20-pound). Leaflets of this size and weight have very favorable aerial dissemination characteristics.



FIGURE 18-1

SAMPLE LEAFLET

Categories of Leaflets

Leaflets may be categorized as persuasive, informative, and directive.

The persuasive leaflet attains its objective through use of reason. Facts are presented so that the audience is convinced that the conclusions reached by the propagandist are valid.

The informative leaflet is factual. In presenting facts previously unknown to the audience, it attracts a reading public by satisfying curiosity.

The directive leaflet directs action when intelligence indicates the target is receptive. It is used to direct and control activities of underground forces. It may be used to disrupt enemy production by giving advance warning of bombing attacks and suggesting that workers in enemy production facilities protect themselves by staying away from work.

During consolidation and foreign internal defense operations, directive leaflets assist in maintaining law and order and in publicizing government programs.

Leaflet Use

Leaflets are developed for specific uses, such as standard, special situation, safe conduct, and news.

Standard leaflets contain general propaganda messages intended for repeated use in all types of psychological operations. They are particularly valuable in fast-moving tactical situations when PSYOP units are unable to prepare leaflets to fit rapidly changing situations. The content of standard leaflets used in support of foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and consolidation operations varies widely.

Advantages of Standard Leaflets. Use of standard leaflets:

Permits rapid dissemination of a variety of propaganda messages. Leaflets are prepared in advance, stockpiled in bulk, or loaded in disseminating devices for storage or immediate delivery. This provides flexibility for the use of PSYOP at all levels of command.

Permits standardization of selected propaganda themes or messages, insuring consistency of propaganda content.

Allows cataloging. Standard leaflets are easily cataloged. The availability of catalogs of standard leaflets simplifies the task of integrating selected leaflets into tactical operations.

Permits the most efficient use of large, high-speed presses at theater Army level and maximum use of commercial facilities.

Permits a joint production agency to better control printed propaganda materials.

Allows pretesting well in advance of dissemination.

Insures continuation of the PSYOP effort even though reproduction equipment may be destroyed or temporarily disabled.

Disadvantages of Standard Leaflets:

Standard leaflets are usually less effective than leaflets tailored for a specific action or situation.

They are subject to deterioration.

Circumstances and conditions make them obsolete.

Stockpiles of leaflets become a logistical burden and can be overprinted by the enemy.

They endanger enemy soldiers and civilians seen reading them.

They are instantly identifiable as a PSYOP device; therefore, the leaflet's credibility is suspect.

Contingency leaflets are prepared for an anticipated event.

Special situation leaflets are requested when the standard leaflet message is inadequate to exploit a particular propaganda opportunity, situation, or objective. They are developed when intelligence indicates the existence of a specifically exploitable,

but transient and presumably nonrecurring psychological opportunity. They are intended for use only once because the circumstances which govern their preparation are seldom duplicated.

Use in tactical operations. Tactical PSYOP achieve maximum results when leaflets have specific relevance at the moment of receipt, when psychological pressures are greatest, and when a reasonable course of action is presented. For example, surrender becomes a reasonable course of action only when under current conditions no other alternative action seems plausible.

Use in strategic operations. Strategic PSYOP are made more effective by the use of special situation leaflets that deal with specific problems and discuss them in terms of current facts. The impact is usually cummulative, rather then immediate, extending over weeks, months, or years. These leaflets are used primarily to communicate with special targets, such as foreign workers in enemy or occupied countries, ethnic or religious groups, members of a particular industrial facility or industry, and friendly resistance groups.

Operational considerations. The following operational considerations should determine the use of special situation leaflets:

Serve as a means for timely exploitation of psychological opportunities.

Serve as a means to communicate more intimately with the target audience and permit the message to be more precisely slanted to the immediate and particular needs of the audience.

Physical Characteristics of Leaflets

Leaflet production is affected by the physical characteristics of paper, such as shape, texture, quality, size, and weight. Legibility and color reproduction are noticeably affected by paper quality and texture. A high grade of paper is needed for correct color reproduction. Quality also affects durability. **Safe conduct passes should always be printed on durable, high quality paper.**

The major factors involved in selection of paper weights and leaflet sizes are:

Message length.

Artwork required.

Delivery system to be used.

Press capabilities.

Purpose of the leaflet.

Format

Although leaflets generally are small, they should contain comparatively large print, particularly when directed toward the enemy. However, a small leaflet with large print makes it necessary to use a text that is brief, to the point, and immediately attractive.

Since enemy personnel and civilians in areas under enemy control are prohibited from picking up or reading leaflets from external sources, the large print enables them to read the message without touching the leaflet. In case the reader wishes to hide the leaflet and read it surreptitiously at a later time, a small leaflet is more easily concealed.

Sequence — The order of presentation must be carefully planned and appropriate for the cultural reading habits of the target.

Headline — The headline is important because it summarizes the entire leaflet and is the part of the text that first catches the eye.

Subheadline — Subheadlines are used to introduce separate paragraphs and highlight the significant points of the message.

Text — The text must be simple and to the point, containing only one theme. The first sentence should contain the substance of the message. Credible and verifiable facts should follow.

Photographs and illustrations — Since photographs and illustrations carry a message, they must be arranged and numbered in a culturally logical sequence. For example, in some cultures the sequence of reading is from right to left, in others from top to bottom and right to left. Placing a number in front of the caption which accompanies a photograph or illustration makes it easier for the reader to follow the sequence.

Captions — Caption all photographs and illustrations. If this is not done, the reader may not understand the point the message is trying to make.

LEAFLET DISSEMINATION

Printed material is the one medium that must be physically delivered to a target audience. This presents problems when attempting to disseminate printed propaganda in enemy-held territory. In denied areas, printed propaganda is generally disseminated by air delivery, line-crossers, military patrols, or international mail.

The method of delivery depends upon a variety of factors, such as:

Political conditions.

Military situation.

Target density and population patterns.

Number and size of leaflets to be delivered.

Enemy countermeasures.

Availability of ordnance and delivery devices.

Weather.

Allocation of air sorties for leaflet missions.

Air-to-Ground Delivery

Paper quality affects the drift of airdropped leaflets. If a leaflet, which offers little or no wind resistance, is dropped from a flying aircraft, it will be blown at about the same speed and direction as the wind. If there are updrafts or downdrafts, the leaflet will still follow the general direction of the wind. In areas of no turbulence the constant pull of gravity acting upon the leaflet will cause it to fall at a fairly constant rate. (See figure 18-3, Leaflet Patterns, and figure 18-4, Detailed View ofLeaflet Patterns.)



AUTOROTATING MOTION



FIGURE 18-2

LEAFLET MOTIONS



FIGURE 18-3

LEAFLET PATTERNS



FIGURE 18-4

DETAILED VIEW OF LEAFLET PATTERNS

Leaflet density. The basic objective of leaflet drops is to place sufficient leaflets on the ground to insure that every member of the target audience will see (not necessarily possess) a leaflet. To insure that members of the target audience chance upon leaflets, their location and activities must be considered. Target mobility has a great bearing on the number and density of leaflets dropped and on the area that must be covered.

If the target is a soldier dug in a defensive position, his mobility and the possibility that he will find a leaflet are reduced. This type of target requires more leaflets than one consisting of rear area soldiers with greater mobility.

In mountains or jungle areas, mobility is generally restricted to roads, paths, and trails. Leaflets should be concentrated in these areas to increase the possibility that the target will chance upon them.

An urban population will require more leaflets than the population living and working in open rural terrain. The density of leaflets disseminated over a city should be heavy because a great percentage of leaflets will land on inaccessible rooftops.

As a "rule of thumb," the psychological operator should trade lower densities for greater area coverage. Villages and hamlets should be targeted so leaflets will land not only in the village where people live, but also in the fields where they work. Trails in and out of the area should be targeted.

Airdrop by hand (low altitude)

In areas where low-level delivery is feasible, leaflets can be dropped by hand through aircraft doors, ports, or specially fabricated chutes as the delivery aircraft passes over or circles the target area.

FIGURE 18-5

USE OF CHUTES IN

LOW-ALTITUDE AIRDROP

Leaflets should be dropped in small quantities at very close intervals. This results in an almost continuous release of leaflets evenly distributed downwind and parallel to the flight of the aircraft. Two men can dispense thousands of leaflets per minute using this efficient, inexpensive technique.

Leaflets printed or distributed in areas of high humidity tend to stick together. Ruffling one or both ends of the leaflet stack insures complete dispersion.

High altitude free-fall

Leaflets dispensed from aircraft flying at altitudes up to 50,000 feet (15,000 meters) are carried to their target by prevailing winds. This technique is well suited for leaflet drops directed at large general target areas. It requires long-range planning and preparation to insure prompt reaction to favorable wind conditions. The advice of skilled meteorological personnel is essential throughout the planning and execution of this operation.

The characteristics of different size leaflets must be known to insure that the proper "mix" of leaflets is used to obtain dissemination throughout the target area.

Static line technique

At high altitudes the use of leaflet bundles or boxes opened by static line has proven effective. Through use of rollers on the deck of the aircraft, boxes weighing up to 50 kilograms (110 pounds) can be ejected with minimum exertion. The steps (figure 18-6) in preparing boxes for high-altitude, static line dissemination are:

Step 1. Using a punch, cut four holes about 6 centimeters by 2 centimeters (2 1/2 inches by 3/4 inch) as indicated in figure 18-6.

Step 2. Cut through the box from one hole to another as illustrated.

Step 3. Place a 5-centimeter (2-inch) wide strip of webbing through the holes. The length of webbing depends on the size of the box; it must be long enough to tie after the box has been filled with leaflets.

Step 4. Place a 10-centimeter (3-or 4-inch) strip of masking tape over the 5-centimeter wide strip of webbing.

Step 5. Cut all four corners of the box from the top to about three-fourths of the way down (or less).

Step 6. Again using masking tape, tape one strip up the cut portion and two across, as illustrated.

Step 7. After filling the box with leaflets, tie the two strips of webbing.

Step 8. Attach one end of the static line to the webbing ties. The length of the static line depends upon the type of aircraft, but it is normally about 4 1/2 meters (15 feet) long.



FIGURE 18-6

METHOD OF FABRICATING BOXES FOR HIGH-ALTITUDE STATIC LINE DISSEMINATION

The box is rolled out of the aircraft, and as the container comes to the end of the static line, the sides of the box split. In effect, it is turned inside out and the leaflets fall away followed by the empty box.

Balloon Operations

Balloon operations, useful for penetrating denied areas, can be conducted up to a range of 2,400 kilometers (1,500 miles). As the use of balloons for other than random drops requires a knowledge and study of wind patterns and air currents from the proposed launching site to the intended target area, a meteorologist must be available from the planning to the launching stages of the operation.

Types of balloons

Balloons are made of paper, rubber, or polyethylene.

Inflation and launching

Balloons should be inflated in an area protected from the elements and launched in winds of 5-7 knots. For safety, helium is preferred; however, hydrogen, a highly inflammable (explosive) gas, will support a slightly heavier load. **Extreme care is required when hydrogen is used**: The crew must wear protective cotton clothing and goggles; no silk, fur, nylon, or other potentially spark-producing clothing may be worn; all inflation equipment must be electrically grounded; and smoking is prohibited.

Other lighter-than-air gases, such as coal gas, may also be used.

Flight

Flight patterns are determined by the weather, wind, air currents, and gas pressure. Flight pattern tables showing altitude, time, distance, payload, and gross load are easily constructed. However, the slightest leak in the balloon will alter the flight pattern.

Tracking

Balloons can be radar tracked for about 40 kilometers (25 miles) by adding a conventional reflector. This distance is enough to establish wind patterns and trajectory.

Payload

Although the maximum payload is 9 kilograms (about 20 pounds), balloons are an inexpensive means of disseminating leaflets.

Coverage of the target

The actual leaflet impact area may vary from that predicted by as much as 10 percent. This does not mean failure, because the dimensions of the leaflet pattern will be large enough to assure substantial coverage of the chosen target.

Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs)

Remotely piloted vehicles are capable of conducting a variety of combat missions including leaflet delivery, surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and strike. The remote pilot is able to detect and identify targets, change the course of the RPV, and make decisions to initiate and terminate operations in the target area. **Pinpoint accuracy is possible.**

Use for leaflet drops

RPVs can be flown into enemy territories where the gun and missile antiaircraft defenses are very intense and the losses of manned aircraft might be unacceptable. RPVs similar to those used by the US Air Force for low altitude operations are readily adaptable to leaflet delivery for psychological operations. The RPVs can fly a preselected course at heights as low as a few hundred feet above gound level. The maximum speed will vary from Mach 0.8 for the clean configuration down to about Mach 0.6 when wing pods are installed. **These RPVs can be fitted with modified wing pods providing a large leaflet capacity per mission.**

Launching

Remotely piloted vehicles can be either ground or air launched, resulting in very flexible mission planning. Recovery of the RPVs is accomplished by a parachute system.

US Army variable speed training target

Smaller target drones, such as the US Army's new variable speed training target (VSTT), can be adapted for leaflet dispensing. Since these drones are smaller than the Air Force RPV, they are more easily adapted for short-range operations with the Army in the field.

Leaflet Bomb

The M129E1 leaflet bomb is an Air Force item, obtained through Air Force ordnance channels. Its empty weight is about 52 kilograms (115 pounds) and when loaded with leaflets, approximately 100 kilograms (225 pounds). It can carry approximately 30,000 13 x 20-centimeter (5 1/4 x 8-inch), 16-pound, machine-rolled leaflets. The maximum inside diameter of the bomb is 39.4 centimeters (15 1/2 inches); the minimum is 34.3 centimeters (13 1/2 inches).



FIGURE 18-7

LEAFLET BOMB

Because of the internal configuration, the method for loading 13 x 20-centimeter (5 1/4 x 8-inch) leaflets is to use six 36-centimeter (14 1/2-inch) diameter rolls and one 32-centimeter (12 1/2-inch) diameter roll. Before the leaflets are placed in the bomb, the detonating cord is placed in the seam between the two halves.

The bomb is fuzed and armed at the launch base by Air Force or Navy personnel. When the bomb is released, the fuze functions at a predetermined time, detonating the primer cord separating the two body sections, detaching the fins, and releasing the leaflets.

Surface Delivery

The ground patrol is a useful element for disseminating small amounts of printed material behind enemy lines. Posters, leaflets, pamphlets, kits, and novelties may be placed or scattered by patrols and reconnaissance elements, usually while on regular missions.

Leaflets, posters, and propaganda items can be left behind during retrograde movements.

Infiltrators, line-crossers, and sympathizers can be used to distribute printed propaganda behind enemy lines. They frequently distribute gray or black propaganda.

Propaganda may be mailed to selected individuals or organizations through enemy or neutral postal systems.

In FID situations all agencies of the supported government and civilian public service organizations (to include the religious community) should be used as outlets and distribution points.

Seaworthy containers are easy and inexpensive to use as sea floats. Propaganda is placed in a waterproof container and dropped at predetermined locations at sea, in rivers, or streams. However, access to reliable hydrographic data (prevailing winds, tide, and currents) is needed in order to plot projected courses accurately. Containers may be made of wood, bamboo, glass, plastic, rubber, or similar material. Inexpensive plastic or cellophane envelopes can be profitably used for large-scale float operations. Large-volume dissemination is necessary because a great number of the containers will never reach the designated target audience.



FIGURE 18-8

EXAMPLES OF SEA FLOATS

POSTERS, MAGAZINES, BOOKS, BANNERS, GIFTS, PERSONAL DISPLAY ITEMS

Other types of printed matter known as slow media are also used in psychological operations. These media include posters, pamphlets, books, magazines, reprints, gifts, and other items that contain printed messages. These materials are used primarily in populated and heavily traveled areas.

Posters

Posters include all single-sheet printed and graphic (illustrations, sketches, photographs, and symbols) materials which impart a message by being publicly posted. They are used to inform; their ultimate purpose is to enlist support. The message is generally emotionally colored, intended primarily to influence emotions and gain emotional support.

Posters are a universal medium, easy and inexpensive to produce and place--almost any surface is suitable. Since they present their message pictorially, they have a universal audience that includes illiterates. Properly placed, they cannot be avoided. When placed where people congregate, they stimulate discussion, broadening the impact of the message.

Since the opinions of neutral or other noninvolved foreign audiences may affect the courses of action of the enemy government, its security forces, or its allied and assisting government, posters should be made interesting and appealing to these foreign audiences.

Basic principles

Format.

Use formats, art styles, and forms that are familiar to and appropriate for the target audience. If possible, produce an art form that people want to possess and display.

Graphics.

Give maximum space to simple graphic productions. They attract an audience and significantly increase the impact of the message. Complex graphics, on the other hand, generally confuse the audience and are subject to ambiguous and undesirable interpretations by the audience.

Photographs.

Use photographs or photomontages. People believe them. The less sophisticated the audience, the greater the belief.

Symbols.

Use symbols, inanimate and animate (including human), that are significant to the target audience. Symbols which have positive characteristics (bravery, integrity, leadership, etc.) to the target add prestige and impact to the message.

Color.

As colors have different connotations in different societies, it is important that colors and color combinations used in posters be appropriate to the culture of the target audience. Improper colors may be counterproductive or, at best, nonproductive.

Print for a moving target.

It may be necessary for people to read the unfriendly poster while on the move. Therefore, the poster should be printed in letters of a size that can be read and seen at distances from 10 to 15 meters. For example, an enemy government may impose stringent penalties on any members of its armed forces or civilian population displaying an interest in enemy posters. Or if an enemy shadow government is active and effective, a display of interest in a poster may result in loss of life or limb, injury to family, or destruction of property.

Main point.

The main point, clearly and immediately stated, should occupy the visual center of the poster so it is seen first. In addition, all textual material must relate to the main point of the message.

The appeal.

Make the appeal positive, emotional, simple, and appropriate to the action desired. The poster is too compact to present complex arguments. Do not inflame emotions to the point of violent actions when such actions are neither appropriate nor desired. Overreaction may result in loss of liberty or life and of PSYOP effectiveness.

Slogans.

Slogans reinforce the graphic art and convey emotional appeals that will be long remembered. They are extremely effective in highly authoritative societies and cultures when related to highly emotional issues. In areas of mass illiteracy those who cannot read will hear the slogans spoken frequently, ask the literates to explain them, or have readers available.

Cliches.

Cliches, catchwords, and popular and stereotyped phrases may also be featured with somewhat the same effect as slogans.

Distribution.

Posters must be distributed according to a plan. "Hit-or miss" poster distribution has no part in a poster campaign.

Placement.

Place and display posters where people naturally and habitually gather, and where they have little or nothing to do for brief periods of time; e.g., bus and tram stops, rail stations and depots, parks, outdoor cafes, etc. Posters so displayed are most likely to be exposed to an audience and read.

Viewers tend to associate the poster with the area of placement. This is one reason why posters placed in areas dangerously reached (mountainsides, railroad trestles, water tanks, high walls, etc.) evoke admiration and have a high impact. By the same line of audience reasoning, posters placed in demeaning areas lose their effectiveness.

Vulnerabilities.

Posters are subject to weather conditions. They may be easily removed, destroyed, or defaced. Outdated posters may be used in enemy propaganda. Since a weatherbeaten, obsolete, or defaced poster is a liability, remove it quickly. This requires frequent visits to poster sites.

Magazines, Pamphlets, Reprints

Magazines, pamphlets, and reprints--although differing in length, use of illustrative material, and regularity of distribution--generally have common features as propaganda media:

All are relatively expensive to produce and distribute.

There is no limitation as to the kind of propaganda messages they can carry.

The audience range is unlimited--youth groups, the mass of the population, intellectuals, professionals, etc.

These materials may be dropped from the air, mailed, delivered by messenger, placed in libraries and public areas, or handed out at meetings and rallies or surreptitiously handed out. The contents may be read and discussed on radio and television.

These publications have the basic advantages common to newspapers:

They are relatively permanent.

A wide variety of material may be presented, such as:

Complex and lengthy articles.

Technical and professional information and data.

News, features, and items of popular interest.

Material may be set in a format and edited to appeal to the complete spectrum of audience groups.

Colorful (and colored) graphic presentations may be made.

These publications also have the disadvantages inherent in newspapers:

Production and distribution are time-consuming, complex, and expensive.

They are not suitable for targets of opportunity.

If national policy or situations change, they can be reminders of past policy and situations and used by the enemy.

Magazines and pamphlets require the services of skilled editorial and production personnel.

Books

In consolidation and FID/IDAD operations, books are valuable when available to the audience, where there is an interest in them, and time is available to read them.

Manuscripts offered for publication may indicate popular feeling concerning local conditions, the government, the military, etc.

In the early stages of consolidation of occupied areas, PSYOP units will normally assist in distributing books from US or allied sources. PSYOP personnel may also be called upon to assist in a program to rehabilitate the book publishing industry.

The use of local publishers makes it easier to establish book translation programs by publishing, in the local language and at prices within the reach of the target group, selected books of friendly persuasion. Production shortages are likely to exist; therefore, paper stocks, ink, photographic supplies, and other material must be issued on a priority basis to approved publishers, concentrating on priority subjects.

Censorship may be necessary, even of translations of seemingly harmless literature.

A well-planed book program, including children's books, is of great value, particularly in education (and reeducation) programs. Books on any subject can be provided to all target groups. Popular reading will attract the less educated groups. Other books may help to acquaint the target audience with the achievements, aims, and advantages of the programs, activities, and operations of the United States, allies,or host country. A book written by a member (or ex-member) of the target audience can be most influential.

Banners

A banner is any piece of flag-like cloth, paper, or similar surface on which a message is drawn. A banner may be any size or shape, stationary or mobile.

They generally have a one-time use in intensely emotional situations. The message is short, hard hitting, and emotional with only one theme; it may be a rallying point for adherents to a cause. Banners indicate commitment on the part of those who make or carry them.

The major advantages of banners are their symbolism and ability to rally people to a cause. Other advantages are their high visibility and mobility. Banners are a complementary medium, however, and quickly become obsolete.

Personal Display Items

Personal items such as buttons, vehicular stickers, clothing (e.g., T-shirts), or jewelry which display a belief or cause indicate a relatively high degree of commitment. If seen in public at different times and places, they give the appearance of strength for the cause the propagandist advocates. People like winners, and this appearance of strength gains adherents.

Some of the items are relatively expensive, but if attractive, they will be sold. Purchase of expensive items is an indication of strong attachment to the cause represented by the purchased item.

Gifts and Novelties

Any item of practical use may be used as a message-carrying gift; i.e., soap, matches, lighters, cigarette holders, nail clippers, notebooks, calendars, recipe books, seed packets, grocery bags, salt, or other items for which the target group has a need. Novelties such as simple games, puzzles, wall stickers, playing cards, balloons, greeting cards, and other items of no great practical use may carry messages and be distributed.

The use of novelties must be decided at the highest echelon of command because:

They are expensive.

They require scarce resources.

Distribution must be phased into the overall psychological operation.

Gifts, being useful items, do not serve well for propaganda, for the impulse of the recipient is to use the gift, ignoring the message. Gifts small in size need only be stamped with or contain the known symbol of the donor, a slogan, or a brief message. Gift wrappings or containers are also excellent media for messages, symbols, or slogans.

Normally, action messages should be avoided on gifts. An urgent warning or demand for serious sacrifices should not accompany trivial gifts.

The receipt of a useful or amusing item places the recipient in a receptive frame of mind for an accompanying propaganda message.

The major disadvantage of novelties and gifts is the cumulative expense of mass production and distribution. In addition, such items have only a peripheral, passive effect, seldom if ever moving people to action or changing opinions or emotions. At best, such items complement other media.

APPENDIXES

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Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications A-2
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J-GRAPHICS, MUSIC, AND SOUND EFFECTS REGISTER GUIDES J-1

APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

ARMY REGULATIONS (AR)

10-5	Department of the Army
310-25	Dictionary of United States Army Terms
310-50	Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes
360-61	Community Relations
633-50	Prisoners of War: Administration, Employment, and Compensation
633-51	Civilian Internees: Administration, Employment, and Compensation

FIELD MANUALS (FM)

1-100	Army Aviation Utilization
3-1	Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Support
6-20	Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations
11-40	Tactical and Audio-Visual Doctrine
19-4	Military Police Combat Support, Theater of Operations
19-10	Military Police Operations
19-40	Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees and Detained Persons
21-6	How to Prepare and Conduct Military Training
21-30	Military Symbols
21-76	Survival, Evasion, and Escape
24-1	Combat Communications
27-10	The Law of Land Warfare
29-3-1	Direct Support Supply and Service in Theaters of Operations

30-5	Combat Intelligence
30-10	Military Geographic Intelligence (Terrain)
30-16	Technical Intelligence
30-17	Counterintelligence Operations
31-20	Special Forces Operations (U)
31-85	Rear Area Protection (RAP) Operations
41-10	Civil Affairs Operations
100-5	Operations
101-5	Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure
101-10-1	Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organizational, Technical and Logistical Data Unclassified Data

DA PAMPHLETS (DA PAM)

310-35	Index of International Standardization Agreements
525-7-1	The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application, Vol 1.
525-7-2	The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application, Vol 2.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PUBLICATIONS (JCS PUB)

1	Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage (Short Title: JD)
2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT (TOE)

33-500 series	Psychological Operations Organization
41-500 series	Civil Affairs Organization

ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM (ARTEP)

33-500	Psychological Operations, Battalions and Subordinate Elements

DEFENSE INFORMATION HANDBOOKS

Applied Journalism

Radio and Television

Research and Oral Communication

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

40th - 42d Semiannual Report to the Congress

BOOK

A Psychological Warfare Casebook, ed. William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, 1958.

APPENDIX B

DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF TEAMS

HEADQUARTERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE TEAMS

Team AA, Command and Control (Company).

Capabilities: Command, administrative control, and operational supervision of one to seven platoons or teams. Operates independently as liaison detachment. Parachute qualified when supporting an airborne unit.

Basis of Allocation: One per division, separate brigade, task force, MAAG, mission, or equivalent sized command; one per PSYOP liaison requirement.

Mobility: One hundred percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team AB, Command and Control (Battalion).

Capabilities: Command, administrative control, and operational supervision of two to five PSYOP companies; logistical and administrative support for assigned and attached units; limited procurement and distribution of nonstandard items of equipment and supplies for subordinate operational elements. Operates independently as a liaison detachment. Parachute qualified when supporting an airborne unit.

Basis of Allocation: One per army component of a subordinate unified command, corps, civil affairs or military police prisoner-of-war command, or equivalent sized command or as required; one per PSYOP liaison requirement.

Mobility: Thirty-two percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team AC, Command and Control (Group).

Capabilities: Command of two to five PSYOP battalions; coordination and operational supervision of subordinate elements; specified elements parachute qualified when supporting an airborne unit.

Basis of Allocation: One per theater army, army component of a unified command or corps.

Mobility: Thirty-seven percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team AD, Command Assessment.

Capabilities: To deploy with a corps deployment package into a hostile area, and analyze and evaluate the psychological warfare possibilities. To make recommendations to ground force commander in the area of psychological operations. To determine what psychological functional teams should be deployed into the area. To evaluate the results of any psychological campaign that had been conducted prior to insertion. To plan the use of themes to be used in a PSYOP campaign.

Basis of Allocation: On per corps deployment package.

Mobility: This team has no organic TOE equipment requiring transportation. Non-TOE equipment and supplies constitute approximately 300 pounds (20 cubic feet).

SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE TEAMS

Team BA, Supply and Maintenance.

Capabilities: Plans and coordinates logistical requirements for PSYOP units and teams; procures and distributes standard and nonstandard items of equipment and supplies; this team has a minimum vehicle maintenance capability to support PSYOP companies and teams.

Basis of Allocation: One per PSYOP company or separate teams as required.

Mobility: Sixty-seven percent mobile in organic vehicles.

OPERATIONAL TEAMS

Team FA, Propaganda.

Capabilities: Supervises the production of, or develops, propaganda; controls propaganda development activity supporting theater army, corps, division, MAAG, or mission. Operates independently as a liaison detachment as required. Parachute qualified when supporting an airborne unit.

Basis of Allocation: One per two to eight Teams FB, FC, FD, or FE, as required; one per major command; one per PSYOP liaison requirement.

Mobility: One hundred percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team FB, Audio and Television Production.

Capabilities: Prepares audio and television propaganda in the form of sound tapes, scripts, news, commentary, and entertainment programs for dissemination to target audiences by radio, television, and loudspeaker; researches, locates, procures, and records indigenous music and sound effects. Requires augmentation by indigenous linguists. Must be employed with Team ID, Mobile Radio Production, when not operating in a fixed facility.

Basis of Allocation: One or more per propaganda development activity, as required; one or more per Team IA, Mobile Radio Operations, as required; one per ethnic group targeted or geopolitical area of interest.

Mobility: One hundred percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team FC, Current Intelligence.

Capabilities: Develops intelligence requirements and processes intelligence information to support psychological operations; analyzes current intelligence to determine and verify psychological susceptibilities, vulnerabilities, and opportunities; interrogates prisoners and translates foreign language printed material. Parachute qualified when supporting an airborne unit.

Basis of Allocation: One or more per PSYOP company, battalion, or group as required; one per major enemy unit, ethnic group, targeted, or geopolitical area of interest.

Mobility: One hundred percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team FD, Research and Analysis.

Capabilities: Performs detailed background study and analysis of specific target groups, prepares PSYOP contingency plans, conducts propaganda analysis of friendly and enemy PSYOP. Parachute qualified when supporting an airborne unit.

Basis of Allocation: One or more per PSYOP group or battalion as required.

Mobility: Fifty percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team FE, Graphic Production.

Capabilities: Prepares copy and illustrations necessary to produce leaflets, posters, pamphlets, and newssheets. Parachute qualified when supporting an airborne unit. Requires augmentation by indigenous writers and illustrators.

Basis of Allocation: One per PSYOP group or battalion as required; one per PSYOP unit with organic, medium, or heavy printing platoon.

Mobility: Fifty percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team GA, Light Printing.

Capabilities: Prints propaganda leaflets and newssheets on organic presses. Trims, cuts, packages, rolls, and distributes printed propaganda material for dissemination by aircraft, tube artillery, and other means. Prepares propaganda messages for special situation leaflets and newssheets, as well as reproducing scripts for use by tactical loudspeaker broadcasts. Parachute qualified when supporting an airborne unit.

Basis of Allocation: One or more per PSYOP battalion or company as required.

Mobility: Eighty percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team GB, Medium Printing (Operations, Camera and Plate).

Capabilities: Plans, controls, and supervises printing operations to produce leaflets, posters, and other propaganda materials. Supervises one to four Teams GC operating at a single location. Executes process photography and prepares photolithographic plates for use by Team GC. Provides electrical equipment maintenance and supply support for itself and attached Teams GC. Capable of multishift operations.

Basis of Allocation: One per mobile medium printing requirement.

Mobility: Fifty percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team GC, Medium Printing (Press and Processing).

Capabilities: Prints by photolithographic process up to 1,200,000 production units per day of propaganda leaflets, posters, and other printed material to specification. Trims, cuts, rolls, packages, and distributes propaganda material for dissemination by aircraft, artillery, and other means. Provides direct and general support maintenance for organic presses when supported by Teams BA and GB and when welding and machinist support is provided from an outside source. Requires electrical power and administrative transportation support for prolonged operations. Capable of multishift operations.

Basis of Allocation: One to four per Team GB as required.

Mobility: Sixty percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team GD, Heavy Printing (Operations, Camera and Plate).

Capabilities: Plans, controls, and supervises printing operations to produce leaflets, posters, pamphlets, and other propaganda materials. Supervises one to four Teams GE operating at a single location. Executes process photography and prepares photolithographic plates for use by Team GE. Provides electrical equipment maintenance and supply support for itself and attached Teams GE. Requires a fixed facility and outside source of power for operation. Capable of multishift operations.

Basis of Allocation: One per fixed heavy printing requirement.

Mobility: Five percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team GE, Heavy Printing (Press and Processing).

Capabilities: Prints by photolithographic process up to 5,000,000 production units per day of leaflets, posters, pamphlets, and other printed propaganda materials. Trims, cuts, folds, stitches, packages, and distributes reproduced material for dissemination. Provides direct and general support maintenance for organic presses when supported by Teams BA and GD and when welding and machinist support is available from an outside source. Requires a fixed facility, external power source, and administrative transportation support for operation. Capable of multishift operations.

Basis of Allocation: One to four per Team GD.

Mobility: Five percent in organic vehicles.

Team HA, Platoon Headquarters (Audio and Visual).

Capabilities: Supervision of two or more Teams GA, HB, and HC, or K-Series Teams. Operates independently as a liaison detachment. Parachute qualified when supporting an airborne unit.

Basis of Allocation: One or more per psychological operations group, battalion, or company as required; one per PSYOP liaison requirement.

Mobility: One hundred percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team HB, Loudspeaker.

Capabilities: Plans, prepares, records, and conducts live or taped loudspeaker broadcasts in support of psychological operations; produces limited quantity of and distributes leaflets. Loudspeaker with power source may be manpacked or mounted on ground vehicles, boats, or aircraft. Parachute qualified when supporting an airborne unit.

Basis of Allocation: One or more per combat battalion or as required.

Mobility: One hundred percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team HC, Audio Visual.

Capabilities: Exhibits sound motion pictures, film strips and photographic slides; conducts loudspeaker broadcasts; produces limited quantity of and distributes leaflets; conducts face-to-face propaganda; surveys local population to secure PSYOP intelligence.

Basis of Allocation: One or more per PSYOP battalion or company; one per combat brigade or as required by the tactical or political situation.

Mobility: One hundred percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team IA, Mobile Radio Operations.

Capabilities: Supervision of Teams IB, IC, ID, and IE when more than one team is deployed to support an operational mission. Provides user level supply support for PSYOP-peculiar communications-electronic equipment organic to subordinate teams. Requires company level administrative support.

Basis of Allocation: One per PSYOP group, battalion, or company as required.

Mobility: Thirty-two percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team IB, Mobile Radio Monitoring.

Capabilities: Provides news from friendly and enemy radio and teletype sources including CONUS stations and theater headquarters to provide a base for selected propaganda news broadcasts or other propaganda media. Provides tape monitoring of selected broadcasts for subsequent translation and analysis. Performs direct support maintenance on organic communications-electronics equipment. Capable of multishift operations.

Basis of Allocation: One per Team ID or FC as required.

Mobility: One hundred percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team IC, Mobile Radio Engineer.

Capabilities: Transmits medium or shortwave radio broadcasts in support of propaganda operations. Performs direct support maintenance on organic communications-electronics equipment. Capable of multishift operations.

Basis of Allocation: One per propaganda broadcasting mission.

Mobility: Forty percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team ID, Mobile Radio Production.

Capabilities: Prepares and produces up to 8 hours of original radio programs per day in support of propaganda operations. Requires augmentation by indigenous announcers and support by Team FB.

Basis of Allocation: One or more per studio production requirement.

Mobility: Sixteen percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team KA, Fixed Motion Picture.

Capabilities: Provides for the operation of a motion picture installation and/or the operational supervision or advisory assistance for motion picture installations operated by indigenous personnel.

Basis of Allocation: One per motion picture theater when operated by team members. One per three to five motion picture theaters operated by indigenous personnel.

Mobility: One hundred percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team KB, Fixed Printing.

Capabilities: Provides operational control or advisory assistance for an indigenous newspaper or other type publication plant in a specific geographical area. Parachute qualified when supporting an airborne unit.

Basis of Allocation: One per publications' plant as required.

Mobility: Thirty-three percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team KC, Fixed Radio.

Capabilities: Provides operational control or advisory assistance for an indigenous fixed radio broadcasting station. Parachute qualified when supporting an airborne unit.

Basis of Allocation: One per fixed radio station as required.

Mobility: Sixty-seven percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team KD, Display.

Capabilities: Supervises preparation of copy and illustrations; provides control or advisory assistance for the preparation of copy, artwork, displays, bulletin boards, signs, and other graphic media. Requires augmentation by indigenous interpreters, writers,and illustrators.

Basis of Allocation: As required.

Mobility: Thirty-three percent mobile in organic vehicles.

Team KE, Fixed Television.

Capabilities: Provides for the operational supervision and/or the operation of an indigenous television broadcasting station; provides advisory assistance for television networks or stations. Provides limited maintenance and repair of a television broadcasting station.

Basis of Allocation: One per television broadcasting facility or as required.

Mobility: Fifty percent mobile in organic vehicles.

APPENDIX C

FORMAT FOR BASIC PSYOP STUDY (BPS)

CLASSIFICATION

TITLE PAGE

Indicate the target country/area.

MAP OF COUNTRY/AREA

Title of map, map number, map sheet number, and scale.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The executive summary should focus on those PSYOP-exploitable vulnerabilities enumerated in the BPS. It should be written in a clear, brief, accurate, and coherent form. The summary should open with a short resume' of the area with its strategic significance and then state the PSYOP-relevant characteristics and conclusions reached in the BPS.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

See Tab 1.

INTRODUCTION

See Tab 2.

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY

This chapter gives a general review of the evolution of the state and its people, focusing on those aspects having psychological significance. It is not to be a detailed chronology of the country's development. However, the country's history and those factors which contribute to its formation have a preeminent relationship to the country's historical perspective, its attitudes, and its current world position.

The history chapter must be comprehensive in its "issue" orientation because of its special importance to psychological operations. An analysis of those historical issues which bear directly upon present political, economic, and military policies can provide to the operator a solid foundation for the rest of the study.

CHAPTER 2. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

This chapter covers the country's political system, giving a descriptive analysis of the sources of political power, the policymaking process, and the political complexities of the country's government. It should include the system's responsiveness to pressure and the system's influence on the country's politics.

When discussing politics, particular attention must be given to the role of the individuals and special interest groups or political parties in the political system. This should include the political attitudes and values of the population, their view of the political system, and the function of the government within their society.

CHAPTER 3. FOREIGN RELATIONS AND POLICY

This chapter surveys the country's foreign relations, concentrating on its political alinement in world affairs and its relationship with the United States. It describes the foreign policy of the country, but more important, it analyzes and interprets why the country acts as it does in international affairs.

This analysis and interpretation should cover those leaders who make the decisions that determine foreign policy formation and the success of their policy. This study of the foreign relations gives the psychological operator a view of the country's world position and the reasons for this position. The basis for internal support or opposition, as well as the political climate created by these policies, should be examined.

CHAPTER 4. SOCIETY AND CULTURE

This chapter is a descriptive analysis of the subject country's social setting. This analysis provides the operator with the knowledge needed to understand with whom he is to communicate in a possible PSYOP campaign. Every major aspect of the country's social dynamics which can assist in the assessment of its PSYOP potential must be analyzed.

A study of the country's social organization covers all socially transmitted cultural and behavior patterns and characteristics of the people. These include the society's social values and the role of the family. Its culture, social organization, customs, ethnic composition, and the interrelated effects of religion, language, and history should be addressed.

Associated with this structure are those social patterns of religion, culture, and education which determine the character of a society. An important aspect of the country's social condition, the status of the population's health, and those public programs (or the absence thereof) which seek to improve the general welfare may provide key PSYOP indicators. Social problems and intergroup tensions should be covered.

CHAPTER 5. THE ECONOMY

This chapter presents a brief analysis of the characteristics, structure, and dynamics of the national economy. It covers the target country's economic strengths and weaknesses, current economic and labor problems, and potential economic development.

The general description of the economy details the economic base of the country and the importance of agriculture, industry, and trade. This information is used to determine if the individual's needs are being met by the present economic structure. These economic considerations explain many of the sociological conditions of psychological importance. Of particular importance are perceptions within the society of the wisdom of policies, and how citizens individually or by referent groups stand to gain or lose by the policies.

CHAPTER 6. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

In addition to its primary function of external defense, the military establishment in most countries can be a valuable participant in, or impediment to, the country's programs of political life. Even when the military establishment is not directly involved in competition for political power, its actions and programs can have a major impact on social and political development.

This chapter is not "order-of-battle" oriented, but it should, as a minimum, analyze and provide conclusions on the following topic areas:

Emergence of the modern military establishment.

Military roles in the political, economic, and social spheres, and the effects of these roles.

Issues creating cohesion or conflict within the armed forces.

Internal conflicts within the military establishment.

Extent, quality, and influence of foreign military assistance.

CHAPTER 7. COMMUNICATION PROCESS AND EFFECTS

This chapter contains the information essential to understand communications patterns for the implementation of a psychological campaign. It should cover how and through what social means the people of the country communicate with one another (as distinguished from the technical data in the appendix on communications facilities). Data should include languages and language groups, nonverbal communication, and nonverbal symbols peculiar to the country's culture or cultures. It should identify distinctive styles in rhetoric or the visual arts that are significant to PSYOP, as well as dramatic, poetic, and musical forms, that could be used to inspire attitudes, emotions, and behavior desired by the PSYOP planners.

It should include data on formal and informal leadership positions in the society whose incumbents serve as key communicators and opinion leaders. An analysis of the readership and listenership habits of the society as well as an analysis of media effectiveness should also be presented. Freedom of the press issues, if any, should also be addressed.

CHAPTER 8. PSYOP, POLITICAL WARFARE, AND OFFICIAL INFORMATION

This chapter furnishes information on the propaganda conducted by or directed toward the subject country. Research personnel should examine the information efforts of the country's government and agencies, the kinds of domestic and foreign propaganda being produced for the current situation, and the political and philosophical direction of that information. A careful analysis of the effectiveness of propaganda techniques used by institutions within the society may provide useful insights for future US PSYOP efforts.

Propaganda can also come from other countries directed toward the subject country to achieve certain political aims. This chapter, therefore, should explain these foreign efforts, the media employed, to whom directed, and for what political end. Particular attention should be given to United States efforts and facilities for possible use in a future psychological campaign.

CHAPTER 9. POTENTIAL TARGET GROUPS

This chapter is the most important chapter of the BPS in that it synthesizes the most important information and applies it to the identified target groups. There are categories of information that must be used to define the psychological characteristics of each significant target group. These categories are as follows:

The attitude, past and present, and behavior of the target toward the key issues and conditions.

The **accessibility** of the target to propaganda, including the media to which the target is most responsive.

Susceptibility to persuasion. This requires a thorough analysis of the conditions and attitudes that pertain to the target. This analysis should determine what behavior patterns the target can be persuaded to adopt, what resistance must be overcome, and what the possibilities are of successful target persuasion. It is recognized that some targets may not be susceptible to any line of persuasion. Conditions change and so may the susceptibility of the target.

The **effectiveness** of the target in influencing other targets or the target's ability to take direct action to influence events. In the case of a single individual, this means how effective he is as a communicator. In the case of a group, it means what is the power of the group in relation to other groups in effecting attitude change or in taking direct action in accordance with the behavioral results desired by the psychological operator. Initially, a group's effectiveness may not be what is desired, but as the situation changes, its effectiveness may also change.

Vulnerabilities and **sensitivities**. From the standpoint of identifying motivating themes or themes to be avoided, it should be considered that each target will be vulnerable to certain issues and conditions just as it will be sensitive to its own values.

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(U) Table of Contents ..... vii to viii
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2 (U) Government and Politics ..... 2-1 to
(Subchapter headings)
3 (U) Foreign Policy ..... 3-1 to
(Subchapter headings)
4 (U) Society and Culture ..... 4-1 to
(Subchapter headings)
5 (U) The Economy ..... 5-1 to
(Subchapter headings)
6 (U) The Military Establishment ..... 6-1 to
(Subchapter headings)
7 (U) Communication Process and Effects ..... 7-1 to
(Subchapter headings)
8 (U) PSYOP, Political Warfare, and Official Information ..... 8-1 to
(Subchapter headings)
9 (U) Potential Target Groups ..... 9-1 to
(Subchapter headings)

APPENDIX

A (U) Country Summary ..... A-1 to
B (U) Government Structure ..... B-1 to
C (U) Members of Government and Key Personalities ..... C-1 to
D (U) Communications Facilities ..... D-1 to
E (U) Bibliography ..... E-1 to

INTRODUCTION

() This Basic PSYOP Study (BPS) is intended to provide a summary of those aspects of (country name) that are deemed to have significance to the planning and conduct of psychological operations. The study, therefore, strives to isolate and identify those PSYOP-relevant vulnerabilities, characteristics, insights, and opportunities that are perceived by the authors to exist in (country name). It is prepared specifically as a basic source document for further development of estimates, plans, and annexes. Although this study can assist in developing concepts for contingency planning, its composition has not been tailored to the conduct of any current plan. Rather, it is intentionally a "neutral" document in the sense that its data and insights can be used with a wide variety of possible present and future political and military developments in the region.

() (Here should be inserted a paragraph which references the authority directing the study, research cutoff date, and provisions for update.)

() The format directed for use in this Basic PSYOP Study is designed in all cases to focus on the PSYOP aspects of the many topics addressed. It is intended that this document should not be viewed as a comprehensive and self-contained area study, but should instead be used in conjunction with, and as a complement to, such other standard references as the Department of the Army Area Handbook Series. In addition, the following aspects of the purpose and method of preparation of this BPS are pertinent:

a. It results from research that combines both the standard classified products of the national intelligence community and the findings of the academic social science disciplines.

b. It attempts to be more analytical than descriptive in nature and is, therefore, subject to varying individual perspectives.

c. It should be read, and its conclusions analyzed, in conjunction with other Basic PSYOP Studies prepared on (regional area).

d. It does not presume to be either a definitive statement of US foreign policy or a comprehensive and authoritative analysis of (country name), except in those specialized areas that are of direct PSYOP relevance.

() (Here should be inserted a statement of US Policy objectives toward the country in question. This information should be extracted in order of priority from the appropriate ICA Country Plan, Department of State Policy Memorandum, or similar document.)

() Research has revealed certain areas where gaps exist in material presented in this study. These gaps were occasioned by such limitations as the classification level of the BPS, availability of complete and timely information, or time constraints on the scope of the future research. Their enumeration here will hopefully aid future research and point out further inquiries to be made by users of this document.

() (Insert here those issues or BPS relevant data which could not be addressed or completely answered.)

APPENDIX D

FORMAT FOR PSYOP ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters

Location of CP

Date/Time Group

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION NO.__

Reference: List maps, charts, and source documents necessary for understanding the estimate.

1. MISSION

The restated mission determined by the commander after he completes mission analysis in the sequence of command and staff actions. (See FM 101-5.)

2. THE SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS

a. Intelligence Situation.

(1) Characteristics of the area of operations. Analysis of Area of Operations No.__.

(2) Enemy strength and dispositions. Identification of forces opposing the command.

(3) Enemy capabilities.

(a) Affecting tactical mission. Intelligence Estimate No. _____.

(b) Affecting PSYOP activities.

b. Tactical Situation.

(1) Present dispositions. Operation Estimate No. _____.

(2) Possible tactical courses of action.

(a) Course of action one.

(b) Course of action two.

(c) Course of action three.

(3) Projected operations.

c. Personnel Situation.

(1) Personnel Estimate No. _____.

(2) Critical shortages of personnel that will affect PSYOP support of the operation.

(3) Availability of linguistic personnel.

(4) Availability of indigenous personnel for employment with PSYOP.

d. Logistic Situation.

(1) Logistic Estimate No. _____.

(2) Status of PSYOP specific equipment.

(3) Availability of PSYOP related supplies.

e. Civil Affairs Situation.

(1) Civil Affairs Estimate No._____.

(2) Disposition of CA units.

(3) General attitude of population.

(4) Anticipated enemy civilian personnel reactions and possible effects upon our actions.

f. PSYOP Situation.

(1) Disposition of PSYOP elements. (Annex A--Overlay, Disposition of PSYOP Elements.)

(2) PSYOP situation in the area of operations. Include considerations such as areas to be considered occupied and those to be considered liberated. Include any missions, directives, objectives, or guidance received from higher authority.

(3) Requirements for indigenous personnel support.

(4) Peculiarities of operations to be supported that may impact on PSYOP, such as planned use of nuclear weapons, possibility of pursuit or exploitation, planned use of deception measures, previous operations and their effect on enemy morale, etc.

g. Assumptions.

(1) Approximate length of time that area should remain under control of the command.

(2) Probable enemy PSYOP reaction to planned operations.

(3) Other assumptions as required.

h. Special Factors. Other difficulties, difficult patterns, or considerations that may detract from or assist in the accomplishment of PSYOP objectives.

3. ANALYSIS

a. Analyze each course of action to determine its advantages and disadvantages for the conduct of psychological operations. This is done by wargaming the course of action from the current disposition through the objective. (Annex B--Target Analysis of Enemy Forces.)

b. The first part of the analysis is to determine those considerations or enemy capabilities listed in paragraph 2a that will materially assist in choosing the best course of action.

c. The second step is to analyze each contemplated course of action versus the enemy capabilities. Each course of action is analyzed separately against the enemy capabilities to determine the probable psychological impact.

d. There is no attempt to compare courses of action in this paragraph.

e. Identify deficiencies and advantages and disadvantages of each course of action.

4. COMPARISON

a. Compare the courses of action to determine which one offers the best chance of success. In the first paragraph, list the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action that affect PSYOP.

b. Develop and compare methods of overcoming disadvantages in each course of action.

c. In the last subparagraph state a general conclusion as to which course of action offers the best chance of success for PSYOP.

5. CONCLUSIONS

a. PSYOP can support the operation.

b. Tactical course of action number _____ can best be supported from resource viewpoint. Course of action number _____ provides the most exploitable PSYOP situation.

c. Deficiencies requiring the commander's attention.

d. Recommend the adoption of course of action number_____.

XXXX

G5

Annexes: A--Overlay, Disposition of PSYOP Elements (omitted)
B--Target Analysis, Enemy Military Units (omitted)
C--Target Analysis, Civilian Groups in Area of Operations (omitted)
D--Proposed Employment of PSYOP Resources (omitted)

NOTE:

The information contained in the Psychological Operations Estimate of the Situation may be presented in either of two ways. It may be a separate PSYOP estimate as indicated in this appendix, or the considerations may be included in the Civil-Military Operations Estimate as indicated in FM 101-5. This estimate is normally the responsibility of the CMO staff officer, based on input provided by the supporting PSYOP unit.

The PSYOP staff officer in a tactical unit may also make an estimate to determine the best method for accomplishing a PSYOP task. In such a case, he may use the format for the tactical commander's estimate contained in FM 101-5. Similarly, the PSYOP unit commander or staff officer can use the combat service support commander's estimate of the situation.

APPENDIX E

FORMAT FOR PSYOP ANNEX/APPENDIX

CLASSIFICATION

Copy No _____ of _____copies
Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date/Time Group
Message Reference Number

ANNEX/APPENDIX_____ (Psychological Operations) to OPORD No._____.

References: Maps, charts, documents, reports, and other plans which have a significant bearing on the conduct of PSYOP.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order:

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.

(1) Annex A (Intelligence) to OPORD No._____.

(2) Psychological situation.

(a) Enemy military and civilian morale.

(b) Enemy strengths and weaknesses.

(3) Ideological and psychological factors, favorable and unfavorable.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) OPORD No._____.

(2) PSYOP capabilities and plans of friendly forces and agencies.

(3) Refer to command relationship agreements and to requirements for interagency support.

(4) Periodic PSYOP Report _____.

c. Attachments and Detachments. Task organization OPORD_____.

2. MISSON

A clear, concise, and complete statement of what PSYOP is to accomplish in support of the mission stated in the basic OPORD.

CLASSIFICATION

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. Summarize the course of action and state generally the concept for the conduct and control of PSYOP. Where applicable, indicate phasing of the operation and arrangements for the transfer of operational control of PSYOP assets or the transfer of operational control of psychological operations.

b. Tasking. By subparagraph task the major subordinate headquarters to conduct PSYOP in support of specified objectives and tasks.

c. Target Groups. Identify enemy forces and major target groups that the operation is intended to influence or that are affected by PSYOP actions, information, and propaganda activities conducted in support of the operation. Separately identify subgroups of significance to PSYOP. Include an analysis of the vulnerabilities and effectiveness of each target group and each group's susceptibility to PSYOP. This information may be included as an APPENDIX/TAB to the PSYOP ANNEX/APPENDIX.

d. Objectives.

(1) List in separate subparagraphs the officially stated US national policy objectives and the US national psychological objectives within the countries involved.

(2) In separate subparagraphs, state the psychological objectives that are to be achieved from the planned operation or that are to be induced in support of the action.

e. Themes and Actions To Be Stressed or Avoided.

(1) Themes to be stressed.

(2) Themes to be avoided.

(3) Supportive actions.

(4) Prohibited actions.

g. Coordinating Instructions. List details of coordination, control, and instructions applicable to two or more elements of the command. List procedures necessary for approval of PSYOP to be conducted by subordinate units.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Logistics. Provide a statement of the logistical arrangements applicable to PSYOP but not covered in the basic order. This paragraph may include but is not limited to:

(1) Stocking of propaganda and information materials.

(2) Provisions for the supply and maintenance of PSYOP-peculiar supplies and equipment.

(3) Provisions for control and maintenance of indigenous equipment and materials.

b. Administration. Provide a statement of administrative arrangements applicable to PSYOP not covered in basic plan. The following items may be included:

(1) Requirements for special reports.

(2) Fiscal matters relating to special funds.

(3) Personnel matters relating to indigenous personnel.

c. Annex _____ (Service Support) to OPORD _____.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Signal. Refer to appropriate annex.

b. Command. Provide command instructions concerning command post locations. May include topics concerning relationship arrangements of nonmilitary assets available for support.

XXXX
MG

OFFICIAL
/s/XXXX
XXXX
G5

Appendixes/Inclosures:

Distribution:

NOTE: The information concerning the conduct of PSYOP may be presented as a separate appendix to the Civil-Military Operations Annex or included in the body of the CMO Annex. This is normally prepared by the CMO staff officer based on input and recommendations from the supporting PSYOP unit.

APPENDIX F

EXPLANATION OF TARGET ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

The target analysis worksheet (figure F-1) is a systematic method of evaluating tentative targets by relating conditions to the psychological objective. It is the basis for the Psychological Operations Campaign Control Sheet. A separate worksheet should be completed for each tentative target surfaced from the study of intelligence. When completed, each target analysis worksheet should be filed in the appropriate PSYOP workbook.

National objective: Obtain from US policy statements and documents. Sources for US objectives relevant to US Army PSYOP might be unified command military plans, ICA Country Program memorandums, Department of State and Defense policy statements, and other related command PSYOP guidances.

Mission: The mission received from the next higher headquarters or that mission which results from an analysis of the unit's general mission and the resultant PSYOP tasks.

Target: Select target based on PSYOP mission.

Conditions: Current events and environmental factors which affect the target group.

Attitude: The known attitudes of the target group relevant to the mission are listed.

Target susceptibility: Information relative to the ability to persuade the target group. Consideration is given to the unfulfilled wants, needs, and feelings of the target group. Susceptibility must not be confused with accessibility.

Psychological objective: The type of behavioral or attitudinal change desired of the target to help accomplish the mission. Psychological objectives should be stated in measurable terms. The psychological objective must be supported by information concerning target susceptibility and effectiveness.

Target effectiveness: The study of power; it deals with the target group's ability to accomplish the psychological objective.

Impact indicators: Those factors which indicate the target audience responded to PSYOP and thus fulfilled the psychological objectives. In devising the psychological objective(s), the analyst must consider questions to be answered which measure its achievement.

NOTE: Those blocks with an asterisk (*) should be cross-referenced to the appropriate section, page, and paragraph of the PSYOP workbook or other reference source. If information to support these blocks is not available, it may be necessary to submit an EEI to intelligence gathering sources.

TARGET ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

NATIONAL OBJECTIVE: To assist oppressed people in self-determination.

MISSION: (PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVE) Stimulate disaffection against government in power.

TARGET	*CONDITIONS	*ATTITUDE	*TARGET SUSCEPTIBILITY	PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVE	*TARGET EFFECTIVENESS	IMPACT INDICATORS
Dock workers in _____.	Current intelligence indicates that the shortage of food in _____ has resulted in food rationing which favors government officials and deprives urban workers of all but a subsistence diet. (References:	Increasing resentment and animosity toward local bureaucrats. (References:	It should be relatively simple to communicate with this group because their basic need for food is not being effectively met. Their primary concern centers on obtaining sufficient food. They have demonstrated against the government and as a result some were killed and many imprisoned. Preferred communications are those delivered in person by an emotive orator of high prestige. (References:	Persuade the dock workers to take anti-government actions.	This group is well organized and has positive leadership. It is part of a larger union of longshoremen, a critical labor group in this country, dependent upon seaborne communications. These longshoremen have capable representation in the government. The opinions of these representatives are highly significant and are sought after by national leadership. (References:	30% increase in anti-government demonstrations by dock workers. 25% increase in dock worker absenteeism.

Figure F-1.

APPENDIX G

EXPLANATION OF PSYOP CAMPAIGN CONTROL SHEET

The purpose of the psychological operations campaign control sheet is to provide a planning guide that will assist PSYOP planners in organizing and controlling a campaign after the psychological objective(s) has been selected. The campaign control sheet format (figure G-1) is a guide and can be modified to meet local conditions and echelons of command as appropriate.

National objective: The national objective or other applicable policy guidance. This information and the mission received from the next higher headquarters should be transcribed from the target analysis worksheet.

Psychological objective: The measurable psychological objective which has been developed and which will aid in accomplishing the mission. It is stated in terms of desired action and results.

Conditions: A synopsis of the significant entries in the conditions block of the target analysis worksheet.

Target: A summary of the significant attitudes, susceptibility factors, and effectiveness which were contained in the target analysis worksheet.

Related internal development programs: The various ongoing civic action and related programs which support the achievement of the psychological objective. Planned and ongoing programs by other agencies should be noted.

Themes: The lines of persuasion selected through target analysis to be conveyed to the target audience. Care should be taken not to confuse objectives and themes. The theme is the idea to be communicated that will contribute to the accomplishment of the objective.

Campaign: The media to be used, the frequency, and duration.

Implementation: The schedule for monitoring, recording, and controlling propaganda dissemination as the campaign progresses. It reflects changes in duration, intensity, timing, and susceptibilities, and should be completed in pencil.

Campaign impact indicators: The measurable responses that demonstrate the success of the overall campaign.

CAMPAIGN CONTROL SHEET

NATIONAL OBJECTIVE(S)

MISSION (Psychological Objective):

PSYCHOLOGICAL OBJECTIVE	CONDITIONS	TARGET Attitudes-Susceptibility-Effectiveness	RELATED INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS	THEMES	CAMPAIGN Media-Intensity-Timing	IMPLEMENTATION	CAMPAIGN IMPACT INDICATORS

Figure G-1.

Psychological Operations Campaign Control Sheet

APPENDIX H

PSYOP BASIC TERMS

Attitudes are positively or negatively learned orientations toward something or someone that have a tendency to motivate an individual or group toward some behavior. Experienced soldiers, for example, have negative attitudes toward slovenliness.

A Basic PSYOP Study (BPS) is a detailed background document which describes the PSYOP-relevant vulnerabilities, characteristics, insights, and opportunities that are known about a specific country susceptible to exploitation.

Culture is a generic term for beliefs, values, and behavior that are learned while symbolically interacting with other individuals or groups. Culture is shared among individuals and groups and transmitted by means of words, symbols, and actions. It is the use of these means that attaches meaning and value to things that make the human animal unique. By learning, sharing, and transmitting certain beliefs and behaviors (i.e., industrialization, democracy) and not others (i.e., agriculture, dictatorship), one culture is distinct from another.

Cultural relativism is the social science principle that no aspect of human life can be judged meaningfully outside the context of a particular society or culture.

Communication is the process of standardizing and exchanging intelligence perceptions and meanings found in the form of value statements, ideas, sentiments, beliefs, etc., using words, symbols, or actions.

Drives (i.e., hunger, thirst, and activity) are unlearned (primary) or physiologically learned (secondary) internal tensions or stimuli which dispose the individual or group to a general behavior that will satisfy a need. Drives may stimulate an individual or group to cooperation, competition, or accommodation in order to insure survival. Hunger, for example, may stimulate the individual or group to cooperate, compete, commit aggression, hoard food, or gather food.

Ethnocentrism denotes the tendency of some people to use their way of life as a standard for judging and, usually, criticizing others. It indicates a belief by individuals that their race, culture, society, etc., are superior to others.

Folkways are types of norms. They are commonly accepted and informally sanctioned rules of behavior. Or, they may be thought of as being popular ways of thinking or acting, which are customary but not insisted upon. Formal punishments (negative sanctions) are not involved for those who deviate from expected behavior, but some form of informal punishment, such as expulsion, avoidance, or ostracism may be applied. Shaking hands as a way of greeting is an example of a folkway.

Frustration is individual or group inner conflict. It is created or increased by preventing or blocking the individual's or group's attainment of a desired goal. For example, the target individual's or group's unsuccessful attempts to visit their families may create frustration. Or, another example: The unrelenting presence of a combat force surrounding them may also create frustration.

Goals are the objectives that guide purposeful behavior to satisfy needs. For example, an individual or group may excel in combat as a goal to satisfy a perceived need for recognition and prestige, or to satisfy their standards of pride.

Group is two or more people recognized by others as a collectivity interacting to achieve common goals.

In-group or we-group is two or more people who have a mutual feeling of belonging together as a group. Each person identifies with the collectivity and is bound by mutual attitudes of cooperation, devotion, comradeship, loyalty, respect, sympathy, group pride, and a belief in their superiority over those outside the group. The attitudes of an in-group tend to motivate the individual or group to be hostile to, contemptuous of, indifferent to, and isolated from other groups. An in-group may also be a prestige group.

Interaction occurs when two or more individuals may come into contact and a change in the behavior and/or attitude of one, some, or all takes place. The psychological operator, using the technique of face-to-face communications, interacts with an individual or group. Through his persuasive message, a behavior and/or attitude change is sought.

Intercultural relations are the interactions between two or more individuals or groups differing in behaviors they have learned, shared, and transmitted by means of words, symbols, and actions.

Key communicator is an individual or group having the economic, social, or political power to persuade the individuals or groups with which he interacts to change or reinforce existing opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behaviors.

Language is the written or spoken word and symbols that denote or connote meanings to an individual or group. The denotational meaning of a word is all of the objects, events, or instances to which a word refers. The connotational meanings carry the emotional impact of language, rather than rational meaning or expression; i.e., feelings and attitudes rather than concrete physical items.

Mores are contemporary, required, and sanctioned rules (norms) of social behavior, similar to folkways, agreed upon by common consent for the welfare of society, whose violation justifies the use of sanctions. For example, in some societies mores exist that prohibit the eating of beef; in others, the eating of pork.

Motives, unlike the generalized predispositions of drives, are learned and goal directed. They are drives plus learning, allowing purposeful behavior to satisfy needs. Through learning, hunger is alleviated by a search for food. This is in contrast to a drive, a generalized disposition that may encompass a search, aggression, or hoarding.

Motivation is the process by which an individual or group initiates conscious, deliberate, and purposeful action. An individual or group may hear a loudspeaker message stating a comrade has defected and received food, clothing, shelter, and a pardon. Consciously and deliberately, an individual or group may lay down their weapons.

Needs may be described as tension-producing deficiencies within an individual or group, deficiencies which create a stimulus or tension. To reduce the tension, the individual or group initiates a need-satisfying behavior. If the need (tension) must be satisfied to sustain life, it is a primary or innate need (i.e., hunger or thirst), inborne, unlearned, and possessed by each individual or group. If the need is acquired by cultural and/or societal interaction, or related to social survival, it is a secondary or learned need.

Norm is the average or standard behavior, attitude, opinion, or perception shared by and expected of individuals and groups. Norms may be considered as rules in the game of life of each respective social group and related to its specific culture. Norms must also be seen as relative to the cultural setting in which they occur.

Opinion is a view, judgment, or appraisal formed in the mind about a particular matter or particular matters. It may also be said to be an intellectually defined judgment of what is true for the individual or group. It may be more influenced by attitudes than facts.

Out-group, other group, or they-group is comprised of all the individuals or groups that are not participants in the in-group/group under study. The group may be subjected to hostility, indifference, isolation, and contempt, behaviors that can be attributed to the in-group's attitudes. It should be noted, however, that not all individuals look at out-groups with hostility or hatred. Another common feeling is one of envy or a strong desire to become a member of the out-group. This is true when the members of the out-group have higher status and prestige, and the individual has the possibility of joining the out-group once he meets certain requirements. For example, businessmen wishing to increase their prestige desire to join increasingly higher status country or tennis clubs, or enlisted persons may desire to become officers.

Perceived needs are those tension-producing deficiencies which are sensed by vision, hearing, smell, taste, and/or touch and consciously evaluted; the aspect of perception is tinted by the individual's or group's culture and society. Tension, for example, could be suggested to the individual by his smelling the aroma of food cooking or by receiving a persuasive message...hunger.

Perception is the process of evaluating information which has been received and classified by the five physical senses (vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch) and interpreted by criteria of the culture and society.

Politicomilitary activities encompass the complex of military activities which are conducted primarily for their direct, social, economic, political, and psychological impact. The activities, in their purest form, are the interaction of the military with the society-government. The operational concept involves such functions as community relations; civil affairs, to include civic action; psychological operations; certain aspects of informational activities; and coordination with other US Government agencies and friendly foreign governments.

Propaganda is any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.

Psychological objective is a statement of measurable response expected from the target audience as a result of PSYOP. The psychological objective must accurately define the specific behavioral response or attitude change desired which, in turn, must support the PSYOP goals.

Psychological operations include psychological warfare and encompass those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral, friendly, and nonhostile foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior to support the achievement of national objectives.

Psychological warfare is the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

Society is an enduring and cooperative social group whose members have developed organized patterns of relationships, traditions, institutions, and collective activities and interests. Societies may be considered to be relatively independent human groupings that have their own territory, contain persons of all ages and both sexes, and maintain their unique respective lifestyle (culture). The American people, for instance, have formed lasting and cooperative social groupings which demonstrate organized patterns of behavior such as religious, educational, and political systems.

Stimulus is an action agent or activity that inherently promotes or causes a response, stimulation always implying a response. For example, a persuasive message, airdropped into an industrial area, may warn of an impending air bombardment. The message may act as a stimulus, stimulating a mass evacuation of the area.

Strategic PSYOP are generally designed to further broad or long-term aims in coordination with general strategic planning, with gradual results realizable in the indefinite future. They are directed at enemy troops and civilians behind the combat zones or in enemy, friendly, or neutral countries. See "strategic psychological warfare," JCS Pub 1.

Susceptibility is the degree to which the target audience can be influenced to respond in ways that will assist in the accomplishment of the PSYOP portion of the commander's mission.

Symbols are objects or images whose values or meanings are given by those who use or recognize them; the values are not derived from physical properties. For example, the dove may be a symbol of peace.

Taboo is a prohibition whose violation is expected to produce an automatic penalty such as expulsion, confinement, or death at the hands of someone believed to have supernatural powers.

The complete message is the propaganda message (word) and action (deed) to persuade the individual or group to change or strengthen their opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior; the words and deeds are mutually supportive. The deed plus the word equals the message.

Value is the believed ability of someone or something to satisfy a psychological, physical, or social need of an individual or group. For example, an individual or group may defect to satisfy a human need for security, while another individual or group will remain with their fighting unit to satisfy their need for security and/or their pride in self and unit.

Vulnerability is a condition or sensitivity which creates a need within the target audience, rendering it responsive to persuasive appeals.

APPENDIX I

PSYOP TECHNIQUES

Knowledge of propaganda techniques is necessary to improve one's own propaganda and to uncover enemy PSYOP stratagems. Techniques, however, are not substitutes for the procedures in PSYOP planning, development, or dissemination.

Techniques may be categorized as:

Characteristics of the content self-evident. No additional information is required to recognize the characteristics of this type of propaganda. "Name calling" and the use of slogans are techniques of this nature.

Additional information required to be recognized. Additional information is required by the target or analyst for the use of this technique to be recognized. "Lying" is an example of this technique. The audience or analyst must have additional information in order to know whether a lie is being told.

Evident only after extended output. "Change of pace" is an example of this technique. Neither the audience nor the analyst can know that a change of pace has taken place until various amounts of propaganda have been brought into focus.

Repetition. This technique can be noted only after the same word, theme, message, or phrase has been used a number of times.

Nature of the arguments used. An argument is a reason, or a series of reasons, offered as to why the audience should behave, believe, or think in a certain manner. An argument is expressed or implied.

Inferred intent of the originator. This technique refers to the effect the propagandist wishes to achieve on the target audience. "Divisive" and "unifying" propaganda fall within this technique. It might also be classified on the basis of the effect it has on an audience.

SELF-EVIDENT TECHNIQUE

Appeal to Authority. Appeals to authority cite prominent figures to support a position, idea, argument, or course of action.

Assertion. Assertions are positive statements presented as fact. They imply that what is stated is self-evident and needs no further proof. Assertions may or may not be true.

Bandwagon and Inevitable Victory. Bandwagon-and-inevitable-victory appeals attempt to persuade the target audience to take a course of action "everyone else is taking." "Join the crowd." This technique reinforces people's natural desire to be on the winning side. This technique is used to convince the audience that a program is an expression of an irresistible mass movement and that it is in their interest to join. "Inevitable victory" invites those not already on the bandwagon to join those already on the road to certain victory. Those already, or partially, on the bandwagon are reassured that staying aboard is the best course of action.

Obtain Disapproval. This technique is used to get the audience to disapprove an action or idea by suggesting the idea is popular with groups hated, feared, or held in contempt by the target audience. Thus, if a group which supports a policy is led to believe that undesirable, subversive, or contemptible people also support it, the members of the group might decide to change their position.

Glittering Generalities. Glittering generalities are intensely emotionally appealing words so closely associated with highly valued concepts and beliefs that they carry conviction without supporting information or reason. They appeal to such emotions as love of country, home; desire for peace, freedom, glory, honor, etc. They ask for approval without examination of the reason. Though the words and phrases are vague and suggest different things to different people, their connotation is always favorable: "The concepts and programs of the propagandist are always good, desirable, virtuous."

Generalities may gain or lose effectiveness with changes in conditions. They must, therefore, be responsive to current conditions. Phrases which called up pleasant associations at one time may evoke unpleasant or unfavorable connotations at another, particularly if their frame of reference has been altered.

Vagueness. Generalities are deliberately vague so that the audience may supply its own interpretations. The intention is to move the audience by use of undefined phrases, without analyzing their validity or attempting to determine their reasonableness or application.

Rationalization. Individuals or groups may use favorable generalities to rationalize questionable acts or beliefs. Vague and pleasant phrases are often used to justify such actions or beliefs.

Simplification. Favorable generalities are used to provide simple answers to complex social, political, economic, or military problems.

Transfer. This is a technique of projecting positive or negative qualities (praise or blame) of a person, entity, object, or value (an individual, group, organization, nation, patriotism, etc.) to another in order to make the second more acceptable or to discredit it. This technique is generally used to transfer blame from one member of a conflict to another. It evokes an emotional response which stimulates the target to identify with recognized authorities.

Least of Evils. This is a technique of acknowledging that the course of action being taken is perhaps undesirable but that any alternative would result in an outcome far worse. This technique is generally used to explain the need for sacrifices or to justify the seemingly harsh actions that displease the target audience or restrict personal liberties. Projecting blame on the enemy for the unpleasant or restrictive conditions is usually coupled with this technique.

Name Calling or Substitutions of Names or Moral Labels. This technique attempts to arouse prejudices in an audience by labeling the object of the propaganda campaign as something the target audience fears, hates, loathes, or finds undesirable.

Types of name calling:

Direct name calling is used when the audience is sympathetic or neutral. It is a simple, straightforward attack on an opponent or opposing idea.

Indirect name calling is used when direct name calling would antagonize the audience. It is a label for the degree of attack between direct name calling and insinuation. Sarcasm and ridicule are employed with this technique.

Cartoons, illustrations, and photographs are used in name calling, often with deadly effect.

Dangers inherent in name calling: In its extreme form, name calling may indicate that the propagandist has lost his sense of proportion or is unable to conduct a positive campaign. Before using this technique, the propagandist must weigh the benefits against the possible harmful results. It is best to avoid use of this device. The obstacles are formidable, based primarily on the human tendency to close ranks against a stranger. For example, a group may despise, dislike, or even hate one of its leaders, even openly criticize him, but may (and probably will) resent any nongroup member who criticizes and makes disparaging remarks against that leader.

Pinpointing the Enemy: This is a form of simplification in which a complex situation is reduced to the point where the "enemy" is unequivocally identified. For example, the president of country X is forced to declare a state of emergency in order to protect the peaceful people of his country from the brutal, unprovoked aggression by the leaders of country Y.

Plain Folks or Common Man: The "plain folks" or "common man" approach attempts to convince the audience that the propagandist's positions reflect the common sense of the people. It is designed to win the confidence of the audience by communicating in the common manner and style of the audience. Propagandists use ordinary language and mannerisms (and clothes in face-to-face and audiovisual communications) in attempting to identify their point of view with that of the average person. With the plain folks device, the propagandist can win the confidence of persons who resent or distrust foreign sounding, intellectual speech, words, or mannerisms. The audience can be persuaded to identify its interests with those of the propagandist:

Presenting soldiers as plain folks. The propagandist wants to make the enemy feel he is fighting against soldiers who are "decent, everyday folks" much like himself; this helps to counter themes that paint the opponent as a "bloodthirsty" killer.

Presenting civilians as plain folks. The "plain folks" or "common man" device also can help to convince the enemy that the opposing nation is not composed of arrogant, immoral, deceitful, aggressive, warmongering people, but of people like himself, wishing to live at peace.

Humanizing leaders. This technique paints a more human portrait of US and friendly military and civilian leaders. It humanizes them so that the audience looks upon them as similar human beings or, preferably, as kind, wise, fatherly figures.

Categories of Plain Folk Devices:

Vernacular. This is the contemporary language of a specific region or people as it is commonly spoken or written and includes songs, idioms, and jokes. The current vernacular of the specific target audience must be used.

Dialect. Dialect is a variation in pronunciation, grammar, and vocabulary from the norm of a region or nation. When used by the propagandist, perfection is required. This technique is best left to those to whom the dialect is native, because native level speakers are generally the best users of dialects in propaganda appeals.

Errors. Scholastic pronunciation, enunciation, and delivery give the impression of being artificial. To give the impression of spontaneity, deliberately hesitate between phrases, stammer, or mispronounce words. When not overdone, the effect is one of deep sincerity. Errors in written material may be made only when they are commonly made by members of the reading audience. Generally, errors should be restricted to colloquialisms.

Homey words. Homey words are forms of "virtue words" used in the everyday life of the average man. These words are familiar ones, such as "home," "family," "children," "farm," "neighbors," or cultural equivalents. They evoke a favorable emotional response and help transfer the sympathies of the audience to the propagandist. Homey words are widely used to evoke nostalgia. **Care must be taken to assure that homey messages addressed to enemy troops do not also have the same effect on US/friendly forces.**

If the propaganda or the propagandist lacks naturalness, there may be an adverse backlash. The audience may resent what it considers attempts to mock it, its language, and its ways.

Social Disapproval: This is a technique by which the propagandist marshals group acceptance and suggests that attitudes or actions contrary to the one outlined will result in social rejection, disapproval, or outright ostracism. The latter, ostracism, is a control practice widely used within peer groups and traditional societies.

Virtue Words. These are words in the value system of the target audience which tend to produce a positive image when attached to a person or issue. Peace, happiness, security, wise leadership, freedom, etc., are virtue words.

Slogans: A slogan is a brief striking phrase that may include labeling and stereotyping. If ideas can be sloganized, they should be, as good slogans are self-perpetuating.

Testimonials: Testimonials are quotations, in or out of context, especially cited to support or reject a given policy, action, program, or personality. The reputation or the role (expert, respected public figure, etc.) of the individual giving the statement is exploited. The testimonial places the official sanction of a respected person or authority on a propaganda message. This is done in an effort to cause the target audience to identify itself with the authority or to accept the authority's opinions and beliefs as its own. Several types of testimonials are:

Official Sanction. The testimonial authority must have given the indorsement or be clearly on record as having approved the attributed idea, concept, action, or belief. Four factors are involved:

Accomplishment. People have confidence in an authority who has demonstrated outstanding ability and proficiency in his field. This accomplishment should be related to the subject of the testimonial.

Identification with the target. People have greater confidence in an authority with whom they have a common bond. For example, the soldier more readily trusts an officer with whom he has undergone similar arduous experiences than a civilian authority on military subjects.

Position of authority. The official position of authority may instill confidence in the testimony; i.e., head of state, division commander, etc.

Inanimate objects. Inanimate objects may be used in the testimonial device. In such cases, the propagandist seeks to transfer physical attributes of an inanimate object to the message. The Rock of Gibraltar, for example, is a type of inanimate object associated with steadfast strength.

Personal Sources of Testimonial Authority.

Enemy leaders. The enemy target audience will generally place great value on its high level military leaders as a source of information.

Fellow soldiers. Because of their common experiences, soldiers form a bond of comradeship. As a result, those in the armed forces are inclined to pay close attention to what other soldiers have to say.

Opposing leaders. Testimonials of leaders of the opposing nation are of particular value in messages that outline war aims and objectives for administering the enemy nation after it capitulates.

Famous scholars, writers, and other personalities. Frequently, statements of civilians known to the target as authoritative or famous scholars, writers, scientists, commentators, etc., can be effectivly used in propaganda messages.

Nonpersonal Sources of Testimonial Authority.

Institutions, ideologies, national flags, religious, and other nonpersonal sources are often used. The creeds, beliefs, principles, or dogmas of respected authorities or other public figures may make effective propaganda testimonials.

Factors To Be Considered.

Plausibility. The testimonial must be plausible to the target audience. The esteem in which an authority is held by the target audience **will not always** transfer an implausible testimonial into effective propaganda.

False testimonials. Never use false testimonials. Highly selective testimonials? Yes. Lies (fabrications)? Never. Fabricated (false) testimonials are extremely vulnerable because their lack of authenticity makes them easy to challenge and discredit.

PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES WHICH ARE BASED ON CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONTENT BUT WHICH REQUIRE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE PART OF AN ANALYST TO BE RECOGNIZED

Incredible truths. There are times when the unbelievable (incredible) truth not only can but should be used. Among these occasions are:

When the psychological operator is certain that a vitally important event will take place.

A catastrophic event, or one of significant tactical or strategic importance, unfavorable to the enemy has occurred and the news has been hidden from the enemy public or troops.

The enemy government has denied or glossed over an event detrimental to its cause.

A double-cutting edge. This technique has a double-cutting edge: It increases the credibility of the US/friendly psychological operator while decreasing the credibility of the enemy to the enemy's target audience. Advanced security clearance must be obtained before using this technique so that operations or projects will not be jeopardized or compromised. Actually, propagandists using this technique will normally require access to special compartmented information and facilities to avoid compromise of other sensitive operations or projects of agencies of the US Government.

Though such news will be incredible to the enemy public, it should be given full play by the psychological operator. This event and its significance will eventually become known to the enemy public in spite of government efforts to hide it. The public will recall (the psychological operator will "help" the recall process) that the incredible news was received from US/ allied sources. They will also recall the deception of their government. The prime requirement in using this technique is that the disseminated incredible truth must be or be certain to become a reality.

Insinuation. Insinuation is used to create or stir up the suspicions of the target audience against ideas, groups, or individuals in order to divide an enemy. The propagandist **hints, suggests,** and **implies,** allowing the audience to draw its own conclusions. Latent suspicions and cleavages within the enemy camp are exploited in an attempt to structure them into active expressions of disunity which weaken the enemy's war effort.

Exploitable vulnerabilities. Potential cleavages which may be exploited include the following:

Political differences between the enemy nation and its allies or satellites.

Ethnic and regional differences.

Religious, political, economic, or social differences.

History of civilian animosity or unfair treatment toward enemy soldiers.

Comforts available to rear area soldiers and not available to combat soldiers.

People versus the bureaucracy or hierarchy.

Political differences between the ruling elite, between coalitions members, or between rulers and those out of power.

Differences showing a few benefiting at the expense of the general populace.

Unequal or inequitable tax burdens, or the high level of taxes. The audience should be informed of hidden taxes.

The scarcity of consumer goods for the general public and their availability to the various elites and the dishonest.

Costs of present government policies in terms of lost opportunities to accomplish constructive socially desirable goals.

The powerlessness of the individual. (This may be used to split the audience from the policies of its government by disassociating its members from those policies.) This technique could be used in preparing a campaign to gain opposition to those government policies.

Insinuation devices. A number of devices are available to exploit these and similar vulnerabilities:

Leading questions: The propagandist may ask questions which suggest only one possible answer. Thus, the question, "What is there to do now that your unit is surrounded and you are completely cut off?" insinuates that surrender or desertion is the only reasonable alternative to annihilation.

Humor: Humor can be an effective form of insinuation. Jokes and cartoons about the enemy find a ready audience among those persons in the target country or military camp who normally reject straightforward accusations or assertions. Jokes about totalitarian leaders and their subordinates often spread with ease and rapidity. However, the psychological operator must realize that appreciation of humor differs among target groups and so keep humor within the appropriate cultural context.

Pure motives. This technique makes it clear that the side represented by the propagandist is acting in the best interests of the target audience, insinuating that the enemy is acting to the contrary. For example, the propagandist can use the theme that a satellite force fighting on the side of the enemy is insuring the continued subjugation of its country by helping the common enemy.

Guilt by association: Guilt by association links a person, group, or idea to other persons, groups, or ideas repugnant to the target audience. The insinuation is that the connection is not mutual, accidental, or superficial.

Rumor: Malicious rumors are also a potentially effective form of insinuation.

Pictorial and photographic propaganda: A photograph, picture, or cartoon can often insinuate a derogatory charge more effectively than words. The combination of words and photograph, picture, or cartoon can be far more effective. In this content, selected and composite photographs can be extremely effective.

Vocal: Radio propagandists can artfully suggest a derogatory notion, not only with the words they use, but also by the way in which they deliver them. Significant pauses, tonal inflections, sarcastic pronunciation, ridiculing enunciation, can be more subtle than written insinuation.

Card stacking or selective omission: This is the process of choosing from a variety of facts only those which support the propagandist's purpose. In using this technique, facts are selected and presented which most effectively strengthen and authenticate the point of view of the propagandist. It includes the collection of all available material pertaining to a subject and the selection of that material which most effectively supports the propaganda line. Card stacking, case making, and censorship are all forms of selection. Succes or failure depends on how successful the propagandist is in selecting facts or "cards" and presenting or "stacking" them.

Increase prestige: In time of armed conflict, leading personalities, economic and social systems, and other institutions making up a nation are constantly subjected to propaganda attacks. Card stacking is used to counter these attacks by publicizing and reiterating the best qualities of the institutions, concepts, or persons being attacked. Like most propaganda techniques, card stacking is used to supplement other methods.

The technique may also be used to describe a subject as virtuous or evil and to give simple answers to a complicated subject.

An intelligent propagandist makes his case by imaginative selection of facts. The work of the card stacker in using selected facts is divided into two main phases:

First, the propagandist selects only favorable facts and presents them to the target in such a manner as to obtain a desired reaction.

Second, the propagandist uses these facts as a basis for conclusions, trying to lead the audience into accepting the conclusions by accepting the facts presented.

Presenting the other side: Some persons in a target audience believe that neither belligerent is entirely virtuous. To them propaganda solely in terms of right and wrong may not be credible. Agreement with minor aspects of the enemy's point of view may overcome this cynicism. Another use of presenting the other side is to reduce the impact of propaganda that opposing propagandists are likely to be card stacking (selective omission).

Lying and distortion: Lying is stating as truth that which is contrary to fact. For example, assertions may be lies. **This technique will not be used by US personnel.** It is presented for use of the analyst of enemy propaganda.

Simplification: This is a technique in which the many facts of a situation are reduced so the right or wrong, good or evil, of an act or decision is obvious to all. This technique (simplification) provides simple solutions for complex problems. By suggesting apparently

simple solutions for complex problems, this technique offers simplified interpretations of events, ideas, concepts, or personalities. Statements are positive and firm; qualifying words are never used.

Simplification may be used to sway uneducated and educated audiences. This is true because many persons are well educated or highly skilled, trained specialists in a specific field, but the limitations of time and energy often force them to turn to and accept simplifications to understand, relate, and react to other areas of interest.

Simplification has the following characteristics:

It thinks for others: Some people accept information which they cannot verify personally as long as the source is acceptable to them or the authority is considered expert. Others absorb whatever they read, see, or hear with little or no discrimination. Some people are too lazy or unconcerned to think problems through. Others are uneducated and willingly accept convenient simplifications.

It is concise: Simplification gives the impression of going to the heart of the matter in a few words. The average member of the target audience will not even consider that there may be another answer to the problem.

It builds ego: Some people are reluctant to believe that any field of endeavor, except their own, is difficult to understand. For example, a layman is pleased to hear that "law is just common sense dressed up in fancy language," or "modern art is really a hodgepodge of aimless experiment or nonsense." Such statements reinforce the ego of the lay audience. It is what they would like to believe, because they are afraid that law and modern art may actually be beyond their understanding. Simple explanations are given for complex subjects and problems.

Stereotyping is a form of simplification used to fit persons, groups, nations, or events into readymade categories that tend to produce a desired image of good or bad. Stereotyping puts the subject (people, nations, etc.) or event into a simplistic pattern without any distinguishing individual characteristics.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTENT WHICH MAY BECOME EVIDENT WHEN NUMEROUS PIECES OF OUTPUT ARE EXAMINED

Change of Pace: Change of pace is a technique of switching from belligerent to peaceful output, from "hot" to "cold," from persuasion to threat, from gloomy prophecy to optimism, from emotion to fact.

Stalling: Stalling is a technique of deliberately withholding information until its timeliness is past, thereby reducing the possibility of undesired impact.

Shift of Scene: With this technique, the propagandist replaces one "field of battle" with another. It is an attempt to take the spotlight off an unfavorable situation or condition by shifting it to another, preferably of the opponent, so as to force the enemy to go on the defense.

REPETITION

An idea or position is repeated in an attempt to elicit an almost automatic response from the audience or to reinforce an audience's opinion or attitude. This technique is extremely valid and useful because the human being is basically a creature of habit and develops skills and values by repetition (like walking, talking, code of ethics, etc.). An idea or position may be repeated many times in one message or in many messages. The intent is the same in both instances, namely, to elicit an immediate response or to reinforce an opinion or attitude.

PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES BASED ON THE NATURE OF THE ARGUMENTS USED

The two major types of arguments used in propaganda are rational and nonrational. When this category is used, it must be understood that the truth or falsity of the content has nothing to do with the nature of the argument. Thus, an elaborate structure of reasons proposed to a target audience might consist entirely of lies but still qualify as a rational appeal.

The outstanding example of a rational argument is one using the least-of-evils technique. Selection, case making, and card stacking also fall within the category of rational arguments, as might appeals to authority and, possibly, testimonials.

Nonrational arguments sometimes contain numerous virtue words or engage in considerable name calling. But the mere presence of these characterictics is insufficient reason to label an argument nonrational.

PROPAGANDA CLASSIFIED ON THE BASIS OF THE INFERRED INTENTS OF THE ORIGINATOR

Anticipatory or Preparatory: This type of propaganda is disseminated in order to bring the expectancies of the target audience in line with the realities of the situation. This technique which prepares the audience for the "worst" is used to soften the blow of an unfavorable situation or result.

Divisive Propaganda: Divisive propaganda intentionally raises issues to stir up dissent and factions within the target audience.

Hot Potato: Hot potato is a technique in which the propagandist presents a potentially embarrassing event, situation, or issue in order to force the enemy to respond, knowing that the response will put the opponent in a bad light.

Coercive Propaganda: This type of propaganda uses forceful or threatening language in order to intimidate the target audience into supporting a position. It is of limited value and duration.

Fear themes and messages: Fear themes and messages are among the most effective means of influencing target audiences. Fear which binds group members against the outside, such as fear that the enemy (the outsider) will block, erode, or destroy the basic values of the audience, has long been used by individuals and groups having parochial interests. In the realm of politics this is illustrated when factions within a political entity are bitterly split over an important issue and someone from outside the entity enters the conflict with his solution to the divisive problem. The differing parties will immediately unite (close ranks) against the outsider.

Using fear messages: When using fear messages, give specific, simple instructions in offering a solution that minimizes the possibility of danger. The message must state or infer that the action called for can be performed if the target follows precisely the simple and precise instructions given in the message. In giving instructions, the psychological operator wants to affect behavior, not test intelligence.

Effectiveness of fear messages: Fear messages are most effective when:

They arouse fear for the safety and welfare of the individual and close family members.

The source of the message is prestigious and credible to the target audience.

The audience is not familiar with the details of the threat posed. Ignorance of the details can be used to pose a threat and build fear.

Members of the audience are self-centered.

The target can take immediate action to execute simple, specific instructions.

Fear of change. People fear change, particularly sudden, imposed change over which they have no control. They fear it will take from them status, wealth, family, friends, comfort, safety, life, or limb. That's why the man in the foxhole hesitates to leave it. He knows and is accustomed to the safety it affords. He is afraid that moving out of his foxhole will expose him to new and greater danger. That is why the psychological campaign must give him a safe, honorable way out of his predicament or situation.

Terrorism: The United States is absolutely opposed to the use of terror or terror tactics. But the psychological operator can give a boomerang effect to enemy terror, making it reverberate against the practitioner, making him repugnant to his own people, and all others who see the results of his heinous savagery. This can be done by disseminating fully captioned photographs in the populated areas of the terrorist's homeland. Such leaflets will separate civilians from their armed forces; it will give them second thoughts about the decency and honorableness of their cause, make them wonder about the righteousness of their ideology, and make the terrorists repugnant to them. Followup leaflets can "fire the flames" of repugnancy, indignation, and doubt, as most civilizations find terror repugnant.

In third countries: Fully captioned photographs depicting terroristic acts may be widely distributed in third countries (including the nation sponsoring the enemy) where they will instill a deep revulsion in the general populace. Distribution in neutral countries is particularly desirable in order to swing the weight of unbiased humanitarian opinion against the enemy.

The enemy may try to rationalize and excuse its conduct (terroristic), but in so doing, it will compound the adverse effect of its actions, because it can never deny the validity of true photographic representations of its acts. Thus, world opinion will sway to the side of the victimized people.

Friendly territory: Under no circumstances should such leaflets be distributed in friendly territory. To distribute them in the friendly area in which the terrorists' acts took place would only create feelings of insecurity. This would defeat the purpose of the psychological operator, which is to build confidence in the government or agency he represents.

APPENDIX J

GRAPHICS, MUSIC, AND SOUND EFFECTS REGISTER GUIDES

Lists and files of art, music, and sound effects native to the anticipated area or country of operations should be prepared by PSYOP units. The material should be continuously reevaluated and upgraded.

The lists in this appendix are guides to material to support propaganda production or in-country PSYOP campaigns.

GRAPHICS REGISTER GUIDE

Scenery and Scenes:

Scenery

Street scenes, cities, towns, villages, hamlets

Idyllic scenes

People:

Key personalities

Members of target audience ethnic groups

Crowds

Children in ordinary and extraordinary, charming, amusing, sad,or tragic poses or activities

Target audience ethnic groups engaged in their various occupations

Military groups with accurate depiction of uniforms, arms, and equipment

Families at home, work, play

Depictions of all possible emotions by individuals

Clothing of all groups and ages, both sexes (including common denominator infantry clothing)

The Home:

Interiors, exteriors, all types of domiciles, private and public buildings, installations, and factories

Furniture and furnishings

Food, food preparation, eating habits, sources of food

Noneconomic Events and Activities:

Activities involving US, friendly and enemy military personnel, and target civilian population groups

Social activities of all groups and ages

Religious activities

Amusements

Sports

Unusual events and incidents

Economic Activities:

Industrial

Commercial

Financial

Agricultural

Waterborne

Other normal occupations

Unusual occupations of all groups

Means of transportation, from human bearers to aircraft

Equipment-Occupational and Household:

Tools, farm implements

Weapons

Utensils, cutlery

Art Forms:

Music

Dance

Painting, drawing, sculpture

Representations of femininity

Representations of masculinity

Pornography--of areas in which acceptable

Military:

Records (photographic, if possible) of all rehabilitation, MAP, AID, and other similar support, US and foreign

Records (photographic, if possible) of typical pre-MAP or AID conditions, especially of well-known buildings and installations

Records (photographs, if possible) of war damages

Records (photographs, if possible) of friendly PSYOP and audience reactions

Long-range photography (close-up, if possible) of enemy frontline positions and fortifications

Photographs of the activities, comforts, and conditions of prisoners of war and civilian internees. Must not be in violation of Rules of Land Warfare and pertinent conventions.

MUSIC REGISTER GUIDE

A music file should be established. The following outline can be used as a guide for such a file:

Folk tunes: dances, ballads

Classics: operas, traditional music

Popular music: currently popular, perennially popular, jazz

Patriotic music: national anthems, military, special holiday, ceremonial, and historical music

Religious music

Denied music: Each music composition, song, or ditty which has been denied to target audiences should be collected, stored, and prepared for use as occasions warrant

Songs of vendors: Record and collect these as feasible

SOUND EFFECTS REGISTER GUIDE

Musical openings, closing bridges, and other sound effects are of vital importance to the dramatic emphasis which may be integrated into sound programs (radio, loudspeaker, television). Ideally, they should be produced by local musicians from areas of operational interest during nonconflict periods. Suggested types of sound effects which should be stored are-

Musical Effects:

Majestic fanfares to usher in processions of dignitaries

Music connotating massive bustling activity of major proportions and importance

Musical announcements of a gathering of martial forces

Fanfares for important announcements

Heavy dramatic openings, serious (some in minor key)

Light dramatic openings, some comic and gay

Medium dramatic openings, not comic nor heavy

Dramatic martial openings, especially for documentaries

Musical connotations of massive destruction, as of a destroyed city, scorched earth, a deserted village, or a wasteland

Musical suggestions of desperation, strong emotions, or agitation

Comical musical representations

Connotations of a mysterious atmosphere with overtones of menace

Meditations

Suggestions of a whimsical tale to follow; light, frothy

Musical descriptions of a street scene, business activities, many people, shopping, bargaining, traffic tieups

Swirling fogs, musically described

Treachery, musically invoked

Musical descriptions of the emotional reactions to a moral blow

Musical reaction to the worst possible news

Musical connotations of the awakening of anger followed by that which evokes mysterious menace, purposeful revenge

Dangerous action

Tone pictures of early morning, of songbirds, or the morning dew--of an awakening, a beginning

Peasant dances, gatherings

Musical equivalent of a comic or amusing interlude, clowns dancing

Music for nature at work, activities of nature, birds, animals

Man at work, building, creating

Warm feeling of an emotional uplift

Musical description of hope awakening, help coming

Music for the approach of the unknown--its steady approach, closer and closer

A poignant stab

An emotional shock, changing to a mood of mystery

Sharp stabs--strings

Stab and holds, repeated to build up tension (varying lengths)

Light dramatic curtains

Medium dramatic curtains

Heavy dramatic curtains

Documentary curtains

Fear music, reactions to approaching disasters

Martial music, national pride musically expressed

Sadness, music connotating the loss of something dear

Musical contemplation, connotating relaxed moods

Music expressing excitement, hurry, confusion, bustle

Other Sound Effects:

Sounds of military action

Street noises

Airport sounds

Animal sounds

Sounds of the market place

Farm sounds

Train and boat whistles

Sounds of various types of vehicles

Sounds of school, bells, children at play, in class

Sounds of church, mosque, temple, etc; praying, bells, gongs, drums, songs, dances, etc.

Sounds of local people at work, play, at home

Transportation sounds, harbor sounds, truck, rail, and other transport sounds

Additional Sound Effects: Additional sound effects are frequently necessary for the production of radio and television programs. Some are also pertinent to loudspeaker broadcasts.

31 AUGUST 1979

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

E. C. MEYER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

J. C. PENNINGTON
Major General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

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A SYLLABUS of PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE



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A SYLLABUS of PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

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PROPAGANDA BRANCH, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, WDGS
THE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OCTOBER, 1946

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Cover Illustration

The leaflet shown on the cover is an instance of the "civilian-action" type. It was an appeal to Chinese villagers to aid American airmen who might be wounded, to conceal them from Japanese, to facilitate their return to base. Another leaflet in the same series is shown in illustration number 8 on page 36.

Note

Instructional and informational material concerning psychological warfare has been requested in a considerable number of inquiries addressed to Propaganda Branch, Intelligence Division. This SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE has been prepared to meet such inquiries until more basic documentation is available. Psychological warfare, sometimes called military propaganda, is a subject new to formal American military doctrine; its definition in relation to other military topics will accordingly take special time and care. A field manual, a technical manual, ordnance and air studies and other appropriate documents are in course of preparation, but until they are approved for publication, no book or outline can be represented as expressing the official views and policies of the War Department. This SYLLABUS is designed to serve during the interim and it must be understood to be provisional in character. It will be superseded when the more formal publications become available.

This SYLLABUS is designed either for independent reading or for course instruction. It has been prepared by Major Paul M. A. Linebarger, AUS, who is in civilian life a professor at the School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D. C. Major Linebarger is also preparing a college-level textbook on psychological warfare. He has worked in this field at the old Psychological Warfare Branch, the O.W.I., the CBI and China Theater propaganda facilities and this Branch.

The Psychological Warfare Division, G-2, Army Ground Forces has closely cooperated in the preparation of this SYLLABUS for publication. Propaganda Branch issues and endorses this SYLLABUS only to the extent of making it available as an instructional aid.

Dana W. Johnston
DANA W. JOHNSTON
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Propaganda Branch
Intelligence Division, WDGS

408022

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I. Definitions

¶1. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. Psychological warfare has been defined as warfare psychologically waged; that is, military operations carried out with close and studied reference to the politics, opinion, and morale of the enemy. It is not in this sense that the term has been used in American practice during World War II. Psychological warfare has been, more narrowly, defined as comprising the use of propaganda against an enemy, together with such other operational measures of a military nature as the effective use of propaganda may require.

¶2. PROPAGANDA. Propaganda may be loosely described as "organized non-violent persuasion." More technically, it may be defined for Army purposes as follows: Military propaganda consists of the planned use of any form of communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given enemy, neutral, or friendly foreign group for a specific strategic or tactical purpose.

¶3. OVERT PROPAGANDA. Overt or "white" propaganda is propaganda which is officially or otherwise plainly issued from a known source. (See Illustrations #1, #4, or #5, as opposed to #9, which falsely implies that it is of American origin.)

¶4. COVERT PROPAGANDA. Covert or "black" propaganda is issued from a concealed or falsified source. (Illustration #9; or a radio station which pretends to be a "freedom station" and is actually operated by one of the belligerent powers.)

¶5. STRATEGIC PROPAGANDA. Strategic propaganda is directed at enemy forces, enemy peoples or enemy-occupied areas in their entirety and--in coordination with other strategically planned means--is designed to effectuate results sought over a long period of time.

¶6. TACTICAL PROPAGANDA. Tactical propaganda (sometimes called "combat propaganda") is directed at specific audiences, and is prepared and executed in support of combat operations.

¶7. CONSOLIDATION PROPAGANDA. Consolidation propaganda is directed toward civil populations in areas occupied by a military force and is designed to insure compliance with the commands promulgated by the commander of the occupying force.

¶8. COUNTERPROPAGANDA. Counterpropaganda is designed to refute a specific point or theme of enemy propaganda.

¶9. POLITICAL WARFARE. Political warfare (also called "crisis diplomacy," or "the war of nerves," or the "diplomacy of dramatic intimidation") consists of the framing of national policy in such a way as to facilitate propaganda or military operations, whether with respect to the direct political relations of governments to one another or in relation to groups of persons possessing a political character.

¶10. MEDIA. The devices by means of which the communication is conveyed. (In everyday life, the most common media are the living voice, the telephone, print, and the typewriter. In war propaganda, the most common media are voice radio, wireless in plain code, leaflets and pamphlets.)

II. Psychological Warfare, 1914-1918

¶11. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR. In the first World War, psychological warfare was employed chiefly by means of political warfare and through combat propaganda which used air-borne and artillery-fired leaflets. Radio was not available.

¶12. POLITICAL WARFARE OF THE CENTRAL POWERS AND THE ALLIES. The Central Powers used very old-fashioned political warfare. They were reactionary monarchies, legitimist in outlook, and were unable to exploit the revolutionary, democratic or autonomist sentiments of the time. Their chief political warfare exploits consisted of inducing Turkey to proclaim a jihad against the Allies; since the Turkish sultan was the titular caliph of all Islam, this seemed promising but was countered by local measures (T. E. Lawrence and the Arab revolt against Turkey, for example) in the Middle East, and of the assistance offered to Lenin and the Bolshevik leaders by the German General Staff. The Germans gave Lenin, a subject of the Czar, transit from Switzerland to Finland in the expectation that Lenin would enter Russia, commit high treason against the Czar, and take Russia out of the war. He did so, but the ensuing wave of Communist revolution contributed to the defeat of Germany as well.

Allied psychological warfare was based preeminently on the political warfare developed by President Woodrow Wilson. The United States entered the war in 1917 with a clear conscience, since the Kaiser's government was plainly the aggressor. Immediately upon participation, the U. S. government strove for the Fourteen Points. These assured both Allies and enemies that the United States sought no new territory as a result of war, that we stood for open diplomacy, that we believed in a "league to enforce peace" which would make further war impossible. They also promised democratic self-government to the hitherto-suppressed nationalities of the Baltic and Central Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, etc.). This democratic political offensive was propagandized by official government action, but its greatest effect was achieved when it was carried by ordinary news channels all over the world.

British political warfare supplemented American effectively. In special cases, the British accomplished even more striking results. Against Turkey they rallied the Arab states, while rallying world-wide Jewish Zionist help to their side by promising the Jews a national home in Palestine (Balfour Declaration). India was quieted, in the face of German, Turkish, and revolutionary propaganda, by the Montagu statement and Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. Japanese political warfare during World War I was directed at her co-Ally, China.

At the end of the war, the Allies faced a serious problem in the revolutionary propaganda of the Russian Communists, who had established a Soviet communist form of state which denied the legitimacy of all other states. The Soviet leaders expected revolution to break out throughout the world. Communist revolts did occur in Hungary, Bavaria, Berlin and elsewhere. The Allies countered these with military intervention on the side of the Conservatives in Russia and with diplomatic and military aid to the states around Russia ("cordon sanitaire"). The reciprocal bitterness and suspicion which resulted from this clash between Allies and Bolsheviks later provided a line of cleavage which Hitler utilized in preparing World War II.

¶14. THE CREEL COMMITTEE. The national propaganda agency of the United States government--the Committee on Public Information, usually known by the name of its chairman, George Creel--was the "Creel Committee." This was actually an emergency wartime department of the government. It was set up by order of the President and was financed out of his special war funds, later supplemented by congressional appropriations. The Creel Committee organized both domestic and foreign propaganda. (There was no War Department or General Staff agency charged with the military side of psychological warfare.) Coordination was effected by Mr. Creel himself; he had close access to the President and to the appropriate cabinet members.

¶15. DOMESTIC PROPAGANDA. Internal propaganda within the United States was more difficult than it was to be in World War II. The decision to declare war had to be taken by the United States. The Germans had been too clever to unite us, as did the Japanese with their psychological blunder at Pearl Harbor, by means of an overt attack on American territory. The Creel Committee had the normal problems of wartime morale (slackers, profiteers, inert people); it also had well-organized groups of Irish-Americans (Ireland then being anti-British), German-Americans and powerful isolationists to counter. The Committee proceeded vigorously on the domestic front. Since there was no radio, it organized "Four Minute Men," standardized public speakers who carried war messages throughout the country. It served the press by systematizing government information policy. It used posters, advertising, cartoons, civic clubs, the theatre, movies, and women's organizations as outlets for its material. The political warfare--the extent of the promises made for a democratic, war-free, prosperous post-war world--probably contributed to the post-1918 reaction against "propaganda" which continued down to World War II; in retrospect, it appears excessive and certain to have caused post-war disappointment and embarrassment to the government.

¶16. TACTICAL PROPAGANDA. Leaflets were the chief means of battle-front propaganda on the Western front. The Germans threatened to

take measures against British airplane pilots who dropped leaflets, so that the British and Americans relied chiefly on mortars and balloons. In General Pershing's headquarters, a section G-2 D was organized for "psychologic" warfare, and tactical leaflets were showered on the German lines. These included surrender passes; forms on which Germans could notify their families that they were safe, pictures of well-fed prisoners of war in American hands; political attacks on Kaiserism and on Prussian control of non-Prussian Germany; leaflets giving the German troops the correct news of the war, when bad; and emphasis on the democratic aims of the Allies. German profiteers and capitalists were attacked. Chief emphasis was on food, however, since the Germans were starving, and on the fact that the Americans had arrived in Europe in large numbers and that millions more were coming. Post-1918 German commentators (including Ludendorff and Hitler) blamed Germany's defeat on Allied propaganda, and credited the Allies with effective professional propaganda. Part of the German willingness to admire Allied propaganda must be discounted, since the German admiration was based in part on an unwillingness to admit loss of the war by military means. Nevertheless, propaganda was a major ingredient of Allied victory in World War I.

¶17. THE INTER-WAR PERIOD. The Communists used propaganda as a major weapon for achieving and consolidating their rule in Russia, and used propaganda for the attempted subversion of "capitalist states". This tended to identify propaganda as something which "Bolsheviks" could use, but which established governments could not counter-employ. In tactical psychological warfare, propaganda was the main feature of Chiang Kai-shek's preliminary unification of China; he had studied Russian irregular warfare and psychological warfare in Moscow.



Illustration #1. American Combat Leaflet, World War I. Although the leaflet uses the German form of the Feldpostkarte and copies the make-up of the original German, it is not "black" propaganda, since there is no attempt to conceal either source or intent. The postcard is to be handed to the first American officer whom the prisoner sees after he surrenders. By marking out appropriate entries, he can send the message to his family that he is well, well-cared for and getting "beef, white bread, beans, plums, genuine coffee-bean coffee, milk, butter, tobacco. . ."--all of them items unprocurable inside Germany.

III. Experience of World War II

¶18. THE NAZIS AS PROPAGANDISTS. In order to gain control of Germany, the National Socialist German Workers' Party, as Hitler called himself and his followers, had to use psychological warfare methods in time of peace. This was made possible by the breach of faith between Left and Right in Germany, each of which had become acutely conscious of propaganda. (The Left, KPD, or German Communist Party, was so propaganda-sensitive that all considerations of constitutionalism or internal security had to be reviewed on the assumption that other parties were propaganda-conscious and that every political move was filled with propaganda value. This stultified their own effectiveness. The anti-Nazis never united successfully.) The Nazis cynically tried to learn from Communist experience and soon gained a mastery of mass media. They used posters, rumor campaigns, personal intimidation, mass rallies, radio, and a coordinated press. They learned strategic psychological warfare techniques--simplicity, clarity, repetition, splitting the opponents, alternate appeasement and intimidation of antagonists--on their way to power within Germany. Once in power, they subordinated their politics to propaganda.

¶19. EFFECTS OF OVER-EMPHASIZED PROPAGANDA. The Nazis over-did propaganda to the extent that neither the Nazi party members nor, even less, the German people could tell what they really wanted. They could not even find out what Germany as a whole was doing or planning to do. The government controlled all news, entertainment, radio, telegraphs; the mails were not secret; publishing was under license. Opposition had to be violent and illegal ("purges"). Secret police and internal espionage used terror against the home population. This gave the Germans a united country. They did not have to worry about cheap, insincere, or fatuous opposition. They did not have to put up with foreign or private propaganda. But they paid a terrible price for this false security, since they lost all chance of finding out their own true economic, political or legal position. By being too suspicious of outside propaganda, they made themselves the utter, willing dupes of Hitlerite propaganda. Propaganda not only put Hitler into power; it helped to keep him there after all other parties were "unified" into the Nazi party or else suppressed, and after criticism and opposition gave the Germans no further chance to check up on him or to oppose him, except through high treason. The evils of the private press were ended; the evils of a single-party system and a controlled press were greater.

¶20. THE CONQUEST OF AUSTRIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. After achieving power within Germany, Hitler began applying the same tactics in his foreign affairs. He called the bluff of the Allies by re-

militarizing the Rhineland, by making it seem a mere matter of prestige. He bullied Austria into submission; Nazi troops crossed the frontier without opposition and reduced the whole country without having to fight. This was accomplished by careful analysis of public opinion in the possible enemy states and by the use of propaganda to scare the victim while assuring all other prospective victims that the occasion in question was the last aggression. Hitler used psychological warfare in the broad sense as well as strategic and tactical propaganda. In 1938, with the Munich crisis, he scored his greatest victory in psychological warfare. The Western democracies (France, England) agreed to the partition of Czechoslovakia in a conference with the Axis (Italy, Germany) while the Russians were excluded from the bargaining. Hitler's propaganda emphasized German claims to the Czech territory in question, and promised no more aggression. Using the threat of force and the manipulation of anti-World War opinion in the democracies themselves, Hitler's propaganda won. A few months later he took the rest of Czechoslovakia and followed that by bullying Russia into a neutrality agreement. The scene was ready for further aggression. Psychological warfare had made the victims themselves agree to each single aggression, had made them hope it was the last, and had kept them from forming an alliance to meet the common danger.

¶21. MILITARY THREAT BEHIND THE PROPAGANDA OPERATION. These successes could not have been won if suspicions between Communists and democratic countries had not been high, if anti-war sentiment had not been so strong, if Hitler had been more frank about his ultimate aims. Furthermore, they could not have been won if psychological warfare had not been backed up by a very real threat of armed force. Hitler did not begin his major aggressions until he had a military edge on his opponents, and his propaganda made his strength seem greater than it was. Whenever he was not operating he let his army and Luftwaffe seem weak, and encouraged the idea he was unready; but crises were underscored with the threat of real military force. Unless the force had actually been there, the powers of Europe would not have yielded. This demonstrates the axiom that psychological warfare cannot work purely by itself; it needs force or the very real threat of force to make it effective. (The German General Staff after the war admitted that Germany's bluff could have been called, but Hitler never left the opposition (no way out). He always offered peace as the reward for non-interference in his one particular demand of the time. He never forced all demands at once, so that his enemies could look at the German armed forces, estimate the situation, estimate the cost of war, and make a reasoned decision as to whether beating the Germans or giving in were better.)

¶22. THE BLACK PROPAGANDA OF THE AXIS FIFTH COLUMN. One of Franco's generals boasted as his forces invested Madrid: "I have five columns. Four here. And a fifth column inside the city." From this

phrase there derived the term fifth column to designate active clandestine operators. Unlike the espionage agent, the fifth columnist seeks to take an active part in the war. He may perform sabotage, instigate rebellion, launch whispering campaigns, prepare for an uprising. The spy has two main jobs: to find fact; to communicate it. The fifth columnist has one job: to make trouble. Whenever Hitler's war of nerves against the democracies struck at morale, the morale was already readied for his blow. His agents sowed dissension throughout Europe and--to a lesser degree--the rest of the world. One of their main functions was black propaganda. This was not Nazi propaganda except in the sense that the Nazis paid for it and expected to benefit by it. It might be any kind of propaganda which heated up the controversies in the anti-Nazi camps. It might take the form of anti-Nazism, provided it did so in such a way as to defeat its purpose. Many of its instruments were unconscious of its Nazi origin. In the early part of World War II, the situation was complicated by the fact that the Communist clandestine operatives had the same short-range goals as the Nazis: discredit of the capitalist democracies, denunciation of the imperialist war, and so forth. With the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, the Communist propaganda line shifted over to support of anti-Nazi military operations.

The fifth column is considered to have made a major contribution to the fall of France. In Norway, a minority of ultra-patriotic fanatics under Vidkun Quisling helped the Germans occupy the country. The tactics of the fifth column cannot be summarized: they involved cutting communications, telephoning false orders, destruction of bridges, calling of strikes, and anything else which would work certain mischief. (Popular writers, since the invention of the atomic bomb, have predicted that a major duty of future fifth columns will be the concealment of atomic bombs in enemy territory. If these were radio-sensitive, one dash on the right wavelength would send the enemy cities white-hot into the stratosphere.)

¶23. POLITICAL WARFARE. Political warfare in World War II was more obvious and less effective than in World War I. Many countries had two governments (India, France, Holland, the Philippines); some even had three (Jugoslavia, Poland). Appeals for support of these governments were made by every available propaganda means. The United Nations sometimes had the government-in-exile (Norway, Holland, Luxembourg); sometimes the Axis had it (Provisional Government of Free India). The three-cornered character of political warfare arose from the presence of rival democratic and Communist governments, both on the United Nations side. The chief lesson learned by all participants was the fact that when a country is occupied, a certain percentage of the population, however small, is going to show improper private ambition and volunteer to serve the enemy; the conquerors, far from having to prepare quisling governments in advance, were almost universally embarrassed by the different cliques of traitors who volunteered to serve the occupying powers.

Parce que ils ont compris que cette guerre n'est pas un simple conflit entre nations, mais bien le heurt de deux idéologies. D'un côté, un peuple qui vient d'accomplir sa révolution sociale et de l'autre, l'internationale Judéo-capitaliste qui, non sans angoisse, voit se lever l'aube d'un renouveau qui n'est pas sans danger pour nos intérêts.

Parce que ils vomissent notre race, la race juive, et qu'ils veulent la mettre, une fois pour toutes, dans l'impossibilité de poursuivre son œuvre de corruption et de désagrégation.

Parce que ils veulent éliminer définitivement les ploutocrates et autres parasites qui vivent de la sueur du peuple.

Parce que ce sont des hommes virils, sains et dynamiques qui méprisent les «zazous» qui sont le produit d'une société en pleine décomposition.

Parce que ils ont vu le bolchevisme chez lui et parce qu'ils ne le veulent pas en France; parce qu'ils connaissent la bestialité et l'effroyable asservissement de ceux qui vivent sous notre despotisme.

Parce que ils veulent pour leurs travailleurs le respect auquel ils ont droit, en même temps que l'assurance définitive d'une EXISTENCE DIGNE.

Parce que ils veulent une Europe unie qui ne s'épuisera plus tous les 25 ans dans une tuerie atroce pour les besoins de notre coffre-fort.

Parce que ils veulent pour cette Patrie, à laquelle ils ont voué leur vie, une place de choix dans l'Europe de demain.

Parce que nous sommes des destructeurs et qu'ils appartiennent à la race des constructeurs.

Parce que fiers de leurs traditions et d'un passé glorieux, ils veulent balayer tout ce qui causa leur médiocrité et CONSTRUIRE LEUR AVENIR.

Parce que leur foi est inébranlable et parce qu'ils ne déposeront pas les armes avant le triomphe final.

Parce que ce sont des soldats héroïques, aussi humains dans la paix qu'ils sont courageux au combat.

VOILA POURQUOI J'ACCUSE LES HOMMES DE LA WAFFEN-SS.

ENGAGEMENTS - RENSEIGNEMENTS
Ersatzkommando Frankreich der Waffen-SS
24, Avenue du Recteur-Poincaré - Paris-16e

Autorisation n° 29.845.

Illustration #2. German leaflet attempting counterpropaganda to Allied radio broadcasts beamed at France.

¶24. RADIO PROPAGANDA. In Europe, especially, the widespread possession of radio sets made it possible for the belligerents to use standard-wave radio broadcasting as a regular means of getting propaganda into enemy territory. The following, in approximate order of importance, were the materials transmitted:

a. Official speeches by government leaders.

b. Official communiques.

c. News of the world, most of it true, but so arranged as to favor one side or the other.

d. Special features (regular lectures, debates, "educational programs").

e. Regularly scheduled commentators (either white or black).

f. Ostensibly private or independent speakers.

g. Black stations (British-sponsored "Gustav Siegfried Eins"; German "Lord Haw Haw"; American " Operation Annie").

h. Planted or falsified news quoted from its ostensible source by official radio, while the official radio disclaimed responsibility.

i. "Ghost" voices or programs, cut in on an enemy wavelength either while enemy radio was on the air or when enemy stations went off because of air raids.

Jamming was not found to be successful except as an interference; it never interdicted all listening to the jammed stations. More feasible anti-radio measures were those taken to prevent use of materials heard over the air; listeners were punished or killed in Axis Europe. Since radio propagandists on both sides counted on the indirect audience (people who were told what the radio had said), restriction of propaganda to the direct audience (people who actually heard the broadcast) amounted to a definite control.

¶25. COUNTERPROPAGANDA AGAINST RADIO. On-the-ground counterpropaganda was attempted. Newspapers on each side were given materials with which to confute radio claims of the enemy. The strength of the democracies showed in that the British and Americans could talk the matter through in their domestic propaganda media, while the Germans and Italians, having made all domestic publishing into propaganda, had no

impartial-looking agency to which to carry an appeal against propaganda. The anti-radio measures included poster and leaflet operations. Illustration #2 shows a German attempt to refute Allied claims that the Waffen-SS (militarized Hitlerite elite guard) was a gang of thugs and murderers; the German leaflet shows the enemy broadcaster as a Jew saying, "I accuse the men of the Waffen-SS!"--of such things as believing in the future, wanting to help France, preventing recurrent world wars, being heroic soldiers.

¶26. TYPES OF CIVILIAN AUDIENCES. Civilian audiences for both radio and leaflet propaganda were often divided into five categories:

a. The home audience;
b. Allies;
c. Friendly or impartial neutrals;
d. Enemy satellites and hostile neutrals;
e. The enemy audience.

Different programs had to be worked out in each case.

¶27. THE PROPAGANDA OUTPOST. For home, allied, and neutral audience, it was possible for the propagandists to move into the city with the audience, to rent an office, go talk to local newspapermen, make arrangements with local theaters, and carry on through the normal procedures of publicity. The picture exhibit and the "cultural" enterprise were among the major undertakings. (Things which were not entertaining enough to be called recreation were frequently listed as "culture"--specialized lectures, exchange of professors, etc.) The propaganda outpost possessed the inestimable advantage of direct contact. When the outpost was in a neutral country, it provided a channel through which material could be given to visiting enemies; or the neutral press, circulating in enemy territory, could be primed with items calculated to do psychological harm to the enemy.

¶28. NEWS LEAFLETS. For both civilian and military enemies, news was one of the main forms of United Nations propaganda against the Axis and enemy-occupied countries. The free nations had a more open news policy, so that the Germans could not use news as freely in reprisal. For civilian audiences, this took the form of miniature airborne newspapers dropped over the enemy by plane. When the military situation became static, such newspapers were dropped on enemy troops as well (see Illustrations #6 and #10). When great events occurred, it usually was found more impressive to get out a special news leaflet summarizing the event. Often these were prepared in advance (D-Day; Russo-Japanese war; fall of Paris); sometimes they had to be worked out at top speed (Roosevelt's death; atomic bomb; Japanese offer to surrender).

¶29. CIVILIAN ACTION LEAFLETS. Leaflets sometimes requested the civilians to perform a specific function. Leaflets like those shown in Illustration #8 were dropped over Occupied China to deny the Japanese the use of Chinese labor in maintaining his line of communications. Since much of the Japanese logistics depended on local help, this was a major undertaking. The propaganda leaflets from the OWI-CBI, distributed by the 14th Air Force, called for the Chinese to stay away from railroads and the texts told the Chinese that their American friends did not desire to bomb them. This was perfectly true. Coolie transport columns sometimes disappeared overnight after being peppered with such leaflets, leaving the Japanese sitting in the middle of nowhere with more gear than they could carry. The cover illustration is another action leaflet, calling for help to be given downed American flyers.

¶30. CIVILIAN MORALE LEAFLETS. Leaflets which had neither news nor special action calls often aimed at enemy morale as a whole, to run it downwards, or at allied morale, to keep it up. Morale leaflets, when effective, most commonly exploited some definite enemy weakness, such as lowered rations, the execution of hostages, denial of furloughs to enlisted fathers.

¶31. BLACK LEAFLETS. Often an enemy situation would arise in which black leaflets could be used. If the enemy issued a complicated new ration card, the dropping of a few million forgeries was certain to embarrass his rationing. Official-looking imitations of enemy documents were dropped, giving "secret" orders to do something highly distasteful to the enemy population. Sometimes an enemy newspaper would be duplicated. Handbooks for malingerers were used by both sides. Soviet propaganda developed some exceedingly handsome "militarist German" attacks on Hitler and his gang as not being Junker enough.

¶32. COMBAT PROPAGANDA. Comparable leaflets were used for strategic propaganda to troops. News and morale leaflets were of the same general types; sometimes the same leaflet was used for both audiences. Action leaflets, however, were not in most instances applicable to military personnel and civilians both. The commonest action leaflet for troops was, of course, the surrender pass or surrender leaflet. The most famous and effective of these is the Passierschein issued from SHAEF (see Illustration #11). Combat propaganda also made use of loudspeakers.

¶33. GIFTS AND NOVELTIES. A sensational but minor field of experiment concerned the dropping of matches, chocolate, needles, salt and other gifts by an air force. Countermeasures to this sometimes consisted in dropping duplicates of the enemy gift, but fixing the duplicates so as to make the receivers suspicious of all such gifts (poisoned chocolate, nauseous salt, etc.).

¶34. TERROR DEVICES. A still less important range of experiment concerned the creation of terror devices--whistles attached to shells, weapon drops to imaginary undergrounds, etc. Though often interesting, these played no appreciable part in the war as a whole. The German attacks on Holland, Belgium and France made very liberal use of such methods. This field overlaps in part with orthodox military deception procedures, such as were illustrated in the post-war press photographs of dummy tanks, jeeps, etc., which were made of rubber and could be inflated.

¶35. SYSTEMATIZATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. The major development of psychological warfare during World War II may perhaps be summed up in terms of its systematization. The war brought forth few wholly new devices, outside of the use of radio. The novelty consisted of the close integration of psychological warfare with national policy on the one hand and with military operations on the other. All major participants, to a greater or less degree, utilized military propaganda units as aids to field operations. The increased use of air power made possible the dissemination of leaflets, pamphlets and occasional books on a tremendous scale. Fitting all these operations to the national governments, the theater or field army headquarters, all appropriate military echelons, and then coordinating propaganda operations one with the other was a task which could not have been accomplished without the plentiful use of the radio and the duplicating machine. World War II made psychological warfare a continuous, systematic, and purposeful part of the general conduct of war. (See Paragraph 58.)

¶36. CONSOLIDATION PROPAGANDA. The value of psychological warfare did not end with the cessation of hostilities. Consolidation propaganda, carried out under the authority of the military headquarters in charge of occupation, proved invaluable in conveying commands of the occupying power to the populace concerned. By the use of propaganda, cooperation was ensured much more swiftly; greater public interest was aroused; and persons friendly to the occupying power were given a chance to step forward and to assist the occupation. In the case of friendly or dubious areas, consolidation facilities put local publishing and broadcasting back on schedule and assured the military of a means of getting help from the people.

IV. Propaganda Analysis

¶37. COLLECTION. Propaganda analysis is valuable to the non-propagandist as a source of news and intelligence. The news or intelligence is in turn valuable for two unrelated purposes: first, for the indication of national or military policy which the attempted mission of the propaganda itself either forecasts or indicates; secondly, for the incidental content of factual material which is used to make up the propaganda. In order to analyze propaganda lines and to glean the valuable fact out of the propaganda material, it is necessary to collect the propaganda. This depends, in difficulty, on the remoteness of the area covered, and on the controls involved. In peacetime, a great deal of propaganda can be acquired by the process of subscribing or even asking for it. In wartime, propaganda collection must be undertaken along with ordinary military intelligence collection from the enemy home area; from neutral areas, it can be gotten by ordinary means; in one's own territory, the only problem is that of definition. Radio materials can be collected by having a living monitor listen to the programs, writing them down or summarizing them, or by making recordings of appropriate material and processing them at leisure.

¶38. MONITORING. Since even the non-propagandist cannot use propaganda analysis unless it deals with up-to-date (sometimes up-to-the-minute) materials, good monitoring is essential. Signal Corps receivers require no modification unless recordings are to be made. Monitoring of radio material simply consists of putting it down in convenient form.

¶39. SPOT ANALYSIS. The psychological warfare operator takes the most current propaganda materials and prepares a brief summary of the news content and of the probable motive of the enemy for using that particular propaganda at that time. (See Paragraph 45.) He is then in a position to develop his own propaganda with reference to the propaganda situation as seen by the enemy. Slavish submission to enemy initiative is a bad idea in propaganda. Normally, the sound operative uses the spot analysis for his own information, but he does not necessarily try to confute enemy propaganda point by point. He tries to counter with strong, independent propaganda lines of his own.

¶40. AREA ANALYSIS. More systematic propaganda analysis requires the collection of all available propaganda materials from a given area for a specific period of time. These materials are then broken down in terms of media which they employ, and each is searched for the probable

motive of the issuer. In a large, free country like the United States, this is a very difficult and complicated task. In a nation which has a dictatorial or one-party government controlling all media of communication, or in a small nation, it is possible to work out an analysis of the major propaganda pressures operating within the country.

When a whole nation is too large an area, the area of analysis can be cut down by procurement of materials from a single city, province, or zone. The important point about area analysis consists of getting a representative sampling (such as all the newspapers published in Rome or Munich or Shanghai on a given day).

¶41. TIME OR DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS. In order to find out what a single propaganda source is doing, the source should be covered day by day, week by week, or month by month. The content of the source can be broken down into percentages (of time, for radio; of columns or square inches, for printed material). The emphasis will become plain as soon as the different percentages are noted on ordinary graph paper. Further study will show what the source is trying to accomplish with each emphasis.

¶42. STRATEGIC PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS. For generalizations about the over-all opinion of a given national group, it is necessary to count as propaganda everything to which the persons concerned have access. For these purposes, it does not matter whether movies have a propaganda slant or not; the fact that 69 percent may have no propaganda slant will itself be a propaganda factor of prime importance. The propaganda presentation consists of all public information to which the persons concerned have access. The propaganda operator must consider the propaganda presentation--that is, his own materials and all other public communications, whatever the kind--before he can even guess the success of a given technique. National morale (before, during, and after war) cannot be gauged by a single propaganda source, but must include a scheduled appraisal of all the contributing factors to the public opinion of the nation concerned.

¶43. PROPAGANDA IDENTIFICATION. The propaganda analyst will find that there is no magic formula by means of which he can unfailingly identify propaganda. Human beings are highly communicative and almost all two billion of them talk a great deal of their waking time. Propaganda is distinguished from conversation, education, private quarrels, recreation, romance, ordinary monologues, etc., by the fact that it is communicated intentionally. It is not the content of the communication, but the motive which impels it, which distinguishes propaganda from non-propaganda. This is like saying that propaganda is propaganda when it is propaganda; to a certain extent this unsatisfactory definition is correct.

However, few communications come from completely unknown sources; when they are, they are often mistrusted. The propaganda analyst must therefore take into account the source, whether ostensible or real, the timing, the people to whom the communication is addressed, and the probable effect which that communication will have on those people at that particular time before he can find the source, if the source is hidden. If the source is not hidden, the whole process is out in the open. (See Paragraph 45.) Thus, even with a hidden source, it is feasible to work back to the probable source by analyzing the probable effect.

¶44. PROPAGANDA VERSUS TRUTH. Good propaganda does not make use of lies. Good propaganda is truthful, except in very extraordinary circumstances. Good propaganda uses the truth selectively. It directs to the audience those truths which will accomplish the results which the propagandist seeks, and withholds those truths which accomplish no particular purpose. To test for propaganda by looking for lies is therefore impractical and unprofitable. The test for propaganda is a dynamic test. It must consider not only the information, but the life-history of the communication. Where does it come from? To whom is it going? Why now? What for? The statement, "People who work get paid," can be propaganda or not, depending on who says it to whom, when, why and on whose behalf. (The reader might try to develop this statement into anti-Russian propaganda by Germans, anti-American propaganda by Germans, anti-German propaganda by Russians, and anti-German propaganda by Americans. The timing, the persons to whom it is addressed, the way it is said, what is said with it--these make it propaganda or not.) There is no conflict between propaganda and truth. Good propaganda uses truth. But the highest truth, in a free civilization, not under totalitarian or ideological control, is deemed to be the truth uttered by disinterested persons who have no ulterior motive in communicating it.

¶45. THE FORMULA FOR A SINGLE ITEM. In large-scope propaganda analysis, it is desirable to proceed quantitatively. Only highly experienced personnel should attempt to weight different parts of a given output in order to guess the weighting given by the source. (The Americans may consider the 1000-hours news program the best item off Radio Nirgends; the Nirgenders themselves may not have thought of that program as their best. Hence, qualitative weighting, unless source itself gives very plain clues, such as using a front page or picking a popular listeners' hour, is dangerous for effective analysis.) When a single item is to be broken down, a careful propaganda analysis formula could be developed on the basis of the following outline;

COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF A SINGLE PROPAGANDA ITEM

a. Source
   (1) True source ("where does it really come from?")
      (a) Release channel ("how did it come out?") if different from true source without concealing true source
      (b) Person or institution in whose name material originates
      (c) Transmitting channel ("who got it to us?"), person or institution effecting known transmission--omitting, of course, analyst's own procurement facilities
   (2) Ostensible source ("where does it pretend to come from?")
      (a) Release channel ("who is supposed to be passing it along?")
   (3) First-use and second-use source (first use, "who is said to have used this first?"; second use, "who pretends to be quoting someone else?")
      (a) Connection between second-use source and first-use source, usually in the form of attributed or unacknowledged quotation; more rarely, plagiarism
      (b) Modification between use by first-use and second-use sources, when both are known
         (i) Deletions
         (ii) Changes in text
         (iii) Enclosure within editorial matter of transmitter
         (iv) Falsification which appears deliberate
         (v) Effects of translation from one language to another

b. Time
   (1) Time of events or utterance to which subject-matter refers
   (2) Time of transmission (publishing, broadcasting, etc.)
   (3) Timing of repetitions
   (4) Reasons, if any are evident, for peculiarities of timing

c. Audience
   (1) Intended direct audience ("in English to North America"; "a paper for New York restaurant operators")
   (2) Intended indirect audience (program beamed "in English to North America" but actually reaching Hongkong and Singapore by deliberate plan of the sender; "a paper for New York restaurant operators" being faked and sent to Southeast Europe in fact)
   (3) Unintended audience (a Guadalcanal native studying Esquire; your aunt reading the Infantry Journal; a Chinese reading American wartime speeches against the "yellow devils" of Japan)
   (4) Ostensibly-unintended direct audience (such as an appeal to strikers in very abusive-sounding language, sent to businessmen to build up opinion against the strikers, or Hitler's use of the fake Protocols of the Elders of Zion)

d. Subject ("what does it say?")
   (1) Content listed under any convenient heading as though it were straight news or intelligence
   (2) Content epitomized as deomonstrating new propaganda technique (such as, "now they're trying to get us out of Tientsin by appeals to our isolationists!")
   (3) Content which may be useful in counterpropaganda (such as, "they said that the Greeks are our witless puppets, so let's pass that along to the Greeks")
   (4) Significance of content for intelligence analysis (example: when the Japanese boasted about their large fish catch, it was an indication their fishing fleet was short of gasoline again, and that the fish catch was actually small; when the Nazis accused the Jews of sedition, it meant that rations were short and that the Nazi government was going to appease the populace by denying the Jews their scanty rations by way of contrast)

e. Mission
   (1) Nation, group, or person attacked
   (2) Relation to previous items with the same or related missions
   (3) Particular psychological approach used in this instance (such as wedge-driving between groups, or between people and leaders, or between armed services; or demoralization of audience in general; or decrease of listeners' faith in the news)
   (4) Known or probable connection with originator's propaganda plan or strategy

This outline may be remembered by the initials of the key words--the five main headings in order--as the STASM formula. The outline is not final or authoritative, and propaganda analysis performed for governmental or military establishments should, of course, conform to the schedule prescribed in the agency concerned. Used in conjunction with a quantitative graph, however, an outline of this type will in the course of use provide a reasonably complete index to the operations of any person, party, group,or government.

¶46. PROPANAL AND FOREIGN OR ENEMY MORALE. Propaganda analysis is sometimes called propanal for short as an administrative convenience; propanal can be used as an intelligence tool of prime importance. A person desiring to spy out just what sickness an ill man had could do so by waiting at the pharmacist's and seeing just what prescriptions were being taken to the patient; similarly, conditions in a foreign (in wartime, even an enemy) country can be systematically guessed, with a high probability factor in favor of the analyst, if the domestic propaganda of the government concerned is analyzed. The home government of any country uses

propaganda--whatever it may be called for courtesy's sake--as a tool of government. Careful scrutiny of what the propaganda is designed to do will give indications of what is wrong inside the country concerned. Few nations, for example, are capable of waging aggressive war without getting their own people ready for war. If a foreign country accused the United States to its own people of being power-mad, imperialistic, meddlesome, threatening and aggressive, while broadcasting to us nothing but fairly calm news materials, it might indicate that:

a. The country was preparing to launch a surprise attack on the United States, the leaders using our alleged aggressiveness as preparation for the statement, "The Americans shot first!", while not exciting us any more than possible, before the attack; or

b. Conditions in the country concerned were so bad that the leaders tried to calm internal discontent by provoking the U.S. into a mud-slinging contest, which would fill the front pages of the papers and would rally the people behind their government.

The utterances of a controlled press or controlled radio in an unfree nation always mean something; nothing is done spontaneously or privately for private enjoyment. Government control is directed at given purposes. Propanal can uncover most of those purposes.

¶47. PROPANAL AND MILITARY INFORMATION. Military information can be derived from the tone, timing, emphasis, and purpose of enemy broadcasts. The Germans predicted a new, secret weapon before they used the V-1; the German predictions dropped off when the launching ramps on the French coast were bombed; when the ramps were repaired, the predictions went up in number. This helped to confirm the supposition that the ramps had an organic connection with the secret weapon which Goebbels and Hitler had promised. General enemy intentions and commitments can be measured against propaganda; propanal becomes a useful auxiliary source when the propaganda habits of the source are well known.

V. Propaganda Intelligence

¶48. THE PECULIAR RESPONSIBILITY OF PROPAGANDA. Propaganda must compete with hostile or private news facilities, but (in the case of "white") must at the same time be issued on the responsibility of the government or army concerned. Propaganda must be checked not merely for its correctness as news, and its usefulness on the immediate propaganda schedule, but for its effect on the issuing government. Propaganda must not offend domestic persons, groups, interests, or minorities of any kind; propaganda must not offend one audience for the sake of winning a point with another; propaganda makes the issuing government accountable to world opinion. Therefore, propaganda cannot be operated the way that a newspaper is operated, or a radio news program; it must be checked for:

a. Factual correctness;
b. Propaganda effect on the occasion of use;
c. Propaganda effect to other audiences or groups not addressed;
d. Relation to the actual policy of the issuing government on the topic concerned;
e. Effect if used in hostile programs and quoted against its source;
f. Coordination with military security, where applicable;
g. Ownership of the material, if copyrighted or borrowed from a private source;
h. Relationship to future propaganda, political, or military plans.

Propaganda is therefore difficult to execute, when it is good. It is one of the most complicated of governmental processes. (The more private the propagandist is, the more satisfaction he can allow himself by being inventive, and the less he has to worry about clearances, authority, permission, and so on. That he is also less effective, goes without saying.)

¶49. THE RAW MATERIAL OF PROPAGANDA. Propaganda requires two kinds of material: news or background materials, out of which to build the propaganda; and guidances or plans, with which to steer it. Propaganda must reach an audience; to reach the audience it must interest them and hold their attention; to hold their attention, it must say something; to say something, it must have something to talk about. (This was not always understood in World War II, with the result that some propagandists broadcast longwinded, tedious political arguments while all over the world click, click, click, their listeners cut off the current.) Propaganda content must reach the audience, but in so doing it must not give away secrets, make fools of the propagandists, or involve the government in difficulty.

The controls must go along with the raw materials. The actual propaganda operator should be given the news as fast as possible; he should be given such background information as he may need to make his presentation sound; but he cannot be trusted, because of the strain of his job, which keeps him in touch with the enemy, with information of high security value. How to control the propagandist without spoiling him at his creative job--how to guide him without interfering unnecessarily in his work--how to watch him without slowing down the actual output--how to observe all controls and regulations while staying up-to-the-minute on schedule: such problems are not readily solved. Yet they must be solved, if the propaganda is to work. Without intelligence materials and guidances, propaganda becomes an expensive and ephemeral kind of literature, giving neither credit nor profit to its authors, and maintaining no particular advantage to the government which pays for it.

¶50. AUDIENCE INTELLIGENCE. Propaganda must be directed at specific goals. It must be conducted with reference to a known audience, taking the characteristics of the audience into account. It must meet the current opinion of the audience addressed. Therefore, all intelligence concerning audience opinions, reactions, fads, slang, rumors, new interests, etc., must be relayed to the propagandist if he is to do his job well. (The Japanese in World War II occasionally showed their lack of such intelligence materials by referring to things which were hopelessly out of date. More frequently they missed their cue by failing to understand actual conditions in wartime America. All they knew was pre-war America.)

¶51. OPINION ANALYSIS. The interrogation of prisoners and, under ideal conditions, the interrogation of enemy home opinion will give indications of enemy morale and of the fluctuations of opinion in the target country. Opinion can also be found negatively by watching the antagonistic propaganda and seeing what things it seeks to oppose or to correct; those very things can thereupon be reinforced by appropriate propaganda measures.

Illustration #3. Domestic Japanese wartime propaganda cartoon directed against Britain and the United States. Such material gave American leaflet-writers models for their leaflets prepared for Japanese audiences.

VI. Propaganda Technique

¶52. PROPAGANDA DISCIPLINE. Basic to all psychological warfare is the discipline of the operative. The participant, military or civilian, who says what he himself wants to say should obviously be thrown out of a propaganda outfit and transferred to some enterprise where he can talk to his heart's content. The whole purpose of propaganda rests upon saying things which the enemy wishes to hear but which, when heard, will damage the enemy war effort. This requires the propagandist to keep his own emotions and opinions under strict discipline. All the rest of his government or army can hate the enemy all they wish; wartime is the season for lawful hatred; there is no reason why they should not hate the enemy. The propagandist has the job of persuading the enemy not to fight. To do so, he must remain sympathetic to the enemy. Jeering, name-calling, reproaching, criticizing without purpose--these should never depend on what the propagandist thinks the enemy deserves to have said to him, but on what the propagandist thinks will affect the enemy's thinking, feeling, and action. The propagandist can denounce the enemy--when the propaganda plan calls for it. He can express his hatred and contempt--if hatred or contempt are on the schedule. Normally these are not. Most of the time, he must play the role of being the sympathetic enemy. Propaganda discipline (first of the individual over himself, then of the outfit over the individual, whether civilian or military) is the first pre-condition of successful psychological warfare. Violation of discipline produces dangerous adverse reactions.

¶53. SCIENTIFIC AIDS. Basic historical, economic, political, social, religious and other data concerning the audience should either be inside the propagandist's head, or else in convenient reference form. (Americans would not think much of enemies who addressed Louisiana troops with, "Hello, Yankee!" under the impression they conveyed a sense of cheerful friendliness, nor would they be impressed by a pamphlet which showed Mother polishing her son's shoes while he lolled in a porch swing, saying, "Gee whiz, I'm glad to be home, mama!" Bad propaganda is worse than no propaganda; good propaganda requires correct background.) Knowing the language does not of itself indicate that the propagandist is ready to start; even being a native or ex-citizen of the country concerned is not a guarantee that the person is qualified. Most Americans speak good American English; most of them know a lot about America; not many of them are capable of becoming first-class radio commentators or great authors. Sound psychological warfare operations depend not only on good language facilities, and on the possession of cadres of personnel with a first-hand

intimate knowledge of the audience, but on scientific aids as well. The research of anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, political scientists and historians provides a body of material on almost every group in the human race. Properly used, these scientific aids will bring to light enemy weaknesses and traits which even the most acute untrained observation would not reveal.

¶54. THE LISTENER. It is sound propaganda, in most cases, to presume a single listener or reader as target. Propaganda should be personal, emphatic, direct, simple, reiterative. Few radio programs or leaflet series can count on hitting the same man regularly enough to build up grandiose cumulative effects. The more concretely the one-man audience at the other end is visualized, the better his worries and hopes are understood, the more that he feels the propagandist "talks his language" with more than words, the more successful the operation will be. Propaganda has little room for the general, the abstract, the formal, or the large-audience appeal. It must get inside somebody's skin; to do so, it must keep the target individual in mind. The only time for formality is the occasion when the listener, by his own customs, expects it. (Note the correct Japanese reaction when President Roosevelt died. The Germans, gibbering with hate, called him nasty names and offended Americans. The Japanese, in a formal, silly, naive but appealing way, extended their condolences to the American people. American public opinion mocked them for doing it, but their action on that occasion helped build up a picture--later to become useful to them--of the Japanese as incomprehensible, gauche, but with all their faults a very courteous people. The Japanese considered their American listener; the Germans forgot and amused themselves, attaining no real advantage.)

¶55. SPECIFIC TECHNIQUES. Specific techniques are among the trade secrets of every major propaganda organization. Some of them are found in the academic literature on propaganda (see Chapter IX). Most of them are evident to common sense. The goals dictate the technique to be used in each concrete situation; some of the permanent goals are to prepare the enemy for defeat in war, to disunite enemy opposition, to promote belief in the utterance of the propagandist, to discredit enemy news sources, to make the individual enemy feel he has friends on this side.

VII. Wartime Propaganda Administration

¶56. WARTIME CIVILIAN AGENCIES. In the United States government, war propaganda has traditionally been a function of the executive branch of the government. Though a responsibility and power of the President, it has not been conducted by President Wilson or President Roosevelt in their respective capacities of commander-in-chief of the armed forces, but has been operated as a special, emergency, civilian enterprise in each war. In World War I, there was established the Creel Committee. In World War II, psychological warfare was at first a responsibility of seven or eight agencies, the most active being the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) and the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF). In the summer of 1942, the OWI was established and took over most psychological warfare functions, particularly all those involving official use of the name of the government; other agencies, such as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the established departments, maintained an interest in the subject. Coordination was effected by a system of consultation and liaison, as shown in the chart on page 29. At the termination of hostilities, both OWI and OSS were dissolved. Some of their informational and research functions have been assigned to the State and War Departments.

¶57. FUTURE PROPAGANDA ADMINISTRATION. Psychological warfare cannot be studied on the assumption that appropriate staff procedures will involve civilian agencies. Since the national agency for propaganda has been improvised for each war, with very little carry-over of doctrine, skill or personnel from one war to the other, it must be considered that another war, should one occur, would require new organization. This might or might not be military. Experience in World War II showed excellent results in the use of large civilian staffs under military command.

¶58. MILITARY FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL PROPAGANDA AGENCY. A national propaganda agency has as its primary job the securing of the home front by sound, effective, honest domestic propaganda which will maintain national morale, support production and keep the national base of the military effort in good condition--so far as this can be done through affecting opinion. The national agency must necessarily serve as the gather and supply point for special news, features, guidances, background studies and so on which are needed by military propaganda facilities overseas. It also has the exceedingly important function of supplying presses, special radio equipment, inks, basic propaganda materials and other supplies which cannot be drawn through ordinary army channels. The OWI in World War II--and the Creel Committee to a lesser extent the time before--per-

formed the indispensible function of finding personnel with the unusual qualifications required for psychological warfare, re-training them, and putting them on either its own or the Army payroll. (Finding an eloquent Pushtu-speaking person in a hurry is no easy task!) Finally, the national agency did a great deal of the onerous fiscal and bookkeeping work, and carried much of the budget load for psychological warfare.

¶59. MILITARY-CIVILIAN COORDINATION. Some of the worst possible blunders of psychological warfare are those which can be committed when there is poor civilian-military coordination. During World War I, the Kaiser's government never succeeded in setting up effective coordination between the military and political agencies of government for propaganda purposes; the British had great difficulty before they worked out a smooth administrative and consultative machinery for the purpose. In between wars, the Japanese lost a great deal of ground because of a lack of such coordination; the government spokesmen promised that troop action in the "China Incident" would halt; the next day the Army would move forward, and Japan got a reputation for calculated trickery only half of which was deserved. Part of their effects were the result of guile and wile; part were the consequence of administrative confusion and independence of the armed services. Hitler, in contrast, achieved in his psychological warfare the smoothest military-political coordination which has yet operated on a grand scale; he had total control of the government and people to start with. In the United States, such coordination was achieved to a much less extent than in Germany.

¶60. GENERAL PLANS. Proper coordination of psychological warfare facilities permits the setting up of general plans which are coordinated with both strategy and national policy. Hitler's propaganda worked in intimate liaison with his military and air headquarters; when an operation such as the conquest of Poland was undertaken, the propagandists were able to time their operations so as to be most useful to the combat elements. Long-range purposes could be sought by clandestine operations and "white" operations supplementing one another. Quislings, for example, could be recruited by the Germans at any one time, but they would not keep over a long period of peace without undergoing changes of heart, twinges of loyalty, some desertions with attendant breach of security, and other deterioration. Coordination of all facilities gave the maximum result.

¶61. CONTINGENCY PLANS. Foreseen contingencies are planned in propaganda. An invasion, a landing, the surrender of an opponent, the fall of a city--such news occasions call for special radio and leaflet operations. These too require coordination between various national-level or general staff agencies, whatever the particular propaganda structure of a country may be. In totalitarian countries, the single party must be included so as to provide for appropriate "spontaneous joy," "mass demonstrations," and so forth.

CHART OF PROPAGANDA ADMINISTRATION IN WORLD WAR II (1942-1945)



* The War Department agency was the Psychological Warfare Branch, 1941-42; liaison officers, 1943; Propaganda Branch, G-2, 1943-45.

Not shown on the chart are the consultative relationships established between OWI headquarters, Washington, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whereby liaison officers from the War and Navy Departments kept in appropriate relationship to OWI in preparing psychological warfare plans and guidances.

¶62. SPECIAL PLANS. Unforeseen contingencies often call for special plans. Emergency consultation facilities must be provided, whereby the propagandists can be called upon to exploit an opportunity before the time passes. To this end, most nations in wartime have propaganda duty officers who are available around the clock; where military and civilian instrumentalities are both employed, duty officers are needed in each.

¶63. APPLICATION OF PLANS AND ORDERS. If plans are highly classified and do not reach the actual producers of propaganda, they are of little value. Propaganda output is measured in terms of the actual newscasts, features, radio scripts of other kinds, leaflet texts, poster appeals and other definite writing tasks. These must be written, translated, and broadcast or printed. The net output of propaganda is made up of the work of the people who perform the practical tasks. In ordinary combat operations, it is perhaps desirable for an infantryman to know as much as feasible about the strategic and tactical mission on which he is engaged, but it is not a condition of his effectiveness. Commands can be filtered down to him, without the reasons accompanying them. Direct command does not usually apply in artistic or literary work such as propaganda. Plans must accordingly be translatable into specific do's and don't's (usually called guidances). To be genuinely practical, guidances must be:

a. Plain and unambiguous.
b. Organized for ready reference.
c. Dated, with automatic expiration.
d. Mandatory.
e. Non-security or low-classified.

The last provision is made necessary by the fact that the propagandist, being in constant touch with the enemy, is always in danger of giving away his purpose; furthermore, propaganda personnel must be recruited from among persons familiar with the enemy or antagonist. This signifies that the best propagandists are those who have a great deal of sympathy for enemy customs, thought-patterns, and ideals. They do not necessarily prove disloyal, but it is plainly unsound to burden such persons with important or secret information.



Ihr seid jetzt abgeschnitten!

Um nutzloses Blutvergiessen zu ersparen, wird Euch dieses Flugblatt zugestellt.

Ihr seid jetzt abgeschnitten. Alliierte Einheiten stehen bereits weit hinter Euch. Ihr habt tapfer gekämpft, aber von jetzt an ist ein Weiterkämpfen nutzlos. Ihr müsst Euch ergeben oder knapp vor Kriegsende sterben.

Ihr erkennt die Lage. Es gilt jetzt, dementsprechend zu handeln. Jeder muss für sich selbst entscheiden. Es ist keine Zeit zu verlieren.

Die Alliierten wollen Euer Leben schonen und sichern Euch anständige Behandlung zu. Ihr müsst aber klar zu verstehen geben, dass Ihr aus dem Kampf scheidet.

HANDELT SOFORT!

TRANSLATION OF Z.G.86

You are now cut off!

In order to avoid needless bloodshed, this leaflet is being delivered to you.

You are now cut off. Allied units are already far in your rear. You have fought bravely, but from now on it would be senseless to continue fighting. You must give up or die — shortly before the end of the war.

You realise your situation. Now you must act accordingly. Every one of you must decide for himself. There is no time to be lost.

The Allies want to spare your lives and guarantee you decent treatment. But you must clearly indicate that you are quitting the fight.

ACT IMMEDIATELY!

友軍が來るだらうか

130—J—1

Illustration #4. Two American combat propaganda contingency leaflets. The map leaflet is addressed to Japanese troops of the Shimbun Shudan on Luzon. It shows their hopeless situation and tells them how to surrender. This was prepared to order. The text leaflet is an English language facsimile of one dropped (in German) on any German unit found to be isolated. The English language facsimiles were used in explaining leaflets to our own soldiers; they helped make psychological warfare intelligible.

VIII. Combat Propaganda Operations

¶64. COMBAT PROPAGANDA ORGANIZATION. During World War II, some theaters never extended systematic psychological warfare organization below the theater headquarters level. Others established elaborate operational units, of which the most ambitious were the First and Second Mobile Broadcasting Companies. These worked in North Africa, Italy, and France. It was found that they functioned best when their component elements were broken down into smaller teams. The ultimate pattern in almost all instances consisted of the creation of a small producing center (in SHAEF, PWD ran into the hundreds; in China, the staff for psychological warfare was not over a dozen men till the last months of war) which was capable of composing and printing leaflets. Leaflets produced in the United States, with the actual printing matrices sent to the theaters, were not successful; they were too remote from theater problems; the consequence was that leaflet production became the backbone of each theater or, in the case of Europe, Army propaganda headquarters. Occasional tactical leaflets were produced by smaller units, sometimes being mimeographed by an officer single-handed, but in most cases the leaflet-printing function remained a major task. The Davidson and Webbenderfer presses, which were used, are not very mobile, and paper supply is a constant logistic problem.

¶65. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMAND. Each theater commander was in complete charge of psychological warfare so far as its use or non-use was concerned. He also controlled the entry into his command of civilian propaganda personnel. Theater commanders did not possess authority to change national propaganda policy, to initiate political propaganda without coordinating with the Department of State, or to improvise propaganda without reference to the propaganda of other theaters or of the continental United States. Theater commanders sometimes used Psychological Warfare as the equivalent of a G-6, sometimes combined it with G-5, sometimes subordinated it to G-3, usually attached it to G-2, and in one instance operated it under the direct scrutiny of a Military Secretary to the Supreme Commander.

¶66. COMBAT PROPAGANDA RADIO. Radio broadcast facilities were found to be extremely valuable for strategic and consolidation propaganda. The relative immobility of even the mobile radio stations precluded their rapid shift in the course of tactical changes, and the radio broadcast facilities as such had little opportunity to reach enemy troops.

¶67. COMBAT PROPAGANDA MONITORING. Monitoring by combat propaganda units was found to provide invaluable materials for loud-

AT FIRST IN THE WEST:

Rundstedt's offensive of desperation smashed!

AND NOW IN THE EAST:

East Prussia cut off!

The Red Army deep in Silesia!

Germany's "Eastern Ruhr" paralysed!

Zukov's Armies West of Posen

Evacuation of Government and Party Offices from Berlin has started!

Illustration #5. Two types of news leaflet. The illustration announced V-E Day to the Japanese, and was prepared in advance; text is on the back (not shown). The printed leaflet is an English facsimile translation of one dropped on the Germans; on the back there were statements from Churchill and Roosevelt.



THE HOME TELEGRAM

A Weekly for American Soldiers

N. 7

Congratulations Boys of the 88th I. D.!

60 truckloads of chocolate-colored boys from North-Africa, yes, real natives from the dark continent, arrived the other day as your neighbors to the east of you. They are going to help you as «liberators» to bring the culture of darkest Africa to those Godforsaken Germans who know nothing about it. Congratulations, they are your friends and allies even if they cannot read or write or eat with knife and fork.

Soviet "Pike" tanks

in Lower Lusatia

In the Lausitz, among the burning and glowing Soviet tanks whose number is ever on the increase, there are also to be found some of the new type which the Soviets have introduced during the fighting in Lower Silesia. The Soviets have chosen this name because the new tank, with its low turret, resembles the head of a fish of prey. The «Pike» tank is an improved T34 with stronger armor and a long barreled 120 mm gun. The «Pike» is supposed to be the best tank of the Red Army and to surpass the Joseph Stalin type. The heavy losses in the Silesian fighting prove, however, that even this improved T34 cannot stand up to the German «Panzer Faust». Soviet tank officers taken prisoner in the Lower Lusatia district speaking of the «Panzer Faust» said: «It is an appalling weapon. The tank is nearly always completely destroyed and the crew burnt in the wreckage.»

"Red Czar" vs. "World President"

Sidelights on the Crimea Conference

The drama of Yalta has come to an end. The two representatives of western capitalism, Premier Churchill and President Roosevelt, have left the Red Empire again, the land of Bolshevism which they have entered with a considerable degree of disbelief. They have returned and the press of their countries has begun to analyse the results of the Conference. The American press has made it understood, as is already known, throughout Europe, that Stalin emerged from the momentous Conference as the true victor. The press at the same time, however, states that everything must be done to blot out that impression. Only «New York World Telegram» misses no words by saying openly, with empty hands: «It is reported that Roosevelt is returning like-wise stated that none England the «Daily Express» Crimea of the vital problems had been solved in the Conference and it was plain that Churchill as well as Roosevelt had been defeated there. Also the US Senator Bearss was pessimistic in connection with the Conference although he couched his words in more diplomatic language when he said that the Crimea Conference had given no clue whatever to an early end of the war. Only the semi-official Moscow paper «Pravda» expressed its complete satisfaction with the Conference.

In the United States the public seems to be particularly disillusioned, according to press and radio reports, that the Conference did not reach any agreement about the question of the Pacific war. Stalin has taken pains to avoid any friction with Japan and there can be no question of an eventual participation of Russia in the war in the Pacific. Mr. Roosevelt would have liked it immensely if he had been able to bring home a Soviet declaration of war against Japan or at least the Soviet assurance that the Russo-Japanese Aggression Pact, which expires this spring, is not going to be renewed. But he could not even get that

Polish Army Corps withdrawn

Crimea decision causes unrest

General Anders, the C.O. of the Polish troops fighting in Italy under Allied supreme command declared in an order of the day: «We shall never recognize the unilateral decision which leaves our country at the mercy of Bolshevism. Nothing can stop Polish soldiers from refusing further help and genuine independence. According to reports made by prisoners, unrest among the troops of the Polish Army Corps has increased to such an extent that they had to be withdrawn from the fighting lines.

"Red Czar" vs. "World President"

(Continued from page 1)

A skilfully directed press campaign in the USA has successfully undertaken to make believe that the Russian wolf has turned into a lamb and that the «RED Czar» is nothing but a good old Joe». But Stalin has, in the meantime, overrun and bolshevised ten European countries, has carried off to Siberia thousands of Roumanians, Poles, Hungarians, Lithuanians, Letts, Estonians, and Bulgarians, announcing cynically that this is only the beginning. One wonders what the Americans relatives of these unfortunate slaves are saying, whether they will not consider the victims as lost and dead.

American boys, however much continue to die as «Stalin's Legionaries» because some of your Jewish or Jew controlled politicians working in union with the Moscow Jews, want it that way. What has become of the once famous American common sense?

Soldiers' Wives at Home

The Divorce Question

The London «Daily Mail» of January 9th reports from New York that the morale of American soldiers at the front is too often seriously affected by their wives requesting a divorce by letter or by neighbours who write to them reporting unfavourably on the conduct of their wives. In the 9th Army every day five soldiers on an average receive letters from their wives proposing divorce. Not only is the soldier directly concerned upset by this but the effect is noticeable on whole groups of married men who begin to feel anxious about their own wives. Soldiers of the 1st Armored Division whose wives have left them in the lurch, have founded a «Broken Hearts Club».

The American Red Cross has appealed to all soldiers' wives who desire a divorce to await the return of their husbands from the front. «American Magazine» in the course of an article on marriage and divorce, states that in 1940 the proportion of divorces was one to every five or six marriages. In 1944 the proportion had risen to one divorce to every four marriages. The percentage is ever on the increase but will reach its peak point when Johnny comes home and finds the girl of his dreams doesn't come up to his idealistic expectations and Mary perceives that Johnny isn't quite such a hero in civilian clothes as he looked in uniform. Millions of broken hearts will ensue.

In some towns the figures for divorce are almost incredible. In Los Angeles for example, last year 33000 marriages and 24,000 divorces took place. This year so many applications for divorce have already been filed that a Law Court official has declared that 1945 will see more divorces than marriages.

Book of Manners for Soviet Officers

In Lower Silesia the Germans have captured a pamphlet published in Leinerad which could well be called a «Book of Manners for Soviet Officers». It contains official and unofficial advice for the behaviour of all Soviet officers. About what primitive trifles of civilisation the Soviet officers require to be enlightened the following sample gives a good idea: «At table behave with a dignified modesty. Refrain from greediness and chew your food with your mouth closed. Smacking the lips and noisy belching are unbecoming. The spoon, the fork and the knife must be properly used and held. Take note, bread must be eaten with a fork, salt must be taken with a knife. Fish and beefsteak are eaten with a fork without using the knife. The fork is held in the left hand, the knife in the right.»

The pamphlet says that discipline, military deportment and external formalities should on no account be looked upon as humiliating or useless.

271,7 m

New medium wave for «Jerry's Front»

Short wave 47.6 meters (6280 kc) daily at: 6.30 a.m., 7.0 a.m., 2.00 p.m., 5.00 p.m., 6.30 p.m., 10.00 p.m., and midnight.

Medium wave 271.7 meters (1105 kc) daily at: 6.30 a.m., 2.00 p.m. and midnight-programme

Wendell Wilkie foresaw another world war

On the subject of the foreign political developments Wendell Wilkie had curtly remarked: «They are preparing the soil for a third world war». After having made this and other frank statements, Wilkie died suddenly

Have You heard this one?

C.O. «Why aren't you working?»

Pte: «I didn't see you coming, Sir.»

* 423/2/45

日本投降訂簽書

緊要新聞

第二十二號 自由報 中華民國三十四年九月一日

共黨對蔣基石和平建議

Illustration #6. Two types of leaflet newspaper. The German paper, in English, is addressed to American troops and ties in with combat propaganda. The American paper, in Chinese, is addressed to Occupied China; it is dated 1 September 1945.

Illustration #7. Morale leaflets, white and black. The white leaflet shows the Japanese propagandist ridiculing the U.S. air force to the Chinese while American planes are overhead. The black is a German item addressed to American troops (both obverse and reverse are shown).

Illustration #8. Two action leaflets and one morale leaflet. The Japanese leaflet reads, "Yearning for the native land, Forget-me-not stuck on my sleeve, Reminding me not to forget my dear old Homeland near the Kagu mountain." This type of poem is characteristically Japanese. The two action leaflets are self-explanatory; the one in Chinese is part of the same series as the one shown on the cover of this syllabus.

speaker and leaflet operations. (In Burma, American psychological warfare got news to the Japanese troops from Radio Tokyo--after editing it in passage--more rapidly than did the Japanese morale officers; Japanese music was recorded off the air in an area where no Japanese phonograph record had ever been played before.)

¶68. MORALE LEAFLETS. All leaflets were processed in a manner similar to that shown on page 38. When the tactical situation was static, morale leaflets (Illustrations #7 and #9) were used; in situations tactically unfavorable for the enemy, contingency leaflets were made up (Illustration #4) and surrender passes were distributed (Illustration #11). Morale leaflets were found to be the most difficult to write. They had to achieve the most definite effect with the least specific appeal; they involved no call to action. The effect of morale leaflets has never been calculated. Surrender and news leaflets can be tested by checking the number of prisoners who come in with surrender passes, and then quizzing them on news to find out how much came from news leaflets; but morale leaflets are not in a comparable situation, and most prisoners were found inclined to make snap judgments on how they should have felt when getting the morale leaflet, rather than how they did feel.

¶69. NEWSPAPERS AND NEWS LEAFLETS. News of common interest--progress of the war, political developments closely connected with the war, the appearance of new weapons, home news from the reader's country--provided a medium of communication which carried more propaganda than did all other means put together. News materials were used continuously, whenever the disseminator and his enemy stayed close enough or stably enough together to permit circulation. Instances are given in the Illustrations. It was found that the repetition of simple themes and slogans was basic to the effective propagandizing of the news and that news, correctly handled, never wore out its appeal.

¶70. LEAFLETS AND ORDER OF BATTLE. Order of battle information contributed tremendously to the effect of some very successful leaflets. The mention of troops by their correct unit names, reference to unpopular officers by name, correct description of enemy conditions--such devices gave the enemy troops the bewildering feeling that they had no security at all, and that the propagandist's forces were omnipotent. (Information of this kind came in great part, of course, from prisoners.) However, the mistaken or incorrect use of names, or even the delivery of the wrong leaflets to a given unit can undo much of the special effect obtained through battle order information and through the revelation of correct front-line intelligence. A simple leaflet which is sure of committing no blunder is commonly more effective than a complicated or tricky leaflet which may have unfavorable repercussions.

Production of a Tactical Leaflet

(Army level)



(Taken from **History of the Second Mobile Broadcasting Company,** no publisher given, issued within the unit, 1945.)

¶71. TACTICAL COORDINATION. The use of psychological warfare devices is ineffectual if the results desired are not rendered practical. For example, pursuit planes should not ask for the surrender of individual prisoners without explaining--in the leaflet--just how, where, and to whom the prisoners should surrender. Invitations to surrender must always be accompanied by control of the troops on the inviting side; if one prisoner starts across and is picked off by an over-enthusiastic sniper, other surrenders are not likely to follow: positive harm will have been done. Coordination between artillery or tactical rockets and leaflet shelling is important; the effect of leaflets can be stepped up measurably if heavy shelling is announced, delivered, lifted for the purpose of accepting surrenders, resumed, lifted again. This type of coordination requires the presence of a psychological warfare liaison officer at the regimental level or below, whether such an officer be one of the normal component trained in psychological warfare techniques or an outsider detailed for the purpose.

¶72. ATROCITY PROPAGANDA. Atrocity propaganda created a revulsion against war generally when it was employed in World War I. The audience reacted against the enemy, but the reaction consisted of nausea and nervous upset to such an extent that it is not now considered desirable to use atrocity propaganda. It may lift morale momentarily, but its long-range effect is not favorable to morale. It will be found in almost every case that rumors--resembling propaganda, except that they are not systematized to achieve a known end--will circulate in the course of operations among the troops themselves, alleging fearsome enemy atrocities. Inevitably, some of these rumors have their foundation in fact. They should not be encouraged and should be made the subject of propaganda campaigns only when the necessity therefor is compelling. It has been found that atrocity propaganda begets atrocities. An audience subjected to atrocity propaganda will react in the normal human way and will effect reprisals in kind if the opportunity offers, so that the outcome is an auction of cruelty, each side seeking to excel the other in wantonness without achieving any respectable military goal. Such propaganda makes combat operations more unpleasant without increasing their effectiveness, and it interferes with national policy in the post-war period, by leaving residual hatreds which are difficult to overcome for normal international relationships. When an enemy has in fact committed atrocities, news thereof is good propaganda only when it is desired to punish the enemy, when punishment can in fact be applied without reprisal in kind, or when publicity may have the effect of forestalling further atrocities of the same kind. (This signifies, usually, that atrocities committed against civilians or prisoners far behind the line of operations are often the appropriate subject of publicity, but that atrocities committed in the course of operations are not sound propaganda material unless compelling national policy requires their use.)

Illustration #9. German black morale leaflet (small photo) and instruction sheet telling German combat units to take along a package of leaflets when proceeding to the front lines, saying "Comrade! take me along and pass me forward. I've got to get to the Tommy and the Yankee to make them soft. I help save our blood!"

¶73. FURTHER COMBAT PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES. Loudspeakers were proved effective, especially after the Brittany operations in Europe and in the last phases of the island operations in the Pacific. Where fighting occurs along beaches, loudspeakers may be mounted on boats and run along the shore. Tank-mounted loudspeakers can sometimes be employed with results which are sensationally effective. When propaganda personnel cannot be taken in the boat or tank, it is possible to arrange a radio-telephone relay. The commander of the boat or tank describes the situation in English to the propaganda broadcaster back at the command post; when the propaganda man has the essential facts, the commander connects the radio-telephone directly into the loudspeaker circuit, and the tanks or boats begin speaking colloquial Japanese, German, Czech, Polish, or whatever language may be required. Loudspeakers are useful in mopping up; they avoid some of the waste effort and possible loss of life involved in using infantry against an enemy whose position is already hopeless, and they are more flexible than leaflets. Their range at the end of the second World War was two miles.

Loudspeakers may, in the interests of humaneness, be made available to enemy prisoners for the purpose of reassuring other enemy soldiers or fragmented units that further resistance involves loss of their lives. At Saipan and Guam, brave Japanese individuals volunteered to help save Japanese and American lives in this fashion. They spoke directly into the loudspeaker with a language officer standing by to make sure that no treachery was achieved. They were able to testify to good treatment. On occasion, the prisoners were so effective that they were given leave to return to the enemy lines, or to look for enemy units, for the purpose of bringing back others. (The Chinese forces in the guerrilla areas used this technique with audacity and astounding success. Lacking loudspeakers, they cut in on field telephones, talked propaganda at the operators, left presents at isolated sentry posts, invited exchanges of letters on the cause of the "imperialist" war, and shouted with megaphones.)

¶74. CONSOLIDATION. Leaflets, loudspeakers, posters, newspapers and local broadcasting are effective in consolidating occupied territories. Decisive action immediately upon occupation, coupled with genuinely effective supply and relief measures, will often prevent the appearance of irregular resistance measures which would involve the local populace and the occupying force in bitter antagonisms. The Germans promoted their own defeat by the arrogant, haughty, and arbitrary way in which they addressed conquered populations; a more genuine attempt to understand local populations would have involved the German army in fewer difficulties, and might have avoided such measures as outright terror; but if the Germans had been capable of such action, they would not have been Nazis and would not have conquered the territories in the first place

(一) No. 2519 マリヤナ時報 昭和二十年七月六日

マリヤナ時報

ボルネオ戰況

日本軍潰亂

濠軍、迅速進擊し

バリクパパンへ迫る

（マニラ七月三日發）濠洲軍第七師團の精鋭は一日、米濠空軍ならびに米濠海軍の砲撃後ボルネオ島バリクパパンの海岸に上陸敢行、引續き前進中と傳へられる、右につきマクアーサー元帥も二日「濠洲軍地上部隊はボルネオ第三次上陸を敢行、東海岸の大精油中心地バリクパパンに堅固な海岸據點を確保した」と發表、さらにメルボルン放送は「濠洲軍第七師團はセピンガン、マンガール兩飛行場の占領をめざして進出、バリクパパン海岸より東北十二キロに進出した」と報じてゐる

バリクパパンは世界で最も豐富な石油原産地の一つで年産一千五百萬樽を達してゐる、昭和十七年初め同島が日本軍に占領されて以來バリクパパンは日本の燃料油、航空用ガソリンの主源泉となつてゐた

前線報道によれば濠洲軍はバリクパパン東方に陸續上陸したのち急速に奥地へ進擊、これに對する日本軍の抵抗は軟弱の輕微であつたが深く進擊するにつれ漸次頑強となつてゐる、また濠洲軍偵察部隊はバリクパパン郊外一哩に近接したが、炎上した貯油タンクから湧出する「火焰の石油」の流れにより前進を阻止された、一方バリクパパン市に向け進擊する濠洲軍部隊は市の周邊全地域を掩蔽し得る一丘陵を奪取すべく日本軍と肉薄戰を演じたが、日本軍は遂に丘陵を放棄したので濠洲軍はその丘陵を降り更に增援を得て今一つの峯を占領した、しかしバリクパパン郊外までにはなほ一つの峰と峽谷があり、右偵察隊が前進を阻止されたのもこの峽谷が「火焰の石油」の流れと化してゐたためであつた、なほ濠洲軍部隊はバリクパパン東北十九キロのマンガール飛行場並びに東方七キロのセピンガン飛行場に向け急進を續けてゐる

（第二面へ續）

日本軍一掃の為聯合軍ボルネオに基地確立

平和憲章上院上程

平和への唯一の道

【ワシントン七月三日發】本日ウルマン大統領は去る二十六日閉會の桑港會議で起草された聯合國世界保障憲章を上院に提出すると共に簡潔に憲章を説明し速かに批准するやう要請した同上院は七月九日に憲議を始めることになつてゐるが憲章の短期批准に完全な一致をみることはまづ間違ひなく、憲議は比較的短期間に終了するものと思はれる大統領の説明左の如し

〃本憲章は恒久平和への唯一の道を示すものに他ならぬ上院の選擇すべきものは今や明かである、卽ちこの憲章と他のものとの何れかを選擇するのではなくしてこの憲章が唯一のものなのである

憲章の目的は將來の戰爭を防止せんとするにある平和手段により且つ正義の原則に基いて國際紛糾を解決し全世界の進歩とより高い生活水準を促進せんとするものであり且つ國際紛爭、國際不安の經濟上の原因を除去せんとするものである

戰爭を法律で禁じ且つ將來の世界保障を設計する完全な協定は多數の人の盡力によつて生れたものである、この憲章は固定した條約ではない、聯合國が設置した機關とその運營方法に經驗をつむならば、將來改正さるべきもので、米國の憲法が改正されたやうに年月がたつと共に改正し得るものである〃

久米島無血上陸

（グワム六月三十日發）米軍は沖縄西方八十キロの久米島をなんらの抵抗も受けることなく占領した旨ニミッツ元帥は本日のコンミニケで發表した、上陸部隊は直ちに全島くまなく偵察したが日本兵には全然遭遇しなかつたといふ、同島は琉球方面で米軍が占領した十六番目の島で長さ十四キロ幅五キロで飛行場建設に適するといはれる、支那沿岸から約五百六十キロ、九州南端から約六百四十キロに位する

支那の日本軍

退却中と報ず

【重慶七月四日發】ユーピー通信によれば、重慶軍高級司令部は廣西省柳州より十八キロ西北の一都市を占領し、柳州爭奪戰では同市の約一割が炎上したが樞要な飛行場は依然として使用可能であり、尙又敗殘日本守備隊は東北方へ退却中であると報じてゐる

「比島解放」發表さる

（マニラ七月五日發）マクアーサー元帥司令部は特別發表を行ひフィリツピン島の完全解放を報じた、本作戰において日本軍二十三個師團兵員合計四十五萬が事實上撃滅されたとマクアーサー元帥は述べた

Illustration #10. **Ma-ri-ya-na Ji-ho.** The **Mariana Times** was published by Psychological Warfare Division, CINCPAC-CINCPOA, for both news-to-troops and consolidation propaganda purposes. Colonel Johnston found experienced Japanese newspapermen among the internees and set them to writing columns about Occupied Tinian and Occupied Saipan. Issue shown is 6 July, 20th Year of Showa Emperor (1945).

¶75. PROPAGANDA EQUIPMENT. Propaganda equipment for printing is usually procured from civilian supply. A variety of presses, from the simplest stencilling machine up to offset machines capable of millions of leaflets per month, is available. Radio equipment can be supplied by existing Signal Corps materials, supplemented where necessary by civilian supply. In the India-Burma and China Theaters, there was developed a leaflet-dispensing machine built into an old auxiliary gasoline tank. All the pilot had to do was to set the controls at the number of leaflets per batch and the speed of ejection. He was then ready to fly over jungle territory, pinpointing possible enemy positions with leaflets. In ETO, there was developed the Monroe bomb, a leaflet bomb suitable for controlled dispersal from high-altitude planes. (If loose leaflets are dropped from high altitudes, they will scatter over immense territory and lose their effect.) Other ordnance and related devices are currently under study; information concerning this is available from Propaganda Branch.

Illustration #11. Surrender Passes, West and East. The standard form of each is used. Note prominent use of English on the Japanese; the stripes are a brilliant red, white and blue, since the Japanese soldiers wanted to be sure we knew they were surrendering. The German, on the other hand, had to be reassured that everything was properly official.

IX. Reading List

Books listed here are likely to be procurable at the larger municipal and college libraries. The bibliographies listed below provide a guide to further reading; a very large body of writing exists on the subject. Most of the books on World War II propaganda remain yet to be written.

Stewart ALSOP and Thomas BRADEN, Sub Rosa: The O.S.S: and American Espionage, New York, 1946.

Heber BLANKENHORN, Adventures in Propaganda, Boston, 1919.

[E. G. BORING, editor], Psychology for the Fighting Man, Washington, 1943.

George C. BRUNTZ, Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918, Stanford, 1938.

Philip DAVIDSON, Propaganda and the American Revolution, Chapel Hill, 1941.

Leonard DOOB, Propaganda, Its Psychology and Technique, New York, 1935.

Adolf HITLER, Mein Kampf, various editions; Chapter VI, "War Propaganda"

Harold LASSWELL, Propaganda Technique in the World War, New York, 1938.

Harold LASSWELL, Ralph D. CASEY, and Bruce Lannes SMITH, Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography, Minneapolis, 1935, and its sequel, Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion, A Comprehensive Reference Guide, Princeton, 1946.

Vladimir Ilyitch LENIN, The Teachings of Karl Marx (various editions).

Paul M. A. LINEBARGER, Psychological Warfare, A Practical Textbook (in preparation).

Leo J. MARGOLIN, Paper Bullets, A Brief Story of Psychological Warfare in World War II. New York, 1946.

Karl MARX and Friedrich ENGELS, The Communist Manifesto (various editions).

George Fort MILTON, Abraham Lincoln and the Fifth Column, Washington, 1943.

Edmond TAYLOR, The Strategy of Terror, New York, 1941.

J. P. WARBURG, Unwritten Treaty, New York, 1946.

ARMY MEDICAL LIBRARY WASHINGTON D.C.

Pad out for lettering

Illustration #12. Propaganda money from three wars. The French revolutionary bill of the Year 2 (1793-95) modestly circulates the slogans of the French revolution: upper left, "unity and indivisibility of the Republic"; upper right, "liberty, equality, fraternity or--death". The Russian bill, recalled and no longer valid as money, appeals in many languages for the world revolution (1919). The Japanese puppet 10-peso note from the Philippines has been overprinted by the PWB at General MacArthur's headquarters; enemy money carried American propaganda.


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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS LEADERS PLANNING GUIDE



November 2005

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HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

INTRODUCTION

This graphic training aid (GTA) is an indispensable reference tool for tactical Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Soldiers assigned to leadership positions. It contains valuable, comprehensive, and timesaving information in a concise format, making it easily transportable and simple to use. The focus of this GTA is to provide requisite information to help the tactical PSYOP Soldier better plan and execute PSYOP in support of a maneuver commander. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) leading a three-man tactical Psychological Operations team (TPT) or planning PSYOP at division or corps levels will find this GTA extremely helpful.

This GTA includes a number of worthwhile tools and techniques to assist in the planning and conduct of tactical-level PSYOP. From the basic principles of military decision-making process (MDMP) and PSYOP planning through the determination of measures of effectiveness (MOEs), this GTA will help the PSYOP NCO plan and execute doctrinally accurate and successful PSYOP. Numerous formats and guides, such as how to conduct PSYOP estimates, complete operational area assessments, and radio station assessments, are also included.

The proponent of this GTA is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and recommended changes to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DTD-PO, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

SUPPORTED UNIT INTEGRATION

The PSYOP Soldier's ability to integrate with a supported unit is key in the overall success of the mission. Failure to properly integrate with the supported unit may cause the supported commander to lose trust and respect for PSYOP and its ability to effectively support the mission.

LINKUP COORDINATION WITH A SUPPORTED UNIT

The following are necessary steps in establishing initial linkup coordination:

- Contact the supported commander or designated representative (chief of staff or J-3/G-3/S-3), and brief the supported commander on—
  - PSYOP capabilities (capabilities brief and Appendix B), including the battalion, company, tactical Psychological Operations detachment (TPD), or TPT organization, equipment, personnel, and employment options.
  - Available dissemination means, assets, or products.
  - Constraints and restrictions (approval process or themes and audiences to be used and avoided).
  - PSYOP assets on hand or available through coordination with higher PSYOP units.
  - For whom PSYOP works. Stress that PSYOP units and detachments work in or for the J-3 in joint operations, the G-3 at corps and division and the S-3 at brigade and battalion.
  - With whom the information operations (IO) officer works. Tactical PSYOP are a battlefield operating system (BOS), a form of nonlethal fire support; therefore, PSYOP works in the J-3/G-3/S-3.
- Ensure PSYOP are included in the mission planning.
- Ask for a briefing on the staff's battle rhythm, and the PSYOP and IO integration plan.
- Coordinate for PSYOP to take part in the decision-making process, staff planning for missions, and daily briefings or meetings.
- Ask for a copy of the supported unit's rules of engagement (ROE).
- Determine unit SOP or requirement for daily situation reports (SITREPs).
- Provide a memorandum from the Psychological Operations group (POG) or Psychological Operations battalion (POB) S-2 confirming the security clearances of all PSYOP Soldiers involved in the mission.
- Provide a copy of current PSYOP priority intelligence requirements (PIR).

- Request access to maneuver unit SITREPs and spot reports (SPOTREPs), enemy prisoner of war (EPW) interrogations, and interrogation reports.
- Ensure PSYOP are coordinated in mission planning with other nonlethal fires.
- Ensure that PSYOP are included in the air-targeting meetings and that targets do not conflict with IO targets.
- Contact the supported unit J-9/G-9/S-9 and—
  - Ascertain if host nation (HN) assets are available for product production and dissemination.
  - Request access to message traffic.
- Contact the supported unit J-6/G-6/S-6 or signal officer, and—
  - Determine the communications systems the supported unit has available, especially Internet, SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), and Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) connectivity.
  - Determine on what radio frequencies the supported unit operates.
  - Coordinate for a PSYOP internal radio frequency.
  - Coordinate for AN/CYZ-10 secure fills.
- Contact the J-1/G-1/S-1, and—
  - Provide a copy of attachment orders and information on the Soldiers to be attached to the supported unit.
  - Provide two copies (one paper copy and one electronic); include (for each attached Soldier) the Soldier's full name, rank, duty position, social security number, security clearance, blood type, next of kin, and next of kin contact information.
  - Determine task organization and which of the supported units the element will be attached to for administrative and logistics support (normally the supported unit's headquarters [HQ] company); provide unit standing operating procedure (SOP) for personnel reporting (for example, daily personnel status [PERSTAT] report).
  - Confirm unit's plan for or availability of mail services and Internet accesses, chaplain or religious services, finance services, and personnel or administrative services.
- Contact the J-4/G-4/S-4, and—
  - Provide information on the number of personnel being attached.
  - Provide the number and types of vehicles and generators.
  - Provide the estimated daily fuel consumption for vehicles and generators.
  - Provide the number and types of weapons systems.

- Provide battery requirements.
- Learn the unit SOP for requesting supplies and the availability, if any, of PSYOP-specific supplies in the supported unit's supply chain.
- Learn the unit SOP for logistics reporting (for example, daily logistical status report [LOGSTAT]).
- Learn the location of fuel points.
- Learn the location of water points and bath and laundry facilities.
- Learn the availability of sundry and comfort packages.
- Learn the location of supported unit's aid station.
- Learn the location of ammunition supply point (ASP) and ammunition basic load or force protection basic load per weapon.

LIAISON OFFICER GUIDE

LNOs are a vital part to the integration of PSYOP forces into the supported unit's plans and operations. LNOs normally are located in the J-3/G-3/S-3 at all levels of command from the geographic combatant command to the division level. LNOs should—

- Be able to answer the following types of questions:
  - Does the sending unit have a copy of the receiving unit's latest operation plan (OPLAN), operation order (OPORD), and fragmentary order (FRAGO)?
  - Does the receiving unit's plan support the plan of the higher HQ, including logistics and the tactical concept?
  - What are the receiving unit's commander's critical information requirements (CCIR)? At what time, phase, or event are they expected to change? Are there any items the CCIR do not contain that the sending unit can help with?
  - Which sending commander's decisions are critical to executing the receiving unit operation?
  - What are the "not-later-than" times for those decisions?
  - What assets does the unit need to acquire to accomplish its mission? How would they be used? How do they support attaining the more senior commander's intent? Where can the unit obtain them from higher HQ? Other Services?
  - How are aviation assets (rotary- and fixed-wing) being used?
  - How can the LNO communicate with the sending unit? Are telephones, radios, facsimile machines, computers, and other information systems (INFOSYS) available? Where are they located? Which ones are secure?
  - What terrain has been designated as key? Decisive?
  - What weather conditions would have a major impact on the operation?

- What effect would a chemical environment have on the operation?
- What effect would large numbers of refugees or EPWs have on the receiving unit's operations?
- If your unit is placed under operational control (OPCON) of a larger multinational force, or given OPCON of a smaller such force, what special problems would it present?
- If going to a multinational force HQ, how do the tactical principles and command concepts of that force differ from those of United States (U.S.) forces?
- What HN support is available to the sending unit?

- Understand what the sending commander wants the receiving commander to know. LNOs—
  - Receive a briefing from operations, intelligence, and other staff elements on current and future operations.
  - Receive and understand the tasks from the sending unit staff.
  - Obtain the correct maps, traces, and overlays.
  - Arrange for transport, communications and cryptographic equipment, codes, and signal instructions, including their protection and security.
  - Arrange for replacement of these items, as necessary.
  - Complete route-reconnaissance and time-management plans so the LNO party arrives at the designated location on time.
  - Make sure liaison personnel and interpreters have security clearances and access appropriate for the mission.
  - Verify that the receiving unit received the liaison team's security clearances and will grant access to the level of information the mission requires.
  - Verify courier orders.
  - Know how to destroy classified information in case of an emergency during transit or at the receiving unit.
  - Inform the sending unit of the LNO's departure time, route, and arrival time.
  - Pick up all correspondence designated for the receiving unit.
- Pack the following items:
  - Credentials (including permissive jump orders, if qualified).
  - Forms: Department of the Army (DA) Form 1594 (Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log) and other blank forms, as required.
  - References.
  - Excerpts of higher and sending HQ's orders and plans.

- Sending unit SOP.
- The unit modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE), unit status report (if its classification allows).
- Computers and other INFOSYS required for information and data exchange.
- Signal operating instructions extract.
- Security code encryption device.
- Communications equipment, including remote frequency modulated (FM) radio equipment.
- Sending unit telephone book.
- List of commanders and staff officers.
- Telephone calling (credit) card.
- Movement table.
- Administrative equipment.
- Map and chart equipment.
- Tent (camouflage net, cots, stove, and other CTA-50 equipment, as appropriate).
- Foreign phrase book and dictionary.
- Local currency, as required.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

One of the most difficult points to contend with in advising the staff and commander is the command relationship of PSYOP forces. The chart on page 7 should help in determining the relationship of any given element or subelement. PSYOP elements will also have reporting requirements with the PSYOP chain for products and other PSYOP-specific information.

IF RELATIONSHIP IS:		INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES ARE:							
		Has Command Relationship With:	May Be Task-Organized By:	Receives Combat Service Support From:	Assigned Position or Area of Operation By:	Provides Liaison To:	Establishes/ Maintains Communica-tions With:	Has Priorities Established By:	Gaining Unit Can Impose Further Command or Support Relationship Of:
COMMAND	**Attached**	Gaining unit	Gaining unit	Gaining unit	Gaining unit	As required by gaining unit	Unit to which attached	Gaining unit	Attached; OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS
	OPCON	Gaining unit	Parent unit and gaining unit; gaining unit may pass OPCON to lower HQ **NOTE 1**	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As required by gaining unit	As required by gaining unit and parent unit	Gaining unit	OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS
	Tactical Control (TACON)	Gaining unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As required by gaining unit	As required by gaining unit and parent unit	Gaining unit	GS; GSR; R; DS
	Assigned	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As required by parent unit	As required by parent unit	Parent unit	Not applicable
SUPPORT	**Direct Support (DS)**	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Supported unit	Supported unit	Parent unit; supported unit	Supported unit	**NOTE 2**
	Reinforcing (R)	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Reinforced unit	Reinforced unit	Parent unit; reinforced unit	Reinforced unit; then parent unit	Not applicable
	General Support Reinforcing (GSR)	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Reinforced unit and as required by parent unit	Reinforced unit and as required by parent unit	Parent unit; then reinforced unit	Not applicable
	General Support (GS)	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	As required by parent unit	As required by parent unit	Parent unit	Not applicable

NOTE 1. In North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the gaining unit may not task-organize a multinational unit (see TACON).

NOTE 2. Commanders of units in DS may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and elements of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.

NOTE 3. Coordinating Authority — A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more military departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations.

PLANNING

The importance of planning cannot be overstated in relation to the overall success of an operation. Military planning is a continuous process that incorporates supported unit and operational planning. Supported unit planning includes deliberate and crisis-action planning where the end state is the production of an OPLAN or OPORD for a supported unit. The OPLAN or OPORD for a supported unit will include a PSYOP annex or tab, depending on the echelon that the planner is working. Operational planning develops a PSYOP support OPLAN or OPORD that considers all the facets of how PSYOP will achieve its stated objectives. Operational planning continues throughout the operation, incorporates all PSYOP assets, and addresses external requirements. Army planning, regardless of whether it is supported unit or operational, is performed within the framework of the MDMP and the five-paragraph format. MDMP is the standard for Army planning.

MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

PSYOP planners are integrated at various levels from combatant command to battalions. Therefore, PSYOP planners need to be familiar with the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the Army's MDMP. Although these processes have slightly different methodologies, the essence of what they accomplish is the same. Military planners use both processes to make decisions and ultimately publish OPLANs and OPORDs. The MDMP is shown on page 9.



THE PSYOP ESTIMATE

The PSYOP estimate is a tool used to conduct PSYOP planning. It is the product of PSYOP IPB and begins during Step II of the MDMP. Its usefulness continues throughout the remainder of the MDMP. The PSYOP estimate is continually updated and may not be submitted as a formal estimate, particularly in crisis-action planning. The MDMP serves as a valuable checklist to remind planners of required information for continued planning. FM 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, provides additional information on the PSYOP estimate.

The estimate should be as detailed as possible, and the PSYOP planner should request assistance in preparing this document from the regional PSYOP battalion and the strategic studies detachment (SSD). The better the estimate, the better the planner will be able to integrate PSYOP into the rest of the supported commander's plan.

The estimate follows a standard five-paragraph format similar to an OPORD. The supported unit's G-2 or S-2 may be able to assist greatly in completing portions of the estimate. The more detail it contains, the better tool it will be.

THE PSYOP ESTIMATE

_____
(Classification)

Headquarters
Place
Date, time, and zone

PSYOP ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION NO._____

(U) REFERENCES:

a. ( ) List maps and charts.

b. ( ) Include other relevant documents (military capability study, special Psychological Operations studies [SPSs], special Psychological Operations assessments [SPAs], and intelligence estimates).

(1) ( ) When the PSYOP estimate is distributed outside the issuing HQ, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the final page of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the originating section, division, or other official, according to local policy.

(2) ( ) Normally, PSYOP estimates are numbered sequentially within a calendar year. The estimate is usually distributed as an appendix to the operations annex.

1. ( ) MISSION.

a. ( ) Supported unit's restated mission resulting from mission analysis.

b. ( ) PSYOP mission statement. Describe the PSYOP mission to support the maneuver commander's mission.

2. ( ) SITUATION AND CONSIDERATION.

a. ( ) Characteristics of the AO.

(1) ( ) Weather.
(2) ( ) Terrain.
(3) ( ) Media infrastructure.

THE PSYOP ESTIMATE (CONTINUED)

b. ( ) Key target sets:

(1) ( ) Hostile target sets.
(2) ( ) Friendly target sets.
(3) ( ) Neutral target sets.

c. ( ) Friendly forces.

(1) ( ) Supported unit COAs.
(2) ( ) Current status of organic personnel and resources.
(3) ( ) Current status of nonorganic personnel and resources.
(4) ( ) Comparison of requirements versus capabilities and recommended solutions.
(5) ( ) Key considerations for COA supportability.

d. ( ) Assumptions.

3. ( ) ANALYSIS OF COAs.

a. ( ) Analyze each COA from the PSYOP point of view to determine its advantages and disadvantages.

b. ( ) The evaluation criteria listed in paragraph 2.

c. Paragraph (5) above establishes the elements to be analyzed for each COA under consideration.

4. ( ) COMPARISON OF COAs.

a. ( ) Compare the proposed COAs to determine the one that offers the best chance of success. List the advantages and disadvantages of each COA. Comparison should be visually supported by a decision matrix.

b. ( ) Develop and compare methods of overcoming disadvantages, if any, in each COA.

c. ( ) State a general conclusion on the COA that offers the best chance of success from a PSYOP perspective.

5. ( ) RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.

a. ( ) Recommended COA based on comparison. Rank COAs from best to worst.

b. ( ) Issues, deficiencies, and risks for each COA, with recommendations to reduce their impact.

(signed) _____

G-3/G-7 PSYOP Officer
ANNEXES:
DISTRIBUTION:

_____
(Classification)

THE PSYOP PROCESS

The PSYOP process is a systematic and continuous method. The PSYOP process includes the elements of planning, analyzing, synchronizing, developing, designing, producing, distributing, disseminating, managing, and evaluating PSYOP products and actions presented to selected target audiences (TAs). The Psychological Operations task force (POTF) or Psychological Operations support element (PSE) HQ and each detachment or team within the Psychological Operations development center (PDC) or tactical Psychological Operations development detachment (TPDD) has specific tasks and responsibilities to complete throughout this process. They complement each other and are mutually coordinated and supportive.

The missions of the POTF, PSE, PDC, and TPDD during PSYOP development are mutually supportive and require continuous coordination. For example, the G-1 or S-1 produces attachment orders that ensure appropriate manning of the POTF. The POTF or PSE G-2 or S-2 submits intelligence requests (information requirement [IRs] and PIR), monitors intelligence reports, gathers PSYOP-relevant information, and searches all available means to collect impact indicators. The G-2 or S-2 supports the target audience analysis process (TAAP) and assists in the evaluation process. The POTF or PSE G-3 or S-3 coordinates and tracks aspects of production, distribution, and dissemination of products and actions. The G-3 or S-3 coordinates and synchronizes the assets needed to ensure a cohesive PSYOP effort. The G-4 or S-4 obtains the assets needed to produce products. The SSD supports the PSYOP development process by providing expert analysis, and advises the commander and the PDC on TAs and the AO. The PDC and TPDD plan, develop, design, and obtain approval of programs.

The PSYOP process encompasses the seven phases shown on page 13. Certain components of the seven phases are accomplished concurrently. The PSYOP process must be applied in its entirety to all products.

The format of the PSYOP appendix to the IO annex to an OPORD (pages 13 through 15) follows the five-paragraph format. Although it is usually designated Appendix 2, the S-3/G-3 may designate it with another letter. All information in this appendix should be PSYOP-relevant. FM 3-05.301 provides additional information on the PSYOP appendix to the IO annex.



PSYOP APPENDIX TO IO ANNEX

_____
(Classification)

APPENDIX 2 (PSYOP) TO ANNEX P (IO) OPERATION ORDER NO.____

1. SITUATION.

Hostile. Resources and elements available to conduct propaganda.
Friendly. Identify ongoing PSYOP series, tasks, and goals.
Neutral. Identify neutral outlets that may conduct PSYOP; for example, al-Jezeera.

Attachments and Detachments.

PSYOP APPENDIX TO IO ANNEX (CONTINUED)

2. MISSION.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Scheme of PSYOP.

b. Tasks to Subordinate Units.

(1) Tactical Psychological Operations company (TPC) HQ: Responsible for the coordination and execution of distributing all product(s) to the TPDs.

(2) TPDD: Responsible for all contracts for airtime of audio and audiovisual products. Responsible for the development of PSYOP series. Also responsible for deployable audio production system (DAPS) team.

(3) TPD 123: Responsible for the distribution and dissemination of audio, visual, and audiovisual products within their AO. Responsible for series testing within their AO.

(4) TPD 124: Responsible for the distribution and dissemination of audio, visual, and audiovisual products within their AO. Responsible for series testing within their AO.

(5) TPD 125: Responsible for the distribution and dissemination of audio, visual, and audiovisual products within their AO. Responsible for series testing within their AO.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Presidential and/or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) themes to stress or avoid.

(a) Themes to stress:

(b) Themes to avoid:

(2) POs, SPOs, potential target audiences (PTAs), and MOE are listed in Appendix 1. Tactical PSYOP elements when faced with situations where approved series do not have the level of specificity necessary can create impromptu provisional loudspeaker and face-to-face products concerning only deception, force protection, or civilian noninterference.

(3) Specific timelines for distribution and dissemination of PSYOP products will be given once a series is approved.

(4) Requests for PSYOP support must be submitted through the S-3 or G-3.

PSYOP APPENDIX TO IO ANNEX (CONTINUED)

(5) All aerial delivery of PSYOP products must be coordinated between the PSYOP commander and the division aviation officer.

(6) See Appendix 3 for the SITREP format.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT.

a. Resources. Identify resources required to conduct PSYOP actions. Additional printing and audio materials will be requested through the G-4 and purchased through contracts.

b. Supply Distribution Plan. 2d Infantry Division (ID) supply channels will provide all Army common items. PSYOP-specific equipment will be requested through PSYOP channels to the special operations theater support element (SOTSE).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Command.

(1) Succession of command.

(2) PSYOP approval process is outlined in Appendix 2.

(Classification)

THE PSYOP PLAN

Military planning is extremely complex and must be integrated, synchronized, and coordinated at many different levels. PSYOP planners must be involved in the supported unit's planning, including the seven steps of MDMP. In addition, five PSYOP-specific planning requirements must be completed for PSYOP forces to conduct the PSYOP process. The five requirements are:

- Develop POs.
- Develop SPOs.
- Identify PTAs.
- Determine MOEs.
- Write the PSYOP appendix.

Although the PSYOP plan may have more POs and SPOs, the following graphic on page 16 shows the correct relationship of the elements of all PSYOP plans. FM 3-05.302, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, provides additional information on PSYOP plans.



ORDERS

Receipt of a mission may occur in several ways. It may begin with the initial WARNO or with the TPT leader's receipt of an OPORD. Frequently, leaders receive a mission in a FRAGO over the radio. Ideally, they receive a series of WARNOs, the OPORD, and a briefing from their commander. The ideal sequence of orders flows from WARNO to OPORD to FRAGO.

WARNO: 1) A preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow.

2) A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of COAs by a supported commander and requests that a commander's estimate be submitted.

3) A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning.

OPORD: A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

FRAGO: An abbreviated form of an operation order (verbal, written, or digital) usually issued on a day-to-day basis that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic OPORD. It may be issued in sections. It is issued after an OPORD to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order.

NOTE: The WARNO format is shown on pages 18 and 19; Quick WARNO Reference, page 19; OPORD, pages 20 and 21; and FRAGO, pages 21 and 22.

Upon receipt of a mission, TPT leaders perform an initial assessment of the situation and allocate the time available for planning and preparation, including rehearsals and movement. This initial assessment and time allocation form the basis of their initial WARNO. Leaders issue the initial WARNO quickly to give subordinates as much time as possible to plan and prepare.

The initial assessment addresses the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC). The order and detail in which TPT leaders analyze the factors of METT-TC are flexible, depending on the amount of information available and the relative importance of each factor. For example, TPT leaders may concentrate on the mission, enemy, and terrain, leaving weather and civil considerations until they receive more detailed information.

Often, TPT leaders do not receive their final unit mission until dissemination of the WARNO after COA approval or the OPORD. Effective leaders do not wait until their higher HQ completes planning to begin their planning. Using all information available, TPT leaders develop their unit mission as completely as possible. They focus on the mission, commander's intent, and concept of operations (CONOPS) of their higher and next-higher PSYOP unit. They identify the major tasks their team most likely will be assigned and develop a mission statement based on information they have received. At this stage, the mission may be incomplete.

Based on what they know, Army leaders estimate the time available to plan and prepare for the mission. They begin by identifying the times at which major planning and preparation events, including rehearsals, must be completed. Reverse planning helps in estimating time. TPT leaders identify the critical times specified by higher HQ and work back from them, estimating how much time each event will consume. Critical times might include aircraft loading times, the line of departure (LD) time, or the start point (SP) time for movement. Through reverse planning, leaders arrive at

the time available to plan and prepare for the operation. They limit the amount of time they use to one-third and allocate the remaining two-thirds of time for preparing subordinates.

WARNO FORMAT

_____
(Classification)
(Change from oral orders, if any) (Optional)
A WARNING ORDER DOES NOT AUTHORIZE EXECUTION
UNLESS SPECIFICALLY STATED

WARNING ORDER _____

References: Refer to higher HQ OPLAN/OPORD, and identify map sheet for the operation. (Optional)

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: (Optional)

Task Organization: (Optional) (See paragraph 1c.)

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces:

b. Friendly forces: (Optional) Only address is essential to the WARNO.

(1) Higher commander's mission.

(2) Higher commander's intent.

c. Attachments and detachments: Initial task organization. Address only major unit changes.

2. MISSION. Issuing HQ mission at the time of the WARNO. Include the higher HQ restated mission or the commander's decisions during MDMP.

3. EXECUTION.

Intent:

a. Concept of operations: Provide as much information as available (may be none during the initial WARNO).

b. Tasks to maneuver units:

c. Tasks to combat support units: See paragraph 3b.

d. Coordinating instructions:

(1) CCIR.

(2) Risk guidance.

(3) Deception guidance.

(4) Specific priorities, in order of completion.

(5) Timeline.

WARNO FORMAT (CONTINUED)

(6) Guidance on orders and rehearsals.
(7) Orders group meeting (attendees, location, and time).
(8) Earliest movement time and degree of notice.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT: (Optional) Include any known logistics preparation for the operation.

a. Special equipment: Identifying requirements and coordinating transfer to using units.

b. Transportation: Identifying requirements and coordinating for pre-position of assets.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL: (Optional)

a. Command: State the chain of command, if different from the unit SOP.

b. Signal: Identify current signal of interest (SOI) edition and pre-position signal assets to support operation.

ACKNOWLEDGE: (Mandatory)

NAME (Commander's last name)

RANK (Commander's rank)

OFFICIAL: (Optional)

_____
(Classification)

QUICK WARNO REFERENCE

SITUATION:
ENEMY:
FRIENDLY:
MISSION:

Task Organization	Equipment Common to All	Special Equipment	Who	What	TIME SCHEDULE	
					When	Where
				Draw Equipment		
				Inspection		
				All	OPORD	
				All	Rehearsal	
				All	Marshall	

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: (For example, special instructions could include additional coordination conducted by a member of the team.)

OPORD FORMAT

_____
(Classification)
(Change from oral orders, if any)

OPERATION ORDER_____ (number)
References:
Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan (Order):
Task Organization:

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces.
b. Friendly forces.
c. Attachments and detachments.
D. Assumptions (OPLAN only).

2. MISSION.

3. EXECUTION.

Intent:

a. Concept of operations.
(1) Maneuver.
(2) Fires.
(3) Reconnaissance (recon) and surveillance.
(4) Intelligence.
(5) Engineer
(6) Air defense.
(7) IO.

b. Tasks to maneuver units.

c. Tasks to combat support units.
(1) Intelligence.
(2) Engineer.
(3) Fire support.
(4) Air defense.
(5) Signal.
(6) Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC).
(7) Provost marshal.
(8) PSYOP.
(9) Civil military.
(10) As required.

d. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Time or condition when a plan or order becomes effective.

OPORD FORMAT (CONTINUED)

(2) CCIR.
(3) Risk reduction control measures.
(4) Rules of engagement.
(5) Environmental considerations.
(6) Force protection
(7) As required.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
a. Support concept.
b. Materiel and services.
c. Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and hospitalization.
d. Personnel.
e. Civil-military.
f. As required.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Command.
b. Signal.

ACKNOWLEDGE:
NAME (Commander's last name)
RANK (Commander's rank)

OFFICIAL:
Name and position
ANNEXES:

_____
(Classification)

FRAGO FORMAT

_____
(Classification)
(Change from oral orders, if any)

FRAGMENTARY ORDER _____

References: (Mandatory) Reference the order being modified.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order (Optional)

1. SITUATION. (Mandatory) Include any changes to the existing order.

2. MISSION. (Mandatory) List the new mission.

FRAGO FORMAT (CONTINUED)

3. EXECUTION.
Intent: (Optional)
a. Concept of operations. (Mandatory)
b. Tasks to subordinate units. (Mandatory)
c. Coordinating instructions. (Mandatory) Include statement, "Current overlay remains in effect" or "See Change 1 to Annex C, Operations Overlay." Mark changes to control measures on overlay, or issue a new overlay.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Include any changes to existing order or the statement, "No change to OPORD xx."

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Include any changes to existing order or the statement, "No change to OPORD xx."

ACKNOWLEDGE:
NAME (Commander's last name)
RANK (Commander's rank)

OFFICIAL:
Name and position

ANNEXES:

(Classification)

TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES

Troop-leading procedures (TLPs) extend the MDMP to small-unit level. Where the MDMP provides a structure for interaction between a commander and staff, TLPs prescribe a sequence of activities for planning and preparing for operations. While the two processes are similar, they are not identical. TLPs and the MDMP are linked by information flow. The type, amount, and timeliness of the information passed from higher to lower HQ directly impact the lower unit leader's TLP. The example on page 23 illustrates the parallel sequences of the MDMP and TLP. However, events do not always occur in the order shown. For example, TLP may start with receipt of an OPORD.

WARNOs may arrive at any time. Team and detachment leaders should remain flexible. They adapt TLPs to fit the situation, rather than try to alter the situation to fit a preconceived idea of how events should flow. Team and detachment leaders should use the TLP guidance shown on pages 23 and 24 when working with TLPs.

PARALLEL SEQUENCES OF MDMP AND TLP



TLP GUIDANCE

1. RECEIVE THE MISSION.
- a. Understand commander's intent.
- b. Received by OPORD, WARNO, or FRAGO.
- c. Perform an initial assessment (METT-TC).
- d. Implement 1/3-2/3 rule for time management.

2. ISSUE A WARNO.
- a. Mission or nature of the operation.
- b. Time and place for issuing the OPORD.
- c. Units participating in the operation.
- d. Specific tasks.
- e. Timeline for operation.

3. MAKE TENTATIVE PLAN.
- a. Conduct mission analysis.
- b. Consider higher HQ mission and commander's intent.
- c. Consider higher HQ concept of the operation.
- d. Consider specified, implied, and essential tasks.

TLP GUIDANCE (CONTINUED)

e. Identify constraints.
f. Consider METT-TC and observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (OAKOC).
g. Develop COAs.
h. Analyze and compare COAs.

4. INITIATE MOVEMENT (includes recon element, guides, quartering parties, or whole units).
a. Move to an assembly area.
b. Move to a new AO.
c. Move to battle position.

5. CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE.
a. Seek to confirm or deny information that supports tentative plan.
b. Conduct first-hand assessment of METT-TC.
c. Conduct minimum recon (consists of map recon and imagery).
d. Focus on information gaps.

6. COMPLETE THE PLAN.
a. Incorporate results of recon into selected COA.
b. Prepare overlays.
c. Conduct or complete coordinations with adjacent units, higher HQ, and CSS.

7. ISSUE THE ORDER.
a. May be verbal or written.
b. Use five-paragraph format.
c. Use terrain model, maps, and detailed sketches.

8. SUPERVISE AND REFINE.
a. Throughout TLP, monitor mission preparation and refine the plan.
b. Conduct initial and final inspections of personnel and equipment.
c. Conduct rehearsals.
d. Conduct confirmation brief.
e. Conduct briefback.
f. Conduct combined arms rehearsal.
g. Conduct support rehearsal.
h. Conduct battle drill or SOP rehearsal.

CAPABILITIES BRIEF

The capabilities (CAPES) brief usually sets the tone for the effectiveness of tactical PSYOP with the supported unit. The brief can be a full PowerPoint slide presentation, a desk-side briefing, or simply an oral presentation. No

matter the briefing type, the briefing must be planned, rehearsed, and tailored to the supported commander. FM 3-05.302 provides additional information on the CAPES brief.

The briefer should advise the commander that he is his PSYOP subject-matter expert and staff planner. To perform as such, he works directly for the commander and the S-3. This relationship requires direct access to the commander and participation throughout the MDMP. The briefer should explain his dual chain of command—he has a coordinating chain for PSYOP-specific support, such as product requests and approval, yet falls under the supported commander's chain of command.

The briefer should advise the commander on the types of products he physically has with him, the types to which he has access, and the product request process. The goal of the briefer should be to let the commander know what he currently has and how he can get more or new products.

All capabilities briefs should be formatted in the same manner whether a TPT-level or a TPC-level briefing. The format should contain the following:

- Introduction.
- How the TPT will support the commander, including—
  - PSYOP plan.
  - Three key PSYOP points.
- Product support and approval chain.
- Equipment.
- Support required.
- Closing.

The most important aspect of the capabilities brief is the presentation of the appropriate information. The briefer must prepare and deliver a professional brief (content, appearance, and delivery). A professional brief will ensure that PSYOP capabilities will be fully nested in the supported unit's concept of operations.

PSYOP capabilities and the supported unit's mission will determine the format and content of the capabilities brief. However, the PSYOP mission statement is critical because it links the SPOs with the supported unit's objectives. The brief may contain the following information; however, the actual content of the brief will be tailored to the specific supported commander:

- PSYOP mission statement (for example: On order TPT/TPD/TPC XXX will support the unit's mission by providing tactical PSYOP support to SPO A and SPO B).

- Command relationships.
- Person PSYOP are working for in the supported unit.
- PSYOP coordination chain.
- Propaganda assessment.
- Ongoing PSYOP programs and their effects in the supported unit's AOI.
- Additional organic capabilities.
- Higher PSYOP capabilities.
- Limitations on PSYOP and higher capabilities.
- Approval process and authority.
- Preapproved series that PSYOP are resourced to execute.
- Preapproved series that PSYOP are not resourced to execute.
- PSYOP MOEs.
- Series development timeline.
- Unresolved issues that require the supported commander's attention.

PSYOP TOOLS

PSYOP leaders use a variety of tools and techniques in planning and conducting tactical-level PSYOP. The tools and techniques are discussed and depicted on pages 26 through 31.

PSYOP MAPPING SYMBOLS

PSYOP leaders use PSYOP mapping symbols to annotate the location of PSYOP activities such as the location of a PSYOP TA. The graphic on page 27 shows PSYOP mapping symbols and their descriptions.

PSYOP MAPPING SYMBOLS

Symbol Title	Description	Symbol
Propaganda	The location of propaganda.	
PSYOP Written	The location for hand dissemination of PSYOP leaflets, handbills, flyers, and posters.	
PSYOP Leaflets, Helicopter (Rotary-Wing)	The location for the helicopter dissemination center of impact area of PSYOP leaflets.	
PSYOP Leaflets, Aerial (Fixed-Wing)	The area for the airborne dissemination center of impact area of PSYOP leaflets. Military or commercial fixed-wing aircraft may make delivery.	
PSYOP TA Location	The location of a PSYOP TA.	
PSYOP Loudspeaker Broadcast, Wheeled-Vehicle Mounted	The location of a ground-based mounted PSYOP loudspeaker broadcast event or loudspeaker team.	
PSYOP Loudspeaker Broadcast, Helicopter (Rotary-Wing) Mounted	The location of a helicopter- (rotary-wing) mounted loudspeaker, PSYOP broadcast mission or event, or a helicopter loudspeaker system or unit.	
PSYOP Broadcast, Aerial (Fixed-Wing) Station	The location of an aerial broadcast transmitted over radio or television (TV) frequencies, or a location of an aerial broadcast PSYOP system or unit.	
PSYOP Radio Broadcast	The location of a civilian- or military-operated radio broadcast tower or station used to broadcast PSYOP messages.	
PSYOP TV Broadcast	The location of a civilian- or military-operated TV broadcast tower or station used to broadcast PSYOP messages.	
PSYOP Face-to-Face	The location of direct face-to-face of tactical PSYOP, used in establishing legitimacy and credibility of messages with foreign populations.	
PSYOP Printing Service	The location of a civilian- or military-operated print facility used to print PSYOP messages.	
PSYOP Distribution Center	The location of a civilian- or military-operated distribution facility or area used as a holding or distribution point for PSYOP messages.	
PSYOP Unmanned Aerial Vehicle	The location of PSYOP unmanned aerial vehicle (wind supported aerial delivery system [WSADS]).	

INTERPRETERS

PSYOP Soldiers may require an interpreter to effectively communicate with the local populace. Guidance on how to select an interpreter, what to do and not do when using an interpreter, and how to work with the interpreter is provided on pages 28 through 31.

GUIDANCE FOR USE OF INTERPRETER

Interpreter Selection:

- An interpreter should be a native speaker of the socially or geographically determined dialect.
- An interpreter's speech, background, and mannerisms should be completely acceptable to the TA so that no attention is given to the way he talks, only to what he says.
- An interpreter may be limited in his effectiveness with a TA if his social standing is considerably lower than that of the audience. Examples include significant differences in military rank or membership in an ethnic or religious group.
- Interpreting goes both ways. The interpreter must be able to convey the information expressed by the interviewee or TA.
- An interpreter should be quick, alert, and responsive to changing conditions and situations.
- An interpreter must be able to grasp complex concepts and discuss them without confusion in a reasonably logical sequence.
- Generally speaking, the better educated the interpreter, the better he will perform because of increased exposure to diverse concepts.
- You may need an interpreter with technical training or experience in special subject areas. This type of interpreter will be able to translate the "meaning" and the "words." For instance, if the subject is very technical or specialized, with terms such as "nuclear physics," background knowledge is useful.
- Beware of the potential interpreter who arrives late for the interview. Make sure the interpreter understands the military's preoccupation with punctuality.
- If the interpreter is a local national, his first loyalty is most likely to the local populace or subgroup, not to the U.S. military.
- Interpreters, for political or personal reasons, may have ulterior motives or a hidden agenda when they apply for the interpreting job.

GUIDANCE FOR USE OF INTERPRETER (CONTINUED)

If you detect or suspect such motives, you should tell the commander or security manager.

- Gender, age, and race have the potential to affect the mission seriously. An interpreter from outside the TA's group may have limited effectiveness, since traditions, values, and biases vary from country to country.
- Interpreters must be honest and free from unfavorable notoriety among the local inhabitants.
- Orient the interpreters as to the nature of their duties, expected standards of conduct, techniques of interview to be used, and any other requirements necessary. The orientation may include the following:
  - Current tactical situation.
  - Background information obtained on the source, interviewee, or TA.
  - Specific objectives for the interview, meeting, or interrogation.
  - Method of interpretation to be used—simultaneous or alternate.
  - Conduct of the interview, lesson, or interrogation.
  - Need for interpreters to avoid injecting their own personality, ideas, or questions into the interview.
  - Instruction to the interpreters to mirror the Soldier's tone and personality of speech.
  - Instruction to the interpreters to inform you if they notice any inconsistencies or peculiarities from sources.
  - Possible need for interpreter to assist in after-action reports (AARs) or assessments.

Interpreter Session:

- You and the interpreter must work as a team. The TA is quick to recognize personality conflicts between the Soldier and the interpreter, which can undermine the effectiveness of the communication effort.
- About 4 hours of active interpreting is the maximum for peak efficiency.
- Be cautious about what information you give the interpreter. Certain tactical situations may require the use of uncleared indigenous personnel as "field-expedient" interpreters. Commanders should be

GUIDANCE FOR USE OF INTERPRETER (CONTINUED)

aware of the increased security risk involved in using such personnel and carefully weigh the risk versus the potential gain. If uncleared interpreters are used, any sensitive information should be kept to a minimum.

- Be aware that some interpreters, because of cultural differences, may try to "save face" by purposely concealing their lack of understanding. They may try to translate what they think you said or meant without asking for a clarification or vice versa.

Dos and Don'ts

- Present one major thought in its entirety, and allow the interpreter to reconstruct it in his language and culture.
- Insist that the interpreter always asks for clarification before interpreting whenever he is not certain of the meaning.
- Ensure the interpreter understands that if questions are asked, he should immediately relay them to the PSYOP Soldier for an answer.
- Ensure the interpreter understands he should never try to answer a question, even though he may know the correct answer.
- Consider the use of profanity, slang, and colloquialisms. In many cases, such expressions cannot be translated.
- If a technical term or expression must be used, ensure the interpreter conveys the proper meaning in the target language.
- Never say more in one sentence than the interpreter can easily repeat word for word immediately after hearing it.
- Each sentence should contain a complete thought without verbiage.
- Keep the entire presentation as simple as possible, using short sentences and simple words (low context).
- Avoid idiomatic English.
- Avoid tendency toward flowery language.
- Avoid slang and colloquial expressions.
- Identify any cultural restrictions before interviewing, instructing, or conferring with an interpreter.
- Position the interpreter by your side (or even a step back). This method keeps the subject or audience from shifting attention or from fixating on the interpreter and not on the PSYOP Soldier.
- Always look at and talk directly to the subject or audience. Guard against the tendency to talk to the interpreter.

GUIDANCE FOR USE OF INTERPRETER (CONTINUED)

- Speak slowly and clearly. Repeat as often as necessary.
- Periodically check the interpreter's accuracy, consistency, and clarity.
- Check with the audience whenever misunderstandings are suspected, and clarify immediately. Using the interpreter, ask questions to elicit answers that indicate the point is clear.
- Make the interpreter feel like a valuable member of the team. Give the interpreter recognition commensurate with the importance of his contribution.
- Do not address the subject or audience in the third person through the interpreter.
- Do not make side comments to the interpreter that he should not translate. This action usually creates the wrong atmosphere for communication.
- Do not be a distraction while the interpreter is translating and the subject or audience is listening.

RAPID LOCAL ASSESSMENT

For planning purposes, PSYOP leaders may require information quickly about the local area. The Rapid Local Assessment shown on pages 31 through 34 will aid them in acquiring this information. FM 3-05.302 provides additional information on Rapid Local Assessment.

RAPID LOCAL ASSESSMENT

1. GENERAL INFORMATION.

a. Village name:_____

_____

Location:_____

b. Population total:_____ Male:_____
Female:_____

c. Pro-U.S., neutral, or pro-enemy comments:_____

_____

_____

RAPID LOCAL ASSESSMENT (CONTINUED)

d. Language:_____
e. Currency:_____
f. Refugees? Yes / No
Total:_____ From:_____
g. Ethnic makeup:_____
h. Religious makeup:_____
i. Tribe:_____
j. Key communicators:
1._____ Title:_____
2._____ Title:_____
3._____ Title:_____
k. Mayor or leader: _____
l. Police chief: _____
m. Local military leaders:_____
n. School leaders:_____
o. Type of dwellings: _____
Overall category:_____

STRUCTURAL EVALUATION CHART

Category 1.
- Broken windows, door locks and hinges, and roof tiles
- Cut off from electricity and water
- *Can be repaired*

Category 3.
- Over 30% roof damage
- Severe fire damage
- Need for replacement of floors
- Doors and windows destroyed
- All piping and wiring destroyed
- *Can be repaired*

Category 2.
- Up to 30% roof damage
- Light shelling or bullet impact on walls
- Partial fire damage
- *Can be repaired*

Category 4.
- Destroyed
- Needs reconstruction
- *Cannot be repaired*

p. Number of dwellings: _____
q. Average number in dwellings: _____
r. Power:_____Reliability:_____
Dwellings with:_____%
s. Water supply type:_____Reliability: _____
Dwellings with:_____%

RAPID LOCAL ASSESSMENT (CONTINUED)

t. Sewage: _____ Reliability: _____
Dwellings with:_____%
u. Transportation between villages:_____
v. Contact with other villages? Yes / No
Reason: _____
w. Medical facilities? Yes / No
Description:_____
_____
Limitations:_____
_____
Doctors:
1._____
2._____

2. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS.

a. Natural resource types:
1._____
2._____
3._____
b. Monetary system used:_____
c. Black market activities? Yes / No
Type?_____
d. Agriculture and domestic food supply main crop:_____
e. Industry type:_____
Owner:_____
f. Unemployment rate:_____%
g. Fuels supply type:_____ Availability:_____
h. NGO activity type:_____
Name:_____
Point of contact (POC):_____
i. Traditions, customs, and taboos:
Comments:_____
_____

RAPID LOCAL ASSESSMENT (CONTINUED)

3. MEDIA.

a. Television (TV):
Number per household or village:_____
Channel:_____ Location:_____

b. Radio:
Number per household or village:_____
Frequency:_____
Location:_____

c. Newspaper: Yes / No
Name:_____
Owner:_____ Frequency:_____

4. CONTACT WITH FORCES.

a. U.S.: Date-time group (DTG):_____
Who?_____
Why?_____

b. Positive and negative comments: _____
_____
_____

c. Coalition: DTG: _____
Who? _____
Why?_____
Positive and negative comments:
_____
_____
_____

d. Enemy: DTG:_____
Who?_____
Positive and negative comments: _____
_____

e. PSYOP:
DTG:_____
Product type:_____
Positive or negative comments:_____
_____

DELIBERATE LOCAL ASSESSMENT

For planning purposes, PSYOP leaders require comprehensive information about the local area. The Deliberate Local Assessment shown on pages 35 through 45 will aid them in acquiring this information.

DELIBERATE LOCAL ASSESSMENT

Location:

Province:_____

District: _____

Alternate district:_____

Settlement name (English):_____

Settlement name (HN language):_____

Geographic (geo) code:_____

Alternate name 1: _____

Alternate name 2: _____

Alternate name 3: _____

Latitude:_____

Longitude:_____

Datum or coordinate system (for example, WGS84/decimal degrees):

_____

(Or military grid reference system [MGRS] with grid zone designator):_____

Coordinate location (Where was the global positioning system [GPS] waypoint taken? For example, was it taken from the center of the settlement?):_____

Physical size (approximate radius in meters from town center):_____

_____

_____

Is settlement province center? Y N

Is settlement district center? Y N

Type of settlement (Circle all that apply.): Urban Suburban Rural Compact Dispersed Seasonal Nomadic Unknown

Other: _____

Is settlement subdivided? Y N

DELIBERATE LOCAL ASSESSMENT (CONTINUED)

Subsettlement(s):
Name 1:_____
Name 2: _____
Name 3: _____
Name 4: _____

Population:
Total population:_____
% Pro-U.S.:_____ % Neutral:_____ % Pro-enemy:_____
Total number of families: _____ Average family size:_____
% Male:_____ % Female:_____
% Children:_____
Number of female-headed households:_____
Ethnicity by %:_____ Religious makeup by %:_____
Literacy %:_____
Number by ethnicity of permanent resident families:_____
Number by ethnicity of refugee returnee families:_____
Number by ethnicity of internally displaced person families:_____
Where are they displaced from (approximate proportion by location):
_____
Reasons for displacement (approximate proportion by reason):_____
_____
Conditions for resettlement (approximate proportion by condition):__
_____

Population structure:

AGE	MALE	FEMALE
0-4		
5-9		
10-14		
15-19		
20-24		
25-29		
30-34		
35-39		
40-44		
45-49		
50-54		
55-59		
>59		

DELIBERATE LOCAL ASSESSMENT (CONTINUED)

Local government or institutions:
Type of government (tribal, elected, and so on):_____
How chosen?
_____
Key leaders: (names and titles)
_____
_____
_____

Police or security force?	Y	N

Key leaders:
_____
Number of police: _____

Armed?	Y	N
Reliable?	Y	N

If no police, how is security and order kept?_____
_____
_____
Legal system:
_____
_____

Reliable?	Y	N

Security:
Settlement access restricted because of—

Landmines?	Y	N
Roadblocks?	Y	N

Other:_____

I) Evidence of weapons?	Y	N
II) Evidence of recent fighting?	Y	N
III) Evidence of criminal activity?	Y	N
IV) Local rivalry leading to hostility?	Y	N
V) Was the team made to feel welcome?	Y	N
VI) Any open hostility?	Y	N
VII) Pro- or anti-central government?	Pro	Anti

Explanation of remarks I-VII above:
_____
_____
_____
_____

DELIBERATE LOCAL ASSESSMENT (CONTINUED)

Media Services:

Radio station(s)? Y N

Orientation: Pro-U.S. Anti-U.S. Neutral

Location(s): _____

Owner(s): _____

Frequency(ies): _____

Types of programs: _____

Times of programs: _____

Newspaper(s)? Y N

Orientation: Pro-U.S. Anti-U.S. Neutral

Location: _____ Owner: _____

Frequency of editions:

_____

Television? Y N

% of populace with access to television: _____

Orientation: Pro-U.S. Anti-U.S. Neutral

Channel(s): _____ Program(s): _____

% of household: _____ Language(s): _____

Information environment:

Propaganda encountered:

_____

_____

What influence does the settlement have upon or from other settlements? (Include names.)

_____

_____

Means of communication (internal and external):

_____

How is information posted or exchanged?

_____

Who are the key communicators? _____

_____

_____

What are the most prestigious symbols of wealth? _____

_____

DELIBERATE LOCAL ASSESSMENT (CONTINUED)

What PSYOP products has the populace encountered? Any impact indicators? _____

_____

_____

_____

What effect have PSYOP products had? (Observable behavior, statements made, and so on.) _____

_____

_____

_____

Unique conditions affecting the populace: _____

_____

_____

Vulnerabilities per unique conditions:_____

_____

Appeals to avoid or stress: _____

_____

_____

Symbols to avoid or stress: _____

_____

Accessibility to the populace: _____

_____

Prior contact with U.S. Soldiers? Y N

General audience summary:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

DELIBERATE LOCAL ASSESSMENT (CONTINUED)

Economy:

HN currency: _____

Attitude toward HN currency:

Positive Negative Indifferent

Preferred currency or alternate currencies:

_____

Primary economic base:

Food crops Commercial crops Livestock Industry Services

Government Other (describe): _____

Markets and shops:

Available? Y N

Type: Permanent Weekly Other

Number of stalls and shops:_____

What other communities use this market? _____

If no market, where do they go for market access?_____

_____

For specific goods? _____

Distributions:

What goods and supplies?_____

_____

Local warehouse or storage facilities available? Y N

Agriculture:

Livestock:

Number of households having livestock: _____

Total number of sheep in the settlement: _____

Total number of goats in the settlement: _____

Total number of cattle in the settlement: _____

Total number of poultry in the settlement: _____

Principal crop: _____

Secondary crop: _____

Self-sufficient in food? Y N

Mechanization used in farming? Y N

Customers and markets (name of location): _____

_____

Evidence of illegal crop cultivation: Y N

Attitude toward illegal crop cultivation: _____

_____

DELIBERATE LOCAL ASSESSMENT (CONTINUED)

Natural resources:
Mineral deposits? Y N
Describe:_____
Oil or gas? Y N
Describe:_____
Gemstones? Y N
Describe:_____
Local industry? Y N
Description:_____
Major employer:_____

Infrastructure:

Housing: (For a description of Categories 1 through 4, see the illustration below.)



Total number of houses:
Category 1:_____
Category 2:_____
Category 3:_____
Category 4:_____
Electricity available? Y N
Number of hours per day:_____
Source of supply: _____
Sewage disposal system: _____
Trash removal system: _____

DELIBERATE LOCAL ASSESSMENT (CONTINUED)

Safe water sources (for example, closed well with hand pump, piped system from protected source with standposts, and protected spring):

_____

Reliable? Y N

Number of wells:_____

Number of standposts:_____

Perceived water quality? Good Bad

Actual water quality? Adequate Inadequate

Grid locations of operational wells:

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

Petroleum, oil, and lubricants available (POL)? Y N

Reliable? Y N

Schools:

Number of primary schools for boys:_____

Condition: 1 2 3 4

Number of primary schools for girls: _____

Condition: 1 2 3 4

Number of primary coeducation schools: _____

Condition: 1 2 3 4

Number of secondary schools for boys: _____

Condition: 1 2 3 4

Number of secondary schools for girls: _____

Condition: 1 2 3 4

Number of secondary coeducation schools: _____

Condition: 1 2 3 4

Name(s) and grid locations of schools:

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

DELIBERATE LOCAL ASSESSMENT (CONTINUED)

Roads:

Route to district center: Name: _____ From: _____ To: _____
Distance from district center (kilometers): _____
Time from district center (four-wheel drive [4WD]): _____
Distance from province center: _____
Time from province center (4WD): _____
Road condition (summer):
Usable by: (Circle all that apply.)
Donkey Motorcycle Car 4WD 6 x 6 Truck
Road condition (winter):
Usable by: (Circle all that apply.)
Donkey Motorcycle Car 4WD 6 x 6 Truck
Road type: Track Paved

Bridges:

Location(s):
Latitude:_____
Longitude:_____
Or grid reference:_____
Location(s):
Between Settlement 1 (name): _____
And Settlement 2 (name): _____
Distance from Settlement 1: _____
Distance from Settlement 2: _____

Type(s) of bridge: (Circle all that apply.)
Road Emergency Floating Auxiliary Foot Ford
Condition:
Summer usable by: (Circle all that apply.)
Donkey Motorcycle Car 4WD 6 x 6 Truck
Winter usable by: (Circle all that apply.)
Donkey Motorcycle Car 4WD 6 x 6 Truck
Capacity: (Maximum weight and maximum dimensions):_____
_____

Medical Services:

Hospital(s):
Name(s): _____
Ownership: _____

DELIBERATE LOCAL ASSESSMENT (CONTINUED)

Coordinates: Latitude: _____ Longitude: _____
Grid location: _____
Population size served: _____
Capability:
Inpatient beds: _____
Male: _____
Female: _____
Operating rooms: _____
Type surgeries performed:

Gynecology (GYN)?	Y	N
General?	Y	N
Orthopedic?	Y	N

Diagnostic capability:

X-ray?	Y	N
Laboratory?	Y	N
Blood bank?	Y	N

Outpatient clinic:

Primary care?	Y	N
Dental?	Y	N
Obstetrics (OB) and GYN?	Y	N
Pediatrics?	Y	N

Doctors:
Male: _____
Female: _____
Surgeons: _____
OB and GYN: _____
Midwives: _____
Nurses: _____
Other: _____

Ambulance services:	Y	N

Number of vehicles: _____
Dispatch Method: _____
_____
General comments on condition of facility and shortfalls in equipment and supplies: _____
_____

DELIBERATE LOCAL ASSESSMENT (CONTINUED)

Organizations Working in the Settlement: (Circle all that apply.)
NONE
Name 1: _____
Projects: Health Education Water and sanitation Agriculture
Shelter orientation: Pro-U.S. Anti-U.S. Neutral
Name 2: _____
Projects: Health Education Water and sanitation Agriculture
Shelter orientation: Pro-U.S. Anti-U.S. Neutral
Name 3: _____
Projects: Health Education Water and sanitation Agriculture
Shelter orientation: Pro-U.S. Anti-U.S. Neutral
Name 4: _____
Projects: Health Education Water and sanitation Agriculture
Shelter orientation: Pro-U.S. Anti-U.S. Neutral

Description and grids of other religious, cultural, and historical sites.

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____
7. _____
8. _____
9. _____
10. _____

Summary and additional remarks:

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

MEDIA ASSESSMENT GUIDE

The information from the media assessment is crucial in supporting the interaction of PSYOP Soldiers with local media assets, such as newspapers and radio and TV stations. The list of questions is not all-inclusive. Some of these questions may not be relevant to all media assets or cannot be initially answered. When visiting a newspaper office or a TV or radio station, forces must not make promises that cannot be supported. Unfulfilled promises can quickly destroy any relationship with the facility and its manager. An example of a Media Assessment Guide is shown on pages 46 through 50. FM 3-05.302 provides additional information on the Media Assessment Guide.

MEDIA ASSESSMENT GUIDE

1. RADIO/TELEVISION STATIONS

a. What is the location of the radio station?
   Town name:_____
   Street name:_____
   Neighborhood:_____
   Universal transverse mercator [UTM] coordinates:_____
   Geographic coordinates:_____
   Proximity to landmarks:_____

b. Who is the manager?
   Owner, or POC: _____
   Professional background: _____
   Languages spoken: _____
   Ethnic group: _____
   Tribal affiliations: _____
   Family background: _____
   Religion: _____
   Political agenda: _____

c. How can we contact the station manager or POC?
   Telephone number: _____
   E-mail: _____
   Residence: _____

d. Who else can act as a facilitator in doing business with this radio station?
   Village headman, political party official, and so on:_____
   _____

MEDIA ASSESSMENT GUIDE (CONTINUED)

e. What other media facilities are collocated with this radio station? (For example, a TV station or audio recording studio in the same or adjacent building.) _____

_____

_____

f. What are program times and formats?
(For example, music, 0600-1000; news, 1000-1200; music, 1200-1600; talk radio, 1600-2200.) _____

_____

_____

g. What are the demographics for the station's audience?
(Ethnicity, ages, socioeconomic standing, and so on.) _____

_____

_____

h. What are the station's sources of broadcast material?
(Internet downloads, satellite network rebroadcasts, commercially purchased programs or CDs, black market materials, recordings of local artists, live performers, gifts from NGOs, and so on.) _____

_____

_____

i. What are the station's sources of news broadcast material?
Commercial news services:_____
Local newspapers:_____
Reporters:_____
Internet:_____
Local journalists:_____

j. What advertisers are currently doing business with the station?
Political parties:_____
Local businesses:_____
NGOs and so on:_____

k. How does the station charge advertisers? (Barter for free airtime? Price per minute? What national currencies does the radio station accept? What form of payments does the station accept?)_____

_____

_____

MEDIA ASSESSMENT GUIDE (CONTINUED)

l. What broadcast equipment does the station use? Format? (CD, DVD, MP3, Betamax, PAL, or NTSC? Manufacturer and model number? Recommend taking a digital photograph of the radio station's broadcast equipment. We want to provide compatible media for broadcast and maybe replacement parts or upgrades; a photograph will facilitate this.) _____
_____
_____

m. What electrical power source does the station use? (Commercial power or generator. What type of electrical outlets is used in the radio station—American or European, 110V or 220V?) _____
_____
_____

n. What are the parameters of the station's electrical power supply? Voltage:_____ Hertz [Hz]:_____

o. What is the reliability of the station's electrical power supply? (How often do blackouts, brownouts, and surges occur?)_____
_____
_____

p. Where is the station's antenna located? (Is the antenna collocated with the broadcast studio or is it in a remote location? UTM:_____ Geo coordinates:_____

q. What type of antenna does the station use? (Dipole, single pole, and so on.)_____

r. What type of soil is prevalent at the antenna site? (Sand, loam, clay, and gravel.)_____

s. What is the station's broadcast output? (In watts)_____

t. What is the radio station manager's estimate of the broadcast footprint? _____

u. What is the total estimated audience size, and what are the peak audience hours and days?_____
_____

v. What nearby terrain features affect the station's broadcast footprint? (Mountains, steep valleys, large buildings.)_____
_____

MEDIA ASSESSMENT GUIDE (CONTINUED)

w. What is the operating frequency or channel designation for the station? _____

2. NEWSPAPER/PRINT

a. What is the location of the newspaper/print office?
Town name: _____
Street name: _____
Neighborhood: _____
UTM coordinates: _____
Geo coordinates: _____
Proximity to landmarks: _____

b. Who is the manager? _____
Owner or POC: _____
Professional background: _____
Languages spoken: _____
Ethnic group: _____
Tribal affiliations: _____
Family background: _____
Religion: _____
Political agenda: _____

c. How can we contact the editor/manager or POC?
Telephone number: _____ E-mail: _____
Residence: _____

d. Who else can act as a facilitator in doing business with this organization? (Village headman, political party official, and so on.) _____

e. What is the overall format and tone of the print source? (Local/town newspaper, national, international, entertainment, general interest, black and white, full color, and so on.)_____
_____
_____

f. What is the orientation of the newspaper/print source? (Pro-U.S. anti-U.S., or central government and so on.)_____
_____
_____

MEDIA ASSESSMENT GUIDE (CONTINUED)

g. What are the station's sources of news material?
   Commercial news services: _____
   Staff reporters: _____
   Internet: _____
   Local journalists: _____
h. What advertisers are currently doing business with the newspaper/print source?
   Political parties: _____
   Local businesses: _____
   NGOs:_____
   Others:_____
i. How does the newspaper/print source charge advertisers? (Barter for free ad space? Price per minute? What national currencies do they accept? What form of payment do they accept?) _____
   _____
   _____
j. What editing equipment does the newspaper/print source use? (PC or Macintosh, hardcopy typesetting, and so on. We want to provide compatible media, so ensure we find out what format is needed.) _____
   _____
   _____
k. What is the publishing frequency? (Daily, 5 days/week, weekly, monthly, and so on.) _____
l. What is the approximate readership? (Readers per issue or per week.) _____
   _____
   _____
m. What are the demographics of their readership? (Ethnicity, socioeconomic standing, and so on.) _____
   _____
   _____
n. What are the most heavily read publishing days (if applicable)?
   _____
   _____

MESSAGE TRAFFIC AND SITREPs

Managing message traffic is an essential task for LNOs and PSYOP staff officers and NCOs. A standard message-numbering format is necessary to ensure a smooth flow of information between elements. Information shown below goes in the upper left corner of all messages distributed.

STANDARD MESSAGE FORMAT

(1) Priority and Distribution: From:
Received by: Message Identification:

(2) Message Identification Format:

In or Out	Date	Hour	Time	Month	Year
I	17	0714	Z	Jun	02

Example: (Incoming message) I170714ZJun 02

SITREPs are a daily (or more) task for an LNO. A sample format is shown on pages 51 through 55.

STANDARD SITREP FORMAT

1. SITUATIONAL REPORTS (SITREPs).

a. How to send and format.
b. SITREP archives.
c. Current situation.
   1) Friendly.
   2) Enemy.
      a) Propaganda.
      b) Source, content, audience, media, and effects (SCAME).
   3) TA.
      a) Key communicators.
      b) Religious leaders.
      c) TA language and literacy percentage.
      d) Conditions.
      e) Vulnerabilities.
      f) Current lines of persuasion.
      g) Susceptibility.
      h) Accessibilty.
      i) Effectiveness.
      j) PO, SPO, and MOE.
   4) Neutral.
   5) ROE.

STANDARD SITREP FORMAT (CONTINUED)

6) Rules of interactions (ROI).

d. Lessons learned.
1) AAR.
2) See also (SITREPs).

2. BATTLE RHYTHM.

a. Update briefs.
1) Decision briefs.
2) Staff briefs.
3) Staff estimates.

b. Chain of command.
1) Commanding officer (CO), executive officer (XO), S-1, S-2, S-3, and so on.

c. Planning tools.
1) Briefings.
2) Model outlines.
3) Maps.
4) PSYOP-specific (SEM and SDW).
5) Current OPORD, Annex, and Tab.
6) Field manual (FM).

3. SUPPORT CHANNELS.

a. Product development detachment.
1) Website.
2) Capabilities.
3) Product turnaround time.
4) Quality.
5) Product books.
6) Current project status.
7) Read on yes or no.
8) Location.
9) Novelty items.
10) Numbering and tracking.
11) Chain of command.

b. Special Operations Media System-B (SOMS-B).
1) Capabilities, recording, and reproduction.
2) Product turnaround time.
3) Interpreter.

STANDARD SITREP FORMAT (CONTINUED)

4) Footprint.
5) Programs.
6) Frequency.
7) Issues.
8) Current and proposed projects.

c. Reachback to TPD.
1) SIPRNET address.
2) Army Knowledge Online (AKO) address.
3) IP address.
4) Red phone.

d. Reachback to company.
1) Secure phone.
2) SIPRNET address.
3) AKO address.
4) Rear detachment battalion S-3.

e. Supported unit's assets.
1) Supply.
2) Quarters.
3) Security.
4) Airflow.
5) Motorpool.
6) Civil-military.
7) Logistics transport means and schedule.

f. Interpreter.
1) Strength.
2) Weakness.
3) Language.
4) Clearance.
5) Location.
6) Writing ability.
7) Vocabulary.
8) Supervisor.
9) Ethnicity.
10) Overall assessment.
11) Equipment needs and issue.
12) Personnel issues.

STANDARD SITREP FORMAT (CONTINUED)

g. Additional support.
   1) Operational detachment A.
   2) Other government agency (OGA).
   3) Civil Affairs (CA).

4. AREA OF OPERATIONS.

a. PSYOP assessment.
   1) Country.
   2) Province.
   3) Village.
   4) Tribes.

b. CA assessments.
c. Availability of contracted assets.

5. ASSIGNMENT OF EQUIPMENT.

a. DA Form 2062 (Hand Receipt/AnnexNumber).
b. Deployment report.
c. Weapons.
d. Vehicles.
e. Radios.
f. Loudspeakers.
g. Minidisk player and recorder.
h. Media kit.
i. Supplies (medical, office, and NBC).
j. Keys, locks, and combinations (CONEX, safe, and tactical operations center [TOC]).
k. Batteries for radios, minidisc player, and cameras.
l. Maps.
m. GPS.
n. Computers.
o. Hard drives (SECRET and UNCLASSIFIED).
p. Storage units (CONEX, ISU-90, and safe).

6. PRODUCTS.

a. PSYOP series.
   1) PO and SPO.
   2) MOE.
   3) SDW.
   4) TA.

STANDARD SITREP FORMAT (CONTINUED)

5) SCW and SEM.

b. Products.
1) Pretest.
2) Posttest.

c. Evaluation.
1) Impact indicators.
2) Spontaneous events.
3) Testing results.
4) New series.
a) TA.
b) PO and SPO.

d. Product book and product CD.
e. Product approval process.
f. Product inventory.
g. Distribution process.

7. COMMUNICATIONS.

a. Comm procedures.
b. Comm chief and location.
c. Signal operating instructions (SOI).
1) Call signs.
2) Frequencies.
3) Current challenge and password.
4) Next frequency changeover.

d. Type of reachback to use:
1) MBITR.
2) SIPRNET.
3) Advanced System Improvement Program (ASIP).
4) NIPRNET.
5) Fox.
6) Giant.
7) 150.
8) STU.
9) IRIDIUM access code.

e. Comm fill.
f. Address to PSYOP SITREP archives.
g. PSYOP web addresses.
h. Passwords for laptops and IRIDIUM.

PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS

PSYOP leaders can use propaganda to sway the opinion of the local populace. The Propaganda Analysis, shown on pages 56 and 57, is a tool for PSYOP leaders to use in determining the effects of propaganda.

PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS

Source Analysis: What is the real source?

DTG: When last updated?

1. Elements of the source:
   a. Actor.
   b. Authority.
   c. Author.
2. Type:
   White _____ Gray _____ Black _____
3. Credibility of each source element:
   a. Actor.
   b. Authority.
   c. Author.

Content Analysis: What does the propaganda say? What is it trying to get the TA to do?

1. Objective of the message.
2. Line of persuasion used.
3. Morale of the source.
4. Involuntary information in the message (news, opinions, and entertainment).
5. Biographical information (new leader and so on).
6. Economic information.
7. Propaganda inconsistencies.
8. Intentions or agenda of the source.
9. Geographic information.

Audience Analysis: Who are the audiences?

1. Apparent audience:
   a. Perception of the message.
   b. Reason selected.
2. Ultimate audience:
   a. Perception of the message.
   b. Reason selected.

PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS (CONTINUED)

3. Intermediate audience:
   a. Perception of the message.
   b. Reasons selected.
4. Unintended audience:
   a. Perception of the message.
   b. Reason selected.

Media Analysis: What media are used and why?

1. Type:
   a. Radio.
   b. Television.
   c. Print (specific type).
   d. Newspaper/magazine.
   e. Internet.
   f. Other.
2. Frequency.
3. Placement.
4. Place of origin.
5. Technical characteristics.
6. Method of dissemination.
7. Transmission mode.

Effects Analysis: What impact is this propaganda having?

1. Methods used in analysis.
2. Impact indicators.
3. Conclusions.

TOOLS TO SUPPORT TACTICAL OPERATIONS

PSYOP planners have tools that they use to support tactical operations. These tools include the following:

AFTER ACTION REVIEWS

AARs can be formal or informal and internal or external. Leaders should, time permitting, do internal AARs with their teams and detachments. Since PSYOP units are attached to combat units, PSYOP team leaders will inevitably have to take part in the AAR(s) of the supported unit. The sequence on page 58 is reproduced from GTA 25-06-023, *After Action Review (AAR) Pocket Reference Guide.* Leaders who will be taking part in several AARs may wish to obtain GTAs 25-06-023 and 08-01-002, *Leader's Guide to After-Action Debriefing.*

AFTER ACTION REVIEW SEQUENCE

1. State training or mission objectives.
2. Have the unit leader restate his mission and present his plan.
3. Review actions before detection or contact.
4. Review first detection or contact.
5. Review report of first detection or contact.
6. Review reaction to first detection or contact.
7. Review FRAGO, if used.
8. Review events during engagement.
9. Review subsequent events.
10. Review extent to which unit met training objectives. (Training, practice required, and untrained performance.)
11. Have participants summarize the major learning points. (Basic for training objectives in next exercise.)
12. Describe clear and concise training objectives for the next exercise. (Objectives must be measurable or observable.)

CIVIL DISTURBANCE GUIDELINES

PSYOP leaders may be faced with a civil disturbance. Guidelines for handling a civil disturbance are shown on pages 58 through 60.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE GUIDELINES

1. Conduct link-up with the supported commander, as needed.
   a. Receive mission, and confirms ROE.
   b. Receive update on current situation.
   c. Assess situation on ground.
   d. Establish liaison with other quick-reaction force (QRF) and graduated response measure (GRM) components, as required.

2. Maintain communications with higher HQ, and submit SITREPs, as required. The team leader conducts a mission analysis.
   a. Identify facts and assumptions (about the TA). Use the following questions as a guide:
      1) Identify key communicator or lead agitator. What is his or her message?
      2) What is the general attitude or behavior of the group(s)?
      3) How many people are present in the group(s)?
      4) What are the demographics (age and gender)?
      5) What is the cultural composition of the group(s)?
      6) How are they moving (mounted or dismounted)?
      7) Are signs or banners present and, if so, what is the message?

CIVIL DISTURBANCE GUIDELINES (CONTINUED)

8) Are media on site? If so, identify who they represent.
9) Are there weapons present?
10) Who else is present at the location (police, elected public officials, NGOs, CA, or other forces)?
11) Is the group(s) from that location or have they come from abroad? If from abroad, where and why?
12) How did the people know or hear about the gathering, rally, or demonstration?
13) What are the underlying grievances or stated objectives for the event?
14) What are the locations of food storage?
15) Is there any Government representation in the area? (Who, what, where, local, national, and so on.)
16) Have there been any reports of war crimes?
17) Has there been any use of propaganda?
18) How are people usually addressed?
19) Historically, do civilians tend to stay in their homes during conflict or do they tend to flee?

b. Specified and implied tasks (see commander's intent, scheme of maneuver, and coordinating instructions).

c. Constraints and limitations (to include resources available to address needs and grievances of the crowd and ROE).

3. Be prepared to create a message for broadcast, if needed.

4. Monitor message content (face-to-face or loudspeaker):

a. Give simple directions and clear and concise instructions, and maintain your composure.

b. Avoid using the word "please" to avoid a passive appearance.

c. Do not issue ultimatums that are not approved by the commander. Give crowds time to conform to ultimatums.

d. Continually monitor impromptu messages.

e. Use approved IO themes, when available.

f. Translate message into TA language, and pretest, if possible.

5. Isolate and conduct face-to-face communication with key communicator(s). Document actions with still or video images.

6. Conduct loudspeaker operations, if necessary:

a. Use only when necessary to address a large crowd or if communications break down.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE GUIDELINES (CONTINUED)

b. Direct broadcast toward agitators.

c. Write scripts, and then read them verbatim. Conduct impromptu broadcasting only if necessary.

d. Use interpreter, if available. Conduct rehearsals with this interpreter before going "live." Ensure gender and other social aspects of interpreter are credible in the eyes of the TA.

e. Select a broadcast position to address the crowd effectively and not compromise the security of the team.

f. Maintain communications with commander or his representative.

g. Limit volume so as not to appear too overbearing. Do not "harass" unless necessary.

7. The team leader ensures that PSYOP-relevant information, human intelligence (HUMINT), and PIR are forwarded through appropriate channels.

a. If a counterintelligence (CI) team is on the mission, conduct a debrief with that team.

b. If no CI team is on the mission, debrief with the supported unit S-2.

c. Forward any relevant PSYOP information back up through normal PSYOP channels.

PREPARATIONS FOR MOVEMENT

The graphics on page 61 provide quick guides to determining necessary fuel and water stores for any movement. These graphics provide good estimates, but specific mission parameters may rotate figures upward. For instance, frequent loiters or security halts may increase fuel consumption. Water consumption will go up during dismounted operations or mounted operations in extreme heat. The recommended water consumption level in extreme situations (the necessity of still conducting operations during Heat Category 5) is 1 quart per hour.

FUEL ESTIMATION

	_____	total miles of mission (mission distance)
divide by	_____	vehicle mpg average
		light load highway = 12 mpg
		heavy load highway = 10 mpg
		light load cross-country = 10 mpg
		heavy load cross-country = 7 mpg
		fully loaded trailer = subtract 5 mpg
equals	_____	gallons necessary per vehicle
plus	_____	% of gallons necessary
		1:250,000 = 15%
		added for map error 1:100,000 = 10%
		1:50,000 = 5%
equals	_____	adjusted gallons necessary per vehicle
multiply by	_____	number of vehicles on mission
equals	_____	gallons necessary for detachment
plus	_____	15% safety factor
equals	_____	total detachment fuel requirements
minus	_____	gallons carried in vehicle fuel tanks
		(25 gallons per vehicle tank)
equals	_____	gallons of fuel to be carried in 5-gallon fuel cans
divide by	_____	gallons per can (U.S. fuel can = 5 gallons)
equals	_____	5-gallon cans necessary for remaining fuel requirements

WATER ESTIMATION FORMULA

	_____	number of personnel
multiply by	_____	number of quarts per day (minimum 4 to 6 quarts)
multiply by	_____	number of days of mission duration
equals	_____	mission water requirements
plus	_____	15% safety factor
equals	_____	total% safety factor
divide by	_____	gallons per can (U.S. water can = 5 gallons)

VEHICLE AND CONVOY OPERATIONS

The graphics on pages 62 through 66 aid PSYOP planners in preparing for movements.

VEHICLE AND CONVOY OPERATIONS PLANNING

1. General threats:
- a. Vehicle-born improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
- b. Suicide bombers.
- c. Rocket-propelled grenades.
- d. Sniper fire.
- e. Direct-fire ambushes.
- f. Grenade attacks.
- g. Motor attacks.
- h. Hostile crowds.
- i. Terrorist or hostile surveillance.

2. Potential specific threats:
- a. Entrances to alleys.
- b. Rooftops or balconies.
- c. Overpasses.
- d. Vans with sliding doors.
- e. Motorcycles.

3. Characteristics:
- a. Aggressiveness.
  - 1) Use aggressive driving skills.
  - 2) "Porcupine" muzzles in an outward posture.
  - 3) Demonstrate a positive readiness and willingness to engage threats.
  - 4) Potentially use vehicle as weapon.
  - 5) Dominate your environment.
- b. Situation awareness:
  - 1) 360-degree security.
  - 2) Recon.
  - 3) Knowledge of route.
  - 4) Collective mission knowledge.
  - 5) Well-rehearsed internal communications.
  - 6) Communications to higher HQ.
  - 7) Scanning in 3-dimension (depth, width, and elevation).
  - 8) Watching people, their hands, and behavior.

VEHICLE AND CONVOY OPERATIONS PLANNING (CONTINUED)

c. Unpredictability:
1) Vary routes, departure times, and vehicle intervals and speeds.
2) Think like the enemy. (How would I attack me?)
3) Convoys should not be easily timed, observed, or approached.
4) Do not appear lost.

d. Agility:
1) Drive as fast as appropriate.
2) Maneuver through or around motorist, pedestrians, and so on.
3) Compress or expand intervals.
4) Be prepared to rapidly change course.

e. Protection:
1) Stay alert, and make yourself a hard target.
2) Be prepared for an IED attack followed by an ambush.
3) Maintain maximum safe speeds.
4) Maintain vehicle dispersion.
5) Be extra cautious at choke points, broken-down vehicles, bridges, one-way streets, and sharp turns.
6) If something causes the convoy to stop, watch the flanks and dismount vehicle.
7) Rehearse actions on contact.
8) Get out of "kill zone" fast.
9) Do not approach IED. IEDs are often command-detonated.
10) Keep up to date with recent threats and enemy tactics.
11) Rehearse dismounted and mounted shooting drills.
12) Place tire on brush guard in the absence of bumper for pushing objects or ramming.
13) Ensure load-out vehicles are nearly identical.
14) Ballistic blankets should be used with 1/4-inch steel plate and strapped and secured to areas needing extra protection.
15) Sandbags should be used with discretion considering weight and secondary missile effect.
16) Remove doors from light-skinned vehicles (situation-dependent).

f. Possible ambush indicators:
1) Absence of women and children when normally present.
2) Dramatic changes in population from one block to the next.

VEHICLE AND CONVOY OPERATIONS PLANNING (CONTINUED)

3) Signals with flares and/or lights (turned off or on) as convoy approaches.
4) Vehicle following convoy for long period of time and then pulling off the side of the road.
5) Broken-down vehicles along roadway.
6) Dead animals along roadway.
7) Freshly dug hole along roadway.
8) Obstacles in roadway used to channel convoy.
9) Personnel on overpass.
10) Personnel in traffic circle.

4. Communication:
a. Ensure everyone knows how to zero all radios.
b. Use intrasquad and intervehicle radios.
c. During missions, have a computer with imagery or Falcon View in the primary navigation vehicle for contingency situations and positive target identification.
d. AN/PRC-150 for command and control (C2) vehicle.
e. External speaker.
f. Use an AN/PRC-148 (MBITR) for ground and air communications.
g. Use an intersquad radio system.
h. Have cryptography equipment for all radios.
i. Use Blue Force Trackers IAW unit SOP.
j. Use primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE).

5. Battle drills:
a. Ramming techniques.
b. Down driver.
c. Vehicle recovery.
d. React to contact, near ambush.
e. React to contact, far ambush.
f. React to sniper fire.
g. React to suspected ground IED.
h. React to IED detonation.
i. React to roadblock.
j. React to vehicle-born improvised explosive device (VBIED).
k. React to large crowd.
l. Consolidation and reorganization.

CONVOY ANNEX

1. Situation.
   a. Enemy forces.
   b. Friendly forces.
   c. Attachments and detachments.
2. Mission.
3. Execution.
   a. Concept of the operation.
      1) Maneuver.
      2) Fires.
   b. Tasks to combat units.
   c. Tasks to combat support units.
   d. Coordinating instructions.
      1) Time of departure and return.
      2) Start point procedures.
      3) Don equipment ("jock-up").
      4) Loading plan.
      5) Order of movement.
      6) Route (primary and alternate).
      7) Security.
      8) Planned danger areas.
      9) Timeline.
      10) Preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS).
      11) Headlight status.
      12) Air guards.
      13) Actions at off-loading and onloading point.
      14) Actions upon halts.
      15) Convoy speed.
      16) Vehicle interval.
      17) ROE.
      18) Rehearsals.
      19) Recovery plan.
      20) Action on enemy contact.
         a) IED detonation.
         b) Suspected IED.
         c) Small-arms fire (direct or indirect).
         d) Roadblock.
         e) Disabled vehicle.
         f) Down driver.

CONVOY ANNEX (CONTINUED)

g) Dead end.
h) Break in contact.

4. Service and support.
   a. Individual.
   b. Team.
   c. Vehicle.
5. Command and signal.
   a. Command.
      1) Chain of command.
      2) Location of leaders.
   b. Signal (PACE).
      1) Call signs.
      2) Long range.
      3) Squad.
      4) Intervehicle.
      5) Hand and arm.
      6) Pyrotechnics.
      7) QRF.
      8) Close air support evacuation (CASEVAC).
      9) Code words.

FIVE-POINT CONTINGENCY PLAN

Leaders give a five-point contingency plan to subordinates as direction and guidance for actions that may happen during the leaders' absence. The leader leaves for many reasons throughout the planning, coordination, preparation, and execution of his patrol mission. Each time the leader departs without radio or wire communications, he must issue a five-point contingency plan. The contingency plan includes the following:

FIVE-POINT CONTINGENCY PLAN (GOTWA)

GOING: Where you are going.
OTHERS: Who you are taking with you.
TIME: Time you will be done.
WHAT: What to do if you do not return in time.
ACTIONS: Actions upon enemy contact for both elements.

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND

Any member may have to take command of the unit at any time during an emergency. When this occurs, continuation of the mission may be necessary.

Assumption of Command

During the assumption of command, situation permitting, the following tasks must be accomplished applying METT-TC:

NOTE: Tasks are not necessarily accomplished in the following order:

- Inform the unit of the command change (use subordinate leaders), and notify higher HQ.
- Check security.
- Check crew-served weapons.
- Pinpoint your location.
- Coordinate, and check equipment status.
- Check personnel status.
- Issue FRAGO (if required).
- Reorganize, as needed, and move out as soon as possible.
- Maintain light and noise discipline.
- If done in a patrol base, do not violate the activities of the patrol base—especially security.

CALL FOR FIRE

The call for fire, shown on pages 67 through 69, is a concise message prepared by the observer. It contains all information needed by the fire direction center (FDC) to determine the method of target attack. It is a request for fire, not an order. It must be sent quickly but clearly enough that it can be understood, recorded, and read back, without error, by the FDC recorder.

CALL FOR FIRE

1. ***OBSERVER IDENTIFICATION:** Use call signs from the SOI.
2. ***WARNING ORDER:**
   a. Type of mission:
      (1) Adjust fire.
      (2) Fire for effect.
      (3) Suppress (planned target).
      (4) Immediate suppression.
   b. Size of element to fire:
      (1) Omission indicates a request for one field artillery battery.
      (2) Larger units by stating size desired.

CALL FOR FIRE (CONTINUED)

c. Method of target location:
(1) Grid: No announcement.
(2) Polar plot: Announce the word "polar."
(3) Shift from a known point: Announce the word "shift" followed immediately by the designation (target number) of the known point.

3. *TARGET LOCATION:

a. Grid: Two-character, six-digit grid; for example, BS123456.
b. Polar: Direction and distance to the target from the observer's position.
c. Shift: Direction to the target.
(1) Lateral shift (left or right) in meters.
(2) Range shift (add or drop) in meters.
(3) Vertical shift (up or down) in meters, if significant.

4. *TARGET DESCRIPTION: A word picture of the target (for example, the number and type of vehicles and personnel observed).

5. METHOD OF ENGAGEMENT:

a. Type of engagement:
(1) Area fire: Standard without request.
(2) Precision fire: Used only with destruction or registration missions.
b. Danger close: Announced when applicable.
c. Trajectory:
(1) Low angle: Standard without request.
(2) High angle: Upon request of observer or when required because of masking terrain.
d. Ammunition:
(1) Type projectile desired in fire-for-effect phase.
(2) Type of fuze action desired in fire-for-effect phase.
(3) Volume of fire desired in fire for effect stated in rounds per howitzer.
e. Distribution: Type sheaf desired. Parallel is standard without request.

6. METHOD OF FIRE AND CONTROL:

a. Method of fire:
(1) Center platoon and center section (one weapon) is standard for adjustment phase.

CALL FOR FIRE (CONTINUED)

(2) Battery or platoon right or left on request.
(3) Time interval (5 seconds is standard when (2) above is used).

b. Method of control.
(1) Fire when ready: Standard—no request required.
(2) At my command: Weapons fire at observer's command.
(3) Cannot observe: Fire will not be observed.
(4) Time on target: Rounds land at specified time.
(5) Continuous illumination: FDC will determine when to fire.
(6) Coordinated illumination: Observer determines when illumination is fired.
(7) Cease loading: Used on missions with more rounds in effect. Causes the firing unit to stop loading rounds.
(8) Check firing: Temporary halt in firing.

* Minimum information required.

NOTE: Danger close must be included when target is within 630 meters, 750 meters for naval guns 5-inch and under, and 1,000 meters for guns larger than 5 inches. Danger close adjustments are made in 100-meter increments.

NINE-LINE MEDEVAC REQUEST

Knowledge of the proper procedures for requesting a MEDEVAC is imperative to the survival of wounded Soldiers on the battlefield. The graphic on pages 69 and 70 outlines the information needed to properly request a MEDEVAC.

NINE-LINE MEDEVAC REQUEST

1. LOCATION OF PICKUP.

2. RADIO FREQUENCY, CALL SIGN, AND SUFFIX.

3. NUMBER OF PATIENTS BY PRECEDENCE.

URGENT - Must be evacuated immediately and in no case more than 2 hours to save life, limb, and eyesight.

PRIORITY - Patient must be evacuated within 4 hours, or medical condition will deteriorate to urgent.

NINE-LINE MEDEVAC REQUEST (CONTINUED)

ROUTINE - Requires evacuation but condition not expected to deteriorate within next 24 hours.

TACTICAL IMMEDIATE - Medical condition is not urgent or priority but evacuation is needed as soon as possible to not endanger unit's tactical mission.

4. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT NEEDED.
Hoist, ventilator, and jungle penetrator are examples.

5. NUMBER OF PATIENTS BY LITTER AND AMBULATORY.

6. SECURITY TO THE PICKUP SITE (in peacetime becomes type of injury, wound, or illness).
No enemy troops in the area.
Possible enemy troops in the area.
Enemy troops in the area (approach with caution).
Enemy troops in the area (armed escort required).

7. METHOD OF MARKING PICKUP SITE.

8. PATIENT NATIONALITY AND STATUS.
U.S. Military.
U.S. Civilian.
Non-U.S. Military.
Non-U.S. Civilian.
EPW.

9. NBC CONTAMINATION (in peacetime becomes terrain description)**.**

MARKING OF LANDING ZONE

A leader must have a clear understanding of landing zone (LZ) procedures and proper markings. Without proper markings, the LZ becomes dangerous to not only those on the ground but to the aircrews, too. LZ markings are listed in the graphic on page 71.

MARKING OF LANDING ZONE

1. SIZE (DIAMETER) OF LZ FOR ONE HELICOPTER

OH-58	25 METERS
UH-1 & AH-1	35 METERS
UH-60 & AH-64	50 METERS
CH-47	80 METERS

2. SURFACE CONDITIONS

LZ should be free of tree stumps, large rocks, and other obstacles that might harm the aircraft, and firm enough to support the aircraft.

3. GROUND SLOPE

0 - 6%	LAND UPSLOPE
7 - 15%	LAND SIDE SLOPE
16% OR MORE	NO TOUCHDOWN

4. OBSTACLES

Use an obstacle clearance ratio of 10:1. For example, a 10-foot tree requires 100 feet of horizontal clearance if the aircraft must approach or depart directly over that tree.

5. MARKING - INVERTED Y

PRECOMBAT INSPECTIONS

Precombat inspections (PCIs) will be dictated primarily by mission requirements and by unit SOP. The general vehicle (page 72) and individual Soldier checks (page 72) and the precombat inspection list (pages 72 through 75) provide a baseline on which leaders can expand.

GENERAL VEHICLE CHECKS:	
1. Proper vehicle load plan	13. Fire extinguisher on hand and serviceable
2. Fuel level (including fuel can[s])	14. Fluid levels checked
3. Emergency POL packed	15. Lights and blackout drive functional
4. Water can(s) full and potable	16. Spare tire good
5. Meals, ready to eat (MREs) loaded	17. Vehicle warning triangle on hand
6. First-aid kit loaded and functional	18. Seat belts worn and serviceable
7. Operator (-10) technical manuals (TMs) on hand	19. Camouflage nets and poles loaded
8. BII/OVM loaded and serviceable	20. All navigation gear functional
9. Vehicle radio loaded and operational	21. Proper dispatch and military license
10. Nine-line MEDEVAC request posted	22. Turret functional
11. Maps on hand and oriented	23. Loudspeaker operational
12. No Class III leaks	

INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER CHECKS:

1. Packing list—
   — Clothing and equipment
   — NBC gear
   — Identification (ID) tags, ID card, and military license
   — Water in canteens
   — Appropriate mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear worn or carried
   — Specifically assigned team gear
2. Sensitive items—
   — Weapon (with cleaning kit)
   — Night vision devices (NVDs)
   — Precise lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR) and GPS
   — Automated net control device (ANCD)
3. Do they know the mission, situation, and detailed plan?
4. Do they know the challenge and password and comm call signs and frequencies?

PRECOMBAT INSPECTION LIST

1. Individual Preparation for Combat.
   a. Seasonal uniform.
   b. Proper field uniform worn according to climate and mission.
   c. Load-bearing equipment (LBE) properly assembled and serviceable.

PRECOMBAT INSPECTION LIST (CONTINUED)

d. First-aid pocket complete.
e. Earplugs and case.
f. Full canteens with M17 drinking cap.
g. Kevlar helmet with camouflage cover and rank and helmet band with cat's eyes and name printed on band.
h. Individual weapon with magazines loaded and with sling. M9s must be secure with lanyards or 550 cord.
i. Night vision goggles (NVGs) complete, tied down, and operational with extra batteries.
j. Weapons cleaning kit.
k. ID tags around neck.
l. ID card on individual.
m. Current driver's license (CONUS and USAREUR).
n. Compass.
o. Eye protection (wind/dust goggles).
p. Wristwatch (optional).
q. NBC gear (training only):
    1) Protective mask with prescription inserts, if applicable.
    2) MOPP suit.
    3) M8 paper (1 pack).
    4) M256A1 sampler packet (1).
r. NBC individual chemical equipment (ICE) pack (real-world mission):
    1) Protective mask with prescription inserts, if applicable.
    2) MOPP suit.
    3) Gloves.
    4) Overboots.
    5) Filters for mask (2).
    6) M8 paper (2 packs).
    7) M291 kit (skin decontamination kit [SDK]).
    8) M295 (individual equipment decontamination kit [EDK]).
s. Briefed on current mission and situation.
t. Briefed on prevention of hot and cold weather injuries. Previous hot or cold weather injuries identified and properly marked.
u. Body armor worn properly.

2. Vehicles.
a. Current, valid PMCS and properly dispatched.
b. Operator (-10) TMs on hand.

PRECOMBAT INSPECTION LIST (CONTINUED)

c. Pioneer tools complete, properly stored, clean, and serviceable.
d. Tools and tool bag complete.
e. Loaded according to loading plan.
f. TA-50 loaded per loading plan.
g. Fuel tank no less than 3/4 full.
h. Fuel cans full (2).
i. Water cans full (2).
j. Fire extinguishers mounted, sealed, tagged, updated, and serviceable.
k. MRE rations.
l. First-aid kits complete.
m. Combat lifesaver (CLS) bag complete.
n. M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW) properly mounted with ammunition, if applicable.
o. ASIP radios (2) with current fill, operational and properly mounted.
p. Additional (2) hand microphones.
q. MBITR AN/PRC-148 with fill and extra batteries.

3. PSYOP-Specific Equipment.

a. Mounted operations (see TM for further detail).
b. Tactical loudspeaker system (family of loudspeakers [FOL]) complete and operational:
1) Low-frequency (LF) speaker cover.
2) LF module.
3) High-frequency (HF) speaker cover.
4) HF speaker array.
5) HF array support tray.
6) Control module assembly.
7) Recorder and reproducer.
8) Amplifier array assembly.
9) Speaker stand assembly.
10) HF speaker cables (15 feet and 50 feet).
11) LF speaker cables (15 feet and 50 feet).
12) Control cables (6 feet and 25 feet).
13) Single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS) adapter cable (6 feet).
14) System power cable, vehicle.
15) Amplifier mounting base.

PRECOMBAT INSPECTION LIST (CONTINUED)

16) Guard assembly, amplifier.
17) Loudspeaker, interface, vehicle.

c. Additional AA batteries for minidisc player and tape player.
d. Additional minidiscs and cassette tapes.
e. PSYOP products (sounds, leaflets, posters, and so on) present.
f. M246A1 kit complete.
g. M274 marking kit complete.
h. M9 tape (1 roll).
i. Dismounted operations (see TM for further detail).
j. Tactical loudspeaker manpack (40C) complete and operational:
   1) Speaker array assembly.
   2) Amplifier and battery box.
   3) Control module assembly.
   4) Recorder and reproducer.
   5) Speaker cable (3 feet).
   6) SINCGARS radio adapter cable (6 feet).
   7) Control cable (6 feet).
   8) System interconnect cable (25 feet).
   9) Remote control cable (25 feet).
   10) Speaker extension cable (50 feet).
   11) Field pack.
   12) BA 5590 batteries (3).
k. MBITR AN/PRC-148 radio operational with current fill.
l. Long- and short-whip antennas.
m. Additional (2) hand microphones.
n. Additional AA batteries for minidisc player and tape player.
o. Additional minidiscs and cassette tapes.
p. Additional BA 5590 batteries.
q. PSYOP products (sounds, leaflets, posters, and so on) present.
r. CLS bag complete.
s. M256A1 kit complete.
t. M274 marking kit complete.
u. M9 tape (1 roll).

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A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, ORGANIZATION, AND CONDUCT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

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by

Stephen Dale Marvin

Submitted to the

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AN ABSTRACT

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ABSTRACT

Psychological operations encompass all courses of action which are planned and conducted to create emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the achievement of national policies and objectives. These operations support, in the realm of ideas, national, political, economic, and military policies from the nature and character of which the psychological operations draw their strength.

Russian heritage provides a national value system which predisposes the Soviet Union to the employment of psychological operations in the conduct of a completely integrated foreign policy. No policy action is taken without consideration of its psychological impact.

Almost the reverse of this situation is encountered in American experience, attitude, and employment of psychological operations. The history of this instrument in American foreign policy has been one of rejection or reluctant use.

Before the United States can employ the psychological instrument effectively, it must develop an integrated planning process for the achievement of its foreign policy goals. To coordinate and to conciliate a total program from the individual programs of member activities has been the American pattern. A solution will evolve only after the

government agencies are no longer permitted to decide whether or not they will carry out the letter and spirit of the Chief Executive's policies. Effective organization and positive leadership will provide this.

TO

MY FATHER

Who Exemplifies Those

Qualities Which Made Our

Country Great

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TO THE SOLDIER WHO MARCHES WEST[1]

You are still alive. It is wonderful. Everything that lives is wonderful, even the green grass and the birds.

The dead and the rocks and the soil and the dung--they are nothing, for they have no life.

We who have life have everything; we possess fabulous wealth.

The rocks, the dead and the soil have nothing, are nothing.

Where will your road lead you, soldier? Are you going West? Are you going to Paris?

Do you know what is in the West, soldier? I shall tell you, soldier; listen.

In front of you are the English, you know that. The French and the Americans are behind them. You also know how they fire into the lines of your comrades. Perhaps they will retreat and new regiments will march ahead. Then they will fire again. Then the Allies retreat again.

But the firing never ceases . . . .

There is something else in the West. I shall tell you what this "something" is. Nobody can tell you exactly where it is, but it surely is in the West.

Your grave lies in the West.

If you march West, you can't help finding it. Possibly it is far ahead of you, behind the mountains. But possibly it is very near you, perhaps you can see it. Today or tomorrow--nobody knows. But surely, the grave lies there, as surely as does the sunset.

Do you march West, soldier? Then we say good-by to you. All of us who live say good-by.

There are only two things on earth, the living and the dead. The difference between these two things is greater than that between friend and foe, greater than that between man and animal. It is the greatest difference in this world. With the dead one you cannot marry, to the dead one you cannot be a friend, you can't talk with him, you don't touch him. If you march West, soldier we say good-by, we who are alive.

---

[1]British Combat Propaganda Leaflet, World War I. Cited by Hans Speir, "Morale and Propaganda," Propaganda in War and Crisis, ed. Daniel Lerner (New York: George W. Stewart, 1951), p. 3.

Men and women, dogs and birds and insects--they shall not be with you any more . . . .

Soldier, farewell.

Today, you are one of us; you are one with men and women and everything that lives. You are master of the rocks and the woods and all inanimate things.

Tomorrow you march West.

Soldier, farewell.

Do you hear our voice?

Farewell.

CHAPTER I

PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR AND OPERATIONS

Psychological operations encompass those political, military, economic, and ideological courses of action which are planned and conducted to create in enemy, hostile, neutral, or friendly groups emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the achievement of national policies and objectives. These operations are included within and implement psychological warfare and psychological activities. At one time, it was fashionable to differentiate between these two forms of psychological action on the basis of the existence or non-existence of a state of war or declared emergency or on the basis of the existence or non-existence of active military operations in a military theater of war.

I. INTRODUCTION

Today, we live in a twilight world of half-war and no peace. We have been involved in this twilight conflict since the conclusion of the Second World War. The future promises no foreseeable conclusion. At stake are the national survival, the continuation of respective political systems, and the pursuit of state goals of the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a contest is a war, irrespective of terminology or of the methods employed in its prosecution.

It seems, therefore, fallacious to approach the conduct of this war in terms other than those of stark reality. The psychological operations involved are the strategies and tactics of psychological war, nothing less. We are involved in a war, not merely in an activity; and there are no theaters where active operations are not in existence.

Modern, total warfare has three major divisions: military, politico-economic, and psychological. Psychological warfare serves as a framework or weapons-mount which provides an interchangeability within and between these three major divisions and which gives their integrated employment the widest conceivable effectiveness. Hence, psychological warfare emerges as a tool of national security policy which

> injects into the "unpsychological" wars of the machine age the recollection and rediscovery of man as the agent of aggression, the object of suffering, and the human element in bureaucratized strategy and industrialized battles.[1]

II. DEFINITIONS AND EARLY USAGE

Psychological warfare has been defined as warfare psychologically waged;[2] that is, operations carried out with

---

[1]Hans Speir, "Psychological Warfare Reconsidered," Propaganda In War and Crisis, ed. Daniel Lerner (New York: George W. Stewart, Inc., 1951), p. 464.

[2]War Department General Staff, Propaganda Branch, Intelligence Division, A Syllabus of Psychological Warfare (The Pentagon, Washington, 1946), pp. 2-3.

close and studied reference to the politics, opinion, and morale of the enemy. In the broad sense, psychological warfare is the application of portions of the science of psychology to further the efforts of political, economic, or military actions. Its principal vehicle, propaganda, is the use of any form of communication to disseminate material designed to affect the minds and actions of a given group for a specific public purpose, whether military, economic, or political. In American usage, psychological warfare connotes propaganda designed to achieve national policy goals in the world political arena. This American concept of psychological warfare is somewhat less comprehensive than other terms with which it is closely linked. The more inclusive concept is that of "political warfare"--the term used by the British--which encompasses more than the means of mass communication or the handling of weapons to achieve maximum impact on the will to resist. Political warfare contributes the important concept that all instruments of policy need to be correlated properly in the conduct of war.[3] Effective national psychological warfare demands the inclusion of this concept of political warfare within its purview.

Psychological warfare is the recent name for an idea

---

[3]Harold D. Lasswell, "Political and Psychological Warfare," Propaganda In War and Crisis, ed. Daniel Lerner (New York: George W. Stewart, Inc., 1951), pp. 264-265.

as old and as widespread as mankind. The idea of using psychology as an adjunct to military action is expounded in the earliest known manuals on strategy and tactics. In the fifth century B.C., Sun Tzu wrote in his Book of War on the importance of destroying the enemy's will to fight by such means as surprise, show, and noise. Essentially the same principles are set forth in the military literature and prevailing maxims of the ancient empires of India and the Middle East. The East Indian political classic, Kantilya's Arthasastra, contains advice on how to destroy enemy morale and build up one's own.[4] In these works, emphasis is placed on what is now called "propaganda of the deed"; that is, the assassination of important officials, the show of force, the achievement of surprise, and the taking of emotionally significant cities.

One of the earliest recorded applications was by Gideon in his great battle with the Midianites (by traditional reckoning, 1245 B.C.). Another Old Testament story relates how Joshua circled Jericho for seven times on seven days, sounding the trumpet, "and the walls came tumbling down."

The Greeks employed the "Trojan Horse" to infiltrate and undermine a mighty fortress-city that they could not

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[4] Ibid., p. 261.

reduce by siege. Herodotus tells how Themistocles subverted the Ionians, who were satellites of the Persians. Messages were engraved on stones near their watering holes to remind them of their common Greek heritage, and with the added line that, if they could not defect, they should behave badly in battle.[5] This was also a source of excellent propaganda intended to make the Persians think that any Ionian less than perfect was a secret Athenian sympathizer. This appeal was sound by all modern standards.[6]

The Romans employed a ritual of "evocatio," which can be traced back to the Hittites, by which the Romans implored the protective gods of the enemy city to pass over to the Roman camp. Some versions tried to bribe the enemy gods with promises of more sumptuous temples. Machiavelli, in his fascination with the problems of besieged cities, came to the conclusion that the Roman method of psychological operations was probably more effective than the measures used against them by their enemies.[7] An early example of correct target selection occurred in the First Punic War, when the Romans, having fled in panic on their first

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[5]Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (second edition; New York: Duell Sloane, and Pearce, 1960), p. 7.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), p. 371.

encounter with the Carthaginian war elephants, retaliated by driving pigs in front of them to stampede the elephants.

The Mongol conquests were accomplished through the use of highly mobile forces, the exploitation of intelligence, the coordination of strategy, and the application of propaganda in all its forms. The Mongols deliberately used rumor to exaggerate accounts of their numbers and ferocity; they even used enemy spies to promote these rumors by boasting and by staging demonstrations to impress known spies and enemy emissaries in their midst. Although the Mongols carried out superb strategic and tactical propaganda operations, they never solved the problem of consolidation and failed to win the loyalty of the conquered peoples.

No examination of early psychological operations would be complete without noting that Cortez used horses to spread terror among the Aztecs and also exploited legends of the Fair God; that the Inquisition was a psychological warfare instrument of the Spanish rulers, Ferdinand and Isabella; that the European feudal classes identified the peasants with filth, anarchy, murder, and cruelty; that the Manchus, with odds of four hundred to one against them, used terror to nullify Chinese superiority; that the Tokugawa Shoguns used preventive psychological warfare, after 1636, to enmesh the minds of the Japanese people; that the British East India Company used propaganda in conquering India

against overwhelming numerical superiority; and that both before and during the French Revolution, revolutionary propaganda was rife.

In America, Whig propaganda was energetic in leading to colonial defiance of England. At Bunker Hill, the Colonists used one of the very earliest versions of front-line combat propaganda, a desertion leaflet for British soldiers. Paine's Common Sense and Washington's just and moderate political and military measures provided a base for patriot propaganda operations. During the Mexican War, both sides employed propaganda, but which was the more successful is difficult to determine. The Mexican effort was certainly not without effect, for the guns defending Mexico City were manned by traitor American artillerymen.[8] Historians in both countries gloss over the treason and subversion which occurred on each side. In the Civil War, psychological operations were carried out by both sides, both against the other and to influence opinion in England and on the continent. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation ranks as one of the great strokes of psychological warfare.

III. THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY

An examination of the conduct of the various

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[8]Linebarger, op. cit., p. 23.

ramifications of international relations since 1914 reveals an ever-increasing emphasis on ideology, or political faith, as a driving force. An ideology is a system of deep-rooted beliefs about fundamental questions in human life and affairs.[9] Ideology, therefore, plays an important part in psychological warfare.

The earliest form of ideology was apparently religion.[10] It was the first group of ideas which decisively influenced the mentality and behavior of primitive man and primitive society. The social ideologies developed later and were, at first, intimately fused with the all-dominating religious conception of the universe. In the later evolutional phase, the social and political ideologies separated from the religions which, more and more, lost their domination over individuals and societies. The latest step in this evolutionary process is the non-religious but totalitarian ideology which appears in recent history in a more and more vigorous and sharply-defined shape.

Ideologies pass, at times, through inactive periods, sometimes centuries in duration. There are also phases of ideological expansion. These are the phases of conquest,

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[9] Ibid., pp. 30-32.

[10] Bela Szunyogh, Psychological Warfare (New York: The William-Frederick Press, 1955), p. 46.

the stage for the most active propaganda, for the blindest fanaticism, and for merciless intolerance. These phases represent a very important form of psychological warfare; they are Wars of Faith.

The expansion of the Muslim Creed and Empire provides a great deal of information which should not be neglected in the twentieth century. The emirs of the Arab conquests demonstrated two principles of long-range, psychological warfare which are still valid.

A people could be converted from one faith to the other if given the choice between conversion and extermination, stubborn individuals being rooted out. To effect the initial conversion, participation in the public ceremonies and formal language of the new faith were required. Sustained counter intelligence remained on the alert against back sliders. Formal acceptance would eventually become genuine acceptance by denying public media of expression to the vanquished faith.

If immediate, wholesale conversion required too extensive or severe operations, the same result could be achieved by toleration of the objectionable faith, combined with the issuance of genuine privileges to the new, preferred faith. The conquered people were left in the private, humble enjoyment of their old beliefs and folkways. However, all participation in public life, be it political, cultural,

or economic, was conditioned upon acceptance of the new faith. In this manner, all up-rising members of the society would move in a few generations over to the new faith in the process of becoming rich, powerful, or learned; what was left of the old belief became a gutter superstition, possessing neither power nor majesty.[11]

These two rules worked admirably in the Muslim conquests. The Germans employed them in World War II; the Soviets have employed them continuously since 1917. The first method is difficult and bloody, providing quick results. The second rule is slow but as irresistible and as sure as the movement of an ice age glacier. Whether the process is termed the "capture of the rising elite" or the "utilization of potential leadership cadres from historically superseded classes," the effect is the same. If men are placed in a position of underprivilege and shame because of their beliefs and if a way is provided for voluntary conversion to the winning side, the winning side will, sooner or later, convert almost everyone who is capable of making trouble.[12]

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[11] Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 8-14 ff.

[12] Ibid., p. 13.

IV. THE ROLE OF PROPAGANDA

Psychological warfare is waged before, during, and after wars--it is everlasting and no one, anywhere, ever escapes its tentacles. It has become a constant part of international relations. Its principal vehicle is propaganda. Propaganda is by no means something new in the struggle of mankind; but its conscious and scientific application by means of modern, high-speed methods of mass communications has lent it an importance infinitely greater than it enjoyed in by-gone days. Because it has the means of reaching mass audiences, psychological warfare is, therefore, a potentially deadly weapon.

The word "propaganda" was originally applied to an activity which was inspired by very laudable motives. In the Roman Catholic Church, the College of Propaganda was a committee of cardinals whose task it was to adapt the teachings of Christianity to the practices and customs of people in widely different parts of the world.[13] Every doctrine or ideology, no matter how noble, is likely to encounter difficulties in getting itself properly understood. A good propagandist is merely one who knows how to present his ideas effectively, and the arts of propaganda are merely the

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[13]Carroll C. Pratt, Psychology: The Third Dimension of War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), p. 18.

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[11][illegible], *Propaganda: [illegible] of War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), p. 12.

means by which a point of view can best be made acceptable. Propaganda, however, is successful only when there is a positive policy to be sold, imaginative and creative spokesmen to sell it, and detailed knowledge about the audience and its aspirations.

V. ELEMENTS OF PROPAGANDA

In the field of propaganda, there are five general areas or elements into which it may be broken and examined: source, time, audience, subject, and mission. These analysis factors are useful in portraying the spectrum across which propaganda is employed.

Source is the most important element. An overt and acknowledged source implies that the government issuing the message is placing it before the world. This requires dignity and an eye to the future and is most effectively accomplished through responsible public officials, preferably with international reputations, who will realize the best effect from the use of the name and facilities of the government. If the source is faked, it is very important for the government to ensure that the propaganda cannot be traced back readily. Covert sources require persons adept at illicit imaginativeness and with a strong sense of discipline and security.

In American practice, source is generally considered as falling into three categories:[14]

1. White propaganda issued by an acknowledged source, usually a government or an agency of the government.

2. Grey propaganda issued by an ill-defined source.

3. Black propaganda purportedly issued by a source other than the true one.

In terms of the time-span of the propaganda, a subdivision into the categories of strategic and tactical can be made.

Strategic propaganda is directed at enemy forces, areas, people, or nations in their entirety and, in coordination with strategic planning, is designed to achieve results planned and sought over a period of psychological changes that may extend over long periods.

Tactical propaganda is directed at specific audiences, usually named, and is prepared and executed in support of localized, ad hoc operations. It is employed to achieve an immediate, short-range purpose and normally does not cover a long time interval.

Propaganda is so intimately keyed to the news and opinion situation that it does not usually bear elaborate pre-operational analysis. However, on a national policy

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[14]Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

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level, propaganda can be categorized as offensive or defensive in nature with regard to the audience envisioned.

Defensive propaganda is designed to maintain an accepted and operating form of social or other public action in the face of a simultaneously hostile propaganda operation.

Offensive propaganda is designed to interrupt a social action not desired by the propagandist or to predispose to a social action which he desires, either through revolutionary means (within the same society) or international means, diplomatic or belligerent (between different societies).

Among the infinite number of propaganda purposes which a psychological warfare group may have in mind for the audience are several broad categories of mission:

Conversionary propaganda is designed to change the emotional or practical allegiance of individuals from one group to another.

Divisive propaganda is designed to split apart the component sub-groups of the enemy and thereby reduce the effectiveness of the enemy group, considered as a single unit.

Consolidation propaganda is directed toward civil populations in areas occupied by a military force and is designed to insure compliance with the commands or policies promulgated by the commander of the occupation forces.

Counter propaganda is designed to refute a specific point or theme of enemy propaganda.

Most of these distinctions are in reality theoretic terms and rarely find expression as a single, pure, operational entity. The basic distinctions are determined by the task involved and not by the propaganda content.[15]

The voice of propaganda must be self confident and convincing at all times. The propagandist must take the imperturbable stand that he can prove anything. He is never wrong, and he must never show any resignation or depression. He can prove any statement, even if it appears absurd at first view. Even if a part of the audience ridicules the speaker, others will give him credit. No failure can be allowed to weaken the speaker's confident words. When all people despair, he cannot despair; for when the propaganda fails, the fall of the movement is inevitable.

Propaganda is made up of words which are adjustable to every situation. It is of minor importance what the subject of the discussion is; what matters is the way it is spoken. Proper words may conceal any fact or may glorify unimportant details to an extreme. The importance of vocabulary is easily recognized by reading the following collection of words and expressions taken from communist writings:

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[15] Ibid., pp. 43-48 ff.

> . . . aggression, flunky, warmonger, enemy of the people, exploitation, mass-demonstration, hostility toward the workers, world peace organization, heroic laborer, reactionary, fighting group, landrobber, stooges, imperialists, the great patriotic war.

The mere collection of these words evokes a certain feeling. They are heavy with emotion, power and intolerance; and they are without mercy. The success of communist propaganda is to be attributed, in part, to such powerful and very dynamic language which strikes the opponent with an annihilating verve and passion.

VI. POLICY GOALS AND PROPAGANDA

Propaganda is the tool, not the master, of policy, although effective propaganda always has some policy. The policy probably will not have been made by propagandists, and it most certainly will not remain forever the same. If the propaganda is consistent with what is known, or believed, of the policy, then it can be effective, otherwise it cannot.

Long-range goals are statements of ultimate and mid-course purposes of life in the body politic. The task of policy is to re-examine and redefine the operational connotations of these long-range goals in the light of current events, needs, and demands, so as to insure that these parameters continue to define the type of future sought by the state and its people. Since policy is the sequence of governing decisions in any body politic, it inevitably

fluctuates as changing conditions alter issues and modify alternatives. Although its guiding policy may shift, the purpose of propaganda remains constant: to serve policy with maximum effectiveness. However, without clear policy goals firmly in control of utterances, propaganda may move its audience--but in no direction or in the wrong direction.

In world politics, policy employs four instruments to achieve its goals: propaganda (persuasion), diplomacy (negotiation), economics (bargaining), and war (coercion). Their respective vehicles are symbols, contracts, commodities, and violence.[16] War, economics, and even diplomacy operate upon the material environment. The propaganda function is to advance policy goals by manipulating the symbolic environment. What people believe about the future shapes their responses to present events. It is these beliefs about the future--the structure of expectations--which propaganda attempts to modify on behalf of policy goals.

The manipulation of expectations is an instrument with powerful uses but also with definite limits. The fundamental limitation is inherent in the instrument: its strategy is persuasion and its vehicle is the symbol. Propaganda does not change conditions but only beliefs about

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[16]Daniel Lerner, "Effective Propaganda: Conditions and Evaluation," Propaganda In War and Crisis, ed. Daniel Lerner (New York: George W. Stewart, Inc., 1951), pp. 344-346.

conditions; it cannot force people to change their beliefs but can only persuade them to do so.

Propaganda is effective when it achieves a modification of audience behavior which alters the distribution of power in ways advantageous to the policy of the propagandist.[17] Policy goals thus define one set of limits for propaganda activity--by postulating what is desirable. A second set of limits is defined by audience predispositions--which determine what is possible. Propaganda strategy operates within the terrain bounded by these policy and audience considerations.

It is important to recognize that the behavioral consequences of modified expectations need not appear immediately. In fact, some of the most important consequences of any attitude alterations appear only in the long-range future. Propaganda attempts to adjust the timing of the behavioral consequences it seeks to the short-range or long-range aims of its policy goals.

One requirement of sound policy is the classification of goals; a second is their instrumentation. Psychological warfare in support of policy must, first, clearly define its objectives and the methods through which it proposes to attain them. Second, it must determine with regard to

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[17] Ibid., pp. 348-354.

objectives and methods, the popular aspirations of those to whom the psychological appeal is addressed. Third, it must determine to what extent psychological warfare is capable of supporting political policy.

VII. INTELLIGENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Assuming that clear goals and firm policy are available for the conduct of psychological operations, to move towards instrumentation of these goals demands adequate intelligence of conditions. The crucial service rendered to policymaking by the intelligence function is perhaps the most serious area of ignorance in our present understanding of the political process. The instruments of policy activate policy decisions by continuously modifying present conditions toward future goals. Policy specifies the desired ends; intelligence appraises the available means. Each of the policy instruments (propaganda, diplomacy, economics, and war) has its destructive techniques, but all are to be appraised by the criterion of effectiveness.[18] Intelligence is, therefore, indispensable to both policy and psychological operations.

Each sphere of policy is to some extent an end and to some extent a means. Thus, for example, every proposed

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[18]Lerner, Propaganda in War and Crisis, op. cit., XIV-XV.

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[16] Lerner, *Propaganda in War and Crisis*, *op. cit.*, 417-27.

military policy must be evaluated with reference to other objectives in that sphere and to the goals in the spheres of diplomacy, economics, and psychology. Intelligence can clarify goals and alternatives and provide needed knowledge. The types of knowledge needed for psychological policy may be classified: (1) distribution of attitudes, (2) trend of attitudes, and (3) comparison of available alternatives with past situations and with scientific findings. Attitudes, in turn, can be inferred from many kinds of data such as: (1) what people say and do, (2) what is said to people, and (3) what is done to people.[19]

The organization of the intelligence function calls for the proper articulation of many specialists with the policy makers. Psychological operations and propaganda are not the same as advertising. Psychological warfare is a task of extraordinary complexity, requiring intellectuals, scholars, journalists, political philosophers, and specialists with creative imaginations in the fields of political sociology, social psychology, history, cultural anthropology, and communications. Psychological warfare must understand and reach the people for whom it is intended. This is not a job for stodgy, conformist bureaucrats.

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[19]Harold D. Lasswell, "Policy and the Intelligence Function," Propaganda In War and Crisis, Daniel Lerner (ed.) (New York: George W. Stewart, Inc., 1951), pp. 55-58 f, 61 f.

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[19] Harold D. Lasswell, "Policy and the Intelligence Function," Propaganda in War and Crisis, Daniel Lerner (ed.) (New York: George W. Stewart, Inc., 1951), pp. 61-78 f. 61 f.

VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND POLICY FORMULATION

The relationships between those who formulate authoritative declarations of policy and those who perform the intelligence function require constant refinement and redefinition. Psychological material is less definitive than technical reports, and its adequate presentation demands a close personal relationship amongst planning personnel. If psychological operations are to be correctly related to policy, psychological planners must occupy a prominent position in all circles and levels of policy councils. Only through constant emphasis can policy makers come to recognize and sense the full degree of their reliance upon certain facts for basic clarification of their task.

Policy makers often leave goals phrased in ambiguous language that is open to misinterpretation, and it is one of the functions of the intelligence branch to point out any ambiguity and to seek out an authoritative declaration. Psychological operators continually ask for new specifications of objectives. Many times the goals enunciated by the makers of policy are inconsistent or even contradictory. On other occasions, authoritative statements are entirely missing in reference to many zones of action. In this process of clarification of goals, the psychological operator

rapidly discovers that there can be no clarification unless the need for integrated policy is widely felt. It is at this point where the nicest balance must be observed. To attempt to force a rigorous proclamation of purpose may not only fail to carry the policy group along but may lead to the rejection of disciplined fact gathering.[20] Yet, failure to keep the need of clarity at the focus of policy-making attention may result in a critical delay in adjustment to reality.

IX. IMPONDERABLES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

In physical warfare, the inherent instability in every situation, including such variables as weather, is partly compensated for by the ponderable factors. In psychological warfare, there is virtually nothing that can be calculated. The target--the enemy mind in its entirety--is a factor beyond the absolute, finite understanding of man. The propagandist can define: (1) the specific kinds of demoralization or discord he wishes to create, (2) the particular enemy audiences in which he wishes to create them, (3) the types of arguments he proposes to use, and (4) the media through which he will project his propaganda; but very

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[20] Ibid., pp. 66-67.

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[illegible], par. 48-51.

little more.[21] The honest psychological operator will admit that he does not know where he is at any given moment, how far he is from his starting point, or how near he is to his goal. The propagandist can never say, "this consideration is now finished; let us proceed to the next phase."

Psychological warfare is far more complex than a single propaganda campaign, and the key to its effective use lies in an appreciation of its possibilities and its limitations. Psychological warfare officers and researchers must develop a realistic, specific, and mature approach to the problems that actually arise. They must realize that the basic principles of war apply also in psychological warfare. Further, psychological factors must be taken into account in making command decisions. This involves the gathering of psychological warfare intelligence, including information on the political and psychological effects of tactics and weapons systems.

At present, it is a rare American political or military leader who consciously considers psychological implications when making command decisions. Possibly this failing is due to the fact that it is a rare intelligence officer (civil or military) who looks for or adequately reports intelligence of the type needed in psychological warfare

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[21] Linebarger, op. cit., p. 150 f.

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[7] Lindenberger, op. cit., p. 150 f.

operations. It is certainly due, in part, to a national indisposition towards psychological operations. Irrespective of the reason, the need for more and better psychological warfare intelligence is great. To be effective, psychological warfare demands valid measurements of the motivational forces affecting groups whose behavior and thinking it is wished to influence. Accurate data must be available on current attitudes, interests, and beliefs of target populations. It is imperative to know what information and misinformation they possess, the source of information they trust, the concepts they hold, and the values they seek to realize.

X. MORAL AND TRADITIONAL OBJECTIONS

The world is governed in accordance with political customs, ideas, and structures that developed long ago. Psychological warfare is in one sense reactionary, because it goes behind the target state and appeals to the individual as a member of the human community. The greater the success of psychological warfare in inducing treason, the more humane it is as a weapon. Nevertheless, there are unpleasant and immoral overtones in the use of psychological warfare. In the hands of the wrong persons, it is capable of being converted into a drastic instrument of domestic confusion. On a broader, international scale, "warfare psychologically waged" by a total state against a free one can be a vile and

effective instrument, achieving victories by exploiting the peacefulness, indecision, and disunity of its victim. The most powerful countermeasure to hostile, prebelligerent attack is high national morale, which, in turn, depends upon the mental, emotional, and physical health of the people.

Apart from the opinion that propaganda is a form of deceit, and thus immoral, specialists often regard other instruments of policy--diplomacy, armaments, economic measures--as both more respectable and more effective. By tradition and experience, Foreign Service officials are inclined to observe the time-honored ways of communicating with their peers in other capitals and to view communications to people at large as either wasteful or dangerous. Indeed, no degree of righteousness and veracity in mass propaganda can alter the fact that propagandist aims are often subversive.

XI. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

Psychological warfare is only an instrument of policy, not a policy itself. There are certain things it can do, others it cannot do. It cannot, in the long run, perpetuate falsehoods. It cannot impose an alien system of values on one that already exists. It cannot satisfy physical needs or permanently substitute words for deeds. Where used in

connection with a political or military policy, it can give life and impetus to political goals, it can encourage friends and discourage enemies; militarily, it can confuse and undermine the enemy, damage his morale, and put him on the defensive. It can do much to dishearten the enemy's allies and to win over neutrals. Properly used, and always in coordination with a policy of action, it can neutralize the potentially hostile or wavering. The policies and particularly the acts of a government are the most potent ammunition of psychological warfare; not only is the nature of these acts significant, but, equally significant are the wording of their announcement and the time of its release.

Psychological warfare is but the impact, in the realm of ideas, of the political, economic, and military policies it seeks to support. It is the ideological expression and projection of the objectives and methods of these policies. From the nature and character of these policies, it draws its strength. With them, it triumphs or fails. If it is to be effective, it must be coupled with political and military policies that have the makings of victory. Deeds speak much louder than words.[22]

In the sphere of political action, there is no such

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[22]Hans J. Morganthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 214, 216, and 219-220.

thing as one and the same truth for everyone. Different people will each consider the same news item, the same idea, from their own particular philosophic, moral, and political perspective. Each will see the idea in a different color and interpret it differently.

Propaganda cannot assume that the sender has the whole truth and the only truth and disregard the basic interests and outlook of the foreign audience. Ignoring the audience's expectations may lead to propaganda boomerangs. Even the most truthful statement can return "home to roost" if it is not attuned to the range of the audience's beliefs and experiences.

XII. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND DEMOCRACY

Psychological warfare subordinated to satisfying the home public is not psychological warfare. One of the greatest difficulties encountered in establishing a psychological warfare program is the failure, at all levels, by officials to recognize the totality of effort required. Every act of a nation has either good or bad psychological implications. For all representatives to have the desired unity of purpose, every agency of the government, every newspaper and magazine must be oriented to give the same view. This requires an indoctrination of officials, a degree of policy guidance,

and a level of internal control which is generally unavailable in a democratic nation.

The character of psychological warfare as a policy instrument derives from the social structure of the nation whose policies it serves. The conditions of its communications industry will determine the number and kinds of channels available for propaganda. The national educational system will determine the personnel available--their number and quality. The values, goals, and aspirations of the nation will condition the policies that psychological warfare will be designed to serve.[23]

Psychological warfare is an instrument of foreign policy: it always has been; for psychology and propaganda are necessary in peace and in war in the pursuit of national goals. Some critics claim that propaganda, psychological operations, and psychological war are antithetical to a democratic way of life. So is war; yet democracy has waged just and honorable wars, and democracy has repeatedly used psychological warfare and propaganda in the conduct of its wars and foreign affairs. To deny the state an effective tool in the international field on the grounds that it is not correct practice in "peacetime" to influence a nation's own people, its friends, the neutrals, the enslaved, and the

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[23]Daniel Lerner, Sykewar (Cornwall, New York: Cornwall Press, Inc., 1949), p. 9.

conquerors through psychological operations is a moralistic bit of nonsense left over from the era of the Light Brigade. Within those limits imposed by national values, the rules of the Marquis of Queensberry must be laid gently, but firmly, to rest.

CHAPTER II

THE FACTORS OF HERITAGE AND IDEOLOGY

I. THE SOVIET UNION

The roots of Russian civilization go deep into the ancient Indo-European background which is common to all European nations. Like all modern peoples, the Russians have acquired a certain admixture of alien blood through the centuries. The Varangians (Norsemen) swept through the land in the eighth and ninth centuries A.D.; and both before and after this period, the eastern Slavs mixed freely with peoples of the Ural-Altaic family--Mongols, Turks, and Finns. Yet, the Russians remained essentially a Slavonic people and did not differ appreciably from such other Indo-European peoples outside of the Mediterranean area as the Germans and the Balts.[1]

The ancient Russian civilization profited greatly from intercourse with the Iranians--also an Indo-European strain--who, in those early days, were firmly established on the south Russian steppes. Slavic mythology, folklore, and heroic songs show wide and unmistakable evidence of this

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[1]George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (fifth revised edition; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 1-19.

influence. Thus, a combination of original Slavic and related Iranian elements underlies Russian civilization.

The Effect of Byzantine Christianity

In the course of the ninth and tenth centuries A.D., Russia was officially converted to Christianity in its Byzantine form. This conversion was of tremendous importance for the whole subsequent course of Russian intellectual and cultural history. Although this conversion laid the basis for a closer relation between Europe and Eurasia, the potential unifying force was greatly inhibited by the eleventh-century breach between the Roman and Byzantine churches. This tended to turn the Russian people inward and laid an early basis of separation between Russia and the West. The constant military pressure exerted by the Poles, Germans, and Swedes against Russia's borders further widened the separation.

The Impact of the Mongols

Across the great sweep of Eurasia, from time immemorial, had surged waves of conquering nomads, each tribe forcing its predecessor onward as inexorably as the pressure of the next outpouring mounted against it in turn. Scythians, Sarmatians, Huns, Avars, and Khazars followed in historic procession, leaving an indelible heritage of fear, conquest, and oppression. Yet, during this long, continuing

assault, the Russian principalities grew, developing a political organization which combined elements of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic forms of government.[2] These three elements of power appeared in varying degrees of importance from place to place. Even the Suzdalian monarchy--the nucleus of the future tsardom of Moscow--where the monarchical element had particularly developed was a constitutional monarchy and not absolute. As late as the thirteenth century, Russian political institutions were based upon a free society. The knell to this evolutionary process was struck in the year 1223 A.D. when the Mongols first emerged from the wastes of Northern Persia and Transcaucasia and penetrated the south Russian steppes.

Historically speaking, the Mongol invasion was the last great drive of the Eurasian nomads to the West. The Mongol's intention was "to establish a world empire under which international peace, the pax mongolica, would be achieved."[3] The full fury of their assault was not exerted for another fourteen years; but when it finally struck in December of 1237, it carried all before it. By 1241, Russia had been overrun and for the next two hundred and forty years, she lay under the Mongol yoke.

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[2] Ibid., pp. 47-56.

[3] Ibid., p. 58.

Mongol rule left many indelible traces in Russian life. City crafts and population declined, while agriculture continued to expand. It was in the Mongol period that Russia became a predominantly agrarian country.[4]

Politically, the decline of the cities meant the weakening and eventual destruction of the democratic element in the old Russian system. While the prince was completely subordinated to the Khan, the Khan's patent now protected him against the political claims of either the townspeople or the boyars. Thus, the very nature of princely authority began to change. As the Khans delegated an increasing number of administrative duties to the princes, particularly the responsibility of collecting taxes, these rulers were able to use, for their own benefit, the administrative and military machine built up in Russia by the Mongols. The Russian princes emerged from the Mongol period much stronger rulers than had been their predecessors before the conquest.

Of great importance was the psychological conditioning process through which the population passed. The people were trained by the Mongols to accept orders unquestioningly, to pay taxes, and to supply manpower without delay. They were subjected to brutal and immediate punishment for any manifest objections. This change in attitude gradually

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[4] Ibid., p. 78.

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[7] Ibid., p. 78.

resulted in a new concept of state and society. The old, free political institutions were replaced by the authority of the Grand Duke. The free society was gradually transformed into a network of social classes bound to state service.

Another important source of influence on Russian heritage lay in the development of the power of the church. Under the protection of a charter of immunity granted by the Khan, Manger-Temir, the church became less dependent upon princely power than in any other period of Russian history. Furthermore, it was in the Mongol period that the rural population was Christianized.

Effects from the Fall of Constantinople, 1453

As a branch of the Byzantine Church, the Russian Church was deeply affected by the grave political and religious crisis which developed in the old Near East between 1350 and 1450. Though Orthodoxy was restored by the Turks in Constantinople following its capture in 1453, the political and psychological conditions inherent in the See of the Patriarch's being in the camp of the infidels forced the Russian Church into self government.[5] It was, thereafter, a natural progression for the Byzantine doctrine of the

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[5] Ibid., p. 83.

symphony of church and state--the concept of Byzantium as the Second Rome--to be adapted to the Russian milieu. Thus, Moscow became the Third Rome--the last Rome; there would be no other. There was also to develop a near mystic conception of purpose: a deep, emotional sense of defending the faith; and, eventually, the concept of caesero-papism which vested in the Tsar the spiritual as well as temporal leadership of the state.

The Effect of Europeanization

The Europeanization of Russia brought with it new political, religious, and social ideas. It also brought profound internal conflict and a crisis of national psychology.[6] The new ideas reached the governing and upper classes and were absorbed by them before they reached the masses. Consequently, a split developed between the top and the bottom of society which was never bridged.

Peter the Great accomplished this political emergence at a great price. In the course of his program of westernizing the state, the people were deprived of political power and local government was abrogated. The Orthodox Church, the chief psychological basis of the old Russian state, was subordinated to the civil power and thereafter continually

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[6] Ibid., p. 148.

[illegible]

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lost influence to such a degree that it faced a threat of disintegration in 1917.

The majority of the people resisted the program of Europeanization, and their inherent suspicion and distrust of the West was further heightened by the forceful imposition of the reforms. Peter's "primary concern was the good, not exactly of the Russian people, but rather of the Russian state."[7] He stopped at nothing in pursuing the interest of the state. His concept of absolutism, as a part of Russian heritage, was to become habitual and traditional.

Familiar Traits

The reports of foreign observers on the status of affairs in those early days have a prophetic tinge and, in retrospect, seem to presage the conflict of these times. Traits were then becoming visible that were destined later to play an important part in the psychological composition of Soviet power. There was a tendency to a messianic concept of Russia's role in history; an intolerance of foreign outlooks and values; a pronounced xenophobia on the part of Russian officialdom; an insistence on isolating the Russian people from foreign contact; a secretiveness and deviousness of diplomatic practice; a seeming inability to understand

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[7] Ibid., p. 151.

anything in the nature of a permanently peaceful and equal relationship between states; a tendency to view every treaty of peace as being in the nature of a provisional armistice; and a tendency to think of conflict as the normal--peace as the provisional and abnormal.

The Role of Ideology

Prophetic as these historic Russian traits may be, it was the linking, by means of a doctrinaire ideology, of a totalitarian party system and national power aspirations which has effectively produced that mutation known as the "cold war." This ideology is woven through the organization of the Communist Party system and interacts with the power considerations of a large block of nations. Therefore, in examining the predilections of the Soviet Union to the use of psychological warfare and psychological operations, it is necessary to examine this ideology for its contribution.

The Contribution of Karl Marx

Karl Marx deriving his concepts from Feuerbach and Hegel combined the materialism of the former with the historical concepts of the latter.[8] "Historical materialism"

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was the derivative: the idea that history occurs because of changes in material, economic conditions which, in turn, lead to changes in human existence and which proceed according to an inescapable logic.

From this derivative, it develops that: (1) life is fundamentally a relation between man and matter (out of this relationship issues a communist's certainty that his beliefs are corroborated by scientific proof); (2) the laws of history can be scientifically determined and the Marxist interpretation is the only "scientific" key to the knowledge of history; (3) one can find general truth about human affairs only by participating in historic change--the point of philosophy is not to interpret but actively to change the world. Out of this purpose, revolutionary activity as a way of life becomes apparent.

The core of the communist teaching about society is the doctrine that all societies above the primitive level are split into classes. These classes are locked in an unceasing and irreconcilable struggle. Thus, struggle is not an abnormal condition, but rather the characteristic trait of all historically recorded societies. In modern society, this struggle has narrowed to a conflict between the bourgeoisie, who are those who produce commodities through hired wage-labor, and the proletariat, who are the propertyless wage workers. In this social conflict, power is

interpreted, basically, as the rule of one class over another.

According to communist theory, it is private ownership of the means of production which enables a class to rule. Since the proletariat possesses no means of production, being without property, its victory in the class struggle cannot result in another class rule.

> The revolution of the proletariat is, therefore, expected to end all class rule and to inaugurate a new type of society in which there will be no classes, no exploitation, and no need for political power--socialist society.[9]

Communist doctrine holds that all societies pass through successive phases of development--primitive, slave-holding, feudal, bourgeois, and, finally, socialist.[10] In the course of this development, the class struggle has fastened itself upon mankind as a result of the institution of private property, for it is private ownership of the means of production which enables a class to rule and wealth can be generated only at the price of poverty. Classes, then, developed a machinery for oppression--the state. Only when human society is free of class rule, will mankind be relieved of these plagues.

In Karl Marx's view, the capitalists exploit the people for profit and rule all men in bourgeois society.

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[9] Ibid., p. 59. [10] Ibid., pp. 54-60, passim.

This system is inherently evil and must be destroyed in its entirety. It also is shot through with inherent contradictions and thus bears the seeds of its own destruction and overthrow by the proletariat. Thus, Marx left to Lenin a target for hostility, a motive for irreconcilable hatred of the world's society, and the prediction of a catastrophic but hopeful end.

Lenin's Adaptations

With the legacy of Marx, developed in his Capital, as bedrock, Lenin proceeded to transform these teachings into the basic Bolshevik doctrine of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

To Lenin, capitalism had advanced from the competitive to the monopolistic and imperialistic stage. This was the final stage, and the capitalist nations could now be expected to turn on each other in mutually destructive wars. The world was, therefore, to be the scene of a final, titanic conflict between the industrial nations on one hand and the socialist and anti-imperialist states on the other. The latter group comprised the "overwhelming majority," according to Lenin, and was, thereby, given a kind of democratic justification.

The struggle was now to be a world-wide conflict between two international "camps" and was, in addition to a contest between the revolutionary forces and capitalism,

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also a struggle against war. In this manner, world politics and revolutionary cause were to be woven into a single fabric.[11]

Marxism-Leninism thus postulated a struggle of the future against the present--the Socialist Revolution or, simply, "the Revolution." It summoned all "toilers," under the unifying leadership of the Communist Party, to fight the revolutionary struggle to bring about the inevitable end of present day capitalist society. Any method required to bring to pass the catastrophic destruction of this bourgeois society was to be justified in the name of the hoped-for result. Deliberate action and political organization would be necessary to accomplish the deed, and no sacrifices could be deemed excessive in the struggle for victory.

While he borrowed heavily from Marx to formulate his views on "the Revolution," the basic operational doctrine for implementation of the revolution was shaped entirely by Lenin.[12]

> We live not only in a state, but in a system of states and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end, either one or the other will conquer. And until that end comes, a series of the most terrible collisions between the Soviet Republic and bourgeois states is inevitable.[13]

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[11] Ibid., p. 63. [12] Ibid., pp. 64-69, passim.

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[11]*Ibid.*, p. 11. [12]*Ibid.*, pp. 10-11, *passim*.

[13]Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1943), p. [illegible].

Hence, the struggle would continue with undiminished fury against external enemies long after the communists had seized power and dealt with their internal foes. Marx's concept of a single upheaval was now transmuted into a "protracted struggle" in which the Communist Party, Communist strategy, the role of the state, and the place of the Soviet Union all had doctrinal functions to perform.

The Role of the Party

The Party was defined as the "vanguard" of the proletariat, and was entrusted with guarding and developing revolutionary theory. It was, therefore, implicitly the judge of the correctness of all thought. Its members would be comparatively few in number and dedicated to the profession of revolution.

Lenin developed a number of strategic principles most of which proposed methods by which a small, compact organization could use revolutions made by others to control large-scale revolutionary movements and change. The use of alliances, neutralization, legal as well as illegal activities, and bourgeoise revolutions which were later to be subverted are all examples of basic tactics.

The road to a society of full freedom when the state has withered away leads through the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, until the long-awaited day when there

is "nothing any more to suppress," the state is to be used dictatorially, not as an instrument of the common good but for combat operations of the Party as a "rule based upon force and unlimited by law."[14]

The Role of the Soviet Union

The Soviet Union was assigned the role of the power base for the world revolutions. Here, the Party could consolidate its power; and Soviet Russia, therefore, became a chief instrument of the world revolution, and the Communist International became the tool of Soviet Russia. "Henceforth, the national power, national security, and national expansion of the Soviet Union came to be intertwined with communism as an ideological cause."[15]

> Any agreements between the Party and outside groups must be regarded as aiding the future liquidation of these groups and as barriers against the liquidation of the Party by them. Therefore there is no essential difference between coming to an ostensibly amicable agreement with an outside group or using violence against it; they are both tactics in an overall strategy of attack.[16]

Bolshevik Combat Philosophy and the Place of Psychological Operations

Therefore, there is no place in the Marxist-Leninist

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[14]Cited by Niemeyer, op. cit., p. 67.

[15]Ibid., p. 68.

[16]Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (Santa Monica: The Rand Corp., 1950), p. 62.

outlook for genuine compromise or coexistence or for any reconciliation of differences. The struggle against the capitalist enemy is the law of life. To end it, even to interrupt it, would be to die. Once an opportunity arises, action--immediate action--is the only permissible course. "History," said Lenin, "will not forgive revolutionaries for procrastination when they can be victorious today . . . , while they risk losing much, in fact, everything tomorrow."[17]

Struggle, consequently, must remain the key to Soviet tactical and strategic thinking. Relaxation, "normalcy" in the conduct of relations with others, peace, as the West understands the term, are by definition incompatible with what the Soviet leaders avow to be their solemn obligation to history. The contest, they themselves insist, must be to the death.

From its earliest days, communist conflict doctrine has revealed a remarkable affinity to military thought. The pith of communist doctrine is the concept that military and political instruments are interchangeable in the execution of one vast strategic plan.[18] War, be it fought with

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[17]Lenin, op. cit., p. 237.

[18]Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Doughety, "The Larger Strategic Vision," American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff (eds.) (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1960), p. 56.

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[17] Lewis, op. cit., p. 211.

military hardware or through non-violent, political, and psychological operations, is a unity. "Hot" and "cold" are but degrees of intensity in one and the same war.

According to standard communist procedure, the predominant enemy group should not be attacked in a decisive manner before its leaders and cadres have become unsure of their capabilities, intentions, rights, and, above all, of their chances of success. This doctrine firmly establishes the operational requirement for psychological warfare and psychological operations as a tool of Soviet foreign policy. Since foreign policy is conceived within the parameters of a nation's values as they have developed out of heritage and ideology, it follows that the Soviet conduct of psychological operations would be in accordance with Bolshevik conflict doctrine. Since war, politics, diplomacy, law, science, economics, and psychology all form a continuum and are closely integrated in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy, psychological operations can be encountered in every act of the Soviet Union. Soviet National Security policy marinates military, foreign, and domestic policies in a vehicle of psychological operations. No action is taken without consideration of its psychological impact upon the entire spectrum of short and long range objectives.

II. THE UNITED STATES

Since the remote ages of pre-history, the land had been there, shielded behind the heaving, restless barriers of the North Atlantic and North Pacific oceans and the swirling sea mists. Perhaps as long ago as 50,000 B.C.[19] man had reached its shores. Kin of the same nomads who periodically welled up out of the depths of Eurasia and surged into the European peninsula, Asiatic migrants crossed the land bridge between Siberia and Alaska. Driven by cold, searching for more game, questing for an easier life, these migrants gradually dispersed through the entire landmass from the Bering Strait to Tierra Del Fuego.

These early arrivals from Asia brought with them a primitive Stone Age culture and knowledge of the use of fire. In time, some of them learned how to work metal; others never advanced beyond stone weapons and tools. In the jungles of Central America, the Valley of Mexico, and the Peruvian highlands, great civilizations comparable to those of the Mediterranean and Western Europe flowered.

No such empires were developed in the vast, near empty sweep of land that would, one day, become the United States and Canada. Here, by the end of the fifteenth century,

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[19]Richard B. Morris, The New World (New York: Time Inc., 1963), p. 9.

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No such empires were developed in the vast, near empty sweep of land that could, one day, become the United States and Canada. Here, by the end of the Fifteenth century,

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[19] Richard S. Morris, Our Own World (New York: Time Inc., 1957), p. 8.

the Indian population numbered no more than a million. These people were split into a large number of tribes marked by the utmost diversity and fragmentation. They did not look alike, speak alike, live alike, or even pray alike. Their weapons and tools were primitive, and they possessed an ineffective political organization. Psychologically, most of them could not unite, which placed them at a great disadvantage when faced by an organized invader. The geography of their land placed them at an additional disadvantage. The coast line provided innumerable attractive sites for initial settlement, while the network of lakes and rivers provided strategic highways of penetration. Only the North Atlantic Ocean protected the seemingly fixed and unalterable patterns of the Indian's way of life.

The first coming of the European was an historical accident which yielded no enduring results, exerted no influence, and for centuries was all but forgotten.[20] The Norseman, Leif (the Lucky) Ericsson, sailed from Norway in the year 1000 A.D. to bring the Christian faith to his pagan homeland in Greenland. En route, he was struck by a violent North Atlantic gale which set him far to the southard. When he raised the land, it was an unknown shore. This was the New World--Vineland, Leif called it.

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Leif sailed away to be followed by one Thorfinn Karlsefnei, a trader, who pursued a colonizing enterprise. The venture was ill-fated and, largely because of the violent contact with a strange and hostile people, he withdrew after three years of terror and combat. For almost another five hundred years the North Atlantic remained unconquered.

The New World

From first light on the morning of October 12, 1492, dates the impact of the New World on the course of history. The Americas now lay before Europe. Spain, with her armed forces freed for the first time in seven hundred years from conflict with the Moors, immediately poured her captains and adventurers into the Western Hemisphere, bent on conquest and the search for gold. France and Britain joined in the early explorations, but while the Spaniards exploited the Americas for precious metals, the French and English amassed less glamorous wealth and developed thriving fishing and fur industries, thus laying the basis for a commercial colonization.

The Results of the Defeat of the Spanish Armada

Following the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, the pace and scope of English expansion into the New World burgeoned. On the eve of that great naval engagement, Philip II of Spain ruled all of the permanent European

settlements in the New World. A century later, the English were entrenched along the North Atlantic coast from Maine to the Carolinas, as well as in the Caribbean. Much of North America was already lost to Spain.

Had British sea power been defeated in the Channel, the character of North America would have, without doubt, developed along entirely different lines. Its culture would have been Latin, its religion Catholic, its native races would have been exploited rather than ejected or exterminated, and its precepts of government and political stability would have been in the Hispanic-colonial style rather than in the Anglo-American traditions of constitutional rights, representative government, and civil liberties.

Emergence of the American

> And those who came were resolved to be Englishmen,
> Gone to the World's end, but English every one,
> And they ate the white corn-kernels, parched in the sun,
> And they knew it not, but they'd not be English again.[21]

Many of the emigrants were farmers seeking cheap or free land. There were weavers, tradesmen, laborers. There were vagrants, bound men and women, pickpockets, convicts, paupers, and prostitutes. Some sought to escape the degradation and hopelessness that had been their lot in the father land. Others sought a freedom of worship not granted

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[21]Stephen Vincent Benet, Western Star (New York: Fanar and Rinehart, Inc., 1943), p. 116.

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<u>Emergence of the American</u>

> And those who came were resolved to be Englishmen,
> Come in the Spirit's mind, but English every one;
> And they are the white sea-wrestle, pressed in one run,
> And they know it not, but they'd not be English again.[11]

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to them in the old country. But no matter their reason for leaving Europe, they all sought a freedom and a liberty that was not available to them in the Old World. Some gave up home; all gave up country; all faced a savage, wild, primeval wilderness. No one can gainsay their collective bravery.

Despite the conditions at home which led the emigrants to sail for the New World, England occupied a position of deep regard in the hearts of the early colonists; and it was natural that they attempted to reproduce, in the wilderness, the institutions of government as they remembered them at home. Yet, the very threat and challenge of the wilderness compounded by the vast problem of communications forced the mutation and evolution of the transplanted political institutions to commence almost as soon as the first crude settlement was laid out. The New World was isolated, and autonomous action was necessary for survival. Any arrangements between the Crown and the Colonies which inhibited the action necessary for the physical, economic, or political survival and well being--as the Colonist saw these factors--would be and was intolerable. The roots of the American tradition of Isolationism can be found in this early demand for freedom of action and the necessity, later grown to a felt preference, to rely chiefly on one's own strength and resources for colonial survival.

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The Crown ruled the colonies in a paradoxical manner.[22] While granting home rule to the Colonists, it waged a constant campaign to prevent their ruling. The Empire counted upon the loyalty of the Colonies yet appeared not to trust them to remain loyal. While the Colonists were regarded as English citizens, they were, at the same time, denied many of the basic rights of Englishmen. The colonies were required to assume a share of the burden of empire and simultaneously denied a serious voice in the imperial decision-making process. The fleet effectively protected the Colonies from foreign attack to such an extent that the Empire considered it much less necessary to provide troop protection for the Colonials.

It was difficult to tell at just what point the colonists ceased to be loyal English subjects outraged over taxes and repressive measures imposed from abroad. Perhaps one third remained loyal. But gradually others, at first a few, then in ever-increasing numbers turned to the idea of liberty. King George III's American subjects had ever been quick to defend their ancient English liberties; his English subjects had let theirs erode.[23]

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[22]Morris, op. cit., p. 143.

[23]Ibid., p. 156.

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[illegible]

The American Revolution

The American Revolution, which developed gradually from a series of political skirmishes for the defense of colonial rights, finally exploded into a full-scale war for political independence, unleashing pent-up demands for political and social reform. The Americans carried into the conflict a deep concern for, and emphatic stress upon, legality. They fought for the rights they believed were guaranteed them as Englishmen under the British constitution and for the rights of man as they understood them to be derived from the "Laws of Nature and of Nature's God." This sense of community, achieved through an explicit commitment to particular concepts of social and political organization, was later to be reenforced by a growing nationalism. The resulting compound defines one of the basic elements of American experience and heritage, and it continues to shape American values.

The Declaration of Independence with its affirmation of the natural rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness would become the conscience of the American people, reminding them of standards by which to judge the conduct of their national life. When Jefferson wrote into the Declaration the natural right of the individual to the pursuit of happiness, he was providing a theoretical base for an experience in the open-class system already a century and a

The American Revolution

half old. A man could aspire to heights limited only by his ability, and he could enjoy acceptance by his fellows on the basis of his character and his accomplishments. The idea and reality of the open-class system was one of the most important contributions of the Americans to the social thinking of Western civilization.

The successful conclusion of the Revolution resulted in the throwing off of the English allegiance--the rejection of the only embodied authority which was generally recognized. It was not, at the time, the replacement of one authority by another. The birth of the American Republic was marked by the rejection of authority as such: authority was coercive, arbitrary, despotic, morally wrong.

For eleven years the thirteen independent Colonies pursued widely diverse paths. The almost complete bankruptcy to which this near anarchy brought the Confederation demonstrated that it was impossible for them to survive without some sort of central authority.

The Advent of the Constitution

All hope for the future of America was centered in the Philadelphia convention which opened in May of 1787. The remarkable document which was produced created a federal structure that endowed the national government with both power and energy. It reflected the American suspicion of authority and the dedication to freedom of action through an

ingenious system of checks and balances and the principle of divided powers. Thus, authority was jealously circumscribed by the erection of insuperable legal barriers to the excessive hegemony of one person or group.

The typical American attitudes toward authority have remained substantially the same as those manifested by the framers of the Constitution. Authority must be as circumscribed, diffused, and limited as legal ingenuity can devise, and the holders of these positions should be under constant scrutiny and should be watched as potential enemies.

Washington's Farewell Address

From 1492, American had been involved in the overseas ramifications of every European conflict. Her independence had been gained through the support of France to the extent that Paris assessed the positive net worth of such a military venture in the overall Anglo-French contest. In an attempt to frame American perspective in terms of the Napoleonic Era and the still precarious national position, Washington spoke on a general theme embracing domestic and foreign policy. The shadow of this Farewell Address has lain across the development of American thought ever since. Washington attempted to focus attention on a distinctive course of action for the nation so that its national interest could be related to the world environment in which, perforce, it must exist. He counseled not a hermit land but an American

nation, sufficiently strong militarily, to protect itself from a position of maneuver purposely kept free from formal commitments to any nations involved in the European power struggle of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This would provide the American people the opportunity to develop their land and destiny free of European destiny. Only in this way could Washington foresee unlimited horizons for the new American commitment to its distinctive set of values in political and social life.

The Westward Movement

The Nation accepted this advice and turned itself to the task of building and consolidating its hold upon the land of North America; and it was a marvelous land--its earth rich, its streams filled with fish. The primeval stand of woodlands stretched to the great plains where the immense, waving buffalo grass prairies, undulating in the wind, whispered and heaved like a sea. Only nature, the aboriginal tribes, and its own internal limitations blocked territorial expansion. For another hundred years, the day-by-day life of America would be directly challenged by the undreamed rich potential of this land, and this century-long steepage in such an environment was also to play a large measure in the molding of American experience and basic values.

> Without childishly denying the relevance of the past, can we not recognize that the American past does not, like the past of many other peoples, extend downward into the soil on which we at any moment stand. Our past, by and large, extends laterally backward across the mountains or plains, or across the sea, to somewhere else. Our history is the process of westering and the counter process of return . . . . A long, complex, and sometimes rapid sequence of consecutive change. America is not an artifact. It is not a fixed and immutable ideal . . . . America is process, and in so far as we are American, the work of our heads and hands and hearts inevitably reflects that fact.[24]

> Their eyes are fixed upon another sight: The American people views its own march across these wilds [and] . . . this magnificent image of themselves does not meet the gaze of the American at intervals only; it may be said to haunt every one of them in his heart as well as his most important actions and to be always flitting before his mind.[25]

The Westward movement further attenuated America's political ties with Europe; the acquisition of the Louisiana territory and conclusion of the War of 1812 accelerated the process. The power of attraction of this westward movement is to be felt even today in the rich American connotations of the word "frontier." As the American center of gravity moved westward, America's national culture became continually more remote from its European origins.

The frontier became the milieu in which a unique

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[24]John Kouwenhoven, "What is American About America," Colorado Quarterly (June 1956), p. 54.

[25]Cited from de Tocqueville by W. W. Rostow, "The National Style," The American Style, Elting E. Morison (ed.) (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), pp. 251-252.

American national character was shaped. The man who could solve the urgent, material, day-to-day problems, organize and operate profitably a productive enterprise, and deal effectively with the daily local social and political life rose in status and repute. His operational approach to all matters became the American approach. His faculties, attuned to an assessment of concrete problems, an empirical method of resolution, and a pragmatic solution became the national approach to all problems. It followed naturally that this same national approach, preoccupied with ad hoc solutions to arduous, practical tasks and generally unable to take time for reflective thought, generated a proclivity towards the accumulation of a store of general concepts. As can be the case with empiricism, these general concepts were not always demonstrably related to each other or, for that matter, related to the bodies of fact they were supposed to encompass.

The Religious Input

Religion had ever been present throughout the colonies. Some offered sanctuary to oppressed faiths, some forbade all but their own; generally Protestantism predominated. The Puritans contributed much to the spiritual heritage of the nation. Politically, reaction to Puritanism helped shape early American political parties and contributed

to the constitutional separation of church and state. However, the Puritan character, diluted in its westward movement, spread throughout the country and is still reflected in the character of modern America in the sense of the moral content of life and in the mixture of practicality and militant zeal for humanitarian causes. It underlies the sense of mission, first carried westward by the settlers and frontiersman, that the Nation created in 1776 exists as a corporate entity not only to further the peace and security of its citizens but to aid--at home and, by example, abroad--the cause of freedom and humane living.

The Nineteenth Century Balance of Power

America was singularly blessed in that fortune granted the young nation, after 1815, a century during which a protracted era of international peace existed. The geographic protection afforded by two large oceans and a British foreign policy, supported by naval power, which found it to be in the Imperial interest to deny the Western Hemisphere to incursions by other European powers, permitted uninterrupted national development. Throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century, therefore, there was no autonomous center of military power, other than the United States, in the Western Hemisphere and, consequently, no immediate threat to its existence. By historical accident, it was to be that

the great theaters of the nineteenth and twentieth century wars would be in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far East; for over a hundred years, the European balance of power remained such that no substantial European coalition could likely be brought to bear to threaten the security of the American Republic.

The domestic impact of such fortune seemed to support the Washingtonian policies of non-entanglement in world politics. It would have seemed the height of folly to abandon such a position and willfully become involved in the shifts and realignments of European balance-of-power politics. European disunity and American remoteness, then, acted to protect the United States. Both conditions made alliances superfluous--alliances which would, at best, have reduced America's own security in world politics. Unencumbered, American diplomacy retained a freedom of action within the Western Hemisphere, established a benign reputation among nations and peoples who considered themselves victims of the European balance-of-power system, and permitted a physical and industrial growth to occur which was commonly viewed with indifference rather than with concern by the European powers. Consequently, the continuity of national life seemed to validate the initial cultural, political, and value choices and decisions followed since the time of Washington.

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The Immigrants

As the expansion continued, the waves of immigration poured into the Atlantic ports.

> Give me your tired, your poor,
> Your huddled masses yearning to be free,
> The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
> Send these the homeless, tempest-tossed to me.
> I hold the lamp before the golden door.[26]

These new immigrations sustained the widespread belief that America was a refuge from Europe and its discontents. Most of those who came did so voluntarily. Yet, for many of these ethnic groups, particularly the Irish and the East Europeans, cultural assimilation was difficult. In the land of equality, they found themselves considered as social inferiors. Memories of Europe were simultaneously humiliating reminders of their incomplete assimilation into the American culture and society and a source of a comforting ethnic subculture which lessened the loneliness and isolation they felt. The effect of these ethnic tensions was to reenforce the basic concept of neutrality towards the European balance of power.

> So long as one's own personal renunciation of Europe coincided with the broader national purposes of America, there was no reason to expect that foreign policy crises would tear apart the seam of American nationalism.[27]

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[26]Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus (inscribed on the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty, Bedloe Island, New York).

[27]Paul Seabury, Power, Freedom and Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 44.

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In this manner, the multi-national background of American society served to enhance the country's isolationist impulses.

Self-Sufficiency

With the opening and exploration of the land, the continent was found to contain most of the natural resources necessary to sustain a constantly enlarging standard of living. The absence of internal tariff barriers and restrictions on interstate commerce opened a gigantic internal market within which industrial and agricultural production could be marketed. Concurrent increase in agricultural productivity rendered the United States virtually self-sufficient in foodstuffs. This set of circumstances was in direct opposition to the European pattern which, in quest of materials, markets, and food, had turned outwards upon the world and thereby increased the relative involvement of these nations in world trade and the international implications of each other's economic policies. In America, the consequences of economic growth were just the opposite and served as yet another source of validation for the chosen national path.

The Developing Pattern of Organization

The industrial and governmental complex expanded with the growth of the nation, and concurrently the matter of organizational attitudes and structure for the operation of

these organizations received increasing attention. Throughout the developmental process, American politics and industry "relied on the ability of an individualistic society to throw up a succession of innovating leaders."[28] The operating code of this American organizational pattern became centered about a planning process which projected into the future the pattern of the familiar on-going processes and trends. The emphasis became one of operating a relatively static process efficiently rather than developing solutions to radically new problems.

American heritage developed out of the individualist society of a pioneering people conquering a new, virgin land. There was no feudal heritage or society and no political past, in the European sense, from which the Americans had to free themselves. The natural concepts and conditions which were taken for granted in the young America had to be bought in blood, if ever achieved, in other lands. Consequently, there has been little in the American heritage would could provide an operational source of experience for the empiric American planning cycle to employ in dealing with the political, social, and economic attitudes and problems of the rest of the world.

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[28]Rostow, op. cit., p. 281.

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[28] Torton, op. cit., p. 241.

The Pains of Emergence onto the World Stage

America was able to pursue its internal expansion and national interest, the course and nature of which established its national values and heritage, through an unwitting (and occasionally a witting) exploitation of the balance-of-power struggle between the major European states. By the beginning of the twentieth century, this kind of exploitation was no longer sufficient. No longer did the fragmentation of Europe assure America that no single power or power group would dominate Eurasia and thereby simultaneously threaten the security of the United States. No longer did the determination of European national interests correspond, even approximately, with those which defined the Washington policy. American interests now collided with issues considered to be of primary importance to the European powers; no longer could American policies be predicated upon the benign fall-out from major European power clashes. America, henceforward, would be unable to finesse her international way; willy-nilly, the United States would be required to participate on the international political stage.

It is on this international political stage that the United States has performed since 1900. It is not surprising in the light of her past that the performance has been a reluctant, often grudging, one. Some of the instinctive rejection of the position into which Americans have found

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themselves pushed since the debut was voiced in the late General Patton's order-of-the-day issued to his troops immediately prior to their amphibious assault on Sicily in July, 1943:

> When we land, we will meet German and Italian soldiers whom it is our honor and privilege to attack and destroy. Many of you have in your veins German and Italian blood, but remember that these ancestors of yours so loved freedom that they gave up home and country to cross the ocean in search of liberty. The ancestors of the people we shall kill lacked the courage to make such a sacrifice and continued as slaves.[29]

A century and a half of insulation from world politics developed traditional American attitudes that will long continue to influence the development of American policy. The uninterrupted decades of national life which produced a continuous growth of wealth, power, and standard of living seem to be irrefutable proof of the worth of the system. The democratic institutions, the relative absence of class conflicts, and the attainments of its multi-national society all seemed to be highly exportable qualities and lent fervor to the definite messianic traits that existed in the liberal traditions of America.

The conquest of the continent was a straightforward military operation. A good Indian was a dead Indian. His heart and scalp, not his mind or eternal soul, were the

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[29]Cited by Geoffrey Gorer, The American People (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1948), p. 23.

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[29] Cited by Geoffrey Lamb, The American People (Newark: W. W. Norton and Co., 1948), p. 24.

targets. There may be considerable validity to the observation that the European settlers of Africa and Central and South America exhibited a fatal lack of foresight, as compared to that of their cousins in the settlements of North America, with respect to the policy applied to the native populations encountered. Be that as it may, the American method was certainly effective. It was in keeping with the pragmatic, total solution sought by the frontiersmen and reflected the American aversion to chronic insecurity and preference for a complete clear-cut victory.

Factors Inhibiting Psychological Operations

There was a rough honesty that wove its way through the process of taming the continent. There was little inclination to consider psychological methods, and even less time or material means for affecting such operations. The moralistic foundations of Puritan and evangelical Protestantism that spread over the land lay across any such course of action. The soul and mind were the province of God and to trespass into this domain was not fitting. It smacked of deceit and bordered on immorality. Practically, it was too slow and inconclusive.

Although the developing features of the American conduct of the government process had little if any effect on American attitudes towards psychological factors in politico-military affairs, nevertheless the developing pattern had

definite bearing upon any future, effective use of psychological operations. The empirical approach tended to permit small, long-range problems to be overlooked until they reached major proportions. There was a developing tendency to permit fundamental policy decisions to take the form of compromise solutions, to accord all units in the organization a voice in major decisions. The fundamental American distrust of authority and hegemony lay behind the marked propensity towards multiple, overlapping, and layering agencies, bureaus, and offices working in the same field. The constitutional principle of division of powers, when applied at the working level, produced large-scale units which tended to obscure the field of vision and limit flexibility and rapidity of response.

The American heritage, therefore, does not reflect a basic set of values or operational patterns which predispose the American people to the employment of psychology against the masses of the world. That such is the case is reflected in the reluctance with which the employment of psychological operations is approached. Although there have been noteworthy instances throughout American history when psychological operations have been employed, the overall history of this instrument of foreign policy has been one of rejection or reluctant use inhibited by a moralistic sermonizing which has, to date, prevented the development and employment of an effective American psychological campaign.

CHAPTER III

SOVIET ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

The Cold War is not novel. It closely resembles the intercivilizational wars of the past in which competing civilizations with divergent moral and political foundations fought one another for final survival. The struggle being waged in mid-twentieth century is similar to the protestant-catholic Thirty Years War of 1618 to 1648. The only parallel in American history is to be found in the frontier Indian Wars, with the exception that the American Indian never posed the threat of sweeping a white and Christian civilization, once it had established a foothold, from the continent.[1]

I. THE ROOTS AND NATURE OF SOVIET PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

The Cold War is, therefore, a struggle, which is now being waged between non-communist states and a communist group of nations. The roots of this conflict can be found at any one of several dates (1848, 1917, 1943, and 1946 are a few of those given). However, this East-West relationship

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[1]Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (second edition; New York: Duell, Sloane, and Pearce, 1960), pp. 244-267.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL ISOLATION AND ANXIETY

OF HYPOCHONDRIACAL OBSERVATIONS

[illegible] the child may be more severely. It directly resembles the [illegible] activities with disgusted moral con[illegible]. [illegible] tongue are evidence for final survival. The atrophic [illegible] waged in mid-twentieth century is similar to the [illegible] capable fairly [illegible] of 1810 to 1860. The main practical [illegible] Hamilton Gateway is to be found in the Franklin Theatre, with the exception that the Hamilton Gateway [illegible] the threat of escaping a fifth and [illegible] activities, once it has established a foothold, from the central [illegible].[1]

I. THE RISE AND MARCH OF SOCIAL [illegible]

Introductory Observations

The word [illegible], however, a strongly [illegible] [illegible] using vague [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] tions of [illegible]. The roots of this [illegible] can be found as far back as [illegible] [illegible], 1917, 1918, and 1920 [illegible] a few of these [illegible]. However, this [illegible] relationship

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[1]Paul H. A. [illegible], Psychological Factors Involved [illegible] the Poor (New York, Alcade, 1917), pp. [illegible].

is mainly the product of developments of the present century, the two most important of which were:

1. The completion of the expansion of the Russian state to a point where further expansion was practically impossible except at the price of conflict with some other great power. Hand-in-hand with this went the development of Russia into one of the World's major military and industrial powers.
2. The capture of power throughout Russia by a group of men, led by Lenin, and inspired by the Marxist ideology as Lenin had developed it.

With the healing of the ravages of World War I, the Soviet Union began to resume the march of economic and military development which had been in progress before that war. World War II only temporarily halted the physical--though not the planning--progress toward that ultimate realization of the traditional role of Russian rulers--supremacy in the competition for position amid the territorial and military rivalries of the Eastern European and Asiatic areas.

The conduct of this Soviet campaign has been carried out by means of a precisely orchestrated application of all four tools of foreign policy: diplomacy, economics, coercion, and psychology.

In 1940, Molotov told the former Foreign Minister of

Lithuania:

> We don't fight America. But when we shall have deprived America of her markets, crisis will come, and that crisis will call forth confusion, and the American Workers will appeal to us to come over and restore order. Presently, the American worker is well off, and, of course, we can't get to him. The Worker will not submit. Consequently, we must cause unemployment in America. After we have taken her markets in Europe, expelled her from Asia and elsewhere, she will have no markets to dump her goods on. She will curtail production and there will be unemployment. We shall then be able to settle our accounts with America.[2]

The chief target, as the foregoing quotation and countless others indicate, has been the United States. The Soviet master plan is global in scope and finds support in a worldwide psychological warfare campaign and propaganda apparatus. The "peaceful coexistence" campaign is one major aspect of these psychological operations. Within the plan, direct Soviet military force is to be withheld. Soviet psychological operations seek to frustrate or nullify the will of individuals or nations, to inhibit action, confuse and instill doubt, promote inertia, and keep its victims on the ideological defensive. Once general moral dislocation has been brought about--total paralysis of Western will and debilitation of Western military, economic, and political power--the optimum time will have arrived for the decisive

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[2]Robert S. Byfield, The Fifth Weapon (New York: n.p., 1954) cited from VOA broadcast by Dr. Vencas Kreve-Mickevicius in 1952, p. 7.

contest. Only at this point, provided the military capability of the USSR to launch an effective surprise attack and subsequent second and third strike blows of exploitation has been brought to the qualitative and quantitative level required, and provided the risks of the contest are considered acceptable, will direct military action be applied.

In examining Soviet psychological operations, it shortly becomes very apparent that the study is not one of some new power of the word, but rather a study of an organizational weapon. The word--propaganda--does not stand alone in Soviet planning. Communist leaders and theorists have ever maintained that words had to merge with deeds and that both of these must submit to organization.[3] Rather than directing their efforts to fighting a battle for all men's minds, Soviet psychological operations seem oriented towards winning the minds of certain key groups in order to seize the material sources of power by which the minds of the masses are supposedly influenced.

II. SOVIET CONCEPTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

The Soviet concept of psychological warfare is realistic and unified. As there is no sharp separation

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[3]Wilbur Schramm, "The Soviet Concept of Psychological Warfare," Four Working Papers on Propaganda Theory (University of Illinois: January, 1955), p. 101.

between words and deeds, so also there is no demarcation between political and military warfare. Rather, there is the concept of a Party acting--using words and deeds in such combinations as are needed to further the class struggle. There is no differentiation between war and peace since there can be no peace so long as the class struggle continues. It is the power of a disciplined, ruthless, Combat Party which, in the last analysis, represents the communist "discovery" in the field of psychological operations. To study Soviet psychological warfare it is, therefore, necessary to examine the concept of this Combat Party, its beliefs and goals, its world view, its organization, and its tactical doctrine.

The communist theory of psychological warfare rests upon the importance of clear doctrine. Whereas, the Party leadership need not be concerned with the consistency of statements it makes, it must be sure of the consistency of its position on all issues.

> Running through Lenin's writings, and current Soviet ones as well, is the horror . . . lest one small ideological slip lead to a catastrophic political error. Under Bolshevik assumptions ideological error automatically and inevitably leads to political disaster. The consequence has been the development of strict central control over vital questions of doctrine.[4]

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[4]Barrington Moore, Terror and Progress (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 109.

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[4]Harrison Salisbury, [illegible] (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, [illegible]), p. [illegible].

Poor theoretical leadership to the communists, consequently, means poor organizational leadership. "Lack of theory has been primarily responsible for . . . past opportunistic mistakes."[5] ". . . if our party propaganda for some reason goes lame . . . then our entire State and Party work must inevitably perish."[6]

That the Soviet leaders subscribe to the foregoing view of Stalin is unquestionable in the light of the extent and ramifications of the psychological operations of the Soviet Union.

III. BOLSHEVIK THEORY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

In Bolshevik theory, power is social, resident in people, latent in all social institutions, and generated in the course of all kinds of social actions. To Lenin, the mass represented the greatest reservoir of energy. The availability of this energy increases with the intensity of the class struggle and gain in efficiency as it is organized

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[5]Communist Party in the Philippines, Report on the Political Situation, A Report of the General Secretary of the Communist Party in the Philippines (no publishing data, 1946 or 1947).

[6]Louis Nemzer, "The Kremlin's Professional Staff," American Political Science Quarterly, XLIV (March, 1950), p. 72.

and directed.[7]

> The proletariat has no other weapon in the fight for power except organization . . . the proletariat can become and will become a dominant force only because its intellectual unity created by the principles of Marxism is fortified by the material unity of organization which welds millions of toilers into an army of the working class.[8]

This power of organization is possessed by the Party which consequently regards itself as the advance guard and leader of the mass. The Party thinks of itself as a sort of general staff which transforms a diffuse population into a mobilizable source of power through the establishment of organs of access and control. It is custodian of basic doctrine, expert in organization, eyes and ears for the mass, and the guide into action.

However, when the mass accepts this guidance, it also accepts strict control. Scholars have observed that the Party operates on the Bonapartist assumption that delegation of authority to leadership places the leadership in unlimited control during its period of office.[9] Consequently, attacks against the leadership are equivalent to treason

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[7]Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1950), p. 254.

[8]Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1927), p. 204.

[9]Schramm, op. cit., p. 106.

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> The proletariat has no other weapon in the fight for power except organization . . . the proletariat can become and will become a dominant force only because its intellectual unity created by the principles of Marxism is fortified by the material unity of organization which welds millions of toilers into an army of the working class.[8]

This power of organization is possessed by the Party which consequently regards itself as the advance guard and leader of the mass. The Party thinks of itself as a sort of general staff which transforms a diffuse population into a mobilizable source of power through the establishment of organs of access and control. It is custodian of basic doctrine, expert in organization, eyes and ears for the mass, and the guide into action.

However, when the mass accepts this guidance, it also accepts strict control. Scholars have observed that the Party operates on the nonsecurist assumption that delegation of authority to leadership places the leadership in unlimited control during its period of office.[9] Consequently, attacks against the leadership are equivalent to treason

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[7]Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 254.

[8]Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 294.

[9]Schram, op. cit., p. 108.

against the state, and the political apparatus must provide whatever control structure is necessary to mobilize and direct the energy of the mass.

These controls fall into three categories: (1) Party; (2) secret police and armed forces; (3) the Soviet apparatus.[10] The Soviet apparatus is largely a technical means; the police and the army represent the ultimate negative control. Under the Party is found the politically positive function performed by the elaborate propaganda apparatus and by the control and deliberate manipulation of all media of mass communications.

> Soviet information policy . . . seeks to deny to men the data and concepts required to formulate an alternative to the system. Police and Party control are designed to prevent men from crystallizing effective action should they formulate an alternative.[11]

Since the 1920's, the role of the mass has become more passive and the role of the Party more important. This does not imply that the power of the mass is not still basic to Bolshevik thinking or that the Party does not still think of itself as a general staff of the mass. Rather, the implication lies in the increased importance attached to the maneuverability of the Combat Party within the Soviet strategy.

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[10] Moore, op. cit., p. 7.

[11] W. W. Rostow, The Dynamics of Soviet Society (New York: The New American Library, 1954), p. 164.

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[10] Moore, op. cit., p. 7.

[11] W. W. Keatow, The Dynamics of Soviet Society (New York: The New American Library, 1953), p. 184.

As the mass must submit to the dictatorship of the Party, so must the Party submit to the dictatorship of its central bureaucracy and the Party leaders. Here, as everywhere else, appears the Bolshevik faith in organization. Such organization implies a strictly monolithic party. No competing power structures and no substantial deviations in ideology are permitted. No other type of organization could withstand the changes of course and the ceaseless combat required of the Party.

The Party is never thought of as identical with the entire mass. It is always a minority whose central task it is to guide the mass in the desired direction, to interpret doctrine, and to specify the relation of that doctrine to strategy and tactics in a given situation. The Party is, therefore, carefully organized, rigorously disciplined, constantly at war. Only when the proletariat achieves total victory will there be peace.

The mass, then, is the chief source of power for the communist strategy and in seeking to arouse, harness, and direct this power, communism turns to those points in the modern, industrial world where permanent and reliable tensions exist--to the colonial countries, to the "peasantry" where oppressive conditions still exist in wide areas of the world, to the labor movement, to any situation which creates resentment. Communism seeks to place Party agents at the

head of whatever social forces will set the masses in motion and, at the appropriate time, strike paralyzing blows at the capitalistic economy. The basic communist view is "not to create a mass movement, but to link itself to one which history has already begotten, to establish leadership over it, and to ride to power on its shoulders."[12]

IV. GENERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY

The role of psychological operations at this juncture is to gain adherents and transform them from adherents into agents from whom total conformance can be demanded. The propaganda employed for this purpose has a high doctrinal content.

Once the nuclei are available, the Party can begin to operate and maneuver. It works at first from within, and its targets are the nerve centers of society--key industries, political parties, and other organizations which fulfill enduring needs and which offer tensions that can be capitalized upon.

Once the nerve centers of society have been penetrated, the Party's agents can begin to maneuver in terms of government itself. The communists are, by this time, strong enough to act as political parties, unions, and the like and

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[12]Selznick, op. cit., p. 171.

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IV. GENERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

The role of psychological operations at this juncture is to gain adherents and transform them from adherents into agents from whom total conformance can be commended. The propaganda employed for this purpose has a high doctrinal content.

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Once the nerve centers of society have been penetrated, the Party's agents can begin to maneuver in terms of government itself. The communists are, by this time, strong enough to act as political parties, unions, and the like and

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[12] Selznick, op. cit., p. 379.

to make alliances with other power groups. These alliances are, however, fleeting relationships to be entered into with due caution and wariness and used as steps to greater power. At no time does the Party lose sight of the fact that its momentary ally is a future enemy; and it never places more than momentary reliance on the support of outside groups.

This was the stage of maneuver when the USSR allied itself with the United States and the Western European powers against Germany, maintaining a suspicious and wary attitude throughout the relationship, and discarding its allies as soon as the objective of the alliance had been achieved.

Psychological operations during such a period are oriented towards: (1) maintaining a sense of mission among the faithful; (2) fostering a sense of complacency toward the Party amongst the present allies and future enemies; (3) diverting attention to a common enemy; (4) encouraging disunity and disaffection among other power groups.

The encouragement of conflicts among potential enemies is a late stage in the period of political maneuvering through alliances and applies not only to maneuvering within a country but also to operations on an international scene. The objective is to set the stage for the final act for which all the others are preparing: the seizure of power by the Party.

In a conflict between two powers, the Party will try to intervene late in the conflict and in a decisive manner. Such a policy was followed in the case of entering the war with Japan in 1945. In such a struggle, said Stalin, the Party should ". . . not sit still with idle hands. We will have to come out, but to come out after the others. And we shall come out for the purpose of throwing the decisive weight into the scales of fate."[13] The Party should always be ready to take advantage of such a crisis and the great opportunities for swift advancement which often present themselves. This is the objective of the organization and training of the Party--to be ever ready with proved techniques, unquestioning discipline, and a clearly understood goal in order to take advantage of every opportunity small or large.

In the final stage of operations, when the Party is strong enough to liquidate its temporary allies and seize power itself, the task of psychological operations is to demoralize the enemy, strengthen confidence within the Party, and once power is gained, maintain proper orientation of the mass.

The time table for such operations is a long one, and the rate of advance is uneven. Party patience and constant

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[13]Joseph Stalin, Works (Moscow: State Publishing House, 1952), p. 201.

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pressure underlie the operations. This kind of strategy requires long-range policy. Stalin stated: "We cannot move forward without knowing where it is necessary to go, without knowing the aims of the movement. We cannot build without perspectives."[14]

V. PROPAGANDA, AGITATION, AND ORGANIZATION

Communism has never relied entirely upon propaganda for its program; rather, it has sought to control directly the arena of conflict. This has required the refinement and employment of all phases of psychological operations for effective intervention through the Combat Party and peripheral organizations. It entails the direct weakening of propaganda targets and the development of an organizational strategy designed to afford maximum accessibility and to neutralize opposition. It is, therefore, very clear that the action aspects of psychological warfare are not restricted to the "propaganda of the deed," but include efforts to control the conditions under which agitation and propaganda are carried out.[15] Propaganda, agitation, and organization represent an unbroken continuum within Soviet psychological warfare.

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[14]Cited in Selznick, op. cit., pp. 8 and 279.

[15]Ibid., p. 7.

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[14] Cited in Aitkhanov, op. cit., pp. 4 and 279.

[15] Ibid., p. 7.

Plekhanov defined the famous distinction between agitation and propaganda.[16] A propagandist, he stated, presents many ideas to one or a few people, whereas an agitator presents only one or a few ideas to a mass of people. An agitator fastens his attention on a concrete injustice, leaving to the propagandist the task of giving a complete explanation. There has never been a sharp dichotomy between agitator and propagandist in Soviet thinking. Both are needed in the operations of the Combat Party, and, as the technology of mass communications has developed, the distinction has faded.

Soviet psychological operations are based, in part, upon the discoveries and accomplishments of the psychologist, Pavlov. Just as Pavlov substituted the ringing of a bell for food in the mind of a dog as a stimulus to cause the reaction of hunger, so do the communists use propaganda to make their programs palatable in the minds of men.

> . . . for years research has been going on in the USSR into the mechanisms of verbal propaganda, probably in conjunction with research into methods by which the effect of such verbal stimuli can be reinforced with accompanying visual stimuli.[17]

The application of Pavlovian principles is systematic

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[16]G. B. Plekhanov, Works (Moscow: State Publishing House, 1927), p. 187.

[17]Alan M. G. Little, "Pavlov and Propaganda," Problems of Communism, II:2 (1953), p. 18.

and pushed with great energy. As soon as the communists establish monopoly over the means of communication in a newly-acquired area, they set in motion a highly semi-scientific process of enforced indoctrination.

It is the Soviet system to analyze thoroughly the conditions prevailing in a given area and to deduce from them the ideas which are most likely to appeal to the minds of men. The propaganda is then related to men's environment and their state of mind. No values are projected into the area. The values assumed are those maintaining in the area where the party line is propagated. There is a convenient confluence at this point between the Pavlovian relationship between oral and visual stimuli and the Marxian principle of primacy of men's physical surroundings over their thinking. While these principles may be debated, the undeniable fact remains that their application in propaganda brings results.

Pavlov's dog responded to a bell only after constant repetition and reinforcement of this response. The remarkable single-mindedness of purpose and the relentless reiteration of clearly-defined ideas followed by the communists are based on this principle. "This constant repetition is the most notable feature of Bolshevik propaganda, and is the reason why Soviet newspapers and radio programs are so

desperately monotonous."[18] The repetition and pounding may seem monotonous to be sure, but the desired effect is achieved when the idea is finally lodged in man's subconscious mind. Men learn the party line not knowing how. They learn the communist way of thinking, even while they imagine they are offering resistance. Thought-provoking is the observation:

> Fire and sword were necessary to impose faith upon our more remote ancestors. Pressure had to be used to make their children say their prayers. But their grandchildren and great-grandchildren prayed without constraint and from conviction.[19]

Soviet propaganda does not rely on overt methods alone. The several sections of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation attest to this; movies, the theatre, fictional literature, and music--all are employed for their revolutionary significance or for their portrayal of the evil and follies of bourgeois life, particularly the greed and selfishness that is provoked by money and property under the capitalist order.

Aside from the camouflage which these indirect means of conveying the party line provide, an essential feature of them all is their capacity to awaken emotion in the mind of a recipient. Coupling an aroused emotion with a suggestion

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[18]Alexander Uralov, The Reign of Stalin (London: The Bodley Head, 1953), p. 189.

[19]Uralov, op. cit., p. 191.

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Aside from the camouflage which these indirect means of conveying the party line provide, an essential feature of them all is their capacity to deliver messages in the mind of a recipient. Coupling to trouble section with a suggestion

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[18] Alexander Uralov, The Reign of Stalin (London: The Bodley Head, 1953), p. 189.

[19] Uralov, op. cit., p. 191.

from party doctrine is effective in indoctrinating those targets of Soviet psychological operations whose lives are notably drab or without hope, and who are, therefore, especially susceptible to such methods.

VI. THE ROLE OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS

The Soviet regime places great emphasis on wide dissemination of its decisions and policies. The monopoly over all media of mass communications gives it unique opportunity and virtually unlimited resources. It can direct and control the flow of information and, at any given moment, virtually saturate all public media with whatever subject is considered of greatest importance.

The press and radio are the principal media by which decisions of the Party and government are publicized. Pravda and Izvestia are the two largest central newspapers. Pravda, the official organ of the Party, lays particular emphasis on Party matters; Izvestia, the chief organ of the Council of Ministers, stresses government affairs. Of the two, Pravda is the more authoritative.[20] Pravda, Sovetskaya Rossiya--the newspaper of the Party bureau for the RSFSR (the largest

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[20]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, "National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union," Organizing For National Security, Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 407.

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[30] Walter Duranty, Russia Confronts Asia, Combats or Governs
Most Operations, "National Policy Pendulum in the Soviet
Union," Operations for National Security, 1951, p. 11 (Washing-
ton: Infantry Training Center, 1951), p. 407.

Republic)--and Kommunist, the Party's theoretical journal, have the status of departments under the Party secretariat.[21] As such, they receive guidance directly from the Party secretariat and not, as in the case of Izvestia and other Soviet newspapers, from the Propaganda and Agitation Department. However, these three publications and the Department work closely together, and their activities are well coordinated.

The radio is another important medium of communication for the regime. All radio stations in the USSR are under the general supervision of the All-Union Radio and Television Committee which, although an organ of the government, is closely supervised by the Department of Propaganda and Agitation. Radio Moscow, the largest station, is equipped with the most modern and powerful transmitters for long-range broadcasts to foreign as well as domestic audiences. Its broadcasts are monitored by local stations throughout the USSR and relayed to remote areas or rebroadcast locally.

Radio stations play an important role in familiarizing the population with important Party and government decrees and in transmitting official explanations and "clarifications" of established policy. In this, the radio relies

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[21] Ibid., p. 408.

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 408.

heavily on the press. Radio stations allot considerable time to broadcasting texts of Pravda editorials.

Pravda is an official channel for informing lower level officials of policy decisions.[22] Pravda not only transmits the texts of decrees but, in accompanying editorials, interprets them and lays down broad policy guidelines. Second-echelon officials are expected to read Pravda daily and act accordingly.

The Soviet wire service, Tass, is yet another medium of government communication. It is an agency of the Council of Ministers.[23] Tass, with offices throughout the world, gathers foreign news for the use of Soviet domestic radio and newspapers and transmits domestic Soviet news abroad. It is also a major network for the gathering and transmission of news between Moscow and the provinces. Tass bureaus throughout the Soviet Union play an important part in reporting important local developments, and Pravda prints numerous articles received from local Tass offices.

VII. THE DEPARTMENT OF PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION

The organ of the Communist Party which is designed to mold public opinion and to conduct psychological operations is the Department of Propaganda and Agitation. The mandate

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[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

of this Department, prescribed by the Central Committee of the Party, is as follows:

> The Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks decrees: To concentrate in the department of propaganda and agitation all work on written and oral propaganda of Marxism-Leninism and mass political agitation (Party press; publishing of propaganda and agitation literature; organization of written and oral propaganda of Marxism-Leninism; control over the ideological content of propaganda work; selection and assignment of propaganda cadres; political training and retraining of Party cadres; organization of mass political agitation.)[24]

The Party maintains direct or indirect control over all public information and permits no independent commentary or analysis of its decisions and policies. Since the functions of propaganda and agitation have remained one of the most important considerations of the Party during its entire existence, control of these activities is at a very high point in the Party hierarchy.

The Department of Propaganda and Agitation is administratively located in the Executive Staff of the Party Secretariat.[25] Within the terms of guidance and top policy decisions developed by the Presidium, the Department determines both the general line and the specific courses of

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[24]Cited in Albert M. Leavitt, Propaganda and Agitation in the Soviet Union (Oberammergau: Army Institute of Advanced Russian Studies, 1956), p. 14.

[25]Senate Committee on Government Operations, op. cit., p. 407.

of this department, exercised by the Central Committee of the Party, is as follows:

> The Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks directs, by democratic is the department or [illegible] all work of the Party [illegible] and agitation [illegible] and [illegible] political activities [illegible] of propaganda and agitation literature [illegible] of culture and [illegible] [illegible], determination of relations and assignment of propaganda [illegible] political [illegible] and [illegible] of Party [illegible] and [illegible] of [illegible] political [illegible].[1]

The Party [illegible] issued [illegible] [illegible] all [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

psychological action to bring the Party decisions to fruition. Both the Presidium and the Secretariat are headed by Nikita Khrushchev. Consequently, the interlocking arrangement of policy formation and implementation can be focused directly on the psychological facets of execution.

The title of the organ which has fulfilled this function within the Party has often changed, the internal arrangement has varied, and the importance of its role has fluctuated. It has always existed, however, and generally has been very important, fulfilling its functions as eyes and ears of the Party and, more important, the voice.

The directors of the Department have been prominent in Party affairs. Zhdanov reorganized the Department in 1938 and remained closely connected with it until his death in 1948;[26] Shepilov and Suslov served as directors.[27] Other lesser-known men step from the Department of Propaganda and Agitation to high government and Party posts.[28]

Despite the range of its responsibilities, the Department is not primarily an operational agency. The Department does not make basic propaganda policies--that function is

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[26]Nemzer, op. cit., pp. 72-73.

[27]Pravda, 26 February 1956.

[28]Meisel and Kozera, Materials for the Study of the Soviet Union (Ann Arbor: The George Wahr Publishing Co., 1953), pp. 193-197.

[illegible]

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[26] Sawaar, op. cit., pp. 72-73.

[27] Pravda, 31 January 1956.

[28] Nikol and Sokoto, Materials for the Study of the Soviet Union (Ann Arbor: The Sawaar Wahr Publishing Co., 1953), pp. 161-167.

the prerogative of the Presidium and the Central Committee. Nor does the Department actually administer the program of propaganda, agitation, and psychological operations in general; responsibility for day-to-day operation of the program rests with the government agencies. The Department does no major publishing and does not operate the Soviet radio or newspaper networks. It functions, instead, as planner, director, and watch dog for all media. Its authority touches every realm of intellectual endeavor and every form of organized activity which might conceivably influence public opinion.

At every level of Party administration, there are propaganda and agitation departments with their own personnel in key positions in all local communications media as well as in important factories and other enterprises. Directives and instructions are sent out from the parent Department to local offices and the worldwide network of Party cells. Every Party cell is a nerve end for this system. From these nerve ends as well as from local offices flows a constant stream of reports back up the chain to the Department. This basic data is gathered and analyzed for the consideration of the Presidium and Central Committee in the development of psychological policies. The high-level policy decisions thus reached are then interpreted and disseminated by the Department. Thus the organization acts as a two-way channel

which constantly integrates the evaluated results of the "feed back" function of its operations into a regenerative cycle of psychological policy formulation and thereafter applies the policy correction to the operating conditions in the field.

Until 1920, there was no institutionalized system of propaganda and agitation in the Soviet Union. There was, of course, a propaganda and agitation effort, but it was not until 1920 that the Department of Propaganda and Agitation was created within the Secretariat of the Central Committee. In 1921, the Department was formalized as a Party organ, receiving an extensive mandate which foretold the extent of present-day activities.[29] In 1928, the formerly separate Press Section was incorporated into the Department structure.

In 1930, in connection with the reorganization of the Secretariat which had as its purpose the decentralization of cadre responsibilities within the Secretariat, a change was made in the Department of Propaganda and Agitation.[30] The functions of the old Agitation and Propaganda Section were divided between two new sections: Agitation and Mass

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[29]Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 32.

[30]Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953). This volume presents an outstanding, unclassified, source on the early history and administrative development of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation.

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Campaigns and Culture and Propaganda. The section for Agitation and Mass Campaigns was mainly concerned with creating enthusiasm for industrialization and collectivization. The Culture and Propaganda Section had in its sphere of supervisory operation the press, education, science, literature, and propaganda of Marxism-Leninism.

In 1934, the old Culture and Propaganda Section was replaced by a new Section on Culture and Propaganda of Leninism.

In 1935, this new section was dissolved and five new ones developed to fulfill the same functions. These new sections were: Party Propaganda and Agitation, Press Publishing, Schools, Cultural-Industrial Work, and Science.

In 1939, in connection with the return of the functional arrangement of the departments of the Party, the function of propaganda and agitation now was to be fulfilled by the Propaganda and Agitation Administration. Zhadanov proclaimed:

> The Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks must have a powerful apparatus of propaganda and agitation in the form of an Administration for Propaganda and Agitation, concentrating all work of written and oral propaganda and agitation.[31]

In 1948, functionalism was again discarded and the

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[31]Cited in Leavitt, op. cit., p. 20, from a speech by Zhadanov at the XVIII Party Congress.

Committees and Culture and Propaganda. The section for Agitation and Mass Campaigns was mainly concerned with organizing audiences for theatricalization and collectivization. The Culture and Propaganda Section had in its sphere of supervisory operation the press, education, science, literature, and periodicals of narrow circulation.

In 1933, the old Culture and Propaganda section was replaced by a new section on Culture and Propaganda of Workers.

In 1935, this new section was disbanded and five new ones developed to fulfill the same functions. These new sections were: Party Propaganda and Agitation, Press Publishing, Schools, Cultural-Educational Work, Art Leagues.

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The General Committee of the All-Soviet Communist Party of Solidarity must form a powerful apparatus of propaganda and agitation in the form of an Administration for Propaganda and Agitation, concentrating all work of writers and art propaganda and agitation.[11]

In 1944, Counterintelligence was split Counter-Spy and the

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[11]Oliver In Leavitt, op. cit., p. 23, also a Speech by Suvarov at the XVIII Party Congress.

industrial branch system re-adopted. The major change seems to have been a change of name to the Agitation and Propaganda Section and an assumed return, to the Section, of the control over assignment of key personnel within its sphere of activity. At the same time, propaganda activities were also assumed by the industrial-branch departments.

In 1952, the Rules of the Party effected a major reorganization of the higher Party organs by the formation of the Presidium. However, there was apparently no change in the organization of what had now become the Department of Propaganda and Agitation; it remains one of the departments of the Executive Staff of the Party Secretariat.

VIII. ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION

The scope and diversity of Party psychological operations is reflected in an examination of the internal organization of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation.[32]

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[32] In dealing with the organization of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, the student immediately encounters the lack of information published concerning detailed organization of the Party, in general, and the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, in particular. Since 1952, the Rules of the Party omit the more detailed description of the higher Party organs found in the earlier rules. There is no known unclassified Soviet source. The works of Barrington Moore (Terror and Progress), Louis Nemzer ("The Kremlin's Professional Staff" and "Word-of-Mouth Communication in the Soviet Union"), Alexander Uralov (The Reign of Stalin), and

VIII. DISSOLUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY AND APPLICATION

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[12] In dealing with the organization of the Department of Psychology and Application, the Academy Committee primarily emphasized the lack of interaction psychology departments (organization of the Tavy Navy), in general, and the Department of Psychology and Application, in particular. Since 1922, the duties of the Tavy Navy had more logically dealing of the higher Tavy people found in the service roles. These is an known unclassified Tavy file sources. The Navy of Psychology Tavy (Tavy and Psychology). Tavy Navy (The Navy of Tavy Psychology Tavy) and Tavy-of-Tavy (Tavy Tavy in the Tavy Tavy"), Tavy Tavy (The Tavy of Tavy), and

At the apex of the structure is the Chief, his deputies, and personal assistants. Under the Department Chief comes the staff of the Department's publication: "Culture and Life."

In general, four vertical division headings can be assumed for grouping the various sections of the Department. These are: (1) Press; (2) Other Means of Mass Communication; (3) Education and Science; (4) Campaigns and Lectures.

Under the Press Division are sections for the Local Press, the Central Press (nationally circulated Moscow Press), Intermediate Press (republic, territorial, and regional press activities), and Publishing Houses. These sections supervise the activities of some seven thousand local newspapers, hold regional conferences for editors, conduct briefings and criticisms, check on performance, and closely supervise the Soviet publishing industry which is one of the most extensive in the world. The system of newspapers and publishing houses is considered to be basic for all other means of propaganda. It is a "megaphone" from which all other propaganda agencies take their cue.[33]

Alex Inkeles (Communist Propaganda and Counterpropaganda and Public Opinion in Soviet Russia) serve as foundations for examining the current organization that can be derived from a study of the Department's operations and the bits of organizational information on the Party and the Government which exist in widely scattered sources.

[33]Leavitt, op. cit., p. 21.

Under the Division of Other Means of Mass Communications are located sections for Radio, Motion Pictures, Art Affairs, and Fictional Literature. Although films and broadcasting are administered directly by other government agencies, these activities are closely watched and guided.

Communist attitudes on the role of literature, movies, and the arts--theater, music, painting, etc.--are revealing in so far as their inclusion within the purview of the Department is concerned:

> . . . Communists cannot believe that an artist may be apolitical no matter how much he may wish to be. Since, in their view, a work of art is bound to have political consequences, it is understandable that, as the Communist rulers of Russia, they wish to control these consequences. Hence, they demand partiinost in art. Partiinost . . . carries all the overtones of enthusiasm, intelligent, loyal, and yet essentially uncritical acceptance of the Communist belief system.[34]

Also,

> Art provides one of the main channels through which an approved Party idea can be conveyed to a person without that person's realizing he is being "sold" on it.[35]

Under the Education and Science Division are three sections: Cultural Enlightenment Institutions; Schools; and Science. The Cultural Enlightenment Institutions Section guides the activities of more than eight hundred clubhouses,

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[34]Moore, op. cit., p. 105.

[35]Cited by Leavitt, op. cit., p. 21, from the writings of Karmakov in Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR (Munich: series 2, No. 13).

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[24] Hoover, op. cit., p. 203.

[25] Cited by Inkeles, op. cit., p. 21, from the writings of Karpakov in Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR (Russian: Series 2, No. 14).

trade union centers, reading rooms and other cultural facilities in rural areas which are established by local educational authorities and Kolkhozes throughout the soviets.

The School Section informs educational authorities of the Party Line, ascertains compliance therewith, and studies educational problems with a view to determining new policies. The school system is one of the most widespread canals through which propaganda is disseminated.

The Science Section is concerned with all scientific endeavor, from agriculture to oil and gas research and the teaching of theory in higher institutions. Convinced Communists do not believe that it is possible for science to be non-partisan and place the same demand for partiinost upon the scientist as that placed upon the artist.

The fourth division is the Division of Campaigns and Lectures and is made up of two sections--Propaganda and Agitation. The Agitation Section utilizes trained agitators to promote current Party programs. The Propaganda Section operates through trained Propagandists, personnel more highly qualified ideologically than the agitators. It is through the workings of these two sections that the Department of Propaganda and Agitation most closely approaches an operational body. Propaganda depends on techniques of communication. Agitation includes not only communication but also example and disciplined penetration by indoctrinated

cadres. This conception underlies the continuity of propaganda, agitation, and organization.[36] The work of the Division of Campaigns and Lectures insinuates itself into every other division of the Department and pervades the entire scope of Soviet psychological operations.

This monolithic structure represents a total program. Its structure extends downward from the central government organization through the levels of the republics, regions, districts, and municipalities. Its specialist formation exists at every level of this vertical structure. Furthermore, at each level there is a horizontal structure which embraces the propaganda services of the Supreme Soviet, the different Ministeries, the professional unions, the Communist youth, and the Armed Forces. The entire life of its target becomes the object of a program which spins a tightly-structured web of converging influences. The Combat Party operates everywhere; it uses the same organizational weapons; it responds to the same monolithic control. Its influences go into its human target's home, his work, his leisure. These influences aim at entire thought and behavior patterns.[37]

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[36]Selznick, op. cit., p. 10.

[37]Uralov, op. cit., p. 190.

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[16] Zelenski, op. cit., p. 10.

[17] Gralev, op. cit., p. 150.

IX. EDUCATION FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Zinoviev observed: "With us, propaganda and agitation are based on instruction . . . . Propaganda, instruction, and agitation are a unity which must be realized according to the Leninist conception of education."[38] This concept has three parts: (1) the mastery of Marxist-Leninist doctrine by the small group of advanced leaders who, in turn, (2) supervise the instruction and organization of the masses in the light of this doctrine, employing (3) all teaching devices, formal and informal, including schools, meetings, mass communications, and personal instruction and leadership.

The Party is responsible for training the masses and carries out its assignment through a complete network of schools. The school system is under the direction of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation and extends downward from the Academy of Social Sciences through universities of Marxism-Leninism, political schools, circles, Party evening schools, and also includes much-emphasized provisions for self-study of the works of Marx and Lenin.

The indoctrination and preparation of Party leaders is conducted with extraordinary care. The political school

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is the basic step in this training and is conducted at the level of the primary Party organization. It is designed to give students the basis of political knowledge, to develop in them elementary knowledge of how to study, and to accustom them to systematic development of their ideological-theoretical level. The instructors are trained propaganda specialists. Those who attend classes are Party members, candidates for the Party, or non-Party activists. Upon completion of a two-year, 120-classroom-hour course of study, graduates are expected to become members of the vast army of agitators.

The school system is organized in a pyramid for candidates throughout the Soviet world, and a promising leader can rise through it as he rises in Party prominence. The schooling is a continuous operation. Refresher courses are constantly in progress on all levels of the pyramid. A two- or three-year course is usually followed at appropriate periods by a nine-months' refresher.

The first step upward in this education pyramid is the district Party school. It is attended by lower Party and Komsomol (communist youth) functionaries who study such subjects as history, geography, five-year plans, and governmental and Party structure.

From the district Party school, the path leads to schools operated at regional, territorial, or national

republic level. At these levels, two-year courses are conducted for officials at the district and city level for assumption of duties; such as, Party or Komsomol secretary, propagandist, newspaper editor, or intermediate level government official. The courses continue the fields of study found in the district school curricula with additional courses in dialectic and historical materialism, political economy, foreign policy, and international relations.[39]

At the highest level in the chain of formal schools for the members of Party cadres, there are two institutions: the Higher Party School and the Academy of Social Sciences. The former is placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Cadres and the latter under the Department of Propaganda and Agitation. The distinction made by this arrangement reflects the type of students studying at these two different, higher institutions of communist ideology. To the Higher Party School, under the Department of Cadres, go the functionaries of State and Party, Party secretaries, chairmen of ministries, and the like.[40] To the Academy of Social Sciences go the theoreticians, students, and teachers in

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[39] Inkeles, op. cit., pp. 54-71, passim.

[40] Decree of 2 August 1946, "On the Training and Retraining of the Leading Party and Soviet Workers" (no publishing data), p. 1020.

such fields as government and law, international relations, logic and psychology.

In general, a Party member finds his own level in this schooling system. An agitator needs less grounding in Party doctrine than does a top leader or propagandist. A propagandist needs a firm grasp of such doctrine and an informed world view. An administrator needs a solid foundation in doctrine but also requires an understanding of his country's geography, economy, and political and economic system. A top leader or potential theorist who is to serve as "custodian of the sacred Bolshevik word" needs the most careful and continued training in all aspects of Bolshevik doctrine and practice. Any of the curricula may be supplemented by special training--military instruction for culture officers who are to serve with the armed forces; government accounting for appropriate personnel; practical experience in management and organization.

Thus educated, the Combat Party is uniformly well trained. The two-way channel of communication provided by the Department of Propaganda and Agitation insures that the Party is well informed as well. It is well disciplined and well controlled. In the totality of its program, it approaches its targets with every weapon that is available and appropriate--persuasion, infiltration, espionage, maneuver, blackmail, promise, threats; whatever is needed.

X. PRINCIPAL TARGETS

Soviet psychological warfare directs its operations against three principal targets outside of the Party itself.

The first of these is the main enemy himself. Here the approved tactics are pressure--diplomatic, economic, propaganda, and, as appropriate, military. The struggle is intense and the pressure exerted is maximum. Since the time of Lenin, Soviet leaders have warned against making anything less than a maximum effort, or exerting any less than maximum pressure.

A second target is that part of the enemy's power structure which is "ripe for the picking." This includes the areas of tension and dissatisfaction, the colonial countries, and the semi-feudal and underdeveloped countries, which are vulnerable to the communist approach. No matter how backward a country is, it is a worthwhile target. Every doubtful area must be seized, otherwise the enemy will do so. In assaulting targets of this kind, the organizational weapon of the Combat Party is unsurpassed. No advance is too small to be worthwhile. Yet the Party is warned not to expect to communize all of these lands in accordance with pure communist principles nor to expect the subversive process to be a rapid one.

> The revolution of the colonies is not going to be a Communist revolution in its first stages . . . . In

> its first stages, the revolution in the colonies must be carried on with a program which will include many petty bourgeois reform classes, such as division of land, etc. But from this it does not follow at all that the leadership of the revolution will have to be surrendered to the bourgeois democrats.[41]

Thus, throughout Asia, the Combat Party offered a division of the land amongst the landless peasants; and when North Korea and China fell, such bourgeois arrangements as land reform were instituted. However, the Communist Party was firmly in charge, guiding the country on the desired course. All of the colonial, ex-colonial, and underdeveloped countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America are regarded as targets for the Combat Party, which is willing to accept a small advance when a large one is not possible and which is constantly engaged in a war of organization, infiltration, and maneuver in an effort to split areas from the anti-Soviet power structure.

The third principal target is the Soviet mass. The struggle, in this case, is against what Lenin called that "terrible force" of values and behaviors built up in long years under capitalism. All external evidence indicates that the USSR Party leaders still feel that the Russian masses are swayed by the "bourgeois remnants of their past." The tight surveillance, the close control over communications,

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[41]Cited by Schramm, op. cit., p. 126, from proceedings of the Second International Congress of 1920.

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the "Iron Curtain" erected against external ideas and information, the vast program of agitation--all argue that the Party places considerably less faith than could be expected, after forty-three years of hegemony, in the doctrinal purity of its masses.

Each of these three targets is integral to the program of Soviet psychological operations and each is approached with the maximum effort permitted by the situation and available resources.

XI. COMMUNIST PSYCHOLOGICAL TACTICS

> The strategic advantages of communism include (1) its historic plausibility, as that is bolstered by its relation to the Soviet Union, and (2) the instability of democratic society. In its quest for a monopoly of power, Bolshevik political strategy links a revolutionary elite to whatever social forces are set in motion against existing authority.[42]

This statement penetrates to the heart of communist psychological tactics. Capitalistic society, like every other advanced society since the beginning of history, has certain areas of recurring tension. In their most severe manifestations, these tensions appear as wars, revolutions, or economic panics. In colonial or underdeveloped countries, in countries where one class or group feels discriminated against, in lands where people are hungry for food, land,

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[42]Selznick, op. cit., p. 333.

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[42] Salonica, op. cit., p. 433.

freedom, or status, tensions exist which are highly exploitable. It is at this point that the communist operation begins. Perhaps the greatest tactical strength lies in the capacity to ground basic arguments in these real, deeply-felt, and well-known tensions. By using these tensions as a frame of reference, a basis for understanding is achieved. With a degree of credibility established, the operations proceed using two additional advantages to broaden the scope of operations. The first of these is that a democratic society permits attacks on itself, encouraging its citizens to propose change and protecting minority viewpoints even though they may be inimical to the regime. The second advantage draws from the fact that in Soviet countries some evidence of the historic plausibility of communism as a cure for those tensions may be cited. The price of this cure in terms of terror, fear, and surrender of freedom and human dignity is not so clear and spectacular outside a sovietized country as is the need and apparent accomplishment.

The basic tactic, then, is to ground the operation of the Combat Party in real and generalized tensions throughout the world.

> It is necessary to render genuine oppression even more severe by adding to it the consciousness of oppression, and to make shame even more shameful by throwing upon it the light of publicity.[43]

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[43]Cited in Domenach, op. cit., p. 266, from the works of Karl Marx.

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Lenin applied this guidance by assigning to the Party the task of organizing those ". . . political revelations, embracing all spheres . . . [which] . . . are the necessary and fundamental condition to preparing the masses for their revolutionary activity."[44]

This is a mandate to the propagandist and agitator to examine events in the light of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and, in the terms of the reality of class struggle, to interpret the "real meaning" of events to the masses. Invariably following the basic tactic, the campaign begins with details which are, or seem, verifiable and which are often of a very small irritative nature and interprests them on a grand scale. A political scandal, and unwise statement by a public official, a desire to bring the young men home from military service early, a fear of nuclear fallout--any of these can provide impetus for the Party to begin to work its way along the inverse spiral of a propaganda campaign from the specific to the general doctrinal meaning, so as to "tear the mask from the face of the enemy."

In this activity, slogans become one of the chief tactical weapons of the agitator.

> We are accused of creating mass opinion. This reproach is inexact; we are attempting only to formulate it . . .

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[44]Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1935), pp. 1 and 22.

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In this activity, slogans become one of the third tactical weapons of the agitator.

> We are accused of creating mass opinion. This reproach is inexact; we are attempting only to formulate it . . .

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[44] Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1935), pp. 1 and 17.

> the slogans which correspond to the acute need of a class and epoch themselves create thousands of channels for their own dissemination. The revolutionary milieu is marked by a high conductability of ideas.[45]

"Land and Peace," "bread, peace, and liberty," "for a liberal, democratic government," "ban the bomb"--these represent some of the most successful of all the Bolshevik slogans. One of the great strengths of peace campaigns and appeals is the endless reiteration of the single word "Peace," which means "so many things to so many people and recalls so many of the bruises and hurts of society the world over."[46] Lenin emphasized the importance of grounding all slogans in the needs and tensions of the masses and the requirement for clarity and brevity in expressing the political line of the moment. Every slogan must appeal as broadly as possible to the deepest wishes of the common people.

Probably no propagandists have made such use, nor had the opportunity to make such use, of repetition and variation as have the communists. There are hundreds of different kinds of newspapers and magazines throughout the USSR, each saying the same thing, but translating it into the experience, the words, and the known tensions of the particular audience which the publication serves. Throughout the world,

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[46]Schramm, op. cit., p. 132.

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"Land and Peace," "Bread, peace, and liberty," "for a liberal, democratic government," "Out the book"—these represent some of the most successful of all the Bolshevik slogans. One of the great strengths of peace campaigns and appeals is the endless reiteration of the simple word "Peace," which means "so many things to so many people and recalls so many of the bruises and hurts of society the world over."[46] Lenin emphasized the importance of pronouncing all slogans in the needs and tensions of the masses and the requirement for clarity and brevity in expressing the political line of the moment. Every slogan must appeal as broadly as possible to the deepest wishes of the common people.

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[46] Schramm, op. cit., p. 122.

the Combat Party devotes extraordinary care to fitting its activities into the culture where its objectives lie. The leader of a unit of the Party in India is certain to be an Indian. When the Party moved into North Korea, a large cadre of Russian-trained Koreans were ready to take over leadership. When the North Korean troops advanced into South Korea, they brought with them another cadre of South Koreans who had been trained in China and North Korea to take over the South Korean government at the appropriate time. Behind Mulah Barzani of the Kurds and Khalid Backdash of the Syrians stands the parent Party, while the variation in terms of the audience, the cultural approach, and the acceptability of the local apostle of the new faith is a matter of the closest attention.

Since Lenin, Soviet Party leaders have cautioned against "adventurism" in carrying the attack to the enemy. The admonition against undertaking an action when the resources are inadequate to carry the project off successfully seems to apply to psychological operations as well as to the field of military activity. The Party strives continually to maintain the psychological initiative by carefully choosing the time, place, and issues. This doctrine of attack is another key to the Party's psychological strategy. "The tactic is constant attack--seldom answering, seldom

defending, always changing the field of battle to one of its own choosing."[47]

Lenin emphasized that the Party must be ready to adopt itself to changing conditions. The Party has continually been counseled to expect setbacks or temporary deviations from the long-term path and to be prepared for deals and alliances, also temporary, with enemies. This ability to make a quick shift is in accord with basic political doctrine and planning; it also parallels the pattern of anxiety and fatigue tactics which communists are reported to employ in obtaining "confessions." Some students detect in the "quick shift" the potential element of a truly grand tactic based on the same psychological approach.[48] It is highly credible that when the tension of a particular psychological attack has been raised to a sufficient degree, the Soviet psychological strategists deliberately give the target temporary relief from that tension in order to teach a desired response and, gradually, through a succession of such build ups, inexorably break down the resistance of the enemy.

Party psychological strategists recognize that many of their most likely converts are individuals who feel rejected by the society around them or whose values are in

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flux, and who are looking for firm ideological guidance. Consequently, wherever the Combat Party operates in the world, it provides groups in which a convert can reinforce his new beliefs and establish an identification with a working organization which will give him a sense of mission, status, and a sense of belonging.

XII. THE CONCEPT OF TOTAL ATTACK

The Soviet view of psychological war and psychological operations is a concept of total attack. The Party trusts no one it does not dominate. Its opponents can expect a consistently suspicious attitude toward everything that is said or done. This attitude is not an assumed defense mechanism but is the predictable heritage of Russian history and Party experience and doctrine. There is little cause to regard any settlement offered or entered into by the USSR as a permanent arrangement, for communist doctrine demands its abrogation as soon as it has served its intended purpose.

While the Party is flexible in its line and political arrangements, it never deviates far from the center of its pre-surveyed path. Every step taken is directed along the trend of this path and every step is a move in a war of maneuver. The Combat Party works in every part of the world where it can gain or force entrance and is engaged in a

program of organization, indoctrination, infiltration, and maneuver. It maintains an atmosphere of tension, utilizing every source of potential dissatisfaction, and constantly applying pressure.

From its own activities, the Party knows the dangers of infiltration, and it knows the vulnerability of the masses. It also harbors very real concern for its own masses which it considers still to be "contaminated" from life under the old regime; this concern becomes increasingly more active with the inclusion of satellite peoples within the horizons of Soviet hegemony. The existence of the Iron Curtain, the Berlin Wall, and the adamant refusal to consider effective, on-sight, inspection teams as part of an arms control settlement are not surprising. What would be surprising would be a willing removal of these obstacles. Should this occur, it might indicate that the masses were at last considered safe, or that the Party was a different Party than heretofore, or that, in the estimate of Soviet planners, there was no escape, no way out, and nothing further to be feared from the non-Soviet world.

The Western World cannot afford to overlook Nikita Khrushchev's statement in Tirana, Albania, in May of 1959.

> We do not negotiate on the basis of "give and take." We have nothing whatsoever to give. We will not

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> He is not negotiate on the basis of "give and take," we have nothing whatsoever to give. We will not

make any concessions because our proposals do not form the basis of a barter deal.[49]

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[49]Cited in the Washington Evening Star, July 15, 1963, p. A-7.

CHAPTER IV

THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

American history, since before the Revolution, is sprinkled with the recorded use of psychological operations. In some cases, this employment was sufficiently protracted and sufficiently integrated to approach the dimensions of psychological warfare. In the young days of the Republic, the moralistic undertone to American pragmatism was rarely allowed to stand in the way of results. Furthermore, the demanding immediacy of dealing with the day-by-day conquest and exploitation of the virgin land left insufficient time for the "native hue of resolution . . . [to become] . . . sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." So long as the nation lived with the frontier or with a majority of a population whose recollections were filled with the actual or near actual experiences of opening a continent, conscience made cowards of very few indeed.

I. SOURCES OF AMERICAN AVERSION TO THE USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Any recognized aversion to the use of psychological operations in the formative years of the Republic probably stemmed from three basic sources. American military

CHAPTER IX

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I. EVIDENCE OF AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE
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tradition sprang from Europe where it was considered much more "fitting and proper" to be shot to pieces assaulting a redoubt than to stand back and talk the defenders into surrendering. The latter performance was not cowardly, exactly, but it certainly was not a method susceptible to embellishment in the mess. The earliest basis of illegitimacy lies here.

Immediate results, drawing from an evaluation of concrete facts, were the goals of American operators of all kinds. This is still an American hallmark. The nebulous, ill-defined realm of public opinion, the impact of symbols, the role of ideology--all of these were too distant, too unsubstantial for the American style of taming a country; lack of means of rapid, mass communications only served to relegate such methods to an even lower priority. Consequently, the effectiveness of psychological operations as a tool of policy never approached the proven worth of the Minié ball. There developed, therefore, no national basis for confidence in the employment of psychological operations.

Suspicion of authority and a parallel determination to compartmentalize all authority into legally controllable units provided with powers shared with and, thereby, balanced by other competing units have been features of American political consideration since 1787. In this context, reflective thought on the nature of psychological operations early

discovers the threat of subversion of one organizational unit by another through the employment of a force which can leap the barriers of law and a carefully balanced set of checks and balances. This potential strikes at the heart of American constitutionalism and gives rise to the "round house" statement, so frequently used to dismiss its use: that psychological war is "antithetical to the American way of life."[1] The habitual objection to its employment has been the inference that psychological operations are not consonant with either the past experience or the present-day interests of the nation.

> When forced to resort to arms for redress, an appeal to the tribunal of the world was deemed proper for our justification. This was the object of the Declaration of Independence. Not to find out new principles, or new arguments, never before thought of, not merely to say things which had never been said before; but to

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[1]A "round house" statement is, by definition, a verbal refuge where it is difficult to be cornered. The tone of contemporary reference to that diaphanous web spun of mores, values, style, heritage, and image of America and her people is a distressing fact of American political writing. A search for the stage in our national life when the aforementioned terms ceased to be employed as reasons for acting and became excuses for not acting at all or in an ineffective way might be most enlightening. Perhaps there is validity in the observation that America has ceased to be a Father-land and has become a Mother-land: that the idiosyncratic feature of the American conscience is that it is predominantly feminine. Perhaps, also, the old naval shibboleth that "things aren't like they were in the old Navy--and besides they never were" is also applicable. Nonetheless, the Hamlet pattern is discernible in our quest for moral strength and guidance.

> place before mankind the common sense of the subject, in terms so plain and firm as to command their assent and to justify ourselves in the independent stand we are compelled to take. Neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any particular or previous writing, it was intended to be an expression of the American mind, and to give to that expression the proper tone and spirit called for by the occasion.[2]

Thus, what has come to be one of the documents of the American spirit was first and foremost a propaganda tract. It was effective as a psychological instrument not only because of its powerful annunciation, but because its moral suasions were supported by action which clearly demonstrated that Americans had the strength of their convictions.

II. EARLY INSTANCES OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Both Franklin and Jefferson were involved in a large-scale psychological operation against the Hessian mercenaries. Their "Plan to Cause Hessian Desertions" was an early example of the necessity for high-level political support as a prerequisite to successful psychological warfare. Without a congressional resolution authorizing protection, citizenship, and up to one thousand acres of land, depending upon the rank of the deserter, the program could never have been

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[2]Cited by Oren Stephens, Facts to A Candid World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 29, from a letter to Henry Lee, May 8, 1825, written by Thomas Jefferson.

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carried out. It has been estimated that between five and six thousand men deserted as a result.[3] Since this represented 20 per cent of the Hessian force, the success of the venture was obvious.

The use of psychological operations, therefore, is grounded in the very founding of the nation. The individuals involved certainly did not believe they were engaged in any sinister or unethical action.

The United States army encountered very effective psychological operations by the Mexicans during the Mexican War. A forceful religious appeal, an offer of citizenship, and 320 acres of land addressed to U. S. soldiers of foreign birth, particularly the Irish Catholics, had marked effect. The majority of the deserters were Irishmen who had become convinced by Mexican propaganda that they were on the wrong side in a religious war. These men formed the core of the San Particio Battalion of U. S. deserters in the Mexican Army. Most of the heavy American losses sustained in the seizure of Churubusco were attributed to the skill with which the Mexican cannon were served by members of this battalion.

Sixty-nine members of the battalion were captured at Churubusco. Those who had deserted prior to the declaration

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[3]Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), Vol. III, pp. 517-518.

of war were flogged and branded on the cheek with a "D." Fifty were hanged, the last thirty of which were executed in sight of the actual storming of Chapultepec, having been "let live long enough to see the flag raised on the castle."[4]

The failure of the U. S. Army to develop an effective counter propaganda program presaged a similar failure to counter the strong ideological approach used by the Communists against American soldiers in Korea a century later.

III. LINCOLN'S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION

The composition and timing of the Emancipation Proclamation places it in a category with the Declaration of Independence as one of the classic feats of American psychological operations. Lincoln was under attack from the Northern Abolitionists to which he replied that his "paramount object in this struggle . . . [was] . . . to save the Union, and . . . [was] not either to save or to destroy slavery."[5] In formulating his proclamation, he had to consider the effect of such an instrument not only on the Northern Abolitionist, but also upon the white population of

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[4]Marshal Andrews, "Psychological Warfare in the Mexican War," A Psychological Warfare Case Book, William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (eds.) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), pp. 72-73.

[5]J. G. Randall, Lincoln The President (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1945), Vol. II, p. 158.

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the Confederacy; the slave population of the Southern States; the white population of the Slave States still on the side of the North; those Northerners who were opposed to challenging Southern slavery; and, last, the British, whose government was seriously considering recognizing the Confederacy as an independent state. The record of these considerations indicates that the last factor ranked in the forefront. Many Americans were convinced that only when the rebellion was officially declared to be a war between slavery and individual freedom as well as one against disunion would the British be placed upon such morally thin ice that they would be forced to cease threatening the Union through their thinly-veiled support of the Confederate States.

The proper psychological moment to issue the proclamation was a matter of great importance. Improperly timed, the effect could have been one of "whistling in the dark" or, as Secretary Seward phrased it, "a last shriek on the retreat."[6] The Federal victory at Antietam provided the opportunity.

The wording of the document was military and non-abolitionist in flavor. It opened with a declaration that reunion (not abolition) was the object of the war and later stated that it was warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity. This suggestion of military expediency was

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[6] Ibid., pp. 155-156.

[illegible], pp. 128-129.

inserted as an attempt to vitiate ideological reactions in both the North and the South.

The proclamation placed the North on the side of humane progress. It retained "the 50,000 bayonets" of the slave-holding states still loyal to the Union. It aroused such popular support in England that the British Government could no longer consider overt support of the Southern States. As an instrument of psychological warfare, it has been ranked with the Declaration of Independence and the Fourteen Points.

IV. ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT WHITE FLEET

By 1907, America had begun her emergence into the broader scope of the world stage and was encountering some of the difficulties that accompany such a role. America's popularity in Japan declined precipitously following the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth and as a result of the State of California's discriminatory actions against Japanese immigrants. Newspaper sensationalism and political agitation had created a full-blown issue in the American West, while public Japanese disappointment over the absence of a Russian indemnity, a feeling that America had tried to deprive Japan of the full reward of victory, and outrage over the treatment of Japanese nationals in America combined to produce widespread ill will and anti-American riots in

Tokyo. It was very clear that Japan had emerged as a world power, equal, in military strength, to France of that day; in a dominant position in the Far East; and possessed of an imperialistic drive and hunger. Roosevelt was both conciliatory and pacific. He was outraged by the California action and feared that in the aftermath of a successful war, public opinion in Japan might actually force the government, over its own better judgment, to take up arms in defense of national honor.

> I am exceedingly anxious to impress upon the Japanese that I have nothing but the friendliest possible intentions toward them, but I am none the less anxious that they should realize that I am not afraid of them and that the US will no more submit to bullying than it will bully.[7]

The world cruise of the White Fleet, 1907-1909, was the tactic decided upon. The psychological implications were varied. It was directed inward toward the American people themselves. No comparable fleet had ever rounded Cape Horn before, and the accomplishment of such a maneuver would have great domestic impact. The voyage would formally announce to the world the fact of American interest in the Pacific with a simultaneous demonstration of the power available to protect that interest. It certainly was intended to deter the Japanese militarists from any over-hasty

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decisions. This action was an excellent psychological operation. Its results were carefully calculated, the operations were well executed, and its effect was decisive.

The conduct of American psychological operations prior to World War I, although on occasion quite effective, was sporadic and ad hoc in nature. In the light of present-day definitions of psychological warfare, these activities would certainly fall under the purview of agencies or advisers assigned the task of coordinating the nation's activities in the fields of diplomacy, military operations, and economics. Such, of course, was not the case. The situations requiring such action generated the need which produced a practical solution based upon an analysis of the known or suspected variables. There was no coordinating machinery for a continual sifting of the inputs. There was no organization to study the effect of long-range trends. The world was a much larger globe in those earlier years. Distance, slow travel, and the absence of the means for high speed, long-range and mass communications were obstacles in the path of any effective, large psychological campaigns. When compared to the wide scale and long-term nature of that integrated series of operations which is connoted by the term "psychological warfare," it is probably correct to regard these earlier examples as psychological operations.

V. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE EFFORTS IN WORLD WAR I

World War I witnessed psychological operations transformed from an incidental to a major instrument of national policy. In fact, the post-war period of the 1920's saw the Germans lauding American psychological warfare and counting it as a major factor of defeat. If psychological warfare is considered in the broadest sense, it is true that it was among the decisive instruments. The political policies of the Allies, the appeal of Wilson's Fourteen Points, the obsolescence of the German Imperial system, and the resurgence of Eastern European Nationalism all played important roles in forcing Germany to surrender. However, it must be remembered that following the War, German apologists seized on every pretext to convince the world, and themselves, that their surrender had been due to everything but a military defeat. Therefore, one must be wary of any German evaluation of the efficacy of the American psychological effort.

Propaganda came into prominence in World War I because the nations involved had already made mass communications part of their daily lives. It was inevitable that such civilian developments as huge newspapers, systematic advertising, calculated political publicity, and other forms of opinion manipulation would be integrated into the governmental programs. It followed, naturally, that the

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psychological warfare effort of each of the belligerents was the direct derivative of peacetime, non-political advertising patterns.

The American psychological warfare effort of 1917 to 1919 was no exception and drew heavily on familiar skills. Soon after the entrance of the United States into the war, President Wilson appointed a Committee on Public Information. This committee--known as the Creel Committee--was composed of the Secretaries of the Navy, State, and War Departments with Mr. George Creel as chairman. This was equivalent to appointing a separate cabinet member for psychological warfare; and Mr. Creel was responsible for every aspect of propaganda work, both at home, and abroad. One result of this method of organization was to confer upon the overseas representatives of the committee something of the prestige of the three great Government Departments. The Creel Committee enjoyed a tremendous advantage in the person of the chairman, George Creel. Creel was highly regarded by the President, enjoyed his complete confidence, and had direct access to him. Creel's participation in national policy formulation was, therefore, at a sufficiently high level to provide propaganda coordination to other governmental policies on a credible basis.

The Creel view was that previous wars had been purely physical struggles in which public opinion was of no

importance, whereas World War I was primarily a test of strength between opposed ideals, with "moral verdicts" having as much significance as military decisions. "It was . . . [a] fight for the minds of men, for the 'conquest of their convictions,' and the battle line ran through every home in every country."[8]

The Creel Committee was created to conduct this psychological struggle both at home and abroad. Creel himself considered this task to be one of advertising. His book, How We Advertised America, explained in great detail his efforts and, by its title, indicated the principal shortcoming of the American effort.

The Creel Committee was loosely organized and was run in a simple, almost chaotic, fashion. Agencies proliferated whenever a new idea turned up. The basic concept was that of domestic American agitation as practiced, commercially, through advertising and, socially, through the civic clubs.[9]

A news bureau in Washington was established which supplied material to the domestic and international commercial press and processed other material to publicity missions abroad. Missions were sent to France, England, Italy,

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[8]George Creel, How We Advertised America (New York: Harper and Bros., 1920), p. 3.

[9]Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (second edition; New York: Duell, Sloane, and Pearce, 1960), p. 68.

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Switzerland, Holland, Spain, Scandanavia, the Latin American countries, China, and Russia. The Japanese were given the American propaganda file and were asked to use it. Heavy emphasis was placed on the home audience, for the committee's mission covered all phases of propaganda work. Sections were established for posters, advertising, "Four Minute Men" (volunteer local speakers in all American communities), films, American minority groups and the foreign-language press, women's organizations, information bureaus, syndicated features, and cartoons. The American motion picture industry was employed as a channel for domestic and foreign distribution of American propaganda. Foreign countries, unwilling to run the propaganda films, found that the American producers would not supply any feature productions.

It was hardly an exaggeration to say that no special machinery had to be built up for the conduct of operations. The major task was more one of coordination and guidance. The extent of voluntary contribution was amazing.

The Pamphlet Division commanded the services of any writer it chose to call, and it had ready access to over three thousand of the leading historians of the country. Novelists, essayists, and the publicists, without payment, worked in the production of articles for syndicated distribution. The objective of the Division of Syndicate Features was "to sell the war" to the people and to present in

acceptable newspaper style not only the story of the war but also the "spirit that was back of the whole adventure." The stories reached a circulation of twelve million a month. Of the seventy-five million pamphlets that were distributed, three quarters were sent out on request. Similarly, American painters, sculptors, designers, poster men, illustrators, and cartoonists were "mobilized on a volunteer basis." The foreign-language press was kept informed through the efforts of several hundred volunteer translators.

Through teachers' institutes, summer sessions, and educational organizations, the school was reached. Twice a month, a sixteen-page paper was issued to every one of the five hundred and twenty thousand teachers in the United States. It gave to the schools the needs and messages of government in concise and usable form, and it provided the government a direct medium for reaching the twenty million homes represented in the schools.

The creation of the "four minute man" was another effective device. No less than 75,000 speakers volunteered in 5,200 communities of the United States. They spoke chiefly in moving picture houses, but, later, this area was extended to include Sunday schools, churches, lumber camps, colleges, lodges, and women's clubs. Within a period of eighteen months, they made about a million speeches and reached some four hundred million people.

Nor was the potential of the advertising industry ignored. The large organizations representing advertising agencies, advertising clubs, and business papers were requested to name a board of control that would "mobilize the advertising forces of the country." Advertising space of various periodic publications having a total circulation of about 549,000,000 was purchased by advertisers of merchandise or contributed by the publishers without charge and turned over to the state. The International Association of Display Men donated display resources in six hundred cities. Sixty-thousand patriotic window displays could be timed exactly to supplement the campaigns in periodicals.

> We were fighting for ideas and ideals, and somebody who realized that, and knew it, had to say it and keep on saying it until it was believed. That was a part of the function of the Committee on Public Information. . . . It was this unseen but persuasive and unending flood of ideas that aroused a correct apprehension of the true spirit and idealism of America in the war.[10]

Many in Congress did not share this evaluation by the Secretary of War. The Committee was the subject of bitter and continuous attack, not only for its activities in this country but also for its overseas operations. There were ugly accusations of partisanship, dishonesty, inaccuracy, and inefficiency. Congress explored Mr. Creel's background

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to study his writings and political thought. As the months passed, the attacks became more bitter. Additional allegations were developed charging that the program was infiltrated by spies and saboteurs--a charge to be echoed a generation later against a successor to the Creel Committee. Part of the resentment manifested was grounded in the very heavy emphasis--almost blatant--directed at the home audience. Creel, as a representative of the administration in power, was propagandizing the American people. This situation was inevitably viewed with alarm (and perhaps with some reason) by the minority party, as well as by a number of the members of the majority party, in Congress.

The purely technical side of the work was done well but at the disastrous cost of over-shooting national commitments. "The conquering idea of justice and freedom as expressed in American idealism" and the heated propaganda of "making the world safe for democracy" were discredited at home and abroad. America emerged from the war disappointed and with the definite bad taste of its own soured propaganda in its mouth. In the clear, ever-penetrating light of hind sight, a less boisterous, a more modest, a more calculated propaganda effort might have helped forestall certain attitudes which, in a matured form, contributed to the advent of World War II.

These difficulties also graphically represent the

repercussions to be experienced from the development and annunciation of national policy objectives which are beyond the State's capacity to implement. Wilson's Fourteen Points Speech was made, in part, upon Creel's request for a clear enunciation of United States peace objectives in order to create dissension between the Bolsheviks and the Imperial Germans at the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference.[11] Tactically, the speech provided the operators on the spot with the high-level support necessary to take bold and aggressive propaganda action. As a psychologically significant annunciation, the Fourteen Points are regarded as being on a par with the Declaration of Independence and the Emancipation Proclamation with respect to the clear, deep appeal voiced, in the name of universal justice and natural law, to the democratic conscience of mankind. Strategically, it marked a colossal venture towards ends, the means for the achievement of which were not even available at the time of promulgation. Psychological operations grounded on such a policy can be disastrous.

In both the formulation and annunciation of the Fourteen Points and in the conduct of psychological war, the United States was involved in matters which were operationally and philosophically new and advanced by several orders of

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[11]Edgar Sisson, One Hundred Red Days: A Personal Chronicle of Bolshevik Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), p. 187.

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[11] Edgar Sisson, One Hundred Red Days: A Personal Chronicle of Bolshevik Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), p. 107.

magnitude beyond any operations heretofore attempted. Inexperience, naiveté, unrestrained idealism, all of these contributed to the failure. America had forgotten that beyond the war lay a peace which would be as grim and difficult to win as the war. The Federal Government had won wars, but it had never been involved in anything that remotely resembled the approaching peace conferences. It had never conducted psychological warfare on the scale attempted in World War I. In both cases, the government had advanced far beyond any of its experience. The classic American approach to the problem had little basis of fact from which to project forward for a solution. The failure may have been tragic, but it was not shameful. World War I was to be the last of all wars; perhaps Wilson and Creel believed it themselves.

VI. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IGNORED BETWEEN THE WARS

On the thirtieth of June, 1919, the Committee on Public Information, in the pained words of Creel, "was wiped out of existence . . . by action of Congress." The work of the Committee had been discontinued months before and only an orderly liquidation was in progress. It was this liquidation that Congress sought to interrupt and confuse. No one was left with authority to rent a building, employ a clerk, transfer a bank balance, or to collect a dollar. Creel's

final report was made only through the medium of a book printed by a private publisher.

The bitter battle over the "winning" of the peace led to complete disillusionment when it became apparent that the peace had not been won at all. Once more, America turned its energies inward. The experience of the Creel Committee received practically no attention and little reference was directed to the lessons learned. The Army War College files reveal that only two research papers were written on the subject from 1919 to 1929, and no officer was assigned between 1925 and 1935 to the full-time study of the problems of psychological warfare.[12] This manifestation of reluctance on the part of the military to accept psychological warfare was widespread and existed in every department and agency of the government to a greater or lesser degree. Consequently, when World War II arrived, the United States was too busy to devote the time necessary to plan and organize intelligently. The thinking on the nature of the organization required for effective operations in psychological warfare was neither clear nor consistent. The decisions were, once again, ad hoc. The men who made them were, in many cases, unfamiliar with, or indifferent to, the instrument they were to use and the nature of its relationship to the already-established

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[12]Linebarger, op. cit., p. 77.

instruments of state policy. At that time, the Government literally did not know what it was getting into when it undertook psychological warfare. News still appeared to be the main prop and little time was wasted on other considerations. Yet this was news as the term was understood by the American press. The importance of selecting, explaining, and interpreting that news was not always grasped, even by those concerned with distributing it. Before the war, as well as after the Government entered the field, private American news and publishing agencies continued to engage in operations which had the effect, if not the intention, of propaganda. The Office of War Information (OWI) could scarcely have reached the audience of the Time-Life-Fortune group and the Reader's Digest, both of which achieved global coverage during the course of the war. The unwitting propaganda turned out by such sources possessed a quality no Government information program had--a readership which was unmistakably voluntary, obtained by the appeal of authentic interest and entertainment.

VII. ORGANIZING FOR WORLD WAR II

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, the task of disseminating propaganda to foreign audiences was assigned to two emergency agencies: The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) which confined its activities to

developing good inter-American relations, and the Coordinator of Information (COI) which operated in the rest of the world.

The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) had been created on 16 August 1940, under the direction of Nelson Rockefeller. The information aspects of the CIAA's program was regarded as an integral part of its general cultural and commercial relations program which was carried out in close cooperation with the Department of State.

The Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) had been established by a military order of President Roosevelt on 11 July 1941. It was assigned two major functions: the coordination of intelligence collection and analysis from all sources, including the armed forces; and the transmission of information abroad to areas outside Latin America. The second of these two missions was not clearly stated in the order establishing COI. Although it was not specifically stated in the order, it was clearly understood by the Coordinator, William J. Donovan, and the President that a Foreign Information Service (FIS) was to be established as an integral part of COI.[13] This service was

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directed by the President not to engage in domestic information activities.[14]

Robert Sherwood was appointed as the director of FIS with principal headquarters established in New York City. In accordance with its mission, this service, which from the very beginning was virtually an autonomous agency, undertook to spread the gospel of democracy and to explain the objectives of the United States throughout the world (except, of course, in Latin America). Unfortunately, the early radio scripts were poorly checked; there was chaos in the matter of policy; little policing was possible; and the output reflected the enthusiasm of whatever individual happened to be near the microphone.

VIII. THE LACK OF CENTRALIZED GUIDANCE

The FIS early encountered a pattern of difficulty that would plague all the information programs. From the earliest World War II efforts, President Roosevelt's advisers appeared to be opposed to central direction of any information program. The inevitable result was disunity in the voices that undertook to set forth our position to the

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Although the FIS did not make an effort to find out what the major policy-formulating departments wanted done in the field of American propaganda, it would not advise these same departments on its own intentions or current operations. Consequently, the departments became uncertain of the trustworthiness and security restrictions of FIS. Since they had no knowledge or control over the FIS operation, the Army, Navy, and State Departments pursued the policy of providing the least information and no outline of national plans and policies on the theory that such action would reduce the possibility of official embarrassment.[15] It was a sad

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[15]Murray Dyer, The Weapon on the Wall (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 105.

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commentary that the source of such vital information for psychological operations was the British Political Warfare Executive (PWE). This organization, which was an acknowledged member of the British Policy Organization, shared the information with its American counterparts in London and Washington.

IX. ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES AND REORGANIZATIONS

The overwhelming majority of the major difficulties encountered by the American psychological warfare effort were administrative and not operational. The number of agencies involved in psychological operations literally mushroomed. A partial list included the following: The Office of Facts and Figures; The Office of Government Reports; the general information activities of the Office of Emergency Management; The Foreign Information Service and the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of the Coordinator of Information; Military Intelligence; Naval Intelligence; the State Department; the Office of the Assistant to the President; the Office of Civilian Defense; the Office of the Librarian of Congress; the Department of Agriculture; and The Board of Economic Warfare. Thousands of words in dozens of languages were promulgated throughout the world. These were composed by personnel who had little

if any contact with Federal policy and none with the military establishment, except for formal security. The plans at the top bore little discernible relation to the operations at the bottom. When Washington agencies wanted to find out what the broadcasts were saying, the working offices at New York and San Francisco refused--on the basis of their own security regulations--to let anyone see a word of what they were sending out.[16]

It is not surprising that jurisdictional disputes, tests of power, and unwillingness to cooperate were rife. Rockefeller (Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs) considered the CIAA responsible solely to the President and refused to submit his proposed operations in Latin America to the State Department or to predicate CIAA actions on the Department's approval. Sherwood did not want the State Department to have any hand in the operations of the Foreign Information Service.[17]

This confusion inevitably led to numerous reorganization plans, all of which recognized the need for clearly-fixed lines of administrative responsibility, better integration of planning, and a system for the coordination of output.

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[16]Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

[17]Charles A. H. Thomson, Overseas Information Service of the United States Government (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1948), pp. 17-18.

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[16] Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

[17] Charles A. H. Thomson, Operation Information Service of the United States Government (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1951), pp. 17-18.

After a joint psychological warfare committee had been established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had failed to fulfill an effective policy-coordinating function, on 13 June 1942, the President, by Executive Order 9182, established the Office of War Information (OWI). This order was based upon suggestions contained in a memorandum on the reorganization of war-information services submitted by the Director of the Budget on 7 March 1942. Rockefeller successfully resisted the integration of the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs into a single organization engaged in foreign information work, and, consequently, the order establishing OWI left CIAA out of the new organization.

The OWI was created by the transfer of various information services, both domestic and foreign, to it. Included among the war-information agencies or services merged into OWI were the following: Office of Facts and Figures (OFF); Office of Government Reports (OGR); the general information activities of the Office of Emergency Management (OEM); and the Foreign Information Service (FIS) of the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI).

Upon merger into OWI, FIS became the Overseas Branch. The Domestic Branch was originally comprised, mainly, of the personnel transferred from OFF, OGR, and OEM. Between the two branches was interposed a Program Planning and Review

Board to provide the horizontal lines of communication and coordination.

The Office of Coordinator of Information (COI), shorn of its FIS, was transformed into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under which name three major functions were assigned: (1) continuation of scholastic and informal intelligence; (2) black propaganda operations (authorized in March, 1943); and (3) subversive operations in collaboration with regular military authority. The OSS, led by Colonel Donovan, was made an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). It was unfortunate that the order creating OWI did not clearly establish a division of responsibility between it and OSS for the conduct of psychological operations.

X. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DEVELOPMENT AND CONDUCT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

From the date of OWI's establishment in June of 1942 until March of 1943, three factors influenced the conduct of psychological operations and were to be the bases for the final form of the organization that would at last evolve. First, the overseas activities of both OWI and OSS were vaguely defined. The Overseas Branch of OWI continued to function virtually as an autonomous unit until mid-1943. The Domestic-Information Activities of OWI were dominant. Second, the units comprising the developing psychological

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warfare organization--OWI, OSS, and CIAA--were all rent with inter-agency as well as intra-agency disputes. Third, while the major efforts of the top echelon leaders in OWI were largely concerned with the domestic program, OSS developed far-reaching plans for the conduct of psychological warfare in connection with the then forthcoming military campaigns. These plans, however, were not accepted by Robert Sherwood--Chief of the Overseas Branch, or Elmer Davis, Director of OWI.[18]

XI. ATTEMPTS AT COORDINATION

The compartmentalized nature of the various agencies prevented any one of them from knowing what the others were planning or doing. In the early days of the OWI, a War Information Policy Committee was established. It met only three times! At the first meeting, either the Director or Assistant Secretaries of such agencies and departments as CIAA, the War Production Board, War, and Navy were present. The Department of State sent only its Public Relations Officer. At the second meeting, the War and Navy Departments sent their opposite numbers to the representative of the State Department. At the third meeting, the representatives were all information chiefs, none of whom were empowered to make policy. The committee never reconvened.

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As a very interested bystander, the Military Branch of the Government had made an early attempt to lend continuity by the establishment of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) within the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Its functions were defined as:

> . . . to initiate, formulate and develop psychological warfare plans . . . [and] under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff committee to coordinate psychological warfare of other US governmental agencies and to collaborate with interested nations to the end that all psychological warfare is in accord with approved strategy.[19]

This was an ambitious undertaking in the light of the intense rivalries that existed. Very little ever came from the JPWC, and after the establishment of OWI this organization refused to cooperate with JPWC. By late 1942, JPWC ceased to be active and was finally abolished by the JCS. Following this abolition, no JCS committee possessed or attempted to exercise any consistent responsibility for psychological warfare operations.

In December, 1942, the JCS tried once again, this time to resolve the conflict between OSS and OWI in view of the first extensive United States military operations of the war. An order was issued stating that OSS was to have complete authority "to plan, develop, coordinate and execute the military program of psychological warfare." As a

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[13]Cited in Ibid., p. 140.

consequence, both the head of OWI, Mr. Davis, and the head of CIAA, Mr. Rockefeller, appealed directly to the President, protesting the military usurpation of a Presidential delegation of authority.

XII. EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBER 9312

Executive Order No. 9312 was issued on 9 March 1943 and set forth more clearly the responsibility of OWI in the overseas commands. The order stated that OWI was the designated agency to conduct foreign information and overt propaganda operations abroad, but "in areas of actual or projected military operations" all plans and projects "should be coordinated with the military plans" and would be "subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the approval of the theater Commander."

The order did not define clearly what, if any, psychological warfare functions were retained by OSS. The order did not state whether OWI or OSS had jurisdiction over subversive activities, covert propaganda campaigns, and the like, and it did little to resolve the problems of coordination between the separate agencies.

Executive Order No. 9312 was, in large measure, responsible for the character of the psychological warfare organizations that developed during the war in the overseas commands. The provision that "all plans and projects . . .

shall be subject to the approval . . . of the theater commander" was rigidly adhered to and greatly influenced the type and extent of operations conducted. The organizations everywhere were improvised and largely established on an ad hoc basis. There was relatively little interchange of information from one major military command to another. There were important differences in structure from one command to the next. Perhaps the single clear-cut element common to all was the concept that the theater Commander had final authority.

In each of the theaters, the psychological operation fell into four categories.[20]

1. In enemy countries, to undermine and destroy the morale of the enemy population.
2. In enemy-occupied countries, to keep alive hope of liberation and stimulate resistance to the enemy forces of occupation.
3. In neutral countries, to win the moral support of the neutral population.
4. In allied countries, to counter all enemy propaganda aimed at dividing the United Nations, to promote the morale of the allies, and to foster a better understanding of the United States.

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[20]Thomson, op. cit., p. 40.

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It was perfectly conceivable that a theater Commander would encounter psychological operations in all four of these categories, simultaneously. Such broad operations should involve major national policy and decision at the highest political level. However, both the OWI and the OSS were under the theater Commander's control and he, in the last analysis, was the authority--not Washington. Furthermore, whether or not either the OWI or the OSS carried on operations in a theater was left to the Commander's discretion. The OSS, for example, was not permitted access to the Southwest Pacific area theater, while, in the same theater, OWI, although allowed to be present, found that its weekly directive from Washington was unacceptable.[21] In the South Pacific Command, OSS and OWI personnel were refused clearance for operations. No formal provisions were ever made in this area for a psychological warfare planning staff; in fact, it was just five days before the surrender of Japan that the Central Pacific Command reached the decision that psychological warfare was a sufficiently potent support weapon to deserve the status of a special headquarters branch. The omnipotence of the theater Commander within his purview was matched by the refusal of the agencies to accept his supremacy in matters extending beyond his theater.

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[1]Dyer, op. cit., p. 113.

XIII. SECURITY AND PLANNING FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

One of the most vexing problems drawing from this administrative "gordian knot" was that of the vicious circle established between suspicion, distrust, and security. Clear-cut authority, judgment, discretion, and a broad understanding of the interrelationship between the proper balance of security and information are factors entering into the decision to disclose knowledge. If the planners responsible for the development of psychological operations are not informed of national policy, then there can be no possibility of effective planning and, on occasion, the political repercussions can be of tremendous import.

OWI was not informed about the forthcoming landings in North Africa, even though its members were to participate; of even greater significance was the fact that our psychological planners were confronted by the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear detonations with no "forewarning and had no chance to plan what should be done to maximize favorable effects and to offset bad ones; nor was there any plan offered by the leaders."[22] Effective psychological warfare demands that national plans and operations be known to, at least, the senior responsible official of the psychological

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warfare agency. Without this knowledge, it is impossible to explain and interpret intelligently. There is always present the danger that what may be said because of ignorance will be proven false by events. If this truism were even recognized, it did not govern United States psychological operations in World War II.

XIV. TOP LEVEL ATTITUDES

It is difficult to explain this American failure to organize effectively. Probably the single most important answer lies in the complete lack of interest in psychological warfare displayed by the majority of top-level American officials responsible for the policies and conduct of the war. Following an interview with President Roosevelt, one author wrote:

> It was a curious fact--and I had confirmation of it later--that the President, who established the OWI, never knew what it was doing and sometimes, apparently, confused it with the Office of Censorship. He had been opposed to the creation of a propaganda service and had established OWI with considerable reluctance, under pressure from his advisors, whose primary aim was to provide an adequate flow of information to the American public. Once the organization was established, he did not want to be bothered with it. In his own right Roosevelt was a great propagandist . . . but he did not understand the systematic use of propaganda in total war.[23]

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[21] William Carroll, Persuade or Perish (Boston: Houghton, 1948), p. 7.

The same author goes on to add that "Cordell Hull knew even less than the President about OWI and cared about as much." It is not surprising that American psychological operations ended the war never having been properly organized or coordinated as a national instrument and never having smoothly functioned as one of the nation's policy tools for the conduct of international affairs.

XV. POST WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENTS

Two days prior to the formal surrender of Japan, on 31 August 1945, President Truman issued Executive Order No. 9608 which established an Interim International Information Service (IIIS) in the Department of State and transferred to it the overseas information functions of OWI and the information activities of CIAA. "The nature of present day foreign relations," he stated, "makes it essential for the United States to maintain informational activities abroad as an integral part of the conduct of our foreign affairs."[24] The Order provided for the liquidation of OWI and IIIS by 31 December 1945. The Secretary of State was authorized to continue within the Department such foreign information functions as he considered necessary, to abolish any he thought undesirable, and to eliminate any or to transfer any

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[24]Executive Order No. 9608, August 31, 1945.

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[13]Executive Order No. 9608, August 31, 1945.

to other executive agencies. He was to study the entire question of continuing a foreign information program and was to recommend a solution to the President.

William Benton was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and made the responsible head of the new IIIS. Despite his efforts, the program languished. Diplomats of the traditional school were unconvinced and Congress was uninterested. An Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC) was established in the Department in early 1946 as an outcome of the study requested by President Truman. Its activities remained unchanged until 1948 although its name was changed to the Office of International Information and Education Exchange (OIE). The OIE was later to split, amoeba-like, into the Office of International Information (OII) and the Office of Educational Exchange (OEX), both of which were later to be recombined into the International Information Administration (IIA). Meanwhile, in the atmosphere of the "return to normalcy" and the glow of victory, the overseas information services languished, diminished steadily, and came close to vanishing entirely.

The American people and Congress failed to appreciate the menace of Communist propaganda to American security and failed to grasp the potentialities of psychological operations as an instrument of national policy during time of

peace. There was wide opposition from United States commercial press, radio, and film media, which feared government competition abroad. Many of the most able and skilled personnel in the fields of information and psychological warfare left government service. This loss was irreplaceable.

Throughout the military establishment in Washington, staff planning activities involving psychological operations and warfare ceased with the end of hostilities. Not until June of 1950 did the Department of the Army create the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare as a special staff section. The Department of the Air Force later established a Psychological Warfare Division within the Air Force's Directorate of Plans. The Navy subsequently assigned the task to a branch of the Strategic Plans Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

XVI. THE INFORMATION AND EDUCATION EXCHANGE ACT OF 1948

By 1948, the chill winds of ideological war were blowing out of Eurasia in such an unmistakable manner that Congressional action resulted in the United States Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948, Public Law 402 (The Smith-Mundt Act). This act directed the Secretary of State

> to provide for the preparation and dissemination abroad of information about the United States, its people, and its policies, through press, publications

> radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad.

The act also provided for

> an educational exchange service to cooperate with other nations in (a) the interchange of persons, knowledge, and skills; (b) the rendering of technical and other services; and (c) the interchange of developments in the field of education, the arts, and science.[25]

The educational exchange concept was subsequently given substance with the enactment of the Fulbright Act, which provided that funds derived from the sale abroad of surplus war material should be used to finance the exchange of persons. The administration of the Smith-Mundt Act was placed under the International Information Administration (IIA) of the Department of State.

The Smith-Mundt Act remains the basic legislation for the conduct of the United States information program today. The concept in 1948 was defensive and unrealistic. It was based on the assumption that if other people understood us they would like us, and, if they liked us, they would do what we wanted them to do. This concept has not been completely laid to rest in 1964.

The objective was interpreted once again, as a gigantic advertising campaign, carried on, for the most part, by the broadside telling of America's story. The Secretary of

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[25]Cited by Stephens, op. cit., p. 38.

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[23] Cited by Stephens, op. cit., p. 26.

State had been directed by Public Law 402 to "reduce such government activities whenever corresponding private information dissemination . . . [was] found to be adequate." There followed extensive contracts with domestic broadcasting companies for an overseas broadcasting service to present to the world "a full and fair picture" of the United States. Very shortly thereafter, Congressional concern over scripts, art exhibits, and the general concept of operations developed and threatened, by 1950, to cancel the entire program.

By 1950, however, the international arena was so troubled that the United States was thoroughly awakened to the Soviet threat. There could be no disagreement on the need for a program, and President Truman was given a record appropriation of $121,000,000 to carry on a "campaign of truth" against communism. However, the, apparently inevitable, bureaucratic struggle was raging behind the scenes. In addition to the International Information Administration (IIA), the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the Mutual Security Administration (MSA), the three Armed Services, and the Department of Defense all operated, at one time or another, in the international field and possessed their own overt international information services. Many foreigners preferred the Armed Forces Radio Service (AFRS) newscasts over those of the Voice of America in the conviction that

what the United States Government said to its own citizens would be free of propaganda. Thus, while AFRS broadcast all over the world for the entertainment and enlightenment of American servicemen, large foreign audiences could and did eavesdrop.

XVII. POST WORLD WAR II EFFORTS TOWARDS COORDINATION

In the years following World War II, there had been sporadic efforts between the various Departments towards the more effective integration of their activities; however, the concept of all these efforts was that of the coordination of separate, independent, component parts. Originally, this work began at the direction of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). It continued under the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC). The direction of action was continued by the later Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization (IFIO) which was the policy-making board for the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff (IFIS). After the IFIS came the Psychological Operations Coordinating Board (PCB).

Finally, early in 1950, an official peacetime role, in name, was assigned to psychological warfare with the creation of the Interdepartmental Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee in the Department of State. Through

this device, the Armed Forces had hoped to have a direct voice in advising the Secretary of State on the development and conduct of an integrated, current foreign information program, and to plan for full-scale use of psychological warfare in the case of hostilities. The Department of State evidenced a reluctance to accept much advice from the military, and the committee, contrary to the position taken by its military members, prepared a plan for a psychological mechanism which was to be created when, as, and if World War III began. The Secretary of Defense, through whose office the plan was routed for approval, took strong exception--based on the representations of his military chiefs. In a letter to the President, it was forcefully argued that such a mechanism should be created not when the war was actually upon the nation but immediately. This proposal found no support within the Department of State.

The result of this divergence was the creation, by Executive Order, on 20 June 1951, of the Psychological Strategy Board which placed psychological warfare on an even higher plane. This was to be a high-level planning and coordinating body responsible to the National Security Council. Its mission was to plan long-term psychological approaches to the nation's problems, and to help influence opinions, attitudes, and behavior abroad in support of

national objectives.[26] It was also assigned responsibility for the

> formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies, and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort.

Regular members were the Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Other agencies, such as the Mutual Security Administration, participated as needed. A representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was principal adviser. A staff was provided to do the planning and the Board's director was appointed by the President.

XVIII. THE KOREAN WAR

When the Korean War began, psychological warfare once again was called upon to contribute to the effort. The Korean experience paralleled far too closely the experience in World War II. Once again psychological operations were hampered by security, faulty intelligence, and imperfect organization. Most of the lessons that should have been learned from World War II had to be relearned. The experience

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[26] United States Congress, Senate, Overseas Information Programs of the United States, Report 406, 83rd Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 48.

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In August of 1950, the Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University observed that at that date:

> . . . it was assumed . . . that there were some masters of the problem, authorities who had a systematic understanding of its full scope. The growing realization that no transmissible, reliable, fundamental, true body of knowledge exists on psychological warfare demanded, and still demands, basic research on the problem so that valid operational research can be built up. The lack of a general doctrine on . . . [psychological] war is now recognized.[28]

It should not be a source of surprise to discover that the Psychological Strategy Board floundered and failed. It shortly discovered that there was no such thing as "psychological strategy" apart from the other strategies which together comprise national security strategy. Although it

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[27]Dyer, op. cit., pp. 114-117.

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[28] Ibid., p. 114, cited from an internal memorandum of the Operations Research Office.

was recognized that the tools of foreign policy--diplomacy, military policy, economic activity, and psychological operations--were interdependent, it was not recognized that they were inseparable. It was believed that if the activities of these four instruments were "coordinated," as each proceeded with its own, independent planning and action, a unified, integrated whole would result. It is, at least, to the credit of the Board that the hermaphroditic nature of this concept came to be recognized. In its planning, the Board swung to the only plausible course of action--one which encroached upon the diplomatic, economic, and military fields of activity. Thus was precipitated a continuous series of struggles with the responsible officials who were supposed to execute the Board's plans in those fields.

The foreign information program, itself, became an increasing source of difficulty. The operation grew so large and complex that it simply was beyond the capacity of the existing organization headed by an assistant Secretary of State. Coordination between all the agencies and negotiation towards voluntary consolidation of redundant operations were attempted without success. The regular administrative mechanism of the Department of State was not designed to cope with such an arrangement. The solution lay in the establishment of the semi-autonomous International Information Administration within the State Department. The

new activity was to continue to receive policy guidance from the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs but was to have a free hand in operations. Dr. Wilson Compton, the Administrator, quickly found that the achievement of

> semi-autonomy implies a high degree of consolidation of authorities and responsibilities which heretofore . . . [had] been widely dispersed. There . . . [was] within the Department a reluctance to accept these changes, and if not a resistance, at least a formidable inertia.[29]

XIX. AFTERMATH OF THE 1952 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Following the 1952 Presidential election, the entire United States information and psycholgical warfare structure became the target for searching investigations. The President's Committee on Foreign Information Activities, known as the Jackson Committee after William H. Jackson, its Chairman, was to report by the summer of 1953. A subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under the Chairmanship of Senator Fulbright, initially, and subsequently, Senator Hickenlooper examined subjects related to the overseas information program. An Advisory Commission on Information, established pursuant to the Smith-Mundt Act, convened to examine the conduct of that program. Simultaneously,

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[29]Stephens, op. cit., p. 42, cited from the June 30, 1952, report of Dr. Wilson Compton to the Secretary of State.

[illegible] Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs put out [illegible] to have a free hand in operations." Dr. Wilson Compton, the [illegible] administrator, quickly found that the achievement of

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[24]Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 42, cited from the June 30, 1954, report of Dr. Wilson Compton to the Secretary of State.

Senator McCarthy conducted his own widely-publicized investigation of the foreign information program. Except for the latter "witch-hunt," the results of the investigations, and, in particular, the findings of the Jackson Committee had far-reaching effects on the reorganization of United States Psychological Strategy and Operations.

> . . . data has been available to the committee which suggests that the . . . [Psychological Strategy] Board is not effectively discharging its function. The Executive Order (June 20, 1951), creating the Psychological Strategy Board is loosely drawn. It lodges various responsibilities in the Board but limits its authority to "guidance" and "reporting" . . . . Observations of members of the committee abroad and other evidence moreover suggest that the component agencies of the board (CIA, Defense, State) are continuing to go their separate ways in matters of psychological policy.[30]

> There is no "strategic concept for psychological operations" separate and distinct from a strategic concept for gaining national aims from war . . . . We find that the "psychological" aspect of policy is not separable from policy, but is inherent in every diplomatic, economic or military action. There is a "psychological" implication in every act but this does not have life apart from the act.[31]

XX. REORGANIZING FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE— THE USIA

Out of the recommendations of the three groups emerged

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[30] United States Congress, Senate, Overseas Information Programs of the United States, op. cit., p. 6.

[31] Dyer, op. cit., p. 135, cited from the Report of the President's Committee on International Information Activities.

Another following [illegible] the [illegible]-operational [illegible] dispatch of the Foreign Intelligence program. Because for the latter "clinical-work," the [illegible] of the [illegible], and, in particular, the [illegible] of the [illegible] had [illegible] [illegible] psycho-social effects on the [illegible] [illegible] psychological [illegible] and [illegible].

> . . . data [illegible] available to the operative which suppress [illegible] . . . [psychological] history] based [illegible] not effectively diagnosing [illegible]. The Operative Code [illegible] 20, 1951), covering the [illegible] Strategy based [illegible] loosely drawn. It [illegible] various responsibilities in the Board but limits its autonomy to "guidance" and "reporting" . . . . Deservedly of members of the [illegible] agreed and under [illegible] consumer suggest that the [illegible] operation of the Board [CIA, Central Intelligence] are continually to do their [illegible] work in matters of [illegible] policy.[10]

> There is an "ideologic concept for [illegible] operations" separate and distinct from a strategic doctrine for guiding national [illegible] . . . . We find that the "psychological" aspect of policy is not separable from policy, but is inherent in every [illegible], personal or military action. Thus, if a "psychological" [illegible] be [illegible] and [illegible] does not have life apart from the act.[11]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

One of the recommendations of the Hoover [illegible] [illegible]

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[10]Notes taken [illegible], Henry, [illegible] Defense-Time Functions of the National Estate, op. cit., p. 9.

[11]Ibid., op. cit., p. 113, cited from the Report of the President's Committee on International Information Activities.

Presidential Reorganization Plan 8, approved by the 83rd Congress and made effective on the first of August, 1953. By this plan, the overseas information function was removed from the Department of State and reassigned, along with the foreign information programs of all other agencies, to a new and autonomous United States Information Agency (USIA). The Director of the new Agency was made directly responsible to the President through the National Security Council; he was to receive foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State.

On recommendation of the National Security Council, in a directive dated 22 October 1953, the President established the basic mission of the Agency as:

> to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the US are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace.[32]

This mission was to be accomplished by:[33]

1. Explaining and interpreting to foreign peoples the objectives and policies of the United States Government;
2. Depicting imaginatively the correlation between US policies and the legitimate aspirations of other peoples of the world;
3. By unmasking and countering hostile attempts to distort or to frustrate the objective and policies of the Government of the US;

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[32]United States Information Agency, Background Information (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 3.

[33]Ibid.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

4. By delineating those important aspects of the life and culture of the United States which facilitate understanding of the policies and objectives of the Government of the United States.

Under this mission, the USIA was to concentrate on objective, factual news reporting with appropriate commentaries, designed to present a full exposition of important United States actions and policies, especially as they affected individual countries and areas.

XXI. THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

Pursuant to the Jackson Committee report, the President, by Executive Order No. 10483, on 2 September 1953, abolished the Psychological Strategy Board and replaced it with the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), under the National Security Council. However, it was not until 25 February 1957, that the President issued a revised Executive Order formally placing the OCB within the structure of the National Security Council as of 1 July 1957. The members of the Board were the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, the Director of Central Intelligence, a representative of the President (the Special Assistant for Cold War Planning), and the Director of the USIA (though not formally appointed a member of the board until the spring of 1955). The Jackson Committee had declared that "except for

propaganda, there are no 'psychological warfare' instruments distinct from traditional instruments of policy." In his Executive Order, the President stated the mission of the Operations Coordinating Board as follows:

> The National Security Council having recommended a national security policy and the President having approved it, the Board shall (1) whenever the President shall hereafter so direct, advise with the agencies concerned as to (a) their detailed operational planning responsibilities respecting such policy, (b) the coordination of the interdepartmental aspects of the detailed operational plans developed by the agencies to carry out such policy, (c) the timely and coordinate execution of such policy and plans, and (d) the execution of each security action or project so that it shall make its full contribution to the attainment of national security objectives and to the particular climate of opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world, and (2) initiate new proposals for actions within the framework of national security policies in response to opportunity and changes in the situation.[34]

Thus, it was to be the responsibility of this body to see that actions by other agencies to implement policy were taken in a coordinated manner. Furthermore, as initially conceived by the Jackson Committee and as the concept was first accepted by President Eisenhower, the purpose of this coordination was to achieve maximum psychological impact from the integrated application of all the instruments of policy. However, the OCB not only failed to bring together the opposing viewpoints held by representatives of the

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[34]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing for National Security, Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 455.

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[34] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing for National Security, Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 435.

Department of State, Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency but also gradually evolved almost completely away from its initial concept as a means for facilitating the development of psychological strategy and the integrated psychological operations of psychological warfare.

The old Psychological Strategy Board had been abolished, among other reasons because it had no authority--it was limited to "guidance." Paradoxically, the OCB was created in a similar manner: it lacked authority to formulate a single, unified course when opinions differed. Its actual deliberations bore a close similarity to and paralleled the experience of its early predecessor committees (starting with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee) when the subject of forging an effective psychological structure was taken up. The members of the OCB were, first, departmental representatives and, second, members of a board intended to coordinate and strengthen the voice with which government speaks. It follows that any member of the board could, in effect, veto any proposed action in the field of psychological operations (or any other field, for that matter) since the chairman had no authority to proceed on majority decisions. The board had to agree as a unit. If a member objected in the name of his department, that department was able to prevent the board's achieving anything but a compromise decision.

XXII. THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR COLD WAR PLANNING

A third development, stemming from the recommendations of the Jackson Committee, was the appointment of a Special Presidential Assistant to advise on matters relating to foreign public opinion. The voice of the President of the United States was the Voice of America, and his words had a powerful effect upon foreign audiences. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary that the President consider the role of public opinion in World affairs whenever he spoke. To aid in developing effective Presidential communications, the requirement for specialized assistance in the formulation of public pronouncements had come to be recognized. This was the purview of the Special Assistant for Cold War Planning who was also designated as the President's representative on the OCB. The position was first held by C. D. Jackson who was followed by Nelson Rockefeller, and thereafter, William H. Jackson. These three men had each accumulated extensive experience in propaganda and psychological operations. Planners, as well as operators, had long felt the need for ready access to the President. Before the establishment of the Special Assistant, access had been primarily through press secretaries and speech writers who, preoccupied with problems of domestic public opinion, were not always

knowledgeable or sympathetic on matters of foreign public opinion. Short of placing the foreign information function in the Executive Office of the President or investing a new cabinet status department with this mission, a special Presidential Assistant seemed to offer an arrangement which should go far toward satisfying the requirement for close liaison.

The high point of the role of the Special Assistant for Cold War Planning within the OCB structure was reached early in the life of that body when this Special Assistant served as the Board's Executive Officer.[35] The long-term impact of the Special Assistant for Cold War Planning on the OCB mission can only be inferred from the mutation of the field of operations within the OCB of the President's representative from concern for the "climate of opinion" to a "follow-up function."[36] In July of 1957, with the establishment of the post of Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination, the Cold War Planning Assistant was demoted from the role of the President's representative on the OCB.

XXIII. THE OCB FAILS

By this time, however, the OCB had completely

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[35] Ibid., p. 459. On 4 November 1953, a full-time Executive Officer was appointed.

[36] Ibid.

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[53] Ibid., p. 439. On 4 November 1961, a full-time Executive Officer was appointed.

[54] Ibid.

developed away from the 1953 concept of a sort of lens which would gather the departmental threads of potential psychological operations and focus them into an instrument of national psychological warfare. Already, it was evident that the OCB had little impact on the real coordination of policy execution. The OCB was an interagency committee which lacked command authority. It always acted by "agreement" or "concurrence." It did not "decide" or "direct" action on a document; rather it concurred in it and agreed to carry out any actions it contained. A difference of view among the OCB members which could not be resolved within the Board was referred to the respective agency heads. Failing of resolution at that level, the matter found its way to the President, either directly or through the National Security Council. Consequently, many of the most important decisions affecting the course of programs under the OCB surveillance were made outside the framework of the Board. Furthermore, the departments often bypassed the OCB, pursuing their own interpretations of policy or engaging in "bootleg" coordination through extramural means.[37] It appeared ever more clearly, that an interdepartmental committee cast in the organizational mold of the OCB could not be counted upon to discharge effective major responsibilities for follow through.

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[37]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing for National Security, Vol. III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 37.

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[1]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing for National Security, Vol. III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 17.

XXIV. CONFUSION IN THE AREA OF POLICY GUIDANCE

One of the areas heavily scored in the three 1953 investigations was that of the confusion which existed over responsibility in the field of foreign policy. There was no clear chain of command below the President. Practice had nearly shattered the role of the Secretary of State as the President's executive agent in the field of foreign affairs. Much of the Secretary's authority had been usurped by President Roosevelt during the course of World War II. The post-war and Korean problems had resulted in the acquisition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense of an ever-increasing voice in foreign affairs. Furthermore, Congress had created the Economic Cooperation Administration as an independent agency with cabinet status and, by statute, gave its administrator direct access to the President.

Overseas, the confusion was even worse where the separate agencies pursued their own courses of action and interpreted United States foreign policy as they saw fit. At one time, in Paris, there were four United States representatives with the rank of Ambassador, each independent of the other three. In the foreign information field, a variety of separate and un-coordinated programs were being conducted simultaneously.

President Eisenhower restored the Secretary of State to his traditional role, stating that all other officers

were to receive policy guidance from the Department of State and clear their plans through that Department. The State Department was, in so far as possible, to restrict its own activities to policy-making and diplomacy. Overseas, to the American ambassador or minister in each mission was delegated the same responsibility within his purview as the Secretary of State was now to discharge within the United States Government. Policy was thus to be placed exclusively in the hands of the chief of mission and all agency programs would be under his control.

Reorganization Plan No. 8 and the three additional corrective actions laid a basis in 1953 for an effective psychological structure. It never emerged! The failure, once again, was basically a failure of top-level American officials responsible for policy formulation and execution. The OCB failed not only because it was structurally incapable of accomplishing the job set out for it, but also because it was permitted to develop, or grow away, from the concept from which it was born. The role of the President's Special Assistant for Cold War Planning was permitted to degenerate; it did not deteriorate of its own accord. Both of these deteriorations were directly the responsibility of President Eisenhower and lend credence to the observation that, like his predecessors, he neither understood nor placed appreciable store in the worth of psychological warfare, his frequent protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.

XXV. THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION APPROACH

In January, 1960, John Kennedy, inherited the United States structure for Psychological War. Basically, there was but one tool available--the USIA. Kennedy's subsequent elimination of the OCB struck no new blow to psychological operations--the Board had ceased to contribute to a national psychological effort long before and, even before that, the impact of the Special Assistant for Cold War Planning had been eliminated.

Although a highly-classified Cold War Advisory Panel was created in the Department of Defense, the Kennedy Administration's failure to establish any machinery for the formulation of integrated psychological policy is a source for speculation. Possibly the attitude was that the administration was canny enough to "dead reckon" its way along. The tendency toward ad hoc solutions would serve to support this thesis. Perhaps the announced Presidential policy that each department head was solely responsible for the total effort of his agency was considered sufficient to insure that perfect staff work--both vertical and horizontal--would result in a magic integration. It seems hard to believe that this was the case, and there early developed some question as to the interaction of the functions of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and the Secretary of State with regard to the formulation of foreign policy. The

United States Government is, simply, too vast to rely upon the belief that the complex interrelationship of all its departments can be ordered merely by informing each department head that he is responsible for running his department correctly. There is also the possibility that the Kennedy Administration was no more or less interested or knowledgeable in effective psychological operations than any other administration, and that it was satisfied to proceed with its only remaining tool, the USIA, in an attempt to obtain as much mileage out of the "campaign of truth" and news media facilities available as possible.

XXVI. THE USIA--1964

The USIA in 1963-1964 is a giant organization and under the very effective guidance of Edward R. Murrow, capable of giving Mr. Kennedy and, subsequently, Mr. Johnson much mileage. It employs over eleven thousand people--three thousand within the United States and the remainder staffing some two hundred and nineteen overseas posts in ninety-nine countries. This shift in emphasis from Washington to the field was a most significant factor in the effective development of the USIA. Previously, the field missions were essentially service organizations, receiving and disseminating material supplied to them by the home office. The result was that much of this mass-produced material was of little

or no value in a specific area. By shifting emphasis to the forward theaters, the specific area needs could be examined and dealt with on the spot within the limits established by policy from Washington.

With the expanding overseas program, the annual budget has also grown.[38] From 1954 to 1960, the budget varied from eighty-four to one hundred and four million dollars. In fiscal 1963, the figure climbed to one hundred and forty-three million, and a proposed 1964 budget of over one hundred and ninety million dollars was placed before Congress.

The extent of the USIA operation is impressive and encompasses the entire spectrum of communications media.[39] The Voice of America produces continuous short wave broadcasts to an estimated weekly audience of over twenty million people. It produces over seven thousand five hundred weekly hours of taped programs in twenty-seven languages which are made available to approximately two thousand five hundred local medium wave radio stations which, in turn, reach an additional forty-five million people a week. In the field

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[38]Edward R. Murrow, Improved Communication for Better Understanding (Washington: United States Information Agency, Office of Public Information, press release No. 32, September 14, 1961), p. 7.

[39]United States Information Agency, 18th and 19th Reviews of Operations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962).

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[39] United States Information Agency, 10th and 19th Reviews of Operations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962).

of television, video tapes and films of special merit are made available to stations in sixty-six countries serving fifty million sets and reaching approximately one hundred and sixty million people. The agency also maintains two hundred and ten film libraries in ninety-eight countries with each library having between five hundred to one thousand separate titles all in the native language. Where no theaters are available, USIA has a limited number of mobile units. The weekly audience for these films averages one hundred and fifty million people. In addition, the agency prints and distributes more than eighty magazines and newspapers, operates a worldwide radio teletype which runs to ten thousand words a day directed to eighty-three countries, operates almost two hundred libraries containing over two and one-half million volumes, and presents exhibits such as the Friendship Seven space capsule.

Technically and material wise, the USIA is exceptionally well equipped and is improving itself yearly. Its most effective director, Edward R. Murrow, enjoyed an improved, though less than adequate, participation in the formulation of psychological policy.[40] It is possible that this was a function of the prestige which Mr. Murrow brought

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[40]The following observations on Mr. Murrow's role in the policy-making process are drawn and inferred from a series of interviews with Mrs. Edna King of the Office of Public Information in the United States Information Agency.

to the Agency, and which, undeniably, was transferred to USIA. It will be necessary to observe the role of his successor, Carl Rowan, to determine the extent of this factor.

Mr. Murrow received policy guidance from the Secretary of State. With the elimination of the OCB, he lost his formal membership in the National Security Council structure and seat, as the only observer, at the council table; this was somewhat compensated for by his designation as a "Special-Request Member" which gave him a standing Presidential Invitation to attend those Council meetings which were concerned with matters relating to his official responsibilities. It should be noted, however, that he attended as a "junior member," as a guest, not as an equal to the members designated by law and Executive Order. There does not seem to be any clear definition or guidance to indicate at what point his presence would not be required. The President sought his advice on the impact that policies would have on world opinion before and not after they were implemented. This was all well and good, but it was, of course, a one-way arrangement and could be considered as a valid source of policy formulation and guidance only so long as the President saw fit (or remembered) to consult Mr. Murrow. On occasion, he was asked to attend Cabinet meetings, but at unpredictable times. He was also included in small meetings with the President, the Special Assistant for National

Security Affairs (Bundy), the Director of the State Department Policy Planning Council (Rostow), and the Secretary of State (Rusk). He did not participate in the Policy Planning Council's work. His representative sat with the Cold War Advisory Panel. All of this reenforces an underlying suspicion that USIA policy guidance is a "jury rig" and definitely ad hoc. The general flow is downward to the Agency and while there, quite obviously, is a degree of counter flow of advice and staff work to figure in national policy consideration, this input to the national policy machinery is in the nature of a guest performance and not as a permanent, integral factor.

XXVII. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS UNPREPARED

It would seem that in the last forty-six years, the United States Government has not yet concluded that the conduct of foreign affairs demands identification and consideration of psychological processes in every phase of international relations. The alleged increased participation of the USIA in our policy planning is rated by some observers as a distinct plus. A more restrained view is that it is, at least, not a minus. It is important that the people of the world hear and understand, as much as their intellects will permit, the position and policies of the United States. The fact that they hear and, hopefully, understand has no relationship,

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necessarily, with their support for United States objectives. The danger in becoming euphoric over one's information activities lies in failing to recognize this limitation on what "truth" can do. An information program, undeniably, can have marked psychological effect. It is, however, but one psychological operation. Psychological war is a product of many psychological operations, carried on simultaneously, intensively, for indefinite periods, and so blended, one with the other, that the cause and effects of each weave together into a single integrated whole aimed at achieving national goals. The United States pays lip service to this theorem but has yet to turn its organizational and creative genius to the task of accomplishing such an integrated foreign policy.

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CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND UNITED STATES EFFORTS

Any comparison of Soviet and United States efforts in the field of psychological operations must begin by noting the differences between the basic aims of foreign policy and the conceptions of how foreign policy is to be conducted.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union is a revolutionary power with long-term ideological claims. Its leaders intend to further the socialist revolution throughout the world. Though different nations are at different stages, some more or less ripe than others, for one or another type of revolution, the road is essentially the same for all. The Soviet leaders are not necessarily in a hurry. Their determination to expedite the process of history does not impel them to adventurous or aggressive action. However, they are unshakeably convinced that their diagnosis of history is scientific, and they are constantly on the watch for opportunities to promote their cause.

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The United States is conservative and defensive. It is not that American leaders do not also hold convictions, but that they do not plot, through their foreign policies,

to convert other nations. There is, of course, a strong strain of missionary zeal which is very dear to the American heart, but it cannot be said that the makers of United States policy have set themselves the long-term, ideological aim of converting the people either of the Soviet bloc or of the uncommitted countries to the American way of life. Rather, they are concerned to defend the United States national interest and to foster a world order in which all men are uninterfered with and free to choose their own way of life and government so long as in so doing they do not impinge upon the same rights of other states and men.

If, in the aims of policy, the Soviet leaders are doctrinaire and the United States government is empirical, in the choice of means the opposite is generally the case. In the United States, there is a great deal of public discussion, which can hardly fail to make itself felt within the Government policy machinery and Department of State, as to whether the United States should rely on military strength or economic action, on propaganda or negotiations. This "either-or-ism" must be incomprehensible to Soviet students of American affairs. In Soviet foreign policy, all available instruments are used, in whatever admixture the circumstances of the case would suggest.

II. ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES EFFORTS

A democracy, by its very nature, contains certain

inherent disadvantages in the conduct of psychological operations. The United States is a republic and a democracy and, consequently, subject to the sharp limitations which republican, democratic governments possess.

The United States cannot impose a purpose upon mankind. It cannot enunciate a policy and then hue to that line for years on end. Americans are not messiahs. The limitations of American civilization over and above those restraints imposed by American political institutions are such as to make it impossible for the United States to lead a fanatical counter crusade against communism or to guarantee to the world that America of 1963 can promise that America of 1975 will perform any particular action.

Limitations on Psychological Operations

American psychological operations are limited precisely because they are American. To be American means, to a certain degree, to be free. The American citizen has a definite influence and role in the operation of his government. A new election and a hostile Congress can cut off the funds for any project no matter what its merits may be in the eyes of the policy planners. The rest of the world is acutely aware of this fact, even though Washington politicians and bureaucrats sometimes seem to forget. The promise of a dictator is generally good for his lifetime. The promise of the United States is good only within the

letter of the law: a specific treaty, a definite commercial agreement, a very sharp and very narrow commitment. "In the propaganda field, America certainly is not promise."[1]

The American strength in international affairs, therefore, does not lie in a propaganda capacity to promise, to threaten, or to commit the United States Government to future courses of action. The American strength lies in the immense probabilities of American life, in the virtual certainty that the American people will react in a positive manner to aggression; that the American people will, if attacked, fight in an implacable manner with every intention of destroying their attacker; and that the American people, despite their occasional shortcomings in matters of racial tolerance and political freedom, will, in the long run, be solidly ranged behind whatever policies seem to promise equality, prosperity, and freedom for all men.

The limitations on the United States as a source of propaganda are sharp. There is no United States party line; it is virtually impossible to imagine that within the American civilization, as it exists today, there could be one. There might be an official United States policy, unanimous and binding upon all Federal departments, but the Federal

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[1]Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (second edition; New York: Duell, Sloane, and Pearce, 1960), p. 279.

Government itself, is only one among fifty-one separate governments operating within the United States of America. The state governments, the cities within the states, and the people-at-large are free to contradict what the Federal Government may say at any given point. Therefore, exploitation of United States propaganda strength must always be developed from the probable or apparent center of American opinion at that moment. It is impossible to find a United States policy which can be made compulsory and unanimous upon all Americans, both public and private. American policy planners are faced with the domestic requirement of devising foreign-policy programs which will command the decisive assent of the American people--this demands an adroit combination of leadership, foresight, and a keen awareness of domestic politics.

The Quest for Lost National Purpose

The less peaceful the world is, the more effective a "peacetime" psychological campaign can be. In times of obvious peril, the American people close ranks. In times of relaxation, they scatter in every direction. The American people seem to be incapable, psychologically, of carrying out a crusade without the external stimulus of danger and trouble. Once a war breaks out, Americans, heretofore, have shown an excellent capacity to unite in winning and finishing the conflict. The perplexing question, lies in how the

American people, short of involvement in war can develop the purpose, decision, and unanimity necessary to take those actions which will prevent war.

It has been a century since the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse rode through the American countryside. America's sheltered and peaceful society has diverted the people into a timid and near sterile pattern of political thought. The "more abundant life," the quest for security, the adulation of the "common man" have been thematic byways down which the American people have wandered away from the highway of national character and purpose that built their magnificent country out of a howling wilderness. The character and purpose to which reference is so frequently made did not shrink from destroying the native population when such a course of action augured well for the security of a portion of the American people. Today, it is highly improbable that American exploration and colonization of another planet would be carried out in a comparable manner. Perhaps this is for the good. Brutality or atrocity generally breed more of the same. Nevertheless, it is the manifestation of purpose, the unalterable and unswerving dedication to doing what must be done to perpetuate this land and its system which has relaxed under the eroding effect of security.

Part of the answer probably lies in the field of education. The American people are still largely ignorant or

misinformed as to the nature of communism and its relationship to the power politics of the Soviet Union. A small start has been made in the public school systems of certain of the states. Florida now requires a course, employing the text The Meaning of Communism (Simon and Schuster) to be given in the last years of high school. It is hoped that such programs will spread. While the American possesses patience, endurance, and curiosity, the latter faculty is not generally directed along the historical or political veins. So long as a rational consensus or basis of understanding in these fields is not developed, to that extent will there continue to be just that much more impetus to this aimless drifting or lack of felt national purpose.

The never-ending plaints for a regenerated national purpose and the literary wringing-of-hands over the need for a rededication overlook the fact that it is not so much a matter of having lost but more a matter of having forgotten the already valid and existing precepts that the American people have developed. Here lies a challenge for the political leadership of the nation. It is a double challenge, for unless conducted scrupulously free of partisan and minority politics and free of a propaganda tone and motif it can never succeed. The propagandizing efforts of the Creel Committee amongst the American people have stood as a bar for forty-five years to governmental efforts to develop the requisite foundation of understanding which is necessary to

its policies. It most certainly is a responsibility of leadership to insure that the public is grounded and informed of the factors which determine the national future. This is no program for a series of press conferences or an occasional fireside chat; it is a long-term, continuing, integrated education effort that would require direct participation by the President and his most senior advisers.

Statement of the Problem

Over a decade ago, the crux of psychological war was ably annunciated by President Eisenhower in a campaign speech at San Francisco:

> The present Administration has never yet been able to grasp the full impact of a psychological effort put forth on a national scale. What would such a peacetime of "cold war" national strategy mean. It would mean, in the first place, the selection of broad national purposes and the designation within these purposes of principal targets. Then it would mean this: every significant act of government should be so timed and so directed at a principal target and so related to other governmental actions that it will produce the maximum effect. It means that our government in this critical matter will no longer be divided into airtight compartments. It means that in carrying out a national policy every department and every agency of government that can make a useful contribution will bring its full strength to bear under a coordinated program. We shall no longer have a Department of State that deals with foreign policy in an aloof cloister; a defense establishment that makes military appraisals in a vacuum; a mutual security administration that, with sovereign independence, spends billions overseas. We must bring the dozens of agencies and bureaus into concerted action under an overall scheme of strategy. And we must have a

> firm hand on the tiller to sail the ship along a consistent course.[2]

Beyond this clear annunciation, little advance has been made. Total strategies have never been fully developed or implemented by the United States. The strategies that have been employed have not provided for the integrated use of the four major instruments of foreign policy--the diplomatic, military, economic, and pyschological. There are many reasons for this. The presidential form of government with its division of powers between the executive and the legislature imposes limitations on the probable amount of integration that can be developed. The democratic process itself inhibits the type of central control which can most readily achieve the coordination necessary to actual totality of action in the implementation of a decision. The inherent frictions that exist between Congress and the White House can and often result in budgetary or other restrictions on the scope of implementation of plans developed by the executive.

The aforementioned limitations are constitutional weaknesses which must be endured for the sake of the great strengths and rewards that the system simultaneously affords us. However, there are at least two additional areas which are blocked only by inertia or bureaucratic, vested interest.

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It is in these areas where effective Presidential leadership and sound organization can produce a total diplomacy or total strategy. In fact, it has always been in these areas where the answer has lain, and, in the harsh light of responsibility and accountability, the failure of the United States Government to develop this totality of effort has been solely the responsibility of its Chief-Executive-Officer--the President of the United States.

The Multiplicity of Agencies

The first of these correctable areas centers on the problem of the multiplicity of agencies with overlapping authority and responsibility which stultify the foreign policy decision-making apparatus within the executive branch. In such a vast operation, it is literally impossible to develop a neat series of compartmentalized units which are pure unto themselves. Such an organization could never work for the simple reason that each is, in some degree, dependent upon the other and finds implications of all the tasks performed by the other agencies within its own field. Therefore, the line of attack should be through the "coordinating" machinery and not by successive layering of agency upon agency or by *ad hoc*, "shooting from the hip," emergency methods of dealing with individual situations as they arise. Since World War II, there has been a stately procession of

"coordinating" committees or boards. All have been formed with the best of intentions; each has represented some improvement; and the late OCB even offered promise. All have failed for the same reason--their titles hold the key: "Coordination." If any country should have had its fill of this term, the United States would rank at the very head of the list. From the days of the Continental Congress when "Congress could beg, plead, and implore, but it could not command," this nation has had nothing but the most unfortunate experience with "coordination." The entire history of the American people indicates that they simply do not "coordinate" of their own free wills. The vernacular of the Marine gunnery sergeant, "semper fi, I've got mine, how are you doing?" seems to express the attitude; it probably lies deeply grounded in the independence bred of the frontier experience which is part of American heritage. It cannot be tolerated within an administrative organization, yet it has been tolerated. Eisenhower virtually prostituted his San Francisco campaign speech of 8 October 1952, with the coordinative mandate expressed in the promulgation of the OCB. Probably his concept of military "coordination" colored his judgment of the effectiveness of a civilian, interdepartmental coordinating board. Having lived all one's life in the glowering shadow of the Articles of War, it would be very easy to overlook the absence of such an impelling

incentive to effective coordination. That there is no such sanction renders the coordinating concept useless in the face of vested bureaucratic practice.

The Lack of Understanding

There is a second reason for the United States failure to develop total strategies. American leaders have never truly understood the nature of psychological operations; and, because the full implications of these operations have not been understood, they have never been fully exploited. Although the history of psychological policy implications can be traced back to earliest recorded time, traditionally, psychological operations were not recognized as a separate instrument of statecraft. This was probably due to the very narrow, special audience against which the implications of the traditional tools--diplomacy, military force, and economic activities--were used, whether singly or collectively. However, in the twentieth century, for the first time, it has become possible for the leaders of one nation to communicate directly with the population of another nation. Simultaneously, there has been an immense expansion of the potential or actual power base of a society. Even the most totalitarian of today's dictatorships is forced to solicit the active support of its subjects, whereas its predecessors could exist with mere passive acquiescence. Thus, the new-found power of the masses and the ability of a

foreign power to speak directly to these masses have raised the psychological tool to a level comparable with that of the three traditional instruments.

American Conceptions and Misconceptions

The American concept of psychological warfare has always been tainted with a suspicion of the instrument. Part of this stems from the American public's fear of being influenced psychologically by the government--a fear which is inevitable to a certain degree. This has been reenforced by the spectre of Nazi, Soviet, and Chinese psychological operations and propaganda. There is also the influence of the intriguing "all-American boy" complex that is periodically manifest in a preoccupation with a variation of the Marquis of Queensberry rules in so far as international relations are concerned. The U-2 incident was disturbing to many people simply because we were occupied in spying (and blatant spying at that), not because we got caught at it. The pathetic performance put on by every senior official concerned was capped only by the even more pathetically noble assumption of responsibility by the President. Of course, he was responsible! And every international politician knew that. The public expiation of this international sin was a reflection of the American bent of character which is somehow ashamed of anything that smacks of the underhanded or devious. Under this spell, the word

propaganda has meant something evil. It has meant the dirty weapon of the opponent. Extensive literary effort has been expended to develop some nice, clean, unalarming substitute for such terms as psychological war and propaganda--evidently on the assumption that a rose by any other name will somehow not smell like a rose.

American Usage and Propaganda

Psychological warfare and psychological operations, in American usage, have come largely to connote propaganda. The earliest large-scale experience of the nation was in World War I with the efforts of the Creel Committee. This was primarily a propaganda campaign based almost entirely upon an expansion of domestic advertising techniques. Two basic misconceptions have generally expressed themselves in all American psychological warfare programs ever since. The first is the idea that the conduct of psychological warfare and propaganda is just like advertising. The second is that foreigners think, or wish to think, like Americans.

There has been, for many years, a wide-spread belief that, since Americans are smart advertisers, all that the government needs to do is project this domestic form of agitation on a worldwide basis. Yet this approach is precisely what the world situation does not require. The United States is dealing with a world revolutionary situation involving races, cultures, and aspirations totally alien to American

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experience. Political propaganda is a task of extraordinary complexity and demands the most skilled and sophisticated American political guidance.

What is Good for the United States is Good for the World

Since the earliest days of the Republic, Americans have demonstrated a national ethnocentrism. The New World was, in fact, new, and it bred a new type of man, a new set of values, and new outlooks. Those who did not develop returned to Europe or were swallowed up in the process of the development of American culture. The period of the nineteenth century, during which the great focus of American attention was turned inward to continental consolidation, reenforced the opinion that the American way was a superior way; the spectacular growth which burst forth in the last quarter of the nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth centuries served as proof of the theorem. The American inclination to assume that what was good for America was good for everyone, the tendency to disregard the basic interest and outlooks of the foreign audiences to which America has addressed itself stem from this experience. Consequently, factual statements that the American working man or farmer has a carpet in his home, shoes for all his children, an automobile of his own, and liberty to do as he pleases are regarded as blatant lies by the Transcaucasian

peasant, who simply cannot imagine that one worker or farmer could possibly own such tangible and intangible things.

There has been a realistic trend away from this form of propaganda as the USIA has matured. The non-governmental media of communication, however, film, television, and magazines still convey this message and under the American system cannot be restrained from so doing. This poses an even greater problem for the USIA, for America possesses no revolutionary ideology to fire imaginations and to substitute for the material yearnings of the less-developed peoples of the world. Unfortunately, "you can't fill the baby's bottle with liberty";[3] and there is the ever-present danger of talking only to one's friends who already share American expectations and thereby losing "the great majority of mankind that is still searching for a hope and a vision."[4]

III. ANALYSIS OF SOVIET EFFORTS

When one pauses to contemplate the use that the Soviet Union has made of the psychological tool, one cannot fail to be impressed by the efficient and workmanlike manner in which psychological operations have been woven through

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[3]Saul K. Padover, "Psychological Warfare and Foreign Policy," Propaganda and International Relations, Urban G. Whitaker, Jr. (ed.) (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), p. 143, cited from a quotation of Maury Mavenck.

[4]Ibid.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

the Soviet system. This does not mean that free men should adopt a similar course, but it does indicate that psychological operations can be effective. The United States would be foolish not to recognize the operational strength of the Soviet structure and profit from those lessons which may be drawn in the light of the American experience.

A Total Program

The goals of Soviet foreign policy have been achieved and projected in terms of all resources, capabilities, and the entire machinery of Government. In Soviet hands, psychological operations have proven to be both flexible and responsive to initiative. Time after time in the last twenty years, the speed and efficiency with which the Soviets have moved from a military posture to political action and thence to economic pressure have caught the United States unprepared with any reply except one devised under the impelling pressure of the latest challenge.

Perhaps the single most striking feature of the Soviet effort is its totality, for the Soviet operation is an organizational one, and its strength lies in the rise of organization as a weapon. It is not the power of persuasion so much as it is the power that flows from a dedicated, disciplined, ruthless Combat Party.

The Soviet Value System

The national values which ground the employment of the Combat Party derive from Marxist-Leninist Bolshevik doctrine, portions of which have expanded and contracted, mutated and atrophied as the Soviet Union has progressed from the virulent, but "have not," revolutionary stage to the status of a great world power, rich and growing richer--a definite "have" state. Nevertheless, the communist ideology underlies the organizational and operational frame of the nation.

There exists a considerable body of opinion that holds that this Bolshevik ideology has little or no bearing on the operations or planning factors of the USSR. The observation that "dialectical materialism affected Stalin . . . (and by implication any of the Soviet leaders) . . . about as much and as little as the doctrine of Christian charity affected Ivan the Terrible" is picturesque and perhaps of value, in a rhetorical sense.[5] Such opinion maintains that the confrontation of the mid-twentieth century is a derivative of pure power politics, and that its polar star is power--nothing more nor less. This approach neglects the important role of values in the development of national goals and a national security policy. The leaders of the

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[5]Robert V. Daniels, "What the Russians Mean," Commentary (October, 1962), p. 47.

The Soviet Value System

The national values which ground the employment of the Combat Party derive from Marxist-Leninist Bolshevik doctrine, portions of which have expanded and concentrated, mutated and atrophied as the Soviet Union has progressed from the virulent, but "need not," revolutionary stage to the status of a great world power, rich and growing richer--a definite "have" state. Nevertheless, the communist ideology underlies the organizational and operational frame of the nation.

There exists a considerable body of opinion that holds that this Bolshevik ideology has little or no bearing on the operations or planning factors of the USSR. The observation that "dialectical materialism affected Stalin . . . (and by implication any of the Soviet leaders) . . . about as much and as little as the doctrine of Christian charity affected Ivan the Terrible" is picturesque and perhaps of value, in a rhetorical sense.[2] Once opinion maintains that the confrontation of the mid-twentieth century is a derivative of pure power politics, and that its polar star is power--nothing more nor less. This approach neglects the important role of values in the development of national goals and a national security policy. The leaders of the

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[2]Robert V. Daniels, "What the Russians Want," Commentary (October, 1963), p. 47.

Soviet Union believe in their value system--Marxist-Leninism--as firmly and deeply as their American counterparts believe in democracy. It is no more possible to claim that Soviet foreign policy is conceived independent of that nation's value system, than it is to hold that American values are eliminated during the development of United States policy.

> Unless we are able to devise political tactics and an organizational plan based precisely upon calculations for work over a long period of time, and at the same time, in the very process of this work, put our party in readiness to spring to its post . . . at the very first, even unexpected, call, as soon as the progress of events becomes accelerated, we will prove to be but miserable political adventurers . . . . It would be a grievous error indeed to build up the party organization in the expectation only of outbreaks of street-fighting, or only upon the "forward march of the drab, everyday struggle." We must always carry on our every day work and always be prepared for everything, for very frequently it is almost impossible to foresee beforehand when periods of outbreaks will give away to periods of calm. And even in those cases when it is possible to do so, it will not be possible to utilize this foresight for the purpose of reconstructing our organization, because . . . these changes from turmoil to calm take place with astonishing rapidity.[6]

Thus, in 1902, Lenin enunciated the basic organizational requirements for flexibility and long-range planning with no sharp distinction between words and deeds or between psychological or military warfare.

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[6]Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1927), pp. 4 and 244-245.

The Department of Propaganda and Agitation

To accomplish this organization, control of psychological operations is located at a very high point in the hierarchy of the government. The Department of Propaganda and Agitation, located within the Executive Staff of the Party Secretariat, exercises vast authority. This mandate touches every form of activity which might conceivably influence opinion. It functions as the planner, director, and supervisor for all media. Its mission includes that of providing the Presidium and Central Committee with analyzed data upon which these two high policy bodies can act in the development of a total national policy. The Department supervises the rigorous political education program from which it develops and maintains a well-trained and well-informed Combat Party structure throughout the world.

Agitatsya i Propaganda

Soviet Russia is the first nation in history to produce such a trained class of full-time propagandists, administrators, agitators, and organizers in a Combat Party. Contrary to the democratic attitude towards propaganda and psychological warfare and those who conduct it, AGITATSYA i PROPAGANDA are honorific words in the Soviet Union. They are honorable because the importance of these activities in the pattern of world revolution is recognized and respected. Consequently, the "psychological troops" have a sense of

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mission, a sense of contributing to the National destiny. Such regard is not accorded to American operators by their nation. Since there is no such division or separation of political, military, and civilian planning and executive efforts as exist within the American governmental structure, the Soviets experience little trouble in extracting the maximum psychological return from the integrated, total policy.

The Soviet Concept of Public Opinion

There are additional factors that render the organization of the Combat Party even more formidable. One of these lies in the fundamental distinction between public opinion as it is conceived in a democratic state and as it is conceived in the USSR. A democracy regards public opinion in terms of citizens freely taking a stand on an issue of public importance. The various media of mass communications are operated so as to present facts on which citizens may make up their minds on any given issue--the creation of diversity of opinions is encouraged. Through a process of free elections, the majority opinion is expressed and the government is modified accordingly. In the Soviet Union, quite the opposite is the case. A highly-organized central control of the media of mass communications is manipulated as a guide since the reader looks at the official communications to discover the correct position--not to find

conflicting arguments from which he may make up his mind. The Party and its communications serve to mobilize and formulate public opinion on all important issues. This is not to ignore the state of public attitudes and understanding, however. The Department of Propaganda and Agitation is careful to maintain a close evaluation of the attitudes of the masses so as to be able to estimate how ready they are to support a given policy. Once the direction and intensity of the attitudinal winds are determined, the Department then guides the vanguard and persuades or coerces the laggards. The elections which are held are designed to provide a symbolic expression of this unity. The change which follows such an election will not be reflected upward but downward. The state continues along a predetermined course and the population is expected to conform to the established Party line.

Scope of Operations

The sheer size and variety of the combat resources available are staggering. In all the Soviet world, the entire communications system is at the service of the Party. In any part of the world where the Combat Party functions, it may draw on as many of the proved devices as it can maintain. Furthermore, this Soviet program is a total program. The Combat Party at work outside the Soviet orbit may be

expected to approach its targets with every weapon that is available and appropriate.

It has been estimated that the cost of the most direct means, measures stemming from the professional propagandists, amount to at least five hundred million dollars a year. Indirect means of operation appear in the form of support for parallel organizations that do not openly avow the communist ideology but covertly follow the directions of Moscow; in infiltration tactics employed in schools, churches, trade unions, the press and most other communications media; and in the promotion of various front organizations which are directed at specific objectives such as the anti-European Defense Community campaign and the Stockholm Peace Appeal, as well as in the popular front movement which embrace nationalistic aspirations. When these are all added together they represent an immense psychological effort. A rough estimate is that the entire program involves the utilization of five hundred thousand men and an annual expenditure of some two billion dollars.[7] In comparison, the USIA's total budget is more than matched by the Soviet expenditures simply to jam the Voice of America.[8] This gigantic total is

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[7]United States Congress, Senate, The Technique of Soviet Propaganda (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 2-17 passim.

[8]Edward R. Murrow, Who Speaks for America (Washington: United States Information Agency Office of Public Information, Press Release No. 24, May 24, 1961), p. 13.

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one indication of the value placed on propaganda and the worth of psychological operations.

Role of the Philosophy of Class Struggle

The philosophy of class struggle conceives of every group not dominated by the Party as an enemy and permits no solution to world tension until the Party dominates all other groups--or is itself destroyed. The Combat Party is not a political party such as democratic countries are accustomed to foster and protect, but, rather, an instrument of war in a conflict which the Communists expect ultimately to win.

> It would be a great mistake to believe that a peaceful agreement about concessions is a peaceful agreement with capitalists. This agreement is equivalent to war.[9]

In the face of this point of view, so often and clearly stated, it is hard to believe that a settlement between the Soviets and the United States, by which they can live together indefinitely in peace, is conceivable to the Party leaders. On the other hand, arrangements with the United States, "codifying the momentary relationship of forces"[10] and permitting time to regroup forces for the next advance, are possible and often desirable.

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[9]Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York: McGraw Hill, 1951), p. 88, quoted from Lenin.

[10]Ibid., p. 90.

The Worldwide Opinion Campaigns

The great worldwide opinion campaigns are notable for their length and for the skill with which changes and variations were introduced so as to maintain interest over a long period. They all illustrate the choice of agitational material for wide and continued psychological operations. The peace campaign, the germ warfare campaign, the disarmament campaign, the peaceful coexistence campaign: they are all grounded in tensions of great potency and wide extent. The world is sick of war. The world is fearful of what Chemical-Biological-Radiological (CBR) warfare may bring. The world dreads the possibility of a thermonuclear exchange. In the latter case, the people of Asia are keenly aware that the United States has employed the nuclear weapon only against the yellow people of the Far East. These themes lend themselves to all kinds of specific as well as "rigged" events and evidence. In addition, they possess the beauty of being susceptible to simplification down to the level where the agitator can operate most effectively.

These campaigns have also served as most effective political lubricants for Soviet foreign policy. In his report on "Peace and War," made during the Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party, following the signing of the 1918 Brest-Litovsk peace treaty with Germany, Lenin established the fundamental pattern for the communist peace strategy:

The Aesthetic Option Completed

The great world-wide economic tangle are evocable for basic insight and for the built with which managers and workers have intervened in an to maintain impetuses over a long period. They all illustrate the erosion of explanations essential for wide and sustained psycho-logical operations. The person competent, the game workers mentality, the disorganized economy, the paranoid consciousness accompany. They are all grounded in theories of power potency and wide animals. The world is made of war. The enemy is fanatical or mute Communist-totalitarian (CIA) workers may believe. The social assault the possibility of a democratic existence. In the United states, the psyche of India are linearly behave that the United Nations employed the machine weapons only against the Indian people at the Sino wars. Those elements that threatened to all kinds of specific as well as "alcohol" awards the withdrawn. In addition, they provoke the capacity of being available to objectification down to the level where the existence can operate most efficiently.

These techniques have also served as most effective political instruments for Soviet foreign policy. In the support of Tsarism and later, when during the Leninist Communist of the Marxist-Communist party, following the signing of the 1918 Brest-Litovsk peace treaty with Germany, Lenin established the Fourth-Communist party for the communist cause throughout

1. Compare strengths and avoid war under unfavorable circumstances.
2. Peace negotiations are a means of accumulating power and should be used to seek temporary respite in preparation for new wars.
3. Be willing to retreat so as to plan for future attacks. If all men cannot be withdrawn in complete safety, at least try in half safety. Never hesitate to counter-attack in order to take the best advantage for all chances and opportunities.
4. Trade space for time.
5. Divide the enemies' strength and secure the fruits of revolution. Take maximum advantage of mistrust and discord within the enemy.
6. Crawl in deep mud to brew world revolution. There is nothing to which one cannot or must not resort in order to accomplish one's goals.

Thus Lenin projected the teachings of Marx and Engels who, when faced with serious defeats or frustations, were always ready to resort to the so-called "peaceful" stratagems. Engels, in this connection, held that on occasion one might be forced by circumstances to accept a compromise. When so confronted, however, the true revolutionary aim must never be abandoned; rather, with it firmly fixed in mind,

under whatever circumstances, its ultimate achievement must be pursued.

Stalin wielded the "peace strategy" weapons most effectively. During his dictatorship, the "united front" and "peaceful coexistence" themes were developed as means to seek cooperation with the Western democracies. During the late 1930's, Russian policy had led her to enter into peaceful coexistence arrangements with both sides of the approaching war.

Stalin's Strategic Concept for Peaceful Coexistence

Less than a year before his death, in an article in the September 15, 1952, issue of Pravda, entitled "Economic Problems of Socialism in Soviet Russia," Stalin, following in Lenin's steps, bequeathed the basic strategic direction for the skillful use of the "peaceful coexistence" campaign which was soon to blossom forth. Peaceful coexistence was to be employed as a psychological instrument of Soviet foreign policy so as to:

1. Prevent the premature outbreak of the decisive war against the Western World; i.e., before the Soviet Union was completely prepared, so as to avoid an irreparable defeat.
2. Win sufficient time behind the banner of "peaceful coexistence" so that the Soviet Union could accumulate its strength, multiply the production

of atomic weapons, and advance from an inferior position to a superior one.

3. Dampen the morale of the democratic countries, slow down their rearmament, and weaken their war potential.

4. Carry out, behind the call for peace, political infiltration throughout the free world, and by using neutralists and selfish peoples who want peace at any price sabotage the democratic world from within and place it entirely on the defensive.

5. Divide the democracies by the peace offensive and, above all, isolate the United States from its allies.

Despite his posthumous public degradation, Stalin's strategic legacy remains as valid, subject to Khrushchev's variation on Clausewitz's statement that "war is the continuation of policy by other means." If peace, in dialectic terms, is therefore a struggle, it differs from war not by its objectives, but by the means used. Peace, then, is the absence of military hostilities and nothing more. It is within this frame of reference that current Russian interpretation of peaceful coexistence is fixed. It is precisely this formulation which lends psychological operations their great utility in pursuing the Stalinist strategy.

The Soviet Disarmament Campaign

The really exquisite degree of policy integration, however, becomes strikingly apparent when the Soviet disarmament campaign is examined for the psychological implications and ramifications of this Kremlin policy.

Soviet national security objectives direct major effort toward the neutralization and removal of American power from Eurasia and eventual elimination of any form of military threat from the Western Hemisphere. These national security goals can be combined in proposals for disarmament, the guiding principle of which is: for the USSR, invulnerability; for the United States, paralysis.[11]

The individual goals of this Soviet policy include the following:[12]

1. The paralysis of American will to use strategic nuclear weapons and, if possible, the elimination of all American and other Western nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical.
2. The weakening or disintegration of the American alliance system, especially NATO.

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[11] J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 288.

[12] John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 36-44.

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[12] V. M. Macrinitsch, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (Lawrence: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 135.

[13] John S. Spenser and Joseph L. Hopes, The Politics of Disarmament (New York: Frederick A. Fraeger, 1957), pp. 33-34.

3. The identification of Soviet policies with the aspirations and aims of the neutral nations recently liberated from Western Colonialism. Psychological warfare has served as a principal vehicle for the pursuit of those goals. It has been, from the beginning, a campaign designed to place the USSR in a favorable position, to appeal to the different segments of world public opinion--the Communist bloc, the Western World, and the uncommitted or neutral nations.

The tactical approach has been to attempt to create a worldwide revulsion against nuclear weapons and to prompt peoples and governments all over the world to exert pressure on the American Government to forestall a possible resort to these arms in crisis. The end sought is to force the leadership elite to become unsure of their own capabilities, intentions, rights, and, above all, of their chances of success. This is to be accomplished by the neutralization of allies and by paralyzing principal sources of support, thereby causing the national leaders to vacillate.

By maneuvering American spokesmen into admitting that nuclear weapons are indeed terrible, the USSR has been able

> to place the United States in the paradoxical position whereby, on the one hand, her military power depends almost exclusively on nuclear weapons, while, on the other, her own representatives have stigmatized the

> very strategy on which the United States and her allies rely for their security.[13]

Thus the focus of global concern is disassociated from crises inspired or exploited by the communists and fixed upon the purported immorality of the employment of nuclear weapons, the danger of a nuclear holocaust, and American "atomic aggression."

Classic Bolshevik doctrine holds that communists cannot fight an unjust war, even if they initiate it, since wars fought by communism are, by definition, progressive and revolutionary, the qualifications for "just" war. Khrushchev carefully maintained the distinction between just and unjust wars, thereby retaining war as a permissible instrument of revolutionary change so long as it serves the interests of communism and so long as conditions are suitable for waging it. The Soviet disarmament campaign has represented a major attempt to keep the path to world revolution open to all means of struggle, including whatever use of military force may be necessary, to reach the Soviet goal of global supremacy.

Associated psychological threads weave through all of these programs with the common psychological goals of total paralysis of Western will and debilitation of Western military, economic, and political power. Call it peaceful

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[13] Ibid., pp. 38-39.

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Thus the focus of global concern is disassociated from crises inspired or exploited by the communists and fixed upon the purported immorality of the employment of nuclear weapons, the danger of a nuclear holocaust, and American "revenge aggression."

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[11] Ibid., pp. 28-29.

coexistence, disarmament, world peace--the ultimate interrelated and integrated goals are identical.

IV. A COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND UNITED STATES EFFORTS

A comparison of the organizations existing within the Soviet Union and the United States designed for the conduct of the psychological operations of psychological warfare is a discouraging exercise. It is difficult to compare such dissimilar operations. However, certain relative factors do emerge which demarcate areas of American weakness; these are as follows:

I. A. The Soviet Union is completely organized for the waging of total, full-scale, psychological warfare during peace time and has been so for over thirty years.

B. The United States has barely started its organizational development and has no policy guidance body specifically designated with the responsibility of insuring the development of an integrated, psychological program.

II. A. Soviet psychological operations are uniform and centrally directed in accordance with the integrated plans of the communist party. The control of these activities is absolute,

is at a very high point in the Party, and is the responsibility of a separate department within the Executive Staff of the Party Secretariat.

B. American psychological warfare is only partially uniform. It tends heavily towards information activities conducted by the USIA. There is no central guidance or control; instead, there is a somewhat informal coordination with little compulsion, other than an individual's devotion to duty, to insure that policies, plans, and public announcements are compatible.

III. A. The Soviet Union has waged psychological warfare for forty-six years and has developed advanced organizational and operational techniques. The strategy is a total program, integrating military force, diplomacy, economic activity, and psychological operations into a detailed interlocking plan of action.

B. The United States waged psychological war for the first time in World War I. It carried out extensive operations in World War II and the Korean War. After each of the first

two conflicts, the organizations were hastily disbanded and no scientific, scholarly examination of the lessons to be learned was conducted. Consequently, no effective organization has been developed. The USIA under the guidance of Edward R. Murrow, evolved into a first-class information operation, but lacks the proper psychological matrix to be truly effective as a tool for psychological operations. There is no total United States program: foreign policy is still carried out largely through individual, as opposed to the collective, efforts pursued along the parochial lines of action of the various components of foreign policy.

IV. A. The communist apparatus for psychological war is aggressive and is on the constant offensive--thus giving the USSR a psychological superiority.

B. United States psychological operations, having no clearly-defined place in the conduct of national strategy and not stridently on the offensive, are forced or, in the eyes of

the World, appear to be forced continually into a defensive position.

V. A. The Soviet program fights for the "liberation" of the suppressed and underprivileged. The program is repeated with an uncompromising insistence.

B. The United States has tended to be out of touch with the miseries and aspirations of the masses in the foreign countries, particularly those of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. As a result, the "pitch" has been too high and complicated--appealing to the spirit instead of the flesh. These tendencies began to diminish under Murrow's directorship of the USIA. Commercial means of mass communications retain the Madison Avenue-Hollywood approach. United States psychological efforts are certainly not insistent.

VI. A. Communist propaganda is spread by the largest propaganda organization in the world. Diplomats, trained underground organs, and the Communist Party sell the ideas of the propaganda war.

B. The United States has no single propaganda/

psychological warfare organization and no "psychological troops" to give unanimity to the utterances of the program, such as it may be.

VII. The people of the United States are generally ignorant or ill informed of the interrelationship between communism and the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. They are equally out of touch with their own heritage and national foreign policy. This has bred an apathy and aimlessness that, through the elected leaders, tends to blur the policy formulation process. In turn, a less than incisive and decisive foreign policy has become the hallmark of United States international relations.

However, before one becomes too despondent over these less than fatal frailities of the American nation, it should be remembered that:

> . . . the United States remains the largest extant revolutionary experiment in the world--the first immense human community which survives without profound dogma or profound hatred and which attempts to make short-range, practical, and warm hearted (though ideologically superficial) concurrence the foundation for a political and industrial civilization. If the United States . . . [can survive the cold war] it may be that the rest of mankind will be persuaded that our kind of practicality is not only humanly preferable, but scientifically more defensible than the philosophies of competing civilizations.[14]

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[14]Linebarger, op. cit., p. 296.

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[14] Linsberger, op. cit., p. 299.

CHAPTER VI

A PROPOSAL

I. INTRODUCTION

Many distinguished minds have been directed at the solution to the difficulties encountered in organizing for the conduct of psychological operations. Simultaneously, there has been a curious reluctance to undertake the tasks necessary to the attainment of the objectives of the organizations created. It is the conclusion of this paper that the access route to the development of total strategies, which are, after all, well thought out, integrated plans of action to achieve the goals of American foreign policy, lies through organization and the assumption of the responsibilities of leadership.

Familiarity with a weapon or tool comes only with the employment and use of the instrument. It does not come from philosophic, detached observations. This is not to imply lack of regard for the role of scholarly research; but operational experience derives fundamentally from operating. Scholarship and research can provide theory and tentative doctrine. Its worth is no greater than the practical use to which this theory and doctrine are, or can, be put. The clarity with which the theory and doctrine can be stated and refined requires an operational input. Operational

CHAPTER VI

A PROPOSAL

3. INTRODUCTION

requirements should dictate the doctrinal requirements, not *vice versa*.

It has been developed that in the United States there is neither a clearly-articulated nor a widely-accepted concept of the nature of the psychological instrument of foreign policy. This follows from the Jackson Committee's valid observation that the psychological aspect of policy is not separable from policy and that the psychological implication in every act does not have life apart from the act. The American pragmatic approach yearns for a clear-cut doctrine, a check-off list of "do's" and "don't's." Consequently there is a frustration that derives from attempting to define a function the nature of which is dependent upon the operational requirements of unforeseen contingencies. In vernacular terms, it leaves one with the problem of trying to explain to a person, blind from birth, how purple might taste; in other words, "you simply can't get there from here." One can write around this vicious circle of cause and effect, discoursing upon the innumerable variations on the basic theme, indefinitely. This much is clear, however; so long as the United States awaits the birth of a clear-cut articulation of the role of the psychological instrument before it attempts to utilize the instrument, the understanding needed to articulate the role will never be born. The governmental machinery is "hung on dead center"

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and will remain this way until an operational start is made. Action and only action will break the circle and dispel the

> fuzzy notion . . . [that psychological operations are limited to] a contest between two gladiators with the "minds of men" at stake . . . [accomplished through a process of] providing information or of cracking the Iron Curtain with a battering ram of truth.[1]

To organize the tools of foreign policy so as to provide an integrated strategy requires machinery for the resolution of conflicting department viewpoints and positions. Policy, once formulated, requires methods of evaluation to insure that it is being carried out. In effect, this demands a policing of the departments of government in order to assure the executive leadership that progress toward the policy objective is being made in the way the leadership wants it made. There can be no place for unresolved positions on important national issues simply because the resolution will tread on the toes of one department or another.

II. AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORTS

Since 1941, several distinct organizational approaches to the solution of the problem have been employed. Under Roosevelt, the solution was to proliferate agencies and to

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[1]Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 234-237, passim.

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layer successive committees, offices, and bureaus, one upon the other. The administrative maze that resulted was breath-taking. The almost total elimination of the psychological program following World War II had its bright side, for, at least, it wiped from the governmental complex a truly monstrous, almost grotesque arrangement.

Shortly after World War II, the second conception began to appear in the early State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). The pattern developed through a variety of larval stages and eventually appeared within the Department of State structure as the Interdepartmental Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.

The path of development then passed through the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) which was created by Executive Order in 1951. The PSB was to be responsible for the

> formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort.[2]

It was established outside the National Security Council structure but reported to the NSC on its activities and its

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[2]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, "National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union," Organizing for National Security, Volume 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 439.

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[4]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Policy Machinery in the Senate, Hearings, Reorganizing the National Security, Volume 3 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 119.

evaluation of national psychological operations including implementation of approved objectives, policies, and programs by the departments and agencies concerned. The PSB failed, primarily, because it was founded upon the basic misconception that psychological operations existed apart from official policies and actions and could be dealt with independently by experts in this field.

The last and most refined stage was reached in the establishment, by another Executive Order, of the Operations Coordinating Board. The OCB was, at first, outside the structure of the National Security Council and was not incorporated within the NSC structure for another four years. Following his election, President Kennedy eliminated the Board, thereby, at least temporarily, ending this direction of organizational development.

All of the bodies that were developed in this second approach to the problem suffered from a common, fatal flaw. They attempted to coordinate, to conciliate, to synchronize a total program out of the individual programs of the member activities. None of these bodies could direct or impose a solution. All of them were heeded only, if, as, and when it suited the member activities to act in effective concert. The decision to act in concert was retained on the agency or departmental level. No organization can function properly if presumptuous juniors are permitted to decide whether or

not they will carry out the letter and spirit of the policies of the chief executive. This observation remains as valid today as it was when Napoleon expounded it. A chief executive who permits the establishment of such an organization and subsequently does not correct any proclivities to parochialism is culpably responsible for the inevitable failure of the organization.

The third approach is really no approach at all. It was manifest by the Kennedy Administration's tendency to form policy out of small intimate meetings. This is the ad hoc method which may work satisfactorily in periods of comparative calm. The Cuban crisis produced food for some disturbing thought as to the degree of adaptability of the Kennedy approach to a multiple, high intensity, high risk crisis situation. The intellectual resources of the Government were totally committed during the October 1962 crisis; it is difficult to perceive how a similar or several similar crises could have been handled simultaneously. An effective organization for the employment of the tools of foreign policy must be able to serve in peace, "cold" war, or "hot" war without any major structural adjustments. The government must go on; it cannot pause in mid stride, drop everything else it is doing, and deal with the crisis of the moment. To operate and organize for such a method of problem solving is to invite grave danger.

III. THE POTENTIAL OF THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

The first and third patterns are considered to be very poor and to offer little security if pursued. But the second approach still offers much promise provided it is corrected so as to function viably. The Operations Coordinating Board could have performed as it was intended to perform had it:

1. Been able to direct the members to develop long-range and integrated plans under the policy guidance of the National Security Council.
2. Been able to direct the members to carry out the plans and policy as formulated.
3. Not been allowed to develop away from its original concept. Its official inclusion within the National Security Council Structure in 1957 was bound to result in its performing less of its designed function and more as a NSC staff arm. This is precisely what occurred.
4. Been endowed with sufficient status to deal, at least, on an equal level with the operating agencies and departments. Access to the President, the Cabinet, and the National Security Council must not only be possible, but it must be easy as well. Under the existing conditions

of overlap and multiplicity of responsibility and authority, an agency attempting to develop long-range, integrated plans simply will not be able to conduct effective operations if it is on a lower level of importance than the Department of State or the Defense Department.

IV. CORRECTIVE MEASURES

Status of the Agency Head

Were such a body, as heretofore outlined, to exist, the position of its head within the government hierarchy would be of vital importance. He should attend all meetings of the Cabinet and all National Security Council meetings. He should be at no lower organizational level than that of a Cabinet member. These requirements stem from the following consideration:

First, he must be sufficiently high in rank to speak on equal terms with the department heads of the government. If his organization is to be effective, he must participate, as an equal, in the highest staff levels of policy formulation where his views on the susceptibility of emerging policy to integration into a coordinated planning system could be voiced positively and authoritatively. Since he would be directly concerned with the psychological implications of integrated plans formulated for the achievement of

policy goals, he should inject directly into the policy formulation process a feeling for the important psychological implications which would be expressed much later in those psychological operations developed as part of an integrated national planning process in support of policy. Had such a high level of advice been available, it is possible that decisions which led to such sources of long-term political discomfort as the recognition of Israel, the refusal to fund the Aswan Dam, and the Sky-Bolt might have been viewed in a different manner. Therefore, his position would be untenable if he must participate as a guest or a junior member in any of the policy process.

A second consideration is that his contribution must be made expeditiously so that it may have its impact before policy is formulated. To consult with, or to be consulted by, a Cabinet member or a member of a Cabinet member's staff, out of the context of the actual discussion and after the fact is unsatisfactory. Policy formulation as well as planning for policy execution must be integrated. In many cases, there will be no time or opportunity for altering decisions or changing the course of policy action taken by the President and his principal advisers after they have determined what the decisions and courses should be.

There is one government official whose position within the executive hierarchy vests him with the stature

necessary for such a post: the Vice President of the United States. His post already exists; he is ranked only by the President himself; and he possesses a direct route of communication to the President which is unsurpassed. His direct participation in this foreign policy process would also serve the Country in the most advantageous manner with respect to preparing the Vice President for the full responsibility of the Presidency should he be called upon to succeed to this post.

Agency Location and Authority

An agency such as has been implied might well be established within the Executive Offices of the President and titled the "President's Planning Board." It would have its function stated in the Executive Order establishing its existence as follows:[3]

> The National Security Council having recommended a national security policy and the President having approved it, the Planning Board shall: (1) whenever the President shall hereafter so direct, establish, develop, and formulate with the participation of the

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[3]The statement of function for the OCB serves as an excellent basis for this proposed "President's Planning Board." The original, from section 2 of the Executive Order establishing the OCB, appears on page 455 of U.S. Congress, Senate, Organizing for National Security, op. cit. The OCB, even to its last days exhibited so many possibilities, had it not been "still-born," so to speak, and had it been allowed to develop and not permitted to fall prey to staff absorption within the NSC that it offers a natural basis for an organizational solution.

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> agencies concerned (a) detailed operational planning responsibilities respecting such policy, (b) the integration of the interdepartmental aspects of the detailed operational plans developed by the agencies to carry out such policy, (c) a timely and integrated schedule for execution of such plans, and (d) national plans in such a manner as to exploit the full psychological aspects and implications of the nation's national security policy. (2) initiate new proposals in response to opportunity and changes in the situation. The Board shall from time to time make reports to the National Security Council with respect to the implementation of this order.

The Board thus would start life invested with the Presidential mandate to act, to formulate coordinated policy, and to direct the constituent agencies to carry out the plans developed. It would face the agencies with the necessity to consider individually and collectively the psychological implications throughout the total program.

Membership and Organization

The membership and organization of the President's Planning Board would include the following:

The Director

The Director of the President's Planning Board would be the Vice President of the United States. The Director would participate in all National Security Council and Cabinet meetings and preside at all meetings of the Planning Board.

The Planning Board

The Planning Board would be composed of the following officials:

1. The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
2. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
3. The Director of the USIA.
4. The Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
5. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
6. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The Planning Board Working Groups[4]

These groups would be composed of responsible operating officials from the agencies concerned with policy implementation. The chairman of each group would be representative of the Planning Board staff, and his deputy would be the group member from the agency which had chief responsibility. Each group would include a member from the Bureau of the Budget. The functions of these working groups would be two fold: (1) to provide a standing mechanism at the working level for the development of integrated actions to implement national security policies and

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[4]Patterned after the OCB working groups. In this case, however, Chairmanship devolves upon a Staff member of the Planning Board, providing a tighter control than existed under the OCB system.

[illegible]

(2) to prepare operations plans and progress reports for consideration by the Planning Board.

The Planning Board Assistants[5]

A Board Assistant would be designated from each agency represented on the Planning Board. The membership would include a representative from the Bureau of the Budget. Duties would be to provide staff support for each Board Member; to assist him in interdepartmental as well as intradepartmental planning and negotiation on subjects dealt with by the Board; and to aid the respective agency's Working Group members in meeting the requirements laid down by the Planning Board. In order to meet his responsibilities, an official designated for duty as a Board Assistant would have to hold sufficient rank within his organization to give him direct access to the principal operating officials of his agency.

As a group, the Planning Board Assistants would meet weekly, under the Chairmanship of the Special Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Planning, to review papers prepared by the working groups in order to insure that the documents were

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[5]Patterned directly after the OCB Assistants or "Board Assistants" as they were commonly called.

ready for Board action. It is at this point that most careful attention would be directed to the adequacy of a paper, the accurate reflection of any differences of view among the agencies, and the development of a proposed course of action for further consideration by the Board.

The Planning Board Staff[6]

The Planning Board staff would be composed of the following elements:

1. The Office of the Planning Board Staff Director and the Deputy Director. The Special Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Planning would be the Director.
2. The Secretariat, which would be the source of executive secretaries for the working groups and would generally assist and provide substantive staff support for the process by which member agencies reached decisions and developed actions to carry out national security policies.
3. The Supervisory Staff which would be the source for all chairmen of the Planning

[6]Patterned after the OCB Staff.

Board Working Groups. The Deputy Director of the Planning Board Staff would assume direct responsibility for the operational guidance of this Staff element.

4. The Special Studies Staff which would provide the Special Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Planning and the Supervisory Staff with current background information on foreign political, military, economic, social, and ideological developments effecting the psychological aspects of implementation of national security policies.

The Executive Office of the Director

The Executive Office of the Director would include the Vice President's personal Planning Board Staff which would be headed by the Special Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Planning. It would also include an Office of Inspector General which would be competent to review and evaluate any and all aspects of the operations of Planning Board Agencies.

The Special Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Planning

The Special Assistant to the Vice President for

National Security Planning would be the Vice President's principal staff officer for national security affairs. He would be a person without departmental ties who, through a direct and close staff relationship with the Vice President, would be fully cognizant of the desires and the requirements of the Vice President. The Special Assistant would sit with the State Department Policy Planning Council. He would also sit with the Cold War Advisory Panel of the Department of Defense. He would act as the Executive and principal Staff Officer for the Planning Board, would be the director of the Planning Board Staff, and would chair the Planning Board Assistants.

In a further attempt to improve the quality of input to the Planning Board and the policy formulation process, the Director of the USIA would be designated a member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State. He would attend, as a guest, all Cabinet meetings and all National Security Council meetings. He would continue to be represented on the Cold War Advisory Panel of the Department of Defense.

Operational Evaluation

At this point, the concept of operational evaluation is worth a brief examination. Frankly, it is borrowed from

the idea of the General Accounting Office which acts as a form of independent follow-up and fiscal conscience for the departments and agencies of the Government. The resistance to enforced policy integration will extend downward in all the agencies. It is a peculiar bureaucratic phenomenon that the more junior the official, the more vested becomes the interest and operational patterns. In agencies as large as are those concerned with the formulation and execution of National Security Policy, the dragging of myriads of "little" feet can paralyze the production of total plans. The road to the little man's heart is through his efficiency report, and it would be the role of the Inspector General's staff to shed light on the degree of effective staff work within the agencies.

In the same manner that the Vice President would serve in a way no other official could as the eyes and ears of the President, so would the Inspector General serve the Vice President. The Inspector General would report directly to the Vice President on the results of a continuous series of surprise working inspections administered by his staff to the various headquarters and field offices of Board agencies. These reports would be the basis for improvements in a weak post or activity. The personnel assigned to this office should serve extended tours, on loan from the agencies comprising the Board. They must have demonstrated unquestioned

integrity, objective judgment, and marked ability in a variety of headquarters and field posts of the parent agency before consideration for assignment to the Planning Board Staff.

V. CONCLUSION

It is not intended to delve further into this organization. In the research and studies incident to the development and writing of this paper, a conspicuous lacuna in the American efforts to evolve an organization for the conduct of psychological warfare has been the marked failure to profit from past mistakes. There has been a reluctance to modify and to utilize anything of the past. New structures have been erected and discarded to be replaced by entirely different arrangements. Some of the proposals have been truly mammoth in concept and design, extending to the advocacy of an additional department of the Federal Government. While the American quest has been definitely along the organizational line, its philosophy seems to be that the answer can only lie in something predominantly new and untried.

There seems little doubt that the path is, indeed, an organizational route. However, organization can be expected to produce only a partial answer. President Truman kept a small sign on his White House Desk; it read: "The Buck

Stops Here." The acceptance of the inescapable responsibility of leadership can never be avoided through some piece of organizational legerdemain. The unending series of organizational failures are silhouetted in the light of this reality.

It is submitted that the time is long past when we should look over our shoulder; survey where we have been; and divest ourselves of the American preoccupation with the organizational extravaganza.

The proposed solution makes but three claims to any originality. It attempts to employ an old, familiar framework which, if properly restructured, could function effectively. It focuses attention upon the responsibility of leadership and annunciates an unequivocal, positive guidance which demands, rather than requests, a specific performance from the governmental agencies. At all levels, direction and control are retained tightly, under the interlocking supervision of the Planning Board's permanent staff members. Finally, it is comparatively simple and attempts to profit from the more obvious lessons of the past. In the last analysis, however, the following words of Theodore Roosevelt articulate the riddle of national purpose which must be solved, at all levels of American government and society, if this Nation is to continue along its path of greatness:

> If we stand idly by . . . if we shirk from hard contests where men must win at hazard of their lives and at risk of all they hold dear, then the bolder and stronger people will pass us by and will win for themselves the domination of the world.[7]

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[7]Cited in United States Navy, Leadership Manual (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 1.

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[7]Cited in United States Navy, Leadership Manual
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PLANNING FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

A PROPOSAL

A Research Paper

Presented To

The Research Department

Air Command and Staff College

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements of ACSC

by

Major Lee-Volker Cox

March 1997

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14. ABSTRACT

It is incumbent upon the state to gain support for national objectives. Employment of instruments of power is designed to influence other nations and organizations to respond favorably. Therefore, impacting the decision making process is the underlying principle for IOP power projection and highlights the psychological element. During a period of declining resources and increased world competition, the United States must find new ways to reach out and promote American interests. In order to maximize the impact and exploit the influence events create, joint planning and interagency coordination of psychological operations are critical. The current ad hoc interagency coordination and joint planning process do not maximize the psychological factors? impact and fully exploit its asymmetrical influence on a target audience?s decision making process. Traditional views towards concepts, particularly military PSYOP, do not lead to the innovative solutions demanded by an environment of declining funds and resources. This study recognizes the multidimensional aspect of military PSYOP and calls for redefining an area of operations that has changed little over the years. Additionally, the establishment of an organization responsible for the development of a national marketing strategy integrating all IOPs to achieve objectives beyond the tactical level is advocated. Reviewing subject matter literature from the last forty years provided the project?s basis for concepts relating to PSYOP and the Soviet missile gap deception case study. Internet searches, interviews, and recent literature brought current issues to light and developed a picture of U.S. organizations involved in influencing target audiences.

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Preface

The ancestor of every action is a thought.

—Ralph Waldo Emerson

Thoughts and ideas are the most powerful weapons on earth, for without them questions would be left unanswered and decisions not made. This project explores the tools that are available not only to the warfighter but all decision makers to influence others. The study was developed to: encourage discussion throughout the government and military, not just among those who are considered PSYOP specialists; and call for a reevaluation of how we, as a nation, influence others in pursuit of our objectives.

The impetus for this project was two-fold: professional and personal. First, the recognition that although the armed forces are undergoing their largest demobilization and infrastructure reduction since World War II, their ops tempo is at an all time high as they are increasingly called upon to participate in military operations other than war (MOOTW). In this environment of declining resources and increased taskings, it is imperative we leverage our capabilities to maximize their impact.

Second, I came to the realization that everything we do in the military is done to influence the actions of others. We may use our military instrument of power either as a stick to coerce and deter or as a carrot to entice. Regardless of how or why it is employed, its objective remains constant: to influence others to take actions favorable to American interests.

The following pages argue for the redefining of military PSYOP as it is traditionally understood and the establishment of an organization that guides and integrates its multidimensionality with the psychological impact of other instruments of power into a coordinated national PSYOP effort. The framework begins in chapter one with the development of terminology and systems to introduce the reader to key concepts. Chapter two provides an overview of U.S. organizations involved in influencing target audiences, followed by the Soviet strategic missile gap deception case study in chapter three. The final two chapters integrate concepts and identify the need to redefine PSYOP and the potential role it has in grand strategy.

It would have been impossible to complete this project without the help and efforts of many people. I wish to thank Major Ralph Millsap of Air Command and Staff College for providing me with endless leads for information, loaning support material from his personal library and sponsoring this project as my faculty research advisor. My gratitude goes to President George Bush for responding to my written questions and for sending interview and speech transcripts. Colonel Frank Goldstein of Air War College also deserves my appreciation for our discussions and access to his collection of subject matter materials, as well as Dr. Richard Muller, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Weaver and Major George Weil for their interviews. Many thanks to Phillip Lacombe, with whom I have had numerous stimulating discussions dealing with image and perception projection over the years. My parents were also instrumental in instilling in me the understanding that actions do speak louder than words and what we do influences others. Finally, for my wife Michelle, many thanks for not only her understanding and support, but also her help as a research assistant.

This project explores issues that are not commonly accepted and proposes ideas that go beyond the traditional understanding of PSYOP. It is designed to challenge you to "think outside the box." PSYOP offers you, the warfighter, another tool to leverage U.S. capabilities and exploit the cascading effects of influencing the decision making process. As we head into the 21st century, we need all the tools we can get!

Abstract

It is incumbent upon the state to gain support for national objectives. Employment of instruments of power is designed to influence other nations and organizations to respond favorably. Therefore, impacting the decision making process is the underlying principle for IOP power projection and highlights the psychological element. During a period of declining resources and increased world competition, the United States must find new ways to reach out and promote American interests. In order to maximize the impact and exploit the influence events create, joint planning and interagency coordination of psychological operations are critical.

The current ad hoc interagency coordination and joint planning process do not maximize the psychological factors' impact and fully exploit its asymmetrical influence on a target audience's decision making process. Traditional views towards concepts, particularly military PSYOP, do not lead to the innovative solutions demanded by an environment of declining funds and resources. This study recognizes the multidimensional aspect of military PSYOP and calls for redefining an area of operations that has changed little over the years. Additionally, the establishment of an organization responsible for the development of a national marketing strategy integrating all IOPs to achieve objectives beyond the tactical level is advocated.

Reviewing subject matter literature from the last forty years provided the project's basis for concepts relating to PSYOP and the Soviet missile gap deception case study.

Internet searches, interviews, and recent literature brought current issues to light and developed a picture of U.S. organizations involved in influencing target audiences.

Chapter 1

Introduction

> *To fight and conquer in all battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.*
>
> —Sun Tzu
> *The Art of War*

Conflict is a part of life born from the desire for change. Inherent in change are two opposing forces, one empowered by the status quo and the other driven by the aspiration for a new order. As Sun Tzu recognized 2500 years ago, victory need not be gained on the battlefield. Rather, victory is determined by the side which exerts the greatest influence over the other's decisions and actions, thereby inserting a psychological dimension into conflict. A state has at its disposal instruments of power (IOPs) that provide it with a broad range of options to influence events. When employed in concert, the synergistic effect of diplomatic, economic, military, and information initiatives enhances the state's ability to impact a target audience's decision making process. Since there is a psychological dimension to each IOP, their integration ensures a unity of effort among all participating organizations and maximizes their influence.

Recently, decision makers have placed an ever increasing demand for military IOP options short of the traditional mission of winning the nation's wars. The current national military strategy directs numerous military operations other than war (MOOTW) to "help

shape the evolving world environment," an objective that is not unique to the military.[1] This emphasis places importance on exploiting the military's psychological impact beyond the tactical battlefield level, a prime candidate for military PSYOP but an area of planning that has not received the emphasis warranted by its potential results. Traditional military PSYOP conducted by military personnel emphasizes tactical, battlefield operations. To maximize the military's impact, people both inside and outside the defense establishment must go beyond this limited understanding and a accept a new multidimensional military PSYOP incorporating both military and non-military efforts. A multidimensional PSYOP that embraces all activities conducted by the military to influence not only military events but also economic and political decisions *and* other IOP initiatives designed to influence decisions that impact the military. Only after recognizing the potential influencing power of the military and its synergistic psychological impact when coordinated with other IOPs, can a successful integrated national PSYOP strategy maximize its impact on a target audience's decision making process.[2]

The author proposes that the national strategy planning process lacks sufficient oversight and fails to effectively coordinate the psychological dimension of all the nation's IOPs into an integrated PSYOP strategy. Furthermore, a new understanding of military PSYOP and its inherent multidimensionality is critical for the establishment of a national PSYOP strategy.

Terminology

A wide variety of concerns mold relationships and can be divided into two categories. Those one has control over and those one does not.[3] The environment in which these

relationships exist drives the establishment of national objectives and interests. For instance, the American belief of Manifest Destiny resulted in the Louisiana and Oregon Territory purchases and a war with Mexico. While more recently, the North American Free Trade Agreement was signed to bolster America's economy, an objective outlined in President Clinton's National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement.

The key to influencing a state's behavior and benefiting the sender's objectives is shaping the state's environment, such that decision makers perceive it is in their best interest to take actions favorable in relation to the sender. Therefore, the ability to influence another nation's decisions is based on the perceptions of events as it relates to that states' objectives. This does not imply that the one attempting to influence has complete control over events that shape the target state's environment. However, the power to influence is grounded in manipulating perceptions (perception management) and therefore the psychological element. The accuracy of those perceptions is irrelevant. Their value is not what can or can not occur, but what others believe will occur. It can be said then that the ability to psychologically impact a target audience and favorably influence its decisions serves as the cornerstone of a state's ability to project power.[4]

Today's easy accessibility of information is driving an increasingly interdependent world. Methods of employing IOPs to influence target audiences and the size of those audiences are both growing. As William Bundy recognizes, "Real power—the ability to affect others—seems in fact more widely dispersed than at any other time in world history."[5] An increasing number of leaders and decision makers throughout the government now recognize the importance of coordinating efforts to influence both foreign and domestic audiences. As a result of this heightened interest in influencing

others, policy letters, directives, and other publications are calling for an increased emphasis on projecting the right image to the right audience at the right time to achieve greater success for U.S. initiatives. All of these developments point to the need to better understand the psychological factors that impact the decision making process.[6]

Elements of PSYOP Development

The recognition of the need to coordinate efforts has led to a plethora of concepts and terms relating to PSYOP ranging from the benign sounding marketing and public diplomacy to what many view as anti-democratic tactics such as deception and black propaganda. Theorists, authors, and practitioners have redefined and modified PSYOP terminology to the point that definitions and concepts applicable to this paper must be reviewed prior to further discussion of the topic.

Psychological operations take place throughout the tactical, operational, and strategic environments. The contributions of military PSYOP at the tactical level, supporting a commander during conflict by employing loudspeakers, radio and television transmissions, leaflets, and other locally focused activities, have proven to be effective in combat, most recently Desert Storm. Tactical activities have for the most part gained acceptance and become embedded in the planning process. This paper focuses its efforts on the less understood and accepted strategic and operational PSYOP.

Operational PSYOP is regionally focused. In terms of military efforts, operational military PSYOP involves regionally oriented efforts prior to, during, and after conflict in support of a commander's plans. The final grand strategy level category is strategic, which involves all activities conducted by the government to "influence foreign attitudes,

perceptions, and behavior in favor of U.S. goals and objectives."[7] The Reagan Administration actively pursued strategic PSYOP. However, they also integrated domestic audiences, creating what this paper uses as public diplomacy efforts.[8]

Once the level, strategic, operational, or tactical, of the PSYOP initiative is established, then its purpose, basis, and type must be determined. The PBT model in figure one integrates these three elements (purpose, basis, type) of PSYOP to create a representation of the wide range of activities available to the planner. The purpose for PSYOP activities can be either, coercive, deterrent, or incentive, and is directly related to the desired response.



Figure 1. PSYOP Purpose-Basis-Type (PBT) Model[9]

For instance, as the U.S. projects power, it can influence another government's decision to reverse course, maintain the status quo, or choose a favorable option from several courses of action (COA). A review of the literature reveals a significant disagreement of the uniqueness of coercive and deterrent activities, and very little discussion on incentive PSYOP. For this paper, coercive activities include efforts to convince a government to *reverse* previous decisions and positions. This may involve the threat of force, sanctions, or the removal of special benefits. Deterrence implies the *prevention* of a given course of action, that may or may not have been the state's most

beneficial option. Finally, incentive initiatives are designed to influence a state to *choose* a given option that furthers U.S. interests. Incentives may include security assurances, favored nation status, exchange programs, or nation assistance to name just a few.

A second element of PSYOP is the initiative's factual basis and can be categorized as either white, gray, or black. White activities are based on fact. Black PSYOP ignores the facts and is made-up of lies and fabrications. Gray activities fall between the two extremes and are neither completely true nor false, but may be considered exaggerations and half-truths. Surprisingly, a large amount of the literature is dedicated to the discussion of propaganda in these terms, but none could be found deriving similar identifiers for PSYOP activities in general. However, discussions concerning propaganda assign a second attribute to the concepts, that of what organization is credited with the product, resulting in a restrictive two-dimensional model.[10] The final element of PSYOP addresses this issue.

The third piece of the puzzle involves the type of activities, overt or covert. In the former, the sponsoring state is open and attaches its credibility to events, while the later is characterized by clandestine operations. Figure one serves as a model to illustrate the multidimensionality of PSYOP initiatives and the relationships between its three elements. For instance during the Cold War, U.S. efforts to prevent a Soviet nuclear attack were deterrent in nature. The deterrence was based on a real retaliatory capability (white) and communicated to the world through public statements and demonstrations (overt). Therefore, this can be identified as a deterrent-white-overt PSYOP effort.

Western societies are comfortable with this type of campaign and view activities in the non-white covert realm as inappropriate. On the other hand, maskirovka (deception

tactics) was embedded in the former Soviet Union's power projection efforts. The missile gap deception, discussed in chapter three, serves as an outstanding example of their ability to incorporate multidimensional PSYOP in pursuit of strategic objectives. One of the deception's objectives was to drive a wedge between the Western alliance (coercive). To accomplish this, their deception campaign involved a public campaign of threats (overt) based upon exaggerated capabilities claims (gray). Although their overall efforts may be categorized as coercive-gray-overt, they integrated efforts spanning the entire range of PSYOP from coercive to incentive, white to black, and overt to covert, in attempts to achieve strategic objectives.[11]

The previous discussions are not inclusive of all the issues relating to PSYOP. However, they serve as the background required for understanding the basis of this paper.

Influencing the Target Audience

To better understand how the U.S. influences certain actions or positions of other states, the process leading up to their decision for a given action must be examined. In *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* John Petersen identifies ideas and perceptions as the keys to influencing decision makers in a rapidly changing world environment.

> We have new sets of global problems that discount traditional, narrowly focused national interests. We are finding that the notion of using brute force to coerce behavior change is crude and inefficient, and eventually adds to our problems. We are coming to understand that the nurturing of systems requires new mind-sets and new tools…we appear to be changing our forces from hardware to ideas and perceptions. The fact that there are few things more powerful than ideas for changing someone's behavior only lends fuel to the trend.[12]

Petersen recognizes ideas must be communicated in such a way that the receiver perceives the desired message and then acts upon it favorably in relation to the sender's

objectives. In order to influence decisions, it is critical that PSYOP practitioners understand how to link their objectives with a target audience's actions. The Action-Influence Model (AIM) serves as a framework to do just that. What follows is an overview of key AIM concepts. An in-depth discussion of the model's four phases and an example are located at appendix D, figures 10-15.

The basis for AIM is an understanding of how a sender creates observable phenomena that influence a target audience's decision making process, resulting in actions favorable to the sender. The message flow process, pictured in appendix A, figure four, provides a general framework for the more detailed components of AIM. Forming desired phenomena to support a given interest is the task of the message sender.[13] The sender must carefully select the medium(s) that will most likely result in the desired phenomena, thereby impacting the final decision. By no means is it inferred that the sender has control over all factors involved in both creating and the resultant perception of the phenomena. Although the message process requires a great deal of planning throughout, it is impossible to overcome all of the fog and friction existing within the environment and interactions between humans. However, selecting the proper target audience is a critical link in the process, for if the wrong people are influenced, then the targeted decision making process will not be impacted.[14]

Clausewitz identifies a trinity of the government, people, and military; within each state that is fundamental for its continued existence. All three interact and influence each other in different ways depending on the situation. The understanding of their relationship is imperative, if one is to develop a plan to influence a given segment of society. For as Clausewitz suggests,

> A theory that ignores any one of them and seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.[15]

Figure five, appendix B, demonstrates the relationships between these groups and figure six recognizes the overlap of membership among groups. Within each of the groups, there are various levels incorporating people with greater stature or importance as displayed in appendix C, figure eight. Phenomena may be perceived at any level and then communicated throughout the group or across to one of the other segments (appendix C, figure nine). Regardless of the type of society—democratic, autocratic, monarchy—these relationships do exist to one extent or another. Their impact of cross-influencing other segments may rely on the type of society, but ultimately any one of the three can make decisions or serve as the primary advocate for change.[16] The segment of society that is most influential and the most likely to be impacted in regard to a desired outcome becomes the target audience.

Once the target audience is selected, it becomes the task of the PSYOP specialist to determine the best methods to influence them, taking into consideration contextual and operational variables such as culture, attitudes, motives, social class, religion, organization, and mediums of message transmission.[17] Integrating and expanding these concepts result in AIM.

During the analysis phase (appendix D, figure 11) the sender identifies an objective that is not being achieved and establishes a target audience that is in a position to beneficially influence decisions. As part of the projection phase, seen in figure 12, events are tailored to influence the target audience's decision making process. The medium employed to create a phenomena that transmits the message may aim to coerce, deter, or

entice and can range from actual military force to the media. Col. John Boyd's OODA (observation-orientation-decision-action) loop serves as the basis for the third phase.[18] The internalization phase, in figure 13, begins with the observable phenomena, which may be altered by uncontrollable factors (fog and friction) before it is filtered by the target audience's perceptions. Additional groups, including domestic and secondary audiences, also observe the event and impact either the target audience or message sender. Inputs to the target audience are evaluated and influence a decision to take an action that either moves towards or away from the desired outcome or has no change. As part of the feedback phase, figure 14, the sender evaluates the message's success with the new outcome and inputs from other audiences, resulting in a new objective or further attempts to meet current interests.[19]

Notes

[1] National Military Strategy of the United States, *A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), i. Although this particular quote is from the executive summary, the overall strategy identifies peacetime engagement and deterrence and conflict prevention as primary tasks facilitated by overseas presence and power projection. All of these are MOOTW activities aimed at impacting the perceptions and therefore decision making process of other nations, peoples, or groups.

[2] Frank R. Barnett and Carnes Lord, eds., *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press Publications, 1989), xi.

[3] The Air Force's Air Command and Staff College discusses the importance of considering a wide range of factors during the development of a military initiative in the campaign planning model (see below). Although the campaign planning model is primarily taught as a tool for the development of military action, its basic concepts can be applied to PSYOP initiatives. Beginning with the appropriate end state that will satisfy strategic objectives. Strategic objectives are translated into military objectives. In order to achieve the military objectives, enemy centers of gravity must be identified. These centers of gravity assist in the development of possible COAs, resulting in a final plan. Throughout the process, the campaign planning model identifies the concerns that help shape the environment as "operational art" and "contextual elements." Operational art components are factors that the sender has some control over (more over their own then the target audience's) and include: logistics, technology, information, deception, and targeting

science to name a few. Contextual elements are factors that the sender has little control over other than to possibly exploit the relationships they develop. Several contextual elements are: political, cultural, economic, and leadership.

[4] Hans J. Morgenthau, Albert A. Michelson, and Leonard Davis, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 28-33.

[5] William Bundy, "Elements of Power," *Foreign Affairs* 56, no. 1 (October 1977): 3.

[6] Terminology is not common across agencies and organizations. However, the importance of influencing others using various non-combat methods and a call for better coordination of efforts is a recurring theme. For examples see: United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, http://www.usia.gov/abtusia/ac/96rept.html; White House, *National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement*; U.S. Department of State, Structure and Organization, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/dosstruc.html, Joint Pub 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.*

[7] Joint Publication (Joint Pub) 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, 10 July 1996, I-2.

[8] President, National Security Decision Directive no. 77, "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security," 14 January 1987.

[9] The author developed the PBT model as a representation of the primary elements of PSYOP encountered during the course of research for this project. Although others discussed these elements, few integrated them. None could be found addressing all three.

[10] Col Frank L. Goldstein and Col Daniel W. Jacobowitz, "Psychological Operations: An Introduction," in Col Frank L. Goldstein and Col Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., eds., *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1996): 6.

[11] Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 4. See also U.S. Department of Defense, *Lexicon of Selected Soviet Terms Relating to Maskirovka (Deception)*, Intelligence Document no. DDB-2460-3-83 (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1983). The lexicon provides a broad overview of terms and initiatives related to Soviet deception tactics.

[12] John L. Petersen, "Info War: The Next Generation," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 123/1/1, no. 127 (January 1997): 61.

[13] Department of the Air Force, *Cornerstones of Information Warfare*, 2-3.

[14] Twentieth Air Force, *Twentieth Air Force Communication Strategy: Telling America's ICBM Team Story.*

[15] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89. Some historians and theorists present the concept that if Clausewitz were alive today, he would incorporate the media into his theories, converting his trinity into a cube or some other application. For further discussion, see appendix B, Trinity Plus One discussion.

[16] Many of these concepts evolved over a span of several years of conversations with Phillip Lacombe, Staff Director of the President's Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection.

Notes

[17] Col Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., "Blending Military and Civilian PSYOP Paradigms," in Col Frank L. Goldstein and Col Benjamin F. Findley, eds., *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1996), 55.

[18] Col John R. Boyd, *A Discussion on Winning and Losing*, (August 1987), a collection of unpublished presentations. Document No. M-U 43947, Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, Ala. Boyd's work emphasized "shaping" the perceptions and impressions in the tactical environment. He advocated rapidly changing events that led to a paralysis of the adversary's decision making process. AIM does not attempt to break down the target audience's decision making process. Rather, it requires an intact decision making mechanism to provide influence for longer strategic objectives.

[19] *Twentieth Air Force Communication Strategy: Telling America's ICBM Team Story* and from discussions with Lacombe

Chapter 2

Current U.S. Policy

> *The attainment of the carpenter is that his work is not warped, that the joints are not misaligned, and that the work is truly planed so that it meets well and is not merely finished in sections.*
>
> —Miyamoto Musashi
> *A Book of Five Rings*

The U.S. has a formidable array of organizations and methods at its disposal to increase the acceptance of American policies and objectives. Given the right circumstances, anyone involved with the government, from the President, congressmen, military leaders, to staffers, may play a role in transmitting messages to target audiences and impacting perceptions at the strategic and operational level.[1] During remarks in Detroit, President Clinton identified the need to concentrate and coordinate efforts to "shape" the world.

> We must set our sights on a more distant horizon. Through our size, our strength, our relative wealth, and also through the power of our example, America has a unique ability to shape a world of greater security and prosperity, peace and freedom. These are long-term efforts and often they take place behind the headlines. But only by pursuing them can we give our children the best possible opportunity to realize their own God-given potential.[2]

Integrating Instruments of Power

Perhaps no one better understood the synergistic effect of those efforts than President Reagan, as evidenced throughout his National Security Decision Directives (NSDD). He recognized the interdependent relationship of the economic, military, and political/diplomatic IOPs and identified information as a fourth source of power projection.[3] "U.S. Relations with the U.S.S.R.," NSDD 75, exemplifies President Reagan's IOP coordination efforts. (NSDD 75 can be found at appendix F.) This directive was designed to "focus on shaping the environment in which Soviet decisions are made both in a wide variety of functional and geopolitical arenas and in the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship."[4] The strategy involved a multidimensional PSYOP approach targeting the Soviet leadership, military, and population by impacting their economy, allies, and relationship with third world and Western states. In order to implement his strategies, President Reagan established the Special Planning Group (SPG), which was inactivated after he left office, under the National Security Council.[5]

Recent events in Bosnia provide another example of the U.S. actively pursuing its interests. In this instance, regional stability can be identified as the primary objective. American diplomatic leadership played a major role in establishing U.N. resolutions calling for the end of hostilities and the acceptance of the General Framework Agreement (Dayton Peace Accords). In order to gain international and domestic U.S. support for military intervention, an intensive information campaign was executed. Finally, only those parties abiding by the accords are eligible for American economic assistance. Although diplomatic, economic, informational, and military initiatives had a synergistic effect on the warring factions, there was little effort to coordinate them, further leveraging their impact.

Since there is a psychological dimension to each IOP, failing to integrate them prevents a unity of effort among all participating organizations and suboptimizes their influence.[6] Recognizing PSYOP's inherent multidimensionality and the necessity to leverage declining resources, failure to collectively implement IOPs due to poor interagency coordination is not a luxury the U.S. can afford.

Interagency Relations

Implementing broad strategies to support the National Security Strategy (NSS) or specific programs and initiatives directed by the President or Congress requires cooperation among departments, agencies, and commissions. Unfortunately, the interagency process to integrate efforts maximizing PSYOP impact is ad hoc, leading Frank Barnett to characterize it as the most "neglected" component of the NSS.[7] Although the Department of State is recognized as the "lead U.S. foreign affairs agency," it is but one of the many organizations involved in projecting American interests.[8] In order to understand the scope of U.S. efforts, following are several of the agencies and their missions. The Peace Corps utilizes volunteers working for world peace and mutual understanding, and helps to establish the U.S. as a good neighbor by supporting regional stability. The Environmental Protection Agency is dedicated to preserving the world's ecosystems while supporting the educated use of renewable resources. Businesses look towards the Department of Commerce to promote international trade and the Federal Communications Commission to regulate international communications. Official information relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's "special activities" is scarce but most likely falls into the covert, black, and gray arenas.[9]

The Secretary of State has general foreign policy guidance over two extremely influential agencies: the U.S. Information Agency and the U.S. Agency for International Development.[10] One of the most powerful components of public diplomacy, USIA is chartered to influence foreign publics through numerous programs ranging from Voice of America to cultural exchanges. Its companion organization, USAID, promotes American interests via development and humanitarian assistance.[11] Neither agency is regularly invited to participate in NSC foreign policy discussions.

The two primary players in the forefront of U.S. efforts to influence foreign activities are the Department of State and Department of Defense. Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher described their complementing capabilities.

> In today's world, when American interests are more global than ever, our national security requires the wise use of force and diplomacy together. Diplomacy that is not backed by the credible threat of force can be hollow, ultimately dangerous. But if we do not use diplomacy to promote our vital interests, we will surely find ourselves defending them on the battlefield. Today, in more places and circumstances than ever before we must get the balance right.[12]

More than one scholar has identified this relationship as political-military warfare or political war waged against other states. Recognizing that their methods are unique but their objectives shared and complementary, the interaction between both departments is worth exploring.

The Secretaries of State and Defense participate in the National Security Council and grand strategy development. Their relationship, however, does not involve close, coordinated global or regional program development unless directed by the President. Within the State Department, most issues are addressed as bilateral relationships between the U.S. and a second country by the Under Secretary for Political Affairs Group.

Geographic bureaus, with dissimilar alignment from geographic combatant commanders, coordinate regional initiatives. It is the U.S. Ambassador and his country team that develop programs, in conjunction with the geographic CINC, targeting a country. This under secretariat is also responsible for managing U.S. participation in multilateral peacekeeping and developing support for U.S. policies in the United Nations.[13]

The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, as part of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs Group, is the remaining State Department organization with significant military related responsibilities. Arms control negotiations, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), foreign security assistance and arms sales are several of the bureau's worldwide defense issues.[14]

A case can be made that DOD's counterpart to the Secretary for Arms Control and International Security is the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). The USD(P) is, among other matters, responsible for political-military policy issues, security assistance programs, WMD and arms control issues. The assistant secretary of defense, responsible for special operations and low-intensity conflict including civil affairs and PSYOP, falls under the USD(P).[15] Due to the time-consuming bureaucracy and ad hoc relationships, the primary interaction between DOD and DoS is at the lower levels. Although both the CINC and Ambassador are official representatives for the U.S. government, there is no formal process to coordinate programs. The CINC's staff and Ambassador's country team are responsible for developing integrated plans in an ad hoc environment.[16]

To help guide the CINC, joint doctrine recognizes the vital role PSYOP plays across the range of military operations from MOOTW to war and identifies lofty objectives for its employment.[17] Special operations forces (SOF) from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and

Marine Corps provide DOD PSYOP capabilities. However, the vast majority of their resources are product-oriented and support the dissemination of information through the use of radio and TV broadcasts and printed material distribution. A review of the SOF 1996 posture statement reveals PSYOP is a special forces mission "involving planned operation to convey selected information" to influence foreign audiences. Although this mission, in conjunction with joint doctrine's role of PSYOP, implies a large latitude of operations for PSYOP, an overview of actual uses by combatant CINCs reveals a narrow focus of information dissemination via media products in support of foreign international defense, humanitarian assistance, and commanders during actual conflict. In fact, according to the posture statement, the functional combatant commanders are not involved with SOF PSYOP programs.[18] The lack of understanding and appreciation for the multidimensionality of military PSYOP has resulted in little doctrinal or methodology changes since World War II and a continued focus on the tactical level. With an inadequate understanding of PSYOP and poor interagency coordination, then it comes as no surprise that the U.S. lacks an integrated national PSYOP strategy.

Notes

[1] Col Frank L. Goldstein and Col Daniel W. Jacobowitz, "Psychological Operations: An Introduction," in Col Frank L. Goldstein and Col Benjamin F. Findley, *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1996), 8.

[2] William Jefferson Clinton, President, Address, Fisher Theater, Detroit, Mich., 22 October 1996; on-line, Internet, 14 January 1997, available from http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/detroit.html.

[3] President, National Security Decision Directive No. 130, "U.S. International Information Policy," 6 March 1984.

[4] President, National Security Decision Directive No. 75, "U.S. Relations with the U.S.S.R," 17 January 1983, 2.

[5] President, National Security Decision Directive No. 77, "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security," 14 January 1983, 1.

Notes

[6] Goldstein and Jacobowitz, "Psychological Operations: An Introduction," 8 and Lt Col John T. Fishel and Maj Edmund S. Cowan, "Civil-Military Operations and the War for Moral Legitimacy in Latin America," *Military Review* 68, no. 1 (January 1988), 47.

[7] Frank R. Barnett and Carnes Lord, ed., *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press Publications, 1989), xi.

[8] U.S. Department of State, "Structure and Organization;" on-line, Internet, 14 January 1997, available from http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/dosstruc.html.

[9] The government organizations identified are only a sample of U.S. agencies interacting with foreign audiences. Expanded information on their mission, objectives, roles, and organization can be found on-line at the following Internet addresses: Peace Corps, "Peace Corps;" http://www.peacecorps.gov, U.S. Department of Commerce, "Welcome to the U.S. Department of Commerce" http://www.doc.gov, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Vision, Mission, and Goals Statement for U.S. EPA http://www.epa.gov/epahome/vision.htm, Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Vision, Mission, and Values," http://www.odci.gov/cia/information/mission.html, Federal Communications Commission, "Federal Communication Commission;" http://www.fcc.gov.

[10] U.S. Department of State, "Structure and Organization."

[11] U.S. Information Agency, "USIA's Mission: Public Diplomacy;" on-line, Internet, 15 February 1997, available from http://www.usia.gov/usiahome/mission.html. See also U.S. Agency for International Development, "About USAID;" on-line, Internet, 15 February 1997, available from http://www.info.usaid.gov/about/.

[12] Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, Address, West Point, N.Y. n.d.; on-line, Internet, 14 January 1997, available from http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/961025.

[13] Col Steven E. Cady, "The Country Team: The Critical Interface Between the Department of State and the Department of Defense," in Col Tommy D. Dickson and Dr. Richard R. Mueller, *War and Conflict Resolution*, vol. 6 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1997), 169-185.

[14] U.S. Department of State, "Structure and Organization."

[15] U.S. Department of Defense, "DoD Organization and Functions Guidebook: Under Secretary of Defense (Policy);" on-line, Internet, 14 January 1997, available from http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defenselink/pubs/ofg/of_usdp.html.

[16] Cady, "The Country Team: The Critical Interface Between the Department of State and the Department of Defense," 169-185.

[17] Joint Publication (Joint Pub) 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, 10 July 1996, V1-V7.

[18] U.S. Special Operations Forces, *1996 Posture Statement*, 1996.

Chapter 3

The Soviet Missile Gap Deception

> *We always seek to direct the development of events, so as to ensure that while defending the interests of the socialist camp, we do not provide the imperialist provocateurs with a chance to unleash a new world war.*
>
> —Nikita Khrushchev

> *Sometimes drive a wedge between a sovereign and his ministers; on other occasions separate his allies from him. Make them mutually suspicious so that they drift apart. Then you can plot against him.*
>
> —Chang Yu
> *The Art of War*

Public diplomacy initiatives require a great deal of coordination and the equivalent of interagency cooperation. The Soviet leadership was perhaps the most skilled in integrating all their efforts to influence decisions throughout the world and attain their objectives. This chapter summarizes the Soviet "missile gap" deception, successful for almost five years. Appendix E provides greater detail and analysis.

America awoke 27 August 1957 to the *Washington Post* headline "Red 'World Missile' Fired 'Huge Distance,' Russians Announce."[1] It was the start of a well-conceived Soviet psychological campaign designed to subvert the Western alliance and promote global communism while deterring the use of strategic threats by the U.S.[2] To better understand the events that ensued, one must examine the foundation that set the stage.

Setting the Stage

The Soviets recognized their limited ability to directly impact U.S. policies and actions. They could, on the other hand, greatly influence world opinion, particularly in Western Europe and the Middle East, due to their proximity and ability to project military power. The Soviets quickly exploited potential pawns as states unknowingly became surrogates by pressing for changes in U.S. positions that benefited the communist bloc.

Premier Khrushchev's confidence in his ability "to direct the development of world events" stemmed from his conviction that the U.S. would not initiate an unprovoked attack against the Soviet Union or interfere with activities inside the communist bloc. This belief was created by American responses to four events. First, the U.S. had possessed the capability to destroy the Soviet Union after World War II and failed to take aggressive actions. Next, the rapid acceptance of détente at the 1955 Geneva Summit demonstrated the West's willingness to cooperate with only minor Soviet concessions. Third, the original success of the Soviet strategic bomber deception indicated the ease in which the U.S. willingly accepted exaggerations. Finally, America's failure to provide military assistance to the Hungarian people during the recent revolt exposed a trepidation by the West to become involved in situations that were considered within the accepted Soviet sphere of influence. Khrushchev keenly understood that as long as U.S. interests were not directly threatened, he could take the lead and influence world events.[3] Former CIA director Allen Dulles acknowledged after the missile gap drama played out, he believed the Soviets understood the magnified psychological impact of ICBM advances and space achievements before the West did.[4]

The combination of these factors led the Soviets to develop a program designed to increase U.S. and Western uncertainty about the strategic balance. Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush identify the Soviet inducement of Clausewitz's fog and friction into the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship as:

1. Soviet leaders assert they possess capabilities;
2. Soviet leaders make threats that presuppose such capability;
3. Soviet leaders demonstrate capabilities or similar capabilities to induce others to credit the USSR with capability;
4. Soviet leaders take actions that imply capabilities exist.[5]

The following events during the missile gap deception follow this general pattern of interweaving military and space achievements, the creation of world crises, arms control, media campaigns, threats, and half-truths.

The Deception Unfolds

The seeds for the missile gap deception were sown during the 1956 Suez Crisis as the USSR maneuvered to take advantage of the situation. Statements released by the Soviets implied the use of rockets against Great Britain and France unless they agreed to an immediate cease-fire with Egypt. Both countries stopped hostilities the next day, not because of Soviet demands, rather due to continuing U.S. opposition. However, Soviet timing led to a public perception that France and Great Britain had backed down, boosting Soviet prestige, especially in Egypt and throughout the Middle East. For the next year, similar well-timed demands, threatening the use of rockets, targeted Western activities.[6] Then on 27 August 1957 *The Washington Post* reported that TASS had announced the successful test of a "super, long-distance intercontinental multistage ballistic rocket" that "flew at a very high, unprecedented altitude covering a huge distance." Included in the

announcement was the re-release of a story discussing successful Soviet high altitude atomic tests. According to TASS, the Soviets were "impelled to take all necessary measures with the object of safeguarding" their security.[7] Radio Moscow echoed the assertions, reporting advances only "offset the Western countries in the development of atomic and hydrogen weapons."[8] None of the announcements stated the missile's accuracy or if the technology to put a nuclear warhead on board existed.

Western response echoed Senator Henry M. Jackson's comments on the Senate floor.

> It would be hazardous for the United States to dismiss the ICBM claim as propaganda…It would be a disastrous blow to our people and our allies should the Soviets win this race, because it would represent the first time the United States has failed to win a race involving an important weapon system.[9]

Two days later, Valerian Zorin, the Soviet's chief arms control negotiator terminated talks due to what was categorized as western intransigence. The Soviets had repeated their willingness to renounce all military uses of atomic weapons, but according to Zorin the U.S. refused to accept this offer, forcing the Soviets to develop their new missile. On Friday, 30 August 1957, TASS accused Western and in particular U.S. media for developing a "war hysteria" around the missile.[10] Several days later, *Newsweek* accurately predicted this was the start of a campaign to "make a mockery of the U.S. (nuclear) shield."[11]

The announcement and withdrawal took place about one week before the U.N. General Assembly session on the Hungarian revolt. The Soviets were working to change their image from a ruthless occupying force to a "peace-loving (people) who have the ultimate terror weapon but offers to forfeit its advantage for the sake of peace."[12] For the

next few weeks, TASS reports discussed characteristics and capabilities of ICBMs, never claiming Russia had actually tested one with these traits.[13]

Figure 2. Development of Soviet ICBM impacts arms control negotiations[14]

Less than two months after the ICBM announcement, Sputnik I was launched and the entire world heard a signal from outer space. The Soviets had proven their mastery of rocket technology. In an interview with *The New York Times*, Khrushchev said, "We now have all the rockets we need: long-range rockets, intermediate range rockets, and short range rockets," explicitly announcing they had all the types of missiles needed and implying they also possessed a sufficient quantity. Over the next few years Soviet statements and actions intensified, specifically targeting West Germany, Great Britain, Turkey, Japan, and others, as Khrushchev worked to gain credibility for his ICBM force and its threat to Western Europe.[15]

The Berlin Crisis in 1959 raised concerns that the Soviets truly had a formidable ICBM force. For nothing else had changed in east-west relations, except the possible Soviet missile capability, that would explain the new hard-line position.[16] In a meeting with New York Governor Averell Harriman, Khrushchev said, "If you send in tanks (to

Berlin) they will burn and make no mistake about it. If you want war, you can have it, but remember it will be your war. Our rockets will fly automatically."[17] The cumulative effects of Berlin, Sputnik, missile rattling, and a growing uncertainty over U.S. nuclear security assurances began to impact global perceptions. By early 1960 USIA reported,

> …current views of relative US-USSR power has shifted sharply since the advent of the first Sputnik and the development of intercontinental missile capabilities…In the critical areas of military strength and space achievements and a rate of economic growth capable of supporting them at a high level, popular opinion believes…the U.S. to be inferior to the USSR.[18]

Figure three illustrates the decline of U.S. military prestige and the Soviet Union's corresponding ascension from November 1957 to February 1960. The Soviet's enjoyed a nearly 3:1 public opinion margin in Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Norway. A further analysis of the report identifies the sources of change in opinion were the synergistic result of successful multidimensional PSYOP efforts targeting Western perceptions.



Figure 3. Perceptions of Relative U.S./USSR Military Strength[19]

1. Soviet space achievements were equated with military capabilities.
2. Recently expanded international presence exerted influence and leverage in areas where little or no impact had been the status quo.
3. New "confident tone and aggressive posture" assumed a position of strength. Soviet achievements and Western reactions supported this assumption.

4. Official U.S. concern of Soviet military power and technological achievements.
5. Small, focused Soviet foreign economic programs targeted high impact/visibility situations supported Soviet claims of growing economy and military power.
6. Doubts of Western alliance preparedness to meet Soviet challenges.20

As Western European anxieties brought into question whether they could "unconditionally (depend) upon the protection of America's atomic shield in the event of limited conflict," U.S. estimates of Soviet capabilities were rapidly changing.[21] Secretary McNamara called these downward revisions "substantial." Between January and February, estimates of Soviet ICBMs fell 66 percent. Within 18 months, their ICBM strength was less than four percent of original expectations.[22] Finally, in 1964, DoD admitted the Soviets only had a handful of operational ICBMs.

For almost five years, the Soviets' "double deception" of the size of their ICBM force and willingness to use it drove world relations. They recognized that if a nuclear war started it would be on their terms and they would have to instigate the first critical actions to threaten vital American interests.[23] Therefore, while the U.S. moved forward spending enormous sums on rapid development of three different systems, the Soviets built a force just large enough for show but saved resources for future ICBM generations.[24] In 1963, Allan Dulles, CIA director during the deception, wrote in his book *The Craft of Intelligence*: The question was,

> . . . would they use their bulky and somewhat awkward 'first generation' ICBM, effective though it was, as the missile to deploy, or would they wait for a second or third generation? Were they in such a hurry to capitalize on a moment of possible missile superiority that they would sacrifice this to a more orderly program?[25]

He acknowledged Khrushchev led a remarkable psychological campaign of statements, indicators, and events that gave the impression the Soviets were rapidly

moving forward with early ICBM deployment. Although many of the Soviet gains during the missile gap deception were short lived, others had lasting impacts. Its effects demonstrated the leveraging of a multidimensional PSYOP campaign integrating IOPs to ensure a national unity of effort in pursuit of strategic objectives.

Notes

[1] This rocket was later identified as the SS-6 Sapwood, primarily used as a space booster, very few became operational as strategic ICBMs. In order to overcome a lack of large rocket engine technology, the Sapwood utilized 32 smaller rocket engines. In essence, the Soviets used brute force to obtain an intercontinental range (6200 miles)..

[2] Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, U.S. Air Force Project Rand Report R-434-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, August 1965), x. To eliminate confusion between this report and the book *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, hereafter this will be referred to as Rand Reprt R-434-PR.

[3] Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 211-212.

[4] Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), 163.

[5] Horelick and Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, 5.

[6] Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Soviet Psychological Strategy," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 87, no. 6 (June 1961): 23-25.

[7] "Red 'World Missile' Fired 'Huge Distance,' Russians Announce," *Washington Post*, 27 August 1957.

[8] Murrey Marder, "Zorin Condemns West's Offers on Arms Check," *Washington Post*, 28 August 1957.

[9] John G. Norris, "Missile Plan Cutback Is Charged by Jackson," *Washington Post*, 30 August 1957.

[10] "TASS Accuses U.S. Press of 'Hysteria' on Missile," *Washington Post*, 30 August 1957.

[11] "Dawn of the Super-Missile," *Newsweek* 50, no. 11 (9 September 1957): 45.

[12] "Dawn of the Super-Missile."

[13] Rand Report R-434-PR, 63.

[14] Herblock, *Washington Post*, 28 August 1957. Cartoon appeared in the editorial section.

[15] Horelick and Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, 55.

[16] Ibid., 119.

[17] Averell Harriman, "My Alarming Interview with Khrushchev," *Life* 47, no. 2 (13 July 1959): 33.

[18] Ibid., 1.

Notes

[19] Office of Research and Intelligence, *Free World Views of the US-USSR Power Balance*. United States. Information Agency Report R-54-60 (Washington D.C., 29 August 1960), 21-22. The graph was derived from USIA statistical data.

[20] Ibid., 2-3.

[21] Ibid., 6.

[22] Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Department of Defense Programs and Authorization of Appropriations for Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels by the Armed Forces: Hearings on S. 2734*, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 19 January - 2 February 1962, 49-50.

[23] Horelick and Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, 108-110.

[24] Planned defense spending outlays increased $14 billion over the Eisenhower's budget. $6 billion of the increase targeted strategic systems, most of which were dedicated to ICBM development. In 1997 dollars, the increases equal approximately $76 billion and $32.5 billion respectively. American ICBMs concurrently under development included two liquid fueled systems, Atlas and Titan, and one solid fueled, Minuteman, which later became the backbone of U.S. strategic missile capabilities.

[25] Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence*, 165.

Chapter 4

Reevaluating American PSYOP

> *The efforts of physical and psychological factors form an organic whole, which, unlike a metal alloy, is inseparable by chemical process . . . One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade.*
>
> —Carl von Clausewitz
> *On War*

The Soviet missile gap deception was a successful PSYOP program. Their efforts influenced U.S. and Western decisions as supported by Secretary McNamara's comments after the ruse had been exposed.

> This nation created a myth of its own weakness . . . the ending of the myth has made it possible to take a firm line with our adversaries and at the same time to reassure our friends that we are strong and determined to use our strength if we have to.[1]

His comments imply U.S. positions on issues were softened, and allies' confidence in American security assurances was somewhat shaken. Both outcomes were desired objectives of the Soviet web of deception that involved coordinating space program advances, arms control initiatives, military tests, diplomacy, the impression of a peaceloving nation, official statements, international threats, and media reports into a well-conceived strategic PSYOP program. Soviet efforts of integrating IOPs highlights the multidimensionality of PSYOP campaigns and points towards a reevaluation of how

America influences other states. If, as the Soviets demonstrated, military activities impact non-military decisions and other IOPs may be used to influence military decisions, then the question arises, what role does the military have in the process? In other words, what is military PSYOP?

Redefining Military PSYOP

Joint military doctrine acknowledges the psychological dimension of military actions but draws a line between the influence events may exert on decisions and actual PSYOP. "Actions such as shows of force or limited strikes may have a psychological impact, but they are not PSYOP unless the primary purpose is to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, or behavior of the targeted audience."[2] Yet the only reason for a show of force or any other military activity is to send a message that the U.S. supports a given position and that anyone who opposes it better think twice.

Several recent examples illustrate the psychological dimension of military activities.

1. Libya. The 1986 Libyan Raid objectives, though not planned as PSYOP, coincided with three NSDDs targeting Libya and were designed to demonstrate the high cost of sponsoring terrorism.[3] Muammar Qadhafi received the message loud and clear and since then has considerably reduced his terrorist actions against the U.S.[4]
2. Russia, Zaire, Bangladesh. American armed forces providing disaster relief or humanitarian assistance send a message to the world that America believes in alleviating human suffering and maintaining regional stability with a collateral message that the U.S. can deploy forces anywhere, anytime on short notice.
3. Pasadena. When millions of people around the world saw the B-2 fly over the Rose Bowl parade, the Air Force was putting global reach and global power on display, not entering a high-tech float.
4. Arms Control. U.S. support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is designed to prevent other states from joining the nuclear weapons club.
5. Military arms sales. Providing modern military equipment to Pakistan establishes a regional counterbalance to India.

None of these activities were planned as or even considered PSYOP, but the U.S. initiated them as attempts to influence a target audience and further American interests.

Thirty years after the missile gap deception, President George Bush and Saddam Hussein fought a battle for world opinion before coalition forces expelled Iraqi troops from Kuwait. With the strong backing of Saudi Arabia and several Western states, President Bush worked to develop a coalition force and world support. He painted Iraq's moves as a "ruthless assault" against all civilized nations and consolidated world opinion through U.N. resolutions, resulting in a formidable and overwhelming coalition force.[5] International response was much simpler to gauge than the possible impact efforts had on Iraq and her allies. Without dependable intermediaries, neither President Bush nor then National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft knew if their attempts to communicate with Hussein were reaching him.[6] However, to insure the safety of coalition forces, President Bush felt it was critical to influence Hussein's decisions on the use of weapons of mass destruction. He accomplished this by increasing Hussein's uncertainty of America's willingness to use nuclear weapons.

> …it (a nuclear response) would be extraordinarily difficult. I suppose you could conjure up some horrible scenario that would call for the use…but it was not something that we really contemplated at all. What we did want to do, though, was leave doubt.[7]

On the other side, Hussein was working to break up the coalition and render it an ineffective fighting force. He created an illusion of a much stronger Iraqi army that forced coalition partners to build a larger military force, requiring more time.[8] The longer it took to prepare, the greater the likelihood Hussein could break the coalition. Two of his efforts aimed at influencing the coalition nearly succeeded. The first initiative designed to fan the

flames of anti-American sentiment and fracture the coalition involved a fabricated story reporting that Egyptian and Saudi forces were fighting American troops, who were desecrating Muslim holy sites. This resulted in Muslims rioting around the world against U.S. influences and the coalition. One series of riots threatened the Pakistani government. If the Pakistani government had fallen or given in to pressure and pulled out of the coalition, a domino effect among other Muslim nations might have occurred, jeopardizing the entire coalition.

A second coalition cracking effort targeted Israel. Through the use of Scuds aimed at cities, Hussein hoped to provoke a military response, drawing Israel into the conflict and tearing apart the coalition. Combine the fact that many of the rockets had dummy concrete warheads with their poor accuracy, it can be surmised he was targeting Jewish public opinion, not militarily significant facilities.[9]

The aforementioned events had one thing in common, the implicit or explicit attempt to influence a target audience's behavior in favor of the sender's objectives. In the latest Air Force Executive Guidance, "terrorism, sabotage, and unconventional warfare" are identified as tools available to future adversaries to influence U.S. national policy.[10] These phenomena transcend traditional tactically oriented military PSYOP of radio, television and loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflets. However, the recognition of PSYOP contributions beyond special operations is increasing, especially as Information Warfare moves to the forefront of future operations.[11] The time is right to reevaluate what is considered PSYOP.

If one accepts the joint doctrine premise "the employment of any national power, particularly the military element, has always had a psychological dimension,"[12] then it is

not difficult to conclude that planners should take this dimension into consideration and plan to exploit its influence. For example, United States Strategic Command exists for the psychological dimension of influencing potential adversaries not to employ WMDs against the U.S. The first three words in its mission statement are to "deter military attack."[13] The command takes great pride and has a large public affairs staff to disseminate their message of deterrence, yet it does not have a PSYOP specialist.[14] George Copley repudiates the currently mild reception perception management receives in the military.

> A target audience, whether an enemy or friend, domestic or foreign, will always perceive *something* from the way in which a government or armed force postures itself, *and will act on that perception*. So, given that a perception will be made whether this is wanted or not, it should be seen as important to project the image in the way you wish it to be perceived.[15] (emphasis by Copley)

PSYOP has the potential to be the most powerful weapon in the military's arsenal. It targets the mind, influencing decision makers to take steps supportive of U.S. interests in peacetime and war and possibly preventing conflict. The military establishment must come to the recognition that PSYOP does not support activities; rather military initiatives are developed and executed to influence others and therefore support PSYOP. Multidimensional military PSYOP provides increased options to not only the commander in the field, but also the NCA. It includes activities involving or impacting, but not necessarily undertaken by, the military. For instance, successful efforts to break the coalition by Hussein would have had similar results to victorious Iraqi forces. The coalition would have been weaker, possibly deprived of essential Arab support. A similar analysis recognizing the inherent multidimensionality for the other three IOPs can be employed with identical results.

Therefore the author proposes that military PSYOP must be redefined to accept its multidimensionality. Activities conducted by the military to influence a broad range of decisions (not just military) and efforts employing other IOPs to influence military related decisions must be integrated into a new military PSYOP.

National Marketing Strategy

The Soviets repeatedly demonstrated the value of coordinated public diplomacy. Using the inherent indirect approach of PSYOP, they melded:

> …symphonic orchestras and sports teams with military threats, technological breakthroughs with the propagation of the Marxist-Leninist myth.…So complete (was) the amalgam of military strategy, diplomacy, ideological agitation, and cultural and scientific activities that no one can say where communist propaganda begins and where it ends.[16]

Integrating resources and activities to influence an audience are not new ideas in the West. However, it is better known as marketing, a more palpable term than PSYOP, perception management, or influence peddling. It is virtually impossible to escape marketing efforts aimed at influencing one's opinion. Advertisements on TV, radio, the Internet, billboards, and bumper stickers are designed to influence the consumer. Corporate healthcare, education, and incentive programs are instituted to influence employees to stay at their current jobs. Establishment of charitable organizations and recycling efforts promote the kinder, gentler side of a caring organization. These examples are not intended to be all inclusive or as absolutes but only scratch the surface of the programs developed to influence decisions and perceptions.

Business understands the need to incorporate objectives, vertically and horizontally throughout the organization, to maximize their impact on target audiences. Federal

organizations do take efforts to reach out to external audiences. The challenge strategists face is creating a coordinated program, similar to President Reagan's NSDD 75, integrating their activities and maximizing the possible synergistic effect. The U.S. would benefit from such a national marketing strategy for objectives, not unlike the global campaigns General Motors and IBM use.[17]

Events surrounding the recent Gulf War demonstrated the possible outcome resulting from a lack of IOP unity of effort. For the establishment of a counterbalance to Iranian hegemony in the Middle East, Western nations, including the U.S., provided Iraq with economic and military support, bolstering Hussein's regime and powerbase. Even as he turned the Iraqi military machine against Kuwait and amassed forces on their border, the U.S. diplomatic response to a possible invasion of Kuwait was ambivalent at best and tacit approval at worst. The lack of American military in the region exasperated the image of an uninterested U.S. These efforts influenced Hussein's decision to invade since it appeared American interests were not at stake. This perception could not have been further from the truth. Maintaining regional stability and access to oil reserves were then and still are vital U.S. interests.

Arguably integrating a stronger diplomatic position supporting Kuwaiti sovereignty, a show of military force and economic assistance to aid Iraq's recovery from its recent war with Iran may have deterred Hussein. Employing any one of these in isolation would most likely have had little or no effect. Strong diplomatic efforts denouncing a possible invasion without, as Warren Christopher said, a perceived willingness to support it with force could be dismissed. However, combined diplomatic and military efforts may only have served to illuminate shortcomings in Iraq's ability to execute the invasion, thereby

temporarily deterring him, but not reducing his hostile will. Economic and humanitarian programs would have been needed to complete an integrated multidimensional PSYOP program. In comparison to the expense of: rebuilding Kuwait and Iraq, prosecuting the war, and the lives lost, the above integrated preventive efforts may have been much more cost effective.

The author contends that the Soviets succeeded in developing a coordinated program because they had a strong centralized organization that focused efforts, a critical element the U.S. does not share. Although the President and NSC develop objectives and provide guidance to departments, agencies, and commissions, each organization determines what actions it believes are the most appropriate. Coordination is ad hoc at best, often omitting valuable players such as USIA.[18] Decentralized planning and execution further exasperate the problem of developing common terminology and increases misunderstandings of intentions and capabilities.[19] Therefore, the author proposes the establishment of an oversight organization, similar to President Reagan's NSDD 77 mandated special planning group, would be the first step in exploiting the synergistic effect of a national marketing strategy.

Notes

[1] Stewart Alsop, "McNamara Thinks about the Unthinkable," *Saturday Evening Post* 236, no. 43 (1 December 1962): 19.

[2] Joint Publication (Joint Pub) 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, 10 July 1996, I-1.

[3] NSDD 205, *Sanctions Against Libya* and two unnumbered NSDDs, whose probable names are *Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces and U.S. Naval Exercises off the Libyan Coast* and *Psychological Warfare Against Libya,* targeted Libya's state-sponsorship of terrorism and worked to incite internal dissent against Qadhafi with the objective of his removal from power.

[4] For a more comprehensive discussion on the psychological impact of the raid on Libya and other countries see Alvin H. Bernstein, "Political Strategies in Coercive

Notes

Diplomacy and Limited War," in Frank R. Barnett and Carnes Lord, eds., *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press Publications, 1989) and Col Frank L. Goldstein, "The Libyan Raid as a Psychological Operation," in Col Frank L. Goldstein and Col Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., eds., *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997).

[5] U.S. Information Agency, *The Nations of the World Draw a Line in the Sand*, USIA TV and Film Service, 13 min., n.d., videocassette.

[6] President George Bush, letter to author, 16 January 1997 and President George Bush, interview by David Frost, 16 January 1996, transcript courtesy the office of President George Bush.

[7] Bush, interview by Frost.

[8] MSgt Richard A. Blair and Col Frank L. Goldstein, "The Iraqi Propaganda Network," in Goldstein and Findley, *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, 246.

[9] Frank L. Goldstein, Col, USAF, interview by author.

[10] Department of the Air Force, *Air Force Executive Guidance,* Air Force Strategy Division, HQ USAF/XOXS, October 1996 update, 7.

[11] U.S. Department of Defense, *Information Warfare: A Strategy for Peace ... The Decisive Edge in War* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, distributed 1997), 5-7, 12-14.

[12] Joint Publication (Joint Pub) 3-53, I-1.

[13] U.S. Strategic Command, "STRATCOM," Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996.

[14] George Weil, Maj, USAF, interviewed by author.

[15] Gregory R. Copley, "Perception: The Key to Victory, or Loss," *Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* 24, no. 4 (30 April 1996): 9.

[16] Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Soviet Psychological Strategy," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 87, no. 6 (June 1961): 23.

[17] Col Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., "Blending Military and Civilian PSYOP," in Goldstein and Findley *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case*, 51-61.

[18] U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, "A New Diplomacy for the Information Age;" on-line, Internet, 30 January 1997, available from http://www.usia.gov/abtusia/ac/96rept.html.

[19] Col Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., "No More Tactical Information Detachments: U.S. Military Psychological Operations in Transition," in Goldstein and Findley, *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

> *Machines don't fight wars. Terrain doesn't fight wars. Humans fight wars. You must get into the mind of humans. That's where the battles are won.*
>
> —Col. John Boyd

In today's increasingly interdependent world, the ability of a state to exploit the psychological factor by creating phenomena that favorably influence the decision making process of target audiences continues to expand. Maximizing the impact of a state's tools of influence, its diplomatic, economic, informational, and military IOPs, requires a unity of effort integrating a wide range of agencies and activities into a well orchestrated campaign to support national objectives and interests. Not unlike the other IOPs, the military option can be employed in a broad range of activities, from humanitarian assistance to war, aimed at influencing the decision making process of a target audience. To fully leverage the military's resources and magnify its impact, people both inside and outside the defense establishment must go beyond the traditional acceptance of military PSYOP tactical tool and embrace its intrinsic multidimensionality. The author proposes that a new multidimensional military PSYOP must be accepted, one that expands the military's role to influence a broader range of decisions and incorporate other IOPs in efforts to impact military decisions. Accepting such a redefined PSYOP concept will increase the

effectiveness of America's armed forces, especially as MOOTW taskings increase. Through better understanding of military PSYOP and its inherent ability to influence political, military and economic events, planners can maximize the synergy of integrating it with other IOPs.

The foundation for better understanding PSYOP is embodied in the elements of its development and the four phases of AIM. The elements of PSYOP development involve three factors, purpose, basis, and type, interacting to produce a desired phenomena. The purpose of an activity may either be coercive, deterrent, or incentive, depending on if the desired outcome is a reversal of a target audience's decision, a prevention of the selection of a COA, or enticing a COA selection. A second element involves the informational basis of the initiative and may range from white (factual) to black (lies and fabrications). The final element describes the type of PSYOP efforts as overt at one end of the scale and covert at the other end. The integration of these three elements can be illustrated using the PBT model in figure one.

Incorporating the four interrelated phases of AIM—analysis, projection, internalization and feedback—are critical for successful PSYOP development. The phases guide a PSYOP practitioner in the creation of phenomena that will influence the target audience's decisions to a position favorable to the sender. Analysis serves as the foundation of any PSYOP campaign and includes the objective, desired outcome, target audience and message. Phase two involves projecting a desired message utilizing IOPs in the creation of an observable phenomena. Boyd's OODA loop serves as the basis for phase three, helping to explain the internalization process of observable phenomena and its resultant action. Finally, feedback is critical for a reevaluation the entire process.

The Soviets were masters of this process and recognized the synergistic effect that results from the strategic coordination of PSYOP with the psychological dimension of each IOP. Their successful missile gap deception serves as a testament to their ability to incorporate scientific and military achievements, arms control, threats, the media, economic aid and crises development into a focused effort to drive a wedge into the Western alliance and prevent hard-line U.S. positions. After the deception was uncovered, McNamara and Dulles acknowledged its influence on U.S. positions and policies, the transatlantic alliance, and the cost of efforts to close the gap.

In comparison, American PSYOP today is fragmented by an ad hoc interagency coordination process. Few understand its far reaching effects. There are many advocates of tactical PSYOP in the military. However, advocates for the strategic integration of PSYOP are hard to find. Although Joint Doctrine recognizes the inherent psychological element of military activities, it fails to accept these same activities as PSYOP unless they were planned as such. The multidimensionality of PSYOP escapes those responsible for development of doctrine. Military action is taken to influence a target audience, the very basis of PSYOP, and yet it is not planned to maximize the impact. The author proposes a reevaluation of PSYOP, vastly expanding its uses. Redefining military PSYOP as: activities undertaken by the military to influence a target audience's decision making process, including both military and non-military decisions; and initiatives involving other IOPs to impact a target audience's military; is but the first step in improved exploitation of the psychological factor. A similar intuitive argument can be made for the expansion for PSYOP is it relates to the diplomatic, economic, and informational IOPs.

Acknowledging the multidimensionality of PSYOP and recognizing its synergistic effect are not adequate. The author contends the U.S. must strive for a unity of effort within the multitudes of federal agencies to maximize the synergistic effect of integrating IOPs. At the present, there is no mechanism similar to the Soviet's centralized authority or President Reagan's SPG to integrate and coordinate efforts. The establishment of an oversight organization, responsible for incorporating IOPs into a comprehensive national marketing strategy aimed towards influencing decisions beneficial to U.S. interest, would increase the effectiveness of American actions. Lacking such an organization, the status quo of ad hoc efforts will continue to inefficiently utilize dwindling resources. In such an environment, the criticality of espousing and offering multidimensional military PSYOP activities, as part of a unified campaign designed to influence, rests squarely on the military.

Appendix A

Message Flow[1]



Figure 4. Basic Message Flow Model

1. Sender develops a message that he believes will influence the receiver to take actions that support the sender's objectives. The type of message may be coercive, deterrent, or incentive.

2. Sender transmits the message via one or a combination of IOPs to develop a desired phenomena. An IOP application may include a military raid, economic sanctions, media campaign, U.N. resolutions, etc. or any combination.

3. Receiver observes the phenomena and integrates his perceptions as the phenomena is internalized.

4. Once internalized, the message influences the receiver and impacts the decision making process so that the receiver takes an action that either supports or opposes the sender's desired outcome or takes no action at all.

5. The action taken creates a phenomena that influences the sender's decision as to the applicability of the objective and message. The current course of action may be continued, a new message may be developed, or a different medium may be employed. In the extreme case, the sender may recognize original objectives are not attainable and must be changed.

In order to effectively influence a state to take actions and positions favorable to the U.S., one must first understand the importance of messages and their relationship to objectives of both the U.S. and target audience. Messages not only translate a sender's objectives into observable phenomena but also serve as the foundation of support and the impetus for change and must therefore be carefully developed.

The sender is responsible for identifying an unfulfilled objective and developing a message designed to influence the target audience in taking favorable actions. The message's basis (black, gray, white), its type (covert, overt), and purpose (coercive, deterrent, incentive), help identify the most appropriate medium(s) for the creation of an observable phenomena.

However, the control a sender has over the actual phenomena may be limited, since the planned activity may only be the first phase of an unfolding event that is impacted by numerous other factors. For instance, a military show of force may be met with international condemnation or broad domestic disapproval. This turn of events does not benefit the sender's objectives and it may bolster the target audience's objectives.

How the receiver perceives and internalizes the phenomena influences future decisions, resulting in behavior that either supports the sender's objectives or does not. The message flow process is then reversed as the receiver takes an action that creates a phenomena that is evaluated by the sender. Depending on the sender's interpretation of receiver's response, the message may be modified.

Notes

[1] The message flow process discussed originally appeared in *Twentieth Air Force Communications Strategy* and was developed by the author as a result of extensive discussions with Phillip Lacombe in 1993 and 1994. Lacombe was instrumental in the development of the Reagan Administration's Drug Policy, served in numerous senior public affairs positions throughout DoD, and is currently the Staff Director for the President's Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection. Over the last three years it has evolved to its present state along with the following discussions on target audience and the action-influence model. Since 1994, it has been used by U.S. Space Command, U.S. Strategic Command, Air Force Space Command, and numerous subordinate units.

Appendix B

The Trinity Target Audience



Figure 5. Trinity Target Audience[1]

Clausewitz identifies three pillars of a state, military, government, and population, that interact to establish objectives and interests. Although at different times, each may be the primary group molding events, none are capable of complete isolation from the influence of the others. Phenomena may be observed by members of any or all of the groups. Therefore, it is critical for the sender to identify the segment of society with the greatest impact as a target audience and develop a message designed to influence that particular group.

There is a great deal of communication both between and among the three groups. Military personnel advise government leaders, and may inform the general population of activities. The population may discuss issues with people in either of the two other

groups. This interaction is continuous even if official barriers inhibiting discussions are artificially instituted. Figure six highlights another basis for intergroup communications.

Not only is there interaction among the groups, but there are individuals who are members of more than one group. These people are direct links between and have inputs to different segments of society. This inherently increases the communications and information distribution among groups.



Figure 6. Target Audience Integration

Several military theorists and historians have begun to question the applicability of Clausewitz's trinity. Today transnational organizations play an increasingly powerful role in shaping world events. International corporations, cartels, drug syndicates, religious groups and U.N. agencies impact decisions made by governments, the military, and a state's populace. However, none appear to have changed the fabric of society and influenced the West Phalian state system more than the globalization of the media. Although some argue the media has transformed the trinity into a cube, others believes it is an element that permeates Clausewitz's three pillars.

If one accepts the premise that the media reports the news and strives to be impartial, then it is not a decision maker and should not be put on an equal footing with the other elements of the trinity. However, by reporting and at times interpreting events, the media does influence decisions and future actions. Its influence depends on how the reporting is

perceived and internalized. The perception and internalization may be different for members of the government, military, and population, but the media presents it to all three at the same time in the same manner. Therefore, the media can be seen as a critical input to the decision making process, and at times as a conduit to spread information on observable phenomena. If one accepts this, then the Trinity Plus One model in figure seven can be used to illustrate these relationships.



Figure 7. Trinity Plus One Model

The three sides represent Clausewitz's trinity of government, military, and population. Today, the media have become part of the fabric of society. Its permeation of all three segments is illustrated by partial inclusion in each. The purpose for the phenomena at the center, is that decisions are based on responses to the phenomena. Each segment may be influenced by the phenomena directly or via the media. Therefore, the arrows emanating out from the phenomena represent its direct influence, while the media intersection with each segment represents the phenomena's influence via the media.[2]

Notes

[1] A variation of the Trinity Target Audience appeared in *Twentieth Air Force Strategic Communications Strategy* in 1994 as The Message Triad. The premise discussed the relationship of external and internal audiences relating the Air Force to the general public.

[2] Discussions with Dr. Richard Muller and Major Ralph Millsap brought to light recent developments in interpretations of Clausewitz's work and the possible applicability the media has to his theories.

Appendix C

Target Audience Composition[1]



Figure 8. Target Audience Composition

Within the three segments of society are distinct groups that have varying levels of influence over state interests and objectives. Individuals with the greatest decision making input are on the top of each pyramid, while the broad population base of the group forms its foundation. Generally information flows up and down within a group to accomplish required tasks. Although, each segment of the target audience trinity can be broken down into many small subgroups. Figure eight identifies the three primary levels.

POPULATION: The general population includes every man, woman, and child in the state. Membership in the next level excludes local and community leaders who gain their authority due to their political position. It is comprised of those people who are seen as local and regional community leaders, such as ministers, activists, businessmen, professionals, and anyone else that can influence people. National non-political leaders may involve consumer advocates, religious and civil rights leaders, union presidents, and industry leaders.

MILITARY: The military segment is very similar to the chain of command with some minor inclusions at both the top and base. The general military population includes family members, contractors, and communities where military operations occur. The purpose for their inclusion is that in states with similar situations to the U.S., military issues impacting this broader population have a direct impact on military operations. Civilian control (President, Secretary of Defense, etc.), when it applies, is considered an integral element of national military command.

GOVERNMENT: All three levels, local, regional, and national, involve individuals who work for the government, not including the military, and can influence the decision making process.

Figure nine builds on the interaction and composition of the trinity target audience. One audience may influence another level within that segment or another group. Members may also belong to more than one audience, expanding their ability to impact decisions. Interaction and communication knows no boundaries or established chain of commands. For instance, the Belgium dairy farmer, whose cows are frequently scared by low flying U.S. aircraft or chased by military members during operations, may be good friends with powerful political leaders in the Belgium government. They may then push for greater exercise restrictions that will have a negative impact on training and therefore military capabilities. During the debate over introducing U.S. Pershing and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles to bases in Europe, the Soviet Union employed a wide range of activities in an attempt to influence European popular opinion and prevent their deployment. Ultimately, the missiles were installed at great political cost, but upgrades to their companion short range system's Lance launchers were prevented in West Germany.[2]

Identifying the right target audience is critical for either directly or indirectly influencing decisions. The key is one must always remember the objective and desired outcome required to achieve it. In the above situation, if an adversary wanted to reduce military effectiveness, the farmer and others like him may be the easiest and most appropriate target audience to influence. In order to get a similar result in another situation the hiring of a lobbyist to approach U.S. congressmen may be more appropriate.



Figure 9. Audience Interaction

Notes

[1] Similar to the Message Flow Process and Trinity Target Audience, a variation of the target audience composition and integration themes was developed by the author as a result of extensive discussions with Phillip Lacombe in 1993-1994 and first appeared in *Twentieth Air Force Strategic Communications Strategy,* 1994. Over the last three years it has evolved to its present state. Since 1994, it has been used by U.S. Space Command, U.S. Strategic Command, Air Force Space Command, and numerous subordinate units.

[2] Josef Joffe, "Soviet Diplomacy and Public Opinion: The Case of West Germany," in Janos Radvanyi, ed., *Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long-term Strategic Planning,* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 86.

Appendix D

Action-Influence Model

The *Action-Influence Model* (AIM) has four interlinking phases -- analysis, projection, internalization, and feedback -- that identify the process of influencing a target audience to take actions or modify behavior in favor of the sender's objectives and interests.



Figure 10. Four Phases of the Action-Influence Model

During the initial analysis phase the sender determines an unfulfilled objective, the appropriate target audience that will have the greatest impact on achieving the objective, and the message that will most likely influence the target audience. The projection phase incorporates the activities required to transmit the desired message and ends with an

observable phenomena. Col John Boyd's decision making "OODA Loop" model serves as the basis for the internalization phase. Beginning with the observable phenomena, the target audience internalizes the projected message, resulting in an action that may or may not support the sender's objective.[1] During the final feedback phase, the sender re-evaluates the objective and message in relation to the action taken by the target audience and reactions by other audiences.



Figure 11. AIM Analysis Phase

ANALYSIS PHASE: The analysis phase begins with an evaluation of the state's objectives and the selection of a primary objective that serves to focus efforts. After the objective is selected, a determination must be made as to what outcome is required for its satisfaction. Once a desired outcome is identified, a target audience must be selected. Discovering the target audience requires an analysis of the government, military, and population audiences and a further refinement as to the group that has, either directly or indirectly, the greatest influence over decisions relating to actions impacting primary objective achievement.

After the target audience is selected, a message designed to influence decisions and actions must be developed. Several decisions must be made regarding the message's purpose before a course of action is selected. If the desired outcome requires the reversal of policy, the message will be coercive. If it involves the prevention of some future action, then it is deterrent. Finally, if its aim is to influence decisions that have not been made, it will be incentive. The sender must also determine the message's factual basis, black, gray, or white. Will the premise be based on lies and deception or verifiable facts? This determination may play a role in deciding if the message should be overt or covert.

However, a message designed to deceive and based on half-truths may be projected via overt means as witnessed by the Soviet Union's elaborate missile gap deception.

PROJECTION PHASE: Message development signals the completion of the analysis phase and the initiation of the projection phase. After the message is determined, the most appropriate IOP or combination of IOPs must be identified. Although all IOPs may not directly support the message, it is critical that they do not send mixed signals and counteract initiatives. Once the IOP(s) has been selected, options required to result in a phenomena that will project the desired message must be developed and implemented. It must be noted, the sender does not have complete control over phenomena creation. Fog and friction from other inputs will also influence events.



Figure 12. AIM Projection Phase

INTERNALIZATION PHASE: The resulting projection phase's observable phenomena begins the internalization phase. Similar to Boyd's OODA Loop, the phenomena must be observed before a decision resulting in an action can be made. The target audience's observation is interpreted using both contextual and operational frameworks. In addition to the target audience's interpretation, other audience interpretations influence the final decision. Implicit in the decision is its reaction to the message, either support, opposition or indifference to the primary objective. Unlike Boyd, however, AIM does not seek to break down a target audience's OODA Loop by rapidly changing decision making inputs and parameters.[2] Rather, it seeks to retain (to the maximum extent possible) the ability to predict and influence decisions and actions. It is critical to recognize that audiences influencing the sender may also observe and internalize the phenomena and communicate their decision making inputs.



Figure 13. AIM Internalization Phase

FEEDBACK PHASE: The core of the feedback phase centers around the re-evaluation of the message, medium, and objective in relation to the target audience's actions taken and inputs from domestic and other critical audiences (allies, world organizations, industry groups, etc.). If the target audience's actions result in or move towards the original desired outcome, then the current message and mediums employed may be continued or intensified. If not, the message or mediums may need to be changed or modified. In extreme cases, objectives may also have to be changed.



Figure 14. AIM Feedback Phase

PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER--AN AIM EXAMPLE

Figure 15 incorporates the four phases of AIM. The following hypothetical scenario involving the U.S. and Indonesia is presented to aid in better understanding of the model.

Analysis phase: According to the National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement, the U.S. has three grand objectives: enhancing security; promoting domestic prosperity; and promoting democracy.[3] For this exercise, promoting domestic prosperity is the primary objective. From that, ensuring adequate oil supplies to the U.S. and its allies can be one of the many supporting objectives established. Increasing oil imports from Indonesia is seen as the desired outcome.

Through analysis of Indonesia's government, military, and population audiences, several key factors come to light. The government desires to increase oil exports. However, they lack the investment and physical capital needed. China accounts for nearly 75 percent of Indonesia's total trade. They coerce fifty percent of Indonesia's production at below market prices with the threat of trade sanctions and implied annexation of offshore oil reserves. Finally, the population is yearning for increased standards of living, but due to the lack of oil industry development and artificial prices, no significant economic relief is foreseen in the future. Since China is in the middle of rapid economic expansion, influencing the government to decrease pressure on Indonesia is unlikely. Therefore, the U.S. must develop a strategy to reduce China's influence.



Figure 15. Action-Influence Model

At first look, the Indonesian government appears to be the audience that should be directly targeted, since they control critical export decisions. However, further analysis reveals that the economic prosperity of the general population is the driving factor for oil export allocations. The Indonesian government cannot afford to lose its largest trading partner and must concede to China's demands. Therefore, coercing Indonesia to sell the U.S. more oil would greatly damage the economy and result in even more problems as China began sanctions. Since Indonesia already sells oil to China, the U.S. could work to deter

an increase in sales to the mainland, but since Indonesia is already near oil production capacity, this would provide very little oil for U.S. purchases.

Given this situation, the U.S. should develop an incentive message. One possible message targeting the population may be: "China is experiencing rapid economic growth at the expense of holding back the Indonesian people's prosperity. Establishing better relationships with the U.S. and its allies will improve the standard of living." Note, this message does not mention oil. However, to increase oil exports to the U.S., economic improvement must be credited to America by the people and government of Indonesia, thereby reducing China's ability to leverage their economic IOP. Otherwise, China may take credit and attempt to gain even greater influence. Therefore, this points to a message based on facts and overtly pursued. A PSYOP campaign that is incentive-white-overt.

Projection phase: The desired phenomena to project the above message would be signs of economic improvement not based on Chinese needs or demands. All four IOPs can be coordinated to pursue what at first appears to be an economic issue. The U.S. could lower tariffs and enter into special trade agreements on Indonesian products. Diplomatic efforts may be pursued to encourage other states to do the same. American industry may be provided incentives to do business and cooperative efforts with and upgrades to Indonesian companies. The U.S. Navy can schedule Indonesian locations for port calls, thereby showing the flag and implying American military support against Chinese military threats. Agreements for exploration and exploitation by American oil companies for oil exports to the U.S. and mutual security assurances to protect offshore oil deposits where U.S. companies are working may increase the available oil. Finally, an active public relations effort to ensure everyone is aware of the successful initiatives the U.S. has taken to improve the Indonesian economy would round out the package.

Internalization phase: If the phenomena created from the projection phase increases the Indonesian people's standard of living, they will then in-turn work to influence the government to move towards better relations with the U.S. However, secondary audiences such as China may view the phenomena as a challenge to their ability to control Indonesian oil and react in a negative fashion, possibly threatening military intervention or trade restriction. In this case, American military assurances counter balance the threat of military intervention. Additionally, Indonesia's economy has diversified and is no longer dependent on Chinese imports. Therefore, the action taken is to increase oil exports to the U.S. and its allies at the expense of China.

Feedback phase: Indonesia's increase of oil exports to the U.S. was the original desired outcome. Therefore, it can be said that American efforts to influence events in Indonesia were successful and the outlook for domestic prosperity is improved. However, the selection of multiple IOPs and implementation options were critical for successfully influencing the Indonesian people. If only a military show of force or assurances for the Indonesian sovereignty of oil reserves was employed, China would have still had the leverage of reducing trade and damaging the economy. On the other hand, if only business incentives were used, China may have taken control of the oil fields.

Situations demand coordinated IOP efforts developed to create a desired phenomena that will influence the target audience to make decisions favorable to U.S. interests and objectives.

Notes

[1] John R. Boyd, "A Discourse on Winning and Losing," (August 1987), a series of unpublished presentations. Air University Library Document No. M-U 43947. Boyd emphasized "shaping" the adversary's impressions and perceptions of events. His objective was a rapidly changing environment such that the enemy's OODA loop, (observation-orientation-decision- action) decision making process could not adequately react, thereby becoming disorganized. Major David S. Fadok provides an analysis of Boyd's work in *John Boyd and John Warden, Air Powers Quest for Strategic Paralysis.*

[2] Ibid.

[3] *A National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement,* Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, February 1996.

Appendix E

Legitimizing the Soviet Missile Gap: A Chronology of Events

The following chronology of events prior to, during, and after the missile gap deception illustrate the broad range of IOPs and activities the Soviets employed from 1957 to 1962. A significant portion of this is based on the work of Horelick and Rush. Unless otherwise noted, English translations of comments attributed to Soviet publications and presentations came from their work. Text appearing in italics is an analysis of a particular entry or events leading up to it.

1. Mid-late 1950's. Due to the actual limited number of operational first generation ICBMs deployed by the Soviets, Horelick believes the decision to proceed with a limited program was made sometime between 1955 and 1958.

   This is consistent with attempts by the Soviets to begin legitimizing the stature of their ICBMs even before they possessed an operational force.[1]

2. 1955. West accepts Soviet strategic bomber claims.

   Although the Soviet strategic bomber capabilities were very limited and far inferior to U.S. forces, their successful deception program identified a potential soft spot in western defense analysis, setting the stage for future deception plans.

3. July 55. U.S. eager to move forward with détente.

   During discussion in Geneva, Soviet Premier Bulganin and senior leadership recognized the potential for an asymmetrical relationship with the West. In order to support détente, Western leaders were willing to make major concessions in comparison to the Soviets' relatively minor gestures.

4. 5 Nov 55. Suez Crisis--Soviet Primer Bulganin sends messages to France and Great Britain calling for a cease-fire with Egypt. The day prior to its delivery in London and Paris, the Soviets released the message's basic information through news services threatening the use of rockets if both countries did not terminate hostilities with Egypt. The next day, both France and Great Britain ordered a cease fire, primarily due to U.S. pressure. Many believe Soviet threat resulted in termination.

The message delivered to France and Great Britain was not as threatening as the Soviet news stories indicated. However, this procedure of issuing ultimatums to gain support in situations that had already been decided and alluding to nuclear missile attack became a mainstay of Soviet foreign policy for the next few years. This garnered strong support for the Soviets, especially in the communist and third world nations. In addition, due to their boasts and apparent reactions to the ultimatums, it established a de facto legitimate nuclear missile capability since they were never challenged.[2]

5. 26 Aug 57. Soviets announce successful test of a "super, long distance intercontinental multi-stage ballistic rocket . . . (that) landed in the target area" and reiterate information on recent high altitude nuclear detonation tests. They claim they were forced to develop this ultimate weapon in response to Western threats.

   Although the launch was a surprise to most of the world, U.S. intelligence was aware of at least six successful ICBM tests prior to this. This brings up the Soviet's keen sense of timing to maximize impact. Arms control negotiations had not been going well for them and U.N. hearings on their participation in putting down the recent Hungarian revolt were scheduled within the next few weeks. TASS statements alluded to either a current or soon to be operational nuclear capability of the rocket by re-reporting the nuclear atmospheric tests. Accuracy was implied by claiming it landed in the "target area." The target area could have been all of Siberia. Finally, by claiming they were "forced" to develop such a terrible weapon, they began efforts to put the West and particularly the U.S. on the defensive in World opinion.[3]

6. 27 Aug 57. Soviets reject Western arms control initiatives and charge they are "actually sabotaging the reaching of an agreement" and call for the renouncing of "atomic and hydrogen weapons, including aerial bombs, rockets of any type with atomic or hydrogen warheads, atomic artillery, and so on."

   Soviets continue to work on their image as peaceloving people who were forced to develop the weapon that they would gladly give-up if the West agreed to their arms control proposals.[4]

7. 28 Aug 57. Soviets claim ICBMs can successfully strike strategic bomber facilities in U.S. and allied countries.[5]

8. 28 Aug 57. In an official White House statement, Pres. Eisenhower acknowledges as noteworthy "the boastful statement made by the Soviet Union that they have made advances in the development in means of bringing destruction to any part of the world."

   President Eisenhower's statement lends credibility to Soviet claims and may be seen as acknowledging their ability to bring "mass destruction to any part of the world," including the bomber bases Soviets allude to.[6]

9. 29 Aug 57 *Washington Post:* "Pentagon Embarrassed, Reds Say," and "Rocket 'Guarantees' Ruin, Red Says." TASS and other communist news outlets report on failure of U.S. Atlas test launch, reprint stories from other papers discussing recent launch, call U.S. policy bankrupt, and claims the "most reasonable reaction" is to agree to Soviet arms control terms.

   Soviets begin to further legitimize their ICBM claims by re-printing stories from other papers. Many of these stories were found in Western papers and based on TASS reports, while others were Soviet stories planted in communist and front organization papers. In other words, they were writing news stories that were based on their original claims, beginning an endless cycle.

10. 29 Aug 57. Arms control negotiators return home. Soviets recommend moving talks to the U.N. and reiterate call "for elimination of military bases or withdrawal of troops from foreign territories."

    The abrupt change in Soviet negotiation tactics and new hard-line positions alluded to a change in the world power balance that did not exist. However, the image the Soviets portrayed was that they were in charge and could now push for the removal of U.S. forces from overseas facilities.[7]

11. 29 Aug 57. Senator Henry Jackson calls for re-evaluation of U.S. ICBM program and charges administration with slowdown. "It would be very hazardous for the United States to dismiss the ICBM claim as propaganda. . . . It would be a very disastrous blow to our own people and our Allies should the Soviets win this race, because it would represent the first time the United States has failed to win a race involving an important weapon system."

    Powerful voices within the U.S. government begin to question the balance of world power. Sen. Jackson, along with others, successfully pushed for an increase in U.S. ICBM funding and accelerating development programs. However, public comments and debate led to a growing belief that the U.S. had fallen behind, legitimizing Soviet claims.

12. 30 Aug 57. *Washington Post* headlines: "TASS Accuses U.S. Press of 'Hysteria' on Missile," "Reds Fire 6 Missiles Of Intercontinental Range Over Siberia," "Reds Zoom Ahead In Missile Race."

    These headlines represent the rapid escalation of Western response. The Soviets continue to espouse that the West has nothing to fear from them. Hysteria is unwarranted since the Soviets are peaceloving and willing to give up these terror weapons.

13. Late Aug 57. Western European response similar to Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, "This country's security has been based mainly in the impregnability of the United States. Will this protection now cease to exist?"

Allies begin to question the deterrent value of America's strategic bombers. The protective nuclear umbrella they had come to depend on to prevent Soviet aggression was not as dependable. This was a key theme the Soviets continued to hammer home as they worked to create a rift in NATO.

14. Early Sep 57. Soviet scientist claims accuracy within 12.4 miles.

    This level of accuracy implies the ICBM is a terror weapon, only applicable to very large soft targets similar to cities.[8]

15. 9 Sep 57. Zorin claims, "The statesmen of the U.S. and NATO openly proclaim that they are preparing for atomic war against the peace loving states."

    Once again, the image of Soviets as peace loving people, who only want world harmony is brought to the forefront as the U.N. prepares to begin discussions.[9]

16. Mid-Sep 57. U.N. General Assembly sessions on Hungarian Revolt.

17. 4 Oct 57. USSR successfully launches Sputnik I.

    Soviets pursue efforts to link space achievements to military capabilities. USIA reports indicate they were successful.[10]

18. 3 Nov 57. Sputnik II successfully launched.[11]

19. Mid-Nov 57. Khrushchev: "I think it is no secret that there now exists a range of missiles with the aid of which it is possible to fulfill any assignment of operational and strategic importance."

    Building on recent Soviet space achievements, Khrushchev connects space capabilities with military weapon systems. Official statements can be seen as following a logical sequence continuing to remain ambiguous while creating the belief of a plausible ICBM capability in the West.[12]

20. 1958 (date unknown) Senator John F. Kennedy warns that Soviet missile superiority will threaten U.S. security within the next two to six years.

    The missile gap and Soviet superiority are accepted by the majority of Western leaders.[13]

21. 10 Nov 58. Berlin Crisis begins.

    A new Soviet hard-line surprised the West. The only significant change in the world situation was the Soviet ICBM development. Therefore, they must have a strong ICBM force to risk war over Berlin.

22. 19 Mar 59. Khrushchev: "If such a country as ours, which occupies one-sixth of the globe, can, as they assert, be destroyed in a brief period of time, how much time is

needed to destroy other smaller countries, the allies of the United States, by resorting to the same means with which we are threatened? If the American generals and admirals ignore their own allies and write them off, it is their own affair."

Note that the U.S. is not threatened here. ICBMs are being used as a wedge in possible Western Alliance cracks. ICBMs are not mentioned in this comment, however, since the Soviets did not have a capable bomber force, the implication is that rockets either land or submarine launched would be used against U.S. allies.

23. 9 May 59. Khrushchev claims the Soviet Union has "enough rockets for America, too, should war be unleashed against us. . . . They allege that the Soviet Union has few intercontinental rockets. They would have you believe that the United States stands to lose least from a war. Even if this were true, does this make you Germans feel any better."

    Further efforts to break-up NATO and sway public opinion directly targeted at West Germany.

24. 29 May 59. Khrushchev states if attacked, they will destroy the rocket bases targeting them. "They are located not in bare rocky country, but where people live. But the governments of countries which provide territory for rocket bases of a transoceanic power for some reason do not take the vital interest of their peoples into account."

    A direct attempt to influence Great Britain, threatening the general population and preventing deployment of U.S. Thor missiles to the British Isles. The transoceanic power can only be seen as the U.S. If Thors were deployed to Great Britain, then Europe had more than just a nuclear bomber umbrella to protect them.

25. 1 Jun 59. Khrushchev declares, "The imperialists know our strength. To attack us is tantamount to suicide; one would have to be insane for this. I do not believe they are as stupid as all that; they understand the consequences which the unleashing of war against the socialist countries may have for them."

    More threats implying non-existent Soviet ICBM capabilities.

26. 30 July 59. Khrushchev to the Party Central Committee: "A situation has at present been created in which the imperialists will hardly dare to launch a war against our motherland or against the countries of socialism. Our forces and those of our socialist allies are colossal and in the West, apparently, this is now understood."

27. 11 Oct 59. Khrushchev: "We now have all the rockets we need: long-range rockets, intermediate-range rockets and short range rockets."

    Although many may interpret this to imply the Soviets possessed the quantity of rockets required to threaten the U.S., in actuality Khrushchev was addressing the different types of rockets.

28. Nov 1959. Khrushchev: "We now have stockpiled so many rockets, so many atomic and hydrogen warheads, that, if we were attacked, we could wipe from the face of the earth all our probable opponents."

    By not including bombers, Khrushchev infers the Soviets possess enough operational ICBMs to destroy the U.S. However, it has become generally accepted that Khrushchev did not view the U.S. as a serious threat to the survival of the Soviet Union as long as the Soviets did not threaten vital U.S. interest. It can be argued then that the U.S. was not viewed as a likely opponent that would attack.

29. 29 Nov 59. Khrushchev: "The Soviet Union has intercontinental ballistic rockets with hydrogen warheads."

30. 1 Dec 1959. U.S. Secretary of Defense McElroy calls for 24-hour airborne strategic bomber alert to offset possible missile gap. Pres. Eisenhower rejected this concept but supported a standby alert capability.

    The missile gap was accepted at all levels of government and the possible vulnerability of U.S. bombers to a surprise first strike became a growing concern for both the U.S. and its allies.

31. 15 Jan 60. Khrushchev to Supreme Soviet: "We already have enough nuclear weapons, atomic and hydrogen, and the corresponding rockets to deliver this weapon to the territory of a possible aggressor, that if some madman stirred up an attack on our state or on other socialist states we could literally wipe from the face of the earth the country or countries that attacked us."

    For the first time, Soviets connect sufficient nuclear weapons and the technology to place them on rockets. By including aggression against other socialist states, Khrushchev is implying the missiles are ICBMs.

32. Jan 60. Soviets claim successful test launch of space program rocket over 6,500 nautical miles.

    Soviets continue to use scientific accomplishments as the basis for military claims. If a space rocket has a range of 6,500 nautical miles, then extending the range of other rockets is not difficult.

33. 15 Jan 60. Minister of Defense, Marshall Malinovsky: "The building of large, expensive airfields with complicated equipment is not required for launching rockets. It is far easier to camouflage and even completely conceal rocket-launch positions; this guarantees a higher degree of security and invulnerability for rocket weapons."

    After U-2 flights, U.S. begins to question Soviet claims. Malinovsky uses Western doubt to his advantage and claims that ICBMs can not be discovered.

34. 31 Jan 60. U.S. statements point to much smaller Soviet operational ICBM capabilities than claimed. Soviets respond and say the "data" available to CIA Director, Allen Dulles is of little value. "To calculate in Washington the number of rockets and other types of Soviet arms is of as little use as counting crows on the fence . . . How many rockets do we have? Enough! Enough to wipe from the face of the earth any country that dares attack the Soviet Union."

    Confident Soviet claims continue to fuel the Missile Gap deception.

35. 11 Feb 60. Survey of Western European nations reveals Soviet Union is viewed as militarily superior to the U.S.

    Soviet deception efforts have succeeded in Western Europe. If the deception had not begun to unravel within the next few months, long term effects may have severely threatened the U.S. position and strained NATO.

36. Feb 1960. U.S. intelligence estimates of Soviet ICBMs reduced 66 percent from 1958-Jan 1960 estimates.[14]

37. Mid 60. Berlin Crisis discussions

38. Jun 1960. U.S. Intelligence estimates of Soviet ICBMs reduced 50 percent from Aug 1960 estimates, resulting in an 85 percent reduction since Jan 1960 estimate.

39. Jun 60. 45 percent to 15 percent of Norway opinion survey respondents believe the Soviet Union is militarily stronger.

    U.S. intelligence reports had not been made public at this time. Soviet deception efforts were still having a strong impact on Western states.

40. Aug 1960. U.S. intelligence estimates of Soviet ICBMs reduced four percent from Feb 1960 estimate, resulting in 70 percent reduction since Jan 1960 estimate.

41. Late 1960 to 1961. Defense spending increases gain momentum as Kennedy administration pushes for $14 billion more in outlays over Pres. Eisenhower's plans. U.S. strategic systems receive $6 billion of the increase, primarily improving ICBM capabilities. In 1997 terms, these increases equal $76 billion and $32.5 billion.

    Missile deception results in enormous additional defense spending to overcome the gap.

42. May 1961. Marshall Grechko, senior Warsaw Pact officer: "Soviet rocket troops (are) now able to destroy aggressors at any point on earth."

    Operational Soviet ICBMs continue to be portrayed as a significant threat to the U.S.

43. Mid-late 1961. Kennedy administration aggressively works to overcome inaccurate public opinion of Soviet superiority by supporting policies and actions that demonstrate American strategic capabilities.[15]

44. Sep 1961. U.S. intelligence estimates of Soviet ICBMs reduced to a level only 3.5 percent of Jan 1960 estimate, resulting in a total downward estimate of 96.5 percent in 19 months.

45. 21 Oct 61. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric: "The fact is that this nation has a nuclear retaliatory force of such lethal power that an enemy move which brought it into play would be an act of self-destruction on his part. ...we have a second strike capability which is at least as extensive as what the Soviets can deliver by striking first."

    The Soviet ICBM bluff is called and the U.S. moves to correct the image of an inferior military capability.[16]

46. 23 Oct 61. Malinovsky responds to Gilpatric comments. "Brandishing the might of the United States, he (Gilpatric) threatened us with force. What can one say to this one more threat, to this petty statement? . . . this threat does not frighten us."

    Soviets challenge and attempt to discredit U.S. claims of superiority and Soviet inferiority.

47. 19 Jan to 2 Feb 62. Secretary of Defense McNamara acknowledges overestimates of Soviet ICBM capabilities during congressional testimony.

48. 25 Jan 62. Malinovsky: ". . . we are capable of wiping from the face of the earth with one rocket-nuclear blow any targets, all the industrial and administrative-political centers of the U.S.A."

49. 31 Jan 62. Radio Moscow implies security arrangements between the U.S. and Japan are based on false U.S. capability claims and "the Soviet Union with its nuclear rockets is capable of annihilating with one blow those countries which have permitted other countries to maintain military bases in areas adjacent to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."

    Soviets return to the strategy of threatening U.S. allies and de-emphasizing ICBM capabilities.

50. 2 Feb 62. Soviet Admiral Gorshkov in comments targeting Turkey for its participation in NATO and CENTO said if war comes, ". . . a nuclear rocket blow will, of course, be inflicted on Turkey. After that, the assistance (the NATO Mediterranean Fleet) promises to Turkey will certainly not be asked for, because it will not be needed anymore."

51. 29 June 62. Radio Moscow: "No appeals that blows should be directed only at military objectives could prevent the all-devastating counter-blow at the economic, transportation, military, and administrative centers of the United States and its allies."

    Pres. Kennedy's announcement that the U.S. may consider limited nuclear responses alludes to a possible U.S. first strike. The U.S. may be starting to implement the nuclear blackmail the Soviets feared.

52. Sept-Oct 62. Cuban Missile Crisis

    One final effort to hold significant numbers of U.S. targets at risk compensating for the inadequate Soviet ICBM program. Khrushchev's willingness to back down highlights the Soviets inability to project intercontinental power. The Cuban Missile Crisis signaled the death knell for Soviet ICBM claims.

53. 1 Dec 62. Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara: "The ending of a myth has made it possible to take a firm line with our adversaries and at the same time reassure our friends that we are strong and determined to use our strength if we have to."

    Secretary McNamara further acknowledges the missile gap deception influenced U.S. policies and increased allies' apprehension.

54. 1964. Soviets expand military and economic aid programs to countries such as Indonesia, United Arab Republic, and Algeria.

    Threats aimed at the U.S. and its allies no longer impact world events. The Soviets turn to other methods of influence.

55. 14 Apr 64. DoD admits Soviets deployed only "a handful" of operational ICBMs.

56. Feb 65. U.S. begins bombing campaign against North Vietnam, without Soviet response as had been implied over the previous eight years.

57. Apr 65. Secretary McNamara discussing the current situation of U.S. Soviet strategic relationship: "(The Soviets) have decided that they have lost the quantitative race, and they are not seeking to engage us in that contest . . . There is no indication that the Soviets are seeking to develop a strategic nuclear force as large as ours."

Notes

[1] Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965). Also applies to items 2-3, 21-26, 28, 30-34, 42, 46, 49-51, 54-57.

[2] Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Soviet Psychological Strategy," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 87, no. 6 (June 1961).

Notes

[3] "Red 'World Missile' Fired 'Huge Distance,' Russians Announce," *Washington Post*, 27 August 1957.

[4] Murrey Marder, "Zorin Condemns West's Offers on Arms Check," *Washington Post*, 28 August 1957.

[5] "New Era Seen In Russian Policy," *Washington Post*, 28 August 1957.

[6] *Washington Post*, 29 August 1957. Also applies to item 9. Russian ICBM advances and arms control continue to be front page stories. Quotes taken from several articles appearing on this day. See: "Ike Voices His Concern At 'Scornful Words' In Soviet Arms Talk," "Pentagon Embarrassed, Reds Say," "Rocket 'Guarantees' Ruin, Red Says."

[7] *Washington Post*, 30 August 1957. Also applies to items 11-12. See: "Reds Fire 6 Missiles Of Intercontinental Range Over Siberia," Missile Plan Cutback Charged by Jackson," "Reds Brand Arms Plan Step Back," "TASS Accuses U.S. Press of 'Hysteria' on Missile," "Reds Zoom Ahead In Missile Race."

[8] "Dawn of the Super-Missile," *Newsweek* 50, no. 11 (9 September 1957). Also applies to item 16.

[9] "Foreign News," *Time 70*, no. 11 (9 September 1957).

[10] Office of Research and Intelligence, *Free World View of the US-USSR Power Balance*, USIA Report R-54-60 (29 August 1960). Also applies to items 35 and 39.

[11] Douglas Hart, *The Encyclopedia of Soviet Spacecraft.* (Hong Kong: Bison Books Corp, 1987), 121. Also applies to item 17.

[12] Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, U.S. Air Force Project Rand Report R-434-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, August 1965). Also applies to items 27 and 29.

[13] Stewart Alsop, "McNamara Thinks About the Unthinkable," *The Saturday Evening Post* 236, no. 43 (1 December 1962). Also applies to items 41 and 53.

[14] Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Department of Defense Programs and Authorization of Appropriations for Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels by the Armed Forces: Hearings on S. 2734*, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 19 January - 2 February 1962. Also applies to items 38, 40, 44, and 47.

[15] McGeorge Bundy, "The Presidency and the Peace," *Foreign Affairs* 42, no. 3 (April 1964).

[16] Joseph A. Loftus, "Gilpatric Warns U.S. Can Destroy Atom Aggressor," *New York Times*, 22 October 1961.

Appendix F

National Security Directive Decision 75

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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SYSTEM II
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January 17, 1983

Declassified/Released 3/16/94
under provision... E.O. 12356
by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council
FOIA-1102

National Security Decision
Directive Number 75

U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE USSR (S)

U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will consist of three elements: external resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism; and negotiations to eliminate, on the basis of strict reciprocity, outstanding disagreements. Specifically, U.S. tasks are:

1. To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas -- particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical regions of priority concern to the United States. This will remain the primary focus of U.S. policy toward the USSR.

2. To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced. The U.S. recognizes that Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in the internal system, and that relations with the USSR should therefore take into account whether or not they help to strengthen this system and its capacity to engage in aggression.

3. To engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and which are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest. This is important when the Soviet Union is in the midst of a process of political succession. (S)

In order to implement this threefold strategy, the U.S. must convey clearly to Moscow that unacceptable behavior will incur costs that would outweigh any gains. At the same time, the U.S. must make clear to the Soviets that genuine restraint in their behavior would create the possibility of an East-West relationship that might bring important benefits for the Soviet Union. It is particularly important that this message be conveyed clearly during the succession period, since this may be a particularly opportune time for external forces to affect the policies of Brezhnev's successors. (S)

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Shaping the Soviet Environment: Arenas of Engagement

Implementation of U.S. policy must focus on shaping the environment in which Soviet decisions are made both in a wide variety of functional and geopolitical arenas and in the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship. (S)

A. Functional

1. Military Strategy: The U.S. must modernize its military forces -- both nuclear and conventional -- so that Soviet leaders perceive that the U.S. is determined never to accept a second place or a deteriorating military posture. Soviet calculations of possible war outcomes under any contingency must always result in outcomes so unfavorable to the USSR that there would be no incentive for Soviet leaders to initiate an attack. The future strength of U.S. military capabilities must be assured. U.S. military technology advances must be exploited, while controls over transfer of military related/dual-use technology, products, and services must be tightened. (S)

In Europe, the Soviets must be faced with a reinvigorated NATO. In the Far East we must ensure that the Soviets cannot count on a secure flank in a global war. Worldwide, U.S. general purpose forces must be strong and flexible enough to affect Soviet calculations in a wide variety of contingencies. In the Third World, Moscow must know that areas of interest to the U.S. cannot be attacked or threatened without risk of serious U.S. military countermeasures. (S)

2. Economic Policy: U.S. policy on economic relations with the USSR must serve strategic and foreign policy goals as well as economic interests. In this context, U.S. objectives are:

-- Above all, to ensure that East-West economic relations do not facilitate the Soviet military buildup. This requires prevention of the transfer of technology and equipment that would make a substantial contribution directly or indirectly to Soviet military power.

-- To avoid subsidizing the Soviet economy or unduly easing the burden of Soviet resource allocation decisions, so as not to dilute pressures for structural change in the Soviet system.

-- To seek to minimize the potential for Soviet exercise of reverse leverage on Western countries based on trade, energy supply, and financial relationships.

-- To permit mutual beneficial trade -- without Western subsidization or the creation of Western dependence -- with the USSR in non-strategic areas, such as grains. (S)

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The U.S. must exercise strong leadership with its Allies and others to develop a common understanding of the strategic implications of East-West trade, building upon the agreement announced November 13, 1982 (see NSDD 66). This approach should involve efforts to reach agreements with the Allies on specific measures, such as: (a) no incremental deliveries of Soviet gas beyond the amounts contracted for from the first strand of the Siberian pipeline; (b) the addition of critical technologies and equipment to the COCOM list, the harmonization of national licensing procedures for COCOM, and the substantial improvement of the coordination and effectiveness of international enforcement efforts; (c) controls on advanced technology and equipment beyond the expanded COCOM list, including equipment in the oil and gas sector; (d) further restraints on officially-backed credits such as higher down payments, shortened maturities and an established framework to monitor this process; and (e) the strengthening of the role of the OECD and NATO in East-West trade analysis and policy. (S)

In the longer term, if Soviet behavior should worsen, e.g., an invasion of Poland, we would need to consider extreme measures. Should Soviet behavior improve, carefully calibrated positive economic signals, including a broadening of government-to-governme economic contacts, could be considered as a means of demonstrating to the Soviets the benefits that real restraint in their conduct might bring. Such steps could not, however, alter the basic direction of U.S. policy. (S)

3. Political Action: U.S. policy must have an ideological thrust which clearly affirms the superiority of U.S. and Western values of individual dignity and freedom, a free press, free trade unions, free enterprise, and political democracy over the repressive features of Soviet Communism. We need to review and significantly strengthen U.S. instruments of political action including: (a) The President's London initiative to support democratic forces; (b) USG efforts to highlight Soviet human rights violations; and (c) U.S. radio broadcasting policy. The U.S. should:

-- Expose at all available fora the double standards employed by the Soviet Union in dealing with difficulties within its own domain and the outside ("capitalist") world (e.g., treatment of labor, policies toward ethnic minorities, use of chemical weapons, etc.).

-- Prevent the Soviet propaganda machine from seizing the semantic high-ground in the battle of ideas through the appropriation of such terms as "peace." (S)

B. Geopolitical

1. The Industrial Democracies: An effective response to the Soviet challenge requires close partnership among the industrial democracies, including stronger and more effective collective defense arrangements. The U.S. must provide strong leadership

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and conduct effective consultations to build consensus and cushion the impact of intra-alliance disagreements. While Allied support of U.S. overall strategy is essential, the U.S. may on occasion be forced to act to protect vital interests without Allied support and even in the face of Allied opposition; even in this event, however, U.S. should consult to the maximum extent possible with its Allies. (S)

2. The Third World: The U.S. must rebuild the credibility of its commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on U.S. interests and those of its Allies and friends, and to support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States, or are special targets of Soviet policy. The U.S. effort in the Third World must involve an important role for security assistance and foreign military sales, as well as readiness to use U.S. military forces where necessary to protect vital interests and support endangered Allies and friends. U.S. policy must also involve diplomatic initiatives to promote resolution of regional crises vulnerable to Soviet exploitation, and an appropriate mixture of economic assistance programs and private sector initiatives for Third World countries. (S)

3. The Soviet Empire: There are a number of important weaknesses and vulnerabilities within the Soviet empire which the U.S. should exploit. U.S. policies should seek wherever possible to encourage Soviet allies to distance themselves from Moscow in foreign policy and to move toward democratization domestically. (S)

(a) Eastern Europe: The primary U.S. objective in Eastern Europe is to loosen Moscow's hold on the region while promoting the cause of human rights in individual East European countries. The U.S. can advance this objective by carefully discriminating in favor of countries that show relative independence from the USSR in their foreign policy, or show a greater degree of internal liberalization. U.S. policies must also make clear that East European countries which reverse movements of liberalization, or drift away from an independent stance in foreign policy, will incur significant costs in their relations with the U.S. (S)

(b) Afghanistan: The U.S. objective is to keep maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and to ensure that the Soviets' political, military, and other costs remain high while the occupation continues. (S)

(c) Cuba: The U.S. must take strong countermeasures to affect the political/military impact of Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba. The U.S. must also provide economic and military assistance to states in Central America and the Caribbean Basin threatened by Cuban destabilizing activities. Finally, the U.S. will seek to reduce the Cuban presence and influence in southern Africa by energetic leadership of the diplomatic effort to achieve a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, or failing that, by increasing the costs of Cuba's role in southern Africa. (S)

(d) Soviet Third World Alliances: U.S. policy will seek to limit the destabilizing activities of Soviet Third World allies and clients. It is a further objective to weaken and, where possible, undermine the existing links between them and the Soviet Union. U.S. policy will include active efforts to encourage democratic movements and forces to bring about political change inside these countries. (S)

4. China: China continues to support U.S. efforts to strengthen the world's defenses against Soviet expansionism. The U.S. should over time seek to achieve enhanced strategic cooperation and policy coordination with China, and to reduce the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. The U.S. will continue to pursue a policy of substantially liberalized technology transfer and sale of military equipment to China on a case-by-case basis within the parameters of the policy approved by the President in 1981, and defined further in 1982. (S)

5. Yugoslavia: It is U.S. policy to support the independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's current difficulties in paying its foreign debts have increased its vulnerability to Soviet pressures. The Yugoslav government, well aware of this vulnerability, would like to reduce its trade dependence on the Soviet Union. It is in our interest to prevent any deterioriation in Yugoslavia's economic situation that might weaken its resolve to withstand Soviet pressure. (S)

C. Bilaterial Relationships

1. Arms Control: The U.S. will enter into arms control negotiations when they serve U.S. national security objectives. At the same time, U.S. policy recognizes that arms control agreements are not an end in themselves but are, in combination with U.S. and Allied efforts to maintain the military balance, an important means for enhancing national security and global stability. The U.S. should make clear to the Allies as well as to the USSR that U.S. ability to reach satisfactory results in arms control negotiations will inevitably be influenced by the international situation, the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations, and the difficulties in defining areas of mutual agreement with an adversary which often seeks unilateral gains. U.S. arms control proposals will be consistent with necessary force modernization plans and will seek to achieve balanced, significant, and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable armaments. (S)

2. Official Dialogue: The U.S. should insist that Moscow address the full range of U.S. concerns about Soviet internal behavior and human rights violations, and should continue to resist Soviet efforts to return to a U.S.-Soviet agenda focused primarily on arms control. U.S.-Soviet diplomatic contacts on regional issues can serve U.S. interests if they are used to keep pressure on Moscow for responsible behavior. Such contacts can

also be useful in driving home to Moscow that the costs of irresponsibility are high, and that the U.S. is prepared to work for pragmatic solutions of regional problems if Moscow is willing seriously to address U.S. concerns. At the same time, such contacts must be handled with care to avoid offering the Soviet Union a role in regional questions it would not otherwise secure. (S

A continuing dialogue with the Soviets at Foreign Minister level facilitates necessary diplomatic communication with the Soviet leadership and helps to maintain Allied understanding and support for U.S. approach to East-West relations. A summit between President Reagan and his Soviet counterpart might promise similarly beneficial results. At the same time, unless it were carefully handled a summit could be seen as registering an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations without the changes in Soviet behavior which we have insisted upon. It could therefore generate unrealizable expectations and further stimulate unilateral Allied initiatives toward Moscow. (S)

A summit would not necessarily involve signature of major new U.S.-Soviet agreements. Any summit meeting should achieve the maximum possible positive impact with U.S. Allies and the American public, while making clear to both audiences that improvement in Soviet-American relations depends on changes in Soviet conduct. A summit without such changes must not be understood to signal such improvement. (S)

3. U.S.-Soviet Cooperative Exchanges: The role of U.S.-Soviet cultural, educational, scientific and other cooperative exchanges should be seen in light of the U.S. intention to maintain a strong ideological component in relations with Moscow. The U.S. should not further dismantle the framework of exchanges; indeed those exchanges which could advance the U.S. objective of promoting positive evolutionary change within the Soviet system should be expanded. At the same time, the U.S. will insist on full reciprocity and encourage its Allies to do so as well. This recognizes that unless the U.S. has an effective official framework for handling exchanges, the Soviets will make separate arrangements with private U.S. sponsors, while denying reciprocal access to the Soviet Union. U.S. policy on exchanges must also take into account the necessity to prevent transfer of sensitive U.S. technology to the Soviet Union. (S)

Priorities in the U.S. Approach: Maximizing Restraining Leverage over Soviet Behavior

The interrelated tasks of containing and reversing Soviet expansion and promoting evolutionary change within the Soviet Union itself cannot be accomplished quickly. The coming 5-10 years will be a period of considerable uncertainty in which the Soviets may test U.S. resolve by continuing the kind of aggressive international behavior which the U.S. finds unacceptable. (S)

The uncertainties will be exacerbated by the fact that the Soviet Union will be engaged in the unpredictable process of political succession to Brezhnev. The U.S. will not seek to adjust its policies to the Soviet internal conflict, but rather try to create incentives (positive and negative) for the new leadership to adopt policies less detrimental to U.S. interests. The U.S. will remain ready for improved U.S.-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union makes significant changes in policies of concern to it; the burden for any further deterioration in relations must fall squarely on Moscow. The U.S. must not yield to pressures to "take the first step." (S)

The existing and projected gap between finite U.S. resources and the level of capabilities needed to implement U.S. strategy makes it essential that the U.S.: (1) establish firm priorities for the use of limited U.S. resources where they will have the greatest restraining impact on the Soviet Union; and (2) mobilize the resources of Allies and friends which are willing to join the U.S. in containing the expansion of Soviet power. (S)

Underlying the full range of U.S. and Western policies must be a strong military capable of action across the entire spectrum of potential conflicts and guided by a well conceived political and military strategy. The heart of U.S. military strategy is to deter attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its Allies, or other important countries, and to defeat such an attack should deterrence fail. Although unilateral U.S. efforts must lead the way in rebuilding Western military strength to counter the Soviet threat, the protection of Western interests will require increased U.S. cooperation with Allied and other states and greater utilization of their resources. This military strategy will be combined with a political strategy attaching high priority to the following objectives:

-- Sustaining steady, long-term growth in U.S. defense spending and capabilities -- both nuclear and conventional. This is the most important way of conveying to the Soviets U.S. resolve and political staying-power.

-- Creating a long-term Western consensus for dealing with the Soviet Union. This will require that the U.S. exercise strong leadership in developing policies to deal with the multifaceted Soviet threat to Western interests. It will require that the U.S. take Allied concerns into account, and also that U.S. Allies take into equal account U.S. concerns. In this connection, and in addition to pushing Allies to spend more on defense, the U.S. must make a serious effort to negotiate arms control agreements consistent with U.S. military strategy and necessary force modernization plans, and should seek to achieve balanced, sigificant and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable armaments. The U.S. must also develop, together with the Allies, a unified Western approach to East-West economic relations, implementing the agreement announced on November 13, 1982.

-- Maintenance of a strategic relationship with China, and efforts to minimize opportunities for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

-- Building and sustaining a major ideological/political offensive which, together with other efforts, will be designed to bring about evolutionary change of the Soviet system. This must be a long-term and sophisticated program, given the nature of the Soviet system.

-- Effective opposition to Moscow's efforts to consolidate its position in Afghanistan. This will require that the U.S. continue efforts to promote Soviet withdrawal in the context of a negotiated settlement of the conflict. At the same time, the U.S. must keep pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and ensure that Soviet costs on the ground are high.

-- Blocking the expansion of Soviet influence in the critical Middle East and Southwest Asia regions. This will require both continued efforts to seek a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to bolster U.S. relations with moderate states in the region, and a sustained U.S. defense commitment to deter Soviet military encroachments.

-- Maintenance of international pressure on Moscow to permit a relaxation of the current repression in Poland and a longer-term increase in diversity and independence throughout Eastern Europe. This will require that the U.S. continue to impose costs on the Soviet Union for its behavior in Poland. It will also require that the U.S. maintain a U.S. policy of differentiation among East European countries.

-- Neutralization and reduction of the threat to U.S. national security interests posed by the Soviet-Cuban relationship. This will require that the U.S. use a variety of instruments, including diplomatic efforts and U.S. security and economic assistance. The U.S. must also retain the option of using of its military forces to protect vital U.S. security interests against threats which may arise from the Soviet-Cuban connection. (S)

Articulating the U.S. Approach: Sustaining Public and Congressional Support

The policy outlined above is one for the long haul. It is unlikely to yield a rapid breakthrough in bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. In the absence of dramatic near-term victories in the U.S. effort to moderate Soviet behavior, pressure is likely to mount for change in U.S. policy. There will be appeals from important segments of domestic opinion for a more "normal" U.S.-Soviet relationship, particularly in a period of political transition in Moscow. (S)

It is therefore essential that the American people understand and support U.S. policy. This will require that official U.S. statements and actions avoid generating unrealizable expectations for near-term progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. At the same time, the U.S. must demonstrate credibly that its policy is not a blueprint for an open-ended, sterile confrontation with Moscow, but a serious search for a stable and constructive long-term basis for U.S.-Soviet relations. (S)

Ronald Reagan

Appendix G

Correspondence with President Bush

GEORGE BUSH

January 16, 1997

Dear Major Cox,

Thank you for your letter of 10 January. I appreciated hearing from you.

Unfortunately, Major, I must respectfully decline your request for a personal interview. Since leaving office, I have received hundreds of like requests, and it simply is not possible for me to grant each one. Thus, in fairness, I decline them all. However, I hope the enclosed information is helpful to you in your research.

Regarding your third paragraph, I know very well that I would never send a message to Saddam Hussein "via a Japanese businessman." You state that copies of such a letter were "later found throughout Iraq." If you find a copy of this letter, I would very much like to see it. I am totally confident it is a fraud.

Regarding my pronunciation of Saddam Hussein's name, frankly, I don't really care how I pronounced it. I expect that my pronunciation did differ from time to time; however, I was not conveying some kind of message.

Thank you for writing, and good luck with your project.

Sincerely,



Major Lee-Volker Cox
USAF
1815 Braddock Road
Montgomery, AL 36106

P.S. In the War College there in Montgomery is Colonel Kim Siniscalchi, USAF. She is a nurse and a leader in her field. I know you would enjoy meeting her; and if you do, please tell her that her former Commander in Chief and Mrs. Bush send a huge *abrazo*.

10000 MEMORIAL DRIVE · HOUSTON, TEXAS 77024

Glossary

Acronyms

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	commander-in-chief
COA	course of action
DOD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
IOP	instrument of power
MOOTW	military operations other than war
NCA	National Command Authority
NSDD	National Security Decision Directives
NSS	National Security Strategy
PSYOP	psychological operations
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SOF	special operations forces
SPG	special planning group
STRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
U.N.	United Nations
U.S.	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
USIA	United States Information Agency
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

Definitions

black propaganda. misinformation operations accredited to source other than the originating organization.

black PSYOP. PSYOP based on nonfactual information, lies and fabrications.

CINC. commander-in-chief. Although the U.S. President is considered the commander-in-chief of American forces, references to CINC in this paper imply the combatant commander.

coercive PSYOP. efforts undertaken to convince a target audience to reverse a previous position or decision.

covert. operations not conducted in the open, clandestine.

deception. activities undertaken to purposely mislead a target audience

deterrent PSYOP. activities undertaken to prevent a given course of action that may or may not have been the target audience's most beneficial option.

gray propaganda. factual or misinformation operations from unidentified source.

gray PSYOP. PSYOP based on exaggerations or half-truths

incentive PSYOP. positive actions or inducements offered to a target audience to select a course of action that benefits the sender's interests.

information warfare. action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy an adversary's information and its functions and protecting against similar activities.

intercontinental ballistic missile. Large surface-to-surface nuclear capable ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5,000 miles.

interagency. Relationship between governmental organizations.

military operations other than war. Use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war.

national military strategy. Strategy of how best to employ military capabilities to achieve national goals.

National Security Decision Directives. President Ronald Reagan's authoritative orders on policies he felt were critical to U.S. security and interests.

National Security Strategy. The overarching presidential strategy of integrating IOPs for achieving U.S. objectives and supporting national interests.

operational military PSYOP. activities conducted in a geographic area prior to, during, and after conflict in support of a commander's plans.

operational PSYOP. regionally focused activities undertaken to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in support of the sender's objectives.

overt. activities taken in the open

psychological operations. actions taken to create an observable phenomena that influences the target audience's decision making process.

PSYOP. see psychological operations

public diplomacy. activities undertaken to influence *foreign and domestic* attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in support of the sender's objectives.

show of force. Military operation designed to demonstrate resolve, which involves increased visibility of deployed forces.

Scud. Short range mobile surface ballistic missile originally developed in the USSR but exported and modified by numerous other countries including Iraq.

special operations forces. Military units organized to perform unconventional missions in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.

Special Planning Group. established by NSDD 77 for the overall planning, direction, coordination, implementation and monitoring of public diplomacy activities. No longer in existence.

strategic PSYOP. activities undertaken to influence *foreign* attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in support of the sender's objectives.

tactical military PSYOP. activities conducted in support of a tactical commander during conflict. Radio, television, and loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflets are the most common activities.

tactical PSYOP. locally focused activities undertaken to influence *foreign* attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in support of the sender's objectives.

TASS. Soviet news agency.

United States Strategic Command. Unified military command responsible for deterring a major military attack against the United States and its allies and if necessary employing forces. USSTRATCOM has at its disposal for planning purposes ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines, strategic bombers and reconnaissance assets.

weapons of mass destruction. nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

white propaganda. factual information accredited to originating organization.

white PSYOP. PSYOP based on factual information.

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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

COOKING UP PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: THE INGREDIENTS OF SUCCESSFUL PSYOP

by

Bret M. Bemis

June 2011

Thesis Advisor:	Heather S. Gregg
Second Reader:	John Arquilla

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) have been integral to U.S. military operations in times of war and peace. Using radio broadcasts, leaflets, loudspeakers, and other forms of media, the U.S. has directed PSYOP toward influencing the behavior of a target audience (TA), in order to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning in support of the accomplishment of national aims and objectives. During war, tactical PSYOP is used to lower enemies' will to fight and ultimately lead them to surrender. Academics and practitioners have written a large body of literature over the last seventy years that addresses both successful and unsuccessful PSYOP. There has also been a large body of literature written about communication theory. What the literature fails to do is to address the important linkage between PSYOP and communication theory and how the relationship between the two affects the success or failure of PSYOP. Drawing from communication theory literature, this thesis builds a model for evaluating PSYOP products during the development phase. The thesis then applies this PSYOP model to Psychological Operations during the 1950–1953 Korean War, in an attempt to identify the conditions under which PSYOP products are crafted and deployed successfully.

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COOKING UP PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: THE INGREDIENTS OF SUCCESSFUL PSYOP

Bret M. Bemis
Captain (Promotable), United States Army
B.S., Eastern Kentucky University, 2001

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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from the

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June 2011

Author: Bret M. Bemis

Approved by: Heather S. Gregg
Thesis Advisor

John Arquilla
Second Reader

Gordon McCormick
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis

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ABSTRACT

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) have been integral to U.S. military operations in times of war and peace. Using radio broadcasts, leaflets, loudspeakers, and other forms of media, the U.S. has directed PSYOP toward influencing the behavior of a target audience (TA), in order to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning in support of the accomplishment of national aims and objectives. During war, tactical PSYOP is used to lower enemies' will to fight and ultimately lead them to surrender. Academics and practitioners have written a large body of literature over the last seventy years that addresses both successful and unsuccessful PSYOP. There has also been a large body of literature written about communication theory. What the literature fails to do is to address the important linkage between PSYOP and communication theory and how the relationship between the two affects the success or failure of PSYOP. Drawing from communication theory literature, this thesis builds a model for evaluating PSYOP products during the development phase. The thesis then applies this PSYOP model to Psychological Operations during the 1950–1953 Korean War, in an attempt to identify the conditions under which PSYOP products are crafted and deployed successfully.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

1st L&L	First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company
1st RB&L	First Radio Broadcast and Leaflet Group
COI	Coordinator of Information
CPI	Committee on Public Information
MISO	Military Information Support Operations
MOE	Measure of Effectiveness
MOP	Measure of Performance
MSPD	Military Support to Public Diplomacy
OCPW	Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare
OWI	Office of War Information
OSS	Office of Strategic Studies
PO	Psychological Operations Objective
POG	Psychological Operations Group
POW	Prisoner of War
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
PWB	Psychological Warfare Branch
SPO	Supporting Psychological Operations Objective
SSD	Strategic Studies Detachment
SMCR	Source-Message-Channel-Receiver
TA	Target Audience
TAA	Target Audience Analysis
TAAM	Target Audience Analysis Model
TAAW	Target Audience Analysis Worksheet
UN	United Nations
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

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I. INTRODUCTION

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) have been used, to some extent, in almost every type of conflict since biblical times. During times of war and times of peace, it is directed toward the behavior of a target audience (TA), in order to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning in support of the accomplishment of national aims and objectives.[1] During war, tactical PSYOP is used to lower enemies' will to fight and ultimately lead them to surrender. The importance of PSYOP can be seen in its elevated use throughout the 20th and into the 21st century. Beginning in World War I, the United States has tasked a number of organizations to conduct PSYOP, including the Propaganda Sub-Section, established in 1918, the Office of War Information (OWI), created in 1942, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW), established in 1951, and since 1967, the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG).

In its use of PSYOP, the United States has learned that, in order to influence the behavior of a target audience, one must properly plan the operation in order for it to be successful. However, more than just planning is required in order for PSYOP to be successful; it is also important to consider the best medium for sending the message, the receptiveness of the target audience, and the creation of metrics to evaluate the success of the operation. Literature on communications theory is particularly useful for understanding the necessary conditions that make planning and executing PSYOP successful. In this thesis, I will conduct research on communication theory and Psychological Operations, in particular its use during the Korean War, in an attempt to better understand what makes for successful psychological operations. The aim of this research is to help inform the planning process of future operations in order to execute successful PSYOP.

[1] William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1958), 2.

A. BACKGROUND

A considerable body of literature has been written over the last seventy years that describes cases of PSYOP and communication theory. There are a number of books and reports written on PSYOP during the Korean War, the first great Cold War conflict, and one in which PSYOP were prominently featured. Stephen Pease, George Pettee, Stanley Sandler, Herbert Friedman, and Alfred Paddock provide the information needed to describe who was responsible for the planning and execution of PSYOP, how it was employed, and the effects it had on the target audience during the Korean War. However, these authors do not focus sufficiently on the importance of PSYOP messaging and how it relates to the successfulness or unsuccessfulness of an operation.[2]

Communication theory literature offers a great deal of information on what makes for successful communication. Communication models by Harold Lasswell, Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, Wilber Schramm, and David Berlo provide the foundation for the PSYOP model that will be introduced in this thesis, in particular, the importance of the source, message, medium, and receiver.[3] However, surprisingly little has been written that identifies the practical use of communication models in PSYOP planning. For example, Philip Katz gives a comprehensive detail of communication theory and how it relates to PSYOP but does not identify a way to use communication models in PSYOP

---

[2] Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea*, 1950-1953 (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992); George S. Pettee, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-3: US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War* (Chevy Chase, Maryland: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951); Stanley Sandler, "*Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999); Herbert A. Friedman, "OPERATION MOOLAH: The Plot to Steal a MiG-15," Accessed May 07, 2011. http://www.psywarrior.com/Moolah.html; Alfred H. Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002).

[3] Harold D. Lasswell, "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society," *The Communication of Ideas*, edited by Lyman Bryson (New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1948), 37; Claude F. Shannon and Warren Weaver, *The Mathematical Theory of Communication*, (Urbana, Ill.: The University of Illinois Press, 1964) p. 7; Wilbur Schramm, "How Communication Works," *The Process and Effects of Communication* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1954); David K. Berlo, *The Process of Communication* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960).

planning.[4] This thesis aims to address these shortcomings by creating a model and matrix, using the PSYOP messaging variables, to evaluate PSYOP planning and operations.

Specifically, this thesis argues that, in order to understand what causes PSYOP to be successful or unsuccessful one must look at the source's in-depth knowledge of the TA, the message being sent, the medium that is used to send the message, and the receptivity of the TA.[5] These variables, drawn from communications theory, are necessary for PSYOP to be successful, but to what degree? Is one of these variables more important than another for successful PSYOP? Do all four variables have to be strong or can one or more variables be weak and still achieve the desired effects of the operation? This thesis aims to investigate these questions in order to better understand successful planning and execution of PSYOP operations.

B. METHODOLOGY

Building from literature on PSYOP and communication theory, this thesis begins by defining what PSYOP is and identifies four variables that are necessary for successful PSYOP messaging: in-depth knowledge of the target audience, a clear message, the correct medium, and the receptiveness of the target audience. These four variables make up a PSYOP model and matrix which will be used to evaluate U.S. PSYOP operations during the Korean War, in particular Operation MOOLAH, which aimed to encourage the defection of a MiG-15 fighter pilot with his aircraft, and the U.S. military's use of leaflets and loudspeakers to spread PSYOP messages during the war.

The Korean War is an ideal case to test the PSYOP model and matrix for several reasons. First, there is an abundance of literature written, not only on the Korean War, but also on the use of PSYOP throughout the conflict. Second, since the Korean War took

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[4] See "PSYOP and Communication Theory" by Philip Katz, taken from *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application* (Washington: American Institute for Research, 1976), 20–39.

[5] Although there are a number of variables present during PSYOP, the four that have been chosen coincide with the variables within communication theory. These variables are identified in communication theory and make communication successful.

place over fifty years ago, there has been enough time to evaluate the effectiveness of the PSYOP that took place. Also, documents that were otherwise secret have been made available for study. Third, according to Arend Lijphart, a single case study such as the Korean conflict is a valid and important means of testing theories. "The great advantage of the case study is that by focusing on a single case, that case can be intensively examined…Indirectly, however, case studies can make an important contribution to the establishment of general propositions and thus to theory-building."[6]

The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter II offers a definition of PSYOP, drawn from U.S. Army manuals, and offers a brief overview of PSYOP's history, particularly since World War I. Chapter III uses communication theory to develop a PSYOP model and matrix, arguing that four variables are particularly important for understanding the success of PSYOP products: in-depth knowledge of the target audience, the clarity of the message, the medium used to send the message, and the receptiveness of the TA to the message. Chapter IV uses the PSYOP model and matrix to evaluate U.S. PSYOP during the Korean War, specifically Operation MOOLAH and the use of leaflets and loudspeakers. Chapter V will draw general conclusions and their implications for PSYOP today.

6 Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *The American Political Science Review*, (1971): 691, accessed May 26, 2011, http://campus.murraystate.edu/academic/faculty/mark.wattier/Lijphart1971.pdf.

II. WHAT IS PSYOP?

From the time they were founded in 1775 and 1776, the United States Army and the government of the United States have used many forms of media to send well-crafted and sometimes not-so-well crafted messages to populations around the world. These messages were intended to persuade, influence, and/or change the behavior of populations or target audiences in favor of U.S. objectives. Crafted during times of war and during times of peace, these messages have been the backbone of U.S. strategic communications, public diplomacy, and psychological operations. Strategic communications and public diplomacy have been used extensively to inform foreign populations about the United States, and Psychological Operations have been used extensively during wartime to lower the morale of enemy combatants.

This chapter offers a brief history of Psychological Operations, including its definition, how PSYOP messaging is developed, the roles it plays in U.S. military operations and in support of embassy activities, and its evolution since World War I.

A. DEFINING PSYOP

Psychological Operations (PSYOP)[7] is the term that has been used the longest to describe how the U.S. Army uses selected media to send messages and influence target audiences. PSYOP has outlived the terms "propaganda" and "psychological warfare" (PSYWAR) by more than twenty years each. Just as the term PSYOP has changed over the years, which will be discussed later in this chapter, the definition has also changed. Broadly defined, PSYOP is the actions taken by an organization to decrease an enemy's morale and efficiency, lower their will to fight, and ultimately cause them to surrender. In order to disseminate the selected information, the organization develops a product or message, which can be audio, visual, or combination of both, and decides on the appropriate media that will have maximum effect in reaching the target audience.

[7] Most recently, the U.S. Army has proposed changing the name of PSYOP to Military Information Support Operations (MISO). While the new term is still being debated, this thesis will continue to use the term PSYOP.

In the United States Army, the organization that conducts PSYOP is the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG). The units within the 4th POG conduct PSYOP across the range of military operations and, according to Field Manuel 3-05.301, [PSYOP] are the "planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of Psychological Operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives."[8] In order to influence foreign TAs, PSYOP is employed across all instruments of national power to include diplomatic, information, economic measures, and military operations.

PSYOP is used to amplify the effects of military operations. Used during offensive and defensive operations, PSYOP is employed to hasten the eventual defeat of enemy forces through a number of ways, including undermining the will of the enemy to resist and, undercutting the credibility of enemy leadership, increasing unrest among the civilian population in enemy areas, fostering desertion or surrender of enemy forces, reducing civilian interference with military operations, increasing acceptance of friendly forces in occupied territory, and countering enemy propaganda.[9] Also used during stability operations, PSYOP supports counterterrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and humanitarian assistance.

Current military doctrine calls for a seven-phase PSYOP process. "The seven-phase PSYOP process is a standardized, nonlinear framework by which PSYOP are planned and conducted in support of a broad range of missions."[10] Phase I, or planning, is where the Psychological Operations objectives (PO), supporting Psychological Operations objectives, potential target audiences, initial assessment criteria, and baseline

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8 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, August 2007, Glossary-8.

9 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.30: Psychological Operations*, April 2005, 2-3.

10 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, August 2007, viii.

data are identified. The PO is "a general statement of measurable response that reflects the desired behavioral change of foreign TAs… [a Supporting Psychological Operations Objective] SPO is the specific behavioral response desired from the target audience to accomplish a given PO."[11] In order to accomplish the PO, two or more supporting PSYOP objectives are needed.

Phase II, or target audience analysis, is where "the PSYOP arguments used (the overall argument and approach to obtain the desired behavior from the TA) and recommended actions that the U.S. military and its allies can take to influence the behavior of selected foreign audiences"[12] are identified. Also during this phase, the medium that will be used to carry the message to the TA will be identified. PSYOP planners use the best medium to disseminate the message to the TA. There are a number of mediums that are identified that have the capability to disseminate or communicate the message, including face-to-face communication, broadcast communication such as radio and television, print material such as newspaper, handbills, leaflets, and posters, and digital dissemination such as the Internet.

Phase III, or series development, is where a "complex, creative, and collaborative process that creates synergy between multiple products and actions to achieve the desired behavior change for a single target audience"[13] takes place. Series development is the bringing together of a number of products or messages that will aid in the accomplishment of a single SPO. It usually takes more than one product or message to change the behavior of a single TA.

Phase IV, or product development and design, is when the product/action worksheet is created using information from phases I through III. The worksheet "is a source document and conceptual tool for creating products [messages] and providing guidance for pretest and posttest questionnaires."[14]

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11 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, August 2007, 1-26–1-27.

12 Ibid., 2-1.

13 Ibid., 3-1.

14 Ibid., 4-1.

Phase V, or approval, is where the PSYOP series goes through an internal review board, after pretesting and appropriate changes are made to the products, and then "staffed out for review and signature by the official approval authority."[15]

After approval is granted, Phase VI begins. Phase VI, or production, distribution, and dissemination is where the products [messages] are mass produced, moved to the dissemination point, and then is disseminated, which is "the actual delivery of the PSYOP message to the TA."[16]

Post-testing of products also takes place during this phase, which "helps the PSYOP Soldiers determine which products in the series are reaching the TA, what portions of the PSYOP argument are resonating with the TA, and what degree of influence the PSYOP series has on the TA."[17] With the information obtained during post testing, products can be modified or dropped from the series if they are not achieving the desired effects on the TA.

Phase VII, or evaluation, is the "process for evaluating [the] achievement of [the] SPOs and assessing the overall impact of [the] PSYOP series on [the] TA behavior."[18] PSYOP evaluation is achieved through the monitoring of impact indicators, which answer the assessment criteria questions. "PSYOP assessment criteria are the objective measures used to monitor and assess changes in TA behavior over time…impact indicators are specific, measureable, and observable behavior performed by the TA…analysis of the impact indicators over time will show behavior trends, which determine whether the SPOs are being achieved."[19]

In addition to its military mission, PSYOP provides support to ambassadors and country teams in order to reinforce diplomatic efforts through a number of operations including counterdrug operations, humanitarian mine action, and peace building. United

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15 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, August 2007, 5-1.

16 Ibid., 6-9.

17 Ibid., 6-17.

18 Ibid., 7-1.

19 Ibid., 7-2.

States government information efforts are supported by PSYOP under the auspice of military support to public diplomacy (MSPD).[20] Since foreign audiences are often targeted by specific information, PSYOP has been used more frequently by the U.S. government. For example, PSYOP can be used to support economic measures in the establishment of an exclusion zone. Exclusion zones can be established in the air (no-fly zone), sea (maritime), or on land to prohibit specified activities in a specific geographic area.[21] PSYOP can be used to inform and influence the target audience to act or not act within that zone. Historically, most of the information written about PSYOP is about PSYOP in support of military operations.

B. CRAFTING THE PSYOP MESSAGE

PSYOP messaging consists of four variables: in-depth knowledge of the TA, the message, the medium and the receptiveness of the TA.

The first variable present is the in-depth knowledge of the TA. Studying the enemy before and during conflict gives the PSYOP planner the necessary knowledge to properly employ PSYOP against it. Learning everything they can about the culture, attitudes, emotions, values, and ethics gives valuable insights as to why the TA behaves the way it does. In order to change the behavior of the TA, one must understand why the TA behaves the way it does. An in-depth knowledge of the TA allows the PSYOP planner the ability to understand the behavior and what they need to do to change it.

Initial research on the area of operation which the TA is in should have already been conducted. "PSYOP [planners] should keep abreast of current events and study the history, culture, society, and political makeup of their respective target countries or regions to increase their awareness of long-standing and emerging PSYOP-relevant issues."[22] This initial research allows the PSYOP planner to have a base knowledge of the TA and its surroundings. To build on this base knowledge, the PSYOP planner

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[20] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.30: Psychological Operations*, April 2005, 2-2.

[21] Ibid., 2-5.

[22] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, August 2007, 2-1.

conducts in-depth research on the TA during Phase II, Target Audience Analysis. Researching PSYOP-specific intelligence, open source information, supported unit documentation, finished intelligence products, and special PSYOP studies and assessments by the Strategic Studies Detachment (SSD) allows the PSYOP planner to identify the conditions, vulnerabilities, susceptibility, and accessibility of the TA which will allow them to effectively target the required behavioral change.[23] The PSYOP planner will also identify any differences in meaning between the TA's and planner's language. The differences of meanings in languages, called semantics, can cause the TA to misunderstand the PSYOP message. If the TA misunderstands the PSYOP message, then there is a possibility that the message will not achieve the desired behavioral change that it was intended to do.

The second variable present is the message. Crafting a message is a difficult task and current doctrine does not give enough guidance on how to craft a message. Field Manual 3-05.301, dated 2007, gives step-by-step instructions on how to develop the PSYOP argument, supporting argument, appeal, techniques, and primary influence tactics that will be directed towards the TA. The field manual states, "the main argument is the reason that the TA should engage in the desired behavior…the supporting arguments are used to provide factual evidence, address causes and effects, and exploit vulnerabilities…an appeal is the overall approach used to present the main argument…techniques refer to the specific methods used to present information to the TA… [and] primary influence tactics will magnify the persuasiveness of PSYOP products and actions."[24] The field manual, however, does not explain how to link them together and develop the appropriate message. However, it does state that the PSYOP argument "is not a slogan or tagline and does not provide the specific message or wording for individual product development, which is conducted in Phase IV."[25]

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[23] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, August 2007, 2-1.

[24] Ibid., 2-23, 2-27.

[25] Ibid., 2–24.

The word "message" is used sixty-seven times throughout Phase IV, but nowhere in the field manual does it explain how to craft the message. It does cover how and where the message should be inserted or displayed on the product that is being disseminated, whether it is audio, visual, or a combination of both. Dealing with print products, the most useful information on messages that Phase IV provides is "factors contributing to effective message writing include the following: a good practical knowledge of the TA language, recent residence in the target location and familiarity with current happenings in that area, familiarity with the organization of the TA's leadership, equipment, and arms, familiarity with the civilian population and the political, sociological, economic and psychological environment, and access to personnel with experience in advertising, journalism, public relations, or marketing."[26]

Field Manual 33-1-1, dated 1994, gives better instructions on how to craft a message. The field manual states, "PSYOP messages come in many forms…whatever the kind of message, however, they have a common characteristic—they ultimately have the same kind of purpose and the same need to be attended, understood, accepted, and acted upon."[27] Appendix J of the same manual goes on to explain, "the copy text is the written message…it contains a detailed discussion of the appeal being made, supporting and justifying it. A good text convinces the reader that only by accepting the course of action stated or implied in the text can his needs be fulfilled. The text must contain terms, phrases, and vernacular familiar to the target audience."[28] Just as with print products, current doctrine has left out key information that the PSYOP planner needs to write a message inside a script for an audio product, such as a loudspeaker or radio broadcast. FM 33-1-1 addresses these issues by listing a number of principles and factors that the PSYOP planner should follow in order to properly script a message that would be used in radio and loudspeaker operations.

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26 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, August 2007, 4–17.

27 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 33-1-1: Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures*, May 1994, 7-3.

28 Ibid., J-2.

The third variable is the medium. During Phase II, the best medium is selected, and during Step Six, determining accessibility, the "PSYOP Soldiers determine which media can reach the TA and to what degree the TA can be influenced by each media type."[29] There are a number of tasks that the PSYOP planner completes in order to choose the best medium. These tasks include:

> deciding how the TA currently receives information, deciphering current media patterns and usage, determining how the TA uses the medium, discovering how involved the TA is in the process, understanding whether the TA assesses the media individually or with others, debating what new media can be used to access the TA, including all of the information on the target audience analysis worksheet (TAAW), and articulating the technical aspects of each media. Once these tasks are complete, they will help answer the question, 'What types of media will effectively carry [the] PSYOP [message] to the TA?'[30]

The fourth variable is receptiveness of the TA. Current doctrine discusses susceptibility of the TA but fails to address TA receptiveness. During phase II of the seven-phase PSYOP process, the PSYOP planner implements the Target Audience Analysis Model (TAAM). The TAAM "is a practical research and analysis method that yields the necessary information for developing PSYOP products and actions."[31] Determining TA receptiveness is not identified in any of the seven steps. If the TA is receptive, then they are ready or willing to receive favorably or open to arguments, ideas, or change. For the TA to be influenced by the PSYOP message, they first need to be receptive of the message.

C. EVOLUTION OF PSYOP

Since World War I, the act of using media to send a message to a target audience has evolved through a number of names and definitions, and by those who practice it. "Propaganda" was the first term that people on all sides of the war used, meaning any

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29 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, August 2007, 2-21.

30 Ibid., 2-21.

31 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, August 2007, 2-3.

form of communication which affected the minds, emotions, and actions of a particular group.[32] Military propaganda, defined by Paul Linebarger as "the planned use of any form of communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given enemy, neutral or friendly foreign group for a specific strategic or tactical purpose,"[33] was used extensively by all sides during the war. In the United States, several agencies were responsible for the employment of propaganda throughout the First World War, which included the Committee on Public Information (CPI), better known as the "Creel Committee" and the military Propaganda Section inside the General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces.[34]

After World War I, the United States lost most of its interest in the use of propaganda because many believed that its employment was not necessary in a peace times. The Army disbanded both the CPI and the military Propaganda Section and almost all of the experiences and lessons learned during the war were lost over the next twenty years. In 1920, J.F.C. Fuller analyzed the lessons learned from the employment of new weapons in the war. He prophesied that, in the future, traditional warfare fought on the battlefield would be replaced by a "purely psychological warfare." [35] The term psychological warfare (PSYWAR) would come into play when the United States went to war against Germany and Japan during the Second World War (WWII). This change, from propaganda to PSYWAR, was the result of a translated German document that claimed "psychology should be employed in all phases of combat."[36] However, during this time, both propaganda and PSYWAR were used interchangeably.

Just as in WWI, when WWII broke out the United States did not have a unit dedicated to conducting PSYWAR. President Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to correct

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[32] Paul M.A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 2nd ed. (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce: 1954), 39.

[33] Ibid., 39.

[34] Ibid., 67.

[35] J.F.C. Fuller, *Tanks in the Great War* (London: 1920), 320, quoted in W.E. Daugherty, "Origins of PSYOP Terminology," Daugherty, ed., *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies in Military Application*, 1 (Department of the Army, Washington: April 1976) 18-19.

[36] Alfred H. Paddock, "Legitimizing Army Psychological Operations," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 56 (1st quarter 2010): 90.

the problem by appointing Colonel William Donavon as the Coordinator of Information (COI) in 1941. Over the next four years, the control of PSYWAR would be wrestled between a number of civilian and military agencies. The COI, later renamed the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS), disbanded the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) within the Military Intelligence Service at the end of 1942; ten months later, the PWB was resurrected as the Propaganda Branch within the Military Intelligence Division (G-2). The Office of War Information (OWI), and a number of other agencies fought back and forth for the rights to conduct PSYWAR throughout WWII.[37] In 1944, the Psychological Warfare Branch was established in General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area Command and the Psychological Warfare Division was established in General Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.[38] It was not until 1945 that all the agencies involved would finally be integrated in some way or another to practice PSYWAR. Military historian Stanly Sandler argues:

> The military relationship had been clarified. The new [Propaganda Branch] undertook no operations whatever, but connected War Department with OWI and OSS for policy and liaison…military needs in psychological warfare had been settled by regarding the Theaters in this respect as autonomous, and leaving to the respective Theater Commanders the definition of their relationships with OWI and OSS, and their use of each.[39]

Throughout World War II, PSYWAR had a difficult time in establishing itself within an appropriate agency, either civilian or military. The military finally decided to place the capabilities of PSYWAR within the newly established Propaganda Branch in the G-2. Although short lived (only four years) the Propaganda Branch was finally taken out of the G-2 branch in 1946 and, in early 1947, moved to Plans and Operations under the G-3. During this same period, Major General M.S. Eddy, who was the chief of

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37 Paul M.A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 2nd ed. (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce: 1954) 89–96.

38 Alfred H. Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 3-18.

39 Stanley Sandler, *"Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 42–46.

information, raised concerns over the term psychological warfare and that it would have to be carefully defined "so as not to arouse public indignation or fear of 'gestapo-ism' and authoritarianism in our own country."[40] Military historian Paul Paddock argues:

> Director of Plans and Operations was overall responsible for the general supervision of Army psychological warfare activities…[but] several War Department agencies were given pieces of the pie… Real centralization of psychological warfare activities did not occur until January 1951 with the formation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW), headed by General McClure.[41]

According to OCPW's mission, "it was to formulate and develop psychological and special operations plan for the Army."[42] One of the major divisions that McClure organized his office into was Psychological Operations. The name of the division would later help in transitioning the term PSYWAR to Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in the 1960s.

When North Korea attacked South Korea in the summer of 1950, the only active duty unit that focused on PSYWAR was a small Army detachment based at Fort Riley, Kansas. This detachment, later designated as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company, was sent to Korea in the fall of 1950. Once again, interest in PSYWAR increased within the U.S. government and the Army in response to this new conflict. In 1951, with the need for increased PSYWAR capabilities, the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group was organized and sent to Korea to help support strategic propaganda activities. Throughout the war, the 1st L&L Company conducted PSYWAR using mobile loudspeakers and the 1st RB&L group conducted PSYWAR using print media and radio stations. Even though PSYWAR capabilities increased during the war, once again, at the end of the war and over the next ten years, these capabilities were greatly degraded. Despite this, General McClure was able to establish the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in May 1952, which is most likely why

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40 Alfred H. Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 48.

41 Ibid., 45.

42 Ibid., 95.

PSYWAR capabilities did not disappear altogether. Because the Warfare Center trained both PSYWAR and Special Forces units, the name was later changed to the Special Warfare Center in 1956.

In early 1960, the term that represented the act of sending messages using various types of media changed once again. According to Paddock,

> Psychological operations replaced psychological warfare…Psychological operations, or PSYOP, encompassed psychological warfare, but the latter indicated propaganda directed only against enemy forces and populations for divisive purposes. The new and broader term could also be used to describe propaganda employed toward friendly and neutral audiences for cohesive purposes.[43]

Recognizing the need for PSYOP capabilities in Vietnam, the 6th PSYOP Battalion was activated in country in 1965. Two years later, the size of U.S. Army PSYOP had increased to a group, identified as the 4th PSYOP Group, which consisted of four PSYOP battalions. Once again, having limited and degraded PSYOP capabilities before the war started, the Army spent time during the war to build up and employ the capabilities that were needed. By the end of the war in Vietnam, the U.S. Army had a robust PSYOP capability able to conduct PSYOP at the tactical and strategic levels. This all changed after the war as the U.S. government began to draw down the military. By 1974, the only active duty unit that was capable of conducing effective PSYOP was the 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg, but it was understaffed and poorly equipped. The term "psychological operations" took hold during this period and would be used for the next 30 years.

From 1974 to the mid-1980s, PSYOP forces managed to survive at Fort Bragg. In the mid to late 1980s, PSYOP forces were increased in size and the equipment that they used was modernized. This was the first time such actions took place when the U.S. was not at war. New interests in PSYOP began to rise and, according to Colonel Curtis Boyd, there were a number of things that helped in the growth of PSYOP. Colonel Boyd states,

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43 Alfred H. Paddock, "Legitimizing Army Psychological Operations," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 56 (1st quarter 2010): 91.

> The impact of President Ronald Reagan's National Security Decision Directive 77 (1983), the Department of Defense PSYOP Master Plan (1985) and the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1987) provided permanent PSYOP staff authorizations within the Joint Staff, the Department of the Army and the U.S. Special Operations Command as well as the permanent establishment of two reserve-component PSYOP Groups, an enlisted military occupational specialty (37F), [and] the recognition of the importance of PSYOP planning at Combat Commands.[44]

During the next 30 years, PSYOP forces were used extensively throughout the world supporting missions that expanded across the spectrum of conflicts.

Operation Enduring Freedom, the War on Terror, and Operation Iraqi Freedom presented new challenges for the PSYOP community. With PSYOP forces constantly being deployed to support these operations, the need to increase the size of the community grew every day. In 2006, the PSYOP Branch was created and an authorization to increase the number of soldiers and officers within the 4th PSYOP was given.

Another challenge to the community in the post-September 11 security world was the term PSYOP. Since the origins of PSYOP came from a long history of misunderstandings and name changes, individuals in the government and the Army saw the need to hide what they were doing by calling it different names. Military Support to Public Diplomacy, International Public Diplomacy, and even Information Operations have been used to soften the reputation that the term PSYOP gives.[45] After years of mistrust, misunderstandings, and misuse, a new "softer" term was needed to cover all that PSYOP does and to help employ PSYOP not only in the tactical and strategic area, but also in the political realm. Military Information Support Operations, or MISO, took the place of PSYOP in 2010 and transition to this new term began in 2011. For the purpose of this thesis, the term Psychological Operations will be used because it is well known and has a longer history than Military Information Support Operations.

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44 Colonel Curtis Boyd, "The Future of MISO," *Special Warfare* 24 (2010): 24.

45 Colonel Curtis Boyd, "The Future of MISO," *Special Warfare* 24 (2010): 25.

D. FUTURE

Currently, the state of PSYOP is in flux. Doctrine is being rewritten to cover how to plan and execute PSYOP effectively, but before this can be done, the PSYOP community must learn what makes for successful PSYOP. The community can learn this by looking into the past and by considering communication theory.

The Korean War is a great case to study to find out how to construct, execute, and measure successful PSYOP because there was a standing unit, although small, that was ready to conduct PSYOP when the war began. Also, PSYOP was conducted by all sides in the war and we have had a long time, over fifty years, to analyze the outcomes. There is a lot of information about loudspeaker operations and leaflet drops that were conducted during the Korean War which can be analyzed to find out what made them successful or unsuccessful. One well known case, Operation Moolah, provides excellent information on the effects, or lack thereof, of a leaflet drop that offered a reward for a North Korean pilot to defect with a Soviet MIG.

Even though the name of PSYOP has changed over the last one hundred years and the job to plan and execute PSYOP has moved from one organization to another, the "act" has always stayed the same—sending messages using various types of media to change the behavior of a targeted audience. The next chapter will use communication theory to analyze the process in which a sender sends a message to a receiver. In this case, the sender is the PSYOP organization, the message is the PSYOP message intended to change the behavior of the TA, and the receiver is the TA.

III. COMMUNICATION THEORY

Measuring PSYOP effectiveness has always been a difficult task. Military historian Stephen E. Pease argues, "Judging the effectiveness of a PSYWAR operation is almost impossible…There usually is no immediate and observable link between the cause (the PSYWAR) and effect."[46] Most of the information on PSYOP's use during conflict has focuses on measures of performance (MOP) rather than measures of effectiveness (MOE). MOP such as the number of leaflets dropped, the number of hours of radio broadcasts are made, and the amount of money spent on operations are almost always reported. Rarely is the actual effectiveness of these leaflets, radio broadcasts, and money spent reported in an appropriate time to measure the success of the PSYOP operation. The tendency to report MOP and not MOE is the result of a number of factors. First, commanders typically want to know the immediate results of PSYOP. The problem with this demand is that almost all PSYOP aims to change the behavior of a TA, which takes time. There are a few instances where the effectiveness of PSYOP can be measured fairly quickly, such as a surrender appeal to enemy troops. Effectiveness can be easily measured by the number of enemy surrenders. However, immediate results are the exception, not the norm in PSYOP. Second, in order to prove that they are participating in the operation, PSYOP planners usually report MOP. Because measuring the effects of the PSYOP product takes time and commanders want results now, MOP is easily substituted in place of MOE to give the commander something.

To alleviate the temptation of substituting MOP with MOE, PSYOP planners need to provide the commander with a pre-measurement of the effectiveness of the PSYOP product that will be deployed. This premeasurement can be achieved by using a Communication Theory model in the seven-phase PSYOP process. As an evaluation tool, the model can provide the PSYOP planner with insights on what makes for successful PSYOP. The model can also be used as a lens for analyzing PSYOP that has already been conducted to find out what made the PSYOP successful or unsuccessful.

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[46] Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953* (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 12.

This chapter offers a brief history of Communication Theory models. It then builds off of these models to construct a new communication model as an evaluation tool for PSYOP planning. This model will then be used as an analytical tool to evaluate past PSYOP, specifically PSYOP during the Korean War.

A. HISTORY OF COMMUNICATION THEORY MODELS

Communications have been taking place for thousands of years. Just as the interest in PSYOP increased over the last century, interest in how and why individuals communicate has too. The interest in communication has allowed individuals to create a number of models which describe how communication takes place. At its simplest form, a communication model has three elements: the sender, a message, and the receiver. Throughout the 20th century, political scientists, mathematicians, and communications theorists helped developed the communication models that we use today. Prior to the 20th century, one of the first individuals who discussed the importance of communication was Aristotle. Aristotle, writing in 350 B.C.E., defined the study of communication as "rhetoric" and described three parts that make up the process of communication. He explained, "Rhetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners to speeches. For of the three elements in speech-making—speaker, subject, and person addressed—it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speeches end and object."[47] During his time, Aristotle already recognized the importance of the target audience while communicating. Aristotle's definition can be described as the first communications model in which the speaker is the sender, the subject is the message, and the person addressed is the receiver.

Throughout the 20th century, with the increase of interest in communications, a number of individuals are attributed with laying the foundation of communication theory. A few of these individuals, Harold Lasswell, Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, Wilbur Schramm, and David K. Berlo, developed fairly simple models that show how communication takes place.

47 W. Rhys Roberts (trans), "Rhetorica," The *Works of Aristotle*, volume XI, ed., W.D. Ross (London: Oxford University Press, 1924), 1348.

Harold D. Lasswell, writing in the first half of the 20th century, developed the model that states, "Who says what in which channel to whom with what effect."[48] Lasswell expands on Aristotle's definition by adding an additional part to his model. This part, the channel, can be described today as the medium. This four part model is still being used today to describe how communication works.



Figure 1. Lasswell Model

In 1948, while working for Bell Telephone Labs, Claude Shannon published a paper titled "A Mathematical Theory of Communication." In the paper, Shannon describes a communication system as having six parts: source, message, transmitter/encoder, channel, receiver/decoder, and destination.[49] As a research mathematician, Shannon created this theory in order to help with the information flow over telephone lines. In 1949, Warren Weaver expanded on Shannon's writing and published a paper titled "Recent Contributions to the Mathematical Theory of Communication." With the information presented in their two papers, Shannon and Weaver later published a book titled *The Mathematical Theory of Communication.* Both men are credited with what is now identified as the Shannon-Weaver Model of Communication. This model introduces noise into the communication process. Noise, as

48 Harold D. Lasswell, "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society," *The Communication of Ideas*, edited by Lyman Bryson (New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies, Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1948), 37.

49 C. E. Shannon: "A Mathematical Theory of Communication," *Bell System Technical Journal*, vol. 27, pp. 379–423 and 623–656, July and October, 1948

Weaver states, "may be distortions of sound (in telephony, for example) or static (in radio), or distortions in shape or shading of picture (television), or errors in transmission (telegraphy or facsimile), etc."[50]



Figure 2. Shannon-Weaver Model

Wilbur Schramm, a communication theorist, wrote a number of books and articles about communication throughout the 20th century. The contributions that Schramm made in the field of communications were paramount. In "Wilbur Schramm: Portrait of a Development Communication Pioneer," Arvind Singhal states, "Without Wilbur Schramm, communication science could never have achieved its present status. Perhaps he should be considered a fifth founder of communication research."[51] In his book *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication*, Schramm introduced a model that had the same elements that Aristotle identified in his definition of Rhetoric, the source or speaker, the message or subject, and the destination or person being addressed. Unlike Aristotle, Schramm identifies that there needs to be something in common between the

[50] Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver, *The Mathematical Theory of Communication*, (Urbana, Ill.: The University of Illinois Press, 1964): 7.

[51] Arvind Singhal, "Wilbur Schramm: Portrait of a Development Communication Pioneer," *Communicator: Journal of the Indian Institute of Mass Communication, XXII* (1987): 18. Accessed March 19, 2011. http://utminers.utep.edu/asinghal/Articles%20and%20Chapters/singhal-Wilbur%20Schramm-communicator.pdf

source and the destination for the communication to be effective. This is identified as the overlapping of the field of experience in Schramm's model.



Figure 3. Schramm Model

In 1960, David K. Berlo, a communication theorists like Wilber Schramm, introduced a model of communication called the SMCR model. SMCR, which stands for source, message, channel, receiver, includes a number of factors listed under each element that are needed in order for each element to be effective in the communication process.



Figure 4. Berlo Model

B. PSYOP MODEL

For the purpose of this thesis, Berlo's model will be used with elements from the Shannon-Weaver model. Also added are elements from PSYOP doctrine, which will allow easy analysis once the information is identified during the seven-phase PSYOP process. This model can be used to analyze a PSYOP operation to find out if it has the potential to be successful. The model can also be used to analyze past PSYOP operations to find out what made them successful or unsuccessful.



Figure 5. PSYOP Model

C. EVALUATION TOOL

As a very simple evaluation tool, this PSYOP model can be used to analyze the first four phases of the seven-phase PSYOP process to find out if you have the ingredients that make for successful PSYOP. At the end of phase IV, the PSYOP planner has enough information to use the PSYOP model. The source/sender is the PSYOP planner that is executing the seven-phase PSYOP process. The source/sender has to have an in-depth knowledge of the TA and their environment. In order to have an in-depth knowledge of the TA and their environment, the PSYOP planner must conduct a thorough TAA. FM 3-05.301 states, "Accurate and thorough analyses of the TA will yield vital information for the PSYOP Soldier. PSYOP TAA seeks to answer five key questions:

What TAs will be most effective in accomplishing the SPO?

What are the reasons for the TA's current behavior?

What are the best means of communication to reach the TA?

How can the TA be influenced to achieve the desired behavior?

What are the appropriate criteria by which to assess behavior change?"[52]

The TAAM will provide the information that will be used to develop the PSYOP argument. As stated earlier, the PSYOP argument does not provide the specific message, but it does give you the appropriate information that will allow you to craft (encode) an effective message. An issue the PSYOP planner must be aware of while crafting the PSYOP message is semantic noise. Semantic noise occurs when the PSYOP planner uses phrases, symbols, language dialects, slangs, etc., in the PSYOP message that the TA does not understand. Once the appropriate PSYOP message is crafted, the best medium that was identified during TAA is selected. If the PSYOP planner conducted a thorough TAA, as stated earlier, then the appropriate medium will be identified that will have maximum effects on the TA. If semantic noise was introduced while crafting the message, then the TA will not understand the message when they receive (decode) it from the medium. Once the appropriate message is sent, without semantic noise, to the TA through the appropriate medium, there are two things that the TA has to be in order to receive the message. They have to be receptive and susceptible of the message.

When comparing the model with the information obtained during TAA, the PSYOP planner will insert the required data inside the model. Once inserted, the model will give a visual representation of the communication that will take place between the PSYOP planner (sender) and the TA (receiver). In theory, if the PSYOP planner has the in-depth knowledge of the TA, he/she will be able to craft the appropriate message, without semantic noise, and send it to a receptive and susceptible TA through the appropriate medium, and then the behavior of the TA will be changed.

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[52] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, August 2007, 2-3.

D. PSYOP MODEL AS A LENS

The four variables of PSYOP messaging are present in the PSYOP model. As a lens, the PSYOP model can be used against PSYOP operations that have been conducted in the past to evaluate the effectiveness of the operation. The four variables, in-depth knowledge of the TA, message, medium, and receptiveness of the TA can be used to measure the outcome of the operation. By inserting the information obtained from the operation into the PSYOP model and using the matrix below as a checklist, it can be determined what variables are strong or weak and what impact they had on the operation.

	STRONG	WEAK
In-Depth Knowledge of the TA	• In-depth research was conducted before and during conflict • The proper resources where used to acquire the needed knowledge of the TA	• In-depth research was not conducted before or during conflict • The proper resources were not used to acquire the needed knowledge of the TA
MESSAGE	• Clear of semantic noise • TA understands message • The proper conditions, vulnerabilities, legitimate appeals, persuasion techniques, influence tactics are used	• Has semantic noise • TA does not understand message • The proper conditions, vulnerabilities, legitimate appeals, persuasion techniques, influence tactics are not used
MEDIUM	• Reaches a majority of the TA • Has credibility • TA is able to receive the message through the medium (if a leaflet is used with written text, the TA must be able to read)	• Does not reach a majority of the TA • Does not have credibility • TA is not able to receive the message through the medium (if a radio broadcast is used, a majority if not all of the TA have to have a radio
RECEPTIVENESS OF THE TA	• TA is open to arguments, ideas, or change	• TA is not open to arguments, ideas, or change

Figure 6. PSYOP Matrix

After inserting the information into the model and using the matrix, one will be able to measure the validity of each variable in the hopes of finding out what makes for successful PSYOP. For example, for PSYOP to be successful do all four variables have to be strong or can you have successful PSYOP when one or more variables are weak.

The next chapter will use the PSYOP model and PSYOP matrix as a lens to analyze PSYOP operations during the Korean War. The analysis will focus on one case, Operation Moolah, and two areas where the enemy was targeted for surrender, the use of the safe conduct pass leaflets and the use of loudspeaker surrender appeals.

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IV. KOREAN WAR

This chapter uses the PSYOP model and matrix introduced in chapter three to analyze U.S. Psychological Operations during the 1950–1953 Korean War. In particular, the chapter investigates three operations from the Korean War: Operation Moolah, which aimed to acquire a Russian MiG-15 jet fighter from enemy forces; the use of leaflets that carried the safe conduct pass message; and the use of loudspeakers directed toward enemy forces, which aimed to reduce morale and persuade combatants to surrender.

The Korean War was chosen for several reasons. It was the first time in which there was a standing PSYOP unit ready to deploy when the war started. According to military historian Stephen Pease, "When the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel in June 1950, the only operational PSYWAR unit was the small twenty-person Tactical Information Detachment at Fort Riley, Kansas. It was expanded and sent to South Korea as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L), arriving on 8 November 1950."[53] Also, there was a Psychological Warfare Section, within the Far East Command, that was able to produce and disseminate leaflets within twenty-four hours after President Truman committed U.S. troops to Korea.[54] By having a PSYWAR section in the Far East Command and a standing unit ready to deploy, the Army did not lose any valuable time in training or planning in PSYWAR for the Korean War. Second, there have been multiple reports and books written on the outcomes of PSYOP conducted during the war. This data provides the necessary information to which the PSYOP model and matrix can be applied to better understand the successes and failures of PSYOP products and methods of messaging during the war. Finally, despite the fact that the PSYOP model and matrix were constructed using current doctrine, it is argued that the matrix and model

53 Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea*, 1950–1953 (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 20.

54 Stanley Sandler, "*Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 206–207.

are useful tools for analyzing past and present PSYOP products and means of messaging; it is therefore the purpose of this chapter to test the overall utility of the model and matrix.

Overall, analysis based on the PSYOP model and matrix suggests that the four variables identified for PSYOP messaging were not always strong during the three cases investigated. Despite this, successful PSYOP did occur when three of the four were strong. In the use of safe conduct pass leaflets, three strong variables (message, medium, and receptiveness of the TA) and one weak variable (in-depth knowledge of the TA) resulted in successful PSYOP. In another case, Operation Moolah, all four variables were considered weak, causing PSYOP to be unsuccessful, although the operation was considered a success due to secondary effects. In the last case, loudspeaker surrender appeals, two strong variables (message and medium) and two weak variables (in-depth knowledge of the TA and Receptiveness of the TA) accounted for PSYOP to be successful a majority of the time.

A. CASE STUDIES: OPERATION MOOLAH, SAFE CONDUCT PASS LEAFLET, AND LOUDSPEAKER SURRENDER APPEAL

During the Korean conflict, PSYOP planners had to rely on the August 1949 *Field Manual 33-5, Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations* to plan and execute their operations. The main focus of the manual was to lower the morale of enemy forces and to persuade them to surrender or desert. Field Manual 33-5 states: "Psychological warfare consists of activities, other than combat, which communicate ideas and information intended to affect the minds, emotions, and actions of the enemy…for the purpose of reducing the enemy morale and will to fight."[55] It further states that, "the basic aim of psychological warfare conducted by a military command is to assist in expediting the defeat of the armed forces of the enemy. It achieves this basic purpose by seeking to: Decrease the combat efficiency of the enemy by lowering the morale of his forces; Induce enemy forces to surrender or desert; [and] Sustain the morale of friendly

[55] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 33-5: Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations,* August 1949, 2.

elements in enemy areas."[56] Therefore, PSYOP operations conducted during the Korean War dealt mainly with lowering of morale and surrendering of enemy forces.

1. Operation Moolah

Operation Moolah was an attempt by U.S. forces in Korea to acquire a Russian MiG-15 jet fighter from enemy forces. The U.S. offered $100,000 to the first pilot who defected to South Korea with a combat-capable MiG-15.[57]

In the fall of 1950, UN air forces were at a disadvantage when it came to air combat. The Russian MiG-15 jet fighter wreaked havoc in the skies over Korea and the UN did not have fighters that could match the power and speed that the MiG-15 brought to a dogfight. The U.S. military needed to study a fully operational MiG-15, fitted for combat, in order to understand how the MiG-15 was designed, its capabilities, and how to fight effectively against it in the air. The U.S. government also wanted to prove that the Soviet Union was actively contributing to the Korean conflict. The Soviet Union claimed it was neutral; however, UN pilots reported hearing Russian being spoken over their radio frequencies and UN POWs claimed that Soviet pilots interrogated them while in captivity.[58] The U.S. government, therefore, wanted to prove that the Soviet Union was not only supplying the MiG-15 to North Korean forces, but that it was also providing Soviet pilots to fly the MiG-15 in combat. Ultimately, the operation was aimed at encouraging either a Russian or North Korean pilot to defect with a combat capable MiG-15 jet fighter.

Several stories persist on the origins of the operation, but according to retired SGM Herbert Friedman, Edward Hymoff was the one who came up with the idea of offering $100,000 to an enemy defector for a combat-ready MiG-15.[59] In the fall of 1952,

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[56] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 33-5: Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations,* August 1949, 6.

[57] Stephen E. Pease, PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950–1953 (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 70.

[58] Ibid., 67.

[59] Herbert A. Friedman, "OPERATION MOOLAH: The Plot to Steal a MiG-15," Accessed May 07, 2011. http://www.psywarrior.com/Moolah.html.

Hymoff, who was the Bureau Chief of the *International News Service* in Korean, presented the concept of a reward for a MiG-15 to General Mark W. Clark while on a flight to Tokyo.[60] From there, the idea made its way to Washington and the Pentagon "authorized [General] Clark to offer a reward for a North Korean Air Force jet fighter."[61]

Although many consider Operation Moolah as the "greatest PSYWAR triumph in the Korean War,"[62] it can be argued that it actually was not a success because it did not achieve its goal—the defection of an enemy pilot with a combat-capable MiG-15. Two months after the armistice was signed, in 1953, a North Korean pilot defected and the United States got its hands on a MiG-15, but this defection happened independent of Operation Moolah. The pilot claimed he did not see any of the leaflets dropped or hear any of the radio broadcasts connected with the operation.

However, despite the inability of Operation Moolah to successfully encourage an enemy defector with his MiG-15, there were important secondary effects that U.S. PSYWAR soldiers observed after the operation began. Pease argues that "The Russian-language broadcasts were blocked by a powerful jammer in North Korea… [And] MIG flights dropped drastically. For eight days, there were no MIG sorties at all, an unprecedented stand down."[63] U.S. troops also noted that, following Operation Moolah, "the quality of the MIG pilots was noticeably poorer after regular sorties resumed…the MIG pilots compiled the worst record of the entire war. UN Sabres downed 165 MIGs to only three losses, a fifty-five-to-one ratio!"[64] Military Intelligence believed that the Soviet pilots were no longer flying the MiGs and that the "Koreans were only letting the most politically trustworthy pilots fly, which may have kept their best pilots on the

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60 Herbert A. Friedman, "OPERATION MOOLAH: The Plot to Steal a MiG-15," Accessed May 07, 2011. http://www.psywarrior.com/Moolah.html.

61 Ibid.

62 Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950–1953* (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 68.

63 Ibid., 72.

64 Ibid., 72–73.

ground,"[65] In other words, even though Operation Moolah did not succeed in persuading an enemy pilot to defect with a MiG-15 jet fighter, the operation did have an unintended, measurable effect on air operations.

Operation Moolah consisted of radio broadcasts and leaflet drops in the Korean, Chinese, and Russian languages. U.S. forces dropped over a million leaflets over North Korea and radio broadcasts transmitted approved scripts on two separate occasions in April and May 1953.

a. Analysis of Operation Moolah

The PSYOP model produces the following analysis:

1. In-depth knowledge of the TA: The source of the leaflets and radio broadcasts was Headquarters, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group.[66] The 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group arrived in Tokyo in August 1951 to help the Far East Command's Psychological Warfare Section in its job to wage PSYWAR in Korea. The 1st RB&L Group was largely manned by reserve officers with backgrounds in journalism, newspaper printing, novel and script writing, artwork, and radio technology. Even though the training that these officers received on Korean customs, language, and social details did not provide them with the in-depth knowledge of the TA that they needed, Korean nationals helped the officers in developing and targeting and, within a year, the Group was able to produce leaflets in sixteen languages and dialects.[67]

Two years prior to Operation Moolah, in 1951, George Pettee, a research analysts working in the Operations Research Office at The John Hopkins University, wrote a technical memorandum titled "US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War," in which he made the following observation:

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65 Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950–1953* (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 73.

66 Herbert A. Friedman, "OPERATION MOOLAH: The Plot to Steal a MiG-15," Accessed May 07, 2011. http://www.psywarrior.com/Moolah.html.

67 Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea*, *1950–1953* (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 24–25.

> Research for psywar, to provide summary data on enemy culture, morale, issues, idiom, personalities, etcetera, has barely been initiated. The large volume of bulk intelligence and basic reference materials available, containing pertinent information and data, makes research a requirement for any large scale psywar program.[68]

Overall, the 1st Radio & Leaflet Group did not have the in-depth knowledge necessary of the Chinese, Russian and North Korean TAs. For example, in a conversation between Lieutenant No Kum-Sok, the North Korean pilot who defected with the MiG-15, and retired SGM Herbert Friedman, Lieutenant No stated, "We had no concept of the value of the dollar…My salary was 500,000 Chinese Won per month, which was worth about $50 in U.S. currency…I was absolutely ignorant of what could be purchased with $100,000 then."[69] In other words, the offering of $100,000 did not mean anything to the North Korean pilots.

The incomprehension of the true worth of the $100,000 reward created "semantic noise." Semantic noise, identified in Chapter III, occurs when the PSYOP planner uses phrases, symbols, language dialects, slangs, etc., in the PSYOP message that the TA does not understand. In this case, the ignorance of the value of American dollars by the North Korean pilots caused the message to be weak and misunderstood.

2. Message: There were three variations of the Operation Moolah leaflet that was dropped. Each leaflet was written in the Russian, Chinese, and Korean languages. The main text of the leaflet reads as follows:

> To: Brave Pilots of Jet Aircraft
>
> Subject: A Road to Freedom
>
> Pilots! The Far East Command offers its help to all brave pilots who wish to free themselves from the vicious whip of the Communist regime and start a new and better life, with proper honor in the Free World.

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[68] George S. Pettee, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-3: US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War* (Chevy Chase, Maryland: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 3.

[69] Herbert A. Friedman, "OPERATION MOOLAH: The Plot to Steal a MiG-15," Accessed May 07, 2011. http://www.psywarrior.com/Moolah.html.

The Far East Command offers you refuge, protection, human care and attention. You are given full guarantee that your names will remain secret if you do desire. Pilots! Your brave move will bring you to freedom and will give you opportunity to live in the future without fear for your well-being. Besides that, your heroism and decision will help others by pointing to them the road to freedom.

The Far East Command will reward $50,000 United States dollars to any pilot who delivers a modern, operational, combat-type jet aircraft in flyable condition to South Korea. The first pilot who delivers such a jet aircraft to the Free World will receive a bonus of an additional 50,000 US dollars for his bravery.

Following is a list of instructions to all pilots who desire to free themselves from the Communist yoke. Escapee pilots will fly to Paengyong-do Island, fifty (50) kilometers south of Chodo Island. From Paengyong-do escapee pilots will proceed to Kimpo Air Base at 6100 meters altitude, descend over Kimpo Air Base, and proceed to make an immediate landing. UN Aircraft will accompany escapee remaining always above and behind, unless low clouds or visibility prevent escapee from locating Kimpo Airbase. If escapee is unable to make a visual let-down, he will proceed to the Seoul area at 6100 meters and circle with his gear down. A United States aircraft will then fly close abreast and lead the way to the landing field. Upon initial contact with UN Aircraft, or if at any time UN Aircraft attempts attack, escapee will immediately lower landing gear and rock wings violently.

The Free World shall welcome you as an old friend as well as a hero.

Mark W. Clark

General, United States Army Commander-in-Chief

Far East Command[70]

All three messages were almost exactly alike. The back of the Chinese and Korean language leaflets had an additional message that read: "This is a message from

[70] Herbert A. Friedman, "OPERATION MOOLAH: The Plot to Steal a MiG-15," Accessed May 07, 2011. http://www.psywarrior.com/Moolah.html.

the Americans to any jet pilot who reads Russian. If you know such a person, please give it to him. It tells him how to escape to the UN Forces."[71]

Using the PSYOP model as an analytical tool, we can further identify mistakes that were made when the message was crafted. In addition to the meaningless sum of money offered, the instructions given to potential defectors were also culturally inappropriate and introduced semantic noise. Critiquing the instructions on the leaflet, LT No stated the following:

> During the last 90 days of the war, MiGs seldom flew to North Korea. Chodo is 100km (62 miles) southwest of Pyongyang in the Yellow Sea. To fly to Chodo would be all but fatal at that time. Moreover, flying from Chodo to Paengyong-do, 50 km (31 miles) over the sea does not make any sense. Nobody had ever heard of Paengyong-do in the Yellow Sea. Finally, proceed from Paengyong-do to Kimpo, 200 km (124 miles) at 6100 meter (20,000 feet) altitude. Any MiG following the above flight path for defection would have been an easy prey for the Sabre jets.[72]

In other words, the instructions given to the pilot did not make any sense. Although the source of the message perhaps could not have known that North Korean pilots had not heard of Paengyong-do, they should have known that at the altitude they gave, 20,000 feet, MiGs would be easily attacked and possibly shot out of the sky by Sabre jets.

3. Channel/Medium: Leaflets and radios were the medium of choice for this operation. Millions of leaflets and fourteen radio stations carried the message to the TA.[73] As with the message, several problems occurred because of the medium. The leaflets were not dropped in the right place. Furthermore, the TA did not have access to a radio in order to listen to the broadcasts. According to Lieutenant No, "When the two B-29s dropped those million Moolah leaflets along the Yalu River, my MiG-15 Squadron was stationed in Tunghua Air Base, about 50 miles north of Manpo on the Yalu River. The Americans dropped no leaflets there and we had no radio. I do not believe any North

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[71] Friedman, "OPERATION MOOLAH," http://www.psywarrior.com/Moolah.html.

[72] Herbert A. Friedman, "OPERATION MOOLAH: The Plot to Steal a MiG-15," Accessed May 07, 2011. http://www.psywarrior.com/Moolah.html.

[73] Ibid.

Korean pilots saw the leaflet. Our unit had returned to the Dandong airbase in early July 1953. All the MiG-15s flew to combat from China most of the time."[74] This statement clearly shows that both mediums were ineffective in reaching their TA.

4. Receiver/TA: The intended TA was any pilot who flew a MiG-15. Ideally, the United States wanted a Soviet pilot, but a Chinese or Korean pilot would do. In order to persuade a communist pilot to defect to the West, the receiver would have to first be receptive to the message. The message and the medium are both important for influencing TA receptivity, specifically both needs to be credible in order for the TA to be open to the idea of defecting. In order to produce receptiveness, the message should have included something that the pilot wanted and understood. LT No stated, "The defecting pilot had to be an anti-Communist who wanted political asylum in the United States. Therefore, a statement in the leaflet of guaranteeing freedom and a job in America after defection would have been more effective."[75] In the case of LT No, the defector was not receptive to the idea of defecting for a cash payment, freedom and political asylum would have been more effective incentives.

b. Operation Moolah PSYOP Matrix

Using the PSYOP model and matrix to analyze Operation Moolah yields the following findings. In this case, all four variables—in-depth knowledge of the TA, the message, the medium, and the receptiveness of the TA—are considered weak. Since the overall intent of the operation was to acquire a combat-capable MiG-15 by a defecting pilot, and it did not do this, it can be argued that the operation was unsuccessful.

However, the operation had positive secondary effects that allowed the PSYOP planners to come to the conclusion that the operation was successful. Since these secondary effects—the drop in sorties and the increase of MiG-15 shoot downs—were not the original intent of the operation, they cannot be used to measure the success or

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[74] Herbert A. Friedman, "OPERATION MOOLAH: The Plot to Steal a MiG-15," Accessed May 07, 2011. http://www.psywarrior.com/Moolah.html.

[75] Ibid.

effectiveness of the operation. Even though Operation Moolah was considered the most effective PSYWAR campaign in the Korean War, it had little by way of in-depth knowledge of the TA, messaging, the mediums chosen, and creating receptiveness in its TA, in addition to failing to acquire a combat-capable MiG-15. The findings are summarized in Figure 7.

	STRONG	WEAK	NOTES
In-Depth Knowledge of the TA		• The proper conditions, vulnerabilities, susceptibility, and accessibility were not identified • Semantics were not identified	• No information on what research was conducted • Believe defectors would defect based on the money offered, not wanting freedom • Semantics were introduced in the messaging thus proving that semantics were not identified
MESSAGE		• Has semantic noise • TA does not understand message • The proper conditions, vulnerabilities, legitimate appeals, persuasion techniques, influence tactics are not used	• TA did not understand the concept of the value of the U.S. dollar • An appeal should have been made in terms of guaranteeing freedom and a job in the U.S.
MEDIUM		• Does not reach a majority of the TA • Does not have credibility • TA is not able to receive the message through the medium (if a radio broadcast is used, a majority if not all of the TA have to have a radio	• Leaflets were not dropped in the right area (According to LT No) • No one could have trusted the authenticity of the offer (According to LT No) • TA could not receive the message through the radio
RECEPTIVENESS OF THE TA		• TA is not open to arguments, ideas, or change	• The TA was not open to the idea of defecting because of the financial offer (To be receptive, an offer of freedom and a job offer in the U.S. would have been better suited for the TA to be open to the idea of defecting)

Figure 7. PSYOP Matrix (Operation Moolah)

2. Safe Conduct Pass Leaflets

During the war in Korea, U.S. forces used leaflets, loudspeakers, and radios extensively to carry the PSYOP messages to civilians, friendly forces,[76] and enemy

[76] Friendly forces were the South Korean troops who were fighting the North Koreans before the U.S. or UN arrived.

troops. The most preferred method, leaflets, were dropped by aircraft, delivered by artillery and, on rare occasions, patrols left leaflets "in the most-traveled areas behind the enemy lines."[77] Because leaflets dropped from aircraft would be scattered over a large area, "the 105mm howitzer remained the principal artillery piece for placing propaganda-loaded shells on pinpoint targets."[78] Over the course of the war, hundreds of millions of leaflets were scattered across the Korean peninsula. These leaflets, described as "printed advertisements" by military historian Stephen Pease, varied in size with the smallest measuring 3 by 5 inches to the largest being the size of a newspaper.[79]

The first leaflet dropped occurred less than twenty-four hours after "President Harry Truman announced that U.S. troops, supporting United Nations decisions, would come to the assistance of the invaded Republic of South Korea."[80] This leaflet targeted South Korean troops and civilians; it was very basic in design and informed the troops and civilians that help was on the way and to stand firm.[81] Weeks later, the first leaflet targeting enemy troops was dropped. For the remainder of the war, more than one hundred types of leaflets were dropped that were focused on three major military objectives: weakening the effectiveness and resistance of the North Korean (and, later, the Communist Chinese) People's Army; bringing the truth about the war to the people of North Korea; and bolstering the morale of the South Korean troops and civilian population.[82]

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[77] Stanley Sandler, "*Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 224.

[78] Paul M.A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 2nd ed. (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce: 1954), 307.

[79] Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea*, 1950–1953 (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 37.

[80] N/A, "Psychological Warfare in Korea: An Interim Report," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring, 1951): 65, accessed May 16, 2011, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2745752.

[81] Stanley Sandler, "*Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 207.

[82] Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea*, 1950–1953 (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 18.

The safe conduct pass, which aimed to weaken the effectiveness and resistance of the North Koreans, would become the most famous leaflet used during the war. The safe conduct pass played on the terrible conditions that enemy troops faced, including lack of food, shelter, medical supplies, and their freedom. The leaflet gave instructions for how to surrender and promised food and humane treatment for those who defected.[83] The Far East Command's Psychological Warfare Section and the Eighth Army's Psychological Warfare Division developed several different variations of this message, all encouraging enemy surrenders and defections. However, after learning that "more than thirty percent of the surrendering soldiers were functionally illiterate, able to read only road signs and the simplest instructions,"[84] safe conduct passes and surrender leaflets changed and included an easy to read map that showed the best way to UN positions.

Another change to the surrender leaflet occurred when PSYWAR planners learned that the black bars they used in photographs to hide the identity of the POW's picture on the leaflet were being exploited by Communist officers. "Communist political officers were explaining [to their troops] that the black bars were there to hide the scars from disfiguring chemical warfare experiments."[85] As a result, the black bars were removed so the POW's picture could be seen and to show that there was nothing wrong with them.

a. Analysis of the Safe Conduct Pass

The PSYOP model produces the following analysis:

1. In-depth knowledge: Just as the previous case study, in-depth knowledge of the TA can be considered weak because there was no information on the research conducted before developing the safe conduct passes. There is evidence that the Eighth Army's Psychological Warfare Division lacked the proper resources needed in

83 Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea*, 1950–1953 (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 77.

84 Ibid., 40.

85 Ibid., 81.

acquiring the in-depth knowledge of the TA that was needed. In the technical memorandum *Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War*, it states that:

> EUSAK [Eighth United States Army in Korea] Psywar has little or no library…there is actually no library for the division as a whole. The Projects Group does, however, have a small collection of materials and books. These include three Hong-Kong newspapers, Chinese and Soviet picture magazines, several books on China and Korea (e.g., Crow's Five Hundred Million Customers, Osgood's Ethnology of Korea), Chinese and Korean dictionaries, Army psywar manuals, Linebarger's Psychological Warfare, a college textbook on psychology and collections of the speeches of Mao Tse-tung and Ghu The, as well as official reports of various kinds.[86]

The strongest evidence that the Far East Command's Psychological Warfare Section and the Eighth Army's Psychological Warfare Division had insufficient knowledge of the TA is the fact that they printed elaborate instructions and were unaware that a significant portion of the TA was illiterate. Once this was discovered, they made improvements to the safe conduct pass and included a map. Furthermore, after the Psychological Warfare section learned that the black bars on the leaflet pictures were believed to be hiding marks of torture, the black bars were removed so the POW's picture could be seen and to show that there was nothing wrong with them.

2. Message: The Far East Command's Psychological Warfare Section and the Eighth Army's Psychological Warfare Division created several variations of the safe conduct pass and each leaflet was written in the Korean, Chinese, and English languages. Although each pass varied, they usually carried the same message to the enemy, which stated:

> WHEN YOU COME OVER TO THE U.N. FORCES, IT IS IMPORTANT TO FOLLOW THESE STEPS.
>
> 1. Wait for a favorable time to escape from your unit.
>
> 2. Destroy or bury your weapons.

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86 Willmoore Kendall, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-17(FEC): Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War* (Chevy Chase, Maryland: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 32.

3. Make your way to the nearest UN forces during daylight hours only.

4. Come down an open road in single file, with both hands raised above your head.

5. Bring your wounded brothers with you.[87]

The English portion of the message stated:

Attention all soldiers of the United Nations Forces. This leaflet guarantees humane treatment to any North Korean desiring to cease fighting. Take this man to your nearest commissioned officer at once.[88]

Another leaflet stated:

1. This is from the UN, to you soldiers. If you have a friend you can trust, please let him read it, too.

2. If you want to escape, try it at night.

3. The UN soldiers will warmly welcome you.

4. Please come safely and the UN will give you food, a warm place, and medical treatment. You will be happy and welcome.[89]

Because the message was basic, easy to read, and had clear instructions, it was very effective in informing enemy combatants that could read the best way to surrender. Following the discovery that roughly 30% could not read, the pass provided a visual map for the enemy troops to follow. Semantic noise was not introduced in the message, making it clear and easy to understand.

3. Channel/Medium: The medium that was chosen to carry the safe conduct pass was the leaflet; millions were dropped all over enemy positions. Because enemy troops could be executed for carrying these safe conduct passes, U.S. forces

87 Carl Berger, "The Korean Safe-Conducts," *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application,* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1976), 408.

88 Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea*, 1950–1953 (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 78.

89 Pease, *PSYWAR,* 81.

designed many of them to resemble banknotes, which allowed enemy troops to conceal the safe conduct pass from their superiors until the time came for them to be used. The leaflets had credibility because they "carried the signature of the United Nations Commander, General Douglas MacArthur or his successor, General Matthew Ridgway…the Eighth Army [safe conduct pass] was signed by General James Van Fleet."[90]

4. Receiver/TA: The intended TA was enemy troops. Because of the conditions that enemy troops faced—lack of food, shelter, medical supplies, and freedom—they were receptive to a message offering these things in return for surrendering. In one survey of 750 POWs, the "prisoners asserted the greatest obstacle to surrender was the fear of being killed…The promise of cigarettes and freedom from hard labor as well as safety from aerial attack were important to these captives, most of whom claimed that they believed the 'happy POW' accounts in many leaflets."[91] In the following list from technical memorandum *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, dated January 1951, the following number of POWs was recorded.

[90] Carl Berger, "The Korean Safe-Conducts," *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application,* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1976), 407.

[91] R.C Sheldon and H. Senft, Preliminary Evaluations of Psywar Leaflets and Broadcasts from IPOR POW Interrogations (International Public Opinioin Research, Washington: 22 February 1951), cited by Stanley Sandler, "*Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 212.

Table III

Reason for Surrender of Prisoners-of-War

Report Date	POWs Rptd	Reason for Surrender: Battle Conditions	Separation fr Unit	Physical Condition	Desertion	Psywar
11 Sept	1013	559	46	128	196	84
16 Sept	93	40	13	7	16	17
22 Sept	155	35	10	3	23	84
26 Sept	127	31	4	10	27	55
10 Oct	567	138	19	20	86	304
18 Oct	192	68	9	5	31	79
25 Oct	41	15	1	--	2	23
31 Oct	351	84	1	4	30	232
7 Nov	50	30	1	--	12	7
15 Nov	76	29	--	2	35	10
21 Nov	63	24	--	--	30	9
	2728	1053	104	179	488	904

Figure 8. Reasons for Surrender[92]

Because the PSYWAR column in the table is not further broken down into what type of PSYWAR was the cause of their surrender, either by leaflet, loudspeaker, or radio, it is hard to tell what percentage of the total number of surrenders were actually influenced by a safe conduct pass leaflet.

b. Safe Conduct Pass PSYOP Matrix

Using the PSYOP model and matrix t analyze the case yields the following conclusions. In this case, three of the four variables—the message, the medium, and the receptiveness of the TA—are considered strong. One variable, in-depth knowledge of the TA, is considered weak. (See Figure 9.)

Various accounts claim the successfulness of the leaflets in terms of the number of enemy troops that surrendered, "Some estimate that more than 100,000 North Korean and Chinese soldiers surrendered as a result of US PSYWAR activities;"[93] however, there was no distinction between what type of PSYWAR influenced the enemy

92 George S. Pettee, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-3: US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War* (Chevy Chase, Maryland: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 42.

93 Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea*, 1950–1953 (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 37.

to surrender and if there were other causes that prompted enemy troops to desert. It is difficult to say with certainty that the safe conduct pass leaflet accounted for a definitive amount of enemy surrenders throughout the war, despite the high number of defectors.

	STRONG	WEAK	NOTES
In-Depth Knowledge of the TA		• The proper resources were not used to acquire the needed knowledge of the TA	• No information on what research was conducted • Eighth Army lacked the resources needed to conduct the proper research
MESSAGE	• Clear of semantic noise • TA understands message • The proper conditions, vulnerabilities, legitimate appeals, persuasion techniques, influence tactics are used		• Semantics were not introduced in the messaging thus providing a clear message • TA understood the message • Identifying the need for food, medical supplies, and proper treatment allowed for an effective message
MEDIUM	• Reaches a majority of the TA • Has credibility • TA is able to receive the message through the medium (if a leaflet is used with written text, the TA must be able to read)		• Leaflets were dropped all over enemy positions • The leaflet had credibility because it was signed by General MacArthur and General Van Fleet • Although a majority of the TA was illiterate, a simple map showed them how to surrender
RECEPTIVENESS OF THE TA	• TA is open to arguments, ideas, or change		• Because of the conditions that enemy troops faced, they were open to the idea of surrendering because of the offering of food, medical supplies, and humane treatment

Figure 9. PSYOP Matrix (Safe Conduct Pass Leaflet)

3. Loudspeaker Surrender Appeals

Loudspeakers were rarely deployed during the early months of the war. In January 1951, seven months after the war started, George Pettee explained in the technical memorandum *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War* that "Public address, or loudspeaker equipment, has been used on a scale so small as to be little more than

experimental. Although widely and effectively used by many forces on both sides in World War II, there has been little equipment available in Korea, and what has been available has been used with little effect."[94]

The unit responsible for conducting tactical level PSYWAR was the 1st Leaflet & Loudspeaker Company. This unit, which was originally the twenty-person Tactical Information Detachment at Fort Riley, Kansas, was expanded, renamed, and sent to Korea, arriving in November 1950.[95] Within this deployment, the Loudspeaker Platoon was pushed down to commanders to be utilized along the front lines.[96] Although the 1st Leaflet & Loudspeaker Company was issued three loudspeakers, which were mounted on one-quarter ton trailers, only two of the loudspeakers had arrived in Korea by the end of November 1951; of the two that had arrived, only one was working.[97] However, over the next few months, the 1st Leaflet & Loudspeaker Company increased in size, and early in 1951, "there were 12 to 21 [loudspeaker] teams, with four or more usually posted to each corps and one per division on the line."[98]

According to military historian Stanley Sandler, there were a number of advantages that loudspeakers had compared to leaflets. "[A loudspeaker] was not 'wasted' like approximately ninety percent of the tens of millions of leaflets produced in this war, it had obviously more of an appeal to semi-literate peasants than leaflets, and the Korean language (Hangul) seemed more suited to the spoken than to the written word. In addition, enemy cadre could hardly forbid their men to listen, as they could

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[94] George S. Pettee, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-3: US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War* (Chevy Chase, Maryland: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 23.

[95] Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea*, 1950-1953 (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 20.

[96] Ibid., 22.

[97] George S. Pettee, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-3: US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War* (Chevy Chase, Maryland: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 29.

[98] Stanley Sandler, "*Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 226.

prohibit their picking up leaflets."[99] The message of choice by the loudspeaker teams was the surrender appeal. Because the "range of the loudspeaker was 1,000 yards to one mile,"[100] teams were brought to the front lines to broadcast their appeals to the enemy.

A May 1951 command report attributed success to the loudspeaker teams, arguing that:

> Nine (9) teams operated during the period with all American divisions, and with other United Nations forces, conducting a total of forty-eight (48) missions…A known total of two thousand nine hundred forty three (2943) prisoners surrendered as a direct result of ground loudspeaker broadcasts. This is a considerable increase over the preceding period.[101]

a. Analysis of Loudspeaker Surrender Appeals

The PSYOP model produces the following analysis:

1. In-depth knowledge: Just as the previous case studies, in-depth knowledge of the TA can be considered weak because there was no information on the research conducted before developing the safe conduct passes. Also, just as with safe conduct passes, it can be said that the Eighth Army's Psychological Warfare Division lacked the proper resources needed in acquiring the in-depth knowledge of the TA that was needed. The *Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War* states that:

> EUSAK [Eighth United States Army in Korea] Psywar has little or no library…there is actually no library for the division as a whole. The Projects Group does, however, have a small collection of materials and books. These include three Hong-Kong newspapers, Chinese and Soviet picture magazines, several books on China and Korea (e.g., Crow's Five Hundred Million Customers, Osgood's Ethnology of Korea), Chinese and

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99 Kilchoon Kim and E.A. Johnson, *Evaluation of Effects of Leaflets on Early North Korean Prisoners of War* (ORO, Baltimore: 20 February 1951), 7-8; John Ponturo, *Psychological Operations at Lower Echelons in Eighth Army, July 1952-July 1953* (ORO, Baltimore: 25 January 1953), 53-56, cited by Stanley Sandler, "*Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 225.

100 Stanley Sandler, "*Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 226.

101 Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea*, 1950-1953 (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 187–188.

> Korean dictionaries, Army psywar manuals, Linebarger's Psychological Warfare, a college textbook on psychology and collections of the speeches of Mao Tse-tung and Ghu The, as well as official reports of various kinds.[102]

Although the Eighth Army initially lacked the required resources needed to better understand the TA, by the summer of 1951, the 1st Leaflet & Loudspeaker Company had aquired "more than 139 military, civilian and indigenous personnel, (which included 10 professional Chinese and Korean translators and interviewers)."[103] These indigenous personnel and professional translators helped in the development of loudspeaker scripts, thus reducing semantic noise. Thus, the in-depth knowledge of the TA improved over time and with the acquisition of indigenous help.

2. Message: The message of choice by the loudspeaker teams was the surrender appeal. Examples of broadcasted statements include:

> Soon you will be committed to battle again to be sacrificed in the UN's sea of fire. Think of the thousands and thousands of your comrades who have already died for nothing in this foreign land. Friends, be wise, come to the UN lines, at the first opportunity you are guaranteed good treatment.
>
> Or
>
> Here's how to escape and come to UN lines. Listen carefully to the instruction which follows…Listen carefully…This is the way to escape your unit and come over to the UN lines:…"[104]

Sandler claims that "typical U.S. loudspeaker messages avoided overt political themes and usually offered a way out for the individual enemy soldier." Furthermore, because indigenous personnel and professional translators were used, the

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[102] Willmore Kendall, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-17(FEC): Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War* (Chevy Chase, Maryland: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 32.

[103] Stanley Sandler, "*Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 216.

[104] Loudspeaker scripts in "Contingency Scripts, Loudspeaker Platoon, 1st L & L", n.d., n.p.; and 1st L & L Co., "Command Report," for July 1952, cited by Stanley Sandler, "*Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 228–229.

messages were easy to understand and did not have semantic noise introduced unknowingly by U.S. forces. Messages were kept short, between 60 to 90 seconds, and followed the following guidelines;

1. Be used as a tactical weapon, with no lofty strategic (or "political") messages ("End the War!" "Fight Communism!").

2. Use simple, easy-to-understand messages.

3. Take a firm note.

4. Always repeat "punch line."

5. Sound "official" in tone and language.

6. Personalize target, by name, if possible.

7. Give directions on how to surrender.

8. Preface message with English-language warning to friendly forces not to shoot defectors coming across the lines (easier said than done).

9. Give up-to-date news.

10. Use native-speakers if at all possible, to avoid foreign accent.[105]

3. Channel/Medium: Along with leaflets, the medium that was chosen to carry the surrender message was the loudspeaker. With the range it had, loudspeakers were particularly useful on the front lines. It can be inferred that these broadcasts were threatening to enemy troops because loudspeaker broadcasts were fired upon by the enemy. According to Sandler, one study reported, "Hardly a day went by during the last year of the war without reports that the enemy had countered broadcasts with a generous amount of mortar or artillery rounds…a good many of the ground loud-speakers…were

105 "Student Summary, Army General Ground School", Conference on Loudspeakers, Air Dropped Newspapers, n.d., in Vatcher Papers, box 11, "Korean War" folder, cited by Stanley Sandler, "*Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 226.

destroyed by enemy counter fire."[106] Also, because the loudspeakers were so effective in reaching the enemy, Communist officers usually ordered their men to make noise to drown out the broadcast. Soldiers were told to fire their weapons, bang on containers, ring bells, and sing in hopes that they would not be able to hear the message.[107] These activities point to both the effectiveness of the medium in reaching the enemy and the message it carried.

4. Receiver/TA: As with the safe conduct pass leaflets, the intended TA was enemy troops. Loudspeaker surrender appeals seemed to work best after a major offensive took place. Sandler again observes: "After the 3rd Division's task force had flanked and decimated the targeted enemy, the loudspeaker team chief drew up a "threat-surrender" message for the survivors and "many" enemy troops surrendered."[108]

Sandler reports that "From January 1951 to the Armistice of 27 July 1953, 8th Army loudspeaker teams made 20,000 distinct broadcasts"[109] Although General McClure, who was head of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, "claimed that something like one-third of enemy surrenderees had been "influenced in their decision" by U.S. psywar,"[110] it is not known how many of them surrendered because of loudspeaker broadcasts. However, one can come to the conclusion that loudspeaker broadcasts could account for a fair amount of these surrenders based on the large number of broadcasts made.

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106 Stanley Sandler, "*Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 227.

107 Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea*, 1950–1953 (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 107.

108 J.V.Russel, "Psychological Warfare Ground Operations during the Attack," Student Monograph, Advanced Infantry Officers Course, Class #2 (1952-1953), 5-11, cited by Stanley Sandler, "*Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 230–231.

109 Stanley Sandler, "*Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 226.

110 McClure interview, USNWP; McClure lecture before Army War College, 16 February, 1953, typescript in AWC Archives, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, cited by Stanley Sandler, "*Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 252.

b. Loudspeaker Surrender Appeal PSYOP Matrix

Using the PSYOP model and matrix to analyze the loudspeaker surrender appeal yields the following findings. In this case, two of the four variables—message and medium—are considered strong and the other two—in-depth knowledge of the TA and the receptiveness of the TA—are considered weak. (See Figure 10.)

As with leaflets, the use of loudspeaker surrender appeals correlated with high numbers of defectees. This can be observed by taking in to account the number of broadcasts made throughout the war and the number of enemy personnel who surrendered. As stated earlier, it is estimated that more than 100,000 enemy troops surrendered due to U.S. PSYWAR and over 20,000 distinct broadcasts were made directed toward enemy troops. From this information, one can infer that the loudspeaker broadcasts had had some effects toward the enemy and ultimately caused them to surrender

	STRONG	WEAK	NOTES
In-Depth Knowledge of the TA		• The proper resources were not used to acquire the needed knowledge of the TA	• No information on what research was conducted • Eighth Army lacked the resources needed to conduct the proper research
MESSAGE	• Clear of semantic noise • TA understands message • The proper conditions, vulnerabilities, legitimate appeals, persuasion techniques, influence tactics are used		• The messages were clear and did not contain semantic noise
MEDIUM	• Reaches a majority of the TA • Has credibility • TA is able to receive the message through the medium (if a leaflet is used with written text, the TA must be able to read)		• Loudspeakers were brought close enough to the front lines to reach the TA • Enemy forces knew the broadcasts were from U.S. personnel • Most of the time, the TA could receive the message unless they were ordered to make noise by their superior to drown out the message
RECEPTIVENESS OF THE TA		• TA is not open to arguments, ideas, or change	• Unless something triggered the enemy's receptiveness (after a major attack or artillery barrage) they were not likely to be receptive of the surrender appeal

Figure 10. PSYOP Matrix (Loudspeaker Surrender Appeal)

B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Out of the three cases analyzed, none of them had four strong variables. One case had four weak variables, Operation Moolah, one case had three strong variables, and one weak variable, safe conduct pass leaflet, and one case had two strong variables and two weak variables, loudspeaker surrender appeals. In-depth knowledge of the TA was weak in all three. Message was weak in one, Operation Moolah, and strong in the other two, safe conduct pass leaflet and loudspeaker surrender appeal. Medium was weak in one, Operation Moolah, and strong in the other two, safe conduct pass leaflet and loudspeaker surrender appeal. Receptiveness of the TA was weak in two, Operation Moolah and loudspeaker surrender appeal, and strong in one, safe conduct pass. The findings are summarized in Figure 11.

	STRONG VARIABLES	WEAK VARIABLES
OPERATION MOOLAH		• In-depth knowledge of the TA • Message • Medium • Receptiveness of the TA
Safe Conduct Pass Leaflet	• Message • Medium • Receptiveness of the TA	• In-depth knowledge of the TA
Loudspeaker Surrender Appeal	• Message • Medium	• In-depth knowledge of the TA •Receptiveness of the TA

Figure 11. Summary of Findings

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V. CONCLUSION

After analyzing communication theory and applying the PSYOP model and matrix to three cases of tactical PSYOP in the Korean War, this thesis offers the following general conclusions. First, PSYOP is not successful when all four variables are weak in the PSYOP message. Second, successful PSYOP is possible, when there are two or more strong variables present in the operation. Finally, since the three case studies can be classified as tactical PSYOP,[111] the general conclusions made here cannot be applied to strategic or operational PSYOP. Each of these points will be elaborated below.

A. THE FOUR VARIABLES

The strength of the four variables studied in this thesis—in-depth knowledge of the TA, the message, the medium, and the receptiveness of the TA—offers insights on the potential success of a given PSYOP operation.

1. In-Depth Knowledge of the TA

In all three cases, in-depth knowledge of the TA was weak. One can come to the conclusion that, for tactical PSYOP, in-depth knowledge of the TA is not necessary for tactical level PSYOP; the PSYOP planner only needs to have a basic knowledge of the TA in order to be effective.

The following questions can provide the basic knowledge that the PSYOP planner needs of the TA to execute successful tactical PSYOP:

- Can the TA read?
- Can the TA understand basic drawings and pictures?
- What conditions, such as weak leadership, lack of food and medical care, fear of death, or lack of training, can be exploited to cause the TA to surrender?
- What medium can best reach the TA?

111 The overall intent of the cases was to cause the enemy to surrender or defect.

There may be more questions but, with these basic four questions, the PSYOP planner will gain enough knowledge of the TA to craft an effective PSYOP message.

2. Message

In two of the cases, the message was strong. These two cases, safe conduct pass leaflets and loudspeaker surrender appeal, were successful in influencing the TA to surrender. By contrast, a weak message, which was present in Operation Moolah, caused that operation to be unsuccessful. From these cases, one can conclude that, for tactical PSYOP, the message needs to be strong in order for the PSYOP operation to be successful. The message is considered strong when it does not contain semantic noise, the TA is able to understand it, and the proper conditions, vulnerabilities, legitimate appeals, persuasion techniques, and influence tactics are used when it is crafted.

3. Medium

In two of the cases—safe conduct pass leaflets and loudspeaker surrender appeal—the medium correctly fit the operation and therefore was strong. Operation Moolah, by contrast, had an ineffective medium, which contributed to its lack of success. From these observations, one can conclude that, for tactical PSYOP, the medium needs to be strong in order for the PSYOP operation to be successful. The medium is considered strong when it is able to reach a majority of the TA, and it has credibility. For example, the TA need to be literate in order to read a leaflet with words.

4. Receptiveness of the TA

In two of the cases, receptiveness of the TA was weak. Of these two cases, loudspeaker surrender appeal and Operation Moolah, only loudspeaker surrender appeal was successful in influencing the TA to surrender; Operation Moolah was unsuccessful. A strong receptiveness of the TA, identified in safe conduct pass leaflet, is necessary for tactical PSYOP to be successful. Receptiveness of the TA is considered strong when the TA is open to arguments, ideas, or change.

B. THE THREE CASES

1. Operation Moolah

Analysis of Operation Moolah shows that if all four variables are weak, then the PSYOP operation will be unsuccessful. Even though the unintended effects of the operation were profoundly positive, the operation's goal—influencing a Soviet or North Korean pilot to defect with a combat capable MiG-15 jetfighter—was not met.

2. Safe Conduct Pass Leaflets

For both safe conduct pass leaflets and loudspeaker surrender appeal, in-depth knowledge of the TA was weak. However, a basic knowledge of the TA allowed the PSYOP planner to choose the right medium and craft the right message to be successful. Analysis of the safe conduct pass leaflets demonstrates that if the two or more variables that are strong include the message and the medium, then the likelihood of the PSYOP operation's success will increase. The fourth variable, receptiveness of the TA, is more complicated. Ultimately, enemy soldiers were receptive to the message and surrendered in large numbers. However, it is unclear whether they were receptive when they received the message, or became receptive over time Further analysis of this variable can bring about insights as to how receptive the TA was when the safe conduct pass leaflet was dropped.

3. Loudspeaker Surrender Appeal

Analysis of the loudspeaker surrender appeal also demonstrates that if the two or more variables that are strong include message and medium, then the likelihood of the PSYOP's message will be successful increases. Analysis of the fourth variable, receptiveness of the TA, shows that loudspeaker surrender appeal was most effective when it was broadcasted to the TA after a major attack or aerial bombardment. In other words, the TA's receptiveness of the loudspeaker surrender appeal significantly changed after friendly forces did something to cause them to want to surrender. The TA's original conditions were not enough to cause them to be open to the idea of surrendering. As with

safe conduct pass leaflets and Operation Moolah, in-depth knowledge of the TA was also weak. However, a basic knowledge of the TA allowed the PSYOP planner to choose the right medium and craft the right message, aiding in the success of the operation.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYOP TODAY

The practitioners of PSYOP today can learn from both successful and unsuccessful PSYOP from past operations. These cases offer valuable insights on what the PSYOP planner needs to focus their time and effort. For tactical PSYOP, the importance of a strong message and the choice of a strong medium can cause the operation to be successful; in-depth knowledge of the TA is not necessarily needed while executing tactical PSYOP. Second, receptiveness of the TA can be further enhanced when friendly forces do something before the PSYOP is executed. Further analysis of in-depth knowledge of the TA for strategic and operational PSYOP is needed in order to understand its importance for PSYOP operations at this level.

Furthermore, PSYOP planners can improve the effectiveness of their PSYOP products by applying the model and matrix presented in this thesis to their planning process. Specifically, PSYOP planners can compare the PSYOP matrix with their operation and make changes accordingly to any weak variables that they identify.

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Lanigan, John Dennis

Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

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A MEDIA ALLOCATION MODEL FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

by

John Dennis Lanigan

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A MEDIA ALLOCATION MODEL FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

by

John Dennis Lanigan
Major, United States Marine Corps
B.S., Naval Academy, 1958



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ABSTRACT

This thesis demonstrates the formulation and use of a "goal programming" model in optimizing the allocation of media for psychological operations. The parallels between advertising and psychological operations are outlined; particularly, those in connection with defining a product, specifying a target audience and measuring success. Attributes and limitations of the various forms of mass media are discussed. The problem is developed as one of minimizing the variance between a set of goals stated with respect to specified target audiences for varying time frames subject to budget and resource limitations. The goals considered are related to the total number of times that members of a target audience are subjected to propaganda, the percent subjected and frequency of subjection. Ultimately, a numerical example is presented to demonstrate the potential use of the model.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The use of propaganda techniques, whereby one party seeks to change or mold the behavioral and mental processes of another party, can be found throughout history. Indeed, the Bible cites many examples whereby these techniques are used to cause the people to fear the wrath of God. The books of the Prophets contain many examples of "propaganda"; e.g., the people are told that if they do not deny false gods, repent, and reform, they will suffer the eternal damnation of almighty God. However, in modern days, the term "propaganda" has been primarily reserved for usage in reference to war-connected or political activities; whereas, a country's internal use of propaganda is referred to as "advertising" or "marketing strategy". Karin Dovring, author of Road of Propaganda, has coined another term for propaganda. She writes:

> "...Biased communication is a sophisticated term for propaganda, a word feared or avoided by all objective people and therefore a source of darkness and obscurity since nobody wants to talk about it but nevertheless everybody uses it."[12]

Advertising, biased communication and propaganda all seek to change behavior and herein lies the purpose for which this thesis is written. The commercial use of advertising has become much more sophisticated than that of its military counterpart. Many years have been expended in marketing research to determine the best methods of presenting information to a target audience so that they will buy a

certain product, vote for a given politician or change their beliefs. It is felt that this knowledge has not been satisfactorily applied to military problems. If there are techniques available that can create "needs" for items such as electric tooth brushes, pens that write under water or aftershave lotions that will make every man a Valentino; then, it seems reasonable that these same techniques could be used to "win the hearts and minds" of the populace in a given country or to cause an enemy force to fight less effectively or to surrender.

Historical Background of Modern Psychological Operations

The emergence of psychological operations as a rudimentary science is considered to be the First World War. In England, a Department for Enemy Propaganda (known as Crewe House) was established to co-ordinate the allied propaganda efforts. Representatives from France, the United States, and Italy worked with the British in unifying all propaganda efforts during the war. The efforts of Crewe House were lauded by the Germans subsequent to the war. However, this credit was largely undeserved; the Germans found it far more palatable to admit loss of the war due to propaganda efforts than they did to admitting that their armies had been severely defeated on the field of battle.[15]

The major lessons in psychological warfare (a term used almost interchangeably with psychological operations)

that evolved from the First World War are summarized as follows:

1. In many cases it is best for the propagandist to use self restraint in his efforts. The overstated case may well alienate a potential sympathizer.

2. Stereotyped and unimaginative propaganda, such as the German claims of allied atrocities, is worse than no propaganda at all.

3. Uncommitted nations are generally adversely impressed by any appeals for their sympathy or pity.

4. Denials of enemy propaganda are often dangerous. The old adage, "He who excuses himself accuses himself," proved to be true in a number of instances.[15]

The propaganda principles that were applied by Hitler and the German National Socialist party in their rise to power are in many ways at odds with what has come to be accepted as the "proper" means of establishing an effective psychological operations campaign. National Socialist propaganda was lacking in either internal or external consistency. At times it was hysterical and emotionally uncontrolled while at others it appeared to be the product of a cold and calculating intellect. However, its success cannot be denied. Hitler based his propaganda campaign to the German people on their desire for national self respect and personal self assurance, their self pity and fear, a belief that if Germany were given a chance she could surpass all other nations, and a claim that his party was one aimed at

the betterment of the "little man". Basically, Hitler's propaganda principles can be summarized as follows:[18]

1. Appeals to the emotions of a people are much more important than appeals to their reason. (Hitler believed in assertion and not in argument.)

2. The passions of a target audience must be directed at one clearly-defined enemy or they will become weakened by dispersal. (In the case of Germany this enemy was, of course, the Jews.)

3. All means whereby the populace receives information should be controlled. Strict censorship must be enforced.

4. Consistency is not important. (Hitler changed his propaganda messages to suit the mood and makeup of different target audiences.

By following these principles Hitler achieved unqualified success within Germany. However, his attempts to affect other nations in this way failed.

During World War II the allied forces considered propaganda to have a three-fold purpose: to impress and to depress one's enemies; to comfort, encourage and advise friends; and to divide one's enemies against one another. Further, propaganda was always to be truthful, consistent, and frank. (Later in the war it became apparent that being truthful was not sufficient; propaganda had to be believable.) In the long run, the psychological operations conducted by the allied powers proved to be more effective than any of those conducted by the axis powers.[15]

The relative austerity of the United States' propaganda efforts during the first two wars is succinctly stated by Doctor Hans Speir of Princeton University.

> "In the two world wars American psychological warfare was improvised after the outbreak of hostilities and conducted according to hit-or-miss methods. No peace-time agency existed which had preserved and developed pertinent skills and knowledge in this field, trained expert personnel, or engaged in appropriate research and planning. Psychological warfare was regarded as an operation requiring no planning, training, and research."[23]

Today, we are somewhat better off in our preparations for psychological operations but the field is still open to vast improvement. The American people do not like to believe that there is any need for "propaganda" and the term itself has come to connote a bad or evil practice. It is hard to imagine a "propaganda ministry" being established as a part of our national government. However, their is very definitely a need for some institution that would effectively serve this purpose. Agencies such as USIA are doing part of this job, but more needs to be done to cope with the many global conflicts that confront us today. We cannot rest on our laurels and expect the rest of the world to admire and support us because we are so all powerful or because the standard of living in our "great society" is so much above that of most of the rest of the world. Our country must strive to be more successful in combatting Communism than we have been in the years since the end of the Second World War. The instruments of global policy; propaganda, diplomacy, economics, and war must be judiciously

applied. Otherwise, many of the now emerging nations will become communist oriented.

Effective Propaganda

To be effective, propaganda must fill four essential conditions.[12]

1. It must gain and hold the attention of those people whom you specifically desire to receive your message; that is, your target audience.

2. It must be believable to both the members of the target audience and to others with whom they may discuss it.

3. It must be directed so as to lead the target audience along a path they are "willing" to follow.

4. It must be propagated in an environment that will allow the target audience to pursue the course of action desired.

This Thesis

Thus far we have discussed many of the reasons that make psychological operations important and have summarized some of the propaganda principles that have evolved since the First World War. This was done to stress the need for careful planning in preparing for psychological operations.

Once this planning has been accomplished and the propaganda themes have been established we must then decide on best ways to propagate our messages to specific target audiences. This is the problem area that is addressed by this thesis. Specifically, we shall develop analogies

between message dissemination in advertising and in psychological operations. Then, we shall show how a goal programming model that is currently being used to project "optimal" media allocation for advertising U. S. consumer goods can be successfully applied to use in psychological operations.

In the following chapters, we shall first discuss the meaning of the term "product" as it would be applied to psychological operations. Then, we will consider the audience itself; that is, its stratification, receptivity and access to various forms of communication media. Next, the problems of measuring the success of various psychological campaigns will be discussed in rather broad terms. This is not done to negate the importance of feedback. In fact, without some effectiveness measurement there would be no way to evaluate the predictive success of the media mix model that will be used. However, the problems inherent to evaluating success are in themselves still very much in the research stage.

Prior to presenting the media mix model, we shall discuss the basic communication process and some of the means of transmitting information. This is done so that the reader can better understand why considerations other than cost or number of people to be communicated with may be important. Some media vehicles (where "media vehicle" is defined to be the medium that brings a message to the attention of a target audience)[26] have greater prestige,

more impact, etc., than others. For instance, in the United States, a number of companies specify that "regardless of the cost" they want at least one advertisement to appear in Life magazine. Here, there is a definite prestige factor in that the company can then use the phrase, "as advertised in Life" in other advertisements.

Finally, we shall present an example of how the model can be used, state conclusions and make recommendations for further study in this area.

CHAPTER II

COMPARISON AND CONTRAST OF ADVERTISING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

In this chapter we shall discuss some of the major similarities and differences between advertising and psychological operations. In this way, we will be able to develop analogies that can be used in connection with the media mix model that will be presented in a later chapter.

Initially, a general overview concerning the applicability of advertising techniques in psychological operations will be given. Then, we shall consider the major factors that must be accounted for in both advertising and psychological operations. These are: the definition of the product; the target audience; and, the measures of success.

Obviously, there is not a one-to-one mapping of the parameters involved in advertising to those necessary for psychological operations. However, this has sometimes been taken to be the case. Writing about the United States' psychological warfare policy during the Second World War, Donald V. McGranahan refers to an "'advertising complex' that underlay our conception of propaganda." He goes on to state,

> "Our ideas of successful propaganda in this country are derived to a large extent from the principles of advertising and public relations, and our policy makers, unconsciously perhaps, seem to have applied the same principles to psychological warfare."[23]

Further on in his article, Mr. McGranahan does an excellent job in summarizing the advertising philosophies in order to compare them to their psychological operations counterparts.

> "In advertising, you are careful not to offend the public or any important segment of it. Your interest is in the broadest mass audience and the lowest common denominator. You do not attack established values and symbols. You avoid debate and debatable issues, and make your appeals to attitudes that are widespread and noncontroversial--desire for physical comfort, health, beauty, popularity, love of home and children, etc. If the advertiser wants to introduce a social change, such as getting women to smoke cigarettes, he does so by indirect methods, never openly attacking the belief or custom that is the main obstacle to his efforts. When the advertising philosophy of propaganda is carried over into the field of national psychological warfare, it results quite naturally in the theory that we should avoid open discussion of political faith and loyalties, where opposing passions may be aroused, and concentrate on non-ideological uniformity among the enemy population."[23]

This "advertising approach" to psychological operations may be applicable in many situations. However, we must be certain that we do not mask possible psychological victories by completely stereotyping our propaganda techniques and policies to those that have proven to be successful on Madison Avenue. No one can doubt the success of religious propaganda, whereby Christianity has been spread throughout the world; yet, missionaries have readily damned pagan beliefs, condemned non-converts to the everlasting fires of hell, and forthrightly stated that conversion was their ultimate goal. These are certainly not accepted advertising

techniques but they have worked and are still working today in some parts of the world.

Another type of propaganda, revolutionary propaganda, has also been very successfully used; particularly so by the communists in the past twenty years. Generally, the proponents of revolutionary propaganda are careful not to attack the people themselves but attack existing political systems and the leaders that are enforcing them. Here again, this approach is somewhat at odds with both the advertising and religious approaches.

The point to be made is that psychological operations should be specifically tailored to the problem at hand and not necessarily patterned on any one method or technique nor on any combination of them. There may be occasions when some of the techniques used by the missionaries can be effective; particularly, when we are dealing with superstitious or very "backward" people. On other occasions it may be our desire to foment revolution; e.g., in Cuba today. However, the techniques and policies that are applicable to one situation may be totally inappropriate in another. We cannot devise a "standard operating procedure" for psychological operations as a whole. Any stereotyped plans or methods of operation will almost surely detract from the overall success of our propaganda efforts.

We have agreed that the administration of the U. S. psychological operations should not necessarily be relegated to the advertising giants of Madison Avenue. The

techniques that they have developed will certainly be a help, as will some of the ones that have been used by missionaries and revolutionaries. Although, psychological operations is an entity unto its own and is not meant to be defined as a function or subset of any other form of mass communication, there do exist some analogies. We shall now discuss those that will be important in the model to be presented in this paper.

The Definition of the Product

One of the major differences between advertising and psychological operations is that in psychological operations there is no clearly defined product. One can see, feel, or taste a newly marketed brand of toothpaste; however, such "products" as allegiance, loyalty, or willingness to bear arms in defense of one's country defy animate description. One cannot drink a pint of allegiance or squeeze a tube of loyalty. However, there are some ways in which the nebulous concerns of a governmental power can be defined so that they might be treated as products.

We might proclaim a governmental chief in a manner similar to that which is used in the campaigns of many of the politicians in this country today; that is, sell the man and we will sell the ideology he represents. This method of defining the product may be a good one if we have a leader with whom the people desire to identify. The defeat of the Huks in the Phillipines was largely facilitated by the charismatic leadership of Ramon Magsaysay. On the other hand, selling the man may have serious limitations. One wrong action

on the part of the leader being exalted, his demise at the expense of some insurgent power or even his death may greatly diminish the effectiveness of a propaganda campaign.

A second way to define the product is essentially the converse of the first. That is, we publicize a public office as the embodiment of a certain ideology. (In Thailand, the King might well be the "product".) In this way, we allow for the contingencies that may befall the man currently holding office. (If the present king should die a new king would take his place.) This means of defining the product does not have the inherent drawbacks of the first method. However, the product may be weaker in the sense that many of the people will not personally attach themselves to an office in the same manner in which they would a man.

Nationalism, national unity, and heritage can all be loosely defined as "products" in certain situations. Naturally, these products would not be of much benefit in Russia or Communist China. They would also be of limited benefit in divided countries like Vietnam or Korea since national unity is one of the terms that the communists use in their attempts to instigate revolution. However, in a country like Thailand, where there exists a comparatively contiguous population and relatively strong central ties, a product such as national unity may be salable.

One "product" that can be used in virtually any environment is that of freedom. It could be defined differently for each target area of our concern. In Russia we might define it as freedom of choice, freedom to speak and write as one

desires, etc.; whereas, in the underdeveloped countries we would define it in terms such as freedom from hunger or freedom from disease. The major consideration in using "freedom" as a product is that of making it believable. Advertising that a doctor will be placed in every village may be as unbelievable to a Vietnamese peasant as would be a presidential candidate in the United States promising a Cadillac for every man over eighteen.

Hate, if properly directed can also be a very effective product. It was most certainly used in this country during the Second World War to foster an American antagonism against the Germans and Japanese. Hitler used it in his rise to power, by attempting to focus the hatred of the German people on the Jewish race. Today, hate is one of the major propaganda products being used by the many militant groups that have formed in the United States. We may ask ourselves the question; How much sooner would the war in Vietnam end if we were able to instill in the U.S. and South Vietnamese peoples a true hatred for the Viet Cong?

Thus far, we have not considered the "products" or "counter-products" that are being "sold" by the enemy. We can be certain that he will do all in his power to publicize every governmental shortcoming (whether real or imagined), mistake, or action that can in any way be construed as one that will be displeasing to the populace. If a leader is proclaimed as the embodiment of certain ideals, the enemy will try to counter by magnifying any defects in

his character or mode of operation. Normally, it will not be to the best interests of the government to discredit enemy propaganda by public denials. It is often better to simply ignore it than it is to re-publicize it in an attempt to explain, qualify or deny enemy accusations.

The enemy may also use assasination or other terrorist techniques as propaganda tools. If the government of a country is fortunate enough to have a particularly strong leader it may be to the advantage of the enemy to assasinate him. The initial hatred that is provoked may be counterbalanced by the loss of leadership to the country. Further, a feeling of fear and insecurity will often permeate a country where there is widespread use of terrorist tactics. The central government may be hardpressed to counter insurgent psychological operations of this nature. Generally, it is not sufficient for the government to claim that better protection for the people is on the way. When people are being bombed or burned out of their homes they want immediate protection, not promises.

We have by no means exhausted the list of possible propaganda products but have merely selected some of the more important ones. In waging any psychological war there will generally be a number of propaganda themes that can be sufficiently well-defined to allow their use as products in the model presented in this paper.

The Target Audience

Marketing organizations within the United States are dealing with a comparatively homogeneous audience; whereas, psychological operations will often be conducted against highly diverse populations. The variation in the effect of a promotion slogan used in Southern Florida and Northern Washington State (over 3500 miles apart) may be negligible in comparison with the expected variance between two Vietnamese villages only a few miles apart. (The converse might also be true if we were considering the difference between Brooklyn, New York, and Jackson, Mississippi.) It is for this reason that we must be particularly careful in defining the various segments of a target audience to insure that the demographic, social, and economic groupings we have selected are the ones that are most applicable to the situation. We must consider the mores, beliefs, taboos, sensitivities, education, allegiances and leadership of all ethnic, religious, cultural or any other groupings that may exist within the target country.

One U. S. advertising firm subdivides the U. S. population into a number of demographic groupings, many of which overlap. It is then possible for them to select primary and secondary target audiences for each advertising venture. This type of subdivision of target audiences will be even more important in psychological operations in that there is normally a greater diversity in the population. The following are included in their breakdown of the U. S. population:

1. Total population (children, teens, adults).
2. Teens by sex.
3. Age (18-24, 25-34, 35-49, 50-64, over 65).
4. Occupation (Prof. & Tech., Unskilled, Farm, etc.).
5. Income (under $3000.00, $3000.00-$5000.00, etc.).
6. Size of county (less than 5000 people, 5000 - 10,000 people, etc.).
7. Region (New England, Metropolitan New York, Middle Atlantic, etc.).
8. Size of family.

Each of the above categories is defined for men, women, and "ladies of the house" who are treated as a separate entity since they are quite often the prime audience for advertising campaigns. It should also be noted that the number of people in each of categories (4) through (7) are the same.

For psychological operations we can transform this breakdown into a useable form by establishing different subcategories: e.g., the salary breakdown in category (5) would be almost meaningless in most of the underdeveloped countries since the greatest plurality of the people would be in the "under $3000.00" category; there would be no need for the separate classification "ladies of the house"; etc. Further, we would need to add other categories to the list to represent special considerations indigenous to the target country such as:

1. Religion (Catholic, Buddhist, etc.).
2. Race (Vietnamese, Chinese, etc.).
3. Political loyalties.

When we appeal to a target audience we are eliciting their support for some ideology. We may be asking for their active support, in the form of intelligence or paramilitary help, or merely soliciting passive support or non-interference. However, one thing that we can be certain of is that our enemies are just as active in this battle for the hearts and minds of the populace as we are. In many ways, the central government of a country is at a distinct disadvantage: the insurgent can promise the better way of life but the central government must show that it coming about; the insurgent can use terrorist and agitation tactics with relative impunity as compared with the probable results of any governmental "strong arm" measures; as the "underdog", the insurgent elicits much pity and support that is not given the government. Another problem that is particularly prevalent in the underdeveloped countries is a desire for growth accompanied by an unwillingness to accept growing pains. This point is well constructed in Millikan and Blackmer's book, The Emerging Nations:

> "The mass media, bringing news and views of the world to illiterates in their urban slums and remote villages, introduce a new element into the process of modernization. People learn for the first time about the world outside their immediate environs, and their sense of life's possibilities begins to expand... One danger is that people will learn the fashions of popular participation long before the institutions of representative government are properly functioning. Then pseudo-participation takes command; that is, plebiscites that offer the form of public election without its substance, mob politics-of-the-street in which 'popular will' can destroy people and property without constructing better public policy. When exposure to the mass media overstimulates a people to this point, the leadership is pressed to give radio propaganda primacy over political economy. While

> oratory resounds, development is likely to be shunted to the side and growth impeded. The result, for people led to impose demands which their transitional society cannot yet supply, may be a potentially explosive and spreading sense of frustration." 24

Our discussion of the target audience is purposefully general in nature. Those who are structuring specific psychological operations will need to explore the underlying considerations that make certain segments of the population better target audiences than others. Such considerations as the primary user of the "product" (e.g., It will be more important to insure that city dwellers understand that urban redevelopment programs are on the way than it would be to inform the inhabitants of the rural areas.)will help in identifying the target audiences that we most desire to reach. An initial breakdown of a country into demographic, economic and social groupings will simplify the problem of pinpointing specific target audiences for each propaganda theme that is to be used.

Measures of Success

Measuring success in psychological operations is much more difficult than its advertising counterpart. In advertising, a newly-marketed product costs X dollars to produce and promote, sells for Y dollars; hence, nets a profit of Y - X dollars for each item sold. Profit goals, minimum number of years to obtain payback of investment, and other measures can be used as constraints in a study as to whether or not a particular product is to be marketed. In psychological operations we are most assuredly concerned with dollars but cannot use dollar profits as a measure of success. However, there are parallels between measuring success in a psychological

operation and measuring it in an advertising campaign. In a psychological operation:

1. Profit, though measured differently, is to be maximized.
2. Maximum advertising exposure is to obtained (We are assuming that overexposure cannot occur.)
3. Both long run and short run goals should be established.
4. Real or imagined superiority of our "product", in comparison with other complementary "products" on the market, should be established.

One problem area that is not present is psychological as compared with big business operations is that of monopolistic practices. Big business must pay heed to anti-trust legislation; whereas, in psychological operations, a monopoly on the "hearts and minds" of the target audience is the desired result.

For the model presented in this paper we have simplified the problem of obtaining a measure of success. We do not attempt to measure the effectiveness of psychological operations as a whole. Rather, we only determine the number of people in each demographic, social, or economic grouping who are exposed to our propaganda and the number of times that they are exposed (termed frequency of exposure) over specified time intervals. This sub-optimization is still an important problem and is much more readily solved than would be an attempt to determine the overall effects of a propaganda campaign.

At the beginning of a propaganda campaign we will probably not have access to sufficient data regarding the number of people in each target audience segment who will have the physical opportunity of receiving a message. Hence, some methods need to be devised to effectively sample a population to determine these values (exposure ratings), by demographic, social, and economic groupings, for each type of media that we intend to use.

In 1964, Dr. Paitoon Cruagao, of the Asia Services Company Limited, conducted a study into the village channels of communication in Northeast Thailand. This method, along with comments appropriate to this paper, is described below:[27]

1. Select hamlets, villages or some other groupings that are representative of various degrees of isolation. (This selection is stated in terms of isolation for simplification. A better way to determine the representative groupings might be to weight a combination of variables such as literacy rate, governmental support, insurgent support, isolation, etc.)

2. Divide the sample groupings into the demographic, social, and economic elements that we have determined to be of primary import. (These elements would be the ones discussed in the previous section on defining the target audience.)

3. Select random samples from each demographic, social and economic element that are large enough to insure significant results. (The level of significance specified

will normally be determined by such practical considerations as the time alloted to collect and process the data, the difficulty in obtaining the data, etc.)

4. Utilize pretested questionnaires and any other meaningful methods to determine the primary and secondary channels of communication within each demographic, social, and economic element. (By "channels of communication" is meant the means by which people receive information; e.g., a primary channel of communication might be newspapers whereas a secondary channel could be the husband telling his wife what he had heard during the day.) In Dr. Cruagao's study, "...Information was obtained through a pre-tested questionnaire; special interviews with priests, puyaibans, teachers, government officials and other leaders; and observation."

5. Extend the data obtained for each sample grouping to develop the exposure ratings for each media vehicle.

The initial data that would be obtained by using this approach could be less than satisfactory. One major reason for this is that in the first survey conducted within a country the exposure rating of the various media would usually be determined as a function of how the people were receiving general news and information; whereas, in follow-up surveys we would determine these ratings as they related to specific propaganda themes. Then, predicted exposure ratings could be compared with actual ratings and discrepancies noted. Thus, through successive surveys we could improve the overall reliability of our estimations.

In this chapter we have discussed some means of overcoming the difficulties inherent to defining a product, dealing with a diverse target audience, and measuring success in psychological operations. Next, we shall discuss the communication process and specify advantages and disadvantages in using each of the various types of mass media.

CHAPTER III

COMMUNICATION AND THE USE OF MASS MEDIA

> "The use of mass psychoanalysis to guide campaigns of persuasion has become the basis of a multimillion dollar industry. Professional persuaders have seized upon it in their groping for more effective ways to sell us their wares -- whether products, ideas, attitudes, candidates, goals, or states of mind.[22]

To develop an understanding of what is referred to above as "mass psychoanalysis", we must first look at the basic communication process; then, we can discuss the varying effects and interactions between the different types of mass media.

The Communication Process

Functionally, communication is composed of a source, a message, and a destination. The source can be an individual or an organization such as Radio Free Europe. The message can take any form that is capable of being interpreted in a meaningful manner. We define the form that the message takes as the signal. In one case it may be ink on paper; in another, it could be something as simple as the V for victory sign that was used during the Second World War. The destination is always individuals who may be alone or in groups such as lecture, radio or newspaper audiences.

The communication process can be represented schematically as shown in Figure I. In electronic communication, the encoder would be a microphone and the decoder an earphone. In human communication, the source and encoder would be one



Figure I

The Communication Process

person, the signal would be the language spoken, and the person being spoken to would be the decoder and destination.

All psychological operations involve the communication process. This is obvious when referring to transmitted propaganda messages. However, it is equally true in the case where actions or demonstrations are conducted to reap psychological gains. The protest marches conducted by the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. can be construed as a type of psychological operation. Yet, if these marches had been performed in the desert, and if they had been unpublicized (i.e., not communicated to the public), then they would probably have been ineffective. Thus, the communication process can be no more effective than its weakest link permits:

1. The source should have sufficient, believable, and understandable information.
2. Encoding should be complete, accurate and transmittible.
3. Transmission needs to be timely and undistorted, irrespective of attempted interference.
4. Decoding must correspond exactly to the encoding.

5. The destination must be capable of producing the desired result.

Hence, for a communication process to be successful each of its components must be highly reliable. For example, if each component of a communication process was ninety per cent reliable (i.e., ninety per cent of the information from the source would be sufficient, believable and understandable; ninety per cent of the time the encoding would be complete, accurate, and transmittible; etc.); then, the overall reliability of this communication process would be 59.05 per cent, (the product of the individual reliabilities). This figure may seem low, but when we consider the many variables that affect the communication process we begin to realize that one may be doing well if he can keep reliability above the fifty per cent level.

As we discussed in the previous chapter, feedback from the target audience is necessary to effectively measure the reliability of a communication process. In the case of what we shall term "face-to-face discourse", the problem of feedback is greatly simplified in that we can see the expressions of our audience and can hear their grumbles or assenting applause. On the other hand, feedback is not as readily obtained from mass communication forms such as radio, newspapers, etc. In these cases, one cannot see the target audience to obtain immediate reactions. However, the overall success of our communication can sometimes be inferred by determining the number of people that "tune in" on the media that we are using. If we are using radio broadcasts and find

that our radio audience has diminished by 100,000 people we would infer that something has gone wrong with our communication. It would then be necessary to determine which "link in the chain" is weak. For example, in the Korean War, the Communists seized Seoul and confiscated all radio receivers, even though they had control of Seoul radio station, the most powerful one in the area. In this way, they denied free world radio communication to all but the brave few who had satisfactorily hidden their receivers. (It should be noted that this was done at the expense of losing their own capability to use radio in transmitting communist propaganda to the South Koreans.) In this example, the "weak link" was determined to be maximal interference (the confiscating of the radios). Therefore, we might have improved our communication with the South Koreans by intensifying the use of some other communication media such as leaflets.

No matter how primitive or oppressed a society is, there will normally be more communication presented to it than can possibly be received by everyone. We can only listen to one radio station at a time and can only read so much material in a day. If we assume that man has some choice in selecting the offerings of mass communications, we can define,

$$\text{Selection Coefficient} = \frac{\text{Expectation of Reward}}{\text{Effort Required to Receive Message}}$$

where both the expectation of reward and the effort required are scaled on the interval 1 - 100. This selection coefficient will vary from person to person and from one target audience to another. Hence, communicators (propagandists, of

course included) should attempt to make it easy and beneficial for a target audience to "tune in". That is, they want to decrease the effort required to receive a message and increase the expectation of reward that will accrue from having received it. The problem of increasing the expectation of reward is primarily one of message content. We shall not discuss it further since the model to be discussed in this paper considers message content as a constant. On the other hand, decreasing the effort required to receive a message is highly dependent on the media used to propagate it. (As was mentioned in the example regarding the Korean War, the effort required to receive a message by radio was great whereas it might have been considerably reduced by using another type of media.) For this reason, we shall discuss the types of mass media in some detail.

The Mass Media

Numerous studies have been conducted to test the effects of the various forms of mass media on the understanding and retentive capabilities of a target audience. Such studies and experiments should be interpreted carefully. Laboratory tests may suggest that television is the most effective means of electronic communication. However, this result would prove to be virtually meaningless if the "real world" audience with which we wished to communicate had different characteristics than the "test" audience; or, in the extreme, if there was only one television set per million people in the "real world" audience. The point to be made is that laboratory results do not necessarily reflect "real world"

happenings. There is no hard and fast set of rules to govern choice of media. The attributes and drawbacks of the various forms of mass media will take on different values for different target audiences. For instance, depth of treatment is considered to be one of the attributes of print, but this "attribute" would be of minimal import if the target audience was illiterate. Hence, the general considerations of each form of mass media discussed below should be interpreted liberally.

Face-to-Face Discourse

Almost all studies on the subject of advertising or psychological operations are in agreement that face-to-face discourse is the most effective individual instrument of persuasion. The following psychological advantages are considered to be the primary reasons for its success:

1. It is more casually engaged in and will often attract an audience that would not trouble itself to receive the same information by other forms of mass communication.

2. The perpetrator of face-to-face discourse can mold his manner of presentation to suit a particular target audience. In this way, he can largely reduce resistance to his message.

3. By expressions of pleasure or displeasure, the target audience can be rewarded or punished for their reaction.

4. The source of face-to-face discourse may be a trusted or intimate friend of the target audience from whom information is believable; e.g., a clergyman.

5. It is sometimes possible to accomplish objectives without first instilling conviction. For instance, if the leader of a local young men's organization tells its members to sign up for service in the militia, some may join just to keep from discrediting themselves in the eyes of their leader.

We recognize that there are many cases when face-to-face discourse is not a practical method of communicating with a target audience. It would hardly be worthwhile for the United States to try to infiltrate men behind the "Iron Curtain" or into Communist China to start a program of face-to-face confrontations on the evils of communism and benefits of "free world" life. The costs would be great and the gains comparatively small. The Nationalist Chinese have on occasion attempted to infiltrate men into the mainland of China to instigate dissatisfaction in the populace. In every recorded case they have been captured almost immediately upon entering the country.[23] (We pre-suppose that the people of Communist China are more afraid of the consequences of not reporting an intruder than they are willing to chance a possibility of bettering their way of life; that is, the expectation of reward is negligible as compared to the effort required.)

Face-to-face discourse may also be considered to include the spectrum of discussions that take place daily throughout the world. Tests have shown that casual conversations, as differentiated from formal addresses, are

potentially more influential than any form of formal communication.[23] For this reason, the proponents of a propaganda campaign should be careful not to alienate any major faction of the target audience, for the initial harm done could be greatly magnified through dissemination of discontent from that portion of the target audience alienated.

Radio

In the recent past, radio has proved to be an efficient means of mass communication to various target audiences. In the field of psychological operations, Radio Free Europe and The Voice of America have been broadcasting for years in an effort to "educate" peoples of the Communist world. The advantages of radio include:[2]

1. The number of people that can be reached at one time is usually large.

2. The propagandist can gain a nation-wide audience by using networks or by increasing the power of his transmitter. He can also pinpoint a specific target audience by properly establishing a low-power transmitter.

3. Audience selectivity can also be gained by scheduling at different times and by use of different types of radio programs.

4. It has a special persuasive quality as a companion, a friend, and a prime source of information for the listener.

When we consider the use of radio in communicating with a target audience we should not only be concerned with the present density of radios within the population. We should also project the costs and benefits that would accrue if we were to distribute radios to members of the population. In some cases it may be more cost-effective to give ten or twenty radios to every village within a country than it would be to attempt to communicate with the people by any other means. Of course, if we are considering giving away radios we must also consider that our intended audience may, in fact, use the radios to tune in on our enemies.

Print

The printed word, whether it be in the form of newspapers, magazines, leaflets, or any other form, has distinct advantages over the other types of media. The primary ones are:[23]

1. The reader is able to pace himself as he desires. He can ponder over important points and skip those that hold no interest for him.

2. Printed matter remains available for the reader to peruse for months or even years after the initial reading.

3. Difficult or complex topics can be treated in depth for the reasons given in (1) and (2) above.

4. It is possible to specialize appeals by utilizing the knowledge that certain people read particular

types of magazines or sections of the newspaper.

5. Print may have greater prestige than the other forms of mass media. This is attributed to the fact that it is one of the oldest of the mass media and that print and "culture" have been traditionally associated.

A recent radio advertisement stated, "Montaigne once wrote, 'What do we do about those people who will not believe anything unless they see it in print?'" The advertisement went on to give the answer, "Print it, of course." As one might guess the advertisement was for a printing and lithographic company. However, it is probably true that some of these people who will not believe anything unless they see it in writing, will believe anything that is written.

When planning the use of print, we must take into account the literacy of the target audience. (The fact that a certain audience may be illiterate may not negate the use of print but it will certainly affect the amount of pictorial or symbolic material required.) We also need to consider the ease of dissemination. If we control the press it will certainly be much easier to reach the people than if we have to rely on covert publications or leaflet drops.

Screen

When we consider the use of screen, television or movies we are implicitly assuming that our audience is indigenous to a country in which we have some degree of

control. The present state of the art in television is such that signals cannot be projected satisfactorily over great distances without a purposeful receiving station in the proximity of the target audience. Further, a television signal is considerably easier to "jam" and the prevalence of television sets in the areas of the world that are of major concern in our propaganda efforts is low. Likewise, there is little opportunity to show movies favorable to the "free world" in such countries as Cuba, Russia or Communist China. Hence, the benefits that we ascribe to the screen are greatly diluted by the opportunity for its use. The benefits are:[2]

1. Concrete visual material is presented.

2. Recall of what has been seen is generally excellent.

3. Children are particularly impressed by what they see.

Interactions Among Mass Media

Almost every propaganda campaign will include the use of more than one type of media to communicate with the target audience. If the target audience receives the same message by more than one medium his belief in what he is receiving will normally be fortified. However, if different messages relating to the same incident or different interpretations on a particular propaganda theme are received via two different media; then, the target audience becomes confused, probably believes neither message,

and loses some faith in both media. Credibility is hard to establish initially, but virtually impossible to re-establish once it is lost; hence, a cardinal rule for the use of mass media is to be consistent in all communication.

Thus far in this paper the stage has been set to present a model that can be used in optimizing allocation of the various forms of mass media. We have discussed how the product, target audience, measures of success and forms of mass media can be characterized in psychological operations. In the next chapter, we shall describe the formulation of the model and present an application of its use in psychological operations.

CHAPTER IV

PROBLEM FORMULATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF A GOAL PROGRAMMING MODEL

In this chapter we shall formally set forth the problems that face the decision maker who is attempting to optimize a media mix for a given psychological operation. Then, a "goal programming" model (which closely parallels one that was developed for marketing by A. Charnes, W. W. Cooper, J. K. DeVoe, D. B. Learner and W. Reinecke[30]) will be presented that will allow determination of the "best" possible" use of available media subject to specified budget restrictions, resource limitations and desired levels of achievement with respect to each target audience of concern.

Problem Formulation

The overall problem that is addressed by the model to be presented is that of staying within a fixed budget while at the same time subjecting to propaganda those people whom we specifically desire to receive a message a given number of times in certain time periods. This is a complex problem and we will approach it by subdividing it into a number of interrelated problems, the intersection of which is equivalent to the original problem. Then, by formulating a method to solve concurrently this set of problems we will guarantee solution to their intersection, the original problem.

Before stating the subdivisions chosen, it is well to summarize the information that should be obtained as data inputs to the model. We will need to determine:

1. The most representative groupings into which the total population of a country can be divided.

2. The number of people in each of these groupings.

3. The geographic subdivisions that are most representative of a country.

4. The density of each grouping in each of the chosen geographic subdivisions.

5. The primary and secondary means by which each grouping receives information.

6. The media that are available internally and externally for use in the country of concern.

7. The cost per publication, broadcast, etc.

8. How often and when each medium is presently used.

9. How often it is possible to use each medium.

10. The savings that accrue through larger purchases of each type medium.

11. The breakdown, by grouping, of the number of people that are subject to transmissions of each possible medium.

12. The budget restrictions that exist.

13. Any special commitments that require use of certain media a specified number of times.

Once this data has been obtained the planners for the psychological operation can structure a set of goals, the simultaneous attainment of which is their objective. To be more precise, the problem as originally stated is subdivided into one of minimizing the variance, subject to a given budget, between goals stated with respect to specified target audiences over both time periods and time intervals (e.g., three monthly time periods make one quarter-year interval). Further, the goals, themselves, can be formed with respect to the total number of times members of a given target audience are to be subjected to propaganda, the percent of each target audience that is to be subjected, and the distribution of the frequencies of subjection. However, in order to simplify the formulation of the model we will develop it with respect to one target audience.

As one may surmise, it will be quite possible to form a set of goals that cannot be simultaneously satisfied, i.e., there might not be a feasible solution to the problem. In these cases, as will be shown, a "best possible solution" is obtained by minimizing the variance from the stated goals, i.e., by "goal programming".

The first step in developing this goal programming model will be to define and quantify methods by which goals can be represented as linear constraints. Specifically, a means of representing the gross target audience, the net target audience and the distribution of times that members of the net target audience are subjected to propaganda will be presented. Then, we shall demonstrate the use of goals and

other constraints, such as budgetary limitations, in forming a goal programming model. Finally, a numerical example will be given.

The Gross Target Audience

During time period t, we might choose to transmit propaganda several times over a given medium. This choice may be represented by the decision variable $x_{jk}(t)$, which would take the value $x_{jk}(t) = 1$ if we chose to use medium j exactly k times during time period t, and would have the value $x_{jk}(t) = 0$ otherwise. To simplify the linear programming techniques required, the restriction on the $x_{jk}(t)$ can be approximated by requiring

$$\sum_{k} x_{jk}(t) \leq 1 \qquad (1)$$

where

$$x_{jk}(t) \geq 0 \quad .$$

Suppose that we elect to use the jth medium k times in time period t; i.e., $x_{jk}(t) = 1$. If U is the set of N people representing our target population, then this decision would mean that a subset $u_{j1}(t)$ of $n_{j1}(t)$ people in our target population would be exposed to the propaganda the first time we used the medium, a subset $u_{j2}(t)$ of $n_{j2}(t)$ people would be exposed the second time we used the medium, and a subset $u_{jk}(t)$ of $n_{jk}(t)$ people would be exposed the kth and final time we used the medium in period t. Note that these subsets are not disjoint, in that a given individual may be subjected to propaganda 2, 3, or possibly k times by medium j during time

period t. We define

$$d_{jk}(t) = \sum_{i=1}^{k} n_{ji}(t)$$

as the total number of exposures from medium j in time period t resulting from our decision to set $x_{jk}(t) = 1$. For example,

$$d_{34}(6) = 25{,}000$$

would imply that by propagating medium three (say, National Magazine), four times in a six-month period, we would subject to propaganda 25,000 members of the target audience, (say, men aged 20 - 25).

The gross target audience for time period t, D(t), is defined as the number of exposures to propaganda by all media in the time period, and can be represented by

$$D(t) = \sum_{j} \sum_{k} d_{jk}(t) x_{jk}(t) \quad . \qquad (2)$$

For example, the matrix

$$\left\| d_{jk}(t) \right\| = \begin{bmatrix} d_{11}(t) & d_{12}(t) \\ d_{21}(t) & d_{22}(t) \end{bmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} 200 & 300 \\ 250 & 350 \end{bmatrix}$$

would imply that in time period t, 200 people would be subjected to propaganda by one transmission of medium 1, 300 people would be subjected to propaganda by two transmissions of medium 1, etc.

Likewise,

$$\left\| x_{jk}(t) \right\| = \begin{bmatrix} x_{11}(t) & x_{12}(t) \\ x_{21}(t) & x_{22}(t) \end{bmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

would imply that in time period t, medium 1 was utilized exactly twice ($x_{12}(t) = 1$) and medium 2 utilized exactly once ($x_{21}(t) = 1$). Hence, the total gross target audience subjected to propaganda by media 1 and 2 during period t would be

$$D(t) = \sum_{j=1}^{2} \sum_{k=1}^{2} d_{jk}(t)\, x_{jk}(t) ,$$

$$= (200)(0) + (300)(1) + (250)(1) + (350)(0),$$

$$= 550 \text{ people.}$$

It is noted again, that gross target audience is determined without regard to duplication. Hence, in the above example there are not necessarily 550 different people subjected to propaganda.

The Net Target Audience

We have seen that if we use the jth medium k times during the tth time period ($x_{jk}(t) = 1$), the total number of exposures is given by

$$d_{jk}(t) = \sum_{i=1}^{k} n_{ji}(t) \quad .$$

The actual number of people, $N_{jk}(t)$, subjected to propaganda at least once by medium j during period t will be the number

of people in the union of the sets; $u_{ji}(t)$, i=1,2,...,k. Let $r_{jk}(t)$ be the proportion of the target audience U (of size N) that is subjected to propaganda at least once from medium j during time period t. Then,

$$r_{jk}(t) = \frac{N_{jk}(t)}{N} ,$$

and we can compute

$$1 - r_{jk}(t) = \prod_{i=1}^{k} (1-\frac{n_{ji}(t)}{N})$$

or

$$r_{jk}(t) = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{k} (1-\frac{n_{ji}(t)}{N}) .$$

We define the net target audience, N(t), as the total number of people in the target audience, U, that are exposed to propaganda by any medium at least once during time period t. The proportion of the total target audience subjected to propaganda at least once in period t is

$$R(t) = \frac{N(t)}{N}$$

and, if we assume the $r_{jk}(t)$ to be independent and require $x_{jk}(t)$ to conform to (1) for each t, it can be computed by

$$1 - R(t) = \prod_{j,k} (1-r_{jk}(t))^{x_{jk}(t)} \qquad (3)$$

where (1-R(t)) is the proportion of the total target audience that is <u>not</u> subjected to propaganda during period t. Using the example mentioned earlier, if out of a total target audience, 80 per cent are subjected twice to medium 1 and 60

per cent subjected once to medium 2 during period t, then

$$1 - R(t) = \prod_{j=1}^{2} \prod_{k=1}^{2} (1-r_{jk}(t))^{x_{jk}(t)} ,$$

$$= (1-r_{11}(t))^{0}(1-0.80)^{1}(1-0.60)^{1}(1-r_{22}(t))^{0} ,$$

$$= 0.08$$

which indicates that 92 per cent of the total target audience is subjected to propaganda at least once, by media 1 and 2, during time period t.

To convert (3) into a form compatible with linear programming we utilize logarithms to obtain

$$\ln(1-R(t)) = \sum_{j} \sum_{k} \ln[1-r_{jk}(t)]x_{jk}(t) . \qquad (4)$$

Distribution of Frequencies

One means of dealing with the problem of estimating the number of times a target audience is subjected to propaganda is to use average frequency (gross target audience divided by net target audience). A drawback to this approach is that it denies the ability to pinpoint that proportion of a target audience that is subjected to propaganda a specific number of times. However, there is a method which was developed for use in advertising that makes use of the log-normal distribution as an approximating device for estimating an entire distribution of frequencies.[33] This same method can be applied in psychological operations.

Let $H_s(t)$ be the proportion of the net target audience that is subjected to propaganda s or more times in period t.

Thus, if Figure II represents the frequency diagram for a given net target audience, we see that

$$H_1(t) = 1.0 \ ,$$

$$H_2(t) = 0.60 \ ,$$

$$H_3(t) = 0.40 \ ,$$

etc.,

which implies that for the net target audience represented, 40 per cent are subjected to propaganda exactly once, 20 per cent exactly twice, etc.



Figure II

Sample Frequency Diagram

As we previously stated, the log-normal distribution is considered a sufficiently accurate representation of the distribution of frequencies. Let $\mu^*(t)$ and $\sigma^*(t)$ be the mean and standard deviation of the log-normal distribution, and let $\mu(t)$ and $\sigma(t)$ be the mean and standard deviation of the associated normal distribution. Then

$$\mu(t) = 2 \ln\mu^*(t) - \frac{1}{2} \ln[\sigma^*(t)^2 + \mu^*(t)^2]$$

and

$$\sigma^2(t) = \ln[\sigma^*(t)^2 + \mu^*(t)^2] - 2 \ln\mu^*(t) \quad .$$

However, experimentation has shown that these exact relationships between the parameters of the normal and the log-normal distributions should be replaced by suitable approximations.[30]

Let A_m, B_m, C_m, D_m and E_m be parameters whose values would either be estimated empirically or approximated for each type of m types or combinations of media. Recalling that N is the total number of people in a specific target audience and defining $P_j(t)$ to be the proportion of the target audience subjected to propaganda by the first transmission of medium j, then

$$P_j(t) = \frac{d_{j1}(t)}{N}$$

and we may write expressions for the relationships between the mean and variance of the normal and log-normal distribution as[33]

$$\mu(t) = A_m + B_m \sum_j \sum_k P_j(t)x_{jk}(t) + C_m \sum_j \sum_k kx_{jk}(t)$$

and (5)

$$\sigma(t) = D_m + E_m \sum_j \sum_k kx_{jk}(t) \quad .$$

In the above expressions, $\sum_j \sum_k P_j(t)x_{jk}(t)$, represents the proportion of the target audience that is subjected to propaganda by all first transmissions and $\sum_j \sum_k kx_{jk}(t)$ counts the total number of times propaganda is transmitted by all media.

Correspondence with the discrete distributions is obtained by the expression

$$Z_{(1-H_s(t))} = \frac{\ln (s-F_m) - \mu(t)}{\sigma(t)} \qquad (6)$$

where Z is the studentized normal variate, N(0,1), and F_m is another parameter whose value is determined empirically for each of m types or combinations of media. Now, since Z is the fractile associated with $1 - H_s(t)$ for N(0,1), we can substitute the values of $\mu(t)$ and $\sigma(t)$ from (5) into (6) to obtain

$$Z_{(1-H_s(t))} = \frac{\ln(s-F_m) - A_m - B_m \sum_j \sum_k P_j(t)x_{jk}(t) - C_m \sum_j \sum_k kx_{jk}(t)}{D_m + E_m \sum_j \sum_k kx_{jk}(t)} \qquad (7)$$

Specification of Goals

Goals can be formulated with respect to both the gross and net target audience. If it is desired that the gross target audience for period t be at least L(t) people, then from (2) we can require

$$D(t) \geq L(t)$$

or equivalently

$$\sum_j \sum_k d_{jk}(t)x_{jk}(t) \geq L(t) ,$$

where the values of L(t) will be varied to account for seasonal limitations or other environmental factors that make the desired goals in time period one different from those in some other time period. In addition to our time period constraints we can also specify goals for specified time intervals such as requiring that the gross target audience for T time

intervals be at least L(T). That is, if time periods are of length one month and T is a three month or quarterly interval, we could state the quarterly goal as

$$\sum_{t=1}^{3} \sum_{j} \sum_{k} d_{jk}(t) x_{jk}(t) \geq L(T).$$

In establishing constraints or goals with respect to the net target audience we might require that the proportion R(t) of the total target audience subjected to propaganda at least once in period t, R(t), be greater than some prescribed percentage of the net target audience, N(t); that is,

$$R(t) \geq N(t),$$

which implies

$$\ln(1-R(t)) \leq \ln(1-N(t)) \quad .$$

Then, the linear constraint,

$$\sum_{j} \sum_{k} \ln [1-r_{jk}(t)] \; x_{jk}(t) \leq \ln(1-N(t))$$

is formed from (4). Once again, we could also specify constraints over selected time intervals; i.e.,

$$\sum_{t \in T} \sum_{j} \sum_{k} \ln[1-r_{jk}(t)] \; x_{jk}(t) \leq \ln(1-N(T)).$$

At this point, it is well to note that it may be difficult to obtain the values for all the $r_{jk}(t)$. However, those that are not known can be generated if values for $r_{j1}(t)$ and any other $r_{jk}(t)$ can be obtained. To do this we substitute the known values into

$$r_{jk}(t) = r_{j1}(t) + a_j(t) \ln(k) \qquad (8)$$

and solve for tha $a_j(t)$. Then, by substituting the $a_j(t)$ back into (8), the unknown values of $r_{jk}(t)$ can be obtained.[33]

In stating goals for the distribution of frequencies, it could be specified that (100)q per cent of the net target audience be subjected to propaganda at least g times in time period t, or

$$H_g(t) \geq q$$

which is equivalent to

$$1 - H_g(t) \leq 1 - q.$$

Then, if Z is the fractile associated with $1 - H_g(t)$ for N(0,1), we can write

$$Z_{(1-H_g(t))} \leq [Z_{(1-q)} = \Phi^{-1}(1-q) = Q]$$

where Φ is the distribution function for N(0,1). Now, constraints of this type can be succinctly stated by using (6),

$$\frac{(\ln(g-F_m) - \mu(t)}{\sigma(t)} \leq Q$$

or by substituting into and performing algebraic rearrangement on (7) to obtain,

$$(C_m+E_mQ)k\sum_j \sum_k x_{jk}(t) + B_m\sum_j \sum_k P_j(t)x_{jk}(t) \geq \ln(g-F_m) - A_m - D_mQ.$$

We have implicitly assumed that we have been able to determine values for the parameters, A_m through F_m. The advertising firm that is presently employing the model upon which this one is based has tried a number of approximating techniques for determining these values for each type and combination of media.[34] The most successful has been to generate the values A_m through E_m by using a form of linear regression to fit

$\mu(t)$ and $\sigma(t)$ to emperical data. Likewise, the value of F_m is determined so that it best fits (6) to experimental results. However, in planning psychological operations we will probably not have the data gathering resources equivalent to those available for advertising studies in the United States. Hence, the initial evaluation of the parameters A_m through F_m would be based on relatively small samples or on values that were determined appropriate for use in another operation. These initial values would need to be verified and, if necessary, updated as soon as reliable feedback is obtained.

In addition to the constraints that have been stated thus far we will also need to specify budget limitations, maximum possible or desired use of each type of media and any other special limitations that may be indigenous to the area in which we are operating.

The overall budget limitation would be

$$\sum_j \sum_k c_{jk}(t)x_{jk}(t) \leq \text{total budget}$$

where the $c_{jk}(t)$ are the costs for k insertions (where an insertion is the planting of a propaganda message in one issue, radio show, etc.)in media vehicle j during time period t and $x_{jk}(t)$ is required to conform to (1). Any special budgetary limitations, such as required expenditures on a certain type of media because of past commitments, can be translated into equations similar to equation (9).

Upper and/or lower bounds on the number of insertions in a certain class of media or in a specific media vehicle are governed by factors such as the number of issues published or

by the number of hours of radio transmissions possible in a certain time period. For instance, if we were considering a weekly newspaper we must constrain the number of insertions possible to 52 per year; that is,

$$\sum_{t\in T} \sum_{k} kx_{8k}(t) \leq 52, \quad t=1,2,\ldots,52,$$

where the subscript, j = 8, refers to this specific weekly newspaper and T is one year. Similarly, if it was mandatory that at least two radio broadcasts be given in time period t, we would specify the constraint as

$$\sum_{k} kx_{9k}(t) \geq 2,$$

where the subscript, j = 9, refers to the specific radio station.

Up to this point we have confined ourselves to formulating methods of dealing with the various constraints that may be given for a certain propaganda campaign. We turn now to a branch of linear programming, termed "goal programming", as the method by which we optimize our actions subject to a set of specific constraints.[9]

Formulating the Goal Program

Basically, "goal programming" allows us to solve unsolvable problems. That is, through iterative techniques we drive our solution to a point that may not be optimal, in the true sense of the word, but is the best that we can do under the restrictions that are placed upon us. (There is no better solution than the one that is obtained.) The constraints that we shall incorporate in the functional to be formed can

be considered goals. Goals that are not attainable will generally have been established as incentive measures, methods by which accomplishments can be evaluated, or as a means of insuring that long-run objectives are not overlooked in obtaining short-run success.

In forming the "goal program" we consider three types of constraints:

First, there are those constraints which must be satisfied in the solution; e.g., budget restrictions. Normal slack vectors are associated with these constraints. For example, the overall budget constraint can be written as

$$\sum_j \sum_k c_{jk}(t)x_{jk}(t) + S_1 = \text{total budget} \qquad (10)$$

where S_1 is a slack vector of the type that is normally used in linear programming.

A second type of constraint is one where a goal is specified that is attainable if considered independently of other goals but may not be attainable when considered as a member of the entire system of constraints. In this case, we allow the specified goal to be either exceeded or not reached by an amount that will allow a "best possible solution" for the entire system. For example, the budget and resource constraints may be such that it is possible to subject to propaganda at least L(t) members of the gross target audience (neglecting other goals) for all t, t=1,2,...,T. Then, this constraint would be written as

$$\sum_j \sum_k d_{jk}(t)x_{jk}(t) + S_2^+ - S_2^- = L(t)$$

where the terms S_2^+ and S_2^- indicate that this goal is best satisfied by minimizing the absolute value of S_2. (Obviously, both S_2^+ and S_2^- cannot appear at a positive level in the final basis. This fact is guaranteed by the linear independence of the basis vectors in the simplex method of linear programming.)

A third type of constraint that may enter the goal program is one that is known to be unattainable given specified budget and resource limitations. For instance, if we know that it is not possible to reach a proportion equal to N(t) of the target audience for at least some t, we would state this constraint as

$$\sum_j \sum_k \ln[1-r_{jk}(t)]x_{jk}(t) - S_3^- = \ln(1-N(t)) \qquad (12)$$

where S_3^- is the amount by which we miss attaining this goal.

To demonstrate the formulation of the entire "goal program" we will consider that equations (10), (11), and (12) are the goals that we have been directed to satisfy in conducting some psychological operation. We will also consider that the rather ill-defined term, "as close as possible", is satisfied by minimizing the sum of the absolute deviations of each of the goal constraints. That is, we can define a function, d(x,y), to be the "distance" (or, metric) in a general vector space with properties:

$d(x,y) \geq 0$ and $d(x,y) = 0$ iff $x = y$;

$d(x,y) = d(y,x)$;

$d(x,y) \leq d(x,z) + d(z,y)$.

Then, the measure of the mean deviation (or ℓ_1 metric) is defined as

$$d(x,y) = \sum_j |x_j - y_j| .$$

Hence, for our illustrative "goal program" the objective function will be

$$\min. \sum_j \sum_k \left| d_{jk}(t)x_{jk}(t) - L(t) \right| + \left| \sum_j \sum_k \ln\left[1 - r_{jk}(t)\right]x_{jk}(t) - \ln(1-N(t)) \right|$$

or equivalently,

$$\min.\ z = S_2^+ + S_2^- + S_3^- ,$$

since each of the terms in (13) is required to be non-negative. Therefore, the entire "goal program" (neglecting any resource constraints) can be written as:

$$\min.\ z = S_2^+ + S_2^- + S_3^- ,$$

$$\text{S.T.} \quad \sum_j \sum_k c_{jk}(t)x_{jk}(t) + S_1 = \text{total budget},$$

$$\sum_j \sum_k d_{jk}(t)x_{jk}(t) + S_2^+ - S_2^- = L(t),$$

$$\sum_j \sum_k \ln\left[1 - r_{jk}(t)\right]x_{jk}(t) - S_3^- = \ln(1-N(t)),$$

$$\sum_k x_{jk}(t) + S_4 = 1,$$

and

$$S_1,\ S_2^+,\ S_2^-,\ S_3^-,\ S_4,\ r_{jk}(t),\ x_{jk}(t),\ L(t),\ N(t) \geq 0,\ \forall j,\ k.$$

This concludes the formulation of a "goal programming" model that can be used to project the "best possible" use of available media to achieve specified objectives given budget and

resource constraints. Next, the use of the model will be demonstrated in a numerical example.

Hypothetical Application of the Model

The situation and values used in this application of the model will be fictitious; however, an attempt has been made to make them realistic. It is also noted that this example use of the model will be greatly simplified from that which would be expected to occur in actual practice in order to facilitate a better understanding of the rudimentary aspects of the model. Hence, only one target audience and two choices of media will be considered.

As a scenario, we assume that the United States was called upon by Frebia, a member of the SEATO alliance, to assist them in overcoming the first phase of a Communist-inspired insurgency. One portion of the support given by the United States was in the form of a team of advisors in the field of psychological operations. This team (which included "experts" on the political, cultural, sociological and economic concerns of Frebia) moved to Frebia and in conjunction with Frebian government officials determined that one of the major problem areas in Frebia was a lack of nationalistic spirit, especially among the young men of the country. It was decided to launch an extensive psychological operations campaign aimed at inspiring a nationalistic feeling in the men, aged 20 - 25. A budget limitation of $11,000 was placed on this goal.

The first step in using the model presented in this paper was to define the product which in this case was determined to

be "Nationalism". Next, extensive surveying and data gathering were conducted in three villages that were representative of three degrees of isolation from the central government. From the data obtained it was determined that the two best means of communicating with the primary target audience, men between the ages of twenty and twenty-five, was Radio Frebia (a weekly radio broadcast) and National Frebian (a bi-weekly magazine). The latest census indicated that the total number of people in this target audience, N, was 70,000. Multiple regression was used to fit $\mu(t)$ and $\sigma(t)$ from (6) to the applicable data that had been obtained from the three villages. The parameters A_m through F_m were determined to have the following values for both Radio Frebia and National Frebian: (Since both were determined to have the same values, we shall drop the subscript, m.)

$$A = 0.057$$

$$B = 0.020$$

$$C = 0.002$$

$$D = 0.015$$

$$E = 0.135$$

$$F = 0.850 \quad .$$

Next, the costs shown in Table I were obtained from the media publishers and the data shown in Table II determined from the representative samples taken in the three villages for a one month time period, $t = 1$.

Table I

Sample Media Costs

Media	j	Cost per Insertion	Max Insertions per Month
Radio Frebia	1	$1000.00	2
National Frebian	2	$3000.00	4

Table II

Sample Gross and Net Target Audience Data

Media	j	$r_{j1}(1)$	$r_{j2}(1)$	$d_{j1}(1)$	$d_{j2}(1)$	$d_{j3}(1)$	$d_{j4}(t)$	$P_j(1)$
Radio Frebia	1	0.25	0.43	20,000	38,000	-	-	0.286
National Frebian	2	0.40	0.55	30,000	55,000	72,000	80,000	0.429

Recall that

$$r_{12}(1) = 0.55$$

implies that the proportion of people in the total target audience (N = 70,000) obtained by the second transmission (k=2) of medium 1 (Radio Frebia) in one month (t=1) is 0.55 and that

$$d_{23}(1) = 72,000$$

indicates that there have been 72,000 exposures to the target audience (where obviously, some have been subjected to propaganda more than once, since N = 70,000) via three

transmissions (k=3) of National Frebian (j=2) in one month (t=1). The proportion of the total target audience subjected to propaganda by the first transmission of j in a one month period, $P_j(1)$, was found using

$$P_j(1) = \frac{d_{j1}(1)}{N} \quad .$$

We also have sufficient data to determine the missing proportions, $r_{23}(1)$ and $r_{24}(1)$. First we solve for $a_2(1)$ in (8). Thus,

$$r_{22}(1) = r_{21}(1) + a_2(1)\ln 2$$

which, by substituting values from Table II gives

$$a_2(1) = (0.55-0.40)(\ln 2)^{-1},$$

$$= 0.2164.$$

Then,

$$r_{23}(1) = r_{21}(1) + a_2(1)\ln 3,$$

$$= 0.638$$

and

$$r_{24}(1) = r_{21}(1) + a_2(1)\ln 4,$$

$$= 0.700.$$

The goals specified by the psychological operations team, as recommended by the Frebian government, are as follows.

1. The proportion of the target audience subjected to propaganda at least once during one month should be greater than or equal to 0.75. That is

$$R(1) \geq [N(1) = 0.75]$$

or, from (12)

$$\sum_{j=1}^{2}\sum_{k=1}^{4} \ln[1-r_{jk}(1)]x_{jk}(1) + S_1^+ - S_1^- = \ln(1-.75) .$$

2. The gross target audience subjected to propaganda during a one month period should be at least 110,000. Then,

$$D(1) \geq L(1) = 110,000$$

or, from (11),

$$\sum_{j=1}^{2}\sum_{k=1}^{4} d_{jk}(1)x_{jk}(1) + S_2^+ - S_2^- = 110,000.$$

3. At least 80 per cent of the net target audience should be subjected to propaganda at least three times in a one month time period. That is

$$H_3(1) \geq [q = 0.80]$$

which implies

$$Z_{(1-H_3(1))} \geq [Q = Z_{(1-0.8)} = Z_{0.2} = \Phi^{-1}(0.2) = 0.84].$$

Now, from (6) we have

$$\frac{\ln(3.0-F) - \mu(1)}{\sigma(1)} \geq (Q = 0.84)$$

so, from (7) we can write this goal as

$$(C + EQ) \sum_{j=1}^{2}\sum_{k=1}^{4} kx_{jk}(1) + B \sum_{j=1}^{2}\sum_{k=1}^{4} P_j(1)x_{jk}(1) + S_3^+$$

$$= \ln(3.0-F) - A - DQ.$$

Substituting in the values for the parameters A through F and Q we obtain

$$\sum_{j=1}^{2}\sum_{k=1}^{4} [(0.11540)k + (0.020)P_j(1)]x_{jk}(1) + S_3^+ = 0.71886.$$

Since it was possible to satisfy the first and second goals if they were considered independently but not necessarily in combination with the other goals, they were assigned plus and minus slacks; thereby, allowing the goals to be either exceeded or not reached. It was known that it was not possible to satisfy the third goal so it was assigned a positive slack to measure the difference from the stated goal. The goal program for this sample situation can now be completely formulated as shown in Figure III.

The solution to our hypothetical problem was obtained using a computerized simplex linear program. The final basis contained the following vectors at the levels indicated:

$$x_{11}(1) = 0,$$

$$x_{12}(1) = 1,$$

$$x_{22}(1) = 0,$$

$$x_{23}(1) = 1,$$

$$S_2^- = 0.1914,$$

$$S_3^+ = 0.12756.$$

Since $x_{12}(1)$ and $x_{23}(1)$ are the only $x_{jk}(1)$ vectors in the final basis at a positive level, we know that the "best possible" solution is to use medium 1, Radio Frebia, twice ($x_{12}(1) = 1$) and medium 2, National Frebian, three times ($x_{23}(1) = 1$).

The fact that S_4 is not in the final basis indicates that we spent the entirety of our budgeted \$11,000 to obtain two units of medium 1 at \$1,000 per unit and three units of medium 2 at \$3,000 per unit.

Minimize $z = s_1^+ + s_1^- + s_2^+ + s_2^- + s_3^+$

Subject to

$$\sum_{j=1}^{2}\sum_{k=1}^{4} \ln[1-r_{jk}(1)]x_{jk}(1) + s_1^+ - s_1^- = \ln(1-.75)$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^{2}\sum_{k=1}^{4} d_{jk}(1)x_{jk}(1) + s_2^+ - s_2^- = 110{,}000$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^{2}\sum_{k=1}^{4} [(0.11540)k + (0.02P_j(1)]x_{jk}(1) + s_3^+ = 0.71886$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^{2}\sum_{k=1}^{4} c_{jk}(1)x_{jk}(1) + s_4 = 10{,}000$$

$$\sum_{k=1}^{4} x_{1k}(1) + s_5 = 1$$

$$\sum_{k=1}^{4} x_{2k}(1) + s_6 = 1$$

$$\sum_{k=1}^{4} x_{1k}(1) + s_7 = 2$$

$$\sum_{k=1}^{4} x_{2k}(1) + s_8 = 4$$

s_i, $i=1,2,\ldots,8; r_{jk}(1), d_{jk}(1), P_j(1), c_{jk}(1), x_{jk}(1) \geq 0 \forall j,k.$

Figure III

Goal Program for Hypothetical Situation

The constraint for the gross target audience was also exactly satisfied since its slack, S_1, is absent from the optimal basis. This may be easily verified by substituting in the values for $d_{jk}(1)$ in the stated goal; that is

$$d_{12}(1)x_{12}(1) + d_{23}(1)x_{23}(1) = 110{,}000$$

or

$$(38{,}000)(1) + (72{,}000)(1) = 110{,}000$$

since $x_{12}(1)$ and $x_{23}(1)$ are the only $x_{jk}(1)$ vectors greater than zero.

We did not quite reach the goal concerning the net target audience since the slack, S_2^-, associated with this goal is in the final basis at a positive level. We could verify this by computing the log values for the net target audience goal; however, it is more readily demonstrated using (3); i.e., by substituting the values for $r_{jk}(1)$ and $x_{jk}(1)$ in

$$1 - R(1) = \prod_{j=1}^{2} \prod_{k=1}^{4} (1-r_{jk}(1))^{x_{jk}(1)}$$

we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} R(1) &= 1 - [1-r_{12}(1)]^{x_{12}(1)} [1-r_{23}(1)]^{x_{12}(1)}, \\ &= 1 - (1-0.43)^1 (1-0.638)^1, \\ &= 0.72566. \end{aligned}$$

Hence, 72.566 per cent of the total target audience will be subjected to propaganda at least once, thereby missing our stated goal of 75 per cent by approximately 2.5 per cent.

We knew that we would not satisfy the goal with respect to the distribution of frequencies. The difference between the goal, computed to be 0.71886, and the value of the slack

vector associated with this goal, $S_3^+ = 0.12756$, indicates that the combination of two broadcasts by Radio Frebia and three entries in the National Frebian will net a value for $\Phi^{-1}(1-H_3(1))$ of 0.59120. This implies that approximately 28 per cent of the net target audience will be subjected to propaganda at least three times by this mix of media.

The other vectors in the final basis, S_7 at a level of zero and S_8 at a level of 1, indicate that both broadcasts of Radio Frebia but only three of the four possible entries in National Frebian were used in the optimal basis to the goal program.

This simplified example demonstrated how this "goal programming" model could be applied in "real world" situations. The problems will be much more complex and the data gathering demanding; however, the results may well lead to more proficient psychological operations.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY

Heretofore, proponents of a psychological operation usually relied on past experience and doctrinal methods in planning and implementing a campaign. The model presented in this paper is not a substitute for experience, nor is it meant to abrogate doctrine; but represents a tool that will allow examination of many alternative courses of action in a systematic and rapid manner. Experience and doctrinal factors may readily be used as a part of the model in the form of constraints. For instance, if experience has shown that at least one-fourth of an alloted budget should go into radio, this constraint could be added to the model. Likewise, "rigid" doctrine might require the insertion of at least one propaganda message in every national magazine, which could also be stated as constraints. In addition to these constraints, the procedures outlined herein allow us to establish goals for specific target audiences. (Recall that a target audience was that segment of the population that we particularly desire to "sell" a certain "product", where the "product" was the embodiment of a propaganda theme.) The goals discussed were with respect to the gross target audience, the net target audience, and the frequency distribution of the net target audience.

Use of the model should be predicated on a complete understanding of its limitations. In actuality, this formulation is a linear approximation to a problem that may not, in fact,

be linear. That is, the objective function and all constraints are stated as linear equations (inequalities); no second, third or higher degree terms are allowed. For this reason, such factors as the reinforcing effect that propaganda transmitted by one medium may have on that transmitted by another are not accounted for. However, linear approximations are not felt to be severe departures from reality.

It should be understood that these procedures are limited to use in predicting optimal allocation of media as a function of exposure to specified groupings. In using them we can specify which people we most desire to expose to propaganda. Further, we can establish the number of times we want to reach them. However, the model will not insure that the initial selection of primary and secondary target audiences is a good one; nor will it consider the impact of the propaganda on the target audience. In other words, it could possibly turn out that the most cost effective way of reaching a maximum number of people in a country is to fly a blimp (e.g., the Goodyear blimp) up and down the country for a couple of days with symbology or slogans painted on its side, signifying that the better life was on the way. A maximum number of people may be exposed to the message on the blimp but the number who actually registered the message or who were moved by the message may have been negligible. Hence, results must be carefully interpreted prior to implementing any major policy changes. Another major consideration that is not specifically accounted for here is the size of the newspaper article, length of radio broadcast, etc.; that is, if a medium

is listed as newspaper X, the model would consider the full page advertisement the same as a one line item at the bottom of the last column. This shortcoming can be overcome within the framework of the model by a judicious choice of media; e.g., a full page advertisement in newspaper X might be medium number ten, a half-page advertisement in newspaper X could be medium number eleven, etc.

The limitations that are specified in the above paragraphs are not meant to detract from the usefulness of the model, which can provide valuable insights into media allocation problems so long as results are interpreted with an understanding of the limitations of the model. Interviews with personnel in the advertising field have indicated that in initially using the model they were reaching solutions where the most cost-effective way to reach specified audiences was by total use of radio broadcasts. (The cost per number of people reached in each target audience was much less than for any other medium.) These results were not transformed into media plans for their clients because it was known that the impact of television and print advertising was much greater than that of radio. Hence, they then added constraints to the model as to the amount of money that could be allocated to radio and were then able to obtain useful results.

Recommendations for further research into modeling psychological operations are comparatively obvious. A means needs to be developed for classifying transmitted propaganda,

as to exposure and impact, as a function of media vehicle, length of transmission, content and type of audience. Procedures might also be developed for determining the effect of cumulative exposure and of establishing the point of diminishing (or even negative) returns for a particular propaganda theme. Ultimately, a method might be developed that would consider the entire spectrum of psychological operations. A major advertising agency has done work in considering overall advertising strategy and is presently using a model called DEMON (Decision Mapping Via Optimum Go-No Networks), which is a dynamic, adaptive model that uses extensions of chance programming to select optimal decision procedures.[29]

It is hoped that the discussion, observations, and modeling techniques contained in this thesis will benefit future psychological operations. Although the problem of quantifying and dealing with the many variables inherent to psychological operations has by no means been completely solved, it is felt that a step has been taken in this direction.

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APO San Francisco 96346

12. Remote Area Conflict Information Center — 2
Battelle Memorial Institute
505 King Avenue
Columbus, Ohio 43201

13. Professor G. Tuck — 1
Department of Operations Analysis
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940

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This thesis demonstrates the formulation and use of a "goal programming" model in optimizing the allocation of media for psychological operations. The parallels between advertising and psychological operations are outlined; particularly, those in connection with defining a product, specifying a target audience and measuring success. Attributes and limitations of the various forms of mass media are discussed. The problem is developed as one of minimizing the variance between a set of goals stated with respect to specified target audiences for varying time frames subject to budget and resource limitations. The goals considered are related to the total number of times that members of a target audience are subjected to propaganda, the percent subjected and frequency of subjection. Ultimately, a numerical example is presented to demonstrate the potential use of the model.

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

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Defense Science Board Task Force
on

The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict

May 2000

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MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on The Creation and Dissemination of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict

I am forwarding the final report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on The Creation and Dissemination of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict.

The Terms of Reference directed the Task Force to:

- assess the capability of the United States Armed Forces to develop programming and to broadcast factual information to a large segment of the general public;
- assess the potential of various airborne and land-based mechanisms to deliver such information; and
- assess other issues in the creation and dissemination of all forms of information in times of conflict, including satellite broadcasts and the use of emerging mobile communication technologies.

Of particular concern is the lack of an integrated PSYOP capability with the strategic International Public Information (IPI) initiative. While a national capability is not the province of DoD, DoD certainly possesses capabilities and experience which would enhance the development of the IPI initiative. The Task Force also found that content creation and dissemination lagged commercial capabilities. Incorporating commercial capabilities should significantly enhance DoD PSYOP capabilities. Finally, although PSYOP has demonstrated its usefulness over time, the incorporation of PSYOP during time of conflict is sporadic and steps need to be taken to strengthen its position within the JTF/CINC organizational structure.

The report offers several recommendations addressing these problems with a major thrust being the incorporation of commercial capability into the creation and dissemination of PSYOP products.

I endorse all of the Task Force's recommendations and propose you review the Task Force Chairman's letter and report.



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MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on The Creation and Dissemination of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict

Attached is the report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on The Creation and Dissemination of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict.

The Terms of Reference charged the Task Force with reviewing PSYOP activities within the Department of Defense (DoD). The purpose of the review was to:

- assess the capability of the United States Armed Forces to develop programming and to broadcast factual information to a large segment of the general public;
- assess the potential of various airborne and land-based mechanisms to deliver such information; and
- assess other issues in the creation and dissemination of all forms of information in times of conflict, including satellite broadcasts and the use of emerging mobile communication technologies.

The Task Force was originally created because of concern over the limitations exhibited in recent military operations in the Balkans, where the *Commando Solo* (EC-130E) aircraft were unable to disseminate TV and radio broadcasts. The Task Force chose to broaden its charter and address issues associated with PSYOP as part of an overall Information Operations (IO) campaign during peace, crisis, and armed hostilities. It also evaluated organizational issues associated with PSYOP forces within DoD and addressed issues associated with the PSYOP community's relationship to the Intelligence Community. Of particular interest is the on-going worldwide explosion of information creation and dissemination technologies and capabilities. The Task Force spent considerable effort addressing modern trends in information dissemination and media content creation. With those trends as a backdrop, the Task Force then assessed the viability of the current *Commando Solo* fleet and a variety of options currently being studied by DoD.

The Task Force found that Military PSYOP offer a unique and powerful asset in military operations, both in peacetime and in war. However, outdated equipment and organizational issues often hamper the creation of PSYOP products that meet mission needs. Given the broad array of complex missions conducted by U.S. military forces, understanding the culture and preparation of the "soft" battlespace is imperative to the conduct of successful operations. A robust and flexible PSYOP capability can be an invaluable tool in these efforts.

With these issues in mind, the report offers several recommendations. The Task Force believes that a major effort is required to integrate DoD PSYOP with International Public Information initiatives to build brand identity and delivery mechanisms required to ensure the message is heard during time of conflict. Efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical level require expert content and market analysis which is widely available in the commercial marketplace. Additionally, DoD needs to acquire the technical capability to understand emerging media dissemination techniques and technologies in order to implement emerging techniques when warranted. More robust connections with the Intelligence Community, specifically the Defense Intelligence Agency are required to enhance PSYOP products for specific countries and regions. Rank structure should be reviewed to ensure the PSYOP commander receives adequate access to the Joint Task Force Commander/CINC which will help enable PSYOP integration with the overall operational plan. Finally, the Task Force recommends against crossdecking the existing Special Mission Equipment used on the *Commando Solo* aircraft from the current EC-130E to the EC-130J. Instead, we should begin the design and development of small and easily reconfigurable information dissemination packages that would be compatible with multiple platforms.

The Task Force would like to express its appreciation for the cooperation, advice, and help provided by the government advisors, support staff, and the many presenters.

Vince Vitto

Mr. Vincent Vitto
Task Force Chairman

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Executive Summary

The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on the Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict was charged with reviewing PSYOP activities within the Department of Defense (DoD). The purpose of the review was to:

- assess the capability of the United States Armed Forces to develop programming and to broadcast factual information to a large segment of the general public;

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Military PSYOP offers a potentially unique and powerful asset in military operations, both in peacetime and in war. However, the creation of PSYOP products that meet mission needs is often hampered by outdated equipment and organizational issues. Given the broad array of complex missions conducted by U.S. military forces, understanding the culture and preparation of the "soft" battlespace is imperative to the conduct of successful operations. A robust and flexible PSYOP capability can be an invaluable tool in these efforts.

The Task Force's Terms of Reference (TOR) asked that the study examine the issue of creating and disseminating information in times of military conflict. (The full TOR is shown in Appendix A, while the Task Force membership and the individuals, both inside and outside DoD, who met with members of the Task Force are presented in Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively.) The Task Force and its TOR were motivated by Congressional language in Public Law 106-65, Section 1061 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, shown in Appendix D, which requested that the Secretary of Defense establish a Task Force to examine (1) the use of radio and television broadcasting as a propaganda instrument in times of military conflict and (2) the adequacy of the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces to make such uses of radio and television during conflicts such as the one in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Spring of 1999.

After initial discussions and briefings, the Task Force broadened the focus of the study to cover the nature of PSYOP as a whole, including organizational issues, PSYOP as part of an overall Information Operations (IO) campaign, and the increase in media opportunities. From the outset, the Task Force concluded that the dissemination of information via television (TV) and radio must be viewed as part of a comprehensive PSYOP campaign covering strategic, operational, and tactical military operations. This report begins with a vision of future PSYOP capabilities as part of an integrated overall information campaign and an overview of how PSYOP activities are conducted today.

Chapter 2 then presents a discussion of the organizational issues and challenges that current PSYOP forces face. Chapter 3 discusses the characterization of target audiences and the need to create an effective and believable brand identity for disseminating the message. Chapter 4 discusses future media production and dissemination trends and how they will likely affect the dissemination of PSYOP products worldwide. Chapter 5 examines the use the *Commando Solo* aircraft to disseminate information via TV and radio broadcasts. Finally, chapter 6 summarizes the Task Force's recommendations.

The Task Force focused on current and future technologies for the dissemination of PSYOP products, organizational issues, and mission needs and requirements. However, the use of PSYOP in military operations must be viewed as an integral part of the operation, and not as an afterthought. For PSYOP to be most effective, efforts must be made to include PSYOP as part of an integrated information operation over *all* phases of conflict, from peacetime to hostilities.

Recommendations

This DSB Task Force was originally created because of concern over the limitations exhibited in recent military operations in the Balkans, where the *Commando Solo* (EC-130E) aircraft were unable to disseminate TV and radio broadcasts. The Task Force chose to broaden its charter and address issues associated with PSYOP as part of an overall Information Operations (IO) campaign during peace, crisis, and armed hostilities. It also evaluated organizational issues associated with PSYOP forces within DoD and addressed issues associated with the PSYOP community's relationship to the Intelligence Community. Of particular interest is the on-going worldwide explosion of information creation and dissemination technologies and capabilities. The Task Force spent considerable effort addressing modern trends in information dissemination and media content creation. With those trends as a backdrop, the Task Force then assessed the viability of the current *Commando Solo* fleet and a variety of options currently being studied by DoD. The following recommendations were derived from all of these considerations.

If PSYOP is to be a useful tool in the future, it must be a nimble asset capable of delivering the right information quickly, and in a manner that is a technologically as sophisticated as any possible competitor within the region. In the future, the value of PSYOP will clearly be seen as best utilized before and after the conflict. PSYOP used before will help shape the military context in a favorable fashion for the U.S. forces. In the best case scenario, PSYOP actions will be coupled with other flexible deterrent options and actually prevent conflict. PSYOP after a conflict will shape the way U.S. military actions are perceived by people in the region and help to achieve the end state desired by the Theater CINC and the National Command Authorities. In the future, bombs and missiles will still determine who militarily wins or loses a conflict at tactical level. PSYOP, though, will help determine how long a conflict lasts and the impact of a military struggle on long term U.S. strategic interests.

Recommendation 1

The Task Force recommends that DoD create a PSYOP policy/planning staff, under the coordination authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD(SO/LIC)). This staff should ensure the integration of operational and tactical level PSYOP with strategic International Public Information (IPI) initiatives and provide planning support for strategic PSYOP activities, as described in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68.

Recommendation 2

The Task Force recommends that rank structure and career paths within PSYOP forces should be reassessed and more specifically:

- *the senior PSYOP Advisor to the geographical CINCs should be an O-6 or equivalent civilian and should be assigned to the CINC Special Staff, and*
- *the Commander of the Joint PSYOP Task Force supporting the Joint Task Force Commander in theater (typically a three-star flag officer) should also be an O-6.*

Recommendation 3

The Task Force recommends that the Office of OASD(SO/LIC) and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) strive to improve overall product quality through increased reliance on commercial providers for high-quality products. Furthermore, the Task Force recommends that the PSYOP force be adequately resourced and trained to engage a stable of commercial media content providers who can deliver these quality products. The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately $10 million per year.

Recommendation 4

The Task Force recommends that the Defense Intelligence Agency be tasked by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD C3I) to establish a psychological warfare intelligence element. ASD C3I should be charged to <u>either</u> (a) provide resources to the PSYOP community to implement a robust organic program of open source acquisition, <u>or</u> (b) task the Intelligence Community to fulfill the need for on-the-shelf, worldwide basic information, including the media and cultural background information necessary to adequately inform PSYOP products in a given country. The Task Force believes that this can be accomplished without incurring an additional budgetary burden.

Recommendation 5

The Task Force recommends that ASD C3I make National Foreign Intel Program/Joint Military Intel Program (NFIP/JMIP) funds available to USSOCOM for the express purpose of acquiring available data sets, particularly for countries outside North America and Europe. The Task Force also recommends that USSOCOM work with the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) to ensure the integration of these data sets with the World Basic Information Library (WBIL) and their community-wide accessibility. Moreover, the Intelligence Community should be further tasked through ASD C3I to

develop methods and sources to obtain media use demographic information where it is not now available but where the U.S. might plausibly have future national security interests in which PSYOP might be employed. The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately $5 million per year.

Recommendation 6

The Task Force recommends that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) work with the Department of State to fund, position, exercise, and maintain suitable distribution channels and brand identities, insofar as these can be reasonably anticipated for future PSYOP requirements. Policies with respect to the use of new and emerging transnational media need to be developed or refined. Liberal reliance on recognized professionals and the generous use of highly qualified commercial entities are highly recommended. Buying good content on which the messages will "ride" is a necessary and desirable expenditure. The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately $10 million per year.

Recommendation 7

The Task Force recommends that DoD acquire the technical capability to understand emerging media dissemination techniques and technologies. Furthermore, DoD should provide the resources to acquire (rent or purchase) emerging media content and dissemination channels from commercial organizations. Here, DoD may be able to acquire good channels very cheaply by means of being an "anchor tenant." The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately $10 million per year.

Recommendation 8

The Task Force recommends that DoD maintain the current EC-130E Commando Solo fleet with existing Special Mission Equipment (SME). The estimated cost of $250 million to cross-deck the SME to a EC-130J platform is not justified by the marginal increase in performance offered by this option. In addition, future worldwide media dissemination trends will limit the effectiveness of radio and TV broadcasts. The Task Force recommends that USSOCOM investigate the creation of small and easily reconfigurable information-dissemination packages that would be compatible with multiple platforms, including UAVs and leased aircraft, for a variety of missions. The Task Force estimates the initial investment for design and development of these packages to be $10 to $20 million per year.

Recommendation 9

The Task Force has recommended annual funding increases (in recommendations 1 through 8) of approximately $50 million per year. The Task Force believes that this increase would be readily supported by reprogramming the $250 million that would be required to fund cross-decking the existing Commando Solo SME to the EC-130J platforms.

The prompt and effective use of PSYOP in military operations can avert crises, end wars, and save lives. DoD should prioritize Psychological Operations appropriately, because the misuse of PSYOP can cause untold damage to military operations. A relatively small

investment over time can reap huge rewards for the United States and its allies, both diplomatically and militarily.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Purpose of the Study

The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on the Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict was charged with reviewing PSYOP underway in the Department of Defense (DoD). The purpose of the study was to:

- assess the capability of the United States Armed Forces to develop programming and broadcast factual information that can reach a large segment of the general public;

- assess the potential of various airborne and land-based mechanisms to distribute such information; and

- assess other issues in the creation and dissemination of all forms of information in time of conflict, including satellite broadcasts and the use of emerging mobile communication technologies.

Military PSYOP offers a potentially unique and powerful asset in military operations, in both peacetime and in war. However, the creation of PSYOP products that meet mission needs is often hampered by outdated equipment and organizational issues. Given the broad array of complex military operations conducted since the end of the Cold War, and assuming these operations will continue in the future, it is imperative to understand the culture and preparation of the "soft" battlespace in order to conduct successful operations. A robust and flexible PSYOP capability can be an invaluable tool in these efforts.

The Task Force's Terms of Reference (TOR) asked that the study examine the creation and dissemination of information in times of military conflict. (The full TOR is shown in Appendix A, while the Task Force membership and a list of experts, both inside and outside DoD, who met with members of the Task Force are presented in Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively.) The Task Force and its TOR were motivated by Congressional language in Public Law 106-65, Section 1061 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, shown in Appendix D, which requested that the Secretary of Defense establish a Task Force to examine (1) the use of radio and television broadcasting as a propaganda instrument in times of military conflict and (2) the adequacy of the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces to make use of radio and television during conflicts such as the one in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Spring of 1999.

From the outset, the Task Force concluded that dissemination of PSYOP information via TV and radio must be addressed in the context of an overall information operations campaign, in peacetime and during hostilities. It therefore broadened its focus to include information on the nature of PSYOP as a whole, including organizational issues, PSYOP

as part of an overall Information Operations (IO) campaign, the characterization of target audiences, and the increase in media opportunities. Instead of focusing merely on the dissemination of information, the Task Force began the study with an overview of how PSYOP is conducted today and then turned to a discussion of the organizational issues and challenges the current PSYOP forces face. It was agreed that the effective characterization of target audiences and the creation of an effective and believable brand identity for disseminating a credible message and product is critical to successful PSYOP. Also critical is a clearer understanding and better modeling of future media trends and how they could affect the dissemination and nature of PSYOP. Finally, the Task Force examined the issue of information dissemination and in particular the utilization, capabilities, and future applicability of the *Commando Solo* aircraft.

1.2 The Increased Relevance of PSYOP

Military Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are programs of products and/or actions that induce or reinforce the attitudes, opinions, and emotions of selected foreign target governments, organizations, groups, and individuals to create a behavior that supports U.S. national policy objectives and the theater combatant commander's intentions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. PSYOP events are planned, coordinated, and executed before, during, and after conflicts. PSYOP actions are a subset of Information Operations (IO) and International Public Information (IPI) as described by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) have been a part of military strategy throughout history. In the recent past, PSYOP campaigns were utilized by both sides in World War II, the Cold War, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. During these large scale conflicts, the PSYOP campaigns were predominantly effective from a United States and coalition partner perspective, except in Vietnam, where PSYOP was more effectively used by the adversary. In more recent conflicts PSYOP played a major role in the US successes in Grenada and Haiti, but has been viewed as particularly successful in the recent Balkan conflicts (Bosnia and Kosovo).

While neither the definition nor the purpose of PSYOP has significantly changed since the end of the Cold War, the nature of conflict, the available technologies, the socio-political environment, and the character of operations involving military forces have all changed dramatically.

Individuals from various backgrounds and perspectives briefed the Task Force and spoke of the growing importance of PSYOP to the success of any action the U.S. Government undertakes overseas, whether diplomatic or military. While the United Sates is years ahead of its competitors in terms of military technology, in terms of PSYOP there are already competitors on par with or even arguably more sophisticated than the U.S. The weakness of U.S. military PSYOP is ironic because the United States leads the world in commercial media technology and development. However, foreign rivals are often more flexible, less restricted by outdated equipment and policy, and better able to take advantage of changes in the manner in which people communicate.

Figure 1.1 Serbian use of propaganda during the Kosovo Crisis

The dense nature of the global information environment, coupled with the importance of the "media message," was demonstrated in past military crises in populations and cultures as diverse as Iraq, Serbia, and Somalia. The trend to involve the U.S. military in peacekeeping operations, where the use of violence is carefully prescribed by restrictive rules of engagement, has furthered emphasized the need for effective information activities. In peacekeeping operations, military PSYOP forces can expect to operate for an extended period of time in an area where sophisticated, robust, indigenous media competes with the U.S. military PSYOP message. In this environment, military PSYOP will not have the ability to monopolize an area's information outlets through destruction or jamming. In fact, PSYOP forces today must often compete with numerous international neutral entities to gain the attention of an intended foreign target audience.

In the Information Age, there is an increasing reliance on sophisticated, near-real time media dissemination. Information, and its denial, is power. The state or entity most able to effectively control or manage information, especially managing the perceptions of particular target audiences, will be the most influential. Future adversaries will be more likely to attempt to rely upon their ability to subvert U.S. foreign policy goals through the use of sophisticated propaganda -- on both its own populace and on international audiences -- than to confront the United States and its coalition partners through traditional military means. They will try to manipulate U.S. policy through selected, discriminate propaganda via both legitimate news media and non-traditional means. For military PSYOP to be effective, they must be continuous and integrated with the other elements of IO.

1.3 A PSYOP Future Vision

If PSYOP is to be a useful tool in the future, it must be a nimble asset capable of delivering the right information quickly, and in a manner that is as technologically sophisticated as any possible competitor within the region. In the future, the value of PSYOP will clearly be seen as best utilized before *and* after the conflict. PSYOP used before will help shape the military context in a favorable fashion for the U.S. forces. In the best case scenario, PSYOP actions will be coupled with other flexible deterrent options and actually prevent conflict. PSYOP after a conflict will shape the way U.S. military actions are perceived by people in the region and help to achieve the end state desired by the Theater CINC and the National Command Authorities. In the future, bombs and missiles will still determine who militarily wins or loses a conflict at tactical level. PSYOP, though, will help determine how long a conflict lasts and the impact of a military struggle on long term U.S. strategic interests.

If the recommendations for military PSYOP contained in this study are enacted, the future military PSYOP capability may well resemble the following description which is also captured in Figure 1.2.



Figure 1.2 PSYOP integrated over all phases of conflict

- Strategic PSYOP: A permanent PSYOP staff organization under the direction of ASD SO/LIC, will work closely with U.S. Department of State Public Diplomacy staff members. Their primary purpose, in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive 68, will be to assist the Department of State in developing strategic International Public information plans and programs. Additionally, this strategic PSYOP policy and planning staff will also be able to de-conflict and synchronize the Theater CINC's PSYOP scheme with the

strategic International Public Information plan. The link between the strategic PSYOP policy/planning staff and the theaters will occur through the Joint PSYOP Headquarters. For the first time, this headquarters will bring all the military PSYOP assets under one organization. Commanded by a flag officer, the Joint PSYOP Headquarters will maintain open contracts with civilian advertising and marketing firms for assistance in PSYOP product development and links with members of academia studying the potential impact of information on the attitudes and behaviors of foreign target audiences.

- Operational PSYOP: In this future PSYOP structure, wartime operational PSYOP will diminish in significance. Much of what is termed today as "operational PSYOP" will occur during future conflict at the strategic or tactical level. However, in the future, operational PSYOP will still be an important contributor during peacetime. In the future, the PSYOP perspective will always reach the Theater CINC because of the existence of a senior PSYOP Advisor (PSYAD). The PSYAD position, a member of the CINC's Special Staff, in close consultation with the Political Advisor, will provide the CINC with a unique viewpoint on the motivations of the people within a specific area of operation. The PSYAD also will advise the CINC on how best to deploy the PSYOP forces organic to his theater. This will be organic PSYOP because PSYOP forces will no longer be exclusively located in CONUS but permanently assigned to their particular theater of operations. This forward deployment will eliminate the long delay caused today by the current requirement for the CINC's staff to request any and all PSYOP forces and for the Joint Staff to issue deployment orders. By having permanent in-theater PSYOP forces, CINC's, in coordination with the various U.S. Embassy Country Teams, will be able to execute a more robust peacetime PSYOP program and have far more confidence and control of their PSYOP assets. Through coordination by way of the Joint PSYOP Headquarters, the Theater CINC's PSYOP staff will provide input into strategic PSYOP plans and programs and insure their efforts are synchronized fully with the International Public Information efforts. During periods of crisis and war, the Theater PSYOP forces will use a variety of platforms, both manned and unmanned to disseminate information. Some of these assets will be based in space and owned by commercial interests, and some others will be owned by other-than-DOD agencies within the U.S. government.

- Tactical PSYOP: Future tactical PSYOP teams will more resemble electronic news gatherers as opposed to loudspeaker teams. PSYOP soldiers will no longer carry loudspeakers in high threat environments. Instead, PSYOP messages will be routed through a wireless network to unmanned speakers. Loudspeakers will be mounted on the outside of more survivable armored vehicles like tanks and will be dropped in the enemy's rear areas. The primary purpose of tactical PSYOP teams will be to gather video footage and send it for further editing to various PSYOP production centers.

Communications links will be robust and real time. Footage gathered by these soldiers will be sent directly back to the Joint PSYOP Headquarters and incorporated into the Department of State's Worldnet Television transmissions. In peacetime, local media contracts will be typically consummated in order to disseminate PSYOP materials.

1.4 PSYOP Today

Used properly, PSYOP can help, in the words of the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu, "subdue the enemy's army without battle." Especially in an era when any loss of life is politically sensitive, the ability of PSYOP to be a 'combat reducer' and save the lives of U.S. troops and citizens, as well as opposing force personnel, is exceedingly important. PSYOP forces offer U.S. policymakers and warfighters a more discreet and often more politically palatable tool than conventional military activities, which are primarily designed to bring the adversary to heel through death and destruction.

However, to be a "combat reducer," PSYOP must be robust and integrated into each element of power. Unfortunately, the current PSYOP structure reflects an outdated Cold War policy, with U.S. PSYOP forces primarily oriented toward supporting tactical forces on the ground, using loudspeaker operations and face-to-face communications. Nevertheless, given the increased velocity of information at every level, and the need to react more quickly to local situations, U.S. military commanders have increasingly relied upon PSYOP forces at all levels as their conduit for information to foreign populations. These commanders depend upon their PSYOP officers and non-commissioned officers to communicate information and expectations, irrespective of local or international competition, in a manner that challenges the PSYOP organizational structure.

1.4.1 Strategic PSYOP

In the past, there were clear distinctions between the three levels of PSYOP: strategic, operational, and tactical. In the post-Cold War world, however, these distinctions have blurred to the extent that they may no longer exist. The world's almost instantaneous access to news and information makes it nearly impossible to localize any information campaign. A leaflet handed out in Bosnia is just as likely to be shown by a reporter on the nightly news in the United States or Europe as it is to be read in Sarajevo.



Figure 1.3 PSYOP Tools Today

Strategic PSYOP, in accordance with PDD 68, is defined as having global implications and is planned, initiated, and executed at the national level. Military PSYOP support strategic PSYOP through planning, and if tasked, through the dissemination of assets. Military PSYOP should also ensure that the geographic CINC's peacetime engagement activities are harmonized with the national strategic PSYOP plan. Despite recent attempts to ensure better coordination, PSYOP plans at the strategic level suffer from a lack of synchronization. Currently, there is not a systemic manner in which military PSYOP organizations gain insight into the strategic perception-management effort – nor is there a practiced method to de-conflict a supported CINC's theater information activities with the national information effort. While strategic PSYOP actions are most effective during peacetime, military PSYOP doctrine and organizational structure are principally configured to respond during a conflict. This over-emphasis on wartime operations is viewed by the Task Force as a deficiency of today's PSYOP force.

1.4.2 Operational PSYOP

During periods of conflict, military PSYOP capabilities and doctrine are more developed and effective. During warfighting, PSYOP elements are flexible and can provide support with a small team or with a robust Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF), potentially consisting of thousands of individuals. Given enough time during a crisis, PSYOP forces can provide a surge capability from bases in the United States to the theater CINC headquarters, supplementing existing PSYOP planning capabilities and/or establishing PSYOP headquarters for multiple Joint Task Forces. Operational PSYOP actions impact throughout the entire military theater of operations and typically consist of widespread

television and radio broadcasts, and newspaper, magazine, and leaflet dissemination. To be effective, PSYOP planners on the supported CINC's staff must oversee and coordinate PSYOP prior to the deployment of large forces from the United States. PSYOP planning staff billets forward in the theaters are however typically thinly and inconsistently manned.

Operational-level military PSYOP forces today are asked to compete against sophisticated local and international media organizations, which are often better funded and more technically sophisticated. Unlike their rivals, U.S. PSYOP forces today cannot readily disseminate materials over the Internet or via commercial broadcast satellites. In addition, the PSYOP force is largely composed of a rather small pool of U.S. Army personnel, who are at best media amateurs. These forces must attempt to compete against often better trained foreigners, who are less encumbered by policies and organizational structures. Ideally, PSYOP research regarding foreign audiences should be modern and sophisticated, and should utilize a wide range of national intelligence capabilities and leverage the latest in commercial marketing and polling techniques. In reality, however, U.S. PSYOP forces have difficulty making intelligence collection requirements known and accessing intelligence. In addition, PSYOP personnel are often untrained in civilian marketing, polling, and media production skills.

Moreover, the PSYOP capability to disseminate via television and radio broadcasts in denied areas is extremely deficient. The current capability for radio and television dissemination is limited to the use of *Commando Solo* aircraft, which have the capability to broadcast AM and FM radio and VHF and UHF TV signals from an altitude of 18,000 feet. The Special Mission Equipment (SME) carried on the EC-130E aircraft features technology that is decades old and vulnerable to an adversary's countermeasures. The current PSYOP operational concept features the deployment of a small element of PSYOP forces forward in the supported CINC's theater of operations. These deployed forces would be primarily supported by PSYOP plans, programs, and products developed at the PSYOP headquarters in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This so-called "Reachback" concept is dependent upon an enormous amount of bandwidth through secure communications links. In practice, "Reachback" has often been very difficult to institute and support.

1.4.3 Tactical PSYOP

Military tactical PSYOP are actions taken in a local area with focused impact. Loudspeaker operations, handbills, local radio broadcasts, and television programming are typical tactical PSYOP actions. Today's PSYOP capability at the tactical level is quite well developed. Recently, PSYOP forces supporting local military commanders were augmented with a capability to produce a limited range of PSYOP products.

In fact, one could make the argument that the current PSYOP structure is too heavily focused toward tactical PSYOP. This structure makes it difficult to support the theater CINCs, especially in an age when the power of electronic media has, in many areas of the

world, overwhelmed the print alternative. Within the current PSYOP organizational structure, the PSYOP regional battalions, primarily responsible for operational-level PSYOP, are the most heavily deployed PSYOP forces and struggle to meet the manpower requirements for the numerous contingency missions. With enough PSYOP tactical forces to support seven Army corps equivalents (one PSYOP tactical battalion is allocated to a corps equivalent), the imbalance between regional and tactical PSYOP forces in the current force structure is obvious.

A major concern regarding tactical PSYOP forces is the survivability of these units during mid- and high-intensity conflicts. With the lethality of the weaponry on the modern battlefield, the lifespan of the three-person PSYOP tactical team in a lightly armed HMMWV, equipped with a loudspeaker with a range of a mere thousand meters, would probably be measured in terms of hours, if not minutes. Should PSYOP loudspeaker operations be needed at the front lines in such difficult threat environments, they will need to be accomplished remotely via a more heavily armored manned vehicle or an unmanned vehicle (either aerial or ground). The capability to conduct remote loudspeaker operations is currently not present in the PSYOP force.

CHAPTER 2

Organizational Issues

> The expectation that the air campaign [against Serbian forces] would last only a short time also was a detriment to the NATO psychological operations effort [in the 1999 Kosovo campaign], since those assets were not included in the initial plans. It took two weeks to start delivering products and some 30 days to develop a campaign plan. Serbia started its psychological operations campaign days earlier and won the early initiative.
>
> *Timothy L. Thomas, "Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority," Parameters, Spring 2000, pp. 13-29.*

> Although USCINCCENT's approval for the theater PSYOP plan was received in late September, execution authority was not granted until December. The interagency approval process, mandated by DoD Directive 3321.1 [Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and Contingencies Short of Declared War], was glacial. Had the Saudis not requested U.S. support to encourage Iraqi desertion and defection, culminating in the formation of a combined U.S., Saudi, Egyptian, Kuwaiti and British PSYOP effort and the King's approval to execute, it is doubtful that PSYOP would have been allowed to play an active role in the [Gulf] war at all.
>
> *Jeffrey B. Jones and Jack N. Summe, "Psychological Operations in Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Urban Freedom," AUSA Landpower Essay Series, No. 97-2, August 1997.*

The above quotes suggest that, in a crisis, DoD cannot conduct psychological operations any faster than the U.S. Government can produce its International Public Information (IPI), Public Diplomacy (PD), and coordinated PSYOP campaign plans.

2.1 Strategic Relationships of Military PSYOP With Non-DoD Agencies

Organizational debates are hardly new to U.S. PSYOP. Indeed, differences over the institutionalization and organization of propaganda in U.S. national security have been a central theme in the evolution of PSYOP throughout the 20th century. Since World War I, the organization of PSYOP has been hotly debated and U.S. military PSYOP capabilities have waxed during wartime and waned during peace.

Since the early 1980s, military PSYOP have become well institutionalized within DoD. The 1983 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 77 ("Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security"); the 1984 National Security Decision 130 ("U.S. International Information Policy"), which instructed DoD to rebuild military PSYOP capabilities; and the 1985 DoD PSYOP Master Plan reversed the post-Vietnam atrophy of military PSYOP capabilities.

This institutionalization of military PSYOP forces, however, did little to eliminate the differing opinions over the organization of PSYOP, particularly regarding national-level interagency coordination of PSYOP campaigns. Since the early 1980s, every NSDD and Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) dealing with IPI, PD, or PSYOP (for example, NSDDs 45, 77, and 130 and PDDs 56 and 68) has required broad interagency coordination of PSYOP between DoD and other national security departments and agencies, under the purview of special ad hoc groups. Nonetheless, DoD PSYOP Master Plans (1985, 1990), and critical assessments during the same period, called repeatedly for improved and streamlined interagency coordination of PSYOP plans and products.

Under PDD 68, the International Public Information Core Group (ICG), chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, coordinates all agencies' IPI activities. If PSYOP campaign plans are not already prepared, the coordination required throughout the U.S. national security community will take time. As a result, the influence of PSYOP on a crisis will not be timely.

During crises PSYOP campaign plans wait upon a complex process of interagency review, coordination, and approval. The most insightful and creative processes for developing PSYOP products, and the most modern media and technologies for delivering PSYOP messages, avail nothing if organizational structures are too complex, inexperienced, or inefficient to coordinate and approve campaign plans in time to influence developing or ongoing crises. As PSYOP adapt to support "Internet War" and as future information operations occur in "Internet time," these issues become even more difficult.

The U.S. PSYOP organizational challenges offer adversaries a clear asymmetric opportunity during crises: they can beat the United States and its allies in getting out the first PSYOP messages. Moreover, if the opponent plans the actions that trigger the crisis, the opponent has that much more lead time to ready its PSYOP campaign.

This DSB Task Force believes that a permanent, properly constituted interagency body should be established within the National Security Council charged with all U.S. Government IPI, PD, PSYOP and other peacetime management policies and operations. An authoritative standing body would ensure on-going, front-end, continuous interagency dialogue, coordination, and integration.

PSYOP actions cue a very flexible component of an overall IO plan. During times of peace or crisis, PSYOP can support strategic international information operations through planning and, if tasked, through the dissemination of assets. *This Task Force found military PSYOP capabilities during periods of peace and crisis to be especially wanting. Traditionally focused on tactical military support, PSYOP forces are particularly challenged to provide support at the strategic level. To retain relevancy and raise effectiveness, military PSYOP forces must augment their current strategic capabilities.*

Strategic international information operations have global policy implications and, in accordance with PDD 68, are planned at the national level. Nevertheless, military

PSYOP planners can serve as a link to inform and synchronize the actions of the geographic CINC in whose theater the strategic perception-management action may be targeted. Additionally, geographic CINCs are now engaged in vigorous theater peacetime engagement activities, where PSYOP forces often play a robust and sometimes key role. As part of these engagement activities, PSYOP forces often develop an Overt Peacetime PSYOP Program (OP3) tailored for the supported geographic CINC.

This Task Force believes that strategic-level PSYOP suffer from a lack of coordination with other U.S. Government organizations that disseminate information to foreign audiences (such as, Radio Marti, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Worldnet Television). This can lead to an uncoordinated effort in various regions around the world, where the U.S. Government's information dissemination power is not used to its fullest advantage. In addition, contradictory information themes could be broadcast simultaneously through the various venues. PDD 68 is designed to help make this coordination occur more effectively. Still, military PSYOP often conduct their information activities oblivious to the higher level perception-management efforts emanating from the Department of State and National Security Council. In addition, U.S. Government agencies outside DoD often do not fully exploit the expertise resident in military PSYOP with respect to knowledge of foreign audiences and information planning capabilities. *Therefore, DoD should create a small military PSYOP planning staff, under the coordination authority of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD(SO/LIC)) to ensure that operational- and tactical-level PSYOP are integrated with strategic perception-management initiatives and that planning support is provided for strategic PSYOP activities.*

2.1.1 The Requirement for a PSYOP Vision and Operational Concept

The 1985 and 1990 PSYOP Master Plans called for a Joint PSYOP vision and operational concept. The publication of *Joint Vision 2010* and the corresponding service vision statements make these recommendations even more compelling. The call for a PSYOP vision and operational concept is repeated again in the 1999 *Joint Psychological Operations Enhancement Study* and endorsed by USSOCOM's review of that study. During the revival of U.S. PSYOP capabilities over the past 15 years, there has been much consensus on the need for a PSYOP vision and operational concept but the production of this document is long overdue.

Weaknesses exposed in U.S. military PSYOP response to recent events in both Bosnia and Kosovo have awakened many to the need to make significant changes. The vast majority of U.S. military PSYOP forces reside in the U.S. Army. This rather small group has a Cold War-oriented structure, often antiquated equipment, and limited financial support. Yet, it is inundated with requests for support from the geographic CINCs to get information to foreign target audiences -- audiences that are being served by an ever expanding array of information dissemination options. The good news is that within military PSYOP forces there is both a willingness to consider new ways to conduct their mission and movement in positive directions to effect change. Nevertheless, it is clear

that this movement is neither robust enough to quickly solve identified deficiencies, nor is it sufficiently supported outside the PSYOP community.
Until a 'road map' for the future of PSYOP is drafted and implemented, it is difficult to see how PSYOP can remain relevant and develop the capabilities to best serve the geographic CINCs. As the first step to remedy the deficiencies within military PSYOP, the Department of Defense must draft a military PSYOP Vision as well as an accompanying future PSYOP Operational Concept.

This action should be undertaken by OASD(SO/LIC), in conjunction with the Joint Staff J39, and USSOCOM. Furthermore, the Task Force believes that these actions should be completed within 12 months. These documents need to be multi-service and interagency in scope, and revolutionary in perspective. As a touchstone, the PSYOP Vision must be in accordance with the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff's *Joint Vision 2010*. To avoid the problems experienced with the previous Master Plans, the document should be signed by the Secretary of Defense and have clear implementation schedules to ensure its adoption.

2.2 Should PSYOP Forces Be Exclusively Under USSOCOM?

Since the 1950s, the center of gravity of military PSYOP has been Fort Bragg, NC, and the Special Warfare Center. Indeed, the Special Warfare Center, established in 1956, evolved from the Psychological Warfare Center, established in 1952. Not surprisingly, as PSYOP capabilities were revived during the 1980s, they were aligned organizationally with special operations. Figure 2.1 shows the current organizational structure within USSOCOM where the bulk of PSYOP forces are concentrated in the 4th PSYOP Operations Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

The authors of the 1985 PSYOP Master Plan, however, believed that the subordination of PSYOP to special operations "detracted from the recognition of the overall applicability of PSYOP in times of peace, crisis, and war..., contributed to the lack of understanding of PSYOP," and reduced the effectiveness of PSYOP planning at unified and specified commands. Despite guidance from the Secretary of Defense to separate PSYOP and special operations in implementing the 1985 Master Plan, after long review PSYOP were subordinated to USSOCOM in 1987.



Figure 2.1 Current SOCOM PSYOP Structure

The 1997 *Critical Assessment*, authored by the former commanders of the U.S. Army's 4th PSYOP Group, called for the creation of a Joint PSYOP Command under USSOCOM.[1] These former commanders saw future PSYOP enhancements as being dependent on:

- far more rank and representation for PSYOP at national levels and in the unified and specified commands and their components;
- far more independence of PSYOP from special operations in staffing, planning, and execution; and
- an all-but independent national-level Joint PSYOP Command, which would coordinate PSYOP support for transnational and national strategic-level, as well as theater-level, operational plans and operations.

The Task Force's investigations led to the conclusion that during periods of conflict, military PSYOP capabilities, particularly at the tactical level (Army Corps equivalent and below), are more developed and effective. Military PSYOP doctrine and organizational structure are primarily configured to respond during a conflict.

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[1] *Psychological Operations into the 21st Century: A Critical Assessment,* 15 May 1997, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

During warfighting, PSYOP elements are flexible and can provide tactical-level support with a small team or operational-level support with a robust Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF), potentially consisting of thousands of individuals. Given enough time during a crisis, PSYOP forces can provide surge capability from bases in the United States to the theater CINC headquarters, supplementing existing PSYOP planning capabilities and/or establishing PSYOP headquarters for multiple Joint Task Forces at the operational-strategic level of war.



Figure 2.2 PSYOP relevance

In addition to issues regarding PSYOP organization and USSOCOM, there are other organizational issues that merit further discussion.

Service PSYOP. Both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy are engaged at the service level, to a relatively limited extent, in PSYOP research, training, and doctrinal development, as well as in developing PSYOP organizations. Since joint military PSYOP is subordinated to USSOCOM, PSYOP doctrine, training, and organization should come under that command's purview.

PSYOP and Information Operations. While USSOCOM has responsibility for joint PSYOP, joint doctrine has established PSYOP as one of the "five pillars" of information IO, and DoD has assigned authority for some elements of IO to other commands (for example, USSPACECOM). The Task Force believes that the role of PSYOP in an overall IO strategy should be considered as part of the development of a PSYOP vision and operational concept.

Military PSYOP and Civilian Perception Management. There are repeated instances of military PSYOP absorbing and employing the talents and resources of civilian perception-management industries during conflict, and then dismissing them entirely from post-conflict PSYOP organization, planning, doctrine, and training. This issue is discussed in chapter 3.

2.3 Forward PSYOP Deployment To Support CINCs

The Task Force recognizes that the shortcomings of the recent NATO PSYOP campaign in Serbia and Kosovo will revive older questions regarding the effectiveness of PSYOP planning on the staffs of the warfighting CINCs. The shortcomings can be explained in part by the inadequacy of PSYOP planning support to the geographic CINCs, and in part by the lack of resources available for ongoing theater engagements of all types, including the CINCs' overt peacetime psychological operations programs.

The 1985 PSYOP Master Plan identified numerous shortcomings in PSYOP planning in the Unified and Specified (U&S) Commands. The 1985 Master Plan led to changes in Defense Planning Guidance, the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The 1990 PSYOP Master Plan pointed out that "the effect of the 1985 Plan was to initiate measurable improvements in each identified area, ameliorating many of the problems...." While the 1990 Master Plan included recommendations to further enhance PSYOP planning, none was directed at the U&S CINCs.

More recently, J39's *Joint PSYOP Enhancement Study*, and the former PSYOP Group commanders' *Critical Assessment* identified problems in PSYOP task organization to support warfighting CINCs. For example, the *Joint PSYOP Enhancement Study* found: "Each of the supported CINCs cited inadequate [PSYOP] force commitment to theater as a root cause of many deficiencies and problems during their evaluation of PSYOP support war scenarios" (p. 2-2-12). The *Critical Assessment* recommended that "PSYOP teams forward deploy to all theater SOCs (Special Operations Commands) to coordinate and participate in deliberate and crisis planning to ensure PSYOP participation on the front end and as the lead elements for the formation of Joint Psychological Operations Task Forces (JPOTFs) when called for by OPLANS" (p. 30). Some CINC staffs recommend a "standing JPOTF" comprised of CINC staff (implying great numbers of CINC PSYOP staff and planners) and personnel from the regional PSYOP support battalions.

The CINC staff participants in the *Joint PSYOP Enhancement Study* identified PSYOP organization for allied and coalition operations as a major shortcoming. The problems include a lack of a standing JPOTF organization, lack of SOPS, and inadequate training. Compounding these problems is the lack of PSYOP forces, SOPs, or doctrine among many allies and coalition partners.

This DSB Task Force agrees with the various recommendations offered by the Critical Assessment and by the Joint PSYOP Enhancement Study. To address the issue of PSYOP support to the CINCs, these recommendations depend on some combination of the following:

- *more PSYOP staff and planners on the CINC staff;*
- *enhanced capabilities to task and organize rapidly to support CINC planning and crisis action;*

- *establishment of a standing "nucleus" (possibly including CINC staff) around which a JPOTF or CPOTF would be established.*
  - *the Joint Staff (J39) and USSOCCOM should examine the adequacy of the existing PSYOP force structure (active and reserve) to fully support the doctrinal recommendation that the JTF be supported by a component-level JPOTF.*

2.4 Rank Structure of PSYOP Forces

There are several arguments favoring greater rank within PSYOP forces.

First, there are the high interest in and high expectations of PSYOP across the spectrum of peace, crisis, and war, coupled with demands for "wide-band" coordination up and down the chain of command. With such expectations must go commensurate responsibility and authority.

Second, the ongoing efforts to modernize and capitalize military PSYOP with advanced capabilities for production, dissemination, and delivery put PSYOP in competition with the most competitive sectors of the services and the general economy for talent and experience. Professionalization of military PSYOP requires specialization in the career field, and that field should offer the possibility of high rank.

Third, the rank of the senior PSYOP advisor in the theater is often much lower than that of the JTF principle staff that effective planning, coordination, and decision-making are severely impaired. PSYOP officers often have little direct access to the warfighting commander.

Fourth, PSYOP officers on staffs of the geographic CINCs lack the rank and the access to the CINC for effective long-range PSYOP planning, or for effectively coordinating the CINC's theater-operational PSYOP with national and transnational strategic-level international information campaigns.

The Task Force concluded that rank structure and career paths within PSYOP forces should be reassessed and more specifically:

- *the senior PSYOP advisor to the geographical CINCs should be an O- 6 or equivalent civilian; and*
- *the commander of the Joint PSYOP Task Force supporting the Joint Task Force Commander (typically a three-star flag officer) in theater should also be an O-6.*

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[2] Steven Collins, "Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and Constraints," *Parameters*, Summer 1999, pp. 57-73.

CHAPTER 3

Reaching the Target Audience

3.1 Packaging the Product

It bears repeating that the goal of PSYOP is to influence the behavior of the target audience. This presumes that the goal can be accomplished by influencing their perceptions. Critical, of course, is the theme of the message. But equally important is the packaging of the message, which must be suitable for the target audience and the dissemination media of choice. This requires considerable understanding of the target audience and their information milieu in order to tailor the message to the audience and choose dissemination media that can be expected to reach that audience.

Today's PSYOP force includes a small but dedicated cadre of country experts familiar with the cultures and fluent in the languages of their accounts. There is also a small and equally dedicated cadre of production personnel, operating a modest suite of production capabilities.

The Task Force considers it important for the PSYOP force to maintain some organic capability for in-house production. Situations arise that require an immediate response, and some situations may be of sufficient sensitivity that outsourcing would be undesirable. However, the Task Force also believes that consistent production of the highest quality products can be accomplished best by relying on a readily accessible set of professional firms that specialize in the desired products for the target audiences and chosen media.

The Task Force has concluded that OASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM should strive to improve overall product quality and recommends increased reliance on commercial providers for high-quality products. The Task Force believes, therefore, that the PSYOP force be adequately resourced and trained to engage a stable of commercial providers who can deliver these quality products.

In addition to training in acquisition skills, government PSYOP personnel require intensive instruction, refresher training, and hands-on familiarization with state-of-the-practice techniques across the spectrum of traditional and emerging media. This should ensure knowledgeable oversight and management of outsourced production, and likewise ensure that there are sufficient in-house skills to operate the modest organic QRC facilities. Once these in-house facilities complete their modernization changeover from analog to digital production, modest but continuing recapitalization may be required to assure compatibility with evolving media and state-of the-practice.

3.2 Developing the Message

Presenting the message so that it is compelling and credible requires a careful blend of creativity and sensitivity. The product must grab the attention of the target audience -- in a wholly positive way -- and leave the message with them in an unambiguous and memorable fashion. Unless a rough-and-ready message has special cachet, the more polished and professional the message is, the better. While there surely are dedicated and creative individuals in the PSYOP force, turning to commercial producers, where possible, is recommended. As previously mentioned, the Task Force recommends that the PSYOP force be adequately resourced to engage commercial providers, and adequately trained to get the most for the expenditure. However, background information required for framing the message and selecting distribution channels, most likely, must be supplied by the government.

Three sources of intelligence contribute to a capable PSYOP program. These are perhaps best described as proprietary information, classified intelligence, and information from the public domain.

Proprietary or privately held information requires considerable diplomatic expertise to acquire. It is best acquired through organizational interchanges, either among governments or non-government entities, or through contacts, meetings, international or transnational coalitions, and the like.

Classified intelligence supports PSYOP in largely traditional ways, except that the ratio between technical collection and clandestine collection is reversed -- that is, the raw information of most value to the conduct of PSYOP is often acquired by clandestine collection. To the extent that the necessary information comes from public and private sources, it should be reinforced through clandestine means as a quality check. A cooperative effort involving intelligence agencies and country teams (coalition, perhaps) is vital.

The Task Force observes that the PSYOP community must better specify the intelligence support it requires, especially for classified collection and tailored production. Currently, the PSYOP community seems to expect that the provision of tailored intelligence and other necessary information will be serendipitous. This is decidedly not the case, and raises a risk that the planning, execution, and assessment of PSYOP effectiveness will be based upon faulty information.

The Task Force believes that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) should be tasked by the Secretary of Defense through his Assistant for C3I to establish a psychological warfare intelligence element. This element, in cooperation with the PSYOP community, should develop intelligence requirements, task the appropriate collectors (overt, technical, or clandestine), and analyze and produce finished intelligence products specifically meeting PSYOP needs. The PSYOP community should have representation within this DIA element, and DIA must be able to access the 4th PSYOP Group's research and analysis group. The DIA element should be authorized to coordinate fully with the other U.S. intelligence agencies, certain law-enforcement agencies, and U.S. and other allied information services.

In addition to proprietary information and classified intelligence, a considerable amount of information needed for the development and employment of PSYOP products is available via open source acquisition and an increasing amount of that information is available on the public Internet. The Task Force distinguishes between two kinds of open source acquisition activities. The first is simply the use of commercial contractors to provide suitable open source products to fit PSYOP needs. This would largely be geared to derivative products and non-Internet sources. In many cases, there are contractors who already supply a market with such information and the costs are merely subscription and licensing costs. In other cases, general products could be tailored to special PSYOP needs at minor cost. Even in cases where the contractor would be required to start from scratch to collect, organize, and synthesize such materials for the PSYOP community, the Task Force anticipates that one can negotiate favorable terms insofar as the contractor is permitted to re-purpose the materials for commercial customers. The second category of open source acquisition involves direct online access. A considerable and increasing amount of the information needed for the development and dissemination of PSYOP products is available on the public Internet. Harvesting that information -- often translating it, organizing it, and providing quality assurance -- is manpower intensive. And while it can be accessed by any individual analyst or tool developer, there are major economies of scale in doing it once, centrally and making it available for the community.

Because the Intelligence Community has declined the opportunity to aggressively organize the open source effort, it falls to individual organizations, such as the 4th PSYOP Group, to shoulder the burden themselves. The Task Force is unanimous in recommending that harvesting this information be done just once and well for the PSYOP community and, moreover, that it be made broadly available within the Department of Defense.

The Task Force believes that ASD C3I should be charged to <u>either</u>: (a) provide resources to the PSYOP community to implement a robust organic program of open source acquisition, <u>or</u> (b) task the Intelligence Community to fulfill the need for on-the-shelf, worldwide basic information, including the media and cultural background information that is necessary to adequately inform PSYOP products in a given country.

Military reservists offer a largely untapped personnel resource that can be profitably applied to the business of mining open sources for the technical and cultural information needed for the development and dissemination of PSYOP products. Unfortunately, reserve forces are not currently structured to optimize their potential contribution to this effort. The principal mismatch -- which, indeed, reflects an active duty problem -- is that the reserve forces are organized around the reservist's wartime Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). In this day and age, however, many reservists have civilian employment in information technology areas, which makes them especially suitable for this open source mission.

The Task Force is not ready to advocate major structural changes in the active reserves. However, there is a large reservoir of individual ready reservists (IRR) and individual mobilization augmentees (IMA) who could be formed into virtual units, disconnected from their earlier active duty service but especially suited to the 21st century Information Battlespace. The potential here is to use IRR and IMA personnel in virtual units, which would participate in "distance drilling" -- participating virtually in unit activities, even from home. And, of course, there are standing reserve intelligence units whose mission would require only a modest tweak in order for them to satisfy the PSYOP information needs more directly.

A prototype effort along these lines was sponsored, originally, by the Intelligence Community's Open Source Program Office, which used such online teams to organize and populate the online World Basic Information Library (WBIL). The WBIL program is now operated by the U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO). Beyond the natural desire to serve their country, the individuals are motivated to "drill for points" so that the dollar costs of this effort are quite modest.

The Task Force also concluded that ASD C3I and Service Reserve Affairs organizations should review the WBIL program at FMSO, recognize the potential of reservists to meet, in a novel way, an otherwise languishing intelligence need, and provide the modest resources necessary to augment this effort.

To take full advantage of efforts like the FMSO WBIL will require the deployment to the PSYOP community of state-of-the-practice data mining software, connectivity, and computing power. The Task Force also notes, in passing, the need for ever more powerful data mining tools to keep up with the explosive growth in online information, which inevitably worsens the "signal-to-noise ratio" -- more wheat, but a lot more chaff; more nuggets, but a lot more ore to be refined.

Correctly choosing the media dissemination channels that reach the target audience is an essential element of PSYOP. This requires knowing the "market penetration" of the media, and the viewing, reading and/or listening habits of the target audience. Media penetration, particularly for electronic media, is a subject of constant commercial study, especially in North America and Europe. An admittedly somewhat cursory search for media penetration data for other regions of the world indicated that there is little or no information available. Those studies that do exist are generally available by subscription or on a selective, one-time-purchase basis. For purposes of long-term planning and quick reaction, these general data sets need to be acquired and on-the-shelf. This requires a certain attention span that is sometimes lacking in the case of the Intelligence Community -- as, for example, its lassitude with respect to global (open source) coverage. Absent a reinvigorated Intelligence Community open source effort, the local solution is to ensure that the PSYOP force has the resources to purchase these materials directly. It is important, however, to acquire and maintain these data sets, where available, for easy access by the entire national security community.

The Task Force encourages ASD C3I to make NFIP/JMIP funds available to USSOCOM for the express purpose of acquiring available data sets, particularly those for countries

outside North America and Europe. The Task Force also recommends that USSOCOM work with FMSO to ensure the integration of these data sets with the WBIL and their community-wide accessibility. Moreover, the Intelligence Community should be further tasked through ASD C3I to develop methods and sources to obtain media-use demographic information where it is not now available, and where the United States might plausibly have future national security interests in which PSYOP might be employed. The underlying premise is that the right business principle is to turn the "consumers" into "customers."

3.3 Brand Identity

The Task Force is persuaded that a considerable foundation must be laid well in advance of the actual need to deliver a PSYOP product to a particular audience. In general, the distribution channels need to be acquired in advance and a suitable "brand identity" needs to be established. Both need to be exercised with sufficient periodicity that good will and market penetration are ready when needed. Such channels and brand identities are at least as important as any technical dissemination platform such as *Commando Solo*, and their operations and maintenance are no less important. This will be increasingly the case as the diversity of programming choices available to target audiences continues to expand. Cable and satellite TV and radio, and especially the public Internet, offer far more choices than over-the-air networks did formerly. The development of channels and identities will be particular, in some cases, to geography and, in other cases, to transnational affinity groups -- Islamic Fundamentalism, for example -- or to more universal demographics, like teenagers. Of course, the development of brand identities must be tightly integrated with ongoing, broad public diplomacy initiatives and themes.

The Task Force notes that preliminary forays into the use of the Internet as a dissemination medium have been fraught with impediments, which the Task Force attributes to immature policy in dealing with the use of a medium that knows no national boundaries.

The Task Force believes, therefore, that OSD should work with the Department of State to fund, preposition, exercise, and maintain suitable distribution channels and brand identities, as far as can be reasonably anticipated for future PSYOP requirements. Policies regarding the use of new and emerging transnational media must be developed or refined. The Task Force highly recommends a liberal reliance on recognized professionals and generous use of highly qualified commercial entities; buying good content on which the messages will "ride" is a necessary and desirable expenditure. In some cases, the U.S. Government has unique content that it can make available.

It should be understood that the credibility and good will associated with a brand identity is capital that is built up over time, and in the actual event that capital may have to be depleted. If such good will has to be expended in a particular PSYOP, equivalent capacity should be restored at the earliest opportunity.

3.4 Measures of Effectiveness

- **Receivability:** How well did the physical message propagate to the intended area?
  - Could it be jammed?
- **Receipt:** How often did members of the target audience tune in to the message?
  - Did they have the right receivers? Could they read? Did they read and speak the language, dialect, and argot in which the message was framed?
- **Receptivity:** How favorably did the target audience respond to the message?
  - Did they change their behavior in a favorable direction? Did it matter?

Issues of receivability are the proximal cause of this Task Force study -- that is, Congressional interest in whether *Commando Solo* was sufficiently capable of propagating the desired media to the desired areas, or whether an improved platform were justified. Answers to questions about receivability are generally found in the physics of the situations -- broadcasts should be higher in the air, higher in the spectrum, higher in power, and so on. This being so, the modeling and simulation to forecast receivability is a reasonably well-established art. Moreover, simple physical measurements in the field can unambiguously answer the question of receivability -- although this is not always immediately feasible in denied areas.

The actual reception -- as opposed to the predicted "hearability" -- needs to be measured in the field, either directly or indirectly. This is necessary in the short term to improve the particular PSYOP. It is necessary in the longer term to refine the modeling and simulation tools to better reflect field conditions.

Of critical interest is the question of how favorably those in the target audience who received the message reacted. The bottom line, of course, is did they change their behavior in the desired way -- that is, did it matter? There is a need for behavioral modeling and simulation research. Again, field measurement is the ultimate test and is necessary to calibrate any models and validate any focus group pre-testing that may have been employed.

The Task Force recognizes that research in this area is most likely to be problematic. Notwithstanding, *the Task Force believes that DARPA should be encouraged to consider favorably any research that may further the goal of developing practical measures of effectiveness.*

CHAPTER 4

Future Trends in Media Creation and Dissemination

4.1 Introduction

The Task Force recognizes that the technological revolution currently transforming the TV and radio industries, telephony, and networking will assuredly have major effects on PSYOP content and dissemination. These three types of technology -- previously quite distinct -- are now rapidly mixing and blurring. Correspondingly, the distinction between *channels* and *content* is coming into much sharper focus since technology now allows one to send virtually any type of content across any type of digital transmission channel. As one simple example, the content of a radio station can now be sent worldwide by the Internet; it no longer relies on transmission through a geographically constrained RF channel. Figure 4.1 shows this revolution in schematic form.



- Telephony
  - Internet PBX's
  - PCs as Telephones
  - Voice over Frame Relay
  - Cable Telephony
- Internet
  - Multimedia Conferencing
  - E-Commerce
- Broadcast Media
  - Internet Radios
  - Web TV

Figure 4.1 Convergence of transmission networks

This chapter provides a brief survey of current mass media trends in these three arenas: TV and radio, telephony, and the Internet. Three major themes will emerge:

- Conventional terrestrial TV and radio are rapidly being rendered obsolete by novel, digital, and "converged" types of media.
- A complex and confusing array of incompatible new technologies is currently being fielded and it is extremely difficult to predict which of these will be successful.
- Broadcasting to mass audiences is quickly being replaced by narrow-casting to much smaller, more targeted audiences, and even by tailoring media streams for individuals.

4.2 Terrestrial TV and Radio

The most important contemporary trend in terrestrial TV broadcasting is the continued, seemingly inexorable cut-over from RF broadcast transmissions to cable systems. This migration is already well-advanced in many parts of the world, and it may even accelerate as cable systems begin to provide a full range of subscriber services, including telephony and high-speed Internet access. At the same time, however, broadcast High-Definition Television (HDTV) is being introduced in a number of incompatible formats across the world. Several less well-known, incompatible forms of digital radio broadcasting are now emerging for terrestrial stations and will likely be widely deployed in the next few years.

4.2.1 Cable TV

Cable TV build-outs are proceeding at very different rates in the different regions of the world, depending on factors such as local regulations and population density. Nonetheless, cable TV is clearly a major factor in television systems worldwide. For example, as shown in figure 4.2, within the next few years, almost 60 million European households will subscribe to cable TV service. The subscriber growth rate has been roughly linear in recent years, but it will likely increase as cable TV systems begin to offer a full range of telecommunications services (such as, telephony and Internet access) through the cable infrastructure.



Figure 4.2 Projected European cable TV penetration (Source: Frost & Sullivan)

Since cable TV offers obvious advantages over broadcast television -- such as excellent reception, an enlarged number of channels, and the possibility of subscription-based premium services -- it is likely to become increasing popular throughout the world as cable plants continue to be built out. The implications for PSYOP and particularly for *Commando Solo* are clear: an ever-increasing number of households worldwide will be unwilling or unable to receive RF broadcast transmissions of TV signals. In addition, U.S. PSYOP will need to compete against a very large menu of commercial TV channels.

4.2.2 High-Definition Television (HDTV)

HDTV is a method of transmitting high-quality TV channels over the existing spectrum allocations for terrestrial RF transmission. As often happens, the Americans, Japanese, and Europeans have settled upon three incompatible formats, in part because of the regions' different TV spectrum allocations. The current Japanese version is analog; the Americans have settled upon a digital transmission method informally termed 8-VSB; and the Europeans prefer another method called COFDM. The technical specifications for these systems are quite complex and each allows a wide range of potential modes; the American version, for instance, allows 18 different transmission formats. Although the U.S. HDTV broadcast system is now nominally operational in at least one station in over 60 percent of the U.S. market, there appear to be recurring doubts as to whether 8-VSB provides adequate viewing quality over an entire coverage area. The FCC has rejected a petition to allow U.S. broadcasters to use COFDM. But even more recently (16 February 2000), the National Broadcasting Corporation's (NBC) Vice President for technical planning and engineering, Peter Smith, raised "extreme concerns" about the performance of 8-VSB based on field trials of both 8-VSB and COFDM. There is also some evidence the 8-VSB will not work with moving receivers (or transmitters) but that COFDM will since the European standard was explicitly designed to service mobile subscribers, such as televisions in cars and buses.

Meanwhile, the U.S. cable TV industry has shown few, if any, signs of interest in deploying a version of HDTV compatible with the U.S. broadcast industry. Rather than aim for a higher quality image in the same bandwidth, they prefer to employ digital techniques to further compress transmissions so that they can provide more channels. The Task Force does not know the plans for digital cable TV outside the United States.

It appears highly likely to this Task Force that broadcast television signals will, over time, transition from analog to digital. At this moment, however, the Task Force doubts that anyone has clear insight into how this transition will unfold, and even whether any of the current HDTV schemes will gain market acceptance in even limited geographic regions.

The implications for PSYOP are thus uncertain. If HDTV becomes widely successful, the PSYOP community would likely need to transition to creating higher quality digital media streams and to distributing them via digital broadcasts. Depending on the media encoding, such transmissions may be technically infeasible from moving platforms such as *Commando Solo*. Furthermore, the HDTV standards worldwide appear to be as fragmented as the current analog standards (NTSC, PAL, SECAM), so that PSYOP would need multiple HDTV systems in order to service all parts of the world.

4.2.3 Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB)

Several efforts are currently under way to introduce a digital form of standard terrestrial radio stations. Since these new methods are digital, they are of course incompatible with

existing *Commando Solo* equipment. Outside the United States – primarily in Europe, Canada, and Australia – there is great interest in an L-band system called Eureka-147. Within the United States, at least two incompatible systems are being tested in the conventional AM and FM bands. One of these systems is now gathering increased attention worldwide for the AM bands.

Eureka-147. This European-designed system will operate in either the L-Band (1452-1492 MHz) or Band III (around 221 MHz). It operates at 224 kilobits per second with Musicam audio coding. Standardization is being carried out through the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) on behalf of two trade organizations[3]. Figure 4.3 shows how a Eureka-147 receiver splits its received bit stream into both compressed music and an overlaid data stream that contains such information as song titles, performers' names, and so forth.



Figure 4.3 Conceptual schematic for DAB receiver

American DAB Systems. The Eureka-147 system has been rejected for use in the United States since its L-band spectrum is reserved for telemetry. Instead, two incompatible U.S. schemes[4] have been proposed for use in the current AM and FM bands. Both schemes preserve the existing analog stations but also overlay new, higher quality digital versions in the same bands. The FCC is well under way to approving these systems.

The U.S. System Worldwide – Digital Radio Mondiale. The U.S., legacy-compatible approach to DAB has proved appealing enough that it is now being pursued worldwide under the auspices of a consortium known as the Digital Radio Mondiale[5] (DRM). DRM's goal is to develop a standard for digital broadcasting in the AM bands below 30 MHz. DRM has lodged its proposal for a digital standard with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and aims to start broadcasting in late 2001, with receivers entering the marketplace at about the same time.

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[3] The World Forum for Digital Audio Broadcasting (www.worlddab.org) and the Eureka 147 Consortium (www.eurekadab.org).

[4] One is proposed by USA Digital Radio (www.usadr.com), the other by Lucent (www.lucent.com).

[5] Web site (www.drm.org).

4.3 Satellite TV and Radio

The Task Force notes that space-based TV and radio systems are already widely deployed throughout the world and they too are beginning a transition to digital formats. This section provides a very brief sampling of current trends in satellite dissemination systems. Such systems are proving extremely popular in the developing world since they can be rolled out very quickly and cheaply.

These satellite systems pose several technical challenges for a mobile PSYOP dissemination platform such as *Commando Solo*. First, the media encodings are digital, and sometimes proprietary, and often encrypted. Thus, they cannot be serviced by *Commando Solo's* current transmission suite. Second, the receivers employ satellite dishes pointed to specific slots in geosynchronous orbits. It will not be easy for a platform such as *Commando Solo* to transmit in such a way that it can be received in these dishes. Third, the satellite systems operate on a variety of bands (L, C, Ku) not currently supported by *Commando Solo*.

Satellite TV. Although U.S. viewers are perhaps most familiar with U.S. systems such as DirecTV, a great many non-U.S. systems currently provide service to other parts of the world. This section briefly discusses one representative system, AsiaSat[6], which should provide an adequate illustration of the competition that *Commando Solo* is now encountering. AsiaSat currently operates three satellites using both the C and Ku bands. Figure 4.4 shows the footprint for its geosynchronous AsiaSat 2 satellite.



Figure 4.4 AsiaSat 2 TV and radio coverage in C and Ku bands

The AsiaSat 2 channels are broadcast in several different digital encodings. One common encoding is MPEG-2/DVB, QPSK modulation, symbol rate: 4.42 Msym/sec, FEC: ¾. It is instructive to peruse the TV and radio channel listings for the AsiaSat 2 C-

[6] Web site: www.asiasat.com.

band[7], as it shows the very wide variety of programming already available to developing-world subscribers. This one band provides at least 25 TV channels and a number of radio channels from a variety of sources around the world. Similar menus are provided for AsiaSat 2 Ku-band and AsiaSat 3 C-band. Consumers in these regions can thus receive quite a wide and entertaining mix of TV and radio channels through typical 18" satellite dishes.

Satellite Radio. The Task Force received a briefing from WorldSpace Corp.[8] on its new satellite radio system, which is currently well on its way to becoming operational. Accordingly, this section discusses the system as an example of satellite radio. WorldSpace does, however, have competitors in the satellite radio business[9]. Figure 4.5 shows the beam footprint for Worldspace's AfriStar satellite alongside a Hitachi-built receiver for WorldSpace broadcasts. Corresponding satellites for Asia and South America will be launched mid- and late-2000.



Figure 4.5 AfriStar satellite coverage and satellite radio receiver

The WorldSpace system is fully digital and transmits a number of stations simultaneously in the L-band. Each station is a separate audio stream encoded in a variant of MPEG-3 audio. Different streams can be sent at different bit-rates; each stream occupies some multiple of 16 Kbps in the overall TDMA plan. Stations can switch encodings "on the fly" so that a number of language-specific commercials can be embedded in the same program by encoding each of the commercials at a lower rate than the overall rate for that station. The total number of channels thus depends on the exact coding rates chosen for each channel, though there will likely be more than 25 channels in each satellite beam.

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[7] Saudi (TV and 2 x radio), Myanmar TV, Chinese provincial TV (Guangxi, Shaanxi, Anhui, Jiangsu, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Henan, Qinghai, Fujian, Jiangxi, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, Guangdong, Hunan, Hubei), Papua New Guinea TV, Egyptian Space Channel, Fashion TV, RTPi TV, Antena 1 Radio, Sky Channel, TVSN, Voice of America, Worldnet, Reuters TV, BBC, AP Television News, Voice of America, Worldnet, CCTV - Channel 4, Deutsche Welle TV and Radio, French TV5, TVE Internacional of Spain , MCM France, RAI International Italy, Radio Finland YLE, Radio France Internationale, Radio Netherlands - de Wereldomroep, World Radio Network, Radio Canada International, Swiss Radio International, Radio Exterior de Espana.

[8] Worldspace Corp. web site: www.worldspace.com.

[9] For instance Sirius Radio (www.siriusradio.com) has targeted U.S. consumers for a fee-based system in alliance with various car manufacturers.

Since the WorldSpace system is fully digital, it will convey data in addition to the audio streams. At the very least this will include the names of the songs and performers. WorldSpace Corp. also expects to transmit Internet web content via this means, though the Task Force believes that their system capacity may be somewhat too low for this to be commercially feasible.

Taken as a whole, increasing market penetration for satellite TV and radio poses two distinct problems for U.S. PSYOP. A narrow, technical problem is that U.S. forces have no available means to disseminate their PSYOP content to households that rely upon satellite services. In particular, the *Commando Solo* aircraft cannot provide this function for the variety reasons listed at the start of this section. A much wider problem, however, is that the PSYOP message now needs to compete against a very rich entertainment menu. As a result, it will become increasingly difficult for the PSYOP community to acquire "mindshare" in its target audiences.

On the other hand, as satellite systems become highly subscribed in one or more regions of the world, they offer an appealing medium for PSYOP dissemination since a single system generally offers full continental coverage at relatively modest cost. The insertions of PSYOP "commercials" and "specials" into existing, branded channels could prove a highly effective, and cost-effective, means for disseminating PSYOP content. Here DoD might wish to become an "anchor tenant" within new systems in order to ensure that such channels exist and are available for DoD use.

4.4 Media Trends in Telephony

As will be discussed, wireless telephony is very rapidly being built out across the world, and there is great interest in evolving cellular telephony systems into multimedia systems by providing higher data rates and non-voice services. This would then allow cellular systems to be used for dissemination of TV, radio, and web content. On a parallel, but unrelated, front the tight integration of computers with fax and voice dial-out systems has begun to allow widespread and economical delivery of voice and graphic messages through the public telephone system. Both these trends offer some promise as new ways to disseminate PSYOP content.

Cellular, PCS, and Wireless Local Loop. Both the developed and developing worlds are building out wireless telephony infrastructures very quickly. It is, however, difficult to provide aggregate worldwide growth figures since commercial market intelligence is generally carried out country by country. Table 4.1 shows a typical projection. Similar growth rates are expected for large areas of South America and Asia. Unfortunately, the technology base for wireless telephony is fragmented among a number of incompatible schemes (GSM, CDMA, TDMA, and various wireless local loop technologies). This makes it impossible to create a universal wireless telephony solution that is applicable worldwide.

Year	Subscriptions (000s)	Revenues ($ millions)	Revenue Growth Rate (%)
1994	423.0	464.5	---
1995	1,313.5	1,407.2	202.9
1996	2,580.4	2,337.4	66.1
1997	4,414.0	4,048.0	73.2
1998	7,798.7	5,302.4	31.0
1999	12,086.4	7,215.6	36.1
2000	14,987.1	7,658.4	6.1
2001	18,134.4	8,559.4	11.8
2002	20,220.8	9,159.6	7.0
2003	22,060.9	10,147.5	10.8
2004	23,891.8	11,682.6	15.1

Table 4.1 Cellular / PCS subscriber and revenue forecasts for Brazil, 1994-2004 (Source: Frost & Sullivan)

Data-Enabled Cellular Systems. Cellular equipment manufacturers and service providers are currently rolling out data services as fast as possible. A confused assortment of protocols are currently vying for market share -- representative examples include Short Messaging Service (SMS), General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Wireless Access Protocol (WAP), Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD), and others. Some of these are directly Internet-compatible, while others require gateways to the Internet. None has significant market share yet, although the only really widely available system, NTT DoCoMo in Japan, currently claims a million subscribers for its cellular data system with 40,000 new customers being added each month.



Figure 4.7 Emerging trends in wireless telephony (cell-phone) technology

As consumer interest in data service increases, today's cellular systems will need significant overhauls in order to efficiently provide high-bandwidth data services. Figure 4.7 pictures something like the current state of the art on the left, namely simple text messaging, and the hoped-for future to its right, namely full motion video and web browsing. The exact path by which current cellular systems will evolve to these future so-called "3G" systems is by no means evident. A number of potential migration paths have been proposed and a variety of incompatible upgrades are now being fielded. It is unclear to this Task Force when, and indeed if, these hoped-for upgrades will actually transform the voice cellular system into a data-centric system.

Computer Telephony Integration (CTI) – Automated Call-Out and Fax Broadcasts. For some years, computers have been tightly integrated with telephony systems in large call centers (for example, for telemarketing). Such systems combine the database functions of computers with voice and/or fax systems in a number of ways. Such systems can, of course, be used for delivery of arbitrary voice and graphic messages, either by call-in (where the other end places the call) or by call-out. In the most extreme form, CTI systems are used for voice and/or fax broadcast. Here, a single voice or fax message is delivered to a potentially unlimited number of recipients. In essence, an operator provides a voice recording or file containing a fax document, together with a list of thousands or tens of thousands of phone numbers, and the computers place a number of calls one after another to deliver the message to each of its intended recipients. Since the computer can tell whether a message has been fully delivered or not, it can keep placing a call or sending a fax until it has been successfully delivered. The computers can also distinguish a human respondent from a fax machine, and deliver a voice message to the former but a graphic document to the latter.

Such voice and fax broadcasts can be implemented in-house or out-sourced to any of a number of companies. Simple arithmetic shows the potential PSYOP impact of such technology. If each call takes 30 seconds, a single calling interface can place two messages per minute, or 120 per hour. Ganging 100 such interfaces can thus deliver 12,000 messages per hour, which can accommodate a mid-size town. In addition, international phone rates are falling rapidly; at today's best consumer rate of 10 cents per international minute, such a fax or voice message broadcast costs only $1,200. This rate is likely to plummet in the near future as additional capacity comes online.

4.5 The Internet

The Internet is, of course, the dominant feature of the "new media" in our time. However, since it is large and highly decentralized, there are no definitive measures of its actual size or growth rate. For this study, the Task Force has relied on the most recently published figures (December 1999) from Telcordia's Dr. Christian Huitema, a well-respected researcher who produces monthly estimates[10]. Overall Dr. Huitema estimates the total number of Internet users at somewhere between 295.0 and 398.8 million, though

[10] ftp://ftp.telcordia.com/pub/huitema/stats/dec99.html

of course this number is very hard to pin down. He further estimates that 78.9 million computers were directly attached to the Internet in December 1999, which is an annual increase of 36 million computers (84 percent) from the estimate of 42.9 million computers in December 1998. This figure represents those computers listed in the global Domain Name Service, and hence it represents only a subset of all computers that can access the Internet. For example, it does not include most home computers that connect via dial-in lines. The regional breakdown of Dr. Huitema's figures is as follows: United States, 60.7 percent; Europe, 24.2 percent; Asia, 12.2 percent; Latin America, 2.3 percent; and Africa, 0.7 percent. Note that even the relatively low percentage for Africa represents over half a million computers.

Web Sites. Web sites are so widely known that this report shall skip all discussion of them except to briefly remark that they are quite suitable for dissemination of PSYOP content.

Email. Email is probably the predominant means of communication for Internet consumers and could also be an excellent medium for PSYOP. It would be rather easy to find a large number of email addresses for users in a country, and then begin to send them email. This can be blocked, but such blocking is generally done by the receiving organization rather than by the service provider. Hence, one might expect a rather porous barrier to unsolicited email into a country. This email could of course contain images and sounds in addition to text. If desired, each message could be tailored to an individual recipient, thus providing some rough form of geographic tailoring and helping to keep opposing authorities somewhat in the dark about what everyone is receiving.

Chat Rooms and Messaging. Internet chat rooms may also have potential PSYOP uses, in that "guided discussions" could perhaps be used to influence how citizens think about certain topics. This example is already in practical use with the candidates in the U.S. presidential elections. China has begun to set up monitored chat rooms so its citizens can discuss a wide range of matters. In the Chinese approach, offending messages are deleted before, or just after, they have been sent to everyone. Such chat rooms might be a way to allow citizens of a country to air their grievances. While the originating point of a chat message is not hard to discover, there are ways around such monitoring. In China, for instance, a great many chat messages come from Internet cafes, and so cannot be traced back to specific people.

4.5.1 New Forms of Wireless Internet Access

The first "pure Internet" wireless networks are just beginning to emerge within the United States. Such networks are entirely designed for Internet devices; they are technically quite different from telephony systems, which have had the primary design goal of carrying human speech. Figure 4.8 shows a typical wireless Internet device (Palm VII™) side by side with a network schematic for the Ricochet™ network by Metricom[11]. The Task Force does not have detailed market estimates for wireless Internet access, but Killen & Associates has forecast a 71 percent compound annual growth rate for this

[11] Metricom web site: www.metricom.com.

market, from $1.3 billion in 1998 to $19.2 billion in 2002. These figures include access through cellular systems as well as "pure Internet" systems.



Figure 4.8 Wireless Internet devices and metropolitan wireless Internets

At present, Ricochet™ is the only wireless Internet suitable for hand-held or vehicle-mounted devices and operational on a metropolitan level. It operates solely within the United States. The current Ricochet™ network covers the San Francisco bay area, Seattle, and Washington, DC, as well as a number of U.S. airports. It employs a proprietary frequency-hopping radio that operates in the ISM band. Within the past year, however, Metricom has had a significant infusion of funds ($1.2 billion) in order to build out a higher speed version of this network across all major U.S. cities. When operational, this network will provide relatively high-speed (128 Kbps) and secure Internet access to any device that has a Metricom modem. Interestingly, these networks are much cheaper to build than those based upon cellular telephony technology, yet they will likely provide noticeably higher performance.

Since both the Internet and mobile wireless fields are extremely active and well-funded at the moment, the Task Force expects that a number of other companies will also begin to build out such networks in the coming year or two. At present there are some regulatory barriers to building such networks in various parts of the world (particularly Europe and Japan), where lower ceilings on the maximum allowable transmission power make such metropolitan networks economically infeasible. It seems likely, however, that such systems will eventually be built throughout the world.

4.5.2 The Internet and the Coming Impact of Fiber Optics

As interesting as the preceding technologies are, the Task Force believes that by far the most important technology driver for the next decade will be the extremely high-bandwidth fiber optic cables across which the Internet will run. Everything described above is an evolution of existing technology. The coming ultra-high-speed Internet technology, however, will be completely revolutionary. As a result, it is exceedingly

hard to predict. But a glance at figure 4.9 shows the magnitude of the changes that are almost literally on today's doorstep.



Figure 4.9 The build-out of extraordinary Internet bandwidth in the suburban United States

Figure 4.9 shows a typical Boston suburban street with a 288-fiber cable pulled by RCN Corp. during 1999 to provide a new residential communications infrastructure. Running with current top-of-the-line commercial equipment, this cable provides full-duplex bandwidth of about 23 terabits to a small region of the town. Broken down by household, that comes to more than 10 gigabits/second per house. Translating that bandwidth into TV and radio shows the extent of this revolution. A single HDTV channel occupies something less than 20 megabits/second. Thus, a given household could have as many as 500 HDTV channels streaming into it simultaneously -- with *none* of these channels shared with any other house in the town. Obviously, no house is going to receive 500 TV stations simultaneously, so if indeed the bandwidth is ever fully used, it will be used by something other than TV or radio. Thus far, of course, the driver has been the Internet, with its seemingly insatiable appetite for bandwidth.

Surprising as it may seem, the developing world probably will not lag terribly far behind the United States in Internet build-out. Today, for instance, although less than 5 percent of China's small companies have ever used Internet services, Frost & Sullivan estimates that over 50 percent are likely to go online within the next five years. Figure 4.10 shows projected annual sales of fiber optic cabling worldwide. The yearly production (and deployment) of fiber is expected to nearly double between 2000 and 2006.



Figure 4.10 Projected worldwide market for fiber optic cables (Source: Frost & Sullivan)

As can be seen from table 4.2, the highest growth rates for fiber optic cabling occur outside North America and Europe. In particular, the least developed parts of the world are projected to have compound annual growth rates (CAGR) of over 50 percent, though of course from a very small base.

Year	North America ($ millions)	Europe ($ millions)	Asia Pacific ($ millions)	Latin America ($ millions)	Rest-of-world ($ millions)
1996	1,582.9	1,039.7	739.2	89.8	2.6
1997	1,681.2	1,228.8	895.8	154.6	3.4
1998	1,800.0	1,433.8	1,053.0	188.2	5.7
1999	1,856.0	1,650.9	1,255.7	230.1	10.0
2000	1,839.4	1,872.4	1,503.4	269.8	22.0
2001	1,826.1	2,002.1	1,790.3	316.3	32.8
2002	1,778.3	2,103.4	2,084.3	363.3	44.6
2003	1,794.7	2,189.4	2,283.7	404.2	64.7
2004	1,762.1	2,278.7	2,491.0	452.9	92.0
2005	1,784.1	2,213.4	2,746.4	510.8	148.1
2006	1,788.2	2,158.2	2,998.4	562.7	200.4
CAGR 1999-2006	(0.5)%	3.9%	13.2%	13.6%	53.4%

Table 4.2 Total fiber optic cable market: revenue forecasts, 1996-2006 (Source: Frost & Sullivan)

Even in the next few years, the Internet is likely to have a major impact on the distribution of radio and TV content within the United States and, a little later, in other parts of the world. Indeed, this process has already begun, though it is currently hampered by the very low bandwidth available in typical homes (53 thousand bits/second at most).

Internet Radio Stations. In recent years there has been an explosive growth of radio stations transmitting real-time audio streams through the Internet. One MIT database records more than 9,000 radio stations transmitting through the Internet[12]. Any of these stations can be heard anywhere in the world by anyone who has a cheap PC and an Internet connection. The list of stations already available online is perhaps even more interesting than the sheer number of such stations[13].

Internet TV Stations. More surprisingly, a number of TV stations are already transmitting through the Internet even though the typical household bandwidths are not yet high enough for satisfactory TV quality. A quick search of one vendor's web site[14] found 85 TV stations broadcasting through the Internet. Transmissions originate in such countries as Brazil, Cyprus, Peru, Russia, Bahrain, Korea, Philippines, Slovenia, Croatia, and India. The Task Force expects the number of such stations to grow very rapidly once cable modems, ADSL, and other high-speed consumer Internet technologies have reached a critical mass.

Audio and Video On Demand. Of course it is a mistake to conceive of the Internet only as a replacement of conventional radio and TV stations. Even when restricting the discussion to only audio and video media, the Internet brings the enormous advantage of being able to supply media clips on demand. Thus, it is rapidly emerging as an important distribution medium for popular music and, in time, it will likely be a prevalent means for distributing video products. Table 4.3, which forecasts the number of free Internet audio players that will be downloaded in the coming years, gives some notion of the projected size of these markets. At present, Internet audio companies offer promotional audio files in order to entice users to use their software products. These free audio files also attract end users to purchase the full CD of the featured artist. By 2001, a wide variety of popular music content is expected to become available and the number of paid audio files is projected to rise to 28 percent of total audio downloads. By 2005, 52 percent of audio downloads are expected to be paid for, while 48 percent of audio downloads are projected to be free and used for promotional purposes.

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[12] MIT Internet radio web site: http://wmbr.mit.edu/stations/.

[13] Lists of countries taken at random, with the number of online radio stations in each country. Papua New Guinea (4), Kazakhstan (4), Kyrgyzstan (3), Philippines (30), Mongolia (2), Lebanon (10), Iran (1), Ghana (10), Madagascar (2), Saint Helena (1), and South Africa (30).

[14] Web site: www.real.com.

Year	Units (millions)	Unit growth rate (%)
1995	0	---
1996	0	---
1997	5.8	---
1998	39.5	581
1999	43.4	10
2000	53.8	24
2001	65.1	21
2002	84.7	30
2003	96.4	14
2004	102.5	6
2005	126.3	23

Table 4.3 Forecast of free Internet audio player downloads, 1995-2005 (Source: Frost & Sullivan)

Trends in Personalization of Web Pages and Media Streams. Internet radio and TV stations will be further distinguished from their classic predecessors in that they will be highly personalized. The preferences of each customer will be maintained in a database and the media stream flowing to that customer will be tailored accordingly. Each customer will receiver his or her own personalized stream of media content and commercials, targeted as carefully as the media supplier can manage. The first results of this technology are already widely deployed in personalized web pages and Internet storefronts. A "My Yahoo" page, for example, contains content tailored for the individual consumer, and the Amazon.com online store records previous purchases in an attempt to suggest tempting new offerings when a consumer re-appears. In a sense, such technology takes "narrow-casting" to an extreme -- it is precisely the *opposite* of broadcasting.

4.6 Other Media

A number of other media types, and means of dissemination, are also widely popular. Video games are perhaps the most popular. They can be disseminated by a number of techniques, ranging from diskettes to web downloads. Internet games allow a number of geographically dispersed players to participate in a large, shared virtual space. Web animations are also popular, as are Java applets. Other important media at this moment include CDs, CD-ROMs, and DVDs. All are suitable for PSYOP in some situations.

4.7 Summary of Media Content and Dissemination Channels

Table 4.4 shows a number of potential types of content (columns) and how such content can be mapped onto a variety of channels (rows). Those intersections marked with a "Y" are those in which a given type of content can be carried via a given medium. Shaded

areas indicate content that can be created and disseminated by traditional PSYOP. Only a very small subset of the potential types of content fall into this category.

Channel / Content	Broad cast?	Video	Audio	Text / Photo	Short Message	Interactive Voice	Interactive Web	Video Game
Radio								
AM / FM	Y		Y					
Shortwave	Y		Y					
Digital	Y		Y		Y			
Satellite	Y		Y					
Television								
VHF / UHF	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			
Cable	a	Y	Y	Y	Y			
HDTV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			
Satellite	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			
Internet								
Classic Web	b			Y	Y		Y	Y
Streaming Media	b	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y
Email	c	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y
Chat / Messaging	d				Y		Y	
Telephony								
PSTN			Y			Y		
Cellular	e		Y		Y	Y		
Satellite	e		Y		Y	Y		
Fax	c			Y	Y			
Paging	f				Y			
Physical Media								
Leaflet				Y	Y			
Cassette			Y					
CD			Y					
CD-ROM		Y	Y	Y				Y

Table 4.4 Content types and distribution channels

Notes:
a. Cable is typically transmitted through coaxial cables. This would make it hard to insert content without permission from the cable's operator. Some parts of cable distribution systems are microwaves, however. In addition, some distribution to users is via RF (for example, MMDS and LMDS in the United States).
b. Although these media appear to be broadcast, in fact they are implemented by a number of individual sessions much like individual phone calls. These individual sessions are generally traceable by the operators of the local Internet service; hence, privacy cannot be guaranteed. In addition, entire web site addresses can be blocked rather easily by a local Internet service.
c. These media can be broadcast by the repeated sending of the messages to individual destinations. Since this is automated, it takes little trouble, but it does take a certain amount of transmission capacity to send so many duplicated messages. In addition, these transmissions can easily be monitored and/or blocked by the local Internet and telephone service providers
d. As with the classic web, these features are easily monitored and/or blocked, assuming that the local Internet service provider can determine the addresses of the chat / messaging sites.
e. Basic cellular and satellite telephone service is one-to-one rather than broadcast. However there might be certain features of some cellular technology that would allow insertion of broadcast messages (audio or text).
f. Basic paging service is one-to-one rather than broadcast. However many pager technologies include groups (for example, for stock market or news updates). These could probably be used for short message delivery.

4.8 Findings

The following are the Task Force's findings on current and future trends in media creation and dissemination.

Fundamental Changes in Media and its Dissemination. The Internet is the most obvious sign of media change, but in fact change is occurring on all fronts. Conventional terrestrial broadcast of TV and radio grows ever less important as consumers switch to cable and direct-to-the-home satellite. Geographic broadcasting is breaking down as satellites broadcast TV and radio channels worldwide. Many thousands of radio stations are now broadcasting through the Internet. And web sites are rapidly becoming a new and as-yet unknown blend of media sites, newspapers, and discussion forums.

Unstable, Rapidly Changing Technology. The worlds of media content and media dissemination are currently in a state of extraordinary flux. Technological innovations are occurring at a rapid pace and impacting deeply enough to fundamentally alter the structure of the world economy. The stable world of conventional broadcast TV and radio is rapidly vanishing and in its place a large variety of new and incompatible technologies are being fielded around the world. No one can tell which, if any, of these new technologies will emerge victorious. But it seems evident that this unstable, rapidly changing environment is likely to last for years or perhaps even decades.

Narrow-casting. All current media trends lead away from the old broadcasting model in which a large number of consumers all receive a relatively small number of widely shared content streams and toward a tightly targeted narrow-casting model. At present, many consumers have hundreds of media channels at their fingertips. Very quickly, even the narrow-casting model will be superceded as media streams are specifically designed for individual consumers. Very large consumer databases will ensure that each consumer receives a stream of images, sounds, and advertisements that are aimed precisely at his or her taste.

Based on these trends, the traditional use of TV and radio broadcasts from an airborne platform (*Commando Solo*) is becoming a less effective method to disseminate PSYOP products in a tactical setting. Consumers in many parts of the world have access to a very wide range of media -- indeed, many may not even be able to receive *Commando Solo* broadcasts of UHF and VHF TV because they have cable or satellite TVs. The consumer's center of gravity is rapidly shifting to the Internet. Broadcasting is no longer how the media works. Instead, everything is becoming more tightly focused as the number of distinct media channels grows ever larger.

CHAPTER 5

FM and TV Broadcast from Aircraft

5.1 FM and TV Broadcast from Aircraft

A critical element of tactical PSYOP has been radio and TV broadcasts from a standoff airborne platform. Transmissions from aircraft altitudes offer an advantage over terrestrial transmissions because obstacles standing between transmitter and receiver in terrestrial transmissions -- such as vegetation, buildings, and terrain -- attenuate transmitted signals and degrade reception. For this reason, aircraft allow access to relatively large areas. The effective range of a transmitter generally improves with altitude, but it is subject to frequency-dependent absorption, reflection, and diffraction. In addition to the broad coverage made possible by altitude, an aircraft broadcast platform can be deployed anywhere on the globe and begin operating in a short amount of time. An element of survivability is also gained over fixed or even portable terrestrial stations.

Radio broadcasts occur in HF, VHF, or UHF. Commercial and government-sponsored radio broadcasters transmit amplitude modulated (AM) signals in the so-called AM band (535 to 1700 kHz) and in any of several short-wave (SW) bands ranging from about 2.3 MHz to 22 MHz. Frequency Modulated (FM) radio broadcasts occupy the FM band, which spans 88 MHz to 108 MHz. TV broadcasts, because of their much higher bandwidth, are confined to VHF and UHF in several TV bands: 54 to 72 and 76 to 88 MHz (VHF-L), 174 to 216 MHz (VHF-H), and 470 to 608 and 614 to 806 MHz (UHF).

The *Commando Solo* aircraft is the only current airborne asset equipped for broadcast PSYOP. A fleet of six EC-130E *Commando Solo* aircraft are operated by a reserve unit. Each is equipped with radio and TV transmitters covering HF, VHF, and UHF commercial and military bands and a variety of other equipment needed to broadcast messages in audio and video formats. The aircraft have six 1-kW transmitters -- two for VHF-L, two for VHF-H, and two for UHF -- and one 10-kW power amplifier that can be operated on VHF or UHF. Separate antennas for VHF-L, VHF-H, and UHF run along each side of the aircraft. Providing 6 to 9 dB gain, these antennas must be switched when the aircraft turns along a typical racetrack pattern. The received signal is degraded or lost during turns. When operated, *Commando Solo* transmitters saturate the front-ends of onboard communications and navigation equipment -- a problem that should be addressed and resolved with high priority.

The effective range of a broadcast transmitter is governed primarily by antenna height, effective radiated power (transmitted power multiplied by antenna gain), transmitted frequency, and receiver noise characteristics. Though the details of governing relationships are complex and usually treated by computer models, simple rules can be applied to predict overall performance.

The distance from the antenna to the earth's horizon is a very important parameter. For an idealized, spherical earth, this distance is the square root of two times the geometric

mean of antenna height and earth radius. This distance, d, scales as the square root of antenna height,

$$d = \sqrt{2 \cdot h_T \cdot R_0},$$

where h_T is the transmitter antenna height and R_0 is the earth's radius. Increased antenna height improves range, but doubling the height (an ambitious proposition) increases range by only about 40 percent.

For a spherical earth, a clear line of sight exists between the transmitter and a receiver antenna on the earth's surface inside this distance. Raising the receiver antenna increases the line-of-sight range by a term identical to the above equation, so the line-of-sight range becomes

$$d = \sqrt{2 \cdot h_T \cdot R_0} + \sqrt{2 \cdot h_R \cdot R_0},$$

where h_R is the receiver antenna height. The second term in this equation is dominated by the first when h_T is an aircraft altitude. Terrain, surface material properties, vegetation, and atmospheric conditions all influence the "actual" line-of-sight range; however, as a general rule, higher transmitter and receiver antennas imply greater range and the situation improves as the square root of height of either receiver or transmitter. Table 5.1 serves as an illustrative example where the receiver antenna is assumed at zero height.

Approx. antenna height (kft)	Range to horizon (mi)	Platform
1	39	Typical TV antenna tower
20	174	EC-130E,EC130J
40	245	Widebody aircraft (eg. Boeing 767)
60	301	Global Hawk, Gulfstream

Table 5.1 Antenna height and range to horizon

Table 5.1 shows that a receiver with clear line of sight to a 1,000 ft tower 39 miles distant would also have a clear line of sight to an EC-130E at about 20,000 ft and 174 miles distant. This table and the preceding equation can be used to roughly estimate effective transmitter range so long as transmitted power is sufficient for line-of-sight communications, or sufficient to overcome so-called R-squared losses. The point is that beyond ranges shown in table 5.1, signals begin degrading in a different way (a higher power of range or even exponentially) and much more rapidly with increased range.

Table 5.2 lists distances typical of operational constraints placed on an airborne broadcast system.

Target audience	Aircraft location	Distance (mi)
Belgrade	Hungarian border	100
Belgrade	Romanian border	50
Baghdad	Saudi border	250
Teheran	Persian Gulf	>300
Teheran	Turkey border	>300
Pyongyang	Korean Sea	40-50
Pyongyang	DMZ	80-100
CINC requirement for radio and TV		**300**

Table 5.2 Operational constraints on airborne broadcasts

Comparing the two tables above, it becomes clear that the current Commando Solo aircraft, the EC-130E, is inadequate for many scenarios even in an idealized situation. Given the real-world issues of obscuration by terrain, vegetation, and buildings, plus the need to fly somewhat behind a political border in order to avoid surface-to-air threats, it is clear why Commando Solo is most effective when transmitting into island or littoral nations. It is also worth noting that the CINC requirement for a 300 mile range may not be large enough to address several important scenarios.

The EC-130E platform currently used for Commando Solo flies at 18,000 feet. There is interest in cross-decking the existing Special Mission Equipment (SME) to an EC-130J platform that would fly at 24,000 feet. This increase in altitude would have only a marginal impact on Commando Solo performance and the Task Force is concerned that the SME hardware represents very old technology and thus projects major weight, size, and power restrictions on any platform that carries the current hardware. The Task Force is also concerned that the debate has focused on the platform and not the payload -- the critical information transport mechanisms in support of PSYOP missions.

Effective radiated power is another important parameter determining broadcast range. When transmitter and receiver antennas are within line of sight, the received signal scales inversely with the range squared -- doubling the range requires four times the power to maintain the same signal quality. Beyond line of sight, this relationship becomes much more complicated. Absorption, scattering, diffraction, and reflection of energy from the transmitter are a strong function of frequency and can vary considerably with time of day, time of year, and even solar activity. Table 5.3 provides a qualitative summary of these effects.

Transmission type	Frequency range (MHz)	Band	Beyond LOS propagation
AM radio	0.535 - 1.7	AM	Reception beyond LOS due to diffraction; much longer range at night due to ionospheric reflection, some variation with season and sunspot cycle
FM radio	88 - 108	FM	Degraded reception beyond LOS; some absorption in foliage and other obstacles; some seasonal variation with foliage
TV	54 - 88	VHF-L	Degraded reception beyond LOS; some absorption in foliage and other obstacles; some seasonal variation with foliage
TV	174-220	VHF-H	More degraded reception beyond LOS; more absorption in foliage and other obstacles; some seasonal variation with foliage
TV	470 - 800	UHF	Highly degraded reception beyond LOS; significant absorption in foliage and other obstacles; more seasonal variation with foliage
Analog and digital telephony	50 - 400	VHF & UHF	Varies with frequency, as described above

Table 5.3 Effectiveness of transmissions from beyond line of sight

The dependence of propagation strength on frequency is also illustrated by typical effective radiated power for U.S. broadcasters: AM radio $\leq$ 20 kW, FM radio $\leq$ 200 kW, VHF TV $\leq$ 300 kW, UHV TV $\leq$ 5 MW. The largest AM radio stations on clear channels reach 1,000 miles or more at night while UHF and VHF TV stations with large antenna towers and high power typically reach 100 miles or less depending strongly on receiver antenna gain and height.

Other important factors determining broadcast range are receiver quality and bandwidth. Receiver quality in the AM band is less important than for VHF and UHF because atmospheric noise tends to dominate signal quality below 30 MHz or so. In the VHF and UHF, however, noise generated by the receiver is important and so newer receivers will tend to be useful with weaker signals. This is particularly true for the UHF. Larger bandwidth implies more receiver noise, so the audio portion of a TV transmission is typically useful beyond the range where the video becomes unacceptable. This effect is, to some extent, a result of the modulation and demodulation techniques used (typically FM for audio and AM for video) and of differences in the way noise is perceived on audio and video information.

Table 5.3 illustrates why *Commando Solo* performance is best for AM radio broadcasts and poorest for UHF TV broadcasts. All *Commando Solo* systems worked well in Haiti, Panama, and Grenada, as would be expected from tables 5.1 and 5.3. Radio broadcasts worked acceptably in Iraq and Kosovo, while TV broadcasts were not satisfactory. During the Kosovo campaign, *Commando Solo* was orbiting at 18,000 to 20,000 ft over Hungary -- about 100 miles from Belgrade. Transmitting 10 kW on UHF channel 21, the video quality was unacceptable while the audio was understandable, again in general agreement with the above discussion even though many details are omitted.

The above discussion and the Kosovo experience can be used to predict, with some confidence, how various options will perform if called upon in future military operations. Table 5.4 summarizes these qualitative predictions assuming a clear channel for each case.

Target audience	AM	FM	VHF TV	UHF TV
Island nations	EC-130	EC-130	EC-130	EC-130
Pyongyang	EC-130	EC-130	EC-130 + ERP, widebody	Widebody
Belgrade	EC-130	EC-130	EC-130 + ERP, widebody	Widebody
Baghdad	EC-130 night, widebody day	Widebody	Widebody + ERP, Global Hawk	Widebody + ERP, Global Hawk
Teheran	EC-130 night, widebody day	Widebody, Global Hawk	Global Hawk	Global Hawk

Table 5.4 Predicted performance of broadcast transmissions in selected operational scenarios

Table 5.4 illustrates the limitations of the EC-130 platform (whether the EC-130E or J variants), attributable primarily to its limited altitude. A widebody platform, flying at 40,000 ft and possibly with 3 to 6 dB additional ERP, would allow radio and TV broadcasts into many additional areas of interest. A Global Hawk UAV platform or a high-altitude unarmed platform flying at 60,000 ft could potentially stand off even further than a widebody; however, issues of payload capacity and flexibility call for careful consideration when comparing the two. At 60,000 ft there is only a 22 percent increase in horizon distance over a widebody (see table 5.1). On the other hand, loss of an unmanned Global Hawk to hostile action is considerably preferable to loss of a manned aircraft.

In the discussions above, a clear channel is assumed -- that is, there is no other radio or TV station transmitting on the frequency in question and there is no jamming. The first of these is a reasonable assumption because it can be safely assumed that several radio and TV channels will be free of existing transmitters even in a dense urban area. The VHF-L TV channels are most desirable for reasons listed in table 5.3, so these will often be occupied, as they are in U.S. urban areas. Next in desirability are the VHF-H channels, and finally the UHF channels, where degradation beyond line of sight is very rapid. Transmissions from *Commando Solo* into Belgrade were confined to UHF because of existing broadcasts into Belgrade and, very importantly, because of potential interference in neighboring countries. Performance deficiencies were clearly exacerbated by operation in UHF.

The question of jamming seems a very important one. If broadcast PSYOP are having a tangible effect on an opponent, then it seems reasonable that jamming will be present. The above discussion illustrates that broadcast quality is marginal in many cases,

especially against sophisticated adversaries including North Korea, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Iran. Given the asymmetries of today's warfare, the placement of jammers on civilian centers would make them quite immune to attack. The very real possibility of broadcast jamming should, therefore, be included in any decision to significantly upgrade system performance.

Several options might be pursued in an effort to maintain the viability of U.S. broadcast PSYOP capabilities. One extreme is to keep the EC-130E fleet and install modest upgrades. This approach does not deny that there are serious inadequacies in the current platform's altitude capability and in the suite of onboard electronics, as demonstrated in Kosovo. However, it does recognize the rapid changes taking place in broadcast telecommunications and expects other broadcast modes to become available and popular in those portions of the world where *Commando Solo* would not perform adequately today, as discussed in chapter 4. Another approach that is currently being studied by DoD is to upgrade and cross-deck current *Commando Solo* equipment to EC-130J aircraft, which have slightly better flight performance and, most likely, lower maintenance costs. On the other end of the spectrum are approaches that would develop a new widebody or even high-altitude UAV (such as Global Hawk), complete with state-of-the-art transmitters and antennas capable of reaching perhaps 300 miles with TV and radio signals -- a large improvement over *Commando Solo* that would, at best, be marginal in Teheran. Such an approach might also require fewer aircraft due to longer endurance.

The Task Force has weighed all of these options and finds that the costs associated with cross-decking the current Commando Solo SME from the EC-130E to the EC-130J platforms (estimated to be about $250 million) are excessive and would not result in substantively improved performance. Furthermore, the trends in future information transport discussed in chapter 4 indicate movement away from TV and radio broadcast in many parts of the world. For these reasons, the Task Force believes that these funds would be better spent for improvements in overall PSYOP capabilities, the utilization of modern media product creation and dissemination capabilities, and the development of modular TV and radio broadcast equipment to allow for their utilization on a variety of platforms.

CHAPTER 6

Recommendations

This DSB Task Force was originally created because of concern over the inability of the *Commando Solo* (EC-130E) aircraft to disseminate TV and radio broadcasts during the recent military operation in the Balkans. The Task Force chose to broaden its charter and address issues associated with PSYOP as part of an overall Information Operations (IO) campaign during peace, crisis, and armed hostilities. The Task Force also evaluated organizational issues associated with PSYOP forces within DoD and addressed issues associated with the PSYOP community's relationship to the Intelligence Community. Of particular interest is the on-going worldwide explosion of information creation and dissemination technologies and capabilities. The Task Force spent considerable effort addressing modern trends in information dissemination and media content creation. With those trends as a backdrop, the Task Force then assessed the viability of the current *Commando Solo* fleet and a variety of options currently being studied by DoD. The following recommendations were derived from all of these considerations.

Recommendation 1

The Task Force recommends that DoD create a PSYOP policy and planning staff, under the coordination authority of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD(SO/LIC)), to ensure the integration of operational- and tactical-level PSYOP with strategic perception-management initiatives and to provide planning support for strategic PSYOP activities.

Recommendation 2

The Task Force recommends that rank structure and career paths within PSYOP forces should be reassessed and more specifically:

- *the senior PSYOP Advisor to the geographical CINCs should be an O-6 or equivalent civilian, and be assigned to the CINC Special Staff, and*
- *the Commander of the Joint PSYOP Task Force supporting the Joint Task Force Commander (typically a three-star flag officer) in theater should also be an O-6.*

Recommendation 3

The Task Force recommends that OASD(SO/LIC) and USSOCOM strive to improve overall product quality through increased reliance on commercial providers for high-quality products. Furthermore, the Task Force recommends that the PSYOP force be adequately resourced and trained to engage a stable of commercial media content providers who can deliver these quality products. The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately $10 million per year.

Recommendation 4

The Task Force recommends that the Defense Intelligence Agency be tasked by the ASD C3I to establish a psychological warfare intelligence element. ASD C3I should be charged to <u>either</u> (a) provide resources to the PSYOP community to implement a robust

organic program of open source acquisition, or (b) task the Intelligence Community to fulfill the need for on-the-shelf, worldwide basic information, including the media and cultural background information necessary to adequately inform PSYOP products in a given country. The Task Force believes that this can be accomplished without incurring an extra budgetary burden.

Recommendation 5

The Task Force recommends that ASD C3I make NFIP/JMIP funds available to USSOCOM for the express purpose of acquiring available data sets, particularly those for countries outside North America and Europe. The Task Force also recommends that CINCSOC work with the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) to ensure the integration of these data sets with the World Basic Information Library (WBIL) and their community-wide accessibility. Moreover, the Intelligence Community should be further tasked through ASD C3I to develop methods and sources to obtain media use demographic information where it is not now available but where the United States might plausibly have future national security interests in which PSYOP might be employed. The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately $5 million per year.

Recommendation 6

The Task Force recommends that OSD work with the Department of State to fund, position, exercise, and maintain suitable distribution channels and brand identities, insofar as these can be reasonably anticipated for future PSYOP requirements. Policies with respect to the use of new and emerging transnational media should be developed and refined. Liberal reliance on recognized professionals and the generous use of highly qualified commercial entities are highly recommended. Buying good content on which the messages will "ride" is a necessary and desirable expenditure. The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately $10 million per year.

Recommendation 7

The Task Force recommends that DoD acquire the technical capability to understand emerging media dissemination techniques and technologies. Furthermore, DoD should provide the resources to acquire (rent or purchase) emerging media content and dissemination channels from commercial organizations. Here, DoD may be able to acquire good channels very cheaply by means of being an "anchor tenant." The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately $10 million per year.

Recommendation 8

The Task Force recommends that DoD maintain the current EC-130E Commando Solo fleet with existing Special Mission Equipment (SME). The estimated cost of $250 million to cross-deck the SME to a EC-130J platform is not justified by the marginal increase in performance offered by this option. In addition, future worldwide media dissemination trends will limit the effectiveness of radio and TV broadcasts. The Task Force recommends that USSOCOM investigate the creation of small and easily reconfigurable information-dissemination packages, compatible with multiple platforms, including UAVs and leased aircraft, for a variety of missions. The Task Force estimates the initial

investment for design and development of these packages to be $10 to $20 million per year.

Recommendation 9

The Task Force has recommended annual funding increases (in recommendations 1 through 8) of approximately $50 million per year. The Task Force believes that this increase would be readily supported by reprogramming the $250 million that would be required to fund cross-decking of the existing Commando SME to the EC-130J platforms.

The prompt and effective use of PSYOP in military operations can avert crises, end wars, and save lives. The Department of Defense should prioritize Psychological Operations appropriately, because the misuse of PSYOP can cause untold damage to military operations. A relatively small investment over time can reap huge rewards for the United States and its allies, both diplomatically and militarily.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

27 October 1999

DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference--Defense Science Board Task Force on the Creation and Dissemination of all Forms of Information in Support of PSYOPS in Time of Military Conflict

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on all forms of information creation and dissemination in support of PSYOPS in times of military conflict. The Task Force is to support the Congressional directive for the Secretary of Defense to examine the creation and dissemination of all forms of information and the adequacy of the capabilities of the United States Armed Forces in this area to deal with situations such as the conflict in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In support of this Congressional direction, the Task Force should:

1. Assess the capabilities of the United States Armed Forces to develop programming and to broadcast factual information that can reach a large segment of the general public in a country like the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

2. Assess the potential of various airborne or land-based mechanisms to have the capabilities described above, including but not limited to desirable improvements to the EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft, and the utilization of other airborne platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, and land-based transmitters in conjunction with satellites;

3. Assess other issues relating to the creation and dissemination of all forms of information in time of conflict, to include satellite broadcasts and the utilization of emerging mobile communication technologies;

The Task Force should provide a progress report by February 1, 2000 to the DoD so that the Secretary of Defense can provide his assessment and recommendations to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2000.

The Task Force will be co-sponsored by the Under Secretary

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations & Low-Intensity Conflict. Mr. Vince Vitto will serve as Chairman of the Task Force. COL Fred Gilbert will serve as Executive Secretary; and CDR Brian Hughes, USN will serve as the DSB Secretariat Representative.

The Task Force shall have access to classified information needed to develop its assessment and recommendations.

The Task Force will be operated in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DoD Directive 5105.4, "The DoD Federal Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of Section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official.

Jacques S. Gansler

Appendix B

TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

Chairman
Vincent Vitto*
C.S. Draper Laboratories

Executive Secretary
Col Fred Gilbert
OASD [SOLIC] PRNA

Members

Jim Babcock
MITRE

Denis Bovin*
Bear Sterns & Co., Inc

Ruth David*
ANSER

Chip Elliott
BBN Technologies

Bran Ferren
Walt Disney Imagineering

Bert Fowler
C.A. Fowler Assoc.

Charlie Hawkins

Peter Marino*

Joe Markowitz

Greg Poe
Logos Technologies

Frank Stech
Mitretek Corp.

Larry Wright
Booz, Allen, & Hamilton

Advisors

LTC Steve Collins
USSOCOM

COL Lawrence D. Dietz
351st Civil Affairs Command

CDR Jeffrey Stratton
USN

Support Staff

CDR Brian Hughes
DSB Office

Melinda K. Baran
SAIC

* Denotes DSB Member

Appendix C

BRIEFERS

Buck Adams
World Space

John Arnold
ANSER

LtCol Eric Weller
193rd Special Operations Wing

LtCol Jim Coffman
SOCOM

Chuck de Caro
AeroBureau

Doug Elwell
4th Psychological Operations Group

LTC Scott Fedorchak
USCENTCOM/CCJ3PI

Mike Furlong
SAIC

Col Fred Goldstein
Chief Psychological Operations Division
Air Intelligence Agency

Paul Kolodzy
DARPA

Bill Malone
FIWC

Col Dusty Rhoads
JCS J39

Richard Shiffrin
Dep Gen Counsel (Intelligence)
DoD General Counsel

MAJ Bill Steinhagen
4th Psychological Operations Group

COL Bob Trost
J39

Graham Turbiville
World Basic Information Library

LTC Brad Ward
4th Psychological Operations Groups

Chuck Williamson
OASD (SO/LIC(SOP))

Appendix D

CONGRESSIONAL LANGUAGE

Public Law 106-65

Title – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000

Subtitle G — Other Matters

Sec. 1061 — Defense Science Board Task Force on Use of Television and Radio as a Propaganda Instrument in Time of Military Conflict

(a) Establishment of Task Force—The Secretary of Defense shall establish a task force of the Defense Science Board to examine—
   (1) the use of radio and television broadcasting as a propaganda instrument in time of military conflict; and
   (2) the adequacy of the capabilities of the Armed Forces to make such uses of radio and television during conflicts such as the conflict in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999.

(b) Duties of Task Force: The task force shall assess and develop recommendations as to the appropriate capabilities, if any, that the Armed Forces should have to broadcast radio and television into a region in time of military conflict so as to ensure that the general public in that region is exposed to the facts of the conflict. In making that assessment and developing those recommendations, the task force shall review the following—
   (1) The capabilities of the Armed Forces to develop programming and to make broadcasts that can reach a large segment of the general public in a country such as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
   (2) The potential of various Department of Defense airborne or land-based mechanisms to have capabilities described in paragraph (1), including improvements to the EC-130 *Commando Solo* aircraft and the use of other airborne platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, and land-based transmitters in conjunction with satellites.
   (3) Other issues relating to he use of television and radio as a propaganda instrument in time of conflict.

(c) Report: The task force shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a report containing its assessments and recommendations under subsection (b) not later than February 1, 2000. The Secretary shall submit the report, together with the comments and recommendations of the Secretary to the congressional defense committees not later than March 1, 2000.

STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

PSYOP OPERATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

BY

GARY L. WHITLEY
Department of the Navy

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

PSYOP Operations in the 21st Century

by

Gary L. Whitley
Department of Navy Civilian

COL James Powers
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Gary L. Whitley

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A revolution in Psychological Operations (PSYOP) will occur in the near future. The Internet will be the vehicle to enable a revolution in PSYOP and improve the capabilities of PSYOP to achieve objectives specified in the National Security Strategy (NSS). The paper is structured to support this thesis by first providing a detailed definition and description of PSYOP. Next the importance of communication techniques in developing PSYOP methods is described. The understanding gained from these sections is then used to emphasize how the Internet can revolutionize PSYOP. Reflex control was presented as a method of PSYOP for the future. Then, based on the knowledge presented in this paper, some recommendations are made on how the Internet could be used to revolutionize future PSYOP campaigns. PSYOP has been an essential element of warfare since ancient times. PSYOP will continue to be a key strategic weapon to provide the ways to accomplish the objectives specified in the NSS. As Napolean Bonaparte once said,

> "There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run the sword is always beaten by the mind."

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PSYOP Operations in the 21st Century

A revolution in Psychological Operations (PSYOP) will occur in the near future. The Internet will be the vehicle to enable a revolution in PSYOP and improve the capabilities of PSYOP to achieve objectives specified in the National Security Strategy (NSS). The paper is structured to support this thesis.

First a detailed definition and description of PSYOP is provided. Next the importance of communication techniques in developing PSYOP methods is described. The understanding gained from these sections is essential to realize how the Internet can revolutionize PSYOP. Reflex control was presented as a method of PSYOP for the future. Then with the knowledge presented in this paper some recommendations are made on how the Internet could be used to revolutionize future PSYOP campaigns.

PSYOP has been an essential element of warfare since ancient times. Some of my favorite PSYOP quotes are contained below.

"To seduce the enemy's soldiers from their allegiance and encourage them to surrender is of special service, for an adversary is more hurt by desertion than by slaughter."
Flavius Vegetius Renatus, c. 378 AD

"One need not destroy one's enemy. One need only destroy his willingness to engage."
Sun Tzu

"There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run the sword is always beaten by the mind."
Napolean Bonaparte

"It is your attitude, and the suspicion that you are maturing the boldest designs against him, that imposes on your enemy."
Frederick the Great, 1747

"As the excited passions of hostile people are of themselves a powerful enemy, both the general and his government should use their best efforts to allay them."
LTG Antoine-Henri Baron de Jomini, 1838

"The real target in war is the mind of the enemy command, not the bodies of his troops. If we operate against his troops it is fundamentally for the effect that action will produce on the mind and will of the commander; indeed, the trend of warfare and the development of new weapons – aircraft and tanks – promise to give us increased and more direct opportunities of striking at this psychological target."
Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 1944

"On the fields of friendly strife are sown the seeds that on other days and other fields will bear the fruits of victory."
General Douglas MacArthur

"PSYOP...was a great threat to troop morale, second only to the coalition bombing campaign."
Iraqi General after Operation Desert Storm

"Killing the enemy's courage is as vital as killing his troops."
Carl Von Clausewitz[1]

There are two purposes for this paper. One is personal and the other is to benefit the reader. On the personal side, the topic area of PSYOP was chosen to improve my knowledge in this area of warfare. To benefit the reader I have provided a detailed and descriptive definition of PSYOP. Also I have provided an explanation of a type of future PSYOP that can be effectively and efficiently employed as a way to achieve the ends as specified in the NSS.

Definition and Description of PSYOP

PSYOP have been employed for thousands of years. Since PSYOP have been conducted over an expansive period of time and across the spectrum of crisis and threats, it is essential that a definition be identified. There were many sources reviewed to derive a definition of PSYOP. The most complete and precise definition was found in Joint Publication 3-53. Accordingly, since this is our current doctrine, it will be used. The definition chosen and used throughout this paper was obtained from Joint Publication 3-53 Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations:

> Psychological operations are operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.[2]

It is also important to understand where PSYOP resides in our joint doctrine. In current joint doctrine, PSYOP is a subset of Information Operations (IO). Joint Publication 3-13 defines IO as actions taken to affect an adversary's information and information systems while defending one's own information and information system. Furthermore, PSYOP is identified as a capability in offensive IO. Joint Pub 3-13 defines Offensive IO as:

> Offensive IO is the integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect adversary decision-makers to achieve or promote specific objectives. These capabilities and activities include, but are not limited to, operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, physical attack and/or destruction, and special information operations, and could include computer network attack.[3]

Strategic PSYOP	International information activities conducted by United States Government agencies to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in favor or United States goals and objectives. These programs are conducted predominantly outside the military arena but can utilize Department of Defense assets and are supported by military PYSOP.
Operational PSYOP	Conducted prior to, during war or conflict, and at the conclusion of open hostilities in a defined geographic area to promote the effectiveness of the area commander's campaigns and strategies.
Tactical PSYOP	Conducted in the area assigned a tactical commander during conflict and war to support the tactical mission against opposing forces.
Consolidated PSYOP	Conducted in foreign areas that are inhabited by an enemy or potentially hostile populace and occupied by United States forces, or in which United States forces, or in which United States forces are based, to produce behaviors by the foreign populace that support United States objectives in the area.

Table 1 Categories of PSYOP[4]

Offensive IO is conducted at all level of war and therefore PSYOP are as well employed at each level. Additionally Joint Publication 3-53 defines the categories of military PSYOP as strategic, operational, tactical, and consolidated. These categories are defined in table 1 above.



Figure Colors of Propaganda/PSYOP[5]

The above Figure illustrates the types of PSYOP that can be conducted. This figure was obtained from a publication published in 1951. As you can see, the term used for PSYOP during this period of times was propaganda. The terms have changed since 1951 but the principles have remained the same. (For further information please refer to the glossary where definitions of several key terms in this paper are defined.)

You can swap the terms for basic definitions of black, gray, and white propaganda for PSYOP. Typically in the United States, the lead agency for conducting black and gray PSYOP is the Central Intelligence Agency. The military Services (the Army in particular) typically have a greater or equal role in conducting white PSYOP. Also it is important to note that the Department of Defense (DoD) does not conduct PSYOP within the United States or against our allies. This is confirmed through the definition of PSYOP as a subset of offensive IO. Therefore it is highly unlikely that the DoD or military Services would conduct offensive IO within the United States or against our allies.

It is also important to note that the utmost care must be taken in planning black or gray PSYOP. Sever damage can occur to credibility of public affairs (PA) and media channels if care is not taken in conducting black or gray PSYOP. Accordingly, white PSYOP should remain as such and not cross into gray or black PSYOP.

PSYOP Planning

The principles of developing PSYOP apply across the range of military operations. Although the complexity of the methodology varies with the target audiences, basic considerations for development of all PSYOP actions are the same. Actions essential to successful PSYOP are:

1. A clearly defined mission; analysis of all targets;
2. Actions that are evaluated for psychological implications;
3. A reliable medium or media for transmission;
4. Rapid exploitation of PSYOP themes; and
5. Continual evaluation of the results of PSYOP for relevance to the mission and goals.[6]

There are four general points to consider with regards to PSYOP. These are contained below.

1. Origination, including both human and mechanical sources,
2. Transmission, including both human and mechanical transmission whether, for example by means of staff commands or by means of electronic impulses.
3. Reception, both in terms of the physio—psychological impact of an actual physical effect on a human nervous system and in terms of the emotional or idea effect produced in the personalities, which are the recipients of the physical transmission.
4. Evaluation, whether by the originating the transmitting, or the receiving-personalities or authorities.[7]

PSYOP techniques are used to plan and execute truth projection activities intended to inform foreign groups and populations persuasively. PA provide objective reporting, without intent to propagandize. As open sources to foreign countries and the United States, PA channels can be used to disseminate international information. To maintain the credibility of military PA, steps must be taken to protect against slanting or manipulating such PA channels. PSYOP messages must be coordinated with counterintelligence planners and operators,

with military deception planners, and with operations security planners to ensure that essential secrecy is realized, counterintelligence operations are not compromised, and messages reinforce the desired appreciation of counterintelligence and deception as well as PSYOP plans.[8]

Planned military PSYOP may affect not only military targets but also political, economic, or social structures within the target area. The general objectives of joint PSYOP are:

1. To reduce efficiency of opposing forces;
2. Further the US and/or multinational war effort by modifying or manipulating attitudes and behavior of selected audiences;
3. Facilitate reorganization and control of occupied or liberated areas in conjunction with civil-military operations;
4. Obtain the cooperation of allies or coalition partners and neutrals in any PSYOP effort; and
5. Support and enhance humanitarian assistance, foreign internal defense, and/or foreign nation assistance military operations.[9]

A thorough knowledge of national and theater military security policies and objectives, joint operations planning skills and a thorough understanding of the customs, mores, and values of the target audience are required for PSYOP success. The development of the PSYOP plan requires research and analysis, development of a way to convey or deny information, production requirements, and dissemination plans.[10]

These sources of information should be accessible to or be activities observable by target groups. When appropriate, deception means can be used to convey messages to foreign groups having access to foreign intelligence. Planners must understand both the possibilities and limitations of each means and the factors to consider in their use. Planners should understand the difference between planning for joint operations and planning for overt peacetime PSYOP programs. Peacetime programs are planned in consonance with the respective US Ambassador's country plan and support national objectives and policy. Plans for military operations other than war (MOOTW) and war also support national objectives and policy but generally have a different focus for PSYOP than peacetime programs.[11]

PSYOP and the Range of Military Operations

The role of PSYOP varies depending on the level of operational activity or environment. Typical MOOTW that can be supported by joint PSYOP include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, nation assistance, security assistance, FID, counterdrug operations, and peace support operations. MOOTW not involving the use or threat of force activities provide training and in-theater access to allow for the facilitation and use of PSYOP during the transition to war. MOOTW involving the use or threat of force require the application of the diplomatic, military, economic, and informational instruments of national power. Nonlethal activities, such as PSYOP, can be decisive in MOOTW involving the use or threat of force. During war, PSYOP at the strategic, operational, and tactical level may enhance the success of operations at all echelons. Employment of PSYOP can be equally effective in supporting both offensive and defensive operations conducted by conventional forces. Special operations are also an integral part of modern warfare, which may support conventional military operations, or they may be conducted alone. Unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and civil affairs are some of the special operations that may support PSYOP.[12]

Support for PSYOP

Intelligence; counterintelligence; Command, Control, Communications, and Computers systems (C^4); and logistics support military PSYOP and are invaluable for the success of such actions.[13]PSYOP planners must possess a thorough and current knowledge of these conditions to develop PSYOP targeted at selected foreign groups to influence the objective and emotional reasoning. Intelligence Support: This knowledge is obtained through the use of the intelligence cycle which is the process by which intelligence is obtained, produced, and made available to the PSYOP planner. The intelligence cycle has five steps: planning and direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination. C4 Systems Support: Communication between staffs and commands that are planning and executing PSYOP actions are necessary for effective joint use of capabilities. A joint PSYOP communications plan should be prepared to ensure that communications systems are compatible and adequate. Logistic Support: PSYOP forces will normally deploy with a 30-day basic load of PSYOP supplies. This is a baseline planning figure and may not be sufficient to meet specific contingency mission requirements. Joint planners must ensure that PSYOP support requirements are taken into account when planning logistic support.[14]

PSYOP Wrap-Up

PSYOP are used to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, objective reasoning, and motives. In order to accomplish this goal, PSYOP must be directed at a clearly defined goal or objective, the ability to analyze and evaluate targets and their effects, a reliable media transmission, and a rapid ability to implement PSYOP. PSYOP depends on communication to ensure proper execution of the mission and objectives. Command and control, preplanning and support from all levels ensure this.[15]

PSYOP and the NSS

The above paragraphs provided a description and definition of PSYOP. From this information one can see that PSYOP is a ways to achieve our objectives as identified in the NSS. PSYOP are a vital part of the broad range of US political, military, economic, and informational activities to achieve the ends of the National Security Strategy. When properly employed, PSYOP can lower the morale and reduce the efficiency of enemy forces and could create dissidence and disaffection within their ranks. There are several pertinent references in the 1999 NSS that PSYOP could be used as a ways to advance the United States' national interests. These are found in the sections using military activities to shape the international environment.

> The U.S. military plays a crucial role in shaping the international security environment in ways that protect and promote U.S. interests. Through overseas presence and peacetime engagement activities such as defense cooperation, security assistance, and training and exercises with allies and friends, our Armed Forces help to deter aggression and coercion, build coalitions, promote regional stability and serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies.[16]

> Our ability to deter potential adversaries in peacetime rests on several factors, particularly on our demonstrated will and ability to uphold our security commitments when they are challenged. We have earned this reputation through both our declared policy, which clearly communicates costs to potential adversaries, and our credible warfighting capability.[17]

> We also are committed to maintaining information superiority - the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting and/or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. We must keep pace with rapidly evolving information technology so that we can cultivate and harvest the promise of information superiority among U.S. forces and coalition partners while exploiting the shortfalls in our adversaries' information capabilities.[18]
>
> Efforts to deter an adversary - be it an aggressor nation, terrorist group or criminal organization - can become the leading edge of crisis response. In this sense, deterrence straddles the line between shaping the international environment and responding to crises. Deterrence in crisis generally involves signaling the United States' commitment to a particular country or interest by enhancing our warfighting capability in the theater. We may also choose to make additional statements to communicate the costs of aggression or coercion to an adversary, and in some cases may choose to employ U.S. forces to underline the message and deter further adventurism.[19]

In each of these references, PSYOP can be employed to achieve the identified ends (to control the thinking and behavior of a group or individual). The need to integrate PSYOP with all national elements of power has been a precept for decades. A 1941 source on German Psychological Warfare in the 1930's states this as,

> "Propaganda is not used for the sake of propaganda. It is used in conjunction with a military, diplomatic or economic objective [must now include informational]. It obtains its best results in neutral countries, or before the actual outbreak of war, or in stirring up disunity in non-belligerent nations. Nazi propaganda must win its major victories before the "shooting war" begins. In wartime it is chiefly an auxiliary weapon. It cannot win wars, nor can it prevent defeat, but its psychological techniques, if applied persistently and timed accurately, can be a deciding factor in battles, particularly in Total War."[20]

Reflex Control and Human Network Attacks

The primary goal of PSYOP is to control the thinking and behavior of the target audience. To accomplish this you must act to manipulate the information the target audience receives. Typically the term given to the controller for information is a data processor. For an individual, the data processor is the brain. This is a vulnerable target since the brain has no firewall or virus protection to protect it from either deceptive or electromagnetic processes. As a result, the mind of the soldier on the battlefield, terrorist, or strategic leader is potentially the most exploitable and unprotected PSYOP target. These targets are vulnerable to human network attacks (HNA).

Russia has some interesting information-psychological operations developments in the area of human behavior control mechanisms termed *reflexive control.* Reflexive control is a type of HNA. The target of a HNA is the enemy's decision making processes, both human (the mind's soft data processor) and material (hardware data processing).

Technological developments make it possible to subject all people, from ordinary citizens to strategic leaders, heads of state, or military leaders, to a complex PSYOP offensive. Simulated and reproduced voices, fabricated provocative speeches delivered by virtual heads of state, and projected images of actual life situations can affect mind and achieve behavior control. This special information media, such as language, texts, images and sound, as future enemy weapons capable of exerting a "multilevel operational effect instead of simply a political or economic one. The target is the enemy's decision-making process, both human and material. The main task is to overwhelm opposing forces through the use of terror tactics, thereby upsetting their psychological stability. PSYOP start in peacetime and, if war erupts, run the spectrum of crisis.[21]

A further description of reflexive control is important here. Reflexive control involves creating a pattern or providing partial information that causes an enemy to react in a predetermined fashion without realizing that he is being manipulated. Its aim above all else is to influence command and control systems and decision-makers. The same type equipment used in a typical PSYOP will support reflexive control operations. In these operations the "information or facts" can now be fabricated in a much more realistic form in real time on radio or TV using a high-tech voice and image recording and editing equipment. Perhaps even more important, the means of psychological warfare are now more diversified, and its striking force has increased.[22]

However, it is important to note that to conduct reflexive control operations we must employ black as well as gray PSYOP. Therefore these operations should be conducted with care to avoid loss of credibility with communication methods essential for conducting white PSYOP.

In Timothy L. Thomas's article, titled Human Network Attacks, he provides an excellent description of methods that could be used in a reflex control operation.

> "Today, simulation, stealth and various types of camouflage technologies allow for the "mixing of the spurious with the genuine" and can cause errors in the enemy's decision-making. More important is acoustic technology because it creates deafening noises, such as explosions, whizzing sounds, rumblings and heartrending screams, to upset psychological stability. [Reflex control operations] will attempt to penetrate the mind of soldiers or key decision-makers to throw them into a psychological maze or cause psychological disorders or panic."[23]

On the effectiveness of reflex control operations, he states:

> "[Reflex control operations, as an] information weapon is more important than firepower in achieving objectives. His understanding is likely based on the belief that the use of the information weapons during the Cold War, such as the Strategic Defense Initiative or SDI, did more to defeat the Soviet Union and bring about its financial exhaustion and demise than any real weapons' use. [Reflex control] is also listed as a method for achieving geopolitical superiority and as a mechanism to control negotiations. In this regard reflex control would be used to influence a state's information element of power and thereby its decision-making process by formulating certain information or misinformation."[24]

The following table contains the eleven types of mechanisms for use against systems, people, or groups in the field.

Distraction	During preparatory stages of combat operations, creating a real or imaginary threat against one of the most vital enemy places such as flanks and rear, forcing him to reevaluate his decisions to operate on this or that axis.
Overload	Often manifested by sending the enemy a large amount of conflicting information.
Paralysis	Creating the belief of a specific threat to a vital interest or weak spot.
Exhaustion	Cause the enemy to carry out useless operations, thereby entering combat with depleted resources.
Deception	During preparatory stages of combat operations force the enemy to reallocate forces to a threatened spot.
Divisive technique	Cause the enemy to believe he must operate in opposition to coalition interests.
Pacification	Through a peaceful attitude and approach cause the enemy to lose vigilance.
Deterrence	Create the impression of superiority.
Provocation	Force enemy action advantageous to your side.
Suggestion	offer information that affects the enemy legally, morally, ideologically or in, other areas.
Pressure	offer information that encourages society to discredit its own government.

Table 2 Eleven Types of Mechanisms[25]

On the outer limits of reflex control, the Russian armed forces are studying a host of unusual subjects, almost all of which center on how information or electronic waves affect the mind. For example, a recent book offered an extensive set of algorithms designed to implant "suggestive influences" or what the author called "psycho viruses" into a person's mind.[26]

PSYOP and Communication

PSYOP is communication. To employ successful PSYOP it is essential to use effective communication techniques to convey the message to the target audience. The function of PSYOP is to use communication to influence behavior. Therefore, a basic understanding of the nature of communication, the role of communication in a social environment, and the process of how people communicate with each other is necessary. Therefore we must define and analyze the principles of communication.[27]

Definition of Communication

Communication includes the numerous processes by which one person influences another. This includes many human actions that include speech, written material, music, drama, Internet web sites, pictorial arts, and other forms of behavior.[28]

Man as a social being develops various habit patterns that permit him to respond to particular gestures, verbal as well as non-verbal, and using this history of objects and events, he creates his particular world of reality. A person's understanding of a particular habit pattern is the set of responses that the individual generates as a result of the stimulus. The participation of the individual in the language process gives him the ability to communicate with himself (think) and with his social group. The entire process is structured around the social group. Human communication is the basis for group norms; it is the means by which social control is exerted, roles are allocated, coordination of effort is achieved, expectations are made manifest, and the social process is carried on. Communication should also be considered as the sharing of information. Each individual or social group considers information or ideas based on his needs, comprehending and using the information in a manner that best suits his particular interests. [29]

To understand communications, you must understand people. To understand human communication it requires the ability to understand and relate the content of communication messages to the desires of people, groups, organizations, and societies. The ability to understand how people relate to each other is crucial.[30]

Individuals living in society generally desire to adhere to the opinions, attitudes, and habits of those with whom they are motivated to interact. They form a culture. The culture influences individuals as well as influences each other's perceptions, and the individual's way of seeing reality is based on the *actual world* around him. All social groups have a culture and require

a degree of conformity. The group culture provides definitive methods and procedures to insure conformity to group norms and values.[31]

A final but significant point is that groups, like individuals have goals. And these goals often cannot be achieved without a degree of consensus. It is obvious that if a majority of the individuals cannot agree on the proper course of action, they cannot act collectively. It is only through meaningful communication that collective action and consensus can be attained.[32]

The Role of Communication

Communication can be considered as the great relating tool. It relates individuals to each other and to historical perspective as well as to the culture of the group. This makes group functioning possible and allows societies to live in harmony.[33]

With the understanding that an important function of communication is relating people to each other or to groups, or to history, the content of a message is significant. We can group the majority of social communication under four major functions from the originator as well as the receiver's point of view.

Originator	Receiver
To inform	To understand
To instruct or teach	To learn
To entertain	To enjoy
To persuade	To dispose or decide

Table 3 Social Communication Major Functions[34]

It is important that PSYOP warriors understand that communication content of the PSYOP messages can be designed to perform all of the functions stated above, any one of the four, or any mix.

Often the role of communication found in United States policy is considered along rigid lines. Frequently the role of PSYOP is viewed as a loudspeaker and leaflet operation addressing only the persuasive function. A PSYOP organization that directs its efforts to only one function communication is at a distinct disadvantage competing with communication viewed as a political weapon and directed at the whole person, skillfully combining the four functions of communication.[35]

The Communication Process

For maximum effect, propaganda demands:

1. A specific rather than a general theme;
2. Some trust of our motives on the part of the audience;
3. Timing such that the propaganda campaign can immediately precede the actions its intended to affect;
4. First class intelligence in three phases:
    a. Social and cultural attributes of the people concerned;
    b. Extent to which the people listen to or read our propaganda;
    c. Extent to which it affects their actions; and
5. Accessibility, i.e., the audience must be able to hear our broadcasts or read our pamphlets.[36]

All human communication must take place in the framework of social relations. The importance of understanding interpersonal relationships as an essential part of the communication process and the need for a clear vision of social pressures as part of the total communication process needs to be emphasized.[37]

There are many variables to consider in order to identify effective communication. Some of these are:

> organizational membership; the audience's image of the sources; the time period; the group orientation of the audience member and the degree to which he values group membership; the activity of opinion leaders; the social aspects of the situation during and after exposure to the media, and the degree to which the audience member is forced to play a role; the personality pattern of the audience member, his social class, and the level of his frustrations; the nature of the media in a free enterprise system; and the availability of social mechanisms for implementing action drives.[38]

Communication Climate

The communication climate is one of the social factors that affect persuasive communication. That is, what people say and how they react to a PSYOP message depends on where they are, who is listening, and what communication channel is being used. The

communication climate can be classified the private communication or public communication.[39]

There are two types of private communication to consider: Face to face and interposed. Face-to-face conversation is one type of private communication: *Interposed* (private communications such as a letter, a telephone call, an electronic mail message, fax, etc.) constitutes the other.[40]

Mass media or public communication channels can be face-to-face and public (mass meetings, cultural drama performances, movies, or operas) or private (the individual as a radio or television viewer, or reading a magazine, book, web site, or leaflet). The significant point is that the communication situation determines to some extent the kind of communication that goes on and the response that is likely to be made to it.[41]

For example, many techniques used to stimulate enthusiasm at a public rally would not be appropriately used in an individual, private environment. It is unlikely that a person listening to a radio in private would develop crowd excitement and its consequent behavior. Additionally, a person would not communicate with a stranger in the same manner as with a member of his immediate family group, nor would he communicate with a trusted friend in the same manner as with a government official.[42]

A variety of communication techniques can be used to combine private and public communication. For example, a duplicate of a public poster can be prepared as a small handout or leaflet, or enhance on a web site, thus permitting the individual to discuss the poster in public and at the same time carry the message home to discuss it with members of his family.[43]

The leaflet reinforces the government message and gives additional meaning to the public poster and the web site can provide branch to additional information or direct the individual where they can gain additional information. Also, the handout or leaflet tends to set in motion a functional communication group to discuss the poster for the second time (after the PSYOP cadre departs) in public.[44]

Influence of the Group

The focus of this section is on the primary groups to which an individual belongs. These groups are the individual's family, friends, informal work teams, small military units, and the more formal groups. Within these groups the members are attracted to each other as personalities. These groups are characterized by their size, relative durability, informality, and face-to-face contact.[45]

The response of the individual to communication cannot be accounted for without reference to his social environment and to the character of his interpersonal relationships. Four variables in the communication processes to consider in influencing the group are:

1. Exposure to the media;
2. Strengths and weakness of the different types of media;
3. Existing attitude or attitudes of the individuals;
4. The content of the message; and
5. The response of the individual to communication.[46]

The influence of the group on communication is extremely important to PSYOP. PSYOP programs must be designed to communication directly to the individual not as an isolated entity of society but rather that the individual is an integral part of an active social environment. This being the case, PSYOP intelligence and information gathering programs should not organize the collection of data as if each member of the target audience is isolated and in a sterile environment but as a member of a group. Man's attachments to these groups are significant; consequently, the opinions and activities shared with a group influence his response to all communication. In other words, interpersonal relationships must be considered to properly understand the communication process and to conduct effective PSYOP. Interpersonal relationships seem to be anchor points for individual opinions, attitudes, habits, and values.

This concept (the importance of the influence of the group) suggests that when people are interacting in the communication process, they generate and maintain common ideas and behavior patterns that they are reluctant to modify. Also, it is apparent that when communication concerns sensitive roles and standards of the group or group culture, it is usually checked with other members of the group.[47]

PSYOP and the Internet

The use of the Internet jump-started the information age that began in the late 1990's. The use of the Internet is revolutionizing our lives. New improvements of higher access speeds and larger bandwidths will make the first decade of the millennium on this planet an amazing place. The Internet can be a tool to revolutionize PSYOP. There are four areas in which the Internet can be used to revolutionize PSYOP. These are to establish a PSYNET, coordination, implementation, and analysis of efficiency and effectiveness of a PSYOP campaign.

PSYNET would be a network similar to the SIPRNET or SCINET. This network would provide the means for PSYOP warriors to communicate and obtain information. The PSYNET is essential to accomplish the second area: coordination.

Coordination would be accomplished by establishing a PSYOP database. This database would contain items such as PSYOP lessons learned, current PSYOP campaign objectives, effective methods, etc. Also the PSYNET could be used to allow PSYOP warriors to exchange ideas as well as further develop this profession.

Implementation refers to methods to accomplish the PSYOP campaign. Reflex control is one of these implementation methods. As explained above, reflex control could entail developing simulated and reproduced voices, fabricated provocative speeches delivered by virtual heads of state, and projected images of actual life situations can affect mind and achieve behavior control. The PSYNET would be the way this message would reach the PSYOP target.

The PSYNET could easily be utilized to analyze the efficiency and effectiveness of a PSYOP campaign. A simple example of this is by monitoring a web site you have created to accomplish your PSYOP objectives. You can easily monitor who visits the web site and therefore determine what percentage of PSYOP target is accessing the web site. Through information data such as emails and voice communications you can gather hard data on the effectiveness of your PSYOP campaign.

The *bad guys* of the world are using the Internet to organize and share lessons learned. The United States must implement the PSYNET to level the playing field.

Conclusion

A revolution in PSYOP will occur in the near future. Improvements in hardware and software will allow for higher access speeds and larger bandwidths which will provide the means to overcome current Internet limitations. With these pending improvements realized, the Internet will be the vehicle to enable a revolution in PSYOP and improve the capabilities of PSYOP to achieve objectives specified in the NSS.

PSYOP has been an essential element of warfare since ancient times. PSYOP will continue to be a key strategic weapon to provide the ways to accomplish the objectives specified in the NSS. The Internet will be the tool to revolutionize PSYOP and make the first decade of the millennium on this planet an amazing place.

WORD COUNT = 5831

Glossary

The following provides some definitions of key terms in this paper.

Black propaganda - Propaganda that purports to emanate from a source other than the true one.

Grey propaganda - Propaganda that does not specifically identify any source.

Propaganda - Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.

Psychological operations - Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.

Psychological warfare - The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

White propaganda - Propaganda disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency thereof.

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VOLUME ONE

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CASE STUDIES OF MILITARY APPLICATION

VOLUME ONE

Project Director

Daniel C. Pollock

Editors

Ronald De McLaurin

Carl F. Rosenthal

Sarah A. Skillings

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Comments and questions on this report are invited and should be addressed to AIR.

FOREWORD

This collection of essays has been compiled by AIR using information in the open literature, unclassified government documents, and original contributions. In scope it covers the entire spectrum of military psychological operations (PSYOP). Appropriate consideration is given to related civilian activities as well as to relevant aspects of communication theory. Emphasis is placed on the entire operational field encompassed by such terms as "international communications," "political warfare," "cultural affairs," "psychological operations" (PSYOP), and "psychological warfare."

The editors have sought to illustrate the effective and noneffective uses of PSYOP and to describe the problems encountered and the solutions adopted by military and civilian personnel involved in PSYOP/Information activities during recent decades. Contrasting points of view were deliberately included in the casebook to provide a balanced as well as a general view of the state of the art. Some of the contributions may be considered controversial, depending on the reader's point of view. Where copyrighted material has been quoted, permission has been obtained for its use.

Comments, corrections, additions, and suggestions for factual, interpretative, or other changes will be welcomed. They may be addressed to:

American Institutes for Research
3301 New Mexico Avenue N.W.,
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PREFACE

AIR, operating under a contract with the Department of the Army, has developed this two-volume anthology in the form of a PSYOP casebook. It has been prepared in response to a request from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This publication has been produced as a part of the overall research program undertaken by the Department of the Army to improve the capability of the United States Army to conduct PSYOP/information programs under a variety of circumstances in many different environments. The major focus of attention has been placed on psychological operations of military relevance, with special emphasis on the types of activities that may confront U.S. personnel in the two decades ahead.

In content, the editors have sought to cover the whole range of U.S. public international communications whether they be described as international information, cultural affairs, or psychological operations, and whether or not they be conducted by members of a military service or personnel of a civilian agency. The editors also have touched upon the ways in which PSYOP is employed elsewhere, with the hope that such material will serve to broaden the American understanding of how others around the world attempt to communicate effectively across cultural barriers and international borders.

COMMUNICATION THEORY AND PSYOP

The science of communication theory is relatively new; more than half of all research, most of the important books and articles in the field, and most of the great figures in the study of communications have become well known only in the last twenty years. Moreover, increasingly for the last decade and a half it is in the context of communication theory that psychological operations—PSYOP—has been studied. Therefore these volumes will include several timely essays on communication theory.

ORGANIZATION

The Art and Science of Psychological Operations is an anthology bringing together both original and previously published material. In effect, the essays comprise an analysis of the state of the PSYOP art. Some of them also provide conclusions and recommendations for the future. The individual essays, which are organized into chapters, deal with the nature and scope of PSYOP and communications; national policy and PSYOP; organizational and personnel matters; policy objectives and operational goals in Volume One; PSYOP intelligence requirements, sources, and methods; social science research (including communication theory) and PSYOP; media, methods, and techniques; evaluation of effectiveness; and foreign ideology and propaganda in Volume Two.

SOURCES

The types of selections that have been incorporated in this casebook

include professional and scholarly publications, original contributions, foreign and domestic PSYOP-related material, excerpts from official memoranda and directives, lecture notes, letters, and newspaper items. An attempt has been made to ensure a reasonable geographic coverage by providing examples from all areas of the world. For example, Algeria, Burma, Cameroon, New Zealand, Nigeria, Portuguese Guinea, Taiwan, and Rumania are among the more than 30 countries treated in the text.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

General

The casebook is designed to serve primarily as background information for training in the field of psychological operations and as an introduction to the more important elements and principles of PSYOP. It is intended to serve not only as a point of departure for the uninitiated but also as a useful reference. The use of overly sophisticated material requiring a substantial social science background has been avoided. On the other hand, articles dealing in overly simplistic terms with principles painfully obvious to the reader have been excluded.

The editors have, however, intentionally included several somewhat advanced papers in the section on research in Chapter VII and on PSYOP effectiveness in Chapter IX. In Chapter VII, the selections give an indication of how sophisticated social science research can contribute to PSYOP. Similarly, the content of Chapter IX would have been incomplete and anachronistic without reference to the methodological thinking current in the 1960s and early 1970s. It is believed that all the articles lend themselves to an understanding of the subject without an extensive background in communications research.

Secondly, most of the case studies have been purposefully selected to complement and supplement a standard reference in the field titled, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, written in 1956 by William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz. Changing perspectives of the nature and scope of PSYOP since that time, as well as changes in the politico-military environment in which PSYOP is carried out, have played an important part in the updating process. In this respect, the editors have given due weight to relevant events occurring since the publication of the PSYWAR casebook and have tried also to portray the new conceptions, methodologies, and techniques that have been developed to improve the effectiveness of PSYOP.

Thus, this compilation of case studies represents PSYOP generally in the 1960s, the situations experienced and the lessons learned in that decade. It is noted that although most of the incidents described took place between 1960 and 1972, some of them happened earlier but are best analyzed in the literature of the 1960s.

Philosophically, the editors of this casebook have tried to indicate the new concerns in PSYOP, the changing conceptions of the field as a whole, and the trends in the use of new methodologies and techniques to improve

its effectiveness. It is with reference to the change in conceptualization of PSYOP over the last fifteen years and to the trend of thinking in the early seventies that PSYOP is viewed in this book as communication. When the question is asked, "What is PSYOP?", the answers of different generations and different experts vary. Yet, as noted earlier, increasingly over the last decade and a half, psychological operations is studied in the context of communication. Although "persuasive" and "purposive" communications are the focus of this study, many scholars in the communications field argue that all communication is "purposive" and hence "persuasive." There is no need, in the context of present purposes, for this anthology to align itself with one or the other of these schools of thought.

Editorial Method

The desire to cover the "open" literature as thoroughly as possible and to make this an essential source book for both military and civilian personnel interested in PSYOP and communications has made it necessary to be as concise as possible. It has therefore been necessary to excerpt many selections on the basis of relevance and concision. Except in the very few cases where the essays were "adapted," the excerpting is indicated by the use of ellipsis points in both copyrighted and noncopyrighted material. Only in the "original" and editors' essays were editorial changes, other than purely stylistic ones, made. Where necessary, the footnotes in each essay were renumbered, but not otherwise altered in form. The notes pertinent to a particular essay appear at the conclusion of that essay. Bibliographic citations for most sources used by the essay authors are found at the end of each chapter.

In as far as possible, the editors sought the consent of authors and organizations, even when their material was not copyrighted. The copyright holder, at least, was provided with a copy of the material in its proposed form. A particular note is made of the willingness with which publishers, editors, and authors responded to requests for permission to reprint material. In some cases, they even offered to update, substitute, or revise their articles, and when time permitted, the editors were able to take advantage of this. Some authors even suggested that they were flattered to be included. The undersigned, however, look at this the other way around: this book needed their contributions.

Inevitably in a work such as this—in which authors represent many nationalities, professions, and perspectives—the reader will find some material in spoken or translated English. For example, in those contributions illustrative of the day-to-day output of military units engaged in actual operations, a kind of clipped but useful military style is employed. Such a style was retained because it has a feel of immediacy and serves as an example of real PSYOP in action.

As in any anthology, one is advised to consider the article's original date of publication in one's reading. A further result of the use of the case study approach is the fact that articles do not have an inherent order and

flow. Although each selection has been placed in a chapter on the basis of its contributions to the topic covered in that chapter, an overly rigid linking of the several selections would be an arbitrary enterprise, misleading in some cases, since many contributions are illustrative rather than conclusive. The editors, therefore, have used the introductory comments at the head of each article to place the contribution in its situational context in many cases. However, this means, in some instances, that emphasis has been placed on aspects the contributing author did not necessarily consider to be preeminent, given his sometimes different purpose. Furthermore, because of the disclaimers carried in the mastheads of many of the original source publications, no implication should be drawn concerning the original source publishers' views on any articles published by them, without consulting the original source.

The chapters of this anthology, as well as the articles themselves, stand alone in large measure, even though references and cross–references reflect the interdependence of the various aspects of the PSYOP process as a whole. It is to be noted that because of the use of the casebook approach, style varies markedly from one article to another, providing a diversion from a single manner of expression.

Finally, a concerted effort has been made in the selection process for this compilation to stress the importance that the "PSYOP-related" fields have for effective psychological operations. Moreover, admittedly, controversial analyses, conclusions, and recommendations are found in several of the articles. These have been included not only for the purposes of the casebook already discussed, but to stimulate thinking. Essays featuring contrasting points of view are presented to provide a general idea of the range of thought of the individuals working in the field.

At any rate, this study looks at psychological operations analytically and conceptually as well as descriptively. Above all, every action and all inaction communicate. The goal in PSYOP must be to ensure that, through the combination of action and words, the desired message is the one that is transmitted. This is as true for nations as it is for individuals and groups.

D. C. Pollock
R. De McLaurin
C. T. Rosenthal
S. A. Skillings

AUTHORS, CONTRIBUTORS, AND EDITORS

AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

AARON, Harold R. (Major General, U.S. Army) — Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, 1974; Graduate of the National War College; Special Warfare Division, Army General Staff, 1960–1961; Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1965–1967; CO 1st Special Forces Group, 1967–1968; CO 5th Special Forces Group, 1968–1969.

ALLEN, George V. — Career Foreign Service Officer, retired; Ambassador to Iran, Yugoslavia, India, Nepal, and Greece; Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, South Asian, and African Affairs, 1955–1956; Director, U.S. Information Agency, 1957–1960; President, Tobacco Institute, 1960–1966; Director, Foreign Service Institute, 1966–1969.

ASKENASY, Alexander R. — Coordinator, Out-Patient Clinic, New York State Psychiatric Institute; Associate Research Scientist, Social Science Research Unit, N.Y. State Psychiatric Institute and Department of Psychiatry, Columbia University, 1969–1972; Senior Research Scientist, Center for Research in Social Systems, 1963–1969; Research Associate, then Project Co-Director, World Federation for Mental Health, 1959–1963; Research Associate, Psychological Research Associates (involved in research on mass communications and psychological warfare during World War II), 1956–1958; Psychologist, U.S. Army Medical Research Laboratory (Ft. Knox) and U.S. Military Government for Germany (public opinion research), 1954–1956; taught at Princeton, Columbia, and The American University and the University of Virginia; author of *Attitudes Toward Mental Illness: A Cross-Cultural Study* and *Perception of Korean Opinions: A Study of U.S. Army Officers' Expertise.*

BAIRDAIN, E. Frederick — Vice President and Senior Research Scientist, Applied Systems Science Technology, Inc.; has held senior management positions in domestic and foreign operations of several major transnational corporations specializing in organization and communications; Project Director of a task force to assess the status of PSYOP in Vietnam; Principal Scientist for conduct of basic and applied field research on measurement of effectiveness of PSYOP; and Principal Scientist for a project to create a history of PSYOP in Southeast Asia and develop recommendations on doctrine and guidance for the future; author of many classified publications and coauthor of *Program Assessment: Vietnam Field Study, Psychological Operations—Vietnam.*

BAIRDAIN, Edith M. — President and Chief Scientist, Applied Systems Science Technology, Inc.; has held management positions in the aerospace and computer systems industry, including International Electric Corporation, Computer Sciences Corporation, and International Telephone and Telegraph; Project Director of a project to create a history of PSYOP in Southeast Asia and develop recommendations on doctrine and guidance for the future; Research Director of a task force advising U.S. agencies on conduct and evaluation of PSYOP in Vietnam; Research Director of a Field Team for Psychological Operations; coauthor of *Program Assessment: Vietnam Field Study, Psychological Operations—Vietnam.*

BARGHOORN, Frederick C. — Professor of Political Science, Yale University; Associate Division Assistant, Department of State, 1941–1942; Press Attache, U.S. Embassy, Moscow, 1943–1947; author of *The Soviet Image of the U.S., Soviet Russian Nationalism, Soviet Cultural Offensive, Soviet Foreign Propaganda.*

BARR, John S. — Retired; represented London Missionary Society in China from 1924 to 1952; Professor and Counselor, Chung Chi College, Hong Kong, until 1966.

BARRETT, Raymond J. — Department of State Advisor at John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, N.C.; as U.S. Foreign Service Officer, served in Madrid, Mexico City, Managua, Dublin, and Cairo overseas, and in the Office of International Conferences, the Office of East and Southern African Affairs, and at Air Force Headquarters in Washington, D.C.

BEELEY, Sir Harold — Retired from British Diplomatic Service; UK Deputy Representative to the United Nations, 1958–1961; UK Representative to Geneva Disarmament Conference, 1964–1967; conducted study of British overseas information services in 1967; Ambassador to the United Arab Republic until 1969.

BELOFF, Max — Gladstone Professor of Government and Public Administration, Oxford University; has studied cultural and information work of Council of Europe and NATO; author of *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929–1941, Public Order and Popular Disturbances, The American Federal Government, The Future of British Foreign Policy, Imperial Sunset.*

BERGER, Carl — Chief, Histories Division, Office of Air Force History; formerly, Historian, Air Force, Cambridge Research Laboratories; Historian, Vandenberg Air Force Base; author of *The Korean Knot, Broadsides and Bayonets, B–29 Superfortress, Strategic Leaflets.*

BOGART, Leo — Executive Vice President and General Manager, Advertising Bureau, American Newspaper Publishers Association; public opinion research, Standard Oil Company, 1948–1951; Vice President, Market Planning Corporation, 1952–1958; lecturer, sociology, Columbia University, 1953–1961; author of *Age of Television, Strategy in Advertising;* editor, *Psychology in Media Strategy, Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Army.*

BOHANNAN, Charles T. R. — Retired career military officer; Smithsonian Institution, before World War II;

(Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)	in Army of the United States, 1941–1961; assigned to Philippines 1945–1948, 1950–1957; co-author of *Counter-Guerrilla Operations—The Philippine Experience.*
BRANDON, James R.	Professor of Drama and Theater, University of Hawaii; has also taught at University of Connecticut and Michigan State University; assistant cultural attache, USIS, Djakarta, 1955–1956; radio officer, 1956–1957; Japanese language officer, Tokyo, 1958–1959; assistant cultural attache, 1959–1961; author of *On Thrones of Gold: Three Javanese Shadow Plays, Theatre in Southeast Asia;* co-author of *Kabuki Plays* (in French).
BROMAN, Barry M.	U.S. Marine Corps, 1968–1971; no further information available.
BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew	Director, Research Institute on Communist Affairs and Professor of Public Law and Government, Columbia University; Harvard University, 1953–1960; Department of State Policy Planning Council, 1966–1968; author of *The Soviet Bloc, Unity and Conflict, Alternative to Partition, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics;* coauthor of *Political Power: USA–U.S.S.R,* and *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy.*
BULLARD, Monte R. (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army)	Assistant Professor of Military Science, University of California, Berkeley; formerly Department of Social Sciences U.S. Military Academy (West Point); Foreign Area Specialist Training Program in Chinese; 1½ years at Foreign Service Institute of Chinese Area and Language Studies, Taiwan; Military Intelligence officer, Seoul, Korea; Political Warfare Staff Advisor, Headquarters, MACV, Vietnam.
CHOUKAS, Michael	Provost, Pierce College; previously on sociology and anthropology faculties, Dartmouth College, 1929–1953; Pierce College, 1968–1971; Office of Strategic Services, 1944–1945; author of *Black Angels of Athos, Propaganda Comes of Age.*
CLARKSON, Edward J.	Member, Mid-range Amphibious Warfare Study Panel, Headquarters, Marine Corps; in charge of III MAF Chieu Hoi Division, CORDS, 1967–1968.

COOPER, Bert H., Jr. — Analyst in National Defense, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress; Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research, 1961–1971, undertaking extensive study of internal conflict; Research Assistant, Library of Congress, 1959–1961; coauthor of *Casebook on Counterinsurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts, Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam 1941–1954, Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Population Protection and Resources Management in Internal Defense Operations;* author of *Statistics on U.S. Participation in Vietnam, Oil Shortages and the U.S. Armed Forces,* and *Cost Overruns in Major Weapons Systems.*

DASBACH, Anita Mallinckrodt — Adjunct Associate Professor to the Political Science Department, George Washington University.

DAUGHERTY, William Edward — Researcher and scholar in the field of PSYOP; teacher and Executive Secretary, North China American School, Tung Hsien, China, 1932–1935; has taught at Amherst College, West Virginia University, and University of Omaha; Wartime Communications Research Project, Library of Congress, 1941; Chief, Japanese Branch Organization and Propaganda Analysis Section, Special Defense Unit, U.S. Department of Justice, 1941–1942; Japanese language, intelligence and division psywar officer, 1943–1946; Operations Research Office/Research Analysis Corporation, 1949–1967; Operations Analyst assigned to U.S. Eighth Army, 1950–1951; Chief, Plans and Special Projects Sections, PWD/G3, U.S. Eighth Army, Korea; Senior Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research, 1967–1971, conducting research in psychological operations, psychological factors affecting the strategic posture of selected foreign countries, and the U.S. military assistance program and U.S. military civil affairs; author of *U.S. Policy and Programs in Latin America, U.S. Strategic Interests in Tropical Africa, The Military Assistance Officer: Key Factors*

to be Considered in His Selection and Training, coauthor of *A Psychological Warfare Casebook, A Review of U.S. Historical Experience with Civil Affairs, 1776–1954.*

DAVIS, Morris — Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois; taught formerly at University of Wisconsin, Dalhousie University, and Tulane University; author of numerous articles on communications and other aspects of political science.

DELANEY Robert Finley — Forrest Sherman Professor of Public Diplomacy, U.S. Naval War College; Foreign Service Officer, U.S. State Department and USIA, 1950–1963; Public Relations Advisor, ESSO Standard Oil, South America, 1963–1965; Deputy Assistant Director JUSPAO, 1965–1966; Assistant Director (Research and Public Opinion), USIA, 1967–1968; Director, Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1968–1970; President, Thunderbird Graduate School of International Management, 1970–1971; author of *Your Career in the Foreign Service, The Literature of Communism in America;* coauthor, *American Public Diplomacy: The First Years.*

DONNELL, John Corwin — Professor of Political Science, Temple University; U.S. Army CIC, 1943–1946; SCAP, Tokyo, war crimes investigator, 1946–1947; Intelligence Analyst, Civil Intelligence Section, Tokyo, 1946–1947; Staff Officer, USIA, 1949–1953; State Department, 1953–1958 (Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaya); taught at Dartmouth College and University of California (Berkeley); staff member, RAND Corporation, Social Science Department, 1964–1965.

DUNN, S. Watson — Professor and Head, Department of Advertising, University of Illinois; has taught at universities of Wisconsin, Pittsburgh, and Western Ontario; author of *Advertising: Its Role in Modern Marketing, International Handbook of Advertising,* and *Advertising Copy and Communications.*

DURHAM,
F. Gayle
(See HOLLANDER,
Gayle D.)

ELLUL,
Jacques
Professor of History of Law and Social History, University of Bordeaux; author of numerous works, including *Autopsy of Revolution, The Political Illusion, Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes,* and *Technological Society.*

ESWARA,
Harrogadde S.
Reader in Psychology, University of Mysore, India.

FOOTE,
A. Edward
Editor, *Educational Broadcasting Review.*

FREE,
Lloyd A.
President, Institute for International Social Research, SAIS, The Johns Hopkins University; onetime Editor of the *Public Opinion Quarterly;* Director, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, World War II; Assistant Military Attache, Switzerland; Senior Counselor, Mass Communications, UNESCO; Acting Director, Office of International Information, State Department; Counselor of Embassy for Public Affairs, Rome; advisor to presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson; advisor/consultant to Vice President Nelson Rockefeller.

FRIEDRICH,
Carl Joachim
Eaton Professor Emeritus of the Science of Government, Harvard University; taught at Harvard, 1926–1971; Director, School for Overseas Administration, 1946–1949; Constitutional Advisor, U.S. Military Government in Germany, 1946–1948; Constitutional Advisor to Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands; President, International Political Science Association, 1966–1970; American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, 1956–1965; author of *Man and His Government, The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (coauthor), *Constitutional Government and Democracy, The Age of the Baroque,* and many other works.

FULTON,
R. Barry
Career officer, USIA; currently assigned to the Management Division, Office of the Assistant Director (Administration and Management), USIA; formerly Special Assistant

	and Second Secretary, American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan; Director, American Center, Karachi Pakistan; Director of the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, Turkey; taught at the University of Illinois, San Antonio College, the University of Maryland, and Pennsylvania State University.
FURSE, Dave	Lieutenant, 9th Infantry, 1968; no further information available.
GARVER, Richard A.	Chairman, Department of Journalism, State University of South Dakota.
GERGEN, Kenneth Jay	Chairman, Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College; operations officer, U.S. Navy, 1957–1959; has also taught at Harvard University; coauthor, *The Self in Social Interaction, The Study of Policy Formation, Personality and Social Behavior, The Psychology of Behavior Exchange.*
GERGEN, Mary	Research Associate, Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College.
GESSNER, Peter	Free-lance film editor and camera assistant.
GIZA, Richard H.	Intelligence Research Specialist, Department of Defense, 1966-present; taught at Fordham University.
GLEASON, Robert L. (Colonel, USAF)	Former Special Warfare Operations Officer, Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University; graduate and former faculty member, Air War College.
GLICK, Nathan	Chief, Dialogue Magazine Branch, USIA; teacher, 1939–1940; social investigator, 1940–1943; magazine editor, 1943–1947; free-lance writer, 1947–1949; writer and editor, Army and State Departments, 1949–1953.
GRINTER, Lawrence E.	Professor of East Asian Affairs, National War College; Visiting Professor of Political Science, Haverford College; Post-doctoral Fellow and Project Manager, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Senior Social Science Analyst, CINCPAC Headquarters, Honolulu; Research Associate, Center for Research in Social Systems; Field Researcher, Simulmatics

	Corporation, Saigon; Peace Corps volunteer teacher, Sierra Leone.
GUTHRIE, George M.	Professor of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University; coauthor of *Child Rearing and Personality Development in the Philippines.*
HARRIS, Elliot	Communications consultant; member, Army reserve (in PSYWAR), late 1940s; attended Psychological Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N.C.; assigned to ACPW, U.S. Army, during Korean War; advertising writer and publishing executive since 1953; author of *The "Un-American" Weapon: Psychological Warfare.*
HAUSMAN, Conrad K. (Colonel, U.S. Army)	Defense Intelligence Agency; 1964–1966, Vietnam (Operations Research Analyst, MACJ3); Desk Officer, MACV Political Warfare; Senior Advisor, Vietnamese Armed Forces Psychological Warfare Directorate; Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, 1st U.S. Infantry Division.
HEMPHILL, John A. (Colonel, U.S. Army)	Director, Company Operations Department, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia; Commander of the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 1972–1973; assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, 1969–1971.
HENDERSON, John W.	Retired career Foreign Service Officer; Washington bureau, Associated Press, before World War II; served with U.S. Army during World War II; served as FSO in Shanghai, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Japan, Thailand, Indonesia; attended National War College; author of *The United States Information Agency.*
HERZ, Martin F.	Career U.S. Foreign Service Officer (1946 to present); currently U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria; formerly Deputy and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs; officer, U.S. Army, 1941–1946 (member, Psychological Warfare Team, Fifth U.S. Army in Italy and chief leaflet writer, PWD/SHAEF, 1944–1945); translator, broadcasting company, 1939–1940; author of many articles on psychological warfare and

	psychological operations; author of *Beginnings of the Cold War.*
HOLLANDER, Gayle D. (F. Gayle Durham)	Assistant Professor of Political Science, Hampshire College; Research Assistant, Communist Political Communications Project, MIT, 1963–1964; Foreign Service Officer, USIS, assigned to USSR, 1964–1965; taught at Amherst and Mount Holyoke colleges; author of *Radio and Television in the Soviet Union, News Broadcasting on Soviet Radio and Television, Amateur Radio Operation in the Soviet Union, The Use of Free Time by Young People in Soviet Society, Soviet Newspapers and Magazines,* and *Soviet Political Indoctrination: Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda Since Stalin.*
HOLT, Robert T.	Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota and Director, Center of Comparative Studies of Technological Development and Social Change; author, *Radio Free Europe;* coauthor, *The Political Basis of Economic Development, Political Parties in Action, Competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics, Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy;* coeditor, *The Methodology of Comparative Research.*
HOSKINS, Marilyn W.	Social anthropologist; no further information available.
HURLEY, Cornelius P., S.J.	Founder and Director, Institute of Social Communications, Bellarmine Center, Santiago, Chile; author of *Theology in Film* and *Sociology in Film.*
JANIS, Irving L.	Professor of Psychology, Yale University; Research Assistant, Study of Wartime Communications, Library of Congress, 1941; Senior Social Science Analyst, Special War Policies Unit, Department of Justice, 1941–1943; U.S. Army, 1943–1945; research, Social Science Research Council, 1945–1947; author, *Air War and Emotional Stress, Psychological Stress;* coauthor, *Communications and Persuasion, Personality and Persuasibility.*
JOHNS, John H. (Brigadier General, U.S. Army)	ODCSPER, DA, 1974; Instructor in Psychological Operations, Special Warfare School, 1960–1962; Senior Advisor/Instructor,

	Vietnam Political Warfare School, 1962–1963; research and operations related to psychological operations, U.S. Army Staff, 1964–1968; Associate Professor of Psychology and Leadership, U.S. Military Academy, 1968–1970; Office, Chief of Staff, Army, 1971–1973; M.A. Psychology; M.S. International Affairs; Ph.D. candidate (Sociology).
JOHNSTON, William F. (Colonel, U.S. Army)	Member, staff and faculty, National Interdepartmental Seminar, Foreign Service Institute; assigned to Office, Chief of Psychological Warfare, 1953; several Special Warfare-type assignments, including command of PSYWAR battalion in USARPAC; Chief, JUSPAO Planning Office, Vietnam, in previous assignment.
KATAGIRI, Taro (Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)	Career military officer; assignments included command of 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam.
KATZ, Phillip Paul (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)	Senior Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research; Psychological Operations Instructor and Lecturer at Army Special Warfare Center, 1956–1963; Psychological Operations Officer at Department of Army and Senior PSYOP Officer for U.S. Army, Pacific, 1963–1967; Senior Program Manager for Development of Strategic Psychological Operations in Support of Field Activities, Vietnam, 1967–1968; developed a computerized PSYOP management information system for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of the Army; author of studies on PSYOP.
KELLY, George A.	Professor of Politics, Brandeis University; Research Associate, Center of International Affairs, Harvard University, 1961–1964, 1967–1968; author of *Idealism, Politics and History* and *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and the Empire in Crisis: 1947–1962;* coeditor of *Internal War and International Systems.*
LANIGAN, John Dennis (Major, USMC, Ret.)	Associate Director in the Policy Analysis Department, Operations Analysis Division, General Research Corporation; graduate of Counterinsurgency and Special

	Warfare Staff Officer Course and of Psychological Operations Officer Course, both at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
LANSDALE, Edward Geary (Major General, USAF, Ret.)	Retired career officer, USAF; served OSS during World War II; deeply involved in psychological operations and counterinsurgency planning for Southeast Asia throughout postwar period.
LERNER, Daniel	Ford Professor of Sociology and International Communication, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; has taught at Stanford and New York universities; World War II, intelligence officer, PWD/SHAEF; Chairman, International Committee, World Association of Public Opinion Research, 1961–1963; author of *The Passing of Traditional Society, Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany, Comparative Study of Symbols;* coauthor, *World Revolutionary Elites;* coeditor, *The Policy Sciences.*
LESCAZE, Lee	Washington Post Foreign Service.
LE VINE, Victor T.	Professor of Political Science, Washington University (St. Louis); also taught at UCLA; author, *The Cameroon from Mandate to Independence, Political Leadership in Africa, The Cameroon Federal Republic.*
LINEBARGER, Paul M.A.	In 1930–1936, Secretary to the Legal Advisor, Nationalist Government, Republic of China; U.S. Army, 1942–1946; Far Eastern specialist, Office of War Information, 1942; taught at Harvard, Duke, and Johns Hopkins universities, 1936–1965; author of *Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen, Government in Republican China, The China of Chiang K'ai-shek, Psychological Warfare.*
LITTLE, John M.	Infantry captain (1966); no further information available.
LONG, Chuong Dac	No information available.
LORIMOR, E. S.	Involved in communications research in Barcelona, Spain; formerly evaluator of teacher education project in Nigeria; Ph.D. in mass communications from the University of Wisconsin.

LOVETT, Colburn B.	Foreign Service Information Officer, USIA, currently assigned to the Operations Center Staff, Office of the Director, USIA; formerly, PSYOP Planning Officer, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army; Senior Field Representative of JUSPAO in a previous assignment; also served in Korea and Thailand.
MACY, William T. (Major, USMC, Ret.)	U.S. Marine Corps (1970) no further information available.
MARTIN, L. John	Professor of Journalism, University of Maryland; reporter, editor, correspondent, Middle East newspapers, 1941–1947; copy editor, *Detroit Free Press*, 1957–1958; Chief, Near East-South Asia Division, Office of Research, USIA, 1961–1966; Coordinator, Overseas Research, USIA, 1966–1967; Chief, Program Analysis Division, USIA, 1967–1969; author, *International Propaganda*.
McAULAY, A.H.D. (Warrant Officer, Australian Army)	Australian Army Intelligence Corps; linguist, attached to Australian forces in Vietnam.
McKAY, Vernon	Professor of African Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; foreign affairs officer, Department of State, 1948–1956; Research Associate, Foreign Policy Association, 1945–1948; also taught at Syracuse University; author, coauthor, and editor of over 100 publications on Africa.
MIDDLETON, Casilear (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)	No further information available.
MILLER, Gerald Raymond	Professor of Communication, Michigan State University; taught at the State University of Iowa and the University of Washington at Seattle; author of *Speech Communication: A Behavioral Approach;* coauthor of *New Techniques of Persuasion.*

MONROE, James L.	President, Preston and Associates; Colonel, U.S. Air Force Reserve, on active duty during World War II and Korean War, heavily involved in leaflet drops (including development of Monroe Leaflet Bomb) and interrogation; contract research following Korean War.
MOON, Gordon A., II (Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)	Formerly Information Officer, Headquarters, Fifth Army, Fort Sheridan, Illinois (1967); no further information available.
MORRIS, Michael A.	Fellow, Canadian Institute of International Affairs (1970); taught at Gallaudet College.
MORRIS, Robert P. (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army)	Operations Research Analyst, Office of the Comptroller of the Army; taught at Florida State University and University of Maryland (Far East Division); Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, 1st Infantry Division, in Vietnam, 1967–1968, supervising U.S. Army tactical psychological operations in five provinces; graduate of U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
MOSKOS, Charles C., Jr.	Professor and Chairman of the Sociology Department, Northwestern University; author of *The American Enlisted Man, Public Opinion and the Military Establishment,* and *Peace Soldiers.*
MOYNAHAN, Brian	No information available.
MURTY, B. S.	Head, Department of Law, Andhra University (India).
NATHAN, Reuben S.	Communications consultant; Special Events Editor, Office of War Information, 1942–1945; Chief, Anglo-American joint magazine publications project, SHAEF, 1945–1946; periodicals section, U.S. Department of State and Department of the Army, 1946–1950; Policy Director, RFE, 1950–1962; Colonel, GS UAR and Chief of Planning, JUSPAO, Vietnam, 1965–1966.
NIEHOFF, Arthur H.	Professor and Chairman, Department of Anthropology, California State College at Los Angeles; also taught at University of Wisconsin; Assistant Curator, Milwaukee Public Museum, 1951–1959; Advisor in community

	Development, USAID, Laos, 1959–1961; Research Scientist, Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO), 1963–1968; author, *East Indians in the West Indies;* coauthor, *Introducing Social Change, Casebook of Social Change.*
NORTON, John H.	Director of International Operations, Keysor-Century Corporation and consultant on international operations for business; Lieutenant Commander U.S. Naval Reserve; naval aviator, 1960–1963; extensive overseas travel; degrees from Yale and Stanford; recently competed a year of advanced studies in economic and political development at Harvard and M.I.T.
OKES, Imogene E.	Education Specialist, U.S. Office of Education; State Department, 1945–1948; U.S. Navy Department, 1948–1952; International Institute, 1955–1956; Research Associate, Special Operations Research Office, American University, 1957–1961; Researcher, State Department Institute for Defense Analysis, 1962–1963; author of *Psychological Operations—Afghanistan, Participation in Adult Education 1969: Initial Report.*
ORTH, Richard H.	Senior Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research; coauthor of a study on Community Relations Advisory Councils and a PSYOP Research Guide.
OZAKI, John (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army)	Career military officer; assigned to Department of Army (1969); served with ASA, headquarters 7th Army, MACV, and in the infantry in Korea; graduate, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; no further information available.
PAPPAS, Dino G.	Geographer, U.S. Army, Concepts Analysis Agency; Federal Energy Administration, 1974; Cost of Living Council, 1973; Battelle Memorial Institute, 1972–1973; American Institutes for Research studying models of PSYOP officers' qualifications; Research Analysis Corporation, 1962–1970; Air Force Intelligence Center, 1958–1962; Army Map Service, 1955–1958; author of *The Role of*

Communications in the Military Assistance Program (MAP).

PIKE, Douglas Eugene — Career officer, USIA, currently North Vietnamese Affairs Officer, USIA, Saigon; formerly Special Assistant to Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, USIA; newspaper reporter, 1945–1946; newspaper editor (Okinawa) and radio network editor (Tokyo), DA, 1950–1951, 1954–1956; Public Information Officer, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, 1951–1952; Radio Writer, USIA, Washington, 1958–1960, 1964; assigned to Saigon, 1960–1964, 1965–1967 and Hong Kong, 1967–1969; author of *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam; War, Peace, and the Viet Cong.*

POOL, Ithiel de Sola — Professor, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; also taught at Stanford University and Hobart College; member, USAF Scientific Advisory Board and the Defense Science Board; author of *Symbols of Democracy, Symbols of Internationalism;* coauthor of *Candidates, Issues and Strategies, American Business and Public Policy;* editor of *Talking Back, Handbook of Communication.*

PRESTON, Harley Oliver — Senior Staff Member, American Psychological Association; Psychological Assistant, U.S. Army Air Forces, 1942–1945; taught at Kent State University, 1941–1942, 1946–1947; Executive Scientist (1947–1960) and Director, International Division (1961–1964), American Institutes for Research; author of *Operations of the Participant Training Program of AID.*

PRICE, James Robert — Coordinator, Major Issues System, Office of the Director, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress; employed by State Department and Central Intelligence Agency, 1950–1957; Washington, D.C. representative and Executive Director, Jami'at al Islam, Inc., 1957–1962; Manager, Cultural Information Analysis Center, American Institutes for Research, Kensington Office, 1962–1970; Technical Director, National Media Analysis, 1962–1972; author of *Radio Free*

Europe—A Survey and Analysis and numerous other studies in the social science field.

QUANG, Phan Trong — No information available.

RAFFA, Aldo L. (Colonel, USAF, Ret.) — No further information available.

RAO, Y. V. Lakshmana — Secretary General, Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Center, Singapore; newspaperman and broadcaster, New Delhi, India, 1947–1957; Research Fellow, Institute for Communication Research, Stanford University, 1961–1963; Deputy Director, Press Institute of India, 1963–1964; Program Specialist, UNESCO, 1964–1969; Senior Specialist, East-West Center, University of Hawaii, 1969–1970; author of *Communication and Development.*

ROBINSON, David D. — Management Consultant Supervisor, Ernst & Ernst; clinical psychologist training, U.S. Veterans Admin., 1961–1964; industrial psychology consulting, 1963–1966; Research Psychologist, Battelle Memorial Institute. 1966–1968; author of *A Brief Review Study of the Problems of Criteria in Psychological Warfare.*

ROLPH, Hammond (Commander, USN, Ret.) — Executive Assistant to the Director, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Southern California, and Consulting Editor, *Studies in Comparative Communism;* retired career (21 years) naval intelligence officer; author of *Vietnamese Communism and the Protracted War;* coauthor of *Communism in Vietnam.*

RONALDS, Francis S., Jr. — Deputy Executive Director, Radio Liberty; News Manager and Program Manager, Radio Liberty, 1952–1966; Deputy Director (Programs), Voice of America, 1966–1971.

RUBIN, Bernard — Professor of Governmental Affairs, School of Public Communication, Boston University; has also taught at Skidmore and Brooklyn colleges and Rutgers University; Chief, Research Design Unit, U.S.I.A., 1968–1969; author of *Political Television, Report to the Government of Massachusetts* (on

reporting and public information), *Report to the Secretary of the U.S. Air Force on the Information Function in USAFE, Report on Presidential Debates and American Politics, Public Relations and the Empire State.*

SARAL, Tulsi Bhatia — Formerly Head, Department of Mass Communications, Literacy House, Lucknow, India; Editor and Information and Publications Officer, Government of Uttar Pradesh, India; Editor of *Nava Yuvak* for five years; author of twelve books in Hindi.

SCHRAMM, Wilbur — Currently with the East-West Center; formerly Professor, Director of Institute of Communications Research, Stanford University; also taught at universities of Illinois and Iowa; director, Education Division, Office of War Information, 1942–1943.

SIMPSON, Howard Russell — Newspaper writer, staff artist, 1950–1951, 1956; press service correspondent and free-lance writer, 1955–1956; State Department, 1951–1952; career USIA officer, assigned to Vietnam (1954–1956; Advisor to Prime Minister and to Political Warfare Section ARVN, 1964–1965), Nigeria, France, and Algeria.

SMITH, Don D. — Professor of Sociology, Florida State University.

SPARKS, Kenneth — Deputy Director, Federal City Council (Washington, D.C.); U.S. Marine Corps, 1957–1960; Social Science Analyst, USIA, 1964–1967 (Chief, European Research Division, 1965–1967); Director, Public Affairs, Office of Economic Opportunity, 1967–1969.

STONE, Vernon A. — Assistant Professor of Journalism, University of Wisconsin.

SUGDEN, G. Scott — Career officer, USIA; currently, Program Coordinator, North Africa, Near East, South Asia; previously assigned to India, Pakistan, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam

SZALAY, Lorand Bertalan — Senior Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research; while Associate Professor in Research at The American University, developed the Associative Group Analysis method; taught also at George Washington University. Consultant to the Library of Congress; author and coauthor of numerous arti-

cles in social science journals on communications and methodology. Among these publications are: *"Ideology: Its Meaning and Measurement," "Designing and Testing Cogent Communications," "Verbal Associations in the Analysis of Subjective Culture," "Measurement of Psychocultural Distance: A Comparison of American Blacks and Whites," Communication Lexicon on Three South Korean Audiences, Domains: Family, Education, and International Relations," "Psychological Meaning: Comparative Analyses and Theoretical Implications."*

TANAKA, Yasumasa — Professor of Social Psychology and Communications, Gakushuin University, Tokyo, Japan; has also taught at universities of Pennsylvania and Saskatchewan; author of four books (in Japanese) on human communication and subjective culture; editor of *Cross-Cultural Social Psychology Newsletter;* Associate Editor of *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology.*

THEBAUD, Charles C. (Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.) — Formerly Staff Officer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Fort Benning, Georgia; no further information available.

THORNTON, Thomas Perry — Member, Policy and Coordination Staff, U.S. Department of State; Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, India, 1955–1958; Analyst, U.S. Navy Department, 1958–1963; Chief, Division of Research and Analysis for South Asia, U.S. State Department, 1963–1969; has taught at George Washington, American, and Johns Hopkins universities; coauthor of *Grobianische tischzuchten;* editor, *The Third World in Soviet Perspective;* coeditor, *communism and Revolution.*

TOO, C. C. — Head, Psychological Warfare Section, Malaysian Government.

TUCK, Robert L. — Director, Program Operations Division, Radio Liberty; Policy Director, Radio Liberty, 1961–1966; Foreign Affairs Analyst, Department of the Army and U.S. Air Force.

VALYUZHENICH, A. — Soviet analyst; no further information available.

VALERIANO, Napoleon (Colonel, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Ret.)	Army of the United States; 1946–1957, Armed Forces of the Philippines; attached to U.S. Military Mission in Indochina, 1954–1957; coauthor of *Counter-Guerrilla Operations—The Philippine Experience.*
VAN DE VELDE, Robert Whitsett (Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)	Professorial Lecturer, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University; career Army officer, 1935–1957; coauthor, *Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy.*
WATSON, Francis M., Jr. (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)	Media researcher, writer, and lecturer, National Media Analysis, Inc.; Deputy Manager, Cultural Information Analysis Center and Chief, Fort Bragg Field Office, American Institutes for Research; author of *Revolution in Executive Perspective, An Analytical Introduction to the Underground Press;* editor TUPART monthly reports on the underground press, 1971.
WECHSLER, Irving Robert	Senior Analyst, Evaluation and Analysis Staff, Office of Research, USIA; taught at Harvard, 1935–1943; Office of War Information, 1944–1945; State Department, 1945–1953; career USIA officer from 1953, occupying several policy guidance positions.
WHELAN, Joseph G.	Senior Specialist, International Affairs, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress; Staff Member, Far Eastern Commission, State Department, 1946; author of numerous reports published by the U.S. Congress on Soviet affairs.
WONG, Paul	Research Sociologist, specializing in Chinese sociology.
YAMASHITA, K. Stanley (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army)	Instructor, Human Behavior Branch, Psychological Warfare Department, U.S. Army Special Warfare School; foreign assignments with U.S. Army in Thailand, Japan, and Okinawa.
YARBOROUGH, William Pelham (Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Ret.)	Airborne officer during World War II; Provost Marshal of U.S. Forces in Austria after the war, organizing Four Power International Patrol; Director, Department of Troop Information and Educa-

tion, Armed Forces Information School, 1947–1949; NATO Plans Section, Joint American Military Advisory Group to Europe, 1950–1952; faculty, Army War College, 1953–1956; Deputy Chief, U.S. Military Advisory and Assistance Group to Cambodia, 1956–1957; Commanding General, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare and Commandant, U.S. Army Special Warfare School, 1961–1965; Senior Member, United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission in Korea, 1965; Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (Special Operations), 1965–1966; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, DA, 1966–1968; Deputy Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff, USARPAC, 1969 until retirement.

YOH, Bernard — Lecturer and consultant on Special Warfare; Advisor to President Diem, Republic of Vietnam, 1955–1963; worked with Maj. Gen. Lansdale as a special team counterinsurgent organizer, fighter, and advisor in Vietnam, 1965–1966; during 1937–1945, organized an anti-Japanese underground that included thieves and pickpockets of Shanghai; also organized bandits into a paramilitary guerrilla force.

YU, George T. — Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois; also taught at University of North Carolina and Stanford University; Advisory Editor, *Journal of Asian Studies;* author, *Party Politics in Republican China;* coauthor, *The Chinese Anarchist Movement.*

ZARTMAN, I. William — Professor and Head of department of Political Science, New York University; also taught at University of South Carolina; Executive Secretary, Middle East Studies Association; author of *International Relations in the New Africa; Problems of New Power: Morocco; Destiny of a Dynasty; Government and Politics in Northern Africa;* coauthor, *African Diplomacy, State and Society in Independent North Africa.*

ZORTHIAN, Barry R. — Vice President, Time Incorporated, President of Time-Life Broadcast, Inc.; news reporter and editor, 1936–1942, 1946–1947;

broadcast news writer, 1947–1948; Voice of America, 1948–1961; Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, India, 1961–1964; Minister-Counselor, Republic of Vietnam, 1964–1968 (Director, JUSPAO).

PROJECT DIRECTOR

POLLOCK, Daniel Carroll (Colonel, USMC, Ret.) — Former Principal Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research; substantial experience in politico-military affairs during military career; Chief, Asia Branch, Cultural Information and Analysis Center, American Institutes for Research; Project Director for the Ethnographic Study Series and several other classified and unclassified research projects.

THE EDITORS

McLaurin, Ronald De — Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research; Assistant for Africa, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), 1968–1969; Management Assistant, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1967–1968; author of and contributor to studies on the analysis of foreign policy, international politics, and social and international conflict; *The Middle East in Soviet Policy.*

ROSENTHAL, Carl F. — Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research; while at American Institutes for Research, conducted studies on insurgency and collective violence, civic action and psychological operations; author of a number of classified or limited publications in these fields; author of *Phases of Civil Disturbances: Problems and Characteristics, Social Conflict and Collective Violence in American Institutions of Higher Education.*

SKILLINGS, Sarah Africa — Research Associate, American Institutes for Research; Research Analyst, U.S. Army Security Agency; General Assistant, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization; editor of a number of publications dealing with military assistance, intercultural communications, psycholinguistics, and psychological operations; coauthor of a technical report on foreign population groups.

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THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: CASE STUDIES OF MILITARY APPLICATION

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THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

CASE STUDIES OF MILITARY APPLICATION

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE 1970s: A PROGRAM IN SEARCH OF A DOCTRINE*

By Robert F. Delaney

An overview of U.S. PSYOP in the past and its implications for the future.

I. BACKGROUND

Projection of American military strategy into the 1970s must be done with careful attention to the total national experience of the postwar era, which is seen by qualified observers as coming to an end. Not only does the United States face a considerably different geo-political situation in the 1970s, but for the first time in thirty years, the American economic resource base is admittedly limited, thus exercising a restraining influence on continued sizeable economic and military assistance programs abroad and defense fiscal year budgets at home. Extension of military thinking into the decade ahead, however, involves considerably more than analyses of the shifting balance of great power relationships as measured against the ever present risk of nuclear warfare.

The entire sweep of American military experience since 1945 is now subject to review. Indeed, in the opinion of such scholars and observers as Samuel Huntington, Thomas Schelling, Morton Halperin, Adam Yarmolinsky and Lyman Kirkpatrick, the United States will have missed a greatly needed opportunity to prepare its national future in a sane, responsible manner if a review is not made. Yet, such a review will most likely be painful, for the parochial and bureaucratic interests of the foreign affairs community and the military establishment will be subject to scrutiny, at times unfavorably. Nonetheless, the need for a sweeping review is quite evident. It would seem that an American style Esher War Committee, paralleling its famous early 1900 British counterpart, should address the doctrinal, organizational, and operational makeup of the American strategic posture and its military force structure. The times call for nothing less.

This paper attempts to address one small segment of such an overall perspective: psychological warfare doctrine and psychological operations past and future. It should be clearly understood that a critical analysis of future American psywar doctrine and its implementation cannot be precise. Psychological operations are not yet fundamentally quantifiable.[1] Beyond the field of public opinion research, social science has not yet developed reliable, accurate measuring techniques with direct applicability to field psychological operations.

But, it is the writer's view that psychological operations suffer less from impreciseness and lack of measurement of effectiveness than from a

*Adapted from a paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar on the Armed Forces, Chicago, Ill., November 1971. Reprinted with the permission of the author.

basic lack of definition, acceptance, and understanding. As a result, its very position within the national security structure is questionable and, in consequence, the organizational influence and the role of psychological operations have never received their proper due. There is ample historical reason for this position: in general, and despite notable but singular American achievements in the field, especially during World War II and at the outset of the "Cold War," American psychological doctrine and its implementation, both civil and military, have been deficient.

II. EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

American psychological doctrine is an outgrowth of three concepts: first, a felt national need for explaining America's position in and to the world; second, a pragmatic conviction that advertising,née propaganda American style, was an instrument peculiar to the American genius and deserving of national attention; and third, a reluctant acceptance of the proposition that psychological warfare, somehow or other, represented a tactical weapons system usable in war-time circumstances.

On the basis of this rather simplistic design the United States slowly evolved a doctrine of use variously termed and organized as propaganda in World War I, psywar in World War II, international information in the "Cold War" period (1947–60), and psychological operations in the Korea-Vietnam era. In retrospect, this pragmatic approach precluded the development of a single national doctrine and left the concept and programs to be fragmented among various agencies of government much as it stands today. The result for the policy makers and national leadership was a series of less than satisfactory half-triumphs and bureaucratic rivalries that by 1970 had caused a skeptical Congress to wonder about the cost effectiveness of American psychological initiatives.

In point of fact, however, the organizational impasse which so impeded the proper conceptualization of the psychological factor in national security planning and operations was only one reason for American myopia in this area. At root, a much more fundamental skepticism was at work, an anxiety deriving from the foundations of national character: in essence, Americans distrust political intrigue, propaganda and psychological manipulation. This, despite the impressive psychological victories of our history dating from the impact of the Declaration of Independence, to the offer of free land to the Hessians in the Revolutionary War period, down to the triumph of idealism in Wilson's Fourteen Points.[2] This suspicion is still with us and it is constantly reflected by Congressional refusal to permit the U.S. Information Agency to disseminate its output within the United States without specific per-case approval of Congress. While the American people have become quite accustomed to the manifold forms of commercial advertising, and while this same advertising industry and its expert practitioners have pioneered world acceptance of marketing and public relations, the political beliefs of the American people continue to resist the notion that psychological factoring has now become an instrument of modern statecraft. Americans tend to be long on

introspective idealism and short on patience; long on solutions and short on conceptualization. So too is it with the American overview to events psychologically considered or propaganda developed as a national motif. The American public believes rather than disbelieves that short tactical bursts of propaganda, wartime psychological coups cleverly arranged are acceptable, but deplorable in times of peace.

The psychological shortfalls in American policy and doctrine are due more to weaknesses in national world view than to technical deficiencies in operations. As Lippmann in his classic *Public Opinion* pointed out, "The world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind."[3]

This is a lesson still to be learned despite the Vietnams of this era, the communications revolution, and the intuitive American sense that something is wrong with our world view. It is precisely in our world view—a combination of innocence, idealism, and shrewdness that one finds the seeds reflecting national reluctance to enter fully into the international arena, though it scarcely can be doubted that in terms of treasure, commitment, and involvement the United States has done just that in the past quarter century. But as de Madariaga once pointed out, the world is full of foreigners, and Americans devoutly believe this as a psychological axiom of life. In short, America, as Max Lerner suggested, is a mixture of idealism and materialism based upon the "lengendry of America as the land of freedom."[4] From this belief there has evolved historically a peculiarly American world view: America's institutions are best suited for the pursuit of freedom; America is a force for peace in a cynical world; America fights its wars emotionally and totally with a view to return to normalcy as soon as possible.[5]

Against this background one can begin to sense the dilemma presented by the development of the psychological factor in national security affairs. For an idealistic, technologically oriented people, and its leadership to accept the premises of psychological warfare and its political constructs in peace and war as a normal permanent instrument of policy is a barrier that the nation has not yet breached. Fundamental to any long term pragmatic use of the psychological weapon is a determination as to whether America's world interests are subject to moral or realistic judgments as the bases of action programs. Strangely, if one studies the published observations of such diplomatists as Dean Acheson, George Kennan, and John Foster Dulles, there is a constant tension or conflict between the moral and the realistic in foreign affairs, an outgrowth no doubt of the idealistic and the pragmatic strains in our national makeup.[6] The fallout of this indecisiveness, amidst a history both strong in heroes and humanitarianism, as well as replete with villians and crassness, has resulted in the hobbling of a potentially vital aspect of modern military and diplomatic endeavor. Nonetheless, the United States has from time to time been enamored of the tool that is political warfare, psychological operations, international information, or progaganda,[7] and it has been

through this manner of fretful advance rather than through a considered national policy that psychological doctrine and its operations have grown in toleration if not in total acceptance during this century.

The first World War provided the stage for the massive and widespread introduction of propaganda and psychological warfare as instruments of modern conflict. The worldwide effort was a curious mixture of success and failure based upon what Paul Linebarger perceptively identified as each belligerent's "peacetime nonpolitical propaganda facilities."[8] The German effort foundered largely on national arrogance, bureaucratic inflexibility, and a firm belief in the Clausewitzian precepts of military victory. In short, Imperial Germany failed to communicate. At the time, and during the interwar years, it was a critically overlooked lesson. Britain, on the other hand, performed brilliantly on the psychological and political warfare front, exploiting the "rape of Belgium," German field terror, and the traditional bonds of Anglo-American language, commercial, and cultural ties. Yet British organizational efforts in the psychological area were compounded of four years of rivalry, agency jousting, and split commands. However, by 1918 the British had settled on an exportable Ministry of Information effort, a clever intelligence and communications security organization (monitoring and censorship), feeding both military and civilian channels, and a domestic National War Aims Committee which addressed the people of the United Kingdom.

The French effort, unlike the British, which featured its superb press communications and news facilities, was more modest and largely circumscribed by press control, image building, and astute diplomatic and cultural campaigning.

For the United States, the psychological warfare of World War I was a national departure from tradition, a giant step forward into the then-emerging world of international communications. It was both a temporary and a reluctant step, as seen by the structures which developed to harness and exploit the national motivational war effort and to "advertise" America as George Creel, presidential advisor and civilian director of the successful, free-flowing, and controversial U. S. Committee for Public Information, so proudly affirmed. The American effort as seen in the Creel Committee touched the civilian population, addressed neutrals, propagandized the enemy, supported our Allies, and even coped with the delicate matter of censorship. Administratively, Creel's bureau was supervised by a committee including the secretaries of Navy, War, and State. An intense rivalry, if not jealousy, arose between the State Department and the Creel Committee over jurisdiction abroad, a forerunner of behavior to be repeated in the immediate post-World-War-II period by the State Department and the Office of War Information (OWI) over the Voice of America. In contrast, the U. S. Army military intelligence quietly and effectively engaged in combat leaflet operations (at that time the only major available front line weapon) and pioneered enemy morale

studies, based upon a reading of German language press and indepth prisoner interrogations. The net effect of the army's program and Creel's innovative world advertising campaign was to lead to a German conviction that American propaganda was all-pervasive, and an American conviction that advertising was a unique native ability destined for greater things. It was out of this milieu that in the 1920s and 1930s America produced Walter Lippmann (who had served in the G–2 psywar effort) and his classic study of *Public Opinion* (1922); Edward L. Bernays (fresh from promoting the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic as a member of the Creel Committee), a leader in the public relations industry; and a George Creel, confident in his belief of *How We Advertised America* (1920), who could not switch to selling presidents.[9] The organizational structure of World War I had passed into the society at large, and as Henry Stimson once remarked we had removed ourselves from the business of reading other people's mail.

And so the American republic lapsed into its disastrous period of normalcy which persisted largely unchallenged until the eve of World War II. Great strides were made domestically in advertising, public relations, and mass communications. Social science research began its first efforts into market research, audience measurement, content analysis, and communications feedback. Radio made its commercial entry into the American market place as a new, prosperous entertainment medium. The motion picture arrived as a determinant of middle class values, a form of propaganda in itself. The techniques of propaganda and psychological warfare in typical fashion were being put to efficient, pragmatic use in America's *Middletown* environment.

However, as America turned inward politically and psychologically, a new world struggle was in the making. The march of Nazi and Fascist totalitarianism had begun. The affairs of empire and aggression were met in political struggle. Psychologically, the tempo accelerated, and for the first time during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), shortwave radio played a role in warfare. The stage for radio warfare had been carefully set; it was no accident. Beginning in 1927 Holland had started broadcasting to the Dutch East Indies. In 1932, the British Broadcasting Corporation commenced its Empire Service (later to evolve into the famous BBC External Services). Nazi Germany launched its *Auslandsdeutsche* programs in 1933; Fascist Italy followed in 1935 with broadcasts to Italians in Latin America; and that same year Japan initiated Japanese and English broadcasts to Hawaii. France joined the race in 1936. The United States did not follow the lead until war had set in. The Voice of America dates from 1942. In addition, British, French, Italian, and German informational and cultural activities were increased around the world. The arena was being prepared systematically for the terror of total warfare and the intensity of ideological conflict. In Russia, the Soviet experiment had survived and the Communists were busily perfecting techniques of subversive propaganda. Shortwave radio as a form of contact across vast

Siberian distances quickly became an instrument of news, indoctrination, and communications. Political warfare, psychological conditioning, and national propaganda became everyday tools in the hands of the totalitarian mandarins. In commenting on the situation, Whitton and Larson carefully summed up the state of psychological preparations in the interwar years:

> Propaganda reflected with remarkable accuracy the foreign policies of the respective states. Aggressive states employed aggressive propaganda, revolutionary states subversive propaganda. The peaceful states either used no propaganda at all or entered the psychological conflict only when forced into it. . . . However, as the powers were preparing for the great trial of arms they had commenced the struggle. . . . with all-out radio war.[10]

A somewhat bewildered yet confident civilian America entered the lists December 7, 1941. With the enthusiasm of near perfect morale and conviction bred of the rightness of the "great crusade," America mobilized. With mobilization came the organization of a formidable, complex, and jurisdictionally divided psychological warfare machine. It was a study in American political fear, executive compromise, and bureaucratic rivalry involving Nelson Rockefeller's cultural operations in Latin America, coordinated through the State Department; General William Donovan's covert psywar responsibilities within the uniformed Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S); Elmer Davis' civilian Office of War Information with duties in foreign and overt propaganda; and the individual armed services' effort in special warfare. In 1942, O.S.S. was given authority to develop psywar plans in support of military programs; by 1943, O.W.I. was given responsibility for official domestic war information dessemination, foreign information, and overt propaganda with linkages to the military through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Theater Commanders. Psywar in the field was handled by a psychological warfare division in the European Theater and a psywar branch in the southwest Pacific area. In Europe, American psychological warfare liaison with the British was excellent; in the Pacific, cooperation with Admiral Louis Mountbatten's command was minimal.[11]

It was largely on the bases of this multiple effort among often competing agencies that America's great reservoir of human talent and communications expertise was sent to war psychologically. American psychological doctrine was based upon two concepts: unconditional surrender and total victory. Politically, history has shown that the Allies might have achieved peace sooner had total victory not been the goal. Technically, while U. S. doctrine whatever its shortcomings was implemented with ingenuity and professional proficiency, by war's victorious end with military triumph at hand, the psychological weapon was once again largely dismantled. The reasoning paralleled the World War I experience: a democracy does not freely engage in political propaganda; psychological warfare is political trickery reluctantly used in all-out conflict.

Conspicuously absent from the early post-World-War-I-and-II arguments waged against the use of psychological warfare or propaganda

agencies in peacetime was the increasing role of ideology and systematic psychological manipulation of attitudes and events in the international arena. In this vein, the Congressional Record in 1918 could report such statements as:

> A bureau of publicity to exploit the various acts and departments of the Government, . . . is a very dangerous thing in a Republic because. . . it has tremendous power, and in ordinary peace-time I do not think any party or any administration would justify or approve it.[12]

Yet, the highly democratic and parliament-conscious British consider psychological operations in a much more systematic and long term manner which might be summarized as (1) determining the opinion not only of an opposing government but of the public on whose support that government depends and then (2) influencing that opinion.[13]

Thus, while British realism expressed the Crown's modest but well-defined approach to psychological and political warfare, and while the Soviet Union was mounting a massive and aggressive postwar propaganda effort directed at the West, the United States was fast retiring its psychological and communications functions. No fundamental doctrinal evaluation or psywar critique flowed from the wartime experience. Few scholars or thinkers addressed the problem.[14] The answer to America's postwar psychological posture came not from doctrine or from organization, for both were largely lacking, but from the fear generated by the worldwide propaganda, subversion, and espionage of the Soviet Bloc led by the USSR. In the name of anti-Communism, the U.S. government girded itself reluctantly once again, and, as part of the rearming, the Voice of America was saved from extinction, a residual information effort was maintained within the State Department, and cultural relations were, interestingly enough, upgraded in image and vitality. The military services, constrained by budgetary restrictions, inexperienced career personnel, and a World-War-II mentality, relegated psychological operations to contingency plans and reserve mobilization billets. The armed forces could not afford the luxury of the psychological weapon.[15]

It was on this thread of organizational chaos and doctrinal fear that the U. S. fought the Korean police action, a desperate, bloody exercise in political warfare which left Americans and their military leadership profoundly frustrated and disappointed because the American urge to victory, military decision, and decisiveness had been blunted. U.S. military professionals mindful of the administrative and personnel difficulties of World-War-II psywar were content to allow an unprepared, unequipped, and uncertain U.S. Information Agency [16] to carry the major burden under President Harry Truman's "Campaign of Truth." [17]

During this entire postwar period of intensifying "Cold War" (1948–60), the American emphasis was largely on organization and channels, a calculated effort to satisfy the various interested governmental agencies. However, individuals and government-sponsored research urged clearer assignments of responsibility, an acceptable priority for psychological doctrine, and a trained professional cadre capable of operating internationally across the spectrum of psychological and informational

activities. It was during this period that American psychological doctrine and operations first began to mature, if not to be fully accepted or implemented as modern instruments of statecraft. Pushed by the Army (especially the Office of the Chief of Speical Warfare), supported by the Department of Defense's Special Operations and Psychological Operations groupings, and encouraged at the White House level by such leading citizens (and practitioners) as C. D. Jackson, William Jackson, and Nelson Rockefeller, the movement, slow in operation, began.[18] Although the State Department continued to view propaganda and psychological operations as a combination of gimmickry and conduct unbecoming a diplomat, the press of world reality pushed the United States inexorably toward an awareness of the new psychological dimension of international political communications. Without quite realizing it, the psychological factor was becoming the "new diplomacy." [19]

Throughout this era the central civilian agency in the drama—the U.S. Information Agency (U.S.I.A.)—moved with caution and uncertainty. Created in 1953 by executive order as an independent agency of government charged with "telling America's story abroad," the Agency was given responsibility for overt international information activities of the U.S. government, some responsibility for "gray" area propaganda and liaison in the darker arts with the contingency military offices concerned, and an even more nebulous relation with the Central Intelligence Agency and its parent National Security Council. In addition, U.S.I.A., by arrangement with the State Department, was responsible for the operation abroad of cultural relations. Thus, one agency, never really completely accepted by the Congress, was charged with U. S. overseas press relations, overt propaganda, cultural relations, and from time to time (as in Korea and later in Vietnam) psychological warfare activities.[20] The Agency gradually developed an operational split, and no wonder, with a continuum of responsibilities, some almost contradictory (commented one officer: "waging psyops in Korea in one tour of duty and being cultural officer in Moscow the next tour is not exactly conducive to consistency and credibility"), little authority within the higher councils of government, and a career orientation among its officers toward the State Department's foreign service officer corps.[21] It was a time approximating what Bernard Rubin describes as the need for the emergence of "psychological peacefare."

III. THE SOVIET PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPT

Against this extended background of administrative and policy uncertainty, the Soviet Union through its international Communist network and ideological control mechanism developed a worldwide "organizational weapon" emphasizing a Pavlovian–repetitive doctrine of propaganda, a highly developed sense of tactics based upon political and psychological goals, and a competence in informal transnational penetration approximating what Andrew Scott terms "the revolution in statecraft."

While Americans argued about how to present the truth, and how to

organize for psychological operations, the Soviets raised ideology to an almost medieval level of zeal, and practiced indoctrination as a tried and true instrument of agitation and propaganda. Organizationally, there was no question but that the Soviets appreciated both the high risks and high rewards of aggressive political and psychological warfare. Starting with Lenin, who was a superb political organizer and propagandist, the Soviet state with its Communist ideology never lost sight of world opinion and psychological advantage. Their approach, contrary to the American technique, was not, as Wilbur Schramm has pointed out, "the word," but rather the hardened organizational cadre. "With the Communists," he observed, "there is no sharp separation between words and deeds, between political and military warfare.[22]

One can attempt to sum up the basic postwar distinctions between the American and Soviet approaches. The Americans have traditionally failed to integrate the psychological principle at the highest levels of government. Psychological warfare has been considered an orphan both of military operations and foreign affairs programming. Operationally, American practitioners have tended to be media oriented, public relations inclined, suspicious of communications research, and firm believers in the spoken and written word. As suggested, the Soviets, for their part, have been organizationally zealous, doctrinally oriented, and inclined to integrate psychopolitical inputs into strategy and tactics, wether diplomatic or military, before implementing programs of operations.[23]

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR

As pointed out in the conference report treating "American Public Diplomacy," whatever the pragmatic successes or shortfalls of American psychological operations may have been in the last half century, and despite intense Soviet interest in the psychological weapon, dramatic new inputs—involving technology, mass communications, private and public constituencies, and instant news—have arrived on the scene, changing forever the earlier political and military stance of psychological operations, and projecting a vastly different set of circumstances to be considered by Americans in the decade ahead.[24]

There is little doubt that the communications revolution of the 1960s, involving the worldwide availability of transistor radios, television, and multichannels of communications, including satellites, has made its mark on doctrine and policy of democrat and totalitarian alike. Today, the psychological impact of rising expectations and rising frustrations converge at a point on the communications spectrum, making the psychological consideration of policy an absolute must. Political communication, as Murray Dyer long ago pointed out, must be organized and respected.[25] This fact of psychological life is now generally accepted whether it be in the "selling of a president" or, as James Reston put it, in dealing with the "artillery of the press."[26] Thus, the advent of a world communications grid has forced the acceptance of a new psychological dimension in international politics and war. A goodly measure of the distress, anger, and frustration over Vietnam stems from the operations of this psychocom-

munications network. Older precepts of privilege, sanctity of information, news censorship, primitive propaganda principles, hallowed military traditions, and standard tactical operating procedures have been literally torn asunder, and the task for the 1970s comprises a basic rebuilding and re-formation of concepts. In the modern idiom of audiovisual communications, it is increasingly difficult to separate domestic information from international political communications. It is likewise well nigh impossible to divide act from word, example from preachment. The spectacular rise of television as a worldwide political instrument has rendered largely ineffective American compartmentalized psychological and propaganda operations, whether they be military as in Vietnam, informational as practiced by U.S.I.A., or news promotional as increasingly urged by government public affairs specialists.[27] What these developments suggest, of course, is that not only have our preoccupations and moderate successes in technique become outmoded, but the twenty-year search for a psychological doctrine has been overtaken by a revolution in technology, which as McLuhan has shown, led both to a "world tuned in" and yet sophisticated enough to differentiate between the hard images of radio and television and the frequently softer hues of official spokesmen and psychological warriors.[28]

V. U.S. ORGANIZATION FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Following what might be historically described as phase I of the "Cold War" (1948–1960) in which the United States stood firm politically and ideologically in defense of its overseas commitments, the complexities of Cuba, the Dominican intervention, and the extended Vietnamese conflict descended upon us and America, again, unprepared psychologically, entered the era of wars of national liberation, a complex model of social, psycho-political, and military factors designed to exploit national vulnerabilities, erode social and economic institutions, and encourage eventual indigenous insurgent takeovers of developing countries. From a psychological point of view, the choice of weapons was and is superb. A modern, conventional high-technology military force is at a basic disadvantage in such a circumstance. The warfare is more political, terroristic, and unconventional than traditionally military. It is warfare fought politically with the help of guerrillas and military force rather than warfare fought militarily with the help of political force. At no point, as Sir Robert Thompson has warned again and again, was the United States prepared adequately to understand and cope with this style and concept of people's war.[29] By 1962, President John Kennedy had tried to retool for political warfare with emphasis on Special Forces operations, military advisors, psychological operations, and coordinated overseas mission activities.[30] With the war escalating in 1965, President Johnson ordered creation of new forms to counter the threatening success of a Communist-directed people's war. The effort was organizational rather than doctrinal. At the Washington level, interested agencies under State Department chairmanship were layered into the Senior Interdepartmental Group with Interdepartmental Regional Groups immediately below. Beyond that, a Washington-level Vietnam Working Group was established and at the

theater level psychological operations were coordinated and directed by the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) with direction for military political warfare and combat psychological operations flowing from this innovative, functional joint civil-military organization.

However, despite a determined bureaucratic effort at coordination, the intensity of the war, the backlash at home brought on by the psychological impact of the communications revolution, the growing frustration of the U.S. Army over its increasing difficulties, and the U.S.I.A. reluctance to practice psychological warfare on a limited resource base led to a splintering of the U.S. psychological effort in-country. Once more, doctrine, never strong, suffered, and technique became an end in itself.[31] Today, with America firmly entered into the 1970s, the permanent organization of national PSYOP is still in large part philosophically ad hoc and administratively careerist oriented; the military, principally the U.S. Army, is still limited by manuals, inflexibility, and the system—although the Army has imaginatively established a career pattern for personnel interested in psychological operations, military assistance, and civil affairs. The time is opportune for a searching review of military-civil operations in the psychological-informational, counterinsurgency, and cultural areas.

VI. TOWARD A DOCTRINE OF THE 1970s

This paper has treated at considerable length the evolution of the American approach to psychological doctrine and operations. It has attempted to indicate where modern communications and Soviet Communist concepts enter the equation. It has done so because it is very nearly impossible to grasp the strengths and, above all, the weaknesses of the U.S. psychological effort without a fairly detailed review of where we are today and where we have come from, psychologically speaking. It seems apparent from what has gone before that America faces a serious task in pulling its psychological forces together for what promises to be the first full decade of instant world communications.

Let us briefly summarize the state of the art:

1. The United States lacks a coherent, government-wide doctrine of psychological operations.

2. The State Department still resists development of psychological initiatives in favor of traditional diplomatic method and leverage.

3. The U.S. military, for whom psychological operations remain tactically and politically important in a revolutionary era of change, has largely failed to adjust to the technical and professional standards required in today's communications environment.

4. The U.S. Information Agency stands in need of re-examination and reorganization. It has slowly lost its mission in the onrush of events and change, and it continues to maintain a structure based essentially on 1953 models.

5. Diplomacy secretly arrived at has given way to international politics psychologically arrived at. Both Moscow and Washington, not to mention Peking and Hanoi, are painfully aware of the open convenant of

public opinion and the growing participation of the masses in affairs of the earth.

Where does this situation leave the cause of the psychological dimension?

First, it demands that reality be faced. The United States has no alternative but to accept the necessity of a prudent psychological doctrine based upon legitimate and achievable foreign policy and national security needs and goals. A State Department that resents the loss of historic authority should no more prevent the updating of doctrine and technique than should a weakened Information Agency resist the implications of modern communications research or the military refuse to develop expertise in and sensitivity to psychological intelligence.

In the 1970s psychological operations of necessity will grow in importance and will encompass the entire foreign and military affairs comunity. The process has in fact already begun. Military planning and decisionmaking today risk failure if the psychological dimension is overlooked.[32] A recent U.S. Navy-sponsored study went so far as to suggest that to be responsive to the strategic environment and support the limited objectives of U.S. policy, "military operations should be conceived, planned, conducted and evaluated in the light of what they may or do communicate to foes, allies, and neutrals among diverse populations." [33] This type of thought does not surprise the modern communicator or psychological planner, but it does represent a departure for the policy decisionmaker. Yet evidence is rapidly accumulating that the new communications environment is at last being accepted in the strategic planning process. As such, it would appear likely that the psychological factor in national security will be in the 1970s a fully accepted equal to military, political, and economic inputs.[34]

If, as a result of reality, psychological doctrine does evolve as a handmaiden of necessity, it will surely not be confined to military PSYOP, but rather it will become an integral consideration in the development of national strategy and policies. It will cut across the government propaganda effort, across administration public affairs postures, information and cultural affairs. It will affect military training and deployments, tactics, and future operations. The 1970s will, in short, bring about a psychological environment made mandatory by communications technology and information flow.

This thesis is reinforced when one considers the array of security problems we face today without ready solution. For example, what permanent impact has the first televised war in history—Vietnam—had on domestic and foreign public opinion? Given the high discipline and strong psychological motivation of guerrillas and insurgents involved in "wars of national liberation," how can conventional military strategies be expected to defeat mobilized resistance and public opinion? How is mass opinion to be analyzed and mobilized in insurgencies? How is national policy to be sustained by popular support in the face of mass involvement through instant communications? One could extend the list almost indefinitely, but it is sufficent to observe that in such a world the psychological factor

becomes a basic consideration, and a doctrinal approach must inevitably follow.

Another area of change in the 1970s will be the reorganization of the military and foreign affairs approach to psychological operations. The Department of Defense, the military services, the State Department, U.S.I.A., and the Central Intelligence Agency will be forced to reform agency structures to conform to national need. Indeed, the intelligence community itself will be called upon to accept the challenges of warfare and diplomacy psychologically waged in what will be a major step forward in providing facts and information fundamental to the operational soundness of such programs.

Finally, after a long period of intellectual hostility there will be a gradual rapproachment between the community of psychological operators and the research community. The 1970s should provide the inpetus for pointed experimentation and research leading to development of techniques for the measurement of effectiveness, methodologies of analysis, and key psychological indicators. With the advent of communication theory, and its rapid advance, the professional calling and training of the psychological and information specialist will take on new meaning. The journalist turned propagandist, the teacher turned cultural ambassador, the military officer turned psy-warrior and advisor will move from the intuitive state (which will still be needed) to the professional level of communicator.

The 1970s will see a change in military environment, in professional training, in world cultural and psychological contact. Nation building will give way in our military assistance plans to the civic culture; military tactics will be leavened by increased attention to communications; and national strategy will find the psychological dimension as readily acceptable by the decade's end as the tank and machine gun were by November 1918.

NOTES

1. As deputy assistant director of field operations (Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office) in Vietnam, 1965–1966, and later as Assistant Director (research) of the U.S. Information Agency, the author found the effort to devise workable methodologies both urgent and futile.

2. The development of the Fourteen Points is in itself a fascinating insight into the potential of psychological operations. Edward L. Bernays in an interview with the author (7 June 1967) affirmed that the Creel Committee on Public Information, which functioned as a World War I temporary agency, was basically responsible for the development and initial dissemination of the 14 Points. The initiative came from Creel's representative in Russia who saw political advantage to be gained in Central and Eastern Europe by such an announcement.

3. Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: The Free Press,1965), p. 18.

4. Max Lerner, *America as a Civilization*, Vol. II (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 883.

5. While it is outside the scope of this paper, it is the widespread questioning of these beliefs, occasioned by the youth generation, the Vietnam War, and the challenge to governmental credibility that has brought serious ferment to American society and its institutions.

6. See Jane Van Hoogstrate, *American Foreign Policy: Realists and Idealists* (St. Louis, Mo.: Herder, 1960).

7. Typical of American ambivalance is the confusion engendered by the profusion of terminology carefully defined to explain and rationalize why America engages in psychological persuasion. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U. S. Information Agency, and the

Central Intelligence Agency can and do agree to definitions but the agreement ends there, and individual agency practices vary widely.

[8] Paul M. A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1954), p. 62.

[9] The literature of America's World War I propaganda effort is largely personal, idealistic and immodest. Among the most informative books are the following: George Creel, *How we Advertised America* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920); Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Techniques in the World War* (New York: Knopf, 1927); Paul Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*; and James Mock, and Cedric Larsen, *Words that Won the War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1939).*

[10] John Whitton and Arthur Larson, *Propaganda* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1963), pp.38–39.

[11] W. E. Daugherty, writing as co-editor (with Morris Janowitz) of *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958.) said of the period "U.S. propaganda was more the result of trial and error planning and ad hoc improvisations than of case blueprinting." (p. 126). The literature, however, is rich in the rather innovative, often brilliant successes organized by U.S. practitioners ranging from the operation of Radio Luxembourg to the U.S. Navy broadcasts aimed at German submariners, and Captain Ellis Zacharias' profoundly effective broadcasts to the Japanese home islands.

[12] U.S. Congress, House, *Congressional Record*, 65th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1918. (Congressman Gillett) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), p. 7915.

[13] See M.R.D. Foot, *SOE in Europe* (London: HMSO, 1966) for an insight into the British approach.

[14] Among the faithful and concerned few were scholar/practitioners such as Harold Lasswell, Phillips Davison, Paul Linebarger, C.A.H. Thomson, Daniel Lerner, Hans Speier, and Martin Herz.

[15] It is a sad truism that until the Vietnam War the American military hierarchy, conventional and hardware oriented as it then was, saw little need for psywar expertise, especially since career men found it "promotionally disadvantageous" and, perhaps more tellingly, were suspicious of the talented, unorthodox, decidedly nonmilitary "psy-warriors" who filled the ranks during wartime.

[16] The saga of our international information effort and the organizational ups and downs of the information agency is without the scope of this paper: nonetheless, the story is symptomatic of our national indecision regarding the role of psychological operations.

[17] In fairness to the military, delimitation agreements and organizational arrangements bridging the Truman-Eisenhower administrations, ranging from JCS contingency planning (largely army oriented) to the Psychological Strategy Board and the Operations Coordinating Board, were efforts to place psychological policy control within the State Department control, and action programs within CIA and USIA purview, with the military services often cast as subsdiary role players.

[18] Tribute must be given to the many able experts in the psychological vineyard ranging from Murray Dyer for his rethinking of doctrine, Lloyd Free and his pioneering work in international public opinion research, Paul Blackstock for his careful examination of Soviet and Nazi psychological techniques, Wilbur Schramm for his studies in mass communications, Joseph Klapper for his analyses of shortwave propaganda, and Robert Strausz-Hupe for his penetrating theory of Sino-Soviet protracted conflict based on the psycho-political dimension.

[19] See A. S. Hoffman, *International Communication and the New Diplomacy* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1968). Also W. P. Davison, *International Political Communication* (New York: Praeger, 1965). During this period as operations and doctrine were being argued and advanced, government experts writing under pseudonyms often took their cases to the public. Typical of this category of period argument were John Amory's *Around the Edge of War.* (New York: Potter, 1961); and Christopher Felix's *A Short Course in the Secret War* (New York: Dutton, 1963).

[20] In time of declared war, USIA would fall under military field control. This is legally acceptable, but in point of experience rather useless since Korea, Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Vietnam were involvements short of declared war.

[21] See Smith Simpson, *Anatomy of the State Department* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967); also John F. Campbell, *The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).
[22] Taken from Wilbur Schramm's article "Soviet Concept of Psychological Warfare," in Daugherty and Janowitz, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, p. 779.
[23] A review of Lenin's often brilliant analyses quickly assures the reader of the importance psychology, organization, and propaganda play in the Soviet concept. For other insights consult: Robert Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind* (New York: Praeger, 1963); Alex Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1950); Raymond Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953); E. M. Earle, *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1952 (Chapters 7 and 14); and S. Possony, *A Century of Conflict* (Chicago: Regnery, 1953).
[24] John Gibson and Robert Delaney, *American Public Diplomacy The Perspective of Fifty Years* (Medford, Mass.: Tufts University Press, 1967). See also "The Future of United States Public Diplomacy" (U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969); and "Modern Communications and Foreign Policy," U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967).
[25] Murray Dyer, *The Weapon on the Wall* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins, 1959). p.58.
[26] James Reston, *The Artillery of the Press* (New York: Harper and Row. 1967).
[27] One finds a growing critical literature in this area. Typical are the following selected titles: Edward Bernays and Burnet Hershey, *The Case for Reappraisal of U. S. Overseas Information Policies and Programs* (New York: Praeger, 1970); William Small, *To Kill a Messenger: Television News and the Real World* (New York: Hastings House, 1970); Phil Goulding, *Confirm or Deny: Informing the People on National Security* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); Ben Bagdikian, *The Information Machines* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
[28] For a brilliant contrast between the real and the unreal in military psywar, compare Barry Zorthian's careful yet candid essay, "The Use of Psychological Operations in Combatting Wars of National Liberation," presented at a National Strategy Information Center Conference, March 11–14, 1971 and an article from *Army Digest* (pp. 8–10) of December 1970 titled "Psyoperators—They Use Words as Weapons" by Major M. L. Plassmeyer.
[29] See the treatment in Sir Robert Thompson, *Revolutionary War in World Strategy 1945–1969* (New York: Taplinger, 1970).
[30] In 1962 the government formed a Joint Inter-Agency Committee to supervise U. S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy, promulgated earlier by President Kennedy and expressed in a circuitous form in his letter to American Ambassadors Abroad, 27 May 1961. (Washington, Federal Register, 17 November 1961, p. 10749). The Army, not U.S.I.A., was assigned the primary psychological contingency role. The U.S.I.A. role and involvement expanded during the directorship of Edward R. Murrow who enjoyed influence and prestige in White House political decision-making circles.
[31] The fascinating story of PSYOP in Vietnam has not yet been definitively told. It is a case study rich in experience and lessons. While such a study would reflect positively on many of the personnel involved, it would also reflect on Amierca's outmoded psychological apparatus.
[32] The 1970 U.S. incursion into Cambodia represented one of the last major military operations planned and executed without serious analysis of the psychological factor—at home and abroad.
[33] James Dodson et al., *The Role of Psychological Operations in Naval Missions* (McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, 1968). p. ii.
[34] See R. F. Delaney, "The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy," a lecture delivered at the Armed Forces Staff College, May 27, 1971.

CHAPTER II
THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF PSYOP

INTRODUCTION

During the 1960s, the use of psychological instruments for national political and military purposes expanded dramatically. As a result, by the early 1970s military employment of PSYOP was no longer limited to combat propaganda or psychological warfare, was no longer viewed, as in World War II and Korean conflict times, as a specialized and subordinate operation. Today the scope of PSYOP encompasses diverse activities—nonmilitary as well as military—in support of national objectives.

PSYOP is communication and therefore covers the entire field of human action. (See the essay by Phillip Katz in this chapter.) Giving rise to the greater scope attributed to the psychological factor in international political and military relations has been a fuller understanding of the field of communication. Communications research has grown so rapidly that many sociological and psychological concepts previously confined to the academic world have influenced or compete to influence revisions of PSYOP concepts and doctrine.

As long as PSYOP retained its constricted image as a minor and almost arcane support to military operations, such matters as rational training, thorough understanding, systematic evaluation, and resulting improvement were elusive. Recognition that PSYOP is essentially a form of communications has both clarified the wide range of potentially contributing fields (for example, psychology, sociology, communications, political science, economics, and anthropology) and, at the same time, obfuscated many of the previously accepted assumptions of PSYOP by subjecting it to the debates going on within these diverse fields.

Even the recognition in the early 1970s that communications are an important part of the political strategy of all countries did not result in a willingness to fully acknowledge psychological strategy and initiatives as acceptable in American political and military operations in peacetime. For years, reluctance to accept the use of persuasive communications precluded the development of basic conceptualization and systematic doctrine. Thus, it is understandable that confusion arose about several doctrinal concepts. Some contended that official Defense Department definitions were too broad and nebulous.

The situation might have continued indefinitely if the United States had not become intimately involved in the socioeconomic development of many foreign nations in the 1960s. The cruciality of communications was evident in carrying out this massive and multifaceted commitment to assist developing areas. Technical cooperation, security assistance, development of supporting national conciousness—each aspect of the American effort depended upon communications. In this context, a specific area of concern is how PSYOP relates to other overseas, nonmilitary missions and activities such as civil affairs, civic action, community relations, troop information, and public information.

Perhaps as a result of this experience, a large effort to integrate psychological operations with the other techniques of supporting national objectives was undertaken in the military. By the early 1970s this effort was still in its formative stages, often reflected more in training and long-range planning than in operations, but the recognition that PSYOP was closely related to other politico-military tools was clear. Indeed, the U.S. Army, in particular, attempted to develop career programs recognizing PSYOP as one of the key politico-military fields.

The essays in this chapter reflect the broad range of thought associated with the nature and scope of PSYOP: the reasons for its importance, its relationship to communication theory, the context of its employment, and the relationship of PSYOP to other Army activities as well as to broad policy objectives. Whatever fluidity of thinking is represented by these essays, PSYOP portends to become an even more essential activity in the years ahead.

ORIGIN OF PSYOP TERMINOLOGY*

By William E. Daugherty

An account of the origin of the terms PSYWAR and PSYOP

It has been amply demonstrated that American employment of propaganda, psychological warfare (PSYWAR), psychological operations (PSYOP), or whatever one chooses to call the activity that these terms are intended to describe is neither revolutionary nor un-American. In this essay the origins of the terms "PSYWAR" and "PSYOP" will be described.

PSYWAR AND PSYOP

The terms "psychological operations" and "psychological warfare" are often used interchangeably to identify an activity or function as old as human conflict or intercultural group relations. Both terms, however, are known to be of relatively recent origin. Psychological warfare was first used in 1920 and psychological operations in 1945.

The British military analyst and historian, J. F. C. Fuller, is believed to have been the one who coined the term "psychological warfare," when in 1920, in a scholarly analysis of lessons learned during World War I, especially as these related to the employment of such new weapons as armor, he allowed his mind to wander imaginatively about the character of the future battlefield. In his treatise on tanks he prophesied that traditional means of warfare, as then known and understood, might in time be

> replaced by a purely psychological warfare, wherein weapons are not used or battlefields sought . . . but [rather] . . . the corruption of the human reason, the dimming of the human intellect, and the disintegration of the moral and spiritual life of one nation by the influence of the will of another is accomplished.[1]

Although Fuller's employment of the term is believed to have been the earliest recorded use of the phrase, there is not thought to be any direct connection between his use and the widespread adoption of it by Ameri-

*Original essay by William E. Daugherty.

cans on the eve of World War II. The British did not adopt the term to describe what both they and the Americans hesitated to describe as propaganda operations. Instead of employing the term "PSYWAR," the British adopted the term "political warfare" to describe those activities that Americans came to identify in time as psychological warfare or PSYWAR. Since World War II the British have followed American practice and now use the term "SYWAR" to describe the activities they previously identified as political warfare. The earliest recorded use of the term "psychological warfare" in an American publication occurred in January 1940 when an article entitled "Psychological Warfare and How to Wage It" appeared in a popular American journal.[2]

The earliest recorded use of the term "psychological operations" occurred early in 1945 when Captain (later Real Admiral) Ellis M. Zacharias, U.S. Navy, employed the term in an operation plan designed to hasten the surrender of Japan. Without any description or explanation, the term was used in the context "All psychological operations will be coordinated both as to times and trends in order to avoid reduction of effectiveness of this main operation." [3] The next use of the term was in 1951, when the Truman Administration renamed an interagency strategy committee giving it the title Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee. Neither in 1945 nor in 1951 did the use of the term "psychological operations" create so much as a ripple of interest.

Although the Department of the Army made the change in 1971, it was not until the 1960s that psychological operations came to supplant psychological warfare as the all-inclusive term in common use. Any explanation of this development must take into account the fact that Americans have become increasingly concerned about the continued use of a term that includes the word "warfare" to describe an activity that is directed to friends and neutrals as much or more than to hostile or potentially hostile people. Examples are the Lebanon crisis of 1958 and the Dominican Republic intervention of 1965.

In the late 1960s, with the widespread use of psychological operations in Indochina, emphasis was placed upon the need to integrate PSYOP with other training and operations and upon the reinforcement which other missions could lend to psychological operations. The psychological objective of military assistance and civic action, for example, was more fully stressed.

NOTES

1. J. F. C. Fuller, *Tanks in the Great War*, 1914–1918 (London: Murray, 1920, p. 320.
2. Anon., "Psychological Warfare and How To Wage It," *Current History and Forum*, LI (January 1940), pp. 52–53.
3. Ellis M. Zacharias, Capt. USN., *Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946), p. 345.

WHAT IS COMMUNICATION?*

By Yasumasa Tanaka

A discussion of the process of communication as it relates to persuasion.

From mentalists to behaviorists, over the last quarter century, an intensive effort has been made to construct a general model of human behavior. Models which can explain human behavior have recently been constructed by a number of behaviorists. Among these is a variety of "cybernetic models" that variably take into account the communication and control aspects of human behavior. In the simplest terms, these models presuppose a series of psychological processes in which one individual's or organization's behavior, in the form of explicit "output" information produced by him or it, is dependent upon the "input" information that an individual or organization may receive from other people or organizations and from the environment. In order to examine their validity and discover their relevance to our problems, let us look briefly at a few of them.

As an initial point of reference, it is useful to keep H. D. Lasswell's classic formula in mind. The scientific study of communication, he says, involves discovering "Who Says What, In Which Channel, To Whom, With What Effect."[1]

There is another type of model, the "cybernetic" one, first introduced by C. E. Shannon for telephone communication and subsequently adjusted for human communication situations by C. E. Osgood.[2, 3]

On the basis of the "theory" of these models, we now can make a more formal statement about the nature of human communication behavior. We can assume the existence of various processes of *decoding* and *encoding* between input and output events. *Decoding* here refers to the way in which the individual human (or organization) receives input information from his environment—namely, the internal reaction caused by the input on the subject. *Encoding* designates those processes whereby the individual human (or organization) chooses some response, in the form of output, to the environment surrounding and affecting him. That which psychologists call the "mediation process" is thus considered as the bridge between *decoding* and *encoding*. In the simplest terms, it is the process which "mediates" between the sensory nervous processes of *decording* on the "input" side and the motor nervous processes of *encoding* on the "output" side. Even in comparatively simple acts, such as making a speech, an individual's communicating behavior is complex, susceptible to many factors, as suggested above, and it is a continuously renewing process whereby he is always adapting to his environment.

At this point the term *feedback* is also relevant. It has been stated thus:

> The action is initiated by an "incongruity" between the state of the organism and the state that is being tested for, and the action persists until the incongruity . . . is removed.[4]

*Excerpts from "Psychological Factors in International Persuasion," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 398 (November 1971), pp. 50–54. Reprinted with the permission of the American Academy of Political and Social Science and the courtesy of the author.

According to this view, the fundamental building block of the social system is the feedback "loop."[5]

Dealing with the complex organization and mechanisms of government, Karl Deutsch defines *feedback* as "a communication network that produces action in response to an input of information, and *includes the results of its own action in the new information by which it modifies its subsequent behavior.*"[6] In other words, by this feedback mechanism, individual humans (and organizations) can correct errors and adjust their behavior to the continuously renewing environment.

Furthermore, in view of the present state of communication technology, interpersonal interaction is not necessarily limited to a face-to-face situation. The whole or part of an encoded message may be quoted in a newspaper, or broadcast by radio and television, or even relayed via a communication satellite to local stations in foreign countries, for literally universal "mass consumption." Then, as the feedback loops become more complex, the source will need some extended "scanning" devices or "monitors," to gather feedback information. He will continuously need to keep an eye on local and national newspapers, radio or television newscasts, and even on the mass media in foreign countries!

PERSUASION AND THE EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATION

Persuasion may be defined as the art of "winning men's minds by words." The basic premise here is that persuasion is an act of communication. We must note, however, that it is a special kind of communication, and it is not involved in all communication situations in which behavior is influenced by a set of input stimuli. In order to be persuasive in nature, the communication situation must involve a conscious attempt by the communicator to influence the thought and behavior of the receiver through the transmission of some message.

Persuasive communication, therefore, implies a judgment of the situation in terms of the intentions of the communicator and the resultant thought or behavior change of the receiver. Persuasive communications can thus be judged with respect to their success in producing desired thought or behavior, or their failure to do so. Examples of success or failure of persuasive communications can be easily seen in election campaigns, advertising, or international diplomacy.

Research on persuasive communication embraces the study of persuasiveness, on the one hand, and persuadibility on the other. It also involves the study of attitudes—how they are formed and how they can be changed. The focus of recent research on persuasion is on interrelationships among these variables, and the studies have been increasingly empirical or "experimental," oriented toward the theory of attitude organization and change.

Comprehensive reviews and summaries of the relevant lituerature on the subject can be found in recent publications by E. P. Bettinghaus,[7] R. L. Rosnow and E. J. Robinson,[8] and W. J. McGuire.[9]

* * * * *

NOTES

[1] H. D. Lasswell, "The Structure and Function of communication in Society," in L. Bryson, ed., *The Communication of Ideas* (New York: Harper & Row, 1948), p. 37 (punctuation added).

[2] C. E. Shannon, "The Mathematical Theory of Communication," in C. E. Shannon and W. Weaver, *The Mathematical Theory of Communication* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1949).

[3] C. E. Osgood, "Psycholinguistics," in S. Koch, ed., *Psychology: A Study of a Science*, vol. 6 (New York: McGraw-Hill 1963), p. 247.

[4] G. A. Miller, E. Galanter, and K. H. Pribram, *Plans and the Structure of Behavior* (New York: Holt, 1960), p. 26.

[5] N. Wiener, *The Human Use of Human Beings* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 12.

[6] K. W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 88.

[7] E. P. Bettinghaus, *Persuasive Communication* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968).

[8] R. L. Rosnow and E. J. Robinson, eds., *Experiments in Persuasion* (New York: Academic Press, 1967).

[9] W. J. McGuire, "The Nature of Attitudes and Attitude Change," in G. Lindzey and E. Aronson, eds., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), vol. 3, pp. 136–314.

PSYOP AND COMMUNICATION THEORY*

BY PHILLIP P. KATZ

Communication involves the total spectrum of human actions. In itself, communication is neither fact nor fiction; it is what the recipient believes it to be.

The purpose of this essay is to relate current communication theory to PSYOP. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, PSYOP is communication. To be precise, the function of PSYOP is to use communication to influence behavior. Therefore, a basic understanding of the nature of communication, the role of communication in a social environment, and the process of communication (how people communicate with each other) is necessary in order to develop meaningful and dynamic PSYOP programs.

THE NATURE OF COMMUNICATION

Communication, in a very broad sense, includes the various processes by which one person influences another and involves the total spectrum of human actions, including speech, written matter, music, drama, the pictorial arts, and other forms of behavior. Charles Cooley defines communication as"...the mechanism through which human relations exist and develop—all the symbols of the mind, together with the means of conveying them through space and preserving them in time...."[1]

Melvin De Fleur notes that man is born into an ongoing and elaborate culture, and an important aspect of this culture is the "set of conventions which exist concerning the relationship between signs and their referents."[2] Man as a social being develops various habit patterns that permit him to respond to particular gestures, verbal and other, having as their

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* Original essay by Phillip P. Katz.

referents objects and events as they occur in their particular world of reality. A person's understanding of a particular symbol is the set of responses that the individual generates as a result of the stimulus of the symbol. The participation of the individual in the language process gives him the ability to communicate with himself (think) and with his social group. The entire process is structured around the social group. Human communication is the basis for group norms; it is the means by which social control is exerted, roles are allocated, coordination of effort is achieved, expectations are made manifest, and the social process is carried on.[3]

Communication should also be considered as the sharing of information. Each individual or social group considers information or ideas based on his needs, comprehending and using the information in a manner that best suits his particular interests.

Human communication involves action; it is not mystical or magical; it is routine, daily, accepted, and normal. To understand communications one must understand, in a very real sense, people. Training in communication is deeper than language training. It requires the ability to understand and relate the content of communication (messages) to the aspirations of people, groups, organizations, and societies. The ability to understand how people relate to each other is crucial. For example, if a communicator develops a series of persuasive messages directed toward a guerrilla force, a very real understanding of interpersonal relationships at squad, platoon, and company levels is necessary for effective communication. In support of this point, Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld state that a key to understanding the content and dynamics of individual opinions and actions is accurate comprehension and knowledge of the content and dynamics of small groups.[4]

Individuals living in society generally desire to adhere to the opinions, attitudes, and habits of those with whom they are motivated to interact. The social reality of group life makes it clear that individuals influence each other's perceptions, and the individual's way of seeing reality is based on the "real world" around him. On the whole, all social groups require a degree of conformity, and a revolutionary movement develops definitive methods and procedures to insure conformity to group norms and values.

A final but significant point is that groups, like individuals, have goals, and such goals often cannot be achieved without a degree of consensus. It is obvious that if a majority of the individuals cannot agree on the proper course of action, they cannot act collectively. It is only through meaningful communication that collective action and consensus can be attained.

THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION

Communication then, can be considered as the great relating tool. It relates individuals to each other and individuals to historical perspective. This makes group functioning possible and allows societies to live in harmony.

However, very seldom does communication have a single function, nor is the manifest content of the message always the important content. Harold Lasswell lists the functions of communication as follows: first, the surveillance of the environment; second, the correlation of the parts of society in responding to the environment; and third, the transmission of social heritage from one generation to the next.[5] With the understanding that an important function of communication is relating people to each other or to groups, or to history, and that the latent content of a message is significant, we can classify the vast majority of social communication under four major headings:

1. To inform
2. To instruct or teach
3. To entertain
4. To persuade

The above classification is from the viewpoint of the sender or the originator of the message. From the receiver's point of view we should list:

1. To understand
2. To learn
3. To enjoy
4. To dispose or decide

It is important that PSYOP program managers understand that communication content (messages) can be designed to perform all of the functions stated in the previous paragraph, any one of the four, or any mix.

David Berlo makes the point that the inform-persuade-entertain distinction has led to confusion in that there has been a tendency to interpret these purposes as exclusive entities; that is, one is not giving information when he is entertaining: one is not entertaining when he is persuading, and so forth.[6] This is not so! Yet the distinction is frequently made. Berlo emphasizes this point as follows:

> ...it is popular today to distinguish between education (inform), propaganda (persuade), and entertainment (entertain). In the public media, we try to distinguish, between educational programs and entertainment programs—without providing any reasonable basis for such distinction. Some professional communicators in the press and education state that they are not trying to persuade people, they are merely giving them informaton. Others view the entertainment industry as something independent of persuasion and ignore the effects their messages might be having on the levels of knowledge, thought processes, and attitudes of their audiences. The theatre, for example, is a distinguished vehicle of communication with a considerable tradition and heritage. Many people would classify the theatre as an "entertainment" vehicle: Yet countless examples could be given of plays that were intended to have, and did have, significant effects on an audience, other than "entertainment." *[7]

The inform-instruct-entertain-persuade distinction causes difficulty if we assume that these are independent functions of communication. As

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indicated above, sometimes it is difficult to relate them directly to experience; that is, "knowing one when we see one." Too often the message (leaflet, speech, skit, newspaper article, or movie) is the only item examined in order to determine communicative purpose.

The inclination to consider the role of communication along rigid lines is often found in U.S. policy. Frequently, the role of PSYOP is viewed as a loudspeaker and leaflet operation with a persuasive function. Furthermore, even the United States Information Agency (USIA) separates its activities into "information" and "cultural" programs, with the tendency to consider information programs from the viewpoint of the American journalist; to associate cultural programs with the objectivity of the U.S. educator; and to view persuasive programs as a function of the propagandist or PSYOP. Of course, a PSYOP organization that follows a rigid distinction as to the functions of communication is at a distinct disadvantage competing with communication viewed as a political weapon and directed at the "whole person," skillfully combining the four functions of communication.[8]

To the National Liberation Front (NLF) in Vietnam, for example, social institutions such as schools and membership associations are as important as the mass media in the total PSYOP effort. Especially at the tactical level the agitprop cadres of the NLF keenly understand the multipurpose function of communication.

Therefore, a single NLF cultural drama program provides the audience with information, instruction, and entertainment, all designed to persuade the target to adopt the political and social viewpoints of the NLF. Hence, it is again emphasized that PSYOP, especially in an insurgency environment, such as that in Vietnam in the 1960s, should integrate all functions of communication in an unmistakably coordinated PSYOP program.

THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS

All human communication must take place in the framework of social relations. The importance of understanding interpersonal relationships as an essential part of the communication process and the need for a clear vision of social pressures as part of the total communication process was emphasized previously. Joseph T. Klapper, Director of Social Research for the Columbia Broadcasting System, provides considerable evidence to support the thesis that effective persuasive communication must relate to the total social situation and that mass media are "not so terribly powerful" in persuasive communication. Specifically, Dr. Klapper writes:

> More recent studies, both in the laboratory and the social world, documented the influence of a host of other variables [in persuasive communication] including various aspects of contextual organization; the audience's image of the sources; the simple passage of time; the group orientation of the audience member and the degree to which he values group membership; the activity of opinion leaders; the *social aspects of the situation during and after exposure to the media,* and the degree to which the audience member is forced to play a role; the personality pattern of the audience member, his social class, and the level of his frustrations; the nature of the media in a free enterprise system; and the availability of social

mechanisms for implementing action drives. The list, if not endless, is at least overwhelming and it continues to grow [9*] (emphasis added).

Communication Situation

The communication situation is one of the social factors that affects persuasive communication in that generally what people say and how they react to a PSYOP message depends on where they are, who is listening, and what communication channel is being used. P.J. Deutschmann has classified the communication situation as private communication and public (mass) communication.[10] He lists face-to-face conversation as one type of private communication; another category would be what he has labeled "interposed" (private communications such as a letter or a telephone call).

It is apparent that in private communication one tends to be less formal and use different signs, words, and symbols. For example, members of the Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) (Viet Cong who have rallied to the GVN) frequently employ private communications to get the "Chieu Hoi message" to the families of known Viet Cong. The teams speak with the authority of experience; they are convincing; they have the personal answers to questions likely to be asked, and by their presence give proof that the Chieu Hoi Program delivers its promises. Furthermore, they can sincerely portray their inner feelings about their decision to defect from the ranks of the Viet Cong.

Mass media communication channels can be face-to-face and public (mass meetings, cultural drama performances, movies, or opera) or private (the individual as a radio or television viewer, or reading a magazine, book, or leaflet). The significant point is that the communication situation determines to some extent the kind of communication that goes on and the response that is likely to be made to it. For example, many techniques used to stimulate enthusiasm at a public rally would not be appropriately used in an individual, private environment. It is unlikely that a person listening to a radio in private would develop crowd excitement and its consequent behavior. Moreover, a person would not communicate with a stranger in the same manner as he would with a member of his immediate family group, nor would he communicate with a trusted friend in the same manner as with a government official.

A variety of communication techniques can be used to combine private and public communication. For example, a duplicate of a public poster can be prepared as a small handout or leaflet, thus permitting the individual to discuss the poster in public and at the same time carry the message home to discuss it with members of his family. The leaflet reinforces the government message and gives additional meaning to the public poster. Also, the handout or leaflet tends to set in motion a functional communication group to discuss the poster for the second time (after the PSYOP cadre departs) in public.

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Influence of the Group

Four intervening variables in the communication processes have been stated in the literature as: first, the exposure to the media; next, the differential character of the various media; third, the existing attitude or attitudes of the individuals; and finally, the content of the message.[11] On the basis of many communication studies, Katz and Lazarsfeld have shown that a fifth variable should be added. They conclude that the response of the individual to communication cannot be accounted for without reference to his social environment and to the character of his interpersonal relationships.

The focus of this section is on the primary group to which an individual belongs—his family, friends, informal work teams, small military units—and the more formal groups such as farmers' organizations, youth groups, defense groups, and so forth.[12] Katz explains that within these groups the members are mutually attracted to each other as personalities. Such groups are usually characterized by their small size, relative durability, informality, and face-to-face contact.[13]

The influence of the group on communication is profoundly important to PSYOP; yet, for the most part, there is a tendency in U.S.-sponsored PSYOP programs to direct communication to the individual as an isolated entity of society rather than to the individual as an integral part of an active social environment. That being the case, many PSYOP intelligence- and information-gathering programs tend to organize the collection of data as if each member of the target audience is isolated and in a sterile environment. Man's social attachments are significant; consequently, the opinions and activities shared with a group influence his response to all communication. In other words, interpersonal relationships must be taken into account to understand properly the communication process, and to conduct effective PSYOP programs. Katz states that interpersonal relationships seem to be anchorage points for individual opinions, attitudes, habits, and values." [14]

This concept (the influence of the group) suggests that when people are interacting in the communication process, they generate and maintain common ideas and behavior patterns which they are reluctant to give up or to modify by themselves. Also, it is apparent that when communication concerns sensitive roles and standards of the group, the communication is usually checked with other members of the group. In this respect, two important communication concepts for PSYOP are (1) the two-step flow of communication; and (2) the reinforcement function.[15]

Two-Step Flow of Communication

Considerable research has shown that the image of the simple, direct effect of the mass media is an oversimplification. The closer one observes the workings of the mass media, the more one realizes that their effects depend on a complex network of specialized personal and social influences. It appears that the mass media as such have marginal effect in persuasive communication about political or social programs. For PSYOP

this means that: (1) interpersonal communication significantly counteracts or reinforces messages transmitted by a source, and that (2) influence spreads gradually in a group via various combinations of mass media and interpersonal networks. A series of studies has demonstrated that communication frequently flows from the various media, reaching first selected opinion leaders (or key communicators) and then, in turn, less active members of a group. Specifically, there could be and usually is a filter, or intervening factor, between the stimulus (the PSYOP message) and the resultant opinions, decisions, or actions of the group. This is what is meant by the two-step flow of communication. Some research has shown that even if there is direct communication, people will go to the key communicator for an interpretation or comment, which acts as a form of filter in the communication process. Katz has commented that it is a result of investigations dealing with the role of the opinion leader that communication research has joined those fields of social research which have rediscovered the primary group.[16]

These studies, many of them products of the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University, found: first, that the influence of other people on specific decisions tends to be more frequent (and certainly more effective) than the influence of the mass media; second, that people are influenced most by their close associates and those who are of the same socioeconomic status; third, that intimate associates tend to hold opinions and attitudes in common and are reluctant to depart unilaterally from the group consensus even when a mass media appeal seems attractive; and finally, that opinion leaders tend to be more exposed to mass media than other members of the group.

Reinforcement Function

It has been stressed that an individual's response to persuasive communication is based on and reinforced by his regular interpersonal relationships. In all societies a normal person usually consults a member of this primary group before taking decisive action in response to persuasive messages. In other words, the tendency is to have a close friend or a relative reinforce his attitude toward the subject contained in the PSYOP message. For example, a great number of the Viet Cong rally to the government of Vietnam's Chieu Hoi Program through an intermediary who is a relative or trusted friend. Many do not defect until they receive assurance from a relative or friend that the government of Vietnam will keep its promises concerning good treatment and other aspects of the amnesty program.

A form of reinforcement (in reverse) is this technique used by the Viet Cong cadres in their attempt to deter defection. To illustrate—a Viet Cong or North Vietnamese army soldier claims to his comrades that he was captured by the GVN or the U.S. forces and that he had subsequently escaped. He then testified that while a prisoner he was treated badly and that he had firsthand knowledge that the government of Vietnam did not abide by their good treatment policy.

The research findings on reinforcement substantiate the fact that inti-

mate associates tend to hold opinions and attitudes in common and are reluctant to depart unilaterally from their group consensus. The importance of face-to-face communicaton (as a reinforcement function) was stated by a district chief to his American advisor as follows: "Americans have much but no talk. VC no have much, but have talk, talk, talk. We must talk." [17]

Society and the Communication Framework

The norms and constraints of the society as a whole also affect the communication framework. In any society there are things one usually does and things one simply does not do; things one generally believes without challenge and ideas one generally does not entertain because of the society that one has grown up in. Consequently, some ideas and traditions can be challenged, others not. Society determines how, why, to and from whom, and with what effects communication occurs.

For example, the central objective of communication for Communist China is to mobilize the entire Chinese population in support of Communist policy. For them, the appeal is all-embracing, addressing itself to the whole person. Every aspect of the society is concerned with the objective, including the social institutions, such as schools and membership associations.[18]

The political regime relies on the radio-loudspeaker system to promulgate new directives, to encourage the study of Mao Tse-tung's works, and to stimulate revolutionary enthusiasm generally. In Peking, for instance, the day begins at 5:30 a.m. with neighborhood loudspeakers pouring forth the music, "The East is Red." This is usually followed by the reading of one of Mao's sayings. Various methods have been used to increase the size of radio-listening audiences. One method is an organized effort to promote collective listening; another method is the use of radio-diffusion exchanges or wired-radio speakers. With regard to wired radio, Franklin Houn writes:

> The Chinese Communists feel, on the basis of their experience, that radio-diffusion exchanges are valuable instruments of agitation for higher labor productivity, and of socialist education among workers and peasants, including the news distribution on national and international affairs. They also see its great value in transmitting and explaining policies and decrees of the party and government, disseminating scientific knowledge and guidance on sanitation, giving weather reports, enriching the cultural life of the nation, and mobilizing the population to undertake emergency works.[19]

In addition to radio, Communist China, in its efforts to reach the total society, has stressed the habit of reading. One effective method is to supplement printed newspapers with mimeographed newspapers, handwritten wall newspapers, and countless blackboard newspapers in small villages and settlements, factories, schools, public organizations, cooperative farms, and company-size units of the army.

Response of the Entire Personality

Schramm says that meaning comes not merely from a dictionary definition; it has factual, emotional, connotative, and denotative content. It is the response of the entire personality to a set of signs, and a person learns these responses in a social, not a sterile environment.[20] Consequently, a

person's experience with the symbols and their referents is the only meaning that anyone can read into a message. As an example, the motion-picture cartoon showing Donald Duck as a soldier had a denotative meaning rather than the intended connotative meaning to the Africans who viewed this kind of presentation for the first time. In a similar way, any effort to explain the abstract principles of representative democracy to a politically unsophisticated target can be a frustrating experience. Certainly, the meaning that two people perceive in a message depends on finding an area in which the experience of the two individuals is sufficiently similar so that they can share the same signs efficiently.

Therefore, if PSYOP programs are to have meaning, the first requirement is to understand that the source and the receiver must find an area where their experiences are sufficiently similar so that they can communicate (share the same signs efficiently). Schramm uses the term "frames of reference" to explain the concept that two people can communicate efficiently only in those areas where they have a common fund of experience. He says:

> The sources can encode, and the destination can decode, only in terms of the experience each has had. If we never learned any Russian, we can neither code nor decode in that language. If an African tribesman has never seen or heard of an airplane, he can only decode the sight of an airplane in terms of whatever experience he has had. The plane may seem to him to be a bird, and the aviator a god borne on wings.*[21]

The concept of frames of reference can be visually portrayed by two circles. If circles around A and around B are considered as their frames of reference, then the areas wherein they can communicate efficiently with each other are represented by the overlap of the two circles. If the circles do not meet because they have no common experience, then communication is impossible. If the circles have only a small area in common, then it is going to be difficult to get the intended meaning across from one to the other. It is suggested that one difficulty experienced by sophisticated urban Vietnamese, in attempting to communicate with rural audiences, is that there is no overlap of their frames of reference. In other words, a significant problem in intercultural communication is finding the area where the experiences of the communicator and the receiver are similar.

Also it is important from a PSYOP viewpoint to understand that the VC soldier who picks up a leaflet or listens to a PSYOP radio broadcast not only brings to the message his language but certain beliefs and values, some lightly held and others he is prepared to defend stubbornly against change; and certain loyalties to persons and groups—these include a sense of the kind of behavior that is expected of him as a member of those groups, and a keen sense of the possible social consequences of going against the norms. If he decides that the PSYOP message is interesting and promising enough, he selects some or all of the cues it offers, interprets them according to his frame of reference, and disposes of them according to his needs, his values, and the social imperatives and

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the constraints he feels. To cite one obvious example, if a PSYOP leaflet (directed to a VC soldier) contains information about a GVN victory over an unknown VC unit in a distant province, it will be of little interest. On the other hand, if the leaflet presents facts and meaningful data about his own unit, if it provides names of people that he knows, and if it has a picture of a friend that he recognizes, it is highly probable that the message will have meaning and the frames of reference will overlap.

Concept of Total Transmission

The decisive step in the communication process is to "transmit" or deliver the message to the intended audience by an appropriate channel. The use of the term "transmit" in this context involves more than the physical dissemination of leaflets or the delivery of audio messages. It is a four-step "total transmission" process in that: first, the message must attract attention; second, it has to be selected; third, it has to be interpreted; and fourth, it should be used at least in part as intended by the source. This "total" process generally applies to all communication, whether the purpose is to inform, to instruct, to entertain, or to persuade. The first three elements of the process will be discussed in this section and the fourth in a subsequent section on Relation to Purpose.

The critical step in the communication process is, of course, to attract attention, so that the message will be given consideration by the audience. All sorts of gimmicks and devices are used to attract attention with the hope that a particular item will be selected for consideration. The newspaper headline, the flashy photograph, the fancy cover on a novel, the display outside of an auditorium, the attractive young lady in a television commercial—all are intended to attract attention. In operations in Vietnam, messages are placed on attractive calendars, put on soap, kites, and numerous utility items such as plastic shopping bags and washbasins.

The next step is to get the audience to read or listen to the message. Reading or listening takes energy, and, generally, man operates to conserve his energy. The more energy required to make a response, the less likely it is that response will be made—other things being equal. David Berlo states that when the decision is made to perform or not perform a given communication behavior, it is based on the relationship between the amount of reward and the amount of energy required.[22]

It is suggested that the reason the safe-conduct pass scores highly as a selected item among enemy soldiers is the expectation of much reward for little effort. For one thing, this PSYOP message is usually direct and brief. Moreover, the safe-conduct leaflet is usually interpreted by the enemy soldier as additional insurance (it could save his life), so the reward is high.

Schramm notes that many times people select things accidentally or on impulse. Much is the result of role patterns or habits learned from

obscure experiences. Yet over the years people tend to seek the kinds of communication that have rewarded them in the past. Furthermore, people tend to develop considerable loyalty to their favorite magazine, radio station, opera, Broadway show, television program, or trusted friend.

Berlo writes that Schramm's concept can be expanded to include more than the selection of a message.[23] Basically, he notes, we react to those things that are worth the effort and make decisions accordingly. He defines the fraction of decision as:

$$\frac{\text{Expected reward}}{\text{Expected energy required}}*$$

After the selection of an item of communication, the next step is acceptance. This depends largely on what Schramm terms the "face validity" of the message, and on the reader's judgment (interpretation) of the orignator's credibility. Carl Hovland, Irving Janis, and Harold Kelly note that the credibility of a message depends on two factors. In their words:

> . . . a recipient may believe that a communicator is capable of transmitting valid statements, but still be inclined to reject the communication if he suspects the communicator is motivated to make nonvalid assertions. It seems necessary, therefore, to make a distinction between (1) the extent to which a communicator is perceived to be a source of valid assertions (his expertness) and (2) the degree of confidence in the communicator's intent to communicate the assertions he considers most valid (his "trustworthiness"). In any given case the weight given a communicator's assertions by his audience will depend upon both these factors, and this resultant value can be referred to as the "credibility" of the communicator.* [24]

Many people regard the radio as more credible than the newspaper; others have the opposite opinion. A great number of studies confirm that attitudes toward the source to which information and news are credited are likely to affect the acceptance of a message. The very large number of studies which fall under the heading of "prestige suggestion" bear on this problem.[25]

As one example, an NVA sergeant stated that he was strongly influenced to defect by a GVN leaflet in the form of a testimonial from a former comrade. The PSYOP message contained three points: first, it related how this NVA soldier was wounded during a specific action and was left on the battlefield for three days; second, the message explained that the wounded soldier was "rescued" by the South Vietnamese army and immediately sent to a hospital; and third, the testimonial emphasized that as a prisoner of war the soldier was receiving good treatment. The NVA sergeant went on to explain that he was able to relate the information in the leaflet to the source (a former comrade) and with the actual

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battle, and it was accurate. At this point he began to doubt the information given him by the VC cadre about the cruel treatment of prisoners.[26]

In a similar manner, statements from high-ranking or prestigious VC or NVA defectors (Hoi Chanh) attract attention and add credibility to messages. One rallier declared that a message from a former VC colonel cast doubt on the credibility of their cadres. The troops asked, "Why should such a high-ranking individual leave the Front and urge his comrades to defect?" A former member of the Viet Cong stated, "I believed the Colonel and I decided to rally." Many Hoi Chanh stated that messages from defectors who were senior party members upset their frame of reference and values.

A significant number of Hoi Chanh emphasized that they judged truth (credibility) in a variety of ways. They considered what they had been told by the cadres and other sources; or they would make a judgment as to how much of this information they actually believed; or, they could consider what information they received from interpersonal relationships (or what they heard); and, finally, what they actually had seen for themselves.[27]

The NLF understand that communication is likely to be rejected when the credibility of the source is questioned. Therefore, they make a determined effort to ensure that their agitprop cadres are expert and have the confidence of the people. In fact, the ideal cadre is a model of dedication, sobriety, and skillfulness.[28] He is concerned with not only the techniques of communication but also with substance. Obviously, from the above discussion, any systems approach to audience analysis for PSYOP programs must consider the four elements of the "total transmission" process. First, Does the message attract attention? Second, Is it being accepted and does its source have credibility? Third, Is the message being understood as desired by the source? And finally, With what effect?

Relation to Purpose

The effect of communication is directly related to its purpose. If the purpose is to provide "pure" news or information and this is accepted by the reader, viewer, or listener, then the communication has had effect. Furthermore, if the purpose is to instruct or educate and the student does well, it is assumed the instructor communicated effectively. If an audience usually responds favorably to an entertainer, then his popularity and success are assured.

Persuasion

Persuasion, especially in support of military operations, requires a planned program of communication to fit the social environment. Furthermore, it is presumptuous and boastful to believe that persuasion can be accomplished with a single message; it requires, as already emphasized, maximum integration of communication media, both mass media and face-to-face communication. It needs one other vital element—an institution; that is, an organization and managers who understand the communication process and the role of media in programmed communication. Effective persuasive communication cannot be random in nature.

In order to persuade, the communication must activate certain psychological dynamics that are related to the individual's perception of his social environment, his needs, his social relationships, and his beliefs and attitudes. To accomplish any substantial change in attitude, persuasive communication must bring about a psychological process in the receiver. Both it and informative communication must get through, but for persuasion it is not enough to bring about a psychological process in the receiver; it is necessary to set in motion the particular dynamics by which the receiver will, in effect, change himself. This is the essential difference between persuading and informing.

In military PSYOP programs, the receiver in a hostile area looks at a hard persuasive message as "another piece of propaganda from the enemy." He comes to it with his defenses up and he is prepared to be skeptical; he asks, What is there for me in the message? He comes to the message with a set of personal relationships and loyalties, and he feels deeply dependent on many of them. He comes with a set of perceptions in regard to his future role in his environment, and he is not prepared to change without good reason. Thus, persuasion requires much skill, patience, and a great deal of current knowledge about the individual (target) and his social environment.

Techniques of Persuasion

Numerous studies and investigations deal with techniques used in persuasion communication. Arthur Cohen writes that the validity of many persuasive techniques has long been argued by propagandists, educators, and public speakers.[29] He asks four cogent questions about such techniques. First, What role does the organization of the arguments play in the effectiveness of a persuasive appeal? Is it more effective to present one side of an issue or to present both sides? Second, Should the conclusion be stated conspicuously in a persuasive communication, or should the reader draw his own conclusion? Third, When a single side is presented, should the strongest argument be used first or at the end? When two sides of an issue are presented, which side should be presented first? Fourth, In a persuasive message, what type of appeal is most effective in stimulating an individual or group to accept a message? For example, What is the effect of fear-arousing propaganda? Of sentimental messages? Of using an ambiguous source? Of using rational appeals? We do not have the answers to many of these questions, especially as they are related to foreign cultures and societies. The above questions are important in a systematic framework for PSYOP, and the answers will be different for the various cultures and subcultures of a society.

An example of a persuasive leaflet message that did not have the desired effect is one disseminated to VC soldiers that stated, "If you do not rally immediately, we will kill you to the last man. We really don't care whether you rally or not; we are quite willing to accomodate your desire for death by killing you."[30] Usually the reaction to such a message is one of anger and a stiffening of the soldiers' will to fight.

Many NVA and VC prisoners assert that messages emphasizing hardships, such as lack of food and medical treatment, are not effective because they always expected to face such hardships. In the words of one Communist soldier, "Hardships are the lot of the revolutionary soldier and the natural thing; only the weak and cowardly are influenced by such enemy propaganda." On the other hand, the less dedicated, and especially the younger soldiers, suggest that the truth be told them about the hardships, in particular the lack of medicine. One high-ranking VC defector is of the opinion that sentimental and nostalgic PSYOP messages are of no value, and he emphasizes that persuasive messages should be factual and to the point.[31] Yet, numerous other VC soldiers repeatedly state that emotion-provoking poems and nostalgic letters are the most effective of the PSYOP messages. The transmission of emotionally persuasive messages to the civilian population "exploiting" VC atrocities is another example of the uncertainty concerning emotional appeals. For the most part, such messages proved to be counterproductive. From the viewpoint of the source, the purpose was to "persuade" the civilian population that the Viet Cong were evil and had no regard for the people or their property. Many such messages, however, only served to increase tension and fear, so that in some cases the PSYOP message tended to reinforce the NLF in its program to obtain cooperation from the people.

It should be noted that two diverse examples have been presented dealing with the use of fear-arousal or imminent threatening messages—one to a military and the other to a civilian audience. The use of the imminent threat or fear-arousal message to the military audience did not have the desired effect. It is suggested that the reasons are: first, the espirit of the primary military group; and second, the fact that military training and indoctrination tend to build resistance to fear-arousal messages. On the other hand, the VC use of terror and threat-arousal techniques on civilians has, in many instances, had the desired effect. This can be attributed to several circumstances: first is the fact that the average civilian group is less organized and disciplined than the military (It is interesting to note that in those areas of Vietnam dominated by militant religious organizations, the use of fear arousal by the Viet Cong has not, generally, been effective), and second, the use of fear-arousal techniques has been effective in those areas where the presence of the VC infrastructure is known and the use of the "carrot" and "stick" approach (by the Viet Cong) is prevalent.

It is obvious that additional research is needed concerning the use of persuasive appeals in support of PSYOP programs, especially in an insurgency environment. Therefore, determining valid persuasive communication techniques that are applicable to an insurgencyenvironment is an important essential element of information (EEI) for PSYOP programs.

The Role of Interpersonal Persuasive Communication

Overwhelming evidence indicates that in persuasive communication, face-to-face contacts were among the most important influences stimulat-

ing opinion change.The investigation by Paul Lazarsfeld et al. in *The People's Choice* disclosed that radio, newspapers, leaflets, and other mass media had only a slight influence on voting; what influenced people most was other people—friends, family, community contacts. As already noted, it was shown that ideas flow from television, radio, and newspaper first to opinion leaders, and from them to the less active elements of the group. Lazarsfeld emphasizes that this was a surprise to those who considered the mass media as omnipotent.[32]

Joseph Klapper supports this viewpoint when he writes that "mass communication ordinarily does not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, but rather functions among and through a nexus of mediating factors and influences."* He notes that on those occasions where the mass media influence change, one of two conditions is likely to exist. Either the mediating factors will be found to be direct; or the mediating factors, which normally favor reinforcement, will be found to be themselves impelling toward change.[33] As stated above, Katz and Lazarsfeld also conclude that personal influence is the most important in persuasive communication.

The Communist movement clearly stresses the importance of interpersonal persuasive communication when it urges the cadres to "mingle with the people as water is mixed with flour to bring about a consistent rising." Pike writes that the NLF clearly understood what all knowledgeable communicators know:

> that the simple communication of facts is often ineffectual in changing men's opinions, [that] majority opinion reinforced by social pressure counts for much more than expert opinion or leadership assertions, and [that] people tend to misinterpret what they hear or read to suit their own preconceptions.[33] (Emphasis added.)

Hence, the VC and NLF units emphasize that , if the revolution is to succeed, units everywhere must launch PSYOP programs and motivate the people to take part "in the revolutionary task and realize the Party's policy line." A political directive from an NVA division in II Corps stated that, "In civilian proselytizing, in addition to the task of helping the people to improve and stabilize their lives, we must attach importance to propaganda in order to create a revolutionary influence among the masses." Numerous VC documents stress the importance of interpersonal communication between the soldier, cadres, and civilian population; mass media, for the most part, are of secondary importance to the VC.

A COMMUNICATION MODEL

To recapitulate, every communication situation differs in some ways from every other one. An attempt will be made in closing to isolate certain elements that all communication systems have in common.In any case, one should constantly remember that this brief discussion is imcomplete, in that this short section cannot possibly list all of the ingredients of the communication process nor adequately discuss how they affect each

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other. The purpose of this last part, then, is to provide the basic ingredients of a communication model and stress the dynamic nature of the process.

Basic Elements

Communication models contain three fundamental elements: the person who speaks or writes; the speech, illustration, or written material produced; and the person who listens or reads.

Institutional Model

All communication must have some source. This can be a person or group of persons (such as an institution) with a purpose. The fundamental purpose of a PSYOP organization, as an institution, is to: (a) code (write or design messages), (b) transmit messages, and (c) influence the audience as intended by the source. The communication encoders (writers, designers, and artists) are responsible for taking the ideas or the guidance from the institution and putting them in a code (language) expressing the source's purpose of PSYOP objectives. It is important to understand that the encoders are not separate entities of the model; they are extensions of the source. (See figure below.).

Since PSYOP programs are always conducted through an institutional base, it is obvious that the individual encoders (B^1) through (B^5) in the figure below are not free agents; the language of the messages, the illustrations, and the channels (D^1) through (D^5) are determined by the institution. This complicates the communication process and makes it vulnerable to error. There is likely to be filtering and distortion at any stage. Wilbur Schramm expresses the chances for error in this way:

> . . . if the source does not have adequate or clear information; if the message is not encoded fully, accurately, effectively in transmittable signs; if these are not transmitted fast enough and accurately enough, despite interference and competition, to the desired receiver; if the message is not decoded in a pattern that corresponds to the encoding; and finally, if the destination is unable to handle the decoded message so as to produce the desired response—then, obviously, the system is working at less than top efficiency. When we realize that all these steps must be accomplished with relatively high efficiency if any communication is to be successful, the everyday act of explaining something to a stranger, or writing a letter, seems a minor miracle.*[37]

An important requirement of any communication system is that the receiver (E) of the message, and the encoder (B) must be in tune. This is easy to see when communication is considered from a mechanical viewpoint—obviously, if an audience is expected to hear a radio broadcast they must have radio receivers and be tuned to the proper frequency or channel. However, mechanical instruments and devices do not themselves really communicate. "Being in tune" with the audience requires people, and people who understand communication techniques, attitudes, and other people who may be different from themselves. Therefore, communication involves more than language skills; it requires a great deal of knowledge and insight. Most of the communication process occurs in what Schramm refers to as the "black box" of the central nervous

*Reprinted from Wilbur Schramm, "How Communication Works," *The Process and Effects of Mass Communications*, ed. Wilbur Schramm, 1955, with the permission of the University of Illinois Press, copyright holder.



A Communication Model.

system, the contents of which we understand only vaguely. Schramm emphasizes that "we are therefore dealing with analogies and gross functions, and the test of any model . . . is whether it enables us to make predictions—not whether it is a true copy of what happens in the 'black box'—a matter of which we cannot speak with any great confidence."[38]

In summary, clearly some PSYOP encompasses more than loudspeaker and leaflet operations. PSYOP and communication involve the entire population, and from a communication viewpoint, the environment is complex—targets are varied and seldom clear cut. Consequently, the scope of communication programs is extensive, many channels are used, and a variety of techniques, including the full spectrum of communication procedures, are programmed.

To gauge the effect of PSYOP programs, it is necessary to consider the objectives and performance of political, social, or economic programs being supported. If the primary programs are seriously deficient and these deficiencies are understood by the people, no amount of PSYOP will persuade the people that the programs are worth while. Therefore, the effect of persuasive communication is highly dependent on a variety of factors including PSYOP policy itself, credibility, the channel and techniques used, and the role of group dynamics.

NOTES

1. Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), pp. 61–62.
2. Melvin L. De Fleur, *Theories of Mass Communication* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1966), p. 87.
3. Ibid., p. 90.
4. Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications* (Glencoe, III.: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 24–34.
5. Harold D. Lasswell, "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society," *Mass Communications: A Book of Readings*, ed. Wilbur Schramm, 2nd ed. (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1960), p. 118.
6. David K. Berlo, *The Process of Communication: An Introduction to Theory and Practice* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 9.
7. Ibid.
8. Franklin W. Houn, *To Change a Nation* (New York: The Free Press, 1961), *passim.*
9. Joseph T. Klapper, *The Effects of Mass Communication* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), p. 3.
10. P. J. Deutschmann, "The Sign Situation-Classification of Human Communication," *Journal of Communication*, VII, no. 1 (1957), pp. 63–73.
11. Katz and Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence*, pp. 22–24.
12. See Edward A Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion and Propaganda*, ed. Daniel Katz, Dorwin Cartwright, Samuel Eldersveld, and Alfred McClung Lee (New York: The Dryden Press, Publishers, 1954), pp. 556–563, for an excellent discussion of the function of the primary group in a military environment.
13. Katz and Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence.*
14. Ibid., pp. 22–24.
15. Elihu Katz, "The Two Step Flow of Communication," in *Mass Communications*, ed.

Wilbur Schramm (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1960), pp. 346–365.
16. Katz and Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence*, pp. 32–33.
17. James H. Pickerell, "Subsector Advisor in Cai Lay District," *Army*, XVI, no. 7 (July 1966), p. 54.
18. Houn, *To Change a Nation*, p. 3.
19. Ibid., pp. 164–165.
20. Wilbur Schramm, "How Communication Works," *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication*, ed. Wilbur Schramm (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois, 1955), pp. 4–5.
21. Ibid., p. 6.
22. Berlo, *The Process of Communication*, p. 98.
23. Ibid.
24. Carl I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis, and Harold H. Kelly, *Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 21.
25. Katz and Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence*, p. 30.
26. Interview with a Viet Cong rallier in Saigon, August 1968. On tape at the Kensington Office of the Amercian Institutes for Research.
27. Ibid.
28. Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 129–130.
29. Arthur R. Cohen, *Attitude Change and Social Influence* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964), pp. 16–22.
30. Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), *Communicating with Vietnamese Through Leaflets* (Saigon: JUSPAO, November 1968), p. 33.
31. Tran Van Dac was the political officer of Subregion 1. He was born on July 6, 1924, in the village of Long Phuoc. Song Cau district, Phu Yen Province. He regrouped to North Vietnam in 1954, and infiltrated into South Vietnam with regular NVA units in March 1962. He commanded 8,000 Viet Cong in the attack on Saigon during Tet, 1967. He was a party member for 24 years.
32. Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 150–158.
33. Klapper, *The Effects of Mass Communication*, p. 8.
34. Katz and Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence*, p. 32.
35. Pike, *Viet Cong*, p. 128.
36. "Our Plans and Policies Concerning the Possible U.S. Bombing Halt of North Vietnam," translated copy of captured Viet Cong directive #30/CT (October 28, 1968), pp. 6–7. (Translated copy on file at the Kensington, Md. Office of the American Institutes for Research.)
37. Schramm, "How Communication Works," pp. 4–5.
38. Ibid., p. 21.

PSYOP
WHAT IS IT* **

By Raymond J. Barrett

Efforts to delineate the concept of psychological operations have been impeded by a reluctance to acknowledge PSYOP as an instrument of strategy.

What is a psychological operation? Is there a psychological aspect to our national security policies and programs? Is there another dimension

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*Excerpts from "PSYOP: What Is It? And What We Should Do About it." *Military Review*, LII, no. 3 (March 1972), pp. 57–72.

**The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the State or Defense Departments. Statement by Editor of *Military Review*.

to our efforts other than the direct impact of our diplomatic, military, and economic activities?

Clearly, the results we achieve do not depend simply on what we do. They also depend on how others perceive our actions. The views of others frequently determine whether they act in ways beneficial or detrimental to the U.S. national security goals we seek through our diplomatic, military, and economic activities.

Thus, there clearly is a psychological aspect to our national security policies and programs. Often, it is the critical element in whether we are successful or not. Psychological operations (PSYOP) respond to this aspect of our national security efforts; they are designed to get others to respond in ways beneficial to achieving our goals.

COLD WAR

The development of the cold war illustrates the reality and importance of psychological considerations. The confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union stemmed from many things. But clearly, a critical factor was how each side viewed the other's actions. The Soviets, having suffered two devastating attacks in 25 years, were intent on absolute security in Eastern Europe. They preceived Western attitudes toward Eastern Europe as being incompatible with this overriding Soviet concern. The United States and Western Europe saw Soviet statements and actions as implacably hostile, aggressively expansionistic, and a direct threat to their very existence.

These perceptions motivated the diplomatic, military, and economic actions of both the Soviets and the West. The pattern of action and reaction multiplied each side's perceptions of the other in ways that steadily deepened the confrontation.

Another salient feature of the cold war has been the role of ideology. The Communists brought to postwar prominence a way of thinking attuned to psychological considerations. The Communist sees the world in an ideological framework. The way the thought of Mao Tse-tung has dominated China's conduct is a salutary reminder of the absorbing concern of the Communist mind with ideology.

Communist China now distributes publications abroad in some 40 languages and broadcasts about 1,500 hours a week in 38 different languages. In the Soviet Union, Tass sends out 75,000 words a day, and foreign broadcasts total over 1,000 hours a week in 40 languages. The volume of these efforts indicates graphically the attention devoted by the Communists to psychological considerations.

A LIVING HERITAGE

Soviet and Chinese ideological and psychological activities often sound like massive polemics of questionable sincerity. However, ideology has real meaning for Communists. Marxist-Leninist ideology is a living heritage. It assures Communists they are right in trying to extend their sway over the rest of the world, and it tells them they will win. The latter conviction also endows their efforts with a patience that contrasts with US impatience for results.

The theoretical certainty of their ideological goals allows Communists to be flexible about means. They can play on the contradictions that bother others without regard to their own complete consistency. An ideological approach also highlights concern for "ideas." This is obviously a frame of mind adapted to identifying and exploiting the psychological aspects of international developments.

Americans, too, approach human behavior and international events from their own conceptual point of view. But the central and explicit Communist concern for ideology has so broadened and deepened the psychological aspect of international relations as to give it a new dimension. The Communist approach to the world incorporates a pervasive effort to foster social climates and public opinion that will affect domestic and international policies in the Communist interests. These Communist activities have often had a direct impact on our diplomatic, military, and economic capabilities. Hostile psychological operations can drive out good deeds.

U.S. REPUTATION

In this connection, it is instructive to examine candidly the deterioration of the reputation of the United States. Why has the Soviet Union maintained a relatively favorable image? Why have the rapes of Hungary, Tibet, and Czechoslovakia made little lasting impression? How could a society that must build a wall to retain its members be attractive to the peoples of the world seeking freedom? In contrast, why has worldwide obloquy attached to the US efforts in Vietnam?

It is no accident that words like "intervention," "imperialism," "exploitation," and "fallout" have become common currency and loaded with unfavorable connotations. Similarly, "peaceful coexistence" and "wars of national liberation" have become acceptable concepts with desirable aspects. In contrast, the words "capitalism" and "capitalist" have been all but universally tainted as involving social injustice and the "exploitation" of man by man.

"Socialism" has become a "good" word, and the Communist countries label themselves "the Socialist Camp" and dedicate their efforts to "Socialist fraternity." Simply labeling a relationship "colonialist" or "neocolonialist" creates a stigma and puts it on the defensive. Soldiers fighting for the government in the Congo became "mercenaries," a derogatory word. On the other hand, the revolutionaries in the Dominican Republic were labeled "constitutionalists," a "good" sounding word.

The United States had a highly favorable image at the end of World War II, and it has given others vast aid and made many sacrifices. Yet the United States is in disrepute in much of the world. In contrast, the Soviet Union has repressed dissent by force, proclaimed a dogmatic ideology, and given far less aid than the United States and several other countries. Yet the Soviet Union has a great deal of sympathy and support in many quarters of the world. How has this come about?

IMAGE OF POWER

Power—or, more exactly, the image of power—has been an important

element. Soviet nuclear power has obviously affected the views of others. The Soviets have adroitly projected an image of power. They have not hesitated, for instance, to dwell on the terrors of nuclear warfare. The Soviet threat is credible enough that they can utilize it to heighten fears of the USSR in many segments of world opinion.

These fears lead to worry about "provoking" the Soviets. "You cannot expect the Soviets to be reasonable if you keep provoking them" runs the plaint. The result is unremitting pressure on the United States to make concessions. We are placed constantly on the defensive, and the United States incurs opprobrium if it does not make repeated, unilateral concessions.

The Communists have shrewdly used their concepts to exploit the aspirations of the developing world. Those struggling to achieve or develop independence were not receptive to the idea of taking control of their destinies gradually. More important to them than advice and assistance are pride and sense of self-realization. In an atmosphere of both poverty and aspirations, the idea of pitting one person against another seems destructive. The concept of working together for the common good seams highly desirable—and translates readily to sympathy for things labeled Socialist.

These attitudes obviously offered a fertile field for Communist psychological exploitation. Admittedly, the Communist could be more freewheeling because they had few direct interests that might be damaged. But they were also astute in playing up to the concerns of the newly independent countries. Delegations from these lands were freely brought to Moscow and Peking, and key Chinese officials, in particular, paid them flattering attention. China diligently portrayed itself as the model for, and friend of, revolution in the Afro-Asian world. Through skillful activities and constant repetition, Communists tenets have been given vague but wide acceptance by many peoples and governments throughout the world.

The United States also had tremendous assets that would seem to have offered it far greater opportunities than the Communists enjoyed for achieving identification with those seeking independence. The United States was the modern model of national independence from a colonial empire. It articulated the ideals of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

UNITY AND DIGNITY

American history, for all its faults, centered around the pursuit of unity and dignity out of diversity. American society and economy, for all their serious defects, offered a quality of life well beyond that achieved previously. The United States accepted the principle of national traditions in a pluralistic world while the Communists, as the Brezhnev doctrine made blatantly clear, had one doctrinal concept for all the world. Yet, despite these seeming advantages, the climate of opinion has clearly changed against the United States and has imposed important practical constraints on what we can do in the world.

In the current era of insurgency and potential or actual instability, psychological considerations are the central element. Public attitudes toward government and violence are crucial. Vietnam has made clear that governmental legitimacy and security stem from a state of mind as much as a set of physical factors.

Psychology is similarly crucial to the success of the Nixon doctrine. The framework of U.S. security is our network of multilateral and bilateral defense treaties. Clearly, the viability of this arrangement depends on continued rapport and confidence. Successful partnership is in many ways, a frame of mind.

Under the Nixon doctrine, we are essentially engaged in developing the self-confidence of our allies. This effort involves our allies' perceptions of their problems and capabilities and of their neighbors and of us. The success of the Nixon doctrine also involves how our allies' neighbors, particularly those who might threaten them, view our capabilities and resolve, as well as those of our allies. All of these elements are heavily psychological.

ERA OF NEGOTIATION

The era of negotiation that the United States seeks has similarly important psychological aspects. The willingness to negotiate is also a frame of mind. President Richard M. Nixon has referred to the need for a spirit of negotiation in which each side defines its interest with concern for the legitimate interests of others. At the same time, a productive spirit of negotiation must stem from a position of confidence and not of weakness. Clearly, all of these actions are heavily underscored with psychological implications. Serious negotiation is more than atmospherics. It comes down to specific steps. A central factor in maintaining our troop levels in Europe was the destabilizing effect a cut might have on the Soviet evaluation of the American will and commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. An important element in proceeding with the *Safeguard* antiballistic missile system has been the belief that it would motivate the Soviets to negotiate more productively at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

Deterrence itself is, in the main, based on psychology. Deterrence relies on influencing the throughts, perceptions, and actions of potential foes in ways that will discourage or prevent them from acting in a manner inimical to our security.

We can also point to examples in which the United States used psychological considerations adroitly and realized clear benefits. One was the "atoms for peace" program in 1953. This program offered a practical way to provide nuclear fuels to third countries for peaceful purposes. It also created a favorable impression for the United States among those countries eager to gain access to nuclear power as a key step toward self-development. And, at the same time, it embarrassed the Soviet Union by highlighting its reluctance to engage in a similar program.

OPEN SKY PROPOSAL

Another example was the "open sky" proposal that President Dwight D. Eisenhower made at the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955. The concept was forthright and clear. Each country would allow complete freedom to inspect its territory from the air.

This approach offered a realistic way to put aside many of the worries and uncertainties that led to fear of a surprise nuclear attack. The move clearly illuminated the Soviet reluctance to accept any form of verification which would be essential to meaningful strategic arms agreement. The proposal offered dramatic evidence that the Unitted States was willing to cooperate toward arms control despite its strategic dominance. It completely changed the atmosphere of the summit conference and of world public opinion in ways favorable to the United States.

A more recent example of psychological benefits for the United States arises from our landings on the moon. Obviously, these explorations have caught the interest of most of the world. The worldwide anxiety during *Apollo 13's* near tragedy underscored the tremendous empathy of the astronauts and our space program. This human concern and interest have comprised a singular asset for the United States that has helped counterbalance the opprobrium that Vietnam has produced.

KEY FOREIGN GROUPS

This review of the reality and importance of psychological considerations in international relations points the way toward defining psychological operations. The key point, clearly, is how pertinent foreign groups perceive actions that are important to US national security. What we want, therefore, are responses by key foreign groups that will further the achievement of important U.S. interests. We must, in short, influence these foreign groups.

Psychological operations, therefore, are those efforts designed primarily to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of key foreign groups in ways that assist in maintaining the national security of the United States. This statement sounds crass and self-centered, but our survey of recent international developments makes clear that the question is not whether psychological considerations will play a key role, but how.

A positive approach to psychological considerations generally is mutually beneficial to the foreign groups and the United States. What is involved is seldom a Machiavellian maniupulation of the beliefs of others against their best interests. Generally, what is needed is an honest effort to understand and respond to the cultural conditioning and aspirations of others to achieve a result beneficial, in some degree, to all concerned.

The response that will most often benefit the United States—peaceful change, international cooperation, economic development, and improved communications—is also beneficial to the other country (or countries) concerned. Often, the US interest will be well served simply by the country avoiding coming heavily under the domination of the Soviet

Union or China. Efforts to influence others cannot be always open and above-board, but the goal, as these considerations make clear, is not an invidious one.

Psychological operations are not something apart from the diplomatic, military, and economic elements of our national security policies and programs. Nor are they a substitute for these other sources of power. They draw on and reinforce these activities and make them more effective. Psychological operations are ineffective without these other activities. The psychological success of the United States in the Cuban missile confrontation of 1962 was possible because the United States psychologically utilized effective military capabilities while the Soviet Union did not. Psychological operations are essential if the United States is to serve its best interests—the skillful nonuse of its great power.

One difficulty in defining more precisely the idea of psychological operations is that the concept has a certain vagueness about it. It is hard to visualize. We can see a diplomat, or a military weapon, or an economic development project, but it is hard to point to anything equally concrete and say, "that is a psychologicial operation."

This difficulty stems from the intimate interdependence between psychological considerations and the other elements of our national security policies and programs. What is appropriate in psychological operations is closely interrelated with our other activities and to whom, where, and why we do them. We cannot separate and identify a single national PSYOP doctrine or strategy. By the same token, psychological operations involve more than simply information, communications, or even propaganda.

OPERATIONS DEFINED

Efforts have been made to develop adequate working definitions of psychological operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have defined the operations, for military purposes, as those that:

> . . . include psychological warfare and, in addition, encompass those political, military, economic and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior to support the achievement of national objectives.

". . . . Another proposal develops the concept of 'strategic psychological operations' as aimed at influencing and shaping decision-makers' power to govern or control their followers."

These definitions tend to suffer from overstatement, overinclusiveness, or vagueness. It is hard to tell from these definitions what is, and what is not, a psychological operation. Greater precision seems necessary if we are to have a workable concept.

WARTIME SITUTION

We can clarify better what is involved by looking at an extreme case—the situation in wartime. Here, our goals are starker. It is easier to see whom we want to influence and the value to us of influencing them in certain ways. We want the enemy to stop fighting. The ability of our forces to move toward this goal is greatly improved if we can persuade

enemy troops to defect or impair their morale so as to lower their abilities as fighting forces. Leaflet and other operations are carried out to achieve these ends. In this instance, psychological operations become something clear and concrete.

The broader impact of psychological considerations is similarly clearer in wartime. It is not just our military forces, economic measures, and diplomatic efforts that induce an enemy to stop fighting—although they are essential. We improve our chances of getting an enemy to stop fighting if we increase his doubts and fears and the thought that he has more to lose than to win by continuing.

The German perception of the demand for "unconditional surrender" almost certainly lengthened the war in Europe, and strongly influenced the way it ended and the shape of the postwar world. Japanese attitudes toward the Emperor and U.S. awareness of this concern had a great deal to do with ending the war in the Pacific and the more favorable postwar events in that area.

We have trouble delimiting psychological operations because we live in an era that is neither peace nor war. Our goals are not as unambiguous as they are in wartime, and the usefulness of our efforts to influence others is correspondingly less clear-cut. We face a dilemma because we long for a world of peace and freedom. Unfortunately, conflict, however we label it, exists in the world in which we must live. We must acknowledge it clearly, both to endure it and to move from it to an era of negotiation. For both pruposes, attention to psychological considerations is essential.

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IS INTERNATIONAL PERSUASION SOCIOLOGICALLY FEASIBLE?*

By Daniel Lerner

Persuasive communication usually has its greatest effect in reinforcement rather than conversion. However, some contemporary problems have been exacerbated, not ameliorated, by international communication.

The answer to the question of whether international persuasion is sociologically feasible, in general, is obviously Yes. International persasion is sociologically feasible, on the face of it, because it has occurred in many different times, places, and circumstances. Our task here is to differentiate the circumstances under which international persuasion is more, or less, feasible.

The central point is that international persuasion is subject to the same conditions as any other form of persuasive communication. In general, international persuasion is more feasible when it operates upon existing predispositions in the foreign audience. That is, obtaining a "reinforcement effect" is far more feasible than obtaining a "conversion effect" for international, as for all, persuasive communication.

A second major condition is that the feasibility of international persua-

* From "Is International Persuasion Sociologically Feasible?" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 398 (November 1971), pp. 41–49. Reprinted with the permission of the American Academy of Political and Social Science and the courtesy of the author.

sion hinges directly upon the historical and existing state of relations between the sending and receiving nations. Where there is a long tradition of friendly relations between two or more nations, messages are likely to pass between those nations more freely and more effectively. Since the motives of the sender are not suspect, in such a freindly relationship his messages are more likely to be accepted at their face value. Such messages will, in this important sense, clearly be more persuasive. A case in point is the exchange of messages between Britian and America.

The situation is reversed when there is a tradition of hostility between the sending and receiving nations. Under these conditions all messages passing between the two hostile nations are likely to be carefully scrutinized and, in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary, treated with suspicion of motives and doubt of purposes. Clearly, such conditions greatly reduce the feasibility of international persuasion. The obvious case in point is communication between the United States of America and the USSR.

The state of the world political arena, at any given time, provides a third major set of conditions which affect the feasibility of international propaganda. When the world arena is relatively pacific, the flow of international traffic is likely to be larger, freer, and therefore more persuasive. In times of war and crisis—war being the most extreme form of international crisis—the world communication network contracts. Comparative studies in content analysis have shown that this contraction operates within as well as between nations. The vocabulary of crisis tends to become more limited and constrained as the crisis deepens and lengthens.

WARTIME PROPAGANDA

Fewer symbols are used to articulate national policies and defend national actions. A single symbol such as "national defense"—as was shown in the studies of Pool, Lasswell, and Lerner—is used to rationalize and justify a great variety of actions which, in times of peace, are justified in terms of other symbols.[1] This internal contraction of communication is multiplied in the international arena. In times of war and crisis, nations appear to talk to each other through clenched teeth. As symbolism contracts, skepticism rises and persuasion is reduced. "Listening to the enemy," in some countries, becomes a crime.

Yet it is essential to note that, even under the extreme hostility of total war, some measure of international persuasion remains feasible. The conspicuous examples are the great propaganda and psychological warfare "campaigns" of the two world wars. Harold D. Lasswell's classic study of World War I established this point.[2] My own study of the Allied campaign against Nazi Germany provides further documentation for World War II.[3] People in Germany, both military and civilian, not only listened to the enemy but increasingly came to believe what he was saying as the war increasingly went his way.

International persuasion, under wartime conditions, has been feasible in the measure that the sender has met the two major conditions mentioned above: credibility and reinforcement. The outstanding example of successful building of credibility is, of course, the wartime British Broadcasting Corporation. The BBC established its reputation for truthfulness largely by being truthful. The core of this "strategy of truth," as practiced by BBC, was never to tell lies—or, more precisely, never to tell lies that could be found out.

An illustration of the BBC technique was its practice of beginning each newscast—all day, every day—by giving first place to British setbacks, losses, defeats. Over the years this produced an image of BBC truthfulness that made it a model of credibility, in Germany as well as elsewhere. Ultimately, this asset of wide credibility became the basis for the high order of persusiveness which BBC attained during the critical middle years of the war (1942–1943) and for the important role it played in persuading a large number of significant Germans that they had lost the war in its final years (1944–1945).

Reinforcement as a central condition of persuasion is vividly illustrated by the military propaganda campaign against the *Wehrmacht.* The specific case in point was the campaign to increase the surrender rate among German soldiers. During the years when Germany occupied most of Europe, and seemed likely to win the final victory, such propaganda was not feasible. As the tide began to turn, however, and German military units encountered severe dangers and increasing deaths, the predispositional machinery for surrender came into operation.

Central to the Anglo-American propaganda effort at this point, was its abstinence from direct attacks upon Hitler. All German soldiers had sworn an oath of loyalty to the Fuhrer and many of them, even under conditions of extreme peril in combat, felt themselves bound unto death by this oath. The Allied propaganda campaign avoided challenging this deep psychological commitment; that is, it did not seek a "conversion" effect. Rather, it moved steadily in the direction of "reinforcing" any predisposition to surrender among soldiers in losing combat. The most effective single message concerned a "safe conduct pass" promising them good treatment as prisoners of war. The psychological basis of its reinforcement impact has been described by Edward Shils:

> Belief in the veracity of this appeal was no doubt based on the attitude that the British and the Americans were respectable, law-abiding soldiers who would treat their captives according to international law. As a result of this predisposition and the wide use of the safe-conduct leaflets, as well as our actual practices in treating prisoners well, the German soldier came to have no fear of capture by British or American Troops.[4]

In passing, it is interesting to note that the psychological warfare campaign against Japan in World War II followed the same strategy. The Emperor, as key symbol of Japanese identity and loyalty, was never directly attacked by Allied propaganda. Instead, as Japanese soldiers found themselves increasingly in painful and perilous situations, Allied

propaganda sought to make surrender easier ("to grease the skids") for those Japanese soldiers who were already predisposed to it.

PROPAGANDA SINCE WORLD WAR II

These examples from the propaganda campaigns of World War II illustrate that international persuasion is feasible even under the most extreme conditions of international crisis. Other examples of more recent vintage can be supplied by most readers . . . . A particularly interesting case to ponder is that of "nuclear blackmail." How are we to evaluate the "international persuasion" exercised by Khrushchev's atomic threats during the Suez crisis of 1956? How are we to evalute the "international persuasion" exercised by the airlift during the Berlin crisis or by Kennedy's standfast language during the Cuban missile crisis? Although appraisals of these essentially propagandistic activities have varied, it is plain that they did in fact considerably influence the course of events. Further studies will help to clarify the underlying "code" that made these international communications persuasive.[5]

Other topics in the relationship between international communication and "persuasibility" merit careful scholarly attention.[6] Among these is the role assigned to the numerous and various organizations for international cooperation that have been created since World War II. Examples on the Western side are the European Community, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the general Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.[7] Also relevent is the transformation of the Pan-American Union into the Organization of American States. Of special interest, in terms of world communication, is the global network of alliances parallel to NATO that has been constructed by the United States: CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization), and ANZUS (Austrialia, New Zealand and the United States). Parallels on the Soviet side of the bipolarized world arena are the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact, which seek, largely through communication techniques, to guarantee the military and economic cohesion of the communist states under Soviet management.[8]

A communication operation of explicit global purpose is the United Nations. The UN has been subject to the strictures affecting all "legislatures" that seek to govern units of unequal power on the basis of parity, that is, one vote per head. Successive governments of France, for example, have made it clear that they do not take seriously any "legislation" enacted by a body in which the vote of Gabon is equal to that of France. This view, stated less candidly and brutally, is shared by many other large member-states of the UN, including the USA and USSR. The long-term success of the UN, however, is less likely to be determined by its activities as a "legislature" than by its effectivness as a "forum" of world communication. It is this aspect of the UN that most deserves study by communication specialists.

Perhaps the most complex problem of feasibility in "international persuasion" arises from the worldwide concern with development. Involved there is nothing less than the future of international relations between the rich and poor countries of the world. Sociologically, the disparities are

enormous. Consider the single disparity of per capita income that separates the United States, which is moving toward $6,000 per annum, from India, which is just barely getting beyond $60 per annum. These simple figures represent what economists call "orders of magnitude." Between $60 and $6,000 per person per year stretches a money gulf that encompasses virtually everything we call the modern way of life. As Paul Samuelson has put it, most of what is distinctive in modern culture may be the common characteristics of any society that exceeds a per capital income distribution of $3,000 per year.

The relatively few rich countries of the world have nearly everything the the numerous poor countries of the world do not have but are seeking to acquire.[9] An urban, literate, technological, participant, and rich society like the United States can now feed itself by the labor of less than 7 percent of its population—and still have a lot of food left over to give, sell, or destroy. A rural, illiterate, overpopulated, underequipped, and poor country like India cannot feed itself adequately even with the labor of over 70 percent of its population. We are speaking here of economic disparities—in a sense which includes social, psychological, and political disparities—that cumulate to several large "orders of magnitude."

A WIDENING GAP

To return to our original question: "Is international persuasion sociologically feasible?"—under such conditions no easy, optimistic answer is possible. Indeed, the record of the past twenty years of effort in "development communication" is marked with failures and frustrations. When President Truman initiated the "bold new program" of development in 1949, most people concerned with development communication set out on their great enterprises on the premise that they would create a "revolution of rising expectations," and that this revolution would be a Good Thing. It would be good because rising expectations, according to the pattern established over five centuries of Western history, would stimulate the poor peoples of the world to revive the energies and acquire the skills needed to satisfy their new wants.

As it turned out, this was easier said than done. The poor peoples of the world have indeed lived through a "revolution of rising expectations" during the past twenty years, but their wants have not been satisfied. Far from it. On the contrary, the gap between the rich and the poor nations has continued to increase over these years.[10] This is a major complication in international communication between rich and poor countries.

Another major complication is that the gap between what people want and what they get has widened within as well as outside most of the world's poor lands. This increasing imbalance in what I call the "Want/Get Ratio" (WGR) has led the poor peoples in the direction of a "revolution of rising frustrations." I have presented this view of our global future elsewhere.[11]

It remains, in concluding this brief overview of feasibility, to indicate why international communication has been less "feasible" over the past two decades of development. The failure of development efforts has been, in large measure, a failure of development communication. We have

taught the poor people to want the "good things of life" available in the rich countries. We have not taught them how to get what they want.

Where we have failed in the past two decades we must now learn to succeed in the next two decades. The technology needed to do this job is available in the form of transistors, satellites, and the spinoff from these major technological advances of the past few years: video tapes, audio tapes, kinescopes, cassettes. This technology can be adapted to the needs of poor countries with relative ease. The harder communication task is to create "software"— that is, to integrate men, ideas, programs, and management in a "continuous feedback loop"—which can make productive use of the available hardware.

So grand a purpose will involve a massive and concerted effort of transnational experimentation, evaluation, and action. This effort cannot be made by the rich nations *for* the poor nations. It must be done by the rich *with* the poor nations, acting in cooperative enterprises. The key word cannot be "transfer"; it must be "transformation." In the end, a true world communication network will become operative only when the poor nations of the world can demand, and deserve, "equal time" with the rich nations.

This is not now the case by a long shot. The current technology of global communication is mainly in the hands of the superpowers. As a result, traffic flows in the world communication network tend to be unilaterally from the rich to the poor, from the strong to the weak. In such a system, all "disparities"—economic, social, psychological, political—contaminate international communication. It is in the interest of all those who believe in "equal time" to help construct this indispensable condition for the just, and effective, operation of a truly global communication network.

Only then will international persuasion, on a world basis, become sociologically feasible—in the worthwile sense proposed by the editors of this journal.

NOTES

1. Ithiel Pool et al., *The Prestige Press* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1970).

2. Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in World War I* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, paperback, 1971).

3. Daniel Lerner, *Psychological Warfare Against Nazi Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, paperback, 1971).

4. E. A. Shils and M. Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," in Daniel Lerner, ed., *Propanda in War and Crisis* (New York: Stewart, 1951), p. 410.

5. Guidelines for forther study of such international communications are provided by Hans Speier, *Force and Folly* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, paperback, 1970).

6. See C. I. Hovland and I. L. Janis, eds., *Personality and Persuasibility* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, paperback, 1959).

7. See D. Lerner and M. Gorden, *Euratlantica: Changing Perspectives of the European Elites* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, paperback, 1969).

8. For an overview, East and West, see W. P. Davison, *International Political Communication* (New York: Prager, 1965).

9. My central thesis is that the poor countries do want what the rich countries have and, over the past two decades, have moved unilaterally in this direction. Several dozen replications of my model have confirmed it in every region of the world. The latest replication is G. R.

Winham, "Political Development and Lerner's Theory," *American Political Science Review* 64, 3 (September, 1970). pp. 810–818.

[10] The most articulate exposition of this process and its consequences is in the voluminous writings of Gunnar Myrdal and Barbara Ward.

[11] The main source is my book *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: Free Press-Macmillan, paperback, 1964). Principal supplementaries are my papers in: L. W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963); W. B. Hamilton, ed., *The Transfer of Institutions* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1964); D. Lerner and W. Schramm, eds., *Communication and Change in the Developing Countries* (Honolulu, Hawaii. East-West Center Press, 1967).

PSYOP AND RELATED ACTIVITIES*

BY FRANCIS M. WATSON, JR.

As communication involves the total spectrum of human actions, so all human interaction, irrespective of intent, communicates: PSYOP policies and actions should be considered in terms of this premise.

In any meaningful study of psychological operations, the PSYOP concept must be defined and its parameters identified against those military activities that support or are closely related to PSYOP *and* against the total psychological impact a military force has on its target audiences. This essay seeks to discuss the connection between PSYOP and its supporting and related military activities.

In this review, note will be taken of matters that can be considered as having psychological impact on the audiences which PSYOP is seeking to reach. That is, although no determination will be attempted about whether or not an action was planned or conducted, in contrast to being simply incidental to the military operation or presence in the area under study, PSYOP is here considered to include psychological warfare and propaganda and to encompass those political, military, economic, and ideological actions that are believed, in fact, to impact on the emotions, attitudes, or behavior of neutral or friendly foreign groups as they relate to the achievement of those U.S. objectives stated or implied in the literature studied.

Attention will therefore be given to each of the following activities, as being so closely related, or intricately involved, in audience impact as to be inseparable from PSYOP:

1. Civic Action
2. Civil Affairs
3. Community Relations
4. Public Information
5. Intelligence
6. Troop Behavior
7. Populace and Resources Control

These activities and functions must be identified rather precisely at the outset. Some definitions of the terms used in this review must be made. Precise points of departure must be established from which appraisals can be made that may have some usefulness in the future development of doctrine or the design of training programs, for even a cursory review of

* Original essay by Francis M. Watson, Jr.

the reports and other literature dealing with these functions indicates great similarities in the names of some of the activities undertaken, and also great differences in objectives. For example, some of the same activities may be undertaken as civic action and community relations, but differences in goals, funding, and technique are great. Thus, each of these functions will be defined and the doctrine and tactics intended for each will be stated and briefly discussed.

CIVIC ACTION

Civic action is listed in the *Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for Joint Usage*, hereafter referred to as *JCS Pub 1*, as synonymous with military civic action and was defined in the late 1960s as:

> ...the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communication, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic, and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.)[1]

Conceived within the context of attitude-and-opinion-change efforts, civic action has been repeatedly used in the field to influence civilian groups toward various objectives sought by the military forces, as well as to achieve environmental improvement.

Although many writers contend that the U.S. military has been conducting civic-action-type activities throughout its history, the specific program to which *JCS Pub 1* addressed itself, and which has received so much emphasis in the field, seems to have begun much more recently. Virgil Ney attributes the origin of the present concept to

> ...Ramon Magsaysay, a former World War II Filipino guerrilla captain, [who] became Secretary of Defense of the Republic of the Philippines. His astute appraisal of the Hukbalahap insurgency was that basically not all Huks were Communists. . . . There was a large group of good Filipinos within the Huk insurgency movement who were there only because of political factors. Magsaysay decided that it was possible to counter insurgency with other than military or violent tactics. In reality, his new tactic was "civic action" and it was based upon subtle but practical operations conducted by the troops in order "to make friends and influence people" in favor of the *de jure* government.[2]

Brought to the U.S. Armed Forces as a Cold War technique and spurred by the Draper Report[3], civic action has received attention ever since. For example, the early PSYOP and civil affairs field manuals do not refer to the concept but it appeared in both in the early 1960s under such headings as "cold war techniques" or "counter-insurgency operations." The 1962 civil affairs manual indicated that:

> Civic action, an aspect of civil affairs, is any function performed by military forces in cooperation with civil authorities, agencies, or groups through the use of military manpower and material resources for the socio-economic well-being and improvement of the civil community with a goal of building or reinforcing mutual respect and fellowship between the civil and military communities.[4]

The Office of the Chief of Military History dates the origin of civic action as follows:

> There was one provision of the 1961 [Congressional] Act that had appeared first in the Mutual Security Act of 1959. Although the concept of civic action had been used previously in Iran and extensively in the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea program following the Korean War, it did not become official until 1959. . . . Some

> C.A. [Civic Action] programs had been initiated under this provision in the 1959–1961 period, but the big impetus came in the 1961–1965 period.[5]

U.S. Army Colonel Robert Slover testified before Congress on civic action in June of 1961. He told the legislators, "civic action should be looked upon as both a preventive or countering measure to prevent deterioration in a country, and also as a technique of guerrilla warfare. . . . ." [6] Slover was a civil affairs specialist and one of the Army's prime spokesmen on civic action at that time. The thesis of his testimony before Congress—and he quoted considerably from FM 41–5, the joint-service manual on civil affairs—was that action was a means for demonstrating brotherhood between the civilian and his own military forces in the improvement of political, economic, and social conditions in their country. Again, these are matters heavily laden with psychological subtleties well within the scope of PSYOP. PSYOP manuals themselves have very little to say about civic action, although they do allude to PSYOP exploitation of civic action successes and PSYOP officers' advisory assistance to their own commanders and indigenous military forces on civic action programs. In the field, however, civic action is effected under the aegis of G5/S5 officers, most of whom seem to be PSYOP-oriented.

Any consideration of contemporary civic action and PSYOP must also embrace community relations:

> . . .in spite of interdepartmental agreement on the definition of the term, "military civic action" has come progressively closer and closer to meaning anything that any soldier or unit does for "the people" that appears at the time, and to the doer, to be good for them [the people][7]

Others have expressed similar concern for the mixing of military-civil relations programs involving psychological impact:

> ...the term "civic action" has been used to refer to a wide range of activities that have traditionally been known in the military by other labels, such as engineering, civil affairs (or military government), public relations, civil defense, troop-community relations, and psychological operations.[8]

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Community relations has most often been undertaken in the military as a subfunction of public information, both because it is usually an "operating responsibility of the information officer," and because it has usually been conducted in conjunction with efforts to gain favorable coverage in the mass media and thus assist in "developing a good image of the Army...."[9] In overseas areas, however, the community relations function has tended to drift toward the G5 staff section, especially with the advent of community relations advisory councils (CRACs) in such places as Korea. The 1971 PSYOP doctrinal manual envisaged coordination of the PSYOP staff officer with the civil affairs officer, for "PSYOP implications on proposed civic action and *community relations* programs, . . . include the impact of these programs on local cultures and the likelihood of popular support for projects." (Emphasis supplied.)[10] Perhaps the greatest difference between civic action and community relations is most clearly seen in the experience of these CRACs. The councils, as well as the programs involved, tend to be initiated because of some problem the

military perceives in its relations with the civilian community and not because of any apparent or expressed need within the civilian community. Both the public relations nature of community relations and its possible confusion with civic action can be seen in the following passage from the 1969 civil affairs manual:

> Many of the individual projects undertaken in a military civic action program will have a superficial resemblance to community relations activities. While improved community relations of the military is an important byproduct of the military civic action effort these relations are not, at least during Phase I of insurgency, the primary product. Military civic action should be designed to make real, lasting improvements to the social, economic, and political environment. For example, if a military unit were to build, maintain, or staff a needed school this would be true military civic action whether or not it also produced a greater civilian respect for the military. On the other hand the activity of a military unit in sponsoring an occasional outing or meal for the children of that school would be primarily in the nature of a community relations project. As such, it would build up goodwill and a better relationship between the military forces and the people, but may be a misapplication of resources which should be devoted to true military civic action.[11]

Appearing on the same page with a reprint of the JCS definition of military civic action quoted earlier, the above passage made no distinction—as the JCS definition did—between the roles of U.S. and indigenous military forces. This distinction can become a key issue. The same manual (FM 41–10), however, did distinguish those roles in connection with community relations:

> Unless the U.S. forces (and their host country allies) understand the requirement for good community relations and proper conduct, the best planned civil affairs and PSYOP effort by CMO staff elements and units will be of little value. The rules of troop behavior required in a counterinsurgency situation are complicated. U.S. personnel must not only conduct themselves to the best advantage; but, by their example as well as by their advice encourage the indigenous military to improve its conduct. Mere generosity on the part of U.S. troops is not enough, particularly when that generosity is practiced with an unconscious show of wealth, a disregard for local custom, or is accompanied by loud or unusual behavior.[12]

The Army Regulation on public information, although it did little to clear up the overlap with civic action, probably gave the purest indication of community relations, defining it as

> That command function which evaluates public interest, and executes a program of action to earn public understanding and acceptance.[13]

PUBLIC INFORMATION

That there is a relationship between public information and PSYOP is evident, especially when there is an overlap in audiences, as suggested by the following paragraph from the civil affairs manual:

> The impact on civil-military relations of the information Officer is not limited to his participation in community relations matters. The command information program for military personnel and for the civilian employees must be coordinated with the psychological operations program if one is being conducted. Information intended only for the education of U.S. military personnel often will reach civilian audiences and must be in consonance with U.S. released information directed at such civilian audiences or released to the world at large. In today's world the mobility of individuals and the profusion of mass communications is such that neither the information officer nor the psychological operations officer can hope to address an audience isolated unto itself. Further, news released abroad to U.S. and international news media and intended for audiences outside the theater of operations will also return to the locale of such operations and influence civilian audiences. Therefore, coordinated information programs must be scheduled if credibility is to be retained.[14]

The first theater-level press officer appeared in World War I within the Press and Propaganda division of the G–2 section of General John J.

Pershing's headquarters. Referred to as "G–2," this office was in the company of three other G–2 subsections labeled: "Enemy Information," "Counterintelligence," and "Maps." Such an association with intelligence or PSYOP would be considered unthinkable now. Indeed, the Army came out of World War II facing a Congress that was suspicious even of the term "public relations"—thus the imposition of the term "public information" for the Army's contacts with the public press.[15] The function was pushed completely away from any suggestion of PSYOP. More recently as recognized by the passage just quoted from the civil affairs manual, the scope and speed of world news collection and dissemination have forced the PSYOP program to be aware of what is being said by the public information staff, because the two are often speaking to the same audiences, even if indirectly through the world press.

The complex interaction between PSYOP and public information was at least partially reinforced in the following two passages from the PSYOP doctrinal manual:

> [The PSYOP staff officer provides] advice on the effects of hostile PSYOP and recommends countermeasures for use in command information programs, [i.e. those directed to US troops], public information programs [information to the world mass media], and PSYOP.
>
> .... The information officer coordinates the command information program with community relations programs and the PSYOP program. The command information program for military and civilian personnel must be coordinated with the PSYOP program. Information intended only for U.S. military personnel often will reach civilian audiences and must be in consonance with U.S. released information.[16]

INTELLIGENCE

In many ways the historical relationship of PSYOP and military intelligence is similar to that of PSYOP and public information in that both were very closely related at the outset, diverged, and are once again drawing close. The advent of an almost saturation level of mass communications in the world has apparently been the main influencing factor. In earlier days, military intelligence and PSYOP were both concerned almost exclusively with the same target, the enemy, and interested in essentially the same information about that target—its composition and the weather and terrain conditions under which that target would be encountered. Evolution of the concern of intelligence along lines manifestly related to PSYOP are evident in the following passage taken from the chapter on "Cold War and Stability Operations" in the 1971 PSYOP doctrinal manual:

> *Intelligence Operations.* In addition to enemy, weather, and terrain [traditional combat intelligence concerns], the population is included as the fourth major consideration of PSYOP intelligence. An important intelligence objective is to persuade the populace to provide information to government or allied forces. Timely and accurate intelligence is essential to successful stability operations. The amount of intelligence furnished by the population is an indication of PSYOP effectiveness. Prior to operations, the PSYOP officer assesses attitudes and behavior of the target audience toward the friendly and insurgent forces. PSYOP endeavors to convince the target audience[to report on the insurgents].[17]

Thus, there is a complex interrelationship between PSYOP and intelligence, as a result of which the PSYOP program is both a producer and consumer of intelligence—as well as an observer of intelligence as a

measure of its own success. The literature survey suggests that it is in its consumer role that PSYOP has its greatest problems, a fact demonstrated by the frequency with which the intelligence sections of the PSYOP manuals have been changed in recent years, changes usually expanding the "sources of PSYOP intelligence" portions of the manuals and reducing specificity about the types of information sought. Neither training literature nor field reports indicate that PSYOP and intelligence elements of the Army have come to agreement on such specifics.

TROOP BEHAVIOR

The term "troop behavior" does not convey the operational ramifications many see it as having on PSYOP. Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger, whose career association with PSYOP included both active duty participation in the program as a military reservist and extensive research, said the behavior of individual soldiers was in itself

> . . .a major form of communication far more important than leaflets, radio broadcasts, or posters. The role of the soldier as he is seen by the people whom he passes is a real contributing element.... In heavily settled areas such as Western Europe or much of East Asia, the soldier plays an indirect psychological warfare role which it is difficult to overestimate.[18]

Even in the early 1970s the PSYOP manuals were almost completely silent on the role of an individual soldier as a PSYOP participant. They were even more so on the responsibility of the PSYOP staff officer as a source of advice or point of coordination, on the impact of troop behavior on the PSYOP situation, or on the training of the individual for his PSYOP role. For example, the latest doctrinal manual published in 1971 made no reference to these matters in its description of the duties and responsibilities of the PSYOP staff officer. Nor were they referred to as points of coordination with either G1 (personnel) or G3 who share responsibilities for troop morale, behavior, and training. The PSYOP operations manual published in 1966 did contain this paragraph:

> [PSYOP planning will insure] *Friendly Troop Orientation.* In any military operation, specific plans must be made to orient friendly troops in psychological operations being conducted. This orientation must never be taken for granted, especially in tactical situations where troops might be unaware that enemy soldiers and civilians are actually endeavoring to rally for amnesty, defect, or surrender. The purpose of psychological operations should be explained to *all* personnel assisting in the mission. Their interest and cooperation will be more genuine if they are given an English translation of the message to be disseminated. If the mission is to promote defection, friendly troops must know how, when, and where the enemy may come over, so that they will recognize the defectors as such. Failure to orient troops beforehand could lead to the killing of enemy troops who actually wish to defect or surrender, thus destroying credibility and adversely affecting future psychological operations.[19]

However, the above passage merely sought to preclude one small, negative PSYOP function. It was certainly an inadequate analysis of the potential negative effects of failure to emphasize the PSYOP consequences of troop behavior, and, apart from the very general injunction at the beginning of the passage, made no effort to elucidate the need for positive PSYOP-oriented troop behavior.

CIVIL AFFAIRS (CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS)

In considering troops as large groups rather than as individuals, civil affairs (or civil-military relations, as the newer manuals are beginning to

term it) now relates to PSYOP because it is now recognized to have a psychological impact on foreign target groups. The October 1969 edition of FM 41–10 contained what appear to be somewhat interlocking definitions for both:

> Civil affairs includes those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area, or occupied country or area when military forces are present. Civil affairs includes, inter alia: (2) [sic] Matters concerning the relationship between military forces located in a country or area and the civil authorities and people of that country or area usually involving performance by the military forces of certain functions or the exercise of certain authority normally the responsibility of the local government. This relationship may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to military action in time of hostilities or other emergency and normally is covered by a treaty or other agreement, express or implied; (2) Military government[:] The form of administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory (AR 310–25).[20]

> CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS.... The ACof, G5, Civil-Military Operations (CMO) officer is the principal staff assistant to the commander in all matters pertaining to political, economic, social, and psychological aspects of military operations. He has primary staff responsibility for those actions embracing the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in the area of operations to include internal assistance and development operations, and for those actions in which PSYOP techniques are used to support the achievement of command objectives by creating in target groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior desired....[21]

The overlap between these two passages is easily seen. Also easily seen is the continued delicacy with which the Army handled the subject of military government within the overall civil affairs function. This was part of a trend underway for several years. In 1960–1961 Dyer, Higgins, and Hausrath wrote:

> It is not clear at present whether the Army itself considers that its main activity in this area [civil affairs] is in the field of military government or in the field of civil relations. The Field Manual, FM 41–10, is written in terms of military government. There are signs that the Army nevertheless is becoming increasingly concerned with civil relations....[22]

These analysts were, of course, writing years ago and were referring to the 1957 edition of FM 41–10, which, indeed, was military government-oriented. In fact, its title was *Civil Affairs/Military Government.* The 1957 manual was superseded by a May 1962 version, titled *Civil Affairs Operations*, and by later editions in August 1967 and October 1969, with similar titles. Comparison of these publications confirms the Dyer-Higgins-Hausrath observation that the Army has been increasingly concerned about relations with civilians, but somewhat hazy on specifics and particularly hesitant in addressing the issue of military government—or such matters as occupied territory. This has definite significance for PSYOP, especially in such matters as consolidation PSYOP. For example, although the language has been tempered—much along the patterns detected by Dyer, Higgins, and Hausrath—consolidation PSYOP "are directed towards the population liberated or occupied areas to facilitate military operations and promote maximum cooperation with the occupying power." [23] At least this has been the traditional context for consolidation PSYOP, and it was still so described in the 1966 version of the PSYOP operational manual, FM 33–5. The 1971 PSYOP doctrinal manual

and the 1969 civil affairs operations manual, FM 41–10, tended to relegate consolidation PSYOP to "limited or general war" or to blend its elements into the same type of subfunctions one finds in counterinsurgency operations—military civic action and populace and resources control, for example.

However Greenspan's writings to the effect that "occupation" and "military government" are terms most appropriately assigned by de facto considerations seem the more accurate.

> Military occupation is always a question of fact. The Hague Regulations state (Article 42): "Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.... The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised." It follows that in an effective occupation the previous government in the territory has been rendered incapable of exercising there its governmental authority, and that the occupying force has substituted its own authority for it....[24]

This point of departure is not offered contentiously, but with the idea that if it appears to apply to some of the actions the Army has taken within the scope of stability operations, the Army and the individual commanders involved would benefit by clarification of the applicable doctrine and precise definition of the operations involved. The erosive effects of equivocation on such terms as "occupied area" and "consolidation PSYOP" in successive manuals is to be avoided. It appears, for example, that the Army has been criticized severely in the world press at times because the commander in a local operation has not taken upon himself the full responsibility that his tactical decisions had thrust upon him as de facto military occupant. A clarification of the doctrine might at least present him with alternatives before he takes such decisions. Without further analysis, it would seem that the present situation is often loaded to give the PSYOP advantage to his opponent while making little if any change in the actual civil affairs situation.

POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

PSYOP support of populace and resources control is seen in some places in the literature as limited to counterinsurgency operations; [25] in other places it is combined with civic action in a limited or general war context.[26] Again, it is a matter with serious impacts on the civil population, curtailing "legitimate as well as subversive activities" and thus of specific concern in the appraisal of PSYOP.[27]

CONCLUSION

In summary, this essay seeks to evaluate PSYOP in the context in which it operates, that is, not only as a source of propaganda directed toward intended target audiences, but as an activity inseparable from the accompanying impacts on these audiences created by the military forces of which the PSYOP effort is a part. This view is perhaps best illustrated by Hausrath's description of the civil-military relationship:*

> The Army lives in an environment of people. On the domestic scene as well as abroad, the Army's presence requires real estate, equipment, food and supplies, housing, recreational facilities, personal services, transportation facilities, labor,

**Note.* A part of Hausrath's study was incorporated into the 1967 edition of the Civil Affairs Manual.

and a myriad of other things for which it competes in the local economy. Its presence frequently congests the area, overtaxes the capacity of utilities, inflates prices, and crowds schools. Allthough it also creates business opportunities and expands the local economy, it draws new population to the area, and these newcomers are not always wanted by the earlier residents.

When the Army moves or maneuvers it may trespass, destroy or damage property, and cause injury to persons and livestock. Although the Army compensates for such damage, these occurrences are likely to irritate and alienate local people, or to invite exploitation by them.

The presence of a military force causes the social and cultural atmosphere of a community to change, and makes political and governmental problems more acute and numerous. The daily lives of the local people are affected, sometimes seriously disrupted. Local mores, respected customs, and valued traditions are infringed upon—often never to be restored. These changes are likely to be resented by many local people, and strong, negative attitudes and emotions may be generated. Although there are advantages as well as disadvantages to the local people in having a military unit in their area, benefits are quickly accepted and soon taken for granted, whereas irritations build up, rankle, and breed antagonisms. An accumulation of these irritations can result in acts of violence or persist as latent or expressed oppositions.[28]

Even though the above passages seem forceful in stating that the impact of a military organization on a civilian environment is very great before the first shot is fired, they do not mention what happens in a combat situation. Under these circumstances the total impact would be even greater.

The importance of the total impact concept in the appraisal of military PSYOP cannot be overstressed, for if purposeful communication is to be effective it must reflect reality, reality that is significantly shaped by the activities of and reactions to modern military forces. A PSYOP action plan that fails to take this into account will clearly be less effective than under optimum conditions and may even seriously prejudice the effectiveness of future psychological operations.

NOTES

1. U. S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 1968), hereinafter *JCS Pub 1*, p. 47.

2. Virgil Ney, *The United States Soldier in a Nonviolent Role: An Historical Overview*, CORG–M–310 (Alexandria, Virginia: Combat Operations Research Group, July 1967), p. 58 AD 667–355.

3. U.S. President's Commission to Study the Military Assistance Program, *Report of the President's Commission to Study the Military Assistance Program* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959), known as the Draper Report. As a result of extensive Congressional debate on military assistance, President Eisenhower established a commission under William H. Draper to evaluate the entire program. Among other things, the committee recommended that emerging nations, not faced with an immediate threat of external aggression, should be given predominantly economic aid. The committee noted that the United States should encourage the military in underdeveloped countries to use their resources for economic objectives. From this recommendation came a spurt of interest in civic action programs.

4. U.S. Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, FM 41–10 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1962), para. 71b.

5. Walter G. Hermes, *Survey of the Development of the Role of the U.S. Army Military Advisor*, OCMH Study (Washington, D.C.: Histories Division, Office of the Chief of Military History, n.d.), p. 70.

6. Col. Robert H. Slover, statement in the *Congressional Record*, Vol. 107, Appendix, 87th Congress, 1st session, June 1961.

7. Hoyt R. Livingston and Francis M. Watson, Jr., "Civic Action: Purpose and Pitfalls," *Military Review*, XLVII, no. 12 (December 1967), p. 22.

[8] Alfred J. Kraemer, *Promoting Civic Action in Less Developed Nations: A Conceptualization of the U. S. Military Role* (Alexandria, Virginia: The George Washington University, Human Resources Research Office, July 1968), p. 6. AD 673–672.
[9] Sidney Alvin Knutson, "History of the Public Relations Program in the United States Army" (M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisc., 1953), pp. 396–409.
[10] U.S. Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations, U.S. Army Doctrine*, FM 33–1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 1971), p. 3–2.
[11] U.S. Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, FM 41–10 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 1969), pp. 7–8.
[12] Ibid., pp. 8–10.
[13] U.S. Department of the Army, "Public Information—Community Relations," AR 360–61 (Washington, D.C., 1957), p. 1–1.
[14] U.S. Department of the Army, FM 14–10 (October 1969), pp. 2–15.
[15] Francis M. Watson, Jr., *"A Study of the Nature and Effectivenss of United States Army Public Relations"* (thesis, University of Georgia, 1959), pp. 5–10.
[16] U.S. Department of the Army, FM 33–1 (February 1971), pp. 3–2 and 3–4 respectively.
[17] Ibid., p. 8–6.
[18] Paul M. A. Linebarger, "Problems in the Utilizaton of Troops in Foreign Areas," *Human Factors in Military Operations*, ed. R. H. Williams (Chevy Chase, Md.: Operations Research Office, 1954), p. 393.
[19] U.S. Department of the Army, *Psychological Operations, Techniques and Procedures*, FM 33–5 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 1966), p. 16.
[20] U.S. Department of the Army, FM 41–10 (October 1969), pp. 1–2.
[21] Ibid., pp. 2–7.
[22] Murray Dyer, Alfred Hausrath, and Gerald J. Higgins, *The Developing Role of the Army in Civil Affairs* (Bethesda, Md.: Operations Research Office, June 1961), p. 67. AD 264–407.
[23] U.S. Department of the Army, FM 33–5 (October 1966), p. 38.
[24] Morris Greenspan, *The Modern Law of Land Warfare* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, 1959), p. 23.
[25] U.S. Department of the Army, FM 33–5 (October 1966), p. 26.
[26] U.S. Department of the Army, FM 33–1 (Febraury 1971), pp. 7–9.
[27] U.S. Department of the Army, FM 33–5 (October 1966), p. 27.
[28] Alfred H. Hausrath, *Civil Affairs in the Cold War* (Bethesda, Md.: Operations Research Office, February 1961), p. 26. AD 264–404; U.S. Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, FM 41–10 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 1967), p. 1.

COMMUNICATION AND INSTITUTION BUILDING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES*

By John H. Johns

Communication can provide the major link required for institution building in developing countries.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this essay is to develop concepts of institutions and institution building that can be used as a frame of reference for U.S. programs, U.S. Army activities, and potential Army contributions to the overall U.S. effort to assist host countries to build strong institutions capable both of effecting social change with a minimum of violence and of resisting subversion.

As used here, a nation is viewed as a social system consisting of a large

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* Original essay by John H. Johns

number of small, close-knit groups (that is, micro-groups), which are connected and linked in a pyramidal fashion by larger, more complex groups (that is, macro-institutions), which are in turn integrated into the overall national system. The small, intimate groups are the basic means of social control within a society, while the larger macro-institutions serve as coordinators, regulators, integrators, communication systems, and linkages for these smaller groups.

In order to function as a viable system, a nation must have a certain amount of unity. Unity of action in a social group is brought about by mutual behavioral adjustments of the individual members of the group, so that the action of the group as a whole has a common aim. Concerted action is the result of the integration or coordination of individual actions, feelings, and purposes of the group members. The behavior of a social group often becomes so highly unified that one speaks of the "solidarity" of the group. The development of this unity is called "group integration." Social or group unity is called "group integration." Social or group unity does not imply that all members of the group act in the same way or have the same thoughts and feelings. On the contrary, differences of behavior and of thought and feeling, when they favor coordination or adjustment, are necessary for the integration of a group. The unity of the group results from integration of the adaptive feelings and purposes of the group members. They unite in order to achieve some collective purpose desired by most of the members of the group. Group unity is due to the pressure of environment, but even more due to adaptive ideas, feelings, and purposes. This is at the heart of institution building.

The need for a certain degree of social cohesion does not mean that social conflict is necessarily bad. On the contrary, sociologists have long recognized that some social conflict is desirable and serves a useful function. Societies tend to "ossify" or become rigid and unresponsive to the needs of the people when there is no conflict to stimulate change. Unless change occurs with time, a society will become outdated and disintegrate, as almost all societies have done throughout history.

Stability operations seek to manage conflict so that it remains constructive and is not permitted to destroy the entire social fabric by developing into anarchy or by overthrowing legitimate authority.* There is a delicate balance here that man has not yet been able to find. Stability operations, a form of conflict management, will succeed only if that delicate balance is found.

Nationbuilding involves the development of unity in both micro- and macro-institutions. This paper discusses some relevant factors that must be understood if the subsequent discussion about the Army's role in institution building is to be placed in the proper context. The primary focus is on micro-institutions at the grass-roots level.

* As used here, "legitimate authority" is defined operationally by the president, that is, it is a government he has chosen to support. The U.S. Army does not become involved in the business of determining legitimacy.

THE NATURE OF INSTITUTIONS

By "institutions" is meant here any enduring, complex, integrated, organized behavior pattern through which social control is exerted and by means of which fundamental societal desires or needs are met. In short, institutions may be viewed as patterns of interaction among people. This concept is in contrast to the popular view of an institution as an organization of a public, or semipublic character involving a directive body, and usually a building or physical establishment of some sort, designated to serve some socially recognized and authorized end, for example, colleges, orphanages, hospitals, and governmental agencies.

Institutions are an essential element of any joint human endeavor. Humanity has progressed because men have been able to work together to achieve goals that could not be attained by working alone. As societies have become more complex and technological changes have dictated more interdependence among people, it has become necessary for men to develop more complex social relationships. These complex relationships require better communication systems in order that diverse sectors of the society will understand how they fit into the overall system, appreciate the benefits of cooperative endeavors, and have mutual respect for the contributions of other groups in the nationbuilding process. Complexity also brings more conflict of interest and hence the need for increased methods of conflict management.

Institutions may be developed through natural, spontaneous human intercourse, since interaction to meet needs tends to develop certain uniformities over time, some of which tend to persist. The basic need of survival dictates that certain institutions come into being. The "natural" development of institutions in this manner is more likely to happen in the case of small institutions characterized by relatively tangible, short-range goals, for example, the family, clan, local groups. Even when small groups do develop "naturally," there is likely to be a great deal of trial-and-error and the process may be inefficient.

The development of larger institutions, for example, states, nations, and international institutions oriented toward long-range, sometimes intangible, goals, is likely to be less spontaneous. This type of institution is likely to result from deliberate planning, that is, social engineering.

There are several important processes involved in institutional development and maintenance that must be understood if appropriate programs are to be designed to influence these processes. Most of these processes are intangible and subtle.

INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES

The terms "group" and "institution" are closely related and sometimes used interchangeably. Most social scientists make a distinction between the two but for present purposes the group may be considered a special case of an institution.

There are two types of groups of concern to the social engineer: the micro/"primary group" and the macro/"secondary group." The "primary

group" is a group characterized by close emotional involvement of the members, which gives it primacy in the socialization process. It was first discussed in 1909 by sociologist Charles H. Cooley, who described the primary group as an "intimate association," as a "mutual identification for which 'we' is the natural expression."[1] Cooley's insights were largely impressionistic and gained through subjective observation. In the last few decades social scientists, using more refined and rigorous scientific methods, have confirmed Cooley's observations and have gained a better insight into the nature of these building blocks of society.

The primary group is of critical importance to the social engineer concerned with institution building and the principal concern of the military in its programs of institution building.

The nature of the primary group is to be contrasted with the secondary group. In the latter, relationships are more casual, impersonal, and segmental or fragmentary. In the intimate primary group there is little need for elaborate social structure because its members are bound by a personal loyalty which is stimulated by their common interests and frequent contact.

As the size of a group increases and its membership becomes dispersed in space and heterogeneous in values and goals, however, the regulative power of personal attitudes is considerably diluted. For its own preservation, the group develops means of facilitating indirect contacts and of controlling the behavior of its members through standard patterns, in the form of rules, laws, and official customs.

It is these latter groups which require more elaborate "linkage" functions. A great deal of the resources of the group must be allocated to the function of connecting the "building blocks" to maintain solidarity and unity of effort. This function is performed through communication systems and becomes more elaborate as the size and heterogeneity of the group increase.

The nation as social system can thus be described in brief as follows: a large number of interdependent primary groups with overlapping membership, linked together to form larger, secondary groups. The larger groups are in turn linked to even larger groups in the same manner and so on until a hierarchical structure of interdependent groups and institutions is integrated into a complex system with more or less common goals, values, and interests. The catalyst that holds the building blocks together is communication, which permits shared ideas, values, and similar world perspectives. Cooley had this to say about communications:

> By communication is here meant that mechanism through which human relations exist and develop—all the symbols of mind, together with the means of conveying them through space and preserving them in time. . . . All these taken together, in the intricacy of their actual combination, make up an organic whole corresponding to the organic whole of human thought; and everything in the way of mental growth has an external existence therein.[2]

Unquestionably, the vast network of social systems ranging from the two-person collectivity to the nation-state numbering in the millions is dependent upon the persistence of communication; without it the life-line

of interaction would be lost and the systems would quickly collapse. The communication process, then, is the key to institution building. Mass media alone, however, do not offer a solution. It is through the interpersonal communication process in the primary group that people are integrated into the social system, obtain a sense of belonging and involvement in the society, and are committed to the goals of the society.

The emphasis on communication as the key to achieving social cohesion should not be interpreted to mean that satisfaction of the material needs of the people is less important. Social cohesion is a product of improvement in the social, economic, and psychological environment. These cannot be meaningfully separated.

The integration of the national system is achieved in part by macro-institutions which may be called "linkage institutions." These are institutions which act as a framework or process whereby one or more of the elements of at least two social institutions are linked in such a manner that they function as interdependent parts of the larger system. Some institutions, for example, regulatory agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), exist solely for the linkage purpose, while others, for example, the military institutions, may provide a valuable linkage service as a secondary function. Another example of a linkage institution of a very abstract sort is the national event such as the Fourth of July celebration.

INSTITUTION BUILDING

Simply put, the task facing many of the developing nations is to establish strong building blocks (that is, primary groups) and link them into an overall national system capable of meeting the needs of the people. They can do this piecemeal and haphazardly, as many have tended to do in the past, or they can use the vast body of scientific knowledge available and do it in a systematic manner. The question—whether to be systematic and scientific or haphazard and intuitive—does not necessarily involve the ethical issues of authoritarianism, throught control, or the myriad of other alleged evils sometimes associated with the use of science to control social forces. The question is whether or not we want to use the knowledge we have. The following discussion summarizes some of the principles pertinent to the U.S. task of assisting developing countries to use knowledge to build viable institutions.

Building a viable nation involves a number of interdependent tasks that must be conducted concurrently. First of all, it involves the establishment of new institutions where none exist to meet needs, the strengthening or modification of existing institutions, and/or elimination of certain dysfunctional (from the standpoint of national unity) institutions.

Of utmost importance is the development of primary groups oriented toward the nation's core goals and values. This task is accomplished by (1) identifying the needs of the people at the grass-roots level, (2) ensuring that primary groups and institutions exist to meet these needs, and (3) integrating the people into these groups.

There are many problems associated with the integration of people into primary groups. Social patterns in traditional societies are extremely resistant to change no matter how dysfunctional they may seem to an outsider. This can be overcome somewhat by "change agents" who understand social processes and the particular culture of the people concerned. There is a great deal of knowledge available that social engineers can use to overcome this problem. Voluntary membership and participation in groups is a psychosocial phenomenon that is generally the same in all societies.

At the same time that strong primary groups are being developed, it is necessary to develop the larger institutions and link the primary groups thereto. This task involves not only the development of technical skills required for specific jobs, but more importantly, the development of common goals, values, and mutual respect and understanding among the diverse elements of the institution. Only when these latter conditions exist can an institution possess the cohesion, espirit de corps, and unity of effort needed to function effectively under the adverse conditions characteristic of the developing areas of the world.

NOTES

1. Charles H.Cooley, *Social Organization,* Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1909.
2. Ibid.

ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS WITHIN THE MILITARY MISSION*

By Alexander R. Askenasy

Psychological strategy is a major tool for realizing national goals; it requires total integration with all other activities—economic, diplomatic, and military—and, accordingly, a coordinated effort by all agencies.

It is ironic that, whereas psychologists have shown only limited interest in psychological operations, to non-psychologists the term has often evoked sinister associations with the mystique of psychology.

Psychological operations, narrowly defined in terms of leaflets and broadcasts, have often been considered a minor appendage to conventional military operations. Some writers have called in general terms for a larger role for psychological operations, but only rarely have we implemented such a role. My thesis is that in contemporary warfare, psychological operations must be integrated with other actions and that a social-psychological approach can be helpful in conceptually unifying all the diverse actions.

Clausewitz saw war as a means of changing the enemy's will or, we might say, as a form of psychological operations. As he defined it: "War is . . . an act of force to compel our adversary to do our will; . . . force . . . is thus the *means;* to impose our will upon the enemy is the *object.*" [1] He

*Excerpts from "Role of Psychological Operations Within the Military Mission," Chapter 21 in *Psychological Research in National Defense Today,* U.S. Army Behaviorial Science Research Laboratory, 1967. Reprinted with the permission of the author.

stated the classical formulation of the military role: "War is mere continuation of policy by other means," and ". . . politics is the womb in which war is developed, in which its outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state, like the qualities of living creatures in their embryos." [2]

Clausewitz was thus precociously aware of the psychological aspects of war. The point of war is not to destroy the enemy physically but rather to make him act in harmony with our will and to change his will to the extent that he no longer opposes our national interest. If we can influence the enemy's head, we will not have to strike his arm.

Burckhardt in his *History of the Renaissance in Italy* tells of the condottieri who moved their armies like chess figures without any fighting taking place, until one commander, perceiving he would lose the battle, conceded defeat. This example is not as anachronistic as it may appear. When we think of opponents in conflict or war, we should visualize not robots hacking at each other, but human beings with constantly changing perceptions, expectations, and alternatives.

BROADENING VIEWS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Linebarger reports that "World War I saw psychological warfare transformed from an incidental to a major military instrument . . ."[3] In his opinion, this country's psychological warfare consists in "the supplementing of normal military operations by the use of mass communications"[4] . . . . Its place is a modest one and its methods are limited by our usages, morality, and law."[5]

The outstanding example of psychological operations in World War I was Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points which appealed, with some success, directly to the people of Germany and Austria-Hungary. During World War I, the term "propaganda" was widely employed. Later on, the term became increasingly discredited—partly by Goebbels' use of it. The United States Army substituted the term "psychological warfare," and made extensive use of this "weapon" in World War II.

At the onset of both World War II and the Korean conflicts, many psychological warfare lessons had to be relearned—a fact that points up the absence of a continuous military policy for psychological operations. In 1957, the Department of the Army replaced the term "psychological warfare" with "psychological operations," indicating a recognition that such operations do not require a formal state of war and that they are not directed solely against enemies.

Finletter argued that "Psychological warfare is a bad term because the word 'warfare' implies that deceit is justifiable if it serves our purpose, and that such a concept is neither consistent with our principles nor is it good business."[6]

In contemporary practice, psychological operations have tended to be conducted primarily on two levels: (1) as propaganda in the traditional sense, conducted by traditional means (leaflets, broadcasts, and so forth)[7], and (2) more recently in specific actions (medical programs, school con-

struction, road-building) explicitly directed toward the change of attitudes and behavior of foreign populations in a direction considered desirable. On both levels, psychological operations have been viewed as subsidiary to conventional military activities.

We encounter too the not uncommon view that psychological warfare is somewhat disreputable or indecent. However that may be, the Communists are waging warfare psychologically today in places like Vietnam. As Dyer puts it, "When one looks at Soviet political communication and compares it with out own, what stands out is the completeness with which the instrument has been integrated into all forms of Soviet activity. . . . If we are to reply merely with counterpropaganda, or even propaganda, in the sense that the term carries today, we are at a disadvantage from the start."[8]

A continuing dissatisfaction with the definitions used in this area has been reflected in the changing terms from "propaganda" to "psychological warfare" to "psychological operations." Other terms have been proposed. One source lists no less than 18 such expressions.[9] In Englnad, the term "political warfare" came into use, meaning "combined operations of diplomacy and propaganda."[10] Lasswell says, "Political warfare adds the important idea that all instruments of policy need to be properly correlated in the conduct of war."[11]

In practice, journalists, public relations men, and advertising specialists have often been called on to conduct psychological operations. Working from trial and error, they have often done skillful, sometimes ingenious work,[12] even though their experience has usually been in the domestic communications industry. One British World War II expert concluded that "many of the techniques employed by journalists and advertisers are not applicable to propaganda operations."[13]

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY WARFARE

In contemporary warfare, the role of psychological operations increased in importance. There are two reasons:

1. As Morgenthau[14] has pointed out, aristocratic internationalism has in the last 200 years been replaced by nationalisms with competing ideological claims, and increasingly wider groups have become involved in government.

2. More recently, nuclear weapons have reduced the feasibility of full-scale wars to settle policy issues. It is becoming increasingly clear that psychological operations are less costly than combat. While formerly the psychological aspects were a small part of an essentially military struggle, now, especially in a cold war, military aspects have become a relatively minor part of an essentially psychological struggle.

The so-called little wars and the insurgencies in developing countries have been recognized as crises which cannot be fought by force of arms only but which pose major political, economic, and psychological problems.[15] It has become essential to win the allegiance of the civilian

population, preferably before an insurgency starts.[16] Mao Tse-Tung has said that the masses must first be convinced and aroused before they can be organized. Guerrilla action can come only later.[17] General Giap of the Viet Minh has similarly maintained that propaganda is more important than fighting.[18]

The revolution of rising expectations in developing nations cannot be contained by police action. Any long-range solution must take into account a poeple's national, economic, and social aspirations. The French found this to be true in Algeria. As Colonel Frequelin[19] has noted, the French Army started out to control the terrain and only later became concerned with the aspirations of the population.

PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

General Wheeler has pointed out that the Army's mission is to conduct combat operations on land which are well understood by ourselves, by our friends, and by our enemies.[20] He further stressed the need for credibility and visibility of Army powers.

It may be argued that the military commander very often is not aware of the psychological implications of his conventional military operations. Yet all military actions can have psychological effects on perception and behavior whether or not the commander intended such effects. Indeed, such unintentional aspects of military operations may have a greater influence on the will to resist than do calculated schemes. Military, political, economic, and psychological actions may, then, be viewed as communications, as processes through which intentions are more or less conveyed. Psychological operations should be seen as a coordinated approach to influence the oppontent's way of thinking and acting.

One shortcoming of psychological operations in developing countries is that communication is addressed primarily to the well-to-do upper or middle classes which represent the status quo, while far less attention is given to the majority of the population. As Osanka said, "the ruling powers (in underdeveloped countries) seldom view the peasants as an important or powerful political threat. Insurgents, and particularly Communist insurgents, take the opposite view"[21] In the long run, it seems difficult to maintain the allegiance of a developing nation by relying only on the upper classes. Smith argues that, over time, the middle and upper classes have to work within the limits of the value constellation of the villagers whom they "govern," or be ousted.[22]

What we need, then, is a clearer picture of the persons with whom we are communicating, the persons who play important roles in modern war and insurgency. They include not only the statesmen and military officers but also the common soldiers and the peasants, the students, and the frustrated intellectuals to whom the Communists seek to appeal.

Changing Perceptions

Cantril developed a theory which brings together perceptual research and the individual's relations to society and social movements. He holds that we must deal not only with the "objective" world surrounding a

person but also with his perceptual world—the world as *he* sees it.[23] People have lived for centuries with poverty and accepted it as unchangeable; then, suddenly, they find it intolerable and act to change it. We must concern ourselves with what has brought about this change in a people's aspirations.

A man's perceptions have developed in a given cultural and social setting. It is the task of the commander and the planner to restructure not only the "real" situation of an opponent but also the situation as the opponent perceives it. This is done not only by propaganda leaflets but also by a wide range of other means. The military commander through actions at his disposal can change not only the opponent's will to fight but also his perceptions of us and our intentions. The commander should ask himself: What do the men opposing us expect us to do? What would they like to see us do?

All too often there is a tendency to project the standards and assumptions of our own nation into the minds of people of other nations. One example of this projection is concerned with so-called "legitimacy." A nation may communicate sympathy and support to another nation for its "legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace." In effect, such a nation sets itself up as a judge of right and wrong, forgetting the views of the people concerned, many of whom may oppose their established government and may even use illegitimate means because they feel their legitimate aspirations will not be fulfilled under the status quo. Too, the concept of treason is a relative one, as Boveri pointed out in her work, *Treason in the Twentieth Century*.[24] A person may feel that in being loyal to the regime, he in effect betrays his nation or social group. Bauer[25], in an article on influence processes and resistance to communication, found need for two levels of analysis, one to account for "the intentions of the regime" and the other to explain the "intentions of the citizen."[26]

In developing countries, where rapid technological change occurs while traditional customs persist, there is need for perceptual restructuring, for a new "definition of the situation." Communism tries to provide a ready-made doctrine which seems to explain all the disturbing changes. Communism tries to offer a common language as an aid to effective communication, to provide categories of thought, and to spread belief in the ultimate triumph of Communism as a historical necessity—a new version of "God's will."[27]

The military commander must be concerned with what he communicates to the enemy leader. What should the enemy know? What should he not know? What impression should he get? As the enemy leader will base his plans and operations in part on his perception of our strength and of his own, what can we do to change this perception in a way favorable to us?

Perceiving the Enemy

In war, there has been traditionally a clear dichotomy between friend and foe, between the "goodies" and "baddies." Gray distinguished four

"images of the enemy": first, as a professional colleague—a comrade in arms; second, as subhuman; third, as devil and enemy of God and the good; fourth, as essentially decent but misguided.[28] Osgood has repeatedly[29] questioned the implicit assumptions we make about our own motivations and about those of the enemy.

In a world war, it is relatively easy to create in a few years simple, endlessly repeated stereotypes. When we are trying to win over enemy soldiers or even leaders, however, it will not help to tell them that they are criminals. In guerrilla warfare, the identification of the enemy becomes increasingly difficult, and the problem of communicating with him the more complex. Who is the enemy in an insurgency in a developing nation—the guerrilla fighter, his military leader, his political leader, a foreign power, hunger, or social crisis? Our military have shown a growing awareness of this complexity by their increasing emphasis on civic actions either combined with regular military operations or as preventive measures.

In the long run, if we want to win over people who are now in opposition to our national interests, neither conventional military nor narrow psychological operations will do the trick. To find a modus vivendi, we must identify "the common purposes, the common interests, the common values of the free world."[30] Smith[31] suggested that the United States gradually redefine political freedom, economic security, and individual dignity in ways both we and non-industrial nations can agree on. Much of what was said about perceptions and expectations holds not only for foreigners but also for ourselves. Nor can one see communication as a one-way street for influence. Bauer advocated a "transactional model of communication, [in which] there is an exchange of values between two or more parties."[32]

Alternatives Open to the Adversary

What alternatives does the soldier or guerrilla perceive as open to him? What value priorities does he attach to these alternatives? Should he resist? What else can he do? These questions are closely related to his will to fight. Most guerrillas fight not for the sake of fighting but because they expect to reach certain goals which they feel cannot be reached by other means. Decision and game theories have not been too helpful in accounting for these processes. Values are subjective and choices are often made on emotional grounds. Nonetheless, it may be useful to think in terms of alternatives and of the probabilities and utility values attached to them.

Lerner in *The Passing of Traditional Society*[33] concluded that mass media create the psychological capacity to imagine alternative ways of life and to perceive oneself in new situations and strange roles. Psychological operations in both the narrow and the broad sense can create and change alternatives. Consider some historical cases—over-simplified, of course. President Wilson's Fourteen Points were widely accepted by people of the Central Powers as an attractive alternative to continued fighting in World War I. In World War II, the Allied insistence on unconditional

surrender is said to have stiffened German resistance. In the Philippines, Magsaysay offered amnesty and free land to Huk guerrillas who surrendered, giving them a most desirable alternative to fighting. In Malaya, the British made surrender more appealing by using such terms for it as "leaving the jungle" or "self-renewal."

. . . . In the broad sense, psychological operations should aim at changing the opponent's perceptions so that resistance no longer appears to serve his interests. From his point of view, he acts in his own interest, which others are resisting. Psychological operations, rather than destroying the enemy, can aim at converting him to see things differently. They can persuade him that it is in his long-range interest to work with us toward a future that satisfies his hopes and expectations. Thus, a common denominator must be found which takes into account the interests of both sides. If there is a one-sided preponderance of military or other power, the formula may neglect the interests of the other side. Such an equilibrium is likely to be short-lived. As soon as the weaker side gains strength—or perceives itself as having gained strength—it is likely to challenge the status quo. Therefore, long-range stability tends to require the acknowledgement of national interests as perceived by both nations involved.

COORDINATION OF MILITARY AND CIVIC ACTIVITIES

Just as the U. S. Army has shown its flexibility in developing new units, training methods, and doctrine for unconventional warfare, so it can adapt to the demands for extended psychological operations in contemporary warfare and insurgencies. The military commander in the field should be able to coordinate psychological and standard military operations, to plan and recommend military activities not only in terms of immediate military results, but also for psychological effect, both immediate and long-range. Magsaysay in the Philippines gave an impressive example of efficiently integrated military and psychological operations.

Although coordination of operations by the Army and other government agencies for psychological effectiveness has long been practiced, some specialists hold that such coordination has at times been incompletely achieved. Crossman for one has warned that "...psychological warfare may do more harm than good unless it is strictly coordinated with diplomatic and military activity."[34]

For efficient psychological operations, the military—and, for that matter, the political—decision makers must see their actions as a united whole. Even though different activities have been assigned to different government agencies, it would be dangerous to assume that the psychological processes involved fall into corresponding separate slots rather than being unitary and continuous. The Communists have been quite aware of this danger and have acted accordingly. We would neglect this unit at our own risk.

In order to conduct and maintain effective military and psychological operations, personnel must be sensitized to the psychological implications

of potential actions. Some such sensitizing training should be given not only to explicitly labeled psychological operations officers but also to commanders who make important decisions and to troops who are in contact with foreign populations.

NOTES

[1] Karl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1953), p. 3.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[3] Paul M. A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare,* 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1954), p. 62.
[4] Ibid., p. 40.
[5] Ibid., p. 43.
[6] Thomas K. Finletter, *Power and Policy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Military Power in the Hydrogen Age* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1954), p. 126.
[7] In Korea, for example, the United Nations psychological warfare agencies dropped 14 million leaflets in one week, in contrast to 3 million distributed by American troops during all of World War I.
[8] Murray Dyer, *The Weapon on the Wall* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 210.
[9] Roland I. Perusse, "Psychological Warfare Reappraised," in *A Psychological Warfare Casebook,* eds. William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (Baltimore, Md.: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), pp. 25–26.
[10] Wilbur Schramm, "Notes on British Concept of Propaganda," *Four Working Papers on Propaganda Theory* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois, January 1955), p. 67.
[11] Harold D. Lasswell, "Political and Psychological Warfare," *Propaganda in War and Crisis,* ed. Daniel Lerner (New York: George W. Stewart, 1951), p. 264.
[12] Daniel Lerner, *Sykewar* (New York: George W. Stewart, Inc., 1949).
[13] Richard H.S. Crossman, lecture, adapted as "The Creed of a Modern Propagandist," in *A Psychological Warfare Casebook,* eds. Daugherty and Janowitz, p. 39.
[14] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961).
[15] Walter W. Rostow, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas," speech given at the Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N.C., June 1961, reprinted in the *Department of State Bulletin* (1961), pp. 233–238.
[16] Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).
[17] Robert B. Rigg, *Red China's Fighting Hordes* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1951), p. 226.
[18] Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 78–79. See also the accounts of Communist propaganda integration in Asia in *A Psychological Warfare Casebook,* eds. Daugherty and Janowitz, pp. 828–857.
[19] R.H. Frequelin, "The French Army and Counterinsurgency Operations," lecture at U. S. Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N.C., 1964.
[20] Earle G. Wheeler, "Guidelines for the Army of 1970," *Army Information Digest,*18, no. 2 (1963), pp. 4–7.
[21] Franklin M. Osanka, "Population Control Technique of Communist Insurgents: A Sociological Analysis," *Australian Army Journal,* no. 176 (January 1964), pp. 11–18.
[22] Bruce L. Smith, "Communications Research in Non-industrial Countries," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 16 (1952), pp. 527–538.
[23] Hadley Cantril, *The Psychology of Social Movements* (New York: Wiley-Science Editions, 1941, 1963); *The Politics of Despair* (New York: Basic Books, 1958); and "A Study of Aspirations," *Scientific American,* 208, no. 2 (1963), pp.41–45.
[24] Margret Boveri, *Treason in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Putnam, 1963).
[25] Raymond A. Bauer, "The Obstinate Audience: The Influence Process from the Point of View of Social Communication," *American Psychologist,* 19 (1964), pp. 319–328.
[26] Ibid., p. 324.

[27] Philip Selznik, *The Organizational Weapon* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), pp.39–40.
[28] J. C. Gray, *The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959).
[29] Charles E. Osgood, "The Psychologist in International Affairs," *American Psychologist*, 19 (1964), pp. 111–118.
[30] G. E. Taylor, "The Intellectual Climate of Asia," *Yale Review*, 42, no. 2 (1952), p. 194.
[31] Smith, "Communication Research."
[32] Bauer, "The Obstinate Audience."
[33] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958).
[34] Richard H. S. Crossman, "Psychological Warfare," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, 97 (1952), pp. 319–332.

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CHAPTER III

NATIONAL POLICY AND PSYOP

Who is responsible for the formulation of foreign policy? Who can claim credit—or should share blame—for policies relating to PSYOP? How is policy formulated? How are competing policy recommendations forged into a single, coherent foreign policy for effective psychological operations? What are the interrelationships of the various departments and agencies, in the Washington PSYOP community and overseas—in policy formulation and in policy implementation (day-to-day operations)? Are there procedural conditions that policy should meet in order to facilitate implementation? What are the most important limitations on policy planning that public pressures create? These are some of the recurrent issues into which this chapter inquires.

The essays that follow seek to explain historical and contemporary aspects of the national policy process in PSYOP. From these essays, certain propositions regarding the framework within which national PSYOP policy is formulated, administered, and implemented emerge. The authors suggest that PSYOP can truly support national objectives only if it receives firm encouragement at the highest levels of government; the superordinate PSYOP apparatus must be specialized and linked in a direct relationship to the key national policymaking machinery if the psychological dimension is to be fully considered in international policy decisions; the PSYOP planning apparatus must wield firm power over all implementing agencies and departments if the information effort, long term as well as short term, is to be fully controlled and coordinated; and PSYOP planners as well as other policymaking leaders in a democracy must consider the role of the panoply of information media and the realtionships between domestic attitudes and international policy.

NATIONAL POLICY AND PSYOP: THE FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY

Although the United States has undertaken psychological initiatives in foreign and military policy since the beginnings of the Republic, systematic planning for PSYOP policy was largely neglected until World War II. Since World War II, how—and even whether—the procedures and mechanisms required for overall PSYOP planning can be accommodated with the national policy framework have been debated. Nevertheless, it is clear that U.S. departments and agencies, as well as the U.S. Congress, are now more acutely aware of the psychological factor in national security planning than in the past, and this is reflected in the attention that psychological considerations have received beginning in the 1960s to the present time.

Much has been written about the national policy structure. In contrast, few writers have explored the national structure in the context of the framing of policy and doctrine for PSYOP. As in any dynamic system, full

comprehension of the framework involves the consideration of interactions:

1. the formal organization for policy formulation and administration
2. the informal relationships between agencies and individuals that determine how policy will be implemented
3. the structure of relations between institutions, and
4. the public environment which influences policy formation and articulation.

The central forum for interagency coordination in the early 1970s was the National Security Council (NSC). How adequately the NSC system could and did execute its functions within the existing framework, however, remained a matter of current debate. Some asserted that information agencies still did not interact in a fashion to insure a coordinated communication effort.

Whatever the circumstances, even the most elaborate organizations will not arrest the development of informal relationships, for they, too, fill important needs. And these needs must likewise be considered within the framework.

Any explanation of the development of informal processes must take into account the general institutional slowness in adapting to new circumstances and in recognizing and utilizing special competence in unforeseen situations. Another part of the explanation involves consideration of the power relations between departments and agencies as well as within them. If used wisely, informal processes can lead to a more flexible program; if used excessively, they can lead to a splintered, fragmented communication effort.

PSYOP IN PERSPECTIVE*

By William E. Daugherty

The international information program of the United States requires a specialized organization for both long-term and short-term objectives. This article provides an historical evaluation of U.S. PSYOP.

BACKGROUND

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) as defined in recent doctrine is not new, either to the armies of history or within the U.S. civilian or military establishment. It has been well documented that leaders of all ages have employed, often on a hit-and-miss basis, techniques which we describe as PSYOP. To paraphase a senior American Army colonel long experienced in the employment of PSYOP, "In the past successful leaders have always used it—albeit such actions were most often done by charismatic personalities or their inspired and viscerally attuned lieutenants who recognized opportunities by some indefinable quality that they seldom understood and rarely could explain to others. In the past the situations of conflict were normally more clearly defined. The enemy was most frequently identifiable. The slower reaction times that were allowed permit-

*Original essay by William E. Daugherty.

ted a higher degree of centralization of political/psychological tactics." However, the situations and environments that U.S. strategic forces—civilian as well as military—have faced in the recent past are believed to be vastly different from those encountered earlier in our history. Yet, we do not know very accurately the scope and nature of the differences as they relate to PSYOP—when, where and how to employ it.

It has only been within the past two decades that the executive branch of the U.S. government and the military services have structured a PSYOP-international information effort on anything other than short-range plans and *ad hoc* improvisations. Although psychological warfare (PSYWAR), as it was called in World War II, was widely used, it was neither well understood nor universally accepted among the nation's top civilian and military leaders. At the end of World War II there were no widespread demands for a written history of how it was employed, or what successes or failures could be attributed to its use. The several civilian information agencies active overseas during the war were greatly reduced in size in 1945 and merged into a small interim branch of the State Department. This activity, then labeled as international information, was not given statutory authority until 1948, and even then it was provided only limited personnel resources and a begrudging acceptance by the parent agency, the Department of State. The USIA, the civilian agency created especially to conduct the nation's strategic international information programs, was not established until 1953.

Since it was established as an independent agency in 1953, the USIA has had a relatively uneven but steady growth and expansion as may be judged by the size of its personnel roster today, the nature and range of its activities, and the power that has been given to it on at least two occasions within the past decade to coordinate the joint civilian agency, military services PSYOP, and international information programs in overseas areas.

Within the military services, the development of a PSYOP capability since the end of World War II has been spectacular. Yet, this growth has not been consistent throughout the services. It is doubtful whether anyone has a very clear picture what the overall national capability is or how the PSYOP capability of any one of the several services can seriously affect the other services or missions of the nation.

PSYWAR FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II

At the end of World War II only the Navy of all the military services made an immediate attempt to assess the lessons it had learned from its employment of what was then called PSYWAR. The Army did not get around to a comparable effort until over five years later, when a contract research agency was asked to undertake aspects of this task. Of the several American civilian agencies that were engaged in the dissemination of the American story overseas during the war, only that agency headed by Nelson Rockefeller, The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, ever succeeded in bringing out a history of the lessons

learned in disseminating information overseas. The Office of War Information, the Coordinator of Information, the Office of Strategic Services, the U.S. Army—none of these operations ever produced a history of comparable scope. There were a few privately sponsored studies dealing with specific aspects of PSYOP or foreign information activity but these were limited in their coverage. Daniel Lerner's *Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany D-Day to VE-Day* (1949), and Charles A. H. Thomson's *Overseas Information Service of the U.S. Government* (1948) were perhaps the most important of the earlier detailed accounts, along with William E. Daugherty, "Psychological Warfare in American History," *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, ed. William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), pp. 59–118 and Paul M. A. Linebarger's *Psychological Warfare* (1948), which was somewhat more general in character.

At the end of World War II all PSYWAR personnel in the military services—staff officers as well as unit personnel—were either retired to an inactive status in the nation's strategic reserve, or, if they remained on active duty in the armed services, they were assigned to other military responsibilties. When the U.S. military forces were ordered into Korea in the summer of 1950 by President Truman, the Army at that time had no existing plans, no accepted doctrine, nor even trained units to provide U.S. troops PSYWAR support.

PSYWAR AND KOREA

To meet the challenges of the moment in Korea it was necessary for personnel assigned occupation duties in Japan to improvise PSYWAR on a day-to-day basis. Those individuals who were placed in charge of the activity in the Far East Command (FEC) in Tokyo had very little precedent to guide them. They received few directives from higher headquarters and they possessed what is now believed to have been an all-too-limited vision of how and for what purposes PSYOP might be effectively employed. For the first seven months of the conflict, the FEC PSYOP effort in Korea itself was confined largely to one man, a lieutenant colonel operating in a liaison capacity for the FEC at Eighth Army Headquarters (EUSAK). No operational PSYOP personnel were assigned anywhere within the EUSAK until late January 1951, seven months after the war began.

EMERGENCE OF PSYWAR OFFICE

At Army headquarters in Washington and throughout CONUS, developments were likewise late. Indeed, not until the end of the first year of the Korean conflict did the Army, for the first time in its history, create a special staff agency, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW), to plan, supervise, and guide the development of doctrine, organization, and training facilities in this heretofore unstructured ad hoc field of activity. The predecessors to the present-day Army PSYOP units—companies, battalions, and groups—were first established in 1951 and were created in response to crash planning. The present day

JFK Center for Military Assistance, with its subordinate schools, can trace its beginning back to 1951 when a military PSYWAR course was first structured and given under the auspices of the Army General School, at Fort Riley, Kansas. In 1952, there was created at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, a PSYWAR Center, a PSYWAR School, and a PSYWAR Board, to train and equip personnel and to study Army needs and crystallize PSYWAR doctrine. To this center the personnel of the PSYWAR Department at the Army General School, Fort Riley, Kansas, were transferred in 1952.

During the 1950s a number of significant changes affecting PSYWAR took place both at Army headquarters in Washington and at Fort Bragg. In the course of time, other activities and functions were assigned to the OCPW. These included: first, the activities of special forces personnel and later, other cold war functions and activities variously described as unconventional warfare, special warfare, and counterinsurgency planning and operations. As additional functions and duties were transferred to the OCPW, there came an urge to label both the function and the offices responsible for their supervision by new names. Thus, in time, the term "Special Warfare" replaced the term "Psychological Warfare" in the title of the special staff section responsible for that function on the Army staff. At Fort Bragg, in time, the PSYWAR Center and School became the Special Warfare Center and School. As a consequence of such Army thinking, the center broadened its mission to provide for the training of Special Forces personnel and units.

In the last years of the 1950s the term PSYOP came into American Army parlance, not to replace the term PSYWAR, but rather to provide Americans with a broader term that would more accurately characterize the changing concepts that Army personnel were gradually accepting. In the first years of the 1960s further changes were made at the Army headquarters and at the center at Fort Bragg.

FUNCTIONAL CHANGES OF PSYWAR BETWEEN WORLD WAR II AND VIETNAM

In World War II, in most Army commands and military theaters, PSYWAR was viewed as a specialized activity of military intelligence. The major exception to this was in General Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) command. During the first seven months of Korean conflict, PSYWAR in the FEC Headquarters and within EUSAK was administered by intelligence personnel. In the eighth month of that conflict the responsibility in EUSAK was transferred from G–2 to G–3. The following June, a year after the American initial involvement in Korea, PSYWAR was divorced from G–2 and made a special staff section at FEC Headquarters, Tokyo.

In 1951, the establishment of OCPW at Army headquarters in Washington as a special staff section suggests that the activity encompassed by the term "PSYWAR" was viewed at that time as a special or subsidiary type of activity, not as an element of operational strategy.

However, as U.S. Army personnel gained more experience in PSYWAR and gave more thought to its use, the activity came to be viewed more and more as a G–3 function, not as a separate or subsidiary exercise of G–2.

To insure that PSYOP plans and operations were integrated more completely into overall military planning and operations, the functions of the Office of the Chief of Special Warfare (OCSW), as OCPW in time came to be called, were transferred approximately a decade ago to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (ODCSOPS). During most of the 1960s these functions were supervised by a director of either Special Warfare, or Special Operations as a part of ODCSOPS. As additional experience in its use was accumulated, and more and more officers came to view PSYOP as a specialized field of military operations, the responsibility for the supervision of PSYOP functions, on behalf of DCSOPS, was transferred from the chief of a directorate—to the chief of a component division of a directorate. Thus from 1967 on, ODCSOPS PSYOP functions were administered by the chief of the PSYOP Division in the International and Civil Affairs Directorate.

As a result of experience gained in South Vietnam, reports submitted by two ad hoc study groups in 1966 and 1967 and a recommendation of an Army board, established in 1966 to study Army training requirements (the Haines Board), PSYOP came to be viewed more and more in the context of a cluster of related activities that required personnel with similar specialized training, not heretofore provided in any depth, in formal courses of instruction in the Army school system. These evolving views with respect to PSYOP are reflected in a number of significant changes made between 1965 and 1969 in Army doctrine and organization at Army headquarters in Washington, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and overseas in such operations at the military involvement in the Dominican Republic crisis and the escalation of operations in South Vietnam.

DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT PSYOP ORGANIZATION

In the middle years of the 1960s, courses of instruction were established at Fort Bragg to provide training in such PSYOP-related functions as military assistance; counterinsurgency, later described as stability operations; and in techniques applicable to military advisory personnel assigned to work with host country counterparts. Overseas, in both South Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, by presidential order, the supervision of joint international information-PSYOP activities were placed under the guidance of a senior officer of the United States Information Agency. Military PSYOP units and civilian personnel of the USIA were required to learn in an ad hoc-type of situation and organization how to work together in a common PSYOP-information program effort. In the course of time many of the hastily improvised arrangements became standard operating procedure not because they worked effectively, but because they provided the least friction. Thus, two different types of

agencies—one military, the other civilian—with disparate missions, organizational concepts, and operational facilities, forged through trial-and-error processes of learning through doing, have fashioned the PSYOP organization and arrangements that exist in South Vietnam today.

Recent changes and long term trends in American PSYOP doctrine and policy show clearly the growing breadth of the concept of psychological operations. In conjunction with those changes there has arisen a need for new organizational and management techniques to bring policy planning and implementation into line with the broader conceptual schema.

THE NATIONAL PSYOP COMMUNITY

By The Editors

A description of the current structure of the national security system as it relates to PSYOP in which a general trend toward a greater understanding and appreciation of PSYOP is noted.

INTRODUCTION

An increasing importance is being attached to the employment of psychological operations, or PSYOP, in the support of national policy abroad. In fact, the Department of Defense has defined national strategy as "The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives."[1] This commentary, prepared by the editors, describes the framework of PSYOP at the national level as it exists as an element of U.S. national strategy in the current international environment of cooperation and conflict.

As a result of the separation of powers provided for in the Constitution of the United States, the formulation and administration of national security policy are responsibilities of the executive branch of the U.S. Government, and, ultimately, of the president. Each executive agency and department tends to define its mission and functions broadly in order to utilize all available resources and exercise control over as many variables as possible in supporting the achievement of departmental objectives. Thus, a major consideration for the president is the rationalization of decisionmaking—the organization and allocation of responsibilities among agencies to reduce overlaps and gaps and to systematize interagency coordination where it is necessary.

Although the structure of the national PSYOP community—as it is now constituted in the early 1970s—is largely an ad hoc one representing departments and agencies as their interests are affected, the constituent parts of the community may be divided into two groups—those with principal and continuing roles in PSYOP, and those with important, but occasional interests. The second group will not be discussed here, although those departments may have key roles in the decisionmaking on specific issues. The agencies and departments with continuing interest in PSYOP constitute the major part of the PSYOP framework at the national level and include the National Security Council and its supporting

structure, the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA)*, the Agency for International Development (AID), and the Department of Defense (DOD).

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Established by the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended), the National Security Council (NSC) advises the president with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. The president has designated the NSC as the principal forum for the consideration of national security policy issues requiring a presidential decision.[2]

Although the council itself is composed of the president, the vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, and the director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), the NSC proper is in reality the highest level of a much larger decision-making system that operates at the direction of the council (and therefore of the president). The NSC staff, including the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the secretariat, an operations staff, a planning group, and a program analysis staff, is supervised by a civilian executive secretary appointed by the president. Major organizational components of the NSC system are the Senior Review Group, the Under Secretaries Committee, NSC Interdepartmental Groups (IG) (and their subordinate working groups), the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), the Defense Program Review Committee, the Verification Panel, the NSC Intelligence Committee, and various other ad hoc committees appointed by the president to deal with specific problems.[3]

Other NSC members may propose the inclusion of items on the agenda, but the assistant to the president for national security affairs, at the president's direction, and in consultation with the state and defense secretaries, has the primary responsibility for determining the NSC agenda and for supervising the preparation of the necessary papers.

When in January 1969, at the direction of the president, the NSC system was substantially reorganized along the lines described in this essay, two new memoranda series were established—the National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM) to report presidential decisions and the National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) to direct the undertaking of studies for the NSC system.[4]

The NSC Senior Review Group examines papers coming out of the NSC groups and committees or from the departments prior to their submission to the NSC. Chaired by the assistant to the president for national security affairs, the review group includes representatives of the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

* Most overseas activities of the USIA, however, are conducted by overseas posts known collectively as the U.S. Information Service (USIS). (See section on USIA Overseas Operations.)

(JCS), and other agencies at the discretion of the chairman. It reviews the papers submitted to insure that: (1) the issue under consideration is worthy of NSC attention, (2) all realistic alternatives are presented, and (3) the facts (including the cost implications and views of all departments and agencies concerned) are fairly and adequately set forth. Action may then be assigned by the NSC Senior Review Group to the NSC Interdepartmental Goups, to the NSC ad hoc groups or committees, or to the Under Secretaries Committee.[5]

The NSC Under Secretaries Committee is a deliberative body in which issues are usually presented in a formal way. Chaired by the under secretary of state, assisted by the undersecretary for political affairs who acts as his alternate, the Under Secretaries Committee consists of the deputy secretary of defense, the assistant to the president for national security affairs, the director of the CIA, the chairman of the JCS, and, depending on the issues under consideration, and at the discretion of the chairman, ranking officers of other agencies. The NSC Under Secretaries Committee considers:

- issues referred to it by the NSC Senior Review Group;
- operational matters pertaining to interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas:
  - —on which NSC Interdepartmental Groups have been unable to reach an agreement and which are of a broader nature than is suitable for any such group;
  - —which do not require consideration at the NSC or presidential level, and which are refered to it by secretary of state; and
  - —other operational matters referred to it jointly by the under secretary of state and the assistant to the president for national security affairs.[6] In effect the Under Secretaries committee was intended to be the group that receives the truly significant problems from all the intermediate bodies and also an implementing body to carry out many presidential directives. However, the committee has lapsed in importance in large measure.[7]

The Interdepartmental Groups (IGs) are the basic elements of the NSC system. Organized on a geographical and functional basis and chaired by the appropriate assistant secretary of state, IGs include in their membership the appropriate assistant secretary of state, representatives of the assistant to the president for national security affairs, of the office of the secretary of defense, of the CIA, and of the JCS, as well as of other agencies at the discretion of the chairman. IG responsibilities include:

- discussion of and decision on interdepartmental issues that can be settled at the assistant secretary level, including those arising out of the implementation of NSC decisions;
- preparation of policy papers for consideration by the NSC; and
- preparation of contingency papers on potential crisis areas for NSC review.[8]

The Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) is chaired by the assistant to the president for national security affairs and includes as members the under secretary of state, the deputy secretary of defense, the JCS chairman, the CIA director, director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) chairman, science advisor to the president, and chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). In its role as arbiter for the allocation of resources, the DPRC reviews and considers those major defense policy and program issues that have diplomatic, economic, political, and strategic implications in relation to overall priorities for the goals and use of national resources.[9]

The Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), another high-level group within the NSC system, endeavors to remain current on possible crises and to develop options for various stages of an international problem. It is essentially the White House operations center for crises. The WSAG, usually a small committee, is chaired by the assistant to the president for national security affairs and includes the deputy secretary of defense or assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs (ISA), director of the CIA, chairman of the JCS, and the under secretary of state. However, membership expands as circumstances require.[10] WSAG is responsible also for anticipating future crises, for reviewing contingency plans prepared by the IGs, and for developing options for NSC consideration.

Also included in the NSC system are the Intelligence Committee, the Vietnam Special Studies Working Group, the Verification Panel (a policy and study group for arms control), and numerous other subgroups and ad hoc bodies.

In brief, almost all major issues of national security are now processed through the NSC mechanism. For example, the president, his assistant for national security affairs, the NSC staff, or an interested department or agency might raise a question or problem pertaining to U.S. PSYOP. The matter would be routed to the presidential assistant and the NSC staff to be formalized in a NSSM directing that a study of the matter be undertaken. Copies of the NSSM would be sent both to the NSC staff, which generates its own data and arguments, and to the departments or agencies involved. In turn, the NSSM would be assigned for action to and considered by, an appropriate NSC interdepartmental group or an ad hoc committee. In all likelihood, in this case it would be sent to an ad hoc PSYOP committee. The committee would then produce a "basic paper" that would go to the NSC Senior Review Group for finishing touches before being presented to the NSC by the assistant to the president. The president would personally make the decision in accordance with his constitutional responsibilities. The decision finally would be transmitted in writing in a NSDM, and the NSC Under Secretaries Committee would begin overseeing its implementation.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington Level Operations

Although the president has the overall responsibility for the foreign policy of the United States, the secretary of state is his principal foreign policy advisor and has responsibility for the execution of foreign policy in accordance with approved policy. The secretary of state also has full authority and responsibility for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas. This authority includes the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance and military assistance and sales programs as provided in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended). The authority does not extend to:

- The activities of U.S. military forces operating in the field where such forces are under command of a U.S. area military commander,
- such other military activities as the president elects to conduct through military channels, or
- activities that are internal to the execution and administration of the approved programs of a single department or agency and that will not significantly affect the overall U.S. program in a foreign country or region.

The State Department also has previously established responsibilities, by virtue of law or executive order, with respect to such matters as: information activities, international educational and cultural affairs, foreign assistance, food for peace, arms control and disarmament, supervision of programs authorized by the Peace Corps Act, social science research, and immigration and refugee assistance.

In providing overall foreign policy guidance, the State Department also coordinates and supervises U.S. resources in the conduct of propaganda and political warfare. The U.S. Information Agency, as will be noted later, conducts overt mass communications and provides policy guidance on the conduct of PSYOP in accordance with the basic foreign policy guidance it receives from the State Department.

The secretary of state is also in charge of the day-to-day operations of the department, including the Foreign Service. A member of the cabinet and of the NSC, he uses the system of NSC Interdepartmental Groups and the Under Secretaries Committee in the implementation of his responsibilities for foreign policy and U.S. activities overseas. Within the purview of these responsibilities the secretary of state delegates executive authority to the chairmen of these committees.

The under secretary of state is the secretary's full deputy and serves as acting secretary in his absence. As the principal advisor to the secretary, he (1) assists in formulating U.S. foreign policy and in providing overall direction to all the elements of the State Department, (2) participates in the NSC meetings, (3) serves as the chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, and (4) oversees the department's particiaption in the NSC system. Assisting the secretary and the under secretary are the

under secretary for political affairs, the deputy secretaries for political affairs and for economic affairs, and the ambassadors at large.[11]

To improve the effectiveness of the department in supporting the role of the secretary of state as the president's principal foreign affairs advisor and as a NSC member and to strengthen the policy planning and coordination responsibilities of the senior levels of the department, a Planning and Coordination Staff responsible to the secretary was established in 1969. The staff furnishes policy support to the secretary and his principal associates, the Under Secretaries Committee, and other elements of the NSC system, including the NSC Senior Review Group and the IGs. It also performs the function of the former Policy Planning Council and relates long-range policy to current operatons.[12]

To provide improved management and policy guidance to the department in politico-military affairs, the department elevated its Office of Politico-Military Affairs to the status of a bureau in September 1969. The bureau is responsible for liaison with the Department of Defense (DOD) in the coordination of foreign and defense policies, as well as for support of senior State Department officers in relationships with the secretary of defense and the JCS.[13]

Five assistant secretaries direct the activities of the geographic bureaus. For the countries within his geographical area, each assistant secretary has the primary responsibility to keep the secretary of state informed of important developments, to advise the secretary in the formulation of U.S. policies, to guide the operations of the U.S. diplomatic establishments, and to direct, coordinate, and supervise interdepartmental and interagency matters.

The regional assistant secretaries also serve as the chairmen of IGs in the NSC system, as previously outlined. These groups discuss and decide issues that can be settled at the assistant secretary level, including those arising out of the implementation of NSC decisions. They prepare policy papers for consideration by the council and contingency papers on potential crisis areas for NSC review.

Each assistant secretary is aided by country directors within his bureau who are responsible for the overall guidance and interdepartmental coordination with respect to their assigned countries. Country directors are the single focal point in Washington serving the needs of the U.S. ambassadors. They work closely with "country teams" in U.S. missions abroad to insure that all elements of a mission in a given country jointly pursue U.S. foreign policy directives.

Within the department, at Washington level, no one specific office, bureau, or agency has a central responsibility for day-to-day PSYOP. PSYOP matters are handled between the regional or country directors or desk officers and the various embassies.[14]

Department of State Overseas Operations

As representatives of the president and acting on his behalf, the chiefs of diplomatic missions in foreign countries exercise a positive authority for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Government

activities in their respective countries. In a letter to ambassadors in December 1969 concerning their responsibilities, the president reemphasized their roles as his personal representatives abroad and directed them to coordinate the work of all elements of the U.S. diplomatic missions. He said he expected that they would use this mandate not only to provide firm policy leadership but also to assure positive direction of all U.S. activities overseas.[15]

THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY (USIA)

USIA was established as one of the independent agencies of the executive branch of the government by the President's Reorganization Plan No. 8, as approved by Congress, on August 1, 1953. The U.S. Congress has taken a very active and decisive interest in the agency's activities from its inception and, in effect, has barred it from any domestic propagandizing.

In short, the role of the agency is to support the foreign policy of the United States by explaining it to the people in other countries; to build overseas understanding of U.S. institutions and culture; and to advise the U.S. Government on public opinion abroad and its implications for U.S policy.[16] The manner in which the USIA performs these functions has been the subject of continuing debate over the years.

The Washington Level of USIA

The agency receives guidance on U.S. policy from the president and the secretary of state. The director of USIA, appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate, is responsible directly to the president.

Some of the past directors of the agency have participated directly in NSC meetings; others have only had seats in the background. Currently, although the director is not a member of the NSC, he does participate in the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, and the agency also is represented in the NSC Review Group and the regular staff meeting of the secretary of state.[17]

USIA output must accuratley reflect and persuasively support national policy. In this the director receives support from both the deputy director and the Office of Policy and Plans (IOP). IOP is also responsible for providing the director advice on the implications of foreign opinion for U.S. foreign policy.

This office also formulates basic information policies for the agency and assures that they are reflected in the agency's output. It prepares guidance on information policy for operating elements of the agency, based on briefings and background information received through liaison with the White House, the departments of state and defense, and other government agencies and private organizations. It issues guidelines for the preparation of planning documents by USIA elements and by overseas posts and reviews the plans to assure that overseas operations are consistent with established policy objectives and that resources are allocated in accordance with agency priorities.

Systematic evaluation of agency operations to insure that they serve program objectives with maximum efficiency is the responsibility of the Office of Research and Assessment (IOR). It provides the agency with a single element responsible for the assessment of products and operations, and it supervises and coordinates the work of the research service, the inspection and audit staff, the evaluation and analysis staff, the agency library, and the historian. Through sample surveys and other methods of empirical research, the research service provides information on foreign opinion relevant to U.S. foreign policy and to the agency's mandate; describes the channels of communication most likely to reach influential audiences abroad; and assesses the reach and impact of specific USIS[18] programs (See section on USIA *Overseas Operations* for explanation of USIA/USIS relationship.) It keeps abreast of foreign press reactions to U.S. actions and policies and reports on the activitities of foreign information services.

The assistant directors of the agency for the seven geographic areas (Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Soviet Union and East Europe, Latin America, Near East and North Africa, South Asia, and West Europe) are the director's principal advisors on all programs in or directed to countries in these areas. They help to formulate information policies and represent the director in interagency groups. They spend a large part of their time in the countries of their geographic region. These assistant directors are responsible for the direction, coordination, and management of information programs for the countries of their geographic areas. Moreover, they supply a knowledge of field problems and requirements to the agency's policy and planning processes; they arrange with media services to provide media products to their areas; and they consult with appropriate area and country officers in the State Department, AID, and with other agencies on operational matters of mutual concern.

The agency's media output must be of the highest professional standard. Thus, the assistant directors in charge of the four Washington media services are responsible to the director for the quality and persuasiveness of their output. They work with IOP and the area assistant directors to provide media products that will help advance U.S. foreign policies generally and specifically in each area. The four media services—Broadcasting (the Voice of America), the Information Center Service, Screen Service (Motion Picture and Television), and Press and Publications—provide materials to USIS posts abroad for use or adaptation by the posts. Other media products are acquired or produced locally by the posts.

Relationships with Other Agencies and Departments [19]

The Washington agency's principal relationships are with the State Department, DOD, AID, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor, and the Smithsonian Institution.

•*State Department.* As noted above, the agency director attends regular staff meetings of the secretary of state and participates in the Under

Secretaries Committee. This is not by any means the extent of interdepartmental cooperation with the State Department, however. The deputy director and the deputy director (Policy and Plans), for example, respectively (1) represent the agency on the Government Advisory Committee on International Book Programs, and (2) supervise continuing liaison with the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the policy planning and coordinating staff, the Bureau of Public Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, and the Office of News. Both the deputy director and the deputy director (Policy and Plans) represent the agency on the Board of the Foreign Service. The assistant directors of the agency for the geographic regions are members of the IG and maintain direct liaison with their counterpart geographic bureaus in the State Department. The assistant director, USIA (Information Centers), is a member of the Interagency Book Committee.

•*Department of Commerce.* USIA allocates Special International Exhibition funds to the department to operate a program under which trade missions (with primarily commercial objectives) are sent abroad.

•*Department of Labor.* Labor exhibits and missions are operated by the department with USIA guidance and with Special International Exhibition funds allocated by the agency. These exhibits and accompanying missions are presented independently or in conjunction with some of USIA's national exhibitions at international fairs. The labor missions work closely with USIS staffs in the field.

The president has also made USIA responsible for coordinating the plans and programs of all other U.S. agencies engaged directly or indirectly in overseas exhibits. This is done through the Interagency Exhibits Committee, which is chaired by USIA. Representatives from the Departments of State, Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, Defense, and Health, Education and Welfare, and from the Atomic Energy Commission, NASA, the Federal Aviation Agency, and the Smithsonian Institution form the committee. Representatives of other agencies also are invited to participate in the deliberations of this committee as might be appropriate.

•*Smithsonian Institution.* The Smithsonian Institution is responsible, except in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, for the conduct of a program of International Exchange of Fine Arts Exhibits. This program encompasses only exhibits in the fine and decorative arts—that is, painting, sculpture, prints, folk arts, crafts, and related categories. Other elements of the agency work closely on a continuing basis with their counterparts in the State Department.

Responsibility for overseas administration of the Exchange of Persons Program, the Cultural Presentation Program, the American Specialist Program, and other educational and cultural activities of the State Department lies with USIA. The State Department, however, performs substantially all administrative housekeeping functions for USIA's overseas installations.

•*Department of Defense.* The agency works with DOD, particularly the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. USIA advises on foreign psychological aspects of public statements and actions in the defense field and works directly with the various services in Washington and commands abroad to increase psychological support for U.S. policies.

•*Agency for International Development.* USIA advises AID on the implications of foreign public opinion for present and contemplated AID programs. The presidential statement of USIS's mission requires AID to consult with USIA when programs affecting communications media in other countries are contemplated. Both in Washington and at posts abroad, the two agencies work together to assure USIA's effective support for U.S. assistance programs, and, conversely, to insure that AID programs effectively support U.S. psychological objectives. The statement also required USIA to service USIS field requests in these categories insofar as possible. The State Department and USIA provide policy guidance to the Smithsonian Institution on international relations and psychological factors, respectively, that influence the program.

USIA is responsible for all national exhibits, including those in the fine arts, that are presented in the Soviet Union and in Eastern European countries under cultural exchange agreements.

In addition to the major contacts described above, USIA briefs representatives of all government organizations operating overseas on U.S. Government informational policies and objectives by supplying policy documents and training programs and by individually briefing key personnel.

USIA Overseas Operations

USIA staffs abroad, acting under the supervision of the chiefs of mission, are responsible for the conduct of overt public information, public relations and cultural activities—that is, those activities intended to inform or influence foreign public opinion—for agencies of the U.S. Government other than DOD commands.

Overseas, USIA vests maximum practicable authority for the conduct of the information program in the public affairs officer (PAO) in charge of the program in each country. Certain overseas installations, such as the radio relay stations, programming centers and monitoring offices, press regional service centers in Manila, Beirut, and Mexico City, and the Regional Exhibits Center in Vienna are actually operating extensions of the Washington media services.

But the largest part of all USIA activities is the United States Information Service (USIS). The term "USIS" antedates the Smith-Mundt Act of 1953, which set up USIA, and is applied to the overseas operations of USIA that are not extensions of Washington media services. "USIS" refers to the overseas post that evolves the program suited to its particular problems, decides on use of specific material, and operates the country information and cultural programs. Posts are required to assess

annually their country plan objectives and their progress. USIA maintains USIS mission posts, branch posts, subposts, reading rooms, and binational centers.

The USIS mission carries out the agency's programs and administers the Exchange of Persons Program for the State Department in each country. USIS operates as an integral part of the U.S. diplomatic mission in each country. The public affairs officer receives general program direction from and reports to the assistant director of the appropriate area in Washington. He is a member of the U.S. country team that is coordinated in each country by the chief of the diplomatic mission (ambassador or minister). Thus, the PAO also reports his activities to, and clears new programs with, the chief of mission who supervises all U.S. Government activities in his country of assignment. USIS operations in some countries are conducted at consulates and at outposts in consular districts as well as at the principal post.

Each country PAO is assisted by a staff of American and foreign national employees (referred to as local employees). The supervisory staff, which varies with the size and scope of the country program, generally includes a cultural affairs officers and an information officer in addition to subordinate Americans. They plan, coordinate, and supervise programming and maintain active personal contact with government officials, media representatives, and academic and business figures important to USIS interests.

The USIA techniques of communication and persuasion are used selectively from country to country, under country plans devised to help achieve U.S. objecives in each country. Country plans are prepared by the PAO and approved by the chief of mission with the advice of his country team. Upon approval by USIA in Washington,they become binding statements of the USIS country programs.

Each country plan lists established U.S. objectives for the country. Those objectives that are susceptible or partially susceptible to furtherance by information and cultural programs are identified, and the USIS capability to help achieve each such objective is explained. From this analysis, each post determines its psychological objectives—that is, those attitudes to be created or strengthened to advance particular U.S. objectives. Also indicated in the country plan are the people or groups who should be influenced—the target audiences—as well as detailed programs by which USIS will undertake to create or strengthen within these specific groups the attitudes the United States seeks to inculcate—the psychological objectives. These country plans are revised as often as necessary to serve as accurate, effective guides to USIS media support and field activities.

The relative emphasis on media to be used varies greatly from country to country. In one, films may be important; in another, not at all. Each program is tailored to the psychological objectives, audiences, and the

means of communication best suited to delivering the right message to the right person at the right time.

USIA also plans and executes, in the field, the cultural and educational programs administered in Washington by the State Department. Such activities are an integral part of USIS programming in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives.

USIA has responsibility for the overall coordination of U.S. PSYOP in stability operations where the military has not yet been assigned command responsibility.[20] For example, according to a Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) memorandum, the responsibility for development of PSYOP policy and for substantive supervision and coordination of all psychological operations in Vietnam [was] delegated to the director, JUSPAO," [21] who was the USIS chief there.

THE UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION

The United States Advisory Commission on Information, established under the Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (P.L.402), recommends to the USIA director the policies and programs for carrying out the act. In a semiannual report submitted directly to Congress, the commission gives its evaluation of USIA and recommends improvements in the information,education, and cultural programs.[22] The agency maintains a secretariat for the commission with a fulltime staff director.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Agency for International Development (AID) was established in 1961 within the State Department when the former International Cooperation Administration (ICA), the Development Loan Fund, and other foreign assistance activities were merged.[23] AID's mission is to carry out U.S. overseas programs of economic and technical assistance to less developed countries, programs designed to bring the countriesto a level of self-sufficiency.

For political, economic, and humanitarian reasons the United States has for over two decades been committed to helping the poorer nations of the world achieve their aspirations for social and economic growth.In this connection, the present administration has undertaken the following shifts of emphasis in the assistance effort.[24]

- increased emphasis has been placed on multilateral aid programs with the administration moving toward greater coordination of U.S. aid with that of other donors;
- more emphasis is being given to applying U.S. knowledge to the problems of development through technical assistance, research, and social innovations;
- the highest priority is being placed on agricultural production and family planing;
- foreign procurement policies are being relaxed to assist the export potential of developing nations, and,

- opportunities are being increased for private enterprise to engage more directly in the development process.

In April 1971, the president sent proposals to Congress for the reorganization of U.S. foreign assistance programs. The changes proposed are not only in philosophy but also in the organizational framework and operating style.[25]

The Washington Level of AID

The AID administrator reports directly to the secretary of state. From 1961 to 1968 the secretary's authority had been delegated to the administrator of AID. In January 1968, in an effort to strengthen the State Department's supervision and control of these programs, this authority returned to the secretary who redelegated part of it to the under secretary of state and part to the then deputy under secretary for political affairs. The former was given general authority to supervise the effective integration of both the economic assistance and military assistance and sales programs within the context of U.S. foreign policy interests, while to the latter was delegated (later redelegated to the director of politico-military affairs) the day-to-day responsibility for the continuous supervision and general direction of the military assistance and sales programs.

In fact, the State Department does not and could not operate and manage the military assistance programs directly. The principal mechanisms for the formulation and application of policy on the presidential level are the annual budget preparation and the presidential decisions taken in the NSC system. At the departmental level there is a continuous dialogue between the State Department and DOD.[26]

The administrator of AID is supported currently by a headquarters staff, five regional bureaus (Africa, Latin America, Near East and South Asia, East Asia, and Vietnam), and the overseas missions. Among other things, the headquarters staff assists in the development of policy and procedure, while the regional bureaus, also located in Washington, are the principal line offices of the AID and are responsible, within overall agency policy, for planning and supervision of U.S. economic development assistance efforts in individual countries overseas.

Although AID operates mainly on the basis of bilateral programs, the agency encourages, supports, and participates in international organizations, consortia, and other coordinating groups designed to provide economic and technical assistance. Of these institutions, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the major international body for general coordination of free world economic assistance policy, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) is the largest of the multilateral lending institutions.

AID Operations Overseas

Approved programs are executed by overseas U.S. AID missions (USAIDs) in cooperation with the officials of the countries being assisted. Several approaches to development assistance are employed:

- *Technical Assistance* is provided to developing nations through the assignment of technical experts as advisors to the public and private sectors of less developed countries and through participant training provided mainly in the United States for cooperating country nations.
- *Capital Assistance.* Capital loans, repayable in U.S. dollars on more faborable terms than private banks would offer, are conditioned on matching measures of self-help by the recipient country to further its own development.
- *Commodity Assistance.* U.S.-produced food and fiber needed for development (either general or in specified economic sectors) is made available through loans, and to a small extent grants, under the Food for Peace Program.
- *Private Investment Surveys.* Through a program of cost-shared investment feasibility surveys, private U.S. firms are encouraged to investigate specific investment opportunities that would contribute to the achievement of objectives in less developed countries.
- *Civil Security Assistance.* AID Public Safety assistance is produced to Free World countries to help them develop civil police institutions capable of maintaining the internal stability essential for economic, social, and political progress. The Public Safety Program serves to train civil police and paramilitary police forces to prevent the development of threats to internal order and to deal with them humanely in their earliest phases so that costly military solutions to civil problems will not have to be chosen later.[27]

AID's most important contribution to U.S. PSYOP is a result of its development activities. As an example, the provision of radios to villages remote from central government administration fulfills several objectives in the nation-building effort and supports PSYOP and public security objectives as well.[28]

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Department of Defense (DOD) was created as a part of a comprehensive program designed to provide for the future security of the United States through the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the U.S. Government relating to national security.[29] Two of its functions prescribed by higher authority are directly relevant to PSYOP:

- to insure by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interests; and
- to uphold and advance the national policies and interest of the United States.

Since the early 1960s, DOD has been adjusting to new forces, circumstances, and aspirations in the national and international environments. As diplomatic, economic, and military resources have been integrated more closely than ever before into national security plans and programs, DOD has steadily established intricate relationships with

many of the other departments and agencies. Military-political contacts—both with the Department of State and with various foreign governments—have become routine, and defense strategy shares a principal objective with foreign policy: the preservation of U.S. national security.

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Secretary of Defense

The secretary of defense is the principal assistant to the president in all matters relating to DOD and exercises direction, authority, and control over the department. He serves as a member of the NSC. Among the several principal military and civilian advisors and staff assistants to the secretary, his assistant secretary for international security affairs (ASD/ISA), in particular, has major PSYOP-related responsibilities.

Office of the OSD/ISA

ASD/ISA is the principal staff assistant to the secretary in the functional field of international security and acts as a DOD liaison in the foreign policy field. He develops, coordinates, and recommends to the secretary of defense DOD positions on NSC affairs and foreign economic and politico-military matters (including disarmament) of DOD interest. Responsible for the planning, direction, and management of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and the activities of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) and military advisory and training missions to foreign nations, the assistant secretary also provides guidance to DOD representatives on U.S. missions and international organizations and conferences.

Within OASD/ISA, the specific responsibility for action on PSYOP is currently in the Long Range Planning Section of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and Plans, and NSC Affairs. Another deputy assistant secretary handles the military assistance and sales plans and programs.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

As the principal military asvisors to the president, the NSC, and the secretary of defense, the JCS are directly concerned with PSYOP. They serve as the immediate military staff of the secretary of defense. They are in the chain of command that runs from the president to the secretary of defense, through the JCS, to the commanders of unified and specified commands. The chain of command to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) also runs from the secretary fo defense through the JCS. The JCS are assisted in the performance of their duties and responsibilities by the joint staff and other agencies of the organization of the JCS.

The Joint Staff is organized into directorates concered with:

- Personnel (J–1)
- Operations (J–3)
- Logistics (J–4)
- Plans and Policy (J–5)
- Communications-Electronics (J–6)

The intelligence function for the JCS is undertaken by the DIA. All of

these directorates have varying degrees of interest in PSYOP. In addition to the directorates, the activities of the various special assistants occasionally involve PSYOP. It is the director, J–3 (Operations), however, who has the responsibility in all matters pertaining to the psychological aspects of military operations. His principal staff assistant for PSYOP is the deputy director for operations (counterinsurgency and special activities) or DOCSA. DOCSA is supported by the PSYOP Division of J–3.

Military Assistance Advisory Groups

The Chief of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) is the personal representative of the Secretary of Defense in the country to which he is accredited. The ASD (ISA) is responsible for planning, organizing, and monitoring activities of the MAAGs, which receive their military guidance from the JCS through the appropriate unified command.[30] If a MAAG is located in the host country, it will often have access to information that may be important to the success of a PSYOP program. Representatives of the MAAG chief are therefore often included in the country team PSYOP agency, if one is formed.[31]

Other DOD Groups with PSYOP Responsibilities

Within DOD, the work of the ASD (Public Affairs) often has potential PSYOP aspects. These include monitoring the release of all official DOD information for publication through any information media as well as responsibility for military participation in public exhibitions, demonstrations, and ceremonies of international significance.

The director of defense research and engineering (DDRE) directs and supervises the activities of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). ARPA is a separately organized (DOD) research and development agency that is responsible for selected basic and applied research. It has supported PSYOP-related tasks as directed by higher authority. ARPA utilizes the services of the military departments, other governmental agencies, private and industrial entities, individuals, and educational or research institutions to perform its projects.

Ongoing Operations

Responsibility for the training of personnel in PSYOP continues to be located in each of the separate military services. Each of the services continues on an individual basis, and with varying degrees of effort, to refine its own doctrine for PSYOP.

OTHER AGENCIES

Since effective PSYOP requires a wide array of resources, the PSYOP community involves the support of several other agencies and departments on either a full-time or intermittent basis. Many government and private agencies contribute intelligence, logistical cooperation, or other assistance: for example, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Dapartment of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, the Department of the Treasury, and

organizations involved in education, health, disaster relief, arts and sciences, and missionary work.[32]

CONCLUSION

This is the structure of the national security system as it relates to PSYOP. Other writers have pointed to the need for closer cooperation, better coordination, less duplication of activities, more systematic planning and analysis among the various agencies, and the like. The current structure in which the centralizing role of the National Security Council has been re-emphasized represents an important attempt to addres these problems—problems which plague many functions besides PSYOP—without reducing the responsiveness of the system to the president's needs in other areas.

In retrospect, there has been an overall trend since the early 1960s toward a greater understanding and appreciation within the executive branch of the U.S. Government of the use of psychological operations. However, the test of the current framework of U.S. PSYOP is in the answers to the questions: How well have the realities of present-day PSYOP been perceived? How well have the capabilities and potentialities of the various departments, agencies, and military services been recognized and employed?

NOTES

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USIA's MISSION AND RESPONSIBILITIES*

By Irving R. Wechsler

Policies and missions for both strategic and tactical operations must be clearly defined, current, and capable of attainment.

During the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, the foreign information resources of the Government continued the development that began in 1945, when the United States for the first time established an official peacetime organization to inform foreign people about the United States and its policies. The United States Informtion Agency, the direct descendant of that organization, expanded in some directions, consolidated in others, shaping and defining its mission and role essentially as a response to the changing longterm nature of international relationships, and to the shifting urgencies and more immediate stresses of the time.

*Excerpts from "USIA's Mission and Responsibilities," in Murray G. Lawson, et al. "The United States Information Agency During the Administration of Lyndon B. Johnson November 1963—January 1969. Volume I: Administration History," Washington, D.C., 1968. Reprinted with the permission of the author.

THE TRUMAN CONCEPT

The basic character and rationale of United States information activities abroad were in certain important aspects, implicit in the August 1945 announcement of President Truman's decision to maintain, as a peacetime service in the Department of State, some of the foreign information functions of the Office of War Information and the Office of Inter-American Affairs.

"The nature of present-day foreign relations makes it essential for the United States to maintain informational activities abroad as an integral part of the conduct of our foreign affairs," President Truman stated in ordering the creation of the Interim International Information Service, a transitional organization, pending study of foreign informational needs by the Secretary of State, and the formulation of a program to be conducted on a continuing basis.

This first statement of mission and responsibilities, brief and general though it was, suggested certain principles that continue to influence the conduct and the concept of United States foreign information programs. The most important, of course, was the idea that foreign information activities are an integral part of the conduct of foreign affairs, arising out of the contemporary nature of foreign affairs; a recognition that diplomacy was to have henceforth a new dimension, stemming from the increasing importance of world public opinion and attitudes, and the burgeoning new technologies that were shaping and expressing them.

This "Government," the statement also announced, "will not attempt to outstrip the extensive and growing information programs of other nations. Rather, it will endeavor to see to it that other people receive a full and fair picture of American life and of the aims and policies of the United States Government." The primary means of informing other nations about the United States would continue, "as in the past " to be American private organizations and individuals; the Government's role would be to assist and supplement them.

Thus, certain limits and emphases were indicated: The United States Government would avoid competition with private American enterprises and activities in overseas information, and would not take its measure from other Governments' propaganda programs. At the same time, its programs would go beyond official Government action and policy, to present "American life," and to "endeavor to see to to it that other people receive a full and fair picture."

Although what is full and fair has at various times been variously interpreted, there has been continued general acceptance of the view that the official American interpretation of America and its policies must rest its case on presenting actualities without deliberate distortion. And finally, the 1945 statement embodied a principle that has been rigorously maintained—both by Congressional insistence and Executive direction—the principle that the overseas information programs would have no responsibilities for explaning Government programs domestically.[1]

THE SMITH-MUNDT REVISION

Early in 1948, the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act (PL 80–402, the Smith-Mundt Act) was passed, reflecting a Congressional realization that the postwar world demanded that the United States have a capacity in the field of foreign information considerably greater than the rudimentary organization that had uneasily and barely survived in the Department of State since 1945. Spurred by the descent of the Iron Curtain, the aggressive posture and programs of the Soviet Union and world Communism, and the clear need for the American story and American policies to penetrate through the perils and complexities that were besetting peoples overseas, the Act stated that its objectives were "to enable the Government of the United States to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries." Among the means to be used in achieving these objectives were "an information service to disseminate abroad information about the United States, its people and policies" and "an educational exchange service."

The passage of the Smith-Mundt Act gave to the information mission both a firm legislative base and a new scale, scope, and prominence. Less from the language of the Act than from the debate and discussion that accompanied it, an awareness of its role and more explicit development of ideas about it emerged—both within the Government and among the public. Two specifics were visible in the Act. One was the emphasis on mutual understanding—the idea that a two-way process was somehow involved, that more than simple declaration and amplification were to be part of the creation of "mutual understanding." Secondly, the Act made explicit the separation of "information" and "educational exchange" as two distinct and different means of creating understanding—one allegedly "propagandistic" and the other "educational" or "cultural." [2]

THE EISENHOWER RESTATEMENT

On August 1, 1953, the United States Information Agency (USIA) was established by President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan No. 8, combining the separate overseas information functions of the Department of State's International Information Administration, the Mutual Security Administration, and the Technical Cooperation Administration. The exchange of persons program, however, was left in State.[3] The USIA was instructed to take its foreign policy guidance from the Department, while being responsible to the President through the National Security Council.

The new Information Agency was given a formal "Statement of Mission," on October 22, 1953. This was the first effort to promulgate, in more than the most general terms, the task and methods of United States foreign information efforts. "In carrying out its responsibilities" the Eisenhower statement said, the Agency shall be guided by the following:

1. The purpose of the United States Information Agency shall be to submit evidence to people of other nations by means of communica-

tion techniques that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace.

2. The purpose in paragraph 1 above is to be carried out primarily:
   a. By explaining and interpreting to foreign peoples the objectives and policies of the United States Government.
   b. By depicting imaginatively the correlation between U.S. policies and the legitimate aspirations of other peoples of the world.
   c. By unmasking and countering hostile attempts to distort or to frustrate the objectives and policies of the United States.
   d. By delineating those important aspects of the life and culture of the people of the United States which facilitate understanding of the policies and objectives of the Government of the United States.

Two additional paragraphs, not made public at the time, regulated the Agency's use of "unattributed" materials.

Some significant emphases in the statement included the stress on "submitting evidence," by some considered to avoid the propaganda stigma of special pleading by "allowing the material facts to speak for themselves;" the stress on demonstrating a harmony of interests, rather than an effort to convert, polemicize, or advocate; the stress on aspects of the United States "which facilitate understanding"—a sharper focus on the purposive and relevant "projection of America" than had sometimes obtained; and the clear and unmistakable mandate for counterpropaganda—to some minds, the primary (if not sole) justification for an information program.[4]

This first formal statement of the Agency's information mission was a significant advance in sophistication and complexity. It served to supply clearer guidelines for action, and to crystallize out new and old doctrine and emerging ideas. As the first Director, Theodore C. Steibert, stated in a letter to the President:

> Under this new mission, avoiding a propagandistic tone, the Agency will emphasize the community of interest that exists among freedom-loving peoples and show how American objectives and policies advance the legitimate interests of such peoples.
> We shall, therefore, concentrate on objective, factual news reporting and appropriate commentaries, designed to present a full exposition of important United States actions and policies, especially as they affect individual countries and areas. In presenting facts we shall see to it that they are not distorted. . .we shall avoid a strident or antagonistic note. This does not, of course, preclude us from making forceful, factual refutations of false accusations such as those that come from the Soviet communist portion of the world.[5]

THE KENNEDY DEFINITION

During the Administration of President John F. Kennedy, a redefiniton of the Agency's mission was formulated. Embodying concepts that had been "put into practice in early 1961" by USIA Director Edward R. Murrow, the new statement was drafted within the Agency, and formally issued in January 1963 as a Presidential directive.

The Kennedy redefinition accepted and continued certain important elements in the Eisenhower statement—a counterpropaganda role, a

stress on those aspects of American life and culture which facilitate understanding of United States policies, and a focus on demonstrating harmony between U.S. policies and the interests of other peoples. It introduced, however, some significant new emphases.

"The mission of the United States Information Agency is to help achieve United States foreign policy objectives," the statement began, giving prominence and explicitness to a role and function that had sometimes been taken for granted, sometimes asserted, sometimes denied or qualified—both within the Government and in public discussion. This support of U.S. foreign policy was to be accomplished in two ways. One was by "influencing public attitudes in other nations," the other by "advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated United States policies, programs, and official statements." [6]

The explicit public assertion that the Agency sought to influence public attitudes abroad was to some a note of welcome candor, while to others it seemed to make USIA too nakedly manipulative or self-serving. In a statement made before a House Subcommittee on March 28, 1963, Director Murrow indicated the limits and interpretation that the Agency sought to give the concept of influence: "Our Government tries to present its policies and programs in as understandable and palatable form as possible—understandable and palatable to those millions abroad, friend, foe, and neutral, whose lives and fortunes are affected by what we do." What was sought as effective communication, he emphasized, was "believability and persuasiveness." "To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that....Obviously...we emphasize those aspects of American life and policy which are of greatest significance in furthering our foreign policy objectives. We report events in context; we explain why things happen. But we do not lie, we do not cheat, we do not suppress."

An explicit acknowledgment that the Agency's mission was to be persuasive in support of U.S. policies appears less revolutionary in practice than the explicit injunction of the Kennedy statement providing that the Agency was to serve as an adviser to the Government on the foreign opinion implications of all its activities—and hence have an important advisory role in the formulation of the very policies that it would seek to publicize abroad. This new responsibility was doubly significant. For it is axiomatic that in a democracy the foreign information activities must take their policy direction from those charged with responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. As Murrow put it succinctly, "We are, then, and properly so, prisoners of [U.S. foreign] policy." In the second instance, this explicit advisory role took on particular importance at this juncture because President Kennedy had just abolished the Operations Coordinating Board, established by Eisenhower in 1953 as a mechanism for concerting the Government's psychological activities—a device, cum-

bersome though it was, that had permitted USIA some voice in interagency consideration and planning. In essence, therefore, the new directive reflected both increased and more sophisticated awareness of the role of public opinion and attitudes in foreign affairs, and the view of Murrow (as one observer has put it) that USIA "should persuade, not just inform, and that it should aggressively and expertly advise the Executive Branch on the foreign opinion implications of policies and programs."[7]

THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION's NEW EMPHASES

During the earlier days of the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, USIA's role reflected the primary needs of a time of tradegy, transition, and the emergence of new directions and new emphases. The need to assure foreign publics that U.S. political processes, policies, and institutions would show steadiness, stability, and continuity appeared paramount. USIA's mission, however, remained essentially as it had been defined and redefined by earlier statements and existing doctrine. Nevertheless, the complex process of adapting the Agency's information resources to new times and new needs proceeded, but gradually and without high visibility—first under Carl T. Rowan (1964–65) and then under Leonard B. Marks (1965–69).

Although Rowan accepted the general statement of mission given the Agency by President Kennedy, and offered no formal redefinition or elaboration of its interpretation, the emergence of new national preoccupations brought new emphases. President Johnson's programs and the problems he faced gave an increased prominence to the U.S. domestic scene. The accelerated pace of efforts to end discrimination, to expand opportunity, and to make war on poverty, along with the resistance encountered and the violence generated, brought to the foreign audience an increased awareness of the U.S. internal situation with dramatic impact and sharpened detail. The prominence of domestic issues and events made for some change in the role of USIA. The persuasive emphasis diminished. Engaged in explicating and reporting developments of increasing complexity—and often of a kind that invited sharply critical condemnation—the Agency had a growing need to rest its case more on providing the background and perspective necessary to an objective understanding of the developments of the day.

Other forces, less dramatic, were also at work to give USIA's concept of its mission new nuances. One was a growing awareness of the limitations of official propaganda as an instrument for securing vital and durable changes in foreign attitudes. The accumulating evidence of academic research had begun to make clearer that the psychological processes of international communication were both more complicated and more difficult than had been assumed by many proponents and practitioners of the art. A more realistic judgment of the capabilities of persuasion and information as instruments of national purpose appeared in the making.

Another force was the burgeoning apparatus of international communication. The "communication revolution" immensely multiplied the reach and range of a nation's ability to transmit its messages, and this revolu-

tion in communication technology was augmented by the developments in transport technology. On the one hand new electronic mechanisms vastly expanded the speed and the amount of communication that was possible between nations and among people; on the other, new mobility brought multiplied and closer contacts. But there was no corresponding assurance of reception and attention—and, hence, of understanding.

Finally, in his remarks at the White House swearing-in of Director Marks, in September 1965, President Johnson stressed the central role of truth in USIA's mission, and disavowed a propaganda aspect. The United States, he said, "has no propaganda to peddle" since "we are neither advocates nor defenders of any dogma so fragile or doctrine so frightened as to require it."

THE MARKS STATEMENT OF MISSION

No doubt influenced by these various developments, Director Marks issued a restatement of the Agency's mission on March 6, 1967. It reflected and elaborated upon many of the forces and preoccupations that were actively shaping the Agency's task "in an increasingly complex world society." He began by restating the basic assumption that President Truman had voiced more than two decades before, namely, "that our responsibility for direct communication with foreign audiences is essential to the conduct of foreign relations," and stressing that this "reflects awareness that public opinion exerts increased influence on governments throughout the world and reaches beyond national barriers." He reaffirmed the persuasive aspect of the Agency's mission and its necessity to create understanding within the context of U.S. foreign policy objectives: "To achieve its foreign policy goals, the United States must break down barriers of misunderstanding; it must communicate effectively and persuasively on the many issues on which our security and welfare depend."

Discussing "The Task of USIA," Director Marks noted that "in carrying out the mission assigned us by law and Presidential directive, USIA:

> Supports the foreign policy of the United States by direct communication with people of other nations.
> Builds understanding of the United States, its institutions, culture and policies among other people; and shares with them information, thought and experience that can contribute toward achieving mutual goals.
> Advises the U.S. government on public opinion abroad and its implications for the United States."

Given new prominence was the concept that USIA "shares . . . information, thought and experience that can contribute toward achieving mutual goals." The idea of harmonizing policies and interests and of demonstrating a consonance of goals was not new; neither was the idea of a sharing of experience and information. But they took on a new emphasis, significance, and explicitness in Marks' discussion of how he viewed the Agency's goals. "I find it helpful," he declared, "to view USIA objectives in the following three broad categories: The United States as a Nation . . . International Issues and U.S. Policies . . . National Development." It is in this last category that there is apparent a major new dimension of information tasks.

Since before World War II, the United States has had programs of

economic aid, rehabilitation, and technical assistance. But the emergence of new nations—many with only the beginnings of the political, economic, and social institutions, traditions, and skills that viability as a modern nation demanded—gave a new aspect and a new content to international relationships, particularly in the postwar context of U.S.-U.S.S.R. rivalry. The developing nations were both an audience and an arena of competition with new and special characteristics, To approach them exclusively within the framework of previous concepts and objedtives would not do: the Agency could not, in the words of the Eisenhower statement of mission, simply "submit evidence . . . by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace." Nor could "influencing public attitudes in other nations" in support of U.S. foreign policies, as the Kennedy directive enjoined, be accomplished so directly as had sometimes been assumed. The new audiences had limited concerns and awareness outside the pressing urgencies of building their own nations and creating viable economies, workable political insititutions, and the social structure and educational levels that would allow them to survive and participate fully in the modern world. Moreover, the techniques and apparatus of communication and public opinion formation that worked with the more established and the more industrialized nations—the chief audiences of earlier information programs—were less applicable to more rudimentary societies of the developing countries.

Expanding on the "National Development" objective, Director Marks stipulated tasks that were a considerable remove from the traditional concepts of changing attitudes about U.S. foreign policy.

> The United States is today helping many developing countries to build the foundations of independent, modern states, responsive to the needs of their people.
> USIA has a role in this total US effort. It may include: Explaining AID assistance and showing how cooperative programs can spur the nation's growth;
> Helping build understanding of responsible citizenship and the democratic process;
> Focusing attention on critical issues such as the relation of population to agricultural production;
> Sharing relevant thought and experience that the developing countries can apply to their own problems;
> Acting as a catalyst in the circulation of ideas and helping build new attitudes that must underlie modernization.

These tasks reflect an increasingly sophisticated and flexible view of the kind of information and the kind of persuasion that would best serve the national interest and U.S. foreign relations—both viewed somewhat more broadly than has been traditional.

In "The United States as Nation" objective, Marks likewise stressed the criterion of relevance to other peoples' interests and preoccupations, and the need to understand and acknowledge these concerns. The "USIA's fundamental responsibility to build understanding of the United States, its institutions, culture, and ideals," he declared "is a necessary basis for the respect, confidence, and support that the U.S. world role today requires." However, he continued, "because the panorama of America is so broad, we must concentrate on *significant* aspects most

relevant for our audiences in their total judgment of the United States. . . . The values that our audiences themselves prize, as well as the misconceptions they hold about the U.S. should determine the points of emphasis in each country program."[8]

* * * * *

OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES: NEW AND OLD

Under the Fulbright-Hayes Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (PL 87–256) the President was given authoity to provide for "United States participation in international fairs and expositions abroad. . . ." Although the President delegated this function to the Director of USIA, who in turn for several years redelegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce, . . . USIA resumed [this] responsibility [on July 1, 1966]. . . . At the same time, the Agency transferred to the Department of Commerce responsibility for budgetary support of Commerce's trade mission programs. . . .[9]

[USIA,] which had been responsible for U.S. international art exhibits,[10] transferred responsibility for such programs (except in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.) to the Smithsonian Institution in 1965.[11]

* * * * *

[However,] policy guidance on international relations and psychological factors was to be provided by the Department of State and USIA, respectively.[12]

If the persuasive function of USIA lost emphasis, the informative function generally gained, and the function of advising the rest of the Government on psychological implications received only minor attention during the Johnson Adminsitration, one massive exception stands out. In Vietnam, and about Vietnam, the older concepts of official information programs were re-established and extended: this active war meant that USIA assumed tasks that had originally been performed by one of its progenitors, the Office of War Information, namely, psychological tactical and strategic and political warfare. But more than a deflection into a former role for information was involved. A new and striking feature was the degree of integration of USIA with other elements of the Government, both abroad and in Washington, and the leading responsibility that USIA assumed in Saigon.

On the basis of earlier experience, it was decided in 1965 that U.S. psychological action in Vietnam required unified direction, encompassing both military and civilian. In April, the National Security Council delegated responsibility for policy direction and coordination of all U.S. psychological action programs in Vietnam to the Director of USIA. A new U.S. Mission organization, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was set up to carry out this responsbility within Vietnam.[13]

But for a peacetime organization, with a wide range of continuing responsibilities in all quarters of the globe, so clearly a military-psychological operation as JUSPAO created some problems, anomalies, and disproportions.

In 1966, JUSPAO's field organization was merged, along with the field elements of other civilian agencies, into an Office of Civil Operations, and later, this organization was combined with noncombat military field activities into a Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support Office—steps that diluted JUSPAO's operational control and influence.

THE FUTURE

The successive definitions and redefinitions of USIA's mission and functions bid fair to continue. The changing emphases and directions, the experiments and extensions and retreats, appear an inevitable reflection of the fact that political communication—information activities, propaganda, public diplomacy, however, it is labeled—is a part of the international political process, and that is never static.

NOTES

1. "The Truman Statement of USIA's Mission," 1945. Document 1–1 in Murray G. Lawson et al. "The United Staes Information Agency During the Administration of Lyndon B. Johnson November 1963–January 1969, vol. II."
2. "The Smith-Mundt United States Information and Educational Exchange Act," 1942. Document 1–2 in Lawson et al., *USIA*, Vol. II.
3. By default, the actual administration of the program overseas remained a USIA responsibility.
4. Document 1–3 in Lawson et al., *USIA*, Vol. II.
5. "Streibert Interpretation of USIA's Mission," 1953. Document 1–4 in Lawson et al., *USIA*, Vol. II.
6. "The Kennedy Statement of USIA's Mission," 1963. Document 1–5 in Lawson et al., *USIA*, Vol. II.
7. Document 1–6 in Lawson et al., *USIA*, Vol. II.
8. "Marks Interpretation of USIA's Mission," 1967. Document 1–8 in Lawson et al., *USIA*, Vol. II.
9. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee, *Hearings on USIA Appropriations for 1967*, September 13, 1967, p. 339.
10. PL 87–256 and Executive Order 11034.
11. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Hearings for 1967*, p. 339.
12. "USIA-Smithsonian Institution Fine Arts Exhibits Agreement," 1965. Document 1–7, Lawson et al., *USIA*, Vol. II.
13. Document 1–6 in Lawson et al., *USIA*, Vol. II.

SELLING UNCLE SAM IN THE SEVENTIES*

BY KENNETH R. SPARKS

Communication reflects society as well as influencing it. All communications channels are important in overseas communications efforts.

It is seven p.m. in Moscow and before a distinguished audience of Soviet dignitaries, dance enthusiasts, and bureaucrats in Estradniy Teatr, the curtain rises on a performance by America's Alvin Ailey Dance Company.

At that very moment in Munich, the Amerika Haus plays host to sixteen German college students discussing the future of the North At-

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* Excerpts from "Selling Uncle Sam in the Seventies" in "Propaganda in International Affairs," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (November 1971), pp. 113–123. Reprinted with the permission of the American Academy of Political and Social Science and the courtesy of the author.

lantic Treaty Organization. Tom Anders, a Fulbright Scholar and graduate student in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, leads the discussion.

In New Delhi, the American Ambassador is calling on Mrs. Gandhi to present a copy of a recent book about her father, former Prime Minister Nehru, by a University of Michigan professor.

Meanwhile, classes are changing at the binational center in Cali, Colombia. Seventeen-year-old Maria Angela Lopez wanders through the halls, gazing at an exhibit which features the Apollo XI moon mission and waiting for her third-year class in English to begin.

In a Bulgarian village just outside of Plovdiv, a retired army officer closes the door to his bedroom and turns on the radio to catch a news broadcast from Radio Free Europe.

In Bangkok, theater lights dim on a full house of Thais who have come to watch John Wayne sock it to the bad guys once again. Following the feature, they will see an unattributed thirty-minute documentary depicting the Soviet Union's ruthless crushing of Czechoslovakia's moment of liberalization in 1968.

All of this represents America's propaganda machinery in action. Around the clock, around the globe, thousands of Americans and non-Americans alike are hard at work seeking to create or enhance public support overseas for United States foreign policy. All but a few of the many government agencies and departments play some part in this operation.

Ostensibly, our primary propaganda vehicle is the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). It is charged with "influencing public attitudes of other nations...by overt use of various techniques of communication...."[1] To carry out this mission, USIA uses radio, television, motion pictures, magazines, newspapers, pamphlets, libraries, exhibits, concerts, English-teaching, and as much personal contact as possible. With a staff of just over ten thousand employees, about half of whom are "locals"—non-Americans who do most of the non-policy work—the agency operates programs in over one hundred countries. In those countries where USIA activity is prohibited, the agency used its international radio arm, the Voice of America, in an attempt to reach the population with the American message.

But, though USIA was created in 1953 to serve as our chief propagandist, its role has always been limited.[2] Other agencies within the governmental hierarchy share its responsibilities.

Any inventory of the American propaganda arsenal must begin with the White House press conference and the daily State Department press briefings. Covered by a host of foreign reporters and by the many news services circulated abroad, these two channels may well be the most important propaganda tools we have. But since these press conferences and briefings are also covered by domestic media, USIA does not partici-

pate. Congress, on numerous occasions, has indicated its intent that the American government not engage in domestic propaganda.

The State Department also has responsibility for cultural exchange. When USIA was organized, many felt that the exchange programs should be moved to the new agency together with the information or popaganda activities....An Assistant Secretary of State makes the policy decisions which direct the annual exchange of 6,000 students, teachers, research scholars, professionals, and government and business leaders. He also manages a limited program of cultural presentations ranging from the Philadelphia Orchestra to the late Louis Armstrong. USIA administers these programs overseas, an anomaly explained only by convenience.

Primarily known for its information-gathering or spying, the Central Intelligence Agency directs a number of sensitive operations that include propaganda. As with all CIA operations, only a select few government officials know the exact nature and dimensions of the propaganda effort. But it has become common knowledge that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which broadcast to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, respectively, are creatures of the Intelligence Agency. Other transmitters in the Caribbean and Southeast Asia have also been traced to the CIA. In addition, the CIA supports local writers in many countries who produce favorable editorials or commentaries when the occasion demands.

The roster of cooks in the U.S. government's propaganda kitchen doesn't stop with the White House, the State Department, and the CIA. Virtually every major department conducts some international activity designed to win friends and influence people abroad. Defense, Commerce, Health, Education, and Welfare, Peace Corps, Nasa—even the Smithsonian—all have their propaganda role. The cost of these operations is close to $300 million annually. USIA's budget is roughly $185 million. The State Department's cultural exchange unit spends approximately $40 million annually.

* * * * *

LACK OF MISSION

Permeating USIA and the State Department is the conviction that American propaganda lacks direction and purpose, that our information and cultural efforts, and even our foreign policy, are lagging behind the changing world we are trying to influence. As relations thaw with the Soviet Union and Communist China, hard-hitting anti-Communist themes, long a staple of USIA's menu of activities, seem anachronistic.

.... Not only does policy appear to be out of date to many observers; it is sometimes non-existent. An example was given me by former Ambassador to France, Sargent Shriver. After his appointment by President Johnson, he searched in vain for an indication of what the State Department expected him to achieve. Preoccupation with Vietnam and a departmental belief that nothing of substance could be achieved while DeGaulle was in power had left a void in U.S. policy. When he turned to the long-range policy staff at the State Department and asked for guid-

ance, one official confessed that none existed, then asked, "Have you tried George Ball's latest book?"

"How can U.S. propaganda be effective until we have a clearly enunciated foreign policy?" mused Shriver. "It's like asking J. Walter Thompson to prepare a campaign for Procter and Gamble and finding out that P & G has no idea what it is trying to sell."

. . . . A second reason for the sense of uneasiness with U.S. propaganda within and without the government stems from frustration over Vietnam. Attempts over the past seven years to explain U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia as (1) fulfilling our commitment to defend a free people, or (2) meeting a Communist threat to the free world's security, have met with skepticism. Whether Vietnam proves the have been right or wrong in the long run, the short-term consequence has been a major psychological defeat for the United States. And a flop on such a global scale is enough to shake the foundations of any public relations firm, even the world's largest.

[USIA FUNCTIONS]

. . . . But it is important to step down from such macrolevel analysis and look for a moment at the functions U.S. propaganda is expected to perform. From time to time, the Information Agency has attempted to serve in at least five capacities: (1) information disseminator, (2) cultural programmer, (3) psychological warrior, (4) nation builder, and (5) public relations adviser. How well does it do each of these?

As a disseminator of information, USIA does about as well as can be expected. The agency has a competent staff of professional media personnel who, by and large, do a pretty good job of getting the message out through available channels. As mentioned earlier, however, many of our most successful operations are in countries where we have only the most limited national interests. Except for routine press contact, occasional special programing such as satellite hook-ups, and a few highly specialized publications, the agency has had little success in reaching Europeans. People in Europe are inundated with information from domestic sources, much as we are in America, and it is difficult for USIA to have much impact.

Those who measure success by counting the communists who have been converted to American-style democracy are bound to be disappointed with the U.S. informational effort. In line with what one would expect from communication theory, USIA is most successful in reinforcing existing attitudes. Relatively less effective are efforts to reach people for whom foreign affairs are less salient. And least successful are attempts to convert opinions from negative to positive. Since congressional attitudes toward the agency have traditionally been related to our "success in winning the Cold War," top officials at USIA have had to provide Congress with a variety of specious proofs of effectiveness at conversion. It is a phony game of piling anecdote upon anecdote which successive agency directors have felt obliged to play.

In cultural matters, USIA shares responsiblity with the Department of State's cultural unit. The agency maintains libraries, reading rooms, and information centers, through which most cultural programing is done. In Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and sections of South Asia, programs of English instruction form part of the effort. The State Dement expenditures in this area dropped from over $55 million to less change of persons and cultural presentations.

Because these activities serve primarily long-range interests, effectiveness is hard to measure and pressures develop to divert resources elsewhere. For instance, during the period of 1965 to 1969,State Department expenditures in this area dropped from over $55 million to less than $36 million per year.[3] As a result, there were fewer cultural exchanges and quality deteriorated. Recent increases in funding have barely matched inflation.

For the most part, the Information Agency has eschewed any responsibility for conducting psychological warfare after a brief flirtation with it in Vietnam. As one agency official put it, "Once the bullets start to fly, we have failed and it is time to hand over the situation to the military." The Vietnam episode taught USIA two valuable lessons. First, psychological warfare requires huge expenditures which rob other programs of funds and talent. And, second, many information and cultural personnel are not suited by training or temperament to "psy-war" activities.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

. . . . For years, USIA staff and interested observers have sought a role for the agency in policy formulation. The case, in its simplest terms, was that USIA with its special expertise in communications could make a valuable contribution by advising the government on the psychological implications of various policy decisions. In his 1963 memorandum to Edward R. Murrow, President Kennedy accepted this argument and directed the agency to begin

> advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated United States policies, programs, and official statements [4]

Murrow was made a member of the National Security Council, and other mechanisms were created for psychological contributions by USIA. These contributions have consisted mainly of (1) roundups of press opinion, (2) a few public opinion polls conducted by the agency's research division, and (3) largely intuitive judgments about the conduct of public relations.

Today this "psychological adviser" role appears to be minimal. Shakespeare does not sit on the National Security Council. His views are generally not sought out by the State Department. His direct contacts with White House staff are of doubtful importance. Other departmental channels exist for USIA to give its views on policy matters, but these seem to have limited impact.

. . . . Overseas, the role of psychological adviser is played by the top USIA officer. How seriously he is taken depends on the personal rela-

tionship he establishes with the ambassador. He has few tools, however, not available to other officers within the embassy.

In summary, U.S. propaganda suffers from a variety of ailments. It will require a major overhaul in Washington and in the field to get the propaganda machine back on track.

FUTURE EFFORTS

What, then, should be the basis of our propaganda in the 1970's? The answer depends on one's view of the world, one's conception of what American foreign policy should be, and the amount of confidence one has in the performance of private and public sectors.

Our relations with other countries will certainly become more, rather than less, difficult. Our audiences will be more sophisticated. No longer can we divide the world into two hostile camps—one free and the other Communist—and ask people to choose. Our broad commitments to peace, prosperity, and individual freedom must be manifested with deeds as well as words. Propaganda can often support and enhance good policy, but it can do little to promote what others conceive as bad policy.

Our audiences will also be larger, as greater numbers of people everywhere will almost certainly seek to share political power. The member of communication channels will be increasing, which, as we have learned in Europe, can be a barrier rather than a boon to international propaganda.

With these few generalizatons as a preamble, I would suggest the following guidelines as a framework for United States propaganda in the 1970's:

1. Nongovernmental media will be America's primary vehicles for informing people in other lands about our policies and culture. Even if Congress were to increase funds dramatically for informational activities, a course which is neither likely nor wise, the official effort would be submerged by nongovernmental communications. Instead of lamenting this fact, the chief preoccupation of government propagandists ought to be to facilitate and promote the best of these unofficial media whenever possible. Ways should be found, for example, to reinstate and expand the old International Media Guarantee (IMG) program, a revolving fund through which private publications, television programs and motion pictures were distributed in certain Communist and other countries. Occasionally, an article or program may embarrass, but the harm created is minute compared with the image which emerges of a truly free and self-confident society that sanctions such distributions.

We must realize that propaganda in its broadest and most important sense is a reflection of our total society. It consists of much more than official government pronouncements, overseas libraries, radio programs, cultural exchange, and a few clandestine operations. Marshall McLuhan, writing in a domestic context, summarized this point well:

> . . . propaganda does not consist in the conveying of messages by press or other media, but consists in the action of the total culture (language, food, ads, entertainment, etc.) upon its participants. The idea that propaganda consists of packaged concepts peddled to unsuspecting citizens is no longer tenable.[5]

We must place our confidence in the nongovernmental media to tell America's story. Aside from promoting these media, the role for U.S. official propaganda is to fill in the cracks, to round out the picture, to provide perspective.

2. Efforts should be based on what we know about the effects of communication, rather than on the naive political judgment that people's opinions can be radically changed if confronted with "the facts." Two decades of communications research have demonstrated that the primary effect of mass communication is to reinforce existing beliefs.[6] This makes the job of the propagandist one of seeking out those attitudes compatible with U.S. objectives and reinforcing them. This task may not be so glamorous as converting enemies into friends, but it is much more likely to be accomplished.

3. As much as possible, our programs should provide a service from the audience's viewpoint as well as our own. Programs which are so limited in appeal as to attract only the favor-seekers and hangers-on ought to be eliminated. In many countries we don't need a full-blown propaganda program, because other media are performing the job for us, or our target audience is so small that it can be reached adequately by routine personal contact.

4. Cultural affairs programing in support of long-range objectives ought generally to be expanded. Increased support for exchange programs should receive top priority. To know others better may not be to love them more, but it does increase understanding. This is the one area that seems to warrant large increases in funds. Cultural presentations need to be improved. America can't afford to send any second-rate talent overseas; our primary emphasis should be on ways to encourage top artists and entertainers to perform abroad, commercially sponsored, if possible, in major population centers. The emphasis on physical facilities—libraries and information centers—ought to be reduced. The cost is too great for the amount of return.

5. Primary responsibility for propaganda decision-making ought to rest at the national level, with the ambassador and his public affairs adviser, based on foreign-policy objectives for that country.

The innovative resource allocation system of the current Administration is a step in the right direction. Under this system, the local staff decides how the money allocated to each country for public affairs programing is spent. This places the funds and the responsibility close to the action. Washington's role should be largely supportive, providing funds, policy guidance, and administrative and production services.

6. Organizationally, USIA should be returned to an expanded State Department, which would become a Department of Foreign Affairs headed by secretaries for political, economic, and information and cul-

tural affairs. A study conducted by the Brookings Institution for the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in 1959 pointed the way.[7]

The arguments used in 1953 to separate information programs from the State Department have either been superseded or have proved less than persuasive. In sum, they were (1) that American propaganda was being outgunned by a monolithic Communist propaganda machine, and consolidation of efforts would produce better propaganda; (2) that old-line bureaucrats in the department did not understand or appreciate propaganda; and (3) that only by separation could field operations be consolidated and coordinated by Washington.[8]

We now know that, except where special circumstances have existed, the Soviets have had no more success than we, and in many cases they have been patently less successful. Furthermore, the new generation of diplomats now assuming control of our foreign affairs is made up of people who are conscious of the merits of "public diplomacy." Finally, field operations have been consolidated by giving ambassadors increased authority. Coordination of programs at home has not been measurably increased. In fact, USIA has become yet another policy-making center, together with the White House staff, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense.

A number of observers have called for cultural programs to be divorced from government control by establishing a quasi-public corporation such as the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) to take over their management.[9]

Considerable support for such a plan can be found and this general direction is one in which we should move. But the likelihood of adequate funding for the exportation of culture remains remote at this time in a country that failed to support the concept of government subsidies for the arts domestically until the late 1960's.

7. Personnel policies should encourage and reward special competence. Shifting staff members from one part of the world to another so that they may gain "fresh perspective" entails too great a loss in competence and personal happiness. Officers with special knowledge of underdeveloped countries and their problems should be shifted to the more developed countries only upon their request or for reasons of health.

Ways must be found to reward excellence in particular specialties. Today, the top pay goes only to the broadgauged generalist. A cultural affairs specialist finds himself bumping against the top pay bracket in a relatively few years. The Macomber Task Force has recommended such incentives, and the means should be found to implement them.[10]

8. Our propaganda should be seen and evaluated as a total system. Scientific evaluation will no doubt continue to be limited to the effects of specific programs. Social science tools are not yet capable of isolating effects on a larger scale, except at great expense. But there is a need for macro-evaluation, based on political judgments augmented by whatever data can be produced. To give a specific example, Uncle Sam now oper-

ates or funds a number of radio stations: the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio in the American Sector (Berlin), and American Forces Network (AFN). Each has a slightly different purpose, but each is part of our propaganda system.[11] Ought RFE and Radio Liberty to receive almost as much money as the Voice of Amierca? This type of evaluation needs to take place across the entire propaganda activity spectrum.

To facilitate such analyses, the research and evaluation operation at USIA should be shifted to the National Security Council staff at the White House. This staff would then develop and conduct the necessary public opinion polling for policy formulation, measure the effectiveness of specific propaganda activities, and assemble data to aid political judgments required for resource allocation among propaganda agencies. Full consolidation of U.S. propaganda programs may not be feasible, but if the White House has the means to evaluate them as a system, duplication can be minimized and the over–all effort strengthened.

We move into the seventies with an increased understanding of the limitations of official propaganda. No longer does it conjure up images of Lenin and Goebbels with their seemingly invincible and mysterious techniques. A world increasingly saturated with communications media operating independently of government has become hard to reach with artificial and polemic messages conceived by government bureaucrats. But governments still have a need to explain their policies and their actions, to participate in the international dialogue on goals for mankind and the means to achieve them. Various information and cultural programs can promote and supplement private media in this task, given redirection and proper leadership.

NOTES

1. Memorandum from President John F. Kennedy to Edward R. Murrow, January 25, 1963. See *The Agency in Brief*, 1971 (Washington, D.C.: USIA, 1971), p. 4.

2. USIA was established August 1, 1953, by President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan 8. For a summary of earlier activities, see John H. Henderson, *The United States Information Agency* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 23–60.

3. See *International Exchange, 1969*, a report by the Bureau of Cultural Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, June 1970), p.27.

4. *The Agency in Brief*, 1971, p. 4.

5. Marshall McLuhan, *DEW Line* 2, no. 3 (1969), poster 1.

6. Although dated, a good review of this material can be found in Joseph T. Klapper, *The Effects of Mass Communication* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960).

7. H. Field Haviland, Jr., et al., *The Formulation and Administration of Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1960).

8. For a good review of the arguments, see "Seventh Semi–Annual Report" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, February 1953), pp. 1–3.

9. For one version of this plan, see Bruce J. Oudes, "The Great Wind Machine," *The Washington Monthly* 2, no. 4 (June 1970), p, 30.

10. William B. Macomber, Jr., *Diplomacy for the 70's* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, December 1970), p. 100.

11. In the case of AFN this is unintentional, but in many parts of the world this service for our armed forces attracts large audiences of foreign nationals.

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PROJECT DIRECTOR

Daniel C. Pollock

Editors

Ronald De McLaurin

Carl F. Rosenthal

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FOREWORD

This collection of essays has been compiled by AIR using information in the open literature, unclassified government documents, and original contributions. In scope it covers the entire spectrum of military psychological operations (PSYOP). Appropriate consideration is given to related civilian activities as well as to relevant aspects of communication theory. Emphasis is placed on the entire operational field encompassed by such terms as "international communications," "political warfare," "cultural affairs," "psychological operations" (PSYOP), and "psychological warfare."

The editors have sought to illustrate the effective and noneffective uses of PSYOP and to describe the problems encountered and the solutions adopted by military and civilian personnel involved in PSYOP/Information activities during recent decades. Contrasting points of view were deliberately included in the casebook to provide a balanced as well as a general view of the state of the art. Some of the contributions may be considered as controversial, depending on the reader's point of view. Where copyrighted material has been quoted, permission has been obtained for its use.

Comments, corrections, additions, and suggestions for factual, interpretative, or other changes will be welcomed. They may be addressed to:

American Institutes for Research
3301 New Mexico Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20016

SOURCES

The types of selections that have been incorporated in this casebook include professional and scholarly publications, original contributions, foreign and domestic PSYOP-related material, excerpts from official memoranda and directives, lecture notes, letters, and newspaper items. An attempt has been made to ensure a reasonable geographic coverage by providing examples from all areas of the world. For example, Algeria, Burma, Cameroon, New Zealand, Nigeria, Portuguese Guinea, Taiwan, and Rumania are among the more than 30 countries treated in the text.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

General

The casebook is designed to serve primarily as background information for training in the field of psychological operations and as an introduction to the more important elements and principles of PSYOP. It is intended to serve not only as a point of departure for the uninitiated but also as a useful reference. The use of overly sophisticated material requiring a substantial social science background has been avoided. On the other hand, articles dealing in overly simplistic terms with principles painfully obvious to the reader have been excluded.

The editors have, however, intentionally included several somewhat advanced papers in the section on research in Chapter VII and on PSYOP effectiveness in Chapter IX. In Chapter VII, the selections give an indication of how sophisticated social science research can contribute to PSYOP. Similarly, the content of Chapter IX would have been incomplete and anachronistic without reference to the methodological thinking current in the 1960s and the early 1970s. It is believed that all the articles lend themselves to an understanding of the subject without an extensive background in communications research.

Secondly, most of the case studies have been purposefully selected to complement and supplement a standard reference in the field titled, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, written in 1956 by William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz. Changing perspectives of the nature and scope of PSYOP since that time, as well as changes in the politico-military environment in which PSYOP is carried out, have played an important part in the updating process. In this respect, the editors have given due weight to relevant events occurring since the publication of the PSYWAR casebook and have tried also to portray the new conceptions, methodologies, and techniques that have been developed to improve the effectiveness of PSYOP.

Thus, this compilation of case studies represents PSYOP generally in the 1960s, the situations experienced and the lessons learned in that decade. It is noted that although most of the incidents described took place between 1960 and 1972, some of them happened earlier but are best analyzed in the literature of the 1960s.

PREFACE

AIR, operating under a contract with the Department of the Army, has developed this two-volume anthology in the form of a PSYOP casebook. It has been prepared in response to a request from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This publication has been produced as a part of the overall research program undertaken by the Department of the Army to improve the capability of the United States Army to conduct PSYOP/information programs under a variety of circumstances in many different environments. The major focus of attention has been placed on psychological operations of military relevance, with special emphasis on the types of activities that may confront U.S. personnel in the two decades ahead.

In content, the editors have sought to cover the whole range of U.S. public international communications whether they be described as international information, cultural affairs, or psychological operations, and whether or not they be conducted by members of a military service or personnel of a civilian agency. The editors also have touched upon the ways in which PSYOP is employed elsewhere, with the hope that such material will serve to broaden the American understanding of how others around the world attempt to communicate effectively across cultural barriers and international borders.

COMMUNICATION THEORY AND PSYOP

The science of communication theory is relatively new; more than half of all the research, most of the important books and articles in the field, and most of the great figures in the study of communications have become well known only in the last twenty years. Moreover, increasingly for the last decade and a half it is in the context of communication theory that psychological operations—PSYOP—has been studied. Therefore, these volumes will include several timely essays on communication theory.

ORGANIZATION

The Art and Science of Psychological Operations is an anthology bringing together both original and previously published material. In effect, the essays comprise an analysis of the state of the PSYOP art. Some of them also provide conclusions and recommendations for the future. The individual essays, which are organized into chapters, deal with the nature and scope of PSYOP and communications; national policy and PSYOP; organizational and personnel matters; policy objectives and operational goals in Volume One; and PSYOP intelligence requirements, sources, and methods; social science research (including communication theory) and PSYOP; media, methods, and techniques; evaluation of effectiveness; and foreign ideology and propaganda in Volume Two.

Philosophically, the editors of this casebook have tried to indicate the new concerns in PSYOP, the changing conceptions of the field as a whole, and the trends in the use of new methodologies and techniques to improve its effectiveness. It is with reference to the change in conceptualization of PSYOP over the last fifteen years and to the trend of thinking in the early seventies that PSYOP is viewed in this book as communication. When the question is asked, "What is PSYOP?", the answers of different generations and different experts vary. Yet, as noted earlier, increasingly over the last decade and a half, psychological operations is studied in the context of communication. Although "persuasive" and "purposive" communications are the focus of this study, many scholars in the communications field argue that all communication is "purposive" and hence "persuasive." There is no need, in the context of present purposes, for this anthology to align itself with one or the other of these schools of thought.

Editorial Method

The desire to cover the "open" literature as thoroughly as possible and to make this an essential source for both military and civilian personnel interested in PSYOP and communications has made it necessary to be as concise as possible. It has therefore been necessary to excerpt many selections on the basis of relevance and concision. Except in the very few cases where the essays were "adapted," the excerpting is indicated by the use of ellipsis points in both copyrighted and noncopyrighted material. Only in the "original" and editors' essays were editorial changes, other than purely stylistic ones, made. Where necessary, the footnotes in each essay were renumbered, but not otherwise altered in form. The notes pertinent to a particular essay appear at the conclusion of that essay. Bibliographic citations for most sources used by the essay authors are found at the end of each chapter.

In as far as possible, the editors sought the consent of authors and organizations, even when their material was not copyrighted. The copyright holder, at least, was provided with a copy of the material in its proposed form. A particular note is made of the willingness with which publishers, editors, and authors responded to requests for permission to reprint material. In some cases, they even offered to update, substitute, or revise their articles, and when time permitted, the editors were able to take advantage of this. Some authors even suggested that they were flattered to be included. The undersigned, however, look at this the other way around: this book needed their contributions.

Inevitably in a work such as this—in which authors represent many nationalities, professions, and perspectives—the reader will find some material in spoken or translated English. For example, in those contributions illustrative of the day-to-day output of military units engaged in actual operations, a kind of clipped but useful military style is employed. Such a style was retained because it has a feel of immediacy and serves as an example of real PSYOP in action.

As in any anthology, one is advised to consider the article's original date of publication in his reading. A further result of the use of the case study approach is the fact that articles do not have an inherent order and flow. Although each selection has been placed in a chapter on the basis of its contributions to the topic covered in that chapter, an overly rigid linking of the several selections would be an arbitrary enterprise, misleading in some cases, since many contributions are illustrative rather than conclusive. The editors, therefore, have used the introductory comments at the head of each article to place the contribution in its situational context in many cases. However, this means, in some instances, that emphasis has been placed on aspects the contributing author did not necessarily consider to be preeminent, given his sometimes different purpose. Furthermore, because of the disclaimers carried in the mastheads of many of the original source publications, no implications should be drawn concerning the original source publishers' views on any articles published by them, without consulting the original source.

The chapters of this anthology, as well as the articles themselves, stand alone in large measure, even though references and cross-references reflect the interdependence of the various aspects of the PSYOP process as a whole. It is to be noted that because of the use of the casebook approach, style varies markedly from one article to another, providing a diversion from a single manner of expression.

Finally, a concerted effort has been made in the selection process for this compilation to stress the importance that the "PSYOP-related" fields have for effective psychological operations. Moreover, admittedly, controversial analyses, conclusions, and recommendations are found in several of the articles. These have been included not only for the purposes of the casebook already discussed, but to stimulate thinking. Essays featuring contrasting points of view are presented to provide a general idea of the range of thought of the individuals working in the field.

At any rate, this study looks at psychological operations analytically and conceptually as well as descriptively. Above all, every action and all inaction communicate. The goal in PSYOP must be to ensure that, through the combination of action and words, the desired message is the one that is transmitted. This is as true for nations as it is for individuals and groups.

D. C. Pollock
R. D. McLaurin
C. T. Rosenthal
S. A. Skillings.

AUTHORS, CONTRIBUTORS, AND EDITORS

AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

AARON, Harold R. (Major General, US. Army) — Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, 1974; Graduate of the National War College; Special Warfare Division, Army General Staff, 1960–1961; Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1965–1967; CO 1st Special Forces Group, 1967–1968; CO 5th Special Forces Group, 1968–1969.

ALLEN, George V. — Career Foreign Service Officer, retired; Ambassador to Iran, Yugoslavia, India, Nepal, and Greece; Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, South Asian, and African Affairs, 1955–1956; Director, U.S. Information Agency, 1957–1960; President, Tobacco Institute, 1960–1966; Director, Foreign Service Institute, 1966–1969.

ASKENASY, Alexander R. — Coordinator, Out-Patient Clinic, New York State Psychiatric Institute; Associate Research Scientist, Social Science Research Unit, N.Y. State Psychiatric Institute and Department of Psychiatry, Columbia University, 1969–1972; Senior Research Scientist, Center for Research in Social Systems, 1963–1969; Research Associate, then Project Co-Director, World Federation of Mental Health, 1959—1963; Research Associate, Psychological Research Associates (involved in research on mass communications and psychological warfare during World War II), 1956–1958; Psychologist, U.S. Army Medical Research Laboratory (Ft. Knox) and U.S. Military Government for Germany (public opinion research), 1954–1956; taught at Princeton, Columbia, and The American University and the University of Virginia; author of *Attitudes Toward Mental Illness: A Cross-Cultural Study* and *Perception of Korean Opinions: A Study of U.S. Army Officers' Expertise.*

BAIRDAIN, E. Frederick — Vice President and Senior Research Scientist, Applied Systems Science Technology, Inc.; has held senior management positions in domestic and foreign operations of several major transnational corporations specializing

in organization and communications; Project Director of a task force to assess the status of PSYOP in Vietnam; Principal Scientist for conduct of basic and applied field research on measurement of effectiveness of PSYOP; and Principal Scientist for a project to create a history of PSYOP in Southeast Asia and develop recommendations on doctrine and guidance for the future; author of many classified publications and coauthor of *Program Assessment: Vietnam Field Study, Psychological Operations—Vietnam.*

BAIRDAIN, Edith M.
President and Chief Scientist, Applied Systems Science Technology, Inc.; has held management postions in the aerospace and computer systems industry, including International Electric Corporation, Computer Sciences Corporation, and International Telephone and Telegraph; Project Director of a project to create a history of PSYOP in Southeast Asia and develop recommendations on doctrine and guidance for the future; Research Director of a task force advising U.S. agencies on conduct and evaluation of PSYOP in Vietnam; Research Director of a Field Team for Psychological Operations; coauthor of *Program Assessment: Vietnam Field Study, Psychological Operations—Vietnam.*

BARGHOORN, Frederick C.
Professor of Political Science, Yale University; Associate Division Assistant, Department of State, 1941–1942; Press Attache, U.S. Embassy, Moscow, 1943–1947; author of *The Soviet Image of the U.S.; Soviet Russian Nationalism; Soviet Cultural Offensive; Soviet Foreign Propaganda.*

BARR, John S.
Retired; represented London Missionary Society in China from 1924 to 1952; Professor and Counselor, Chung Chi College, Hong Kong, until 1966.

BARRETT, Raymond J.
Department of State Advisor at John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, N.C.; as U.S. Foreign Service Officer, served in Madrid, Mexico City, Managua, Dublin, and Cairo overseas, and in the Office of International Conferences, the Office of East and Southern African Affairs, and at Air Force Headquarters in Washington, D.C.

BEELEY, Sir Harold	Retired from British Diplomatic Service; UK Deputy Representative to the United Nations, 1958–1961; UK Representative to Geneva Disarmament Conference, 1964–1967; conducted study of British overseas information services in 1967; Ambassador to the United Arab Republic until 1969.
BELOFF, Max	Gladstone Professor of Government and Public Administration, Oxford University; has studied cultural and information work of Council of Europe and NATO; author of *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929–1941, Public Order and Popular Disturbances, The American Federal Government, The Future of British Foreign Policy, Imperial Sunset.*
BERGER, Carl	Chief, Histories Division, Office of Air Force History; formerly, Historian, Air Force, Cambridge Research Laboratories; Historian, Vandenberg Air Force Base; author of *The Korean Knot, Broadsides and Bayonets, B–29 Superfortress, Strategic Leaflets.*
BOGART, Leo	Executive Vice President and General Manager, Advertising Bureau, American Newspaper Publishers Association; public opinion research, Standard Oil Company, 1948–1951; Vice President, Market Planning Corporation, 1952–1958; lecturer, sociology, Columbia University, 1953–1961; author of *Age of Television, Strategy in Advertising;* editor, *Psychology in Media Strategy, Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Army.*
BOHANNAN, Charles T. R. (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)	Retired career military officer; Smithsonian Institution, before World War II; in Army of the United States, 1941–1961; assigned to Philippines 1945–1948, 1950–1957; coauthor of *Counter-Guerrilla Operations—The Philippine Experience.*
BRANDON, James R.	Professor of Drama and Theater, University of Hawaii; has also taught at University of Connecticut and Michigan State University; assistant cultural attache, USIS, Djakarta, 1955–1956; radio officer, 1956–1957; Japanese language officer, Tokyo, 1958–1958; assistant cultural attache, 1959–1961; author of *On Thrones of Gold: Three Javanese Shadow*

	Plays, Theatre in Southeast Asia; coauthor of *Kabuki Plays* (in French).
BROMAN, Barry M.	U.S. Marine Corps, 1968–1971; no further information available.
BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew	Director, Research Institute on Communist Affairs and Professor of Public Law and Government, Columbia University; Harvard University, 1953–1960; Department of State Policy Planning Council, 1966–1968; author of *The Soviet Bloc, Unity and Conflict, Alternative to Partition, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics;* coauthor of *Political Power: USA–U.S.S.R.*, and *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy.*
BULLARD, Monte R. (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army)	Assistant Professor of Military Science, University of California, Berkeley; formerly, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy (West Point); Foreign Area Specialist Training Program in Chinese; 1½ years at Foreign Service Institute of Chinese Area and Language Studies, Taiwan; Military Intelligence officer, Seoul, Korea; Political Warfare Staff Advisor, Headquarters, MACV, Vietnam.
CHOUKAS, Michael	Provost, Pierce College; previously on sociology and anthropology faculties, Dartmouth College, 1929–1953; Pierce College, 1968–1971; Office of Strategic Services, 1944–1945; author of *Black Angels of Athos, Propaganda Comes of Age.*
CLARKSON, Edward J.	Member, Mid-range Amphibious Warfare Study Panel, Headquarters, Marine Corps; in charge of III MAF Chieu Hoi Divison, CORDS, 1967–1968.
COOPER, Bert H., Jr.	Analyst in National Defense, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress; Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research, 1961–1971, undertaking extensive study of internal conflict; Research Assistant, Library of Congress, 1959–1961; coauthor of *Casebook on Counterinsurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts, Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam 1941–1954, Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Population Protection and Resources Management*

in Internal Defense Operations; author of *Statistics on U.S. Participation in Vietnam, Oil Shortages and the U.S. Armed Forces,* and *Cost Overruns in Major Weapons Systems.*

DASBACH, Anita Mallinckrodt — Adjunct Associate Professor to the Political Science Department, George Washington University.

DAUGHERTY, William Edward — Researcher and scholar in the field of PSYOP; teacher and Executive Secretary, North China American School, Tung Hsien, China, 1932–1935; has taught at Amherst College, West Virginia University, and University of Omaha; Wartime Communications Research Project, Library of Congress, 1941; Chief, Japanese Branch Organization and Propaganda Analysis Section, Special Defense Unit, U.S. Department of Justice, 1941–1942, Japanese language, intelligence and division psywar officer, 1943–1946; Operations Research Office/Research Analysis Corporation, 1949–1967; Operations Analyst assigned to U.S. Eighth Army, 1950–1951; Chief, Plans and Special Projects Sections, PWD/G3, U.S. Eighth Army, Korea; Senior Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research, 1967–1971, conducting research in psychological operations, psychological factors affecting the strategic posture of selected foreign countries, and the U.S. military assistance program and U.S. military civil affairs; author of *U.S. Policy and Programs in Latin America, U.S. Strategic Interests in Tropical Africa, The Military Assistance Officer: Key Factors to be Considered in His Selection and Training,* coauthor of *A Psychological Warfare Casebook, A Review of U.S. Historical Experience with Civil Affairs, 1776–1954.*

DAVIS, Morris — Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois; taught formerly at University of Wisconsin, Dalhousie University, and Tulane University; author of numerous articles on communications and other aspects of political science.

DELANEY Robert Finley — Forrest Sherman Professor of Public Diplomacy, U.S. Naval War College; Foreign Ser-

	vice Officer, U.S. State Department and USIA, 1950–1963; Public Relations Advisor, ESSO Standard Oil, South America, 1963–1965; Deputy Assistant Director JUSPAO, 1965–1966; Assistant Director (Research and Public Opinion), USIA, 1967–1968; Director, Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1968–1970; President, Thunderbird Graduate School of International Management, 1970–1971; author of *Your Career in the Foreign Service, The Literature of Communism in America;* coauthor, *American Public Diplomacy: The First Years.*
DONNELL, John Corwin	Professor of Political Science, Temple University; U.S. Army CIC, 1943–1946; SCAP, Tokyo, war crimes investigator; 1946–1947; Intelligence Analyst, Civil Intelligence Section, Tokyo, 1946–1947; Staff Officer, USIA, 1949–1953; State Department, 1953–1958 (Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaya); taught at Dartmouth College and University of California (Berkeley); staff member, RAND Corporation, Social Science Department, 1964–1965.
DUNN, S. Watson	Professor and Head, Department of Advertising, University of Illinois; has taught at Universities of Wisconsin, Pittsburgh, and Western Ontario; author of *Advertising: Its Role in Modern Marketing, International Handbook of Advertising,* and *Advertising Copy and Communications.*
DURHAM, F. Gayle (See HOLLANDER, Gayle D.)	
ELLUL, Jacques	Professor of History of Law and Social History, University of Bordeaux; author of numerous works, including *Autopsy of Revolution, The Political Illusion, Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes,* and *Technological Society.*
ESWARA, Harrogadde S.	Reader in Psychology, University of Mysore, India.
FOOTE, A. Edward	Editor, *Educational Broadcasting Review.*

FREE, Lloyd A. — President, Institute for International Social Research, SAIS, The Johns Hopkins University; onetime Editor of the *Public Opinion Quarterly;* Director, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, World War II; Assistant Military Attache, Switzerland; Senior Counselor, Mass Communications, UNESCO; Acting Director, Office of International Information, State Department; Counselor of Embassy for Public Affairs, Rome; advisor to presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson; advisor/consultant to Vice President Nelson Rockefeller.

FRIEDRICH, Carl Joachim — Eaton Professor Emeritus of the Science of Government, Harvard University; taught at Harvard, 1926–1971; Director, School for Overseas Administration, 1946–1949; Constitutional Advisor, U.S. Military Government in Germany, 1946–1948; Constitutional Advisor to Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands; President, International Political Science Association, 1966–1970; American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, 1956–1965; author of *Man and His Government, The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (coauthor), *Constitutional Government and Democracy, The Age of the Baroque,* and many other works.

FULTON, R. Barry — Career officer, USIA; currently assigned to the Management Division, Office of the Assistant Director (Administration and Management), USIA; formerly Special Assistant and Second Secretary, American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan; Director, American Center, Karachi Pakistan; Director of the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, Turkey; taught at the University of Illinois, San Antonio College, the University of Maryland, and Pennsylvania State University.

FURSE, Dave — Lieutenant, 9th Infantry, 1968; no further information available.

GARVER, Richard A. — Chairman, Department of Journalism, State University of South Dakota.

GERGEN, Kenneth Jay — Chairman, Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College; operations officer, U.S. Navy, 1957–1959; has also taught at Harvard

	University; coauthor, *The Self in Social Interaction, The Study of Policy Formation, Personality and Social Behavior, The Psychology of Behavior Exchange.*
GERGEN, Mary	Research Associate, Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College.
GESSNER, Peter	Free-lance film editor and camera assistant.
GIZA, Richard H.	Intelligence Research Specialist, Department of Defense, 1966-present; taught at Fordham University.
GLEASON, Robert L. (Colonel, USAF)	Former Special Warfare Operations Officer, Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University; graduate and former faculty member, Air War College.
GLICK, Nathan	Chief, Dialogue Magazine Branch, USIA; teacher, 1939–1940; social investigator, 1940–1943; magazine editor, 1943–1947; free-lance writer, 1947–1949; writer and editor, Army and State Departments, 1949–1953.
GRINTER, Lawrence E.	Professor of East Asian Affairs, National War College; Visiting Professor of Political Science, Haverford College; Post-doctoral Fellow and Project Manager, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Senior Social Science Analyst, CINCPAC Headquarters, Honolulu; Research Associate, Center for Research in Social Systems; Field Researcher, Simulmatics Corporation, Saigon; Peace Corps volunteer teacher, Sierra Leone.
GUTHRIE, George M.	Professor of psychology, Pennsylvania State University; coauthor of *Child Rearing and Personality Development in the Philippines.*
HARRIS, Elliot	Communications consultant; member, Army reserve (in PSYWAR), late 1940s; attended Psychological Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N.C.; assigned to ACPW, U.S. Army, during Korean War; advertising writer and publishing executive since 1953; author of *The "Un-American" Weapon: Psychological Warfare.*
HAUSMAN, Conrad K. (Colonel, U.S. Army)	Defense Intelligence Agency; 1964–1966, Vietnam (Operations Research Analyst, MACJ3); Desk Officer, MACV Political Warfare; Senior Advisor, Vietnamese Armed Forces Psychological Warfare Directorate; Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, 1st U.S. Infantry Division.

HEMPHILL, John A. (Colonel, U.S. Army)	Director, Company Operations Department, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia; Commander of the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 1972–1973; assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, 1969–1971.
HENDERSON, John W.	Retired career Foreign Service Officer; Washington bureau, Associated Press, before World War II; served with U.S. Army during World War II; served as FSO in Shanghai, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Japan, Thailand, Indonesia; attended National War College; author of *The United States Information Agency.*
HERZ,	Career U.S. Foreign Service Officer (1946 to present); currently U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria; formerly Deputy and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs; officer, U.S. Army, 1941–1946 (member, Psychological Warfare Team, Fifth U.S. Army in Italy and chief leaflet writer, PWD/SHAEF, 1944–1945); translator, broadcasting company, 1939–1940; author of many articles on psychological warfare and psychological operations; author of *Beginnings of the Cold War.*
HOLLANDER, Gayle D. (F. Gayle Durham)	Assistant Professor of Political Science, Hampshire College; Research Assistant, Communist Political Communications Project, MIT, 1963–1964; Foreign Service Officer, USIS, assigned to USSR, 1964–1965; taught at Amherst and Mount Holyoke colleges; author of *Radio and Television in the Soviet Union, News Broadcasting on Soviet Radio and Television, Amateur Radio Operation in the Soviet Union, The Use of Free Time by Young People in Soviet Society, Soviet Newspapers and Magazines,* and *Soviet Political Indoctrination: Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda Since Stalin.*
HOLT, Robert T.	Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota and Director, Center of Comparative Studies of Technological Development and Social Change; author, *Radio Free Europe;* coauthor, *The Political Basis of Economic Development, Political Parties in Action, Competing Paradigms in Compara-*

	tive Politics, Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy; coeditor, *The Methodology of Comparative Research.*
HOSKINS, Marilyn W.	Social anthropologist; no further information available.
HURLEY, Cornelius P., S.J.	Founder and Director, Institute of Social Communications, Bellarmine Center, Santiago, Chile; author of *Theology in Film* and *Sociology in Film.*
JANIS, Irving L.	Professor of Psychology, Yale University; Research Assistant, Study of War-time Communications, Library of Congress, 1941; Senior Social Science Analyst, Special War Policies Unit, Department of Justice, 1941–1943; U.S. Army, 1943–1945; research, Social Science Research Council, 1945–1947; author, *Air War and Emotional Stress, Psychological Stress;* coauthor, *Communication and Persuasion, Personality and Persuasibility.*
JOHNS, John H. (Brigadier General, U.S. Army)	ODCSPER, DA, 1974; Instructor in Psychological Operations, Special Warfare School, 1960–1962; Senior Advisor/Instructor, Vietnam Political Warfare School, 1962–1963; research and operations related to psychological operations, U.S. Army Staff, 1964–1968; Associate Professor of Psychology and Leadership, U.S. Military Academy, 1968–1970; Office, Chief of Staff, Army, 1971–1973; M.A. Psychology; M.S. International Affairs; Ph.D. candidate (Sociology).
JOHNSTON, William F. (Colonel, U.S. Army)	Member, staff and faculty, National Interdepartmental Seminar, Foreign Service Institute; assigned to Office, Chief of Psychological Warfare, 1953; several Special Warfare-type assignments, including command of PSYWAR battalion in USARPAC; Chief, JUSPAO Planning Office, Vietnam, in previous assignment.
KATAGIRI, TARO (Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)	Career military officer; assignments included command of 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam.
KATZ, Phillip Paul (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)	Senior Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research; Psychological Operations Instructor and Lecturer at Army Special Warfare Center, 1956–1963; Psychological Opera-

	tions Officer at Department of Army and Senior PSYOP Officer for U.S. Army, Pacific, 1963–1967; Senior Program Manager for Development of Strategic Psychological Operations in Support of Field Activities, Vietnam, 1967–1968; developed a computerized PSYOP management information system for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of the Army; author of studies on PSYOP
KELLY, George A.	Professor of Politics, Brandeis University; Research Associate, Center of International Affairs, Harvard University, 1961–1964, 1967–1968; author of *Idealism, Politics and History* and *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and the Empire in Crisis: 1947–1962;* coeditor of *Internal War and International Systems.*
LANIGAN, John Dennis (Major, USMC, Ret.)	Associate Director in the Policy Analysis Department, Operations Analysis Division, General Research Corporation; graduate of Counterinsurgency and Special Warfare Staff Officer Course and of Psychological Operations Officer Course, both at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
LANSDALE, Edward Geary (Major General, USAF, Ret.)	Retired career officer, USAF; served with OSS during World War II; deeply involved in psychological operations and counterinsurgency planning for Southeast Asia throughout postwar period.
LERNER, Daniel	Ford Professor of Sociology and International Communication, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; has taught at Stanford and New York universities; World War II, intelligence officer, PWD/SHAEF; Chairman, International Committee, World Association of Public Opinion Research, 1961–1963; author of *The Passing of Traditional Society, Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany, Comparative Studies of Elites, Comparative Study of Symbols;* coauthor, *World Revolutionary Elites;* coeditor, *The Policy Sciences.*
LESCAZE, Lee	Washington Post Foreign Service.
LE VINE, Victor T.	Professor of Political Science, Washington University (St. Louis); also taught at UCLA; author, *The Cameroon from Mandate to In-*

	dependence, Political Leadership in Africa, The Cameroon Federal Republic.
LINEBARGER, Paul M.A.	In 1930–1936, Secretary to the Legal Advisor, Nationalist Government, Republic of China; U.S. Army, 1942–1946; Far Eastern specialist, Office of War Information, 1942; taught at Harvard, Duke, and Johns Hopkins universities, 1936–1965; author of *Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen, Government in Republican China, The China of Chiang K'ai-shek, Psychological Warfare.*
LITTLE John M.	Infantry captain (1966); no further information available.
LONG, Chuong Dac	No information available.
LORIMOR, E. S.	Involved in communications research in Barcelona, Spain; formerly evaluator of teacher education project in Nigeria; Ph.D. in mass communications from the University of Wisconsin.
LOVETT, Colburn B.	Foreign Service Information Officer, USIA, currently assigned to the Operations Center Staff, Office of the Director, USIA; formerly, PSYOP Planning Officer, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army; Senior Field Representative of JUSPAO in a previous assignment; also served in Korea and Thailand.
MACY, William T. (Major, USMC, Ret.)	U.S. Marine Corps (1970); no further information available.
MARTIN, L. John	Professor of Journalism, University of Maryland; reporter, editor, correspondent, Middle East newspapers, 1941–1947; copy editor, *Detroit Free Press,* 1957–1958; Chief, Near East-South Asia Division, Office of Research, USIA, 1961–1966; Coordinator, Overseas Research, USIA, 1966–1967; Chief, Program Analysis Division, USIA, 1967–1969; author, *International Propaganda.*
McAULAY, A.H.D. (Warrant Officer, Australian Army)	Australian Army Intelligence Corps; linguist, Attached to Australian forces in Vietnam.
McKAY, Vernon	Professor of African Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins

	University; foreign affairs officer, Department of State, 1948–1956; Research Associate, Foreign Policy Association, 1945–1948; also taught at Syracuse University; author, coauthor, and editor of over 100 publications on Africa.
MIDDLETON, Casilear (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)	No further information available.
MILLER, Gerald Raymond	Professor of Communication, Michigan State University; taught at the State University of Iowa and the University of Washington at Seattle; author of *Speech Communication: A Behavioral Approach;* coauthor of *New Techniques of Persuasion.*
MONROE, James L.	President, Preston and Associates; Colonel, U.S. Air Force Reserve, on active duty during World War II and Korean War, heavily involved in leaflet drops (including development of Monroe Leaflet Bomb) and interrogation; contract research following Korean War.
MOON, Gordon A., II (Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)	Formerly Information Officer, Headquarters, Fifth Army, Fort Sheridan, Illinois (1967); No further information available.
MORRIS, Michael A.	Fellow, Canadian Institute of International Affairs (1970); taught at Gallaudet College.
MORRIS, Robert P. (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army)	Operations research analyst, Office of the Comptroller of the Army; taught at Florida State University and University of Maryland (Far East Division); Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, 1st Infantry Division, in Vietnam, 1967–1968, supervising U.S. Army tactical psychological operations in five provinces; graduate of U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
MOSKOS, Charles C., Jr.	Professor and Chairman of the Sociology Department, Northwestern University; author of *The American Enlisted Man, Public Opinion and the Military Establishment,* and *Peace Soldiers.*
MOYNAHAN, Brian	No information available.

MURTY, B. S.	Head, Department of Law, Andhra University (India).
NATHAN, Reuben S.	Communications consultant; Special Events Editor, Office of War Information, 1942–1945; Chief, Anglo-American joint magazine publications project, SHAEF, 1945–1946; periodicals section, U.S. Department of State and Department of the Army, 1946–1950; Policy Director, RFE, 1950–1962; Colonel, GS UAR and Chief of Planning, JUSPAO, Vietnam, 1965–1966.
NIEHOFF, Arthur H.	Professor and Chairman, Department of Anthropology, California State College at Los Angeles; also taught at University of Wisconsin; Assistant Curator, Milwaukee Public Museum, 1951–1959; Advisor in Community Development, USAID, Laos, 1959–1961; Research Scientist, Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO), 1963–1968; author, *East Indians in the West Indies;* coauthor, *Introducing Social Change, Casebook of Social Change.*
NORTON, John H.	Director of International Operations, Keysor-Century Corporation and consultant on international operations for business; Lieutenant Commander U.S. Naval Reserve; naval aviator, 1960–1963; extensive overseas travel; degrees from Yale and Stanford; recently completed a year of advanced studies in economic and political development at Harvard and M.I.T.
OKES, Imogene E.	Education Specialist, U.S. Office of Education; State Department, 1945–1948; U.S. Navy Department, 1948–1952; International Institute, 1955–1956; Research Associate, Special Operations Research Office, American University, 1957–1961; Researcher, State Department Institute for Defense Analysis, 1962–1963; author of *Psychological Operations––Afghanistan, Participation in Adult Education 1969: Initial Report.*
ORTH, Richard H.	Senior Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research; coauthor of a study on Community Relations Advisory Councils and a PSYOP Research Guide.

OZAKI, John (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army)	Career Military officer; assigned to Department of Army (1969); served with ASA, headquarters 7th Army, MACV, and in the infantry in Korea; graduate, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; no further information available.
PAPPAS, Dino G.	Geographer, U.S. Army, Concepts Analysis Agency; Federal Energy Administration, 1974; Cost of Living Council, 1973; Battelle Memorial Institute, 1972–1973; American Institutes for Research studying models of PSYOP officers' qualifications; Research Analysis Corporation, 1962–1970; Air Force Intelligence Center, 1958–1962; Army Map Service, 1955–1958; author of *The Role of Communications in the Military Assistance Program (MAP).*
PIKE, Douglas Eugene	Career officer, USIA, currently North Vietnamese Affairs Officer, USIA, Saigon; formerly Special Assistant to Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, USIA; newspaper reporter, 1945–1946; newspaper editor (Okinawa) and radio network editor (Tokyo), DA, 1950–1951, 1954–1956; Public Information Officer, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, 1951–1952; Radio Writer, USIA, Washington, 1958–1960, 1964; assigned to Saigon, 1960–1964, 1965–1967 and Hong Kong, 1967–1969; author of *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam; War, Peace, and the Viet Cong.*
POOL, Ithiel de Sola	Professor, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; also taught at Stanford University and Hobart College; member, USAF Scientific Advisory Board and the Defense Science Board; author of *Symbols of Democracy, Symbols of Internationalism;* coauthor of *Candidates, Issues and Strategies, American Business and Public Policy;* editor of *Talking Back, Handbook of Communication.*
PRESTON, Harley Oliver	Senior Staff Member, American Psychological Association; Psychological Assistant, U.S. Army Air Forces, 1942–1945; taught at Kent State University, 1941–1942, 1946–1947;

	Executive Scientist (1947–1960) and Director, International Division (1961–1964), American Institutes for Research; author of *Operations of the Participant Training Program of AID.*
PRICE, James Robert	Coordinator, Major Issues System, Office of the Director, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress; employed by State Department and Central Intelligence Agency, 1950–1957; Washington, D.C. representative and Executive Director, Jami'at al Islam, Inc., 1957–1962; Manager, Cultural Information Analysis Center, American Institutes for Research, Kensington Office, 1962–1970; Technical Director, National Media Analysis, 1962–1972; author of *Radio Free Europe—A Survey and Analysis* and numerous other studies in the social science field.
QUANG, Phan Trong	No information available.
RAFFA, Aldo L. (Colonel, USAF, Ret.)	No further information available.
RAO, Y.V. Lakshmana	Secretary General, Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Center, Singapore; newspaperman and broadcaster, New Delhi, India, 1947–1957; Research Fellow, Institute for Communication Research, Stanford University, 1961–1963; Deputy Director, Press Institute of India, 1963–1964; Program Specialist, UNESCO, 1964–1969; Senior Specialist, East-West Center, University of Hawaii, 1969–1970; author of *Communication and Development.*
ROBINSON, David D.	Management Consultant Supervisor, Ernst & Ernst; clinical psychologist training, U.S. Veterans Admin., 1961–1964; industrial psychology consulting, 1963–1966; Research Psychologist, Battelle Memorial Institute. 1966–1968; author of *A Brief Review Study of the Problems of Criteria in Psychological Warfare.*
ROLPH, Hammond (Commander, USN, Ret.)	Executive Assistant to the Director, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Southern California, and Consulting Editor, *Studies in Comparative Communism;*

	retired career (21 years) naval intelligence officer; author of *Vietnamese Communism and the Protracted War;* coauthor of *Communism in Vietnam.*
RONALDS, Francis S., Jr.	Deputy Executive Director, Radio Liberty; News Manager and Program Manager, Radio Liberty, 1952–1966; Deputy Director (Programs), Voice of America, 1966–1971.
RUBIN, Bernard	Professor of Governmental Affairs, School of Public Communication, Boston University; has also taught at Skidmore and Brooklyn colleges and Rutgers University; Chief, Research Design Unit, U.S.I.A., 1968–1969; author of *Political Television, Report to the Government of Massachusetts* (on Reporting and Public Information), *Report to the Secretary of the U.S. Air Force on the Information Function in USAFE, Report on Presidential Debates and American Politics, Public Relations and the Empire State.*
SARAL, Tulsi Bhatia	Formerly Head, Department of Mass Communications, Literacy House, Lucknow, India; Editor and Information and Publications Officer, Government of Uttar Pradesh, India; Editor of *Nava Yuvak* for five years; author of twelve books in Hindi.
SCHRAMM, Wilbur	Currently with the East-West Center; formerly Professor, Director of Institute of Communications Research, Stanford University; also taught at Universities of Illinois and Iowa; director, Education Division, Office of War Information, 1942–1943.
SIMPSON, Howard Russell	Newspaper writer, staff artist, 1950–1951, 1956; press service correspondent and freelance writer, 1955–1956; State Department, 1951–1952; career USIA officer, assigned to Vietnam (1954–1956; Advisor to Prime Minister and to Political Warfare Section ARVN, 1964–1965), Nigeria, France, and Algeria.
SMITH, Don D.	Professor of Sociology, Florida State Unisity.
SPARKS, Kenneth	Deputy Director, Federal City Council (Washington, D.C.); U.S. Marine Corps, 1957–1960; Social Science Analyst, USIA, 1964–1967 (Chief, European Research Division, 1965–1967); Director, Public Affairs, Office of Economic Opportunity, 1967–1969.

STONE, Vernon A.	Assistant Professor of Journalism, University of Wisconsin.
SUGDEN, G. Scott	Career officer, USIA; currently, Program Coordinator, North Africa, Near East, South Asia; previously assigned to India, Pakistan, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam.
SZALAY, Lorand Bertalan	Senior Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research; while Associate Professor in Research at The American University, developed the Associative Group Analysis method; taught also at George Washington University. Consultant to the Library of Congress; author and coauthor of numerous articles in social science journals on communications and methodology, among these publications are: *"Ideology: Its Meaning and Measurement," "Designing and Testing Cogent Communications," "Verbal Associations in the Analysis of Subjective Culture," "Measurement of Psychocultural Distance: A Comparison of American Blacks and Whites," Communication Lexicon on Three South Korean Audiences, Domains: Family, Education, and International Relations, "Psychological Meaning: Comparative Analyses and Theoretical Implications."*
TANAKA, Yasumasa	Professor of Social Psychology and Communications, Gakushuin University, Tokyo, Japan; has also taught at universities of Pennsylvania and Saskatchewan; author of four books (in Japanese) on human communication and subjective culture, editor of *Cross-Cultural Social Psychology Newsletter,* Associate Editor of *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology.*
THEBAUD, Charles C. (Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)	Formerly Staff Officer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Fort Benning, Georgia; no further information available.
THORNTON, Thomas Perry	Member, Policy and Coordination Staff, U.S. Department of State; Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, India, 1955–1958; Analyst, U.S. Navy Department, 1958–1963; Chief, Division of Research and Analysis for South Asia, U.S. State Department, 1963–1969; has taught at George Washington, American, and Johns

	Hopkins universities; coauthor of *Grobianische tischzuchten;* editor, *The Third World in Soviet Perspective;* coeditor, *Communism and Revolution.*
TOO, C. C.	Head, Psychological Warfare Section, Malaysian Government.
TUCK, Robert L.	Director, Program Operations Division, Radio Liberty; Policy Director, Radio Liberty, 1961–1966; Foreign Affairs Analyst, Department of the Army and U.S. Air Force.
VALYUZHENICH, A.	Soviet analyst; no further information available.
VALERIANO, Napoleon (Colonel, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Ret.)	Army of the United States; 1946–1957, Armed Forces of the Philippines; attached to U.S. Military Mission in Indochina, 1954–1957; coauthor of *Counter-Guerrilla Operations—The Philippine Experience.*
VAN DE VELDE, Robert Whitsett (Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)	Professorial Lecturer, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University; career Army officer, 1935–1957; coauthor, *Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy.*
WATSON, Francis M., Jr. (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)	Media researcher, writer, and lecturer, National Media Analysis, Inc.; Deputy Manager, Cultural Information Analysis Center and Chief, Fort Bragg Field Office, American Institutes for Research; author of *Revolution in Executive Perspective, An Analytical Introduction to the Underground Press;* editor TUPART monthly reports on the underground press, 1971.
WECHSLER, Irving Robert	Senior Analyst, Evaluation and Analysis Staff, Office of Research, USIA; taught at Harvard, 1935–1943; Office of War Information, 1944–1945; State Department, 1945–1953; career USIA officer from 1953, occupying several policy guidance positions.
WHELAN, Joseph G.	Senior Specialist, International Affairs, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress; Staff Member, Far Eastern Commission, State Department, 1946; author of numerous reports published by the U.S. Congress on Soviet affairs.
WONG, Paul	Research Sociologist, specializing in Chinese sociology.
YAMASHITA,	Instructor, Human Behavior Branch, Psycho-

K. Stanley (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army)	logical Warfare Department, U.S. Army Special Warfare School; foreign assignments with U.S. Army in Thailand, Japan, and Okinawa.
YARBOROUGH, William Pelham Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Ret.)	Airborne officer during World War II; Provost Marshal of U.S. Forces in Austria after the war, organizing Four Power International Patrol; Director, Department of Troop Information and Education, Armed Forces Information School, 1947–1949; NATO Plans Section, Joint American Military Advisory Group to Europe, 1950–1952; faculty, Army War College, 1953–1956; Deputy Chief, U.S. Military Advisory and Assistance Group to Cambodia, 1956–1957; Commanding General, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare and Commandant, U.S. Army Special Warfare School, 1961–1965; Senior Member, United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission in Korea, 1965; Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (Special Operations), 1965–1966; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, DA, 1966–1968; Deputy Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff, USARPAC, 1969 until retirement.
YOH, Bernard	Lecturer and consultant on Special Warfare; Advisor to President Diem, Republic of Vietnam, 1955–1963; worked with Maj. Gen. Lansdale as a special team counterinsurgent organizer, fighter, and advisor in Vietnam, 1965–1966; during 1937–1945, organized an anti-Japanese underground that included thieves and pickpockets of Shanghai; also organized bandits into a paramilitary guerrilla force.
YU, George T.	Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois; also taught at University of North Carolina and Stanford University; Advisory Editor, *Journal of Asian Studies;* author, *Party Politics in Republican China;* coauthor, *The Chinese Anarchist Movement.*
ZARTMAN, I. William	Professor and Head of department of Political Science, New York University; also taught at University of South Carolina; Executive Secretary, Middle East Studies Association; author of *International Relations in the New*

Africa; Problems of New Power: Morocco, Destiny of a Dynasty, Government and Politics in Northern Africa; coauthor, *African Diplomacy, State and Society in Independent North Africa.*

ZORTHIAN, Barry R. — Vice President, Time Incorporated, President of Time-Life Broadcast, Inc.; news reporter and editor, 1936–1942, 1946–1947; broadcast news writer, 1947–1948; Voice of America, 1948–1961; Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, India, 1961–1964; Minister-Counselor, Republic of Vietnam, 1964–1968 (Director, JUSPAO).

PROJECT DIRECTOR

POLLOCK, Daniel Carroll (Colonel, USMC, Ret.) — Former Principal Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research; substantial experience in politico-military affairs during military career; Chief, Asia Branch, Cultural Information and Analysis Center, American Institutes for Research; Project Director for the Ethnographic Study Series and several other classified and unclassified research projects.

THE EDITORS

McLaurin, Ronald De — Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research; Assistant for Africa, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), 1968–1969; Management Assistant, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1967–1968; author of and contributor to studies on the analysis of foreign policy, international politics, and social and international conflict.

ROSENTHAL, Carl F. — Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research, while at American Institutes for Research, conducted studies on insurgency and collective violence, civic action, and psychological operations; author of a number of classified or limited publications in these fields; author of *Phases of Civil Disturbances: Problems and Characteristics, Social Conflict and Collective Violence in American Institutions of Higher Education.*

SKILLINGS, Sarah Africa — Research Associate, American Institutes for Research; Research Analyst, U.S. Army Security Agency; General Assistant, United

Nations Food and Agriculture Organization; editor of a number of publications dealing with military assistance, intercultural communications, psycholinguistics, and psychological operations; coauthor of a technical report on foreign population groups.

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THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: CASE STUDIES OF MILITARY APPLICATION

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THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

CASE STUDIES OF MILITARY APPLICATION

CHAPTER VII

INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence and research support PSYOP in a number of crucial ways—from initial planning of a specific PSYOP program to the development of new methodologies for analysis and delivery. This chapter deals with both intelligence and research, the collection of information and its transformation, through research or analysis, into operationally relevant fact.

Intelligence, particularly, is so closely related to the process of effective persuasive communication that separating it from that process for purposes of study is exceedingly difficult. Utilization of intelligence output in some form is bound up in PSYOP planning from its earliest stages and continues to support PSYOP and to be affected by the PSYOP strategy until the process starts over again. Moreover, PSYOP intelligence cannot be neatly separated from other intelligence. Because it must meet both tactical and strategic requirements, specification of even the "essential elements of information" (EEI) overlaps information categories that intelligence is asked to address for other purposes, including politico-military planning and combat operations.

Growth of intelligence capability, particularly in analysis but to some extent collection as well, depends on a number of factors covered elsewhere in this casebook. (See, for example, chapters V and IX.) It also depends upon improvements in techniques resulting from social science research. Once again, in fact, all PSYOP, as all communications, looks to research for conceptual and methodological, as well as technological, innovation.

That intelligence and research are an integral part of PSYOP and central to the entire process, is attested to by the fact that most of the chapters in this casebook involve one or the other, and usually both. Their interrelationship is shown by the importance of the communications concept to the delineation of EEI. Meanwhile, social science research has constantly tried to refine communications models. Refinement supports analysis (Chapter IX), which is central to the processing of intelligence.

The last two decades have seen rapidly increasing social science research on communications. Transferring the results of this research to PSYOP, however, often requires a major effort. Yet, the commitment in the 1960s to utilizing this approach in PSYOP seems to be paying off: PSYOP appears to be on the threshold of important new benefits from the use of computer technology and the findings of communications research.

"A SURVEY OF PSYOP INTELLIGENCE" *

BY PHILLIP P. KATZ

From a PSYOP viewpoint, intelligence is the basis for understanding human actions. PSYOP is dependent on intelligence for the effective management of its programs, for obtaining current information about PSYOP targets, testing or obtaining feedback on message content and format, and measuring the effect of PSYOP messages and programs.

The purpose of this essay is to sharpen the focus of PSYOP essential elements of information (EEI) as related to intelligence requirements. It will emphasize the technical skills and knowledge that are needed to provide the PSYOP community with the answers to the EEI for planning, conducting, and evaluating PSYOP.

To this end, the essay will first discuss the general nature of PSYOP intelligence; second, outline the major focus of the EEI for PSYOP; and third, discuss the three major uses of PSYOP intelligence: target analysis, the testing of communication content, and the measuring of the effect of PSYOP programs.

NATURE OF PSYOP INTELLIGENCE

Since a wide variety of technical data and information is needed to manage, plan, and conduct communication programs effectively, PSYOP is dependent on intelligence for the effective management of its programs. Intelligence, from a PSYOP viewpoint, is the basis for understanding human actions. It involves a thorough understanding of all aspects of the audience of PSYOP targets; the ability to gauge the progress of current programs; and, finally, the capability to determine the overall effect of persuasive communications. Each will be discussed briefly.

First, anyone engaged in communication programs must know certain things about his audience; for example, who they are and how many are reading or viewing his messages. The PSYOP managers, planners, and communication or media programmers should understand the audience as if they were communicating face to face. Certainly, they must have a real understanding of current attitudes on a variety of appropriate subjects, and these attitudes should be considered as ranging, for example, from very hostile, somewhat hostile, neutral to somewhat friendly. On the basis of such knowledge, PSYOP communication programs can then help to:

a. restructure hostile attitudes of selected individuals or groups;
b. reinforce attitudes of friendly individuals or groups; or
c. maintain the continued neutralization of those whose attitudes are unstructured and who are deemed "safe" if they remain neutral.

*Original essay by Phillip P. Katz.

It is obvious, however, that without a real understanding and knowledge of current attitudes on a variety of appropriate subjects there is no scientific way of determining whether progress is being made toward restructuring attitudes.

Second, when a PSYOP campaign is in progress it is very important to obtain constant feedback in order to know how it is going and what tactical changes, if any, are required. This requirement is substantial when the full range of communication media and channels is to be used. A careful and honest analysis is necessary in order to determine what messages and channels of communication worked well and why, what the mistakes were, and what can be done to avoid future errors and failures.

Finally, PSYOP intelligence is needed to measure the overall effect of communication on the attitudes and actions of selected targets.

Importance of Systematic Research

By building on carefully observed and evaluated experience, costly delays and failures can be avoided. In other words, in developing and implementing PSYOP programs, the first requirement is for a systematic approach. Systematic research is the most efficient way yet found to obtain dependable information about people and their environment.

The PSYOP communicator should be suspicious of the single letter or comment about the quality of a particular item of communication. The difference between the unsystematic gathering of information and research is that research, when properly designed and conducted, usually produces results that can be relied upon, whereas we have little idea how reliable less systematic information is. As Wilbur Schramm states:

> The *quality* of information from and about the audience is of the essence. If it is to be useful, it must be based on facts rather than hunches; it must be adequate to allow for differences among parts of the audience, and for changes with time. This is why it is important that, so far as possible, [the] clear light of research be turned on the informational needs of the audiences.[1] (Emphasis added.)

MAJOR FOCUS OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION FOR PSYOP

Figure 1 depicts a concept model of the PSYOP intelligence process as it is related to program implementation. This dynamic process is based on the EEI.

The focus of EEI for PSYOP programs must be related to the total population base, because, as Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap put it, "That's the basis of our strategy that the Americans fail completely to understand." [2] Consequently, the EEI for PSYOP are the critical items of information about PSYOP targets (friendly, neutral, hostile) needed by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist decisionmakers, planners, and media development personnel in implementation of communication (PSYOP) programs. They must include:

1. The definition of key audiences (both friendly and enemy) within the society
2. The beliefs, attitudes, opinions, and motivations of key audiences as individuals and groups
3. The analysis of current vulnerabilities of specific audiences within the society
4. The determination of message content and the most effective (best) communication channels to reach the target
5. The impact or effect of PSYOP communication

Each of these considerations will be discussed below.

Definition of Key Audiences (Friendly and Enemy) Within the Society

The need for definitive target selection has been firmly established. Again, it is emphasized that a country struggling for identification and vitally involved in nationbuilding usually does not have a single audience. In fact, in the United States, despite mass media and a highly developed educational system, there are many special groups based on geography, ethnic origin, religion, race, economic status, and social position. Certainly the attitudes of each group will vary on many political, social, and economic subjects. Therefore, it is important to consider the many diverse segments of the population and to aim communication programs to the specific groups and subgroups that one wishes to influence. Accordingly, specificity of target selection becomes an important first step in the development of PSYOP programs, with the intelligence community playing an important role in the selection of remunerative PSYOP targets.

Significant historical evidence shows that definitively and specifically worded communications are usually more effective. Although strategic programs are not concerned with a single hamlet or a small military unit, they should be concerned with significant religious groups, occupational subgroups, and specific military organizations as worthwhile targets. For example, major PSYOP target groups in an insurgency evironment could be:

Host country civilians (friendly—neutral—hostile)
Insurgency-sponsoring-country civilians (friendly—neutral—hostile)
Incumbent military or paramilitary forces
Insurgent military forces

One of several further subdivisions of the host country friendly civilian target group could be by rural classification and occupational group, in this way:

Land owner
Farm owner-operator
Farm tenant-farm worker
Laborer (unskilled)
Laborer (skilled)
Fisherman
Merchant, Storekeeper



Figure 1. A Schema of PSYOP Intelligence.

Housewife
Priest, minister, monk

This, of course, does not imply that each category requires distinct and definitive media programing. However, based on the importance of the group or subgroup in the particular operational environment, a PSYOP program manager could decide to develop a special pamphlet, magazine article, radio program, or cultural drama team performance directed to any one of the hundreds of possible target categories.

Guidelines for the selection of PSYOP targets are based on several practical considerations: first, the importance of the target to the PSYOP mission. For example, a small rural minority group located in a remote and nonsensitive part of the country would be of little importance to PSYOP programs. On the other hand, a small but highly organized religious order, with its members strategically located throughout the country, could be of great use to PSYOP programs as key or influential communicators. In a similar way, a small minority group that occupies a strategic border area could be an important PSYOP target. Certainly, the PSYOP program manager and planner must understand their significance, as key communicators or important targets, and should direct appropriate communication to affect or restructure their attitudes.

The second guideline for target selection is based on the probability of attitude change. It was stated above that attitudes within a given group could vary from fanatically hostile to extremely friendly. Because it is generally recognized that PSYOP programs (especially mass media) will have little influence on fanatics, intelligence is needed to insure that the major PSYOP effort is directed to typical segments of the population. The atypical person or fanatic could be considered as a secondary or tertiary PSYOP target. For example, Henry V. Dicks, who was a leading PSYOP analyst during World War II, established the following five categories of response to Nazism among German males of military age:

1. Fanatical "hardcore" Nazis (10 percent)
2. Modified Nazis "with reservations" (25 percent)
3. Unpolitical Germans (40 percent)
4. Passive anti-Nazis (15 percent), and
5. Active anti-Nazis (10 percent) [3]

From the above analysis, it appears that a majority of the German soldiers were politically neutral. No doubt this information was valuable to the PSYWAR planners and media programmers in that it provided the basis for the tone of political messages.

Beliefs, Opinions, Motivations, and Attitudes of Key Audiences as Individuals and Groups

If attitudes are to be restructured, reinforced, or neutralized, the first essential is to establish a baseline from which to provide an accurate assessment of current attitudes toward significant political, military, economic, and social subjects. The requirement is for more than hunches

or gossip. Hard scientific evidence about the reality of social situations is needed.

PSYOP is concerned with people's attitudes toward a variety of subjects: political ideologies; the enemy as a military force, as administrators, or as compatriots; and the friendly government, its bureaucracy, military forces, and aid. Also, it is important to understand the attitudes of particular age groups, social strata, and occupational groups. This information is needed for the development of a realistic communication strategy for specific PSYOP targets. As stated, important, significant, and typical audience samples should be used in assessing attitudes. There is considerable danger in assuming that the attitudes of one or two high-ranking defectors or several friendly civilians are typical.

Analysis of Current Vulnerabilities of Specific Audiences Within the Society

An analysis of current dissensions, fears, anxieties, complaints, and "gripes" within a selected target audience is vital in order to determine PSYOP vulnerabilities. Accurate and current evidence is needed about real or imagined complaints dealing with political, social, economic, or military subjects. Obviously, it is important that the complaints be typical ones.

Examples of fears and anxieties on the part of military PSYOP targets could be:

1. Close surveillance by comrades
2. Fear of punishment or reprisal against an individual's family
3. Fear of mistreatment, killings, or torturing of prisoners by the incumbent military forces
4. Fear of air and artillery bombardment
5. Anxiety over aerial surveillance

When assessed realistically and taken advantage of intelligently, many of the fears and anxieties mentioned above can be exploited as target vulnerabilities for PSYOP programs. The problem then becomes one of identifying them so that they can be exploited.

PSYOP vulnerabilities can be of long duration or of relatively recent origin. For example, a group can develop deep animosity, based on religious or racial prejudice toward another group. If the communicator adequately understands the nature of the animosity, it can be used for PSYOP exploitation. In this respect, the Viet Cong in their propaganda still equate the presence of U.S. forces in Vietnam with the colonial French forces, knowing, of course, that the majority of the people have a strong animosity toward both the French and colonialism.

PSYOP vulnerabilities are dynamic, and thus able to be reinforced or changed. By way of illustration, on August 8, 1968, the U.S. Ninth Infantry Division, reacting to a VC ambush, fired on the friendly hamlet of Yen Thuong, killing several innocent civilians. This incident made the people in the area extremely susceptible to anti-U.S. PSYOP. For example, rumors spread by the VC agents stressed that:

The Americans fired without provocation.
The Americans can't tell the difference between enemy and friendly, and open fire on all people in black pajamas. In this respect they are no better than the French.
The hamlet was caught in a crossfire in a fight between the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and U.S. forces.
The American helicopters "callously" opened fire on the hamlet.

Typical thoughts and attitudes of the villagers were:

The Americans are just like the VC—kill innocent people.
The GVN should order the Americans to stop undisciplined firing because too many people get killed. They (the Americans) are just like the French.
We used to think that the Americans came to help us (didn't they build schools and dispensaries?) but now the Americans show how they really feel toward the people.

The next morning (August 9) an ARVN political warfare team explained to the people of Yen Thuong and others in the general area that the Americans reacted to a VC ambush. They emphasized that, had the people informed or reported the VC activity, the tragedy surely would have been avoided. This message was also carried by the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) to district towns and markets. This, plus the active concern of the government of Vietnam, the prompt medical attention given to the wounded, and the distribution of commodities and prompt indemnity payments by the Ninth Division tended to "cool" the situation and thus reduce this PSYOP vulnerability.

Determination of Message Content and the Most Effective Communication Channels

Writing about PSYOP during World War II, Daniel Lerner makes the significant point that the development of PSYOP themes (message content) is the one most crucial element in the PSYOP process. He also notes that this is the point at which the considerations of policy, intelligence, and the target are brought to bear upon the use of available media and channels of communication. Once there is a clear understanding of attitudes and PSYOP vulnerabilities for definitive targets, and with the knowledge of policy guidelines, there is nothing difficult or magical about the selection of thematic content for PSYOP messages. Of course, without an understanding of current attitudes, motivation, and actual vulnerabilities of specific issues, thematic content could be very mysterious.

It is apparent that content for PSYOP messages must meet a triple test: first, it must be consonant with PSYOP policy guidance; next, it should support one or more significant objectives as stated in the PSYOP plan; and, finally, it should be based on as accurate an assessment of vulnerabilities as can be determined by scientific analysis and evaluation of target information.

It is obvious that PSYOP messages should be programed over communication channels that are readily available to the audience. It is a wasted effort to prepare extensive and varied radio programs for groups

in areas not possessing radio receivers, or to develop large quantities of printed matter for an illiterate audience. Deciding on the most effective communication channel or channels to reach a PSYOP target is an important and critical step in the planning of PSYOP programs. There is no doubt that, in many environments, PSYOP is more than a loudspeaker and leaflet operation, and all available communication channels should be considered as PSYOP options.

The first requirement, therefore, is for a scientific analysis of current communication patterns for the target(s). Some of the questions are: (a) What channels are open? (b) What media are credible? (c) What media are most appropriate to the thematic content? (d) What channels are capable of reacting to appropriate time and space requirements? It should be made clear that a considerable amount of current data is required to adequately understand the various communication channels and the pattern of communication for PSYOP targets.

Measuring the Effect of PSYOP Communications

In evaluating the effect of communication programs, consideration should be given to whether the concern is for the short term, long term, or institutional (very long term) effect. As stated previously, if PSYOP programs are to be accurately measured, information is required from many PSYOP sources. Also, measurement requires the use of a variety of techniques, depending, of course, on the location, importance, and size of the PSYOP audience. Specific data-gathering techniques for determining the impact or the effect of PSYOP communication will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

Measurement can be quantitative, qualitative, or textual. Quantitative measurement can be based on the number of prisoners, defectors, or refugees who came in during the reporting period; or on the number of hours of radio or loudspeaker broadcasts; or on the number of leaflets disseminated. The second and third measurements are production indicators only and do not measure the true effect of PSYOP communications in restructuring attitudes. Even the first set of criteria are not necessarily valid indicators of PSYOP effectiveness because it is necessary to demonstrate a relationship between the PSYOP media output and actions, and the inflow of persons. Qualitative measurement can be based on specific cases of measured attitude change. Most of these data are obtained from verbal accounts gleaned from in-depth interviews or survey measurements of the restructuring of attitudes. In addition, textual or content analysis can be used to obtain PSYOP effectiveness clues from enemy documents, newspapers, periodicals, and broadcast monitoring reports, among others.

There is no doubt that the focus of PSYOP EEI for an insurgency environment is more complex than obtaining information about the "enemy and his environment." PSYOP targets represent a broad spectrum of the population, and the exploitation of the varied targets for PSYOP programs requires considerable technical knowledge. The follow-

ing paragraphs will discuss the utilization of PSYOP intelligence in the implementation of programs and the essentially technical method used to exploit major PSYOP information sources. The following discussion of the scientific techniques used to gather data from PSYOP information sources will expose the technical nature of PSYOP intelligence requirements.

UTILIZATION OF PSYOP INTELLIGENCE

Target Analysis (The Importance of Audience Research) [4]

An important first step, in both commercial communication research and psychological operations, is to understand clearly the nature of the audience(s) and the communication patterns related to those audiences. This is accomplished through audience research or target analysis.

The spectrum of information to be derived from audience research is very wide. Five components will be discussed. First, as indicated previously, an important aspect of audience research is concerned with the communication pattern: How does information get to people? Who depends on radio or newspapers or other individuals for a given kind of communication? Who listens to the radio, and when? Who can pick up leaflets, and when? Who goes to the movies? Who reads magazines, and what kind? Specifically, audience research is necessary in order to find out what channels or combinations of channels to use for a given communication purpose.

Audience research is also used to find out what skills an audience has in reading or listening, and how the audience is likely to interpret a given text, illustration, picture, or slogan. This kind of data is essential so that the communicators will have the needed information to encode or prepare messages that are meaningful to the various PSYOP targets.

Another important point is that audience research is vitally concerned with the credibility of information, sources, and channels. In short, what kind of messages are likely to be believed, accepted, and lead to the desired action.

In addition, PSYOP media programmers require a clear understanding of how messages are understood or perceived, what part individuals and groups play, and how perception gives rise to the restructuring of attitudes and eventually a change in behavior.[5]

Moreover, audience research is necessary in order to find out something about the social organization of the audience, that is, to answer such questions as: Who are the opinion leaders (key communicators)? How are decisions on a variety of significant subjects likely to be made? What is the role of the primary group and the social organization in the communication process? This information is needed, specifically, to develop a rational communication strategy and to better understand what use to make of interpersonal communication, mass communication, and mixed strategies in the development of the campaign.

It is very important in attempting persuasive communication to really understand the attitudes of people as individuals and as members of social groups.[6] To a degree, Washington research can provide significant data, but, because target analysis is dynamic and should be based on the reality of "today's attitudes," the answer to the above questions can be obtained only after current field research.

The vital importance of audience research is clearly stated in a document prepared by the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV). It states that:

> Adequate audience analysis is the key to effective psychological operations and the basis for audience analysis is a *sound responsive intelligence gathering effort* [emphasis added]. Audience analysis provides the psyoperator and commander with the vulnerabilities of specific target audiences; susceptibilities to a variety of PSYOP appeals, available communication channels. With this information, the psy operator can develop PSYOP objectives. [Author's note: PSYOP objectives are provided by the command: the "psy operator" develops appropriate themes for media implementation.] [7]

It is apparent that target analysis is necessary in order to identify meaningful population groups and subgroups as specific PSYOP targets. Furthermore, target analysis provides important clues to the attitudes of the selected audiences prior to exposure to PSYOP messages. In addition, it is important because it provides the data needed to anticipate what resistance might be met to communication content and to determine what message content and communication strategy might be most meaningful and effective. In sum, target analysis (through the use of surveys and other data-gathering techniques) tends to bring the selected targets closer to the PSYOP source, for example, the radio scriptwriter, the man at the microphone, the artist or illustrator, the newspaper copywriter or leaflet writer, and, of course, to the PSYOP cadres. Thus, it is evident that audience research is a broad and basic requirement of PSYOP programs.

Testing of Communication Content

The need for testing communication content before the message is disseminated is clear: After the message leaves the channel, it is lost to the PSYOP media programmer (the source); therefore, in the communication process, the source wants to know whether he is in tune with his audience, that is, if his messages are properly understood by the receiver.

In testing messages it is important to check the respondent for psychological as well as sociological representativeness (age, sex, occupation, education, and so forth). These two items should not be confused. Prisoners of war, for example, while they may be much like their uncaptured comrades from a sociological point of view, are very different from them, psychologically speaking. They are relatively safe in a prisoner-of-war compound and no longer have the physical fears associated with the combat area; also, they are no longer under the strict influence of their political officers and the military primary group (squad and platoon).

Consequently, the fact that a persuasive message, directed to a hostile target, scores high on an initial test with prisoners of war or defectors, does not necessarily mean that it will "bring them in." As stated, the social environment in the prisoner-of-war camp is different from that of the target area. In addition, those selected for testing are usually neutral or friendly to the source; they are not in a hostile communication environment; and their primary group will usually be sympathetic toward the source. Hence, while they may be fair subjects for testing some kinds of communication (that is, general information messages), they are not suitable for testing certain persuasive messages. This is also true of political refugees.

Alfred de Grazia, who made a thorough study (1953) of target analysis and propaganda media, states that:

> Although frequently useful as sources of intelligence concerning events and conditions in areas inaccessible to psychological warfare, they (POWs) may not share the attitudes and temper of their former compatriots. The very fact that they chose to flee, and are now situated in such different surroundings affects their perspective and reduces their value as pretest subjects.[8]

De Grazia also stressed that in testing there are no definitive rules. Each instance is unique, and before an estimate can be made of the reliability of a proposed test, careful consideration must be given to the nature of the communication, the type of subjects available, and the overall psychological atmosphere in which the test is to be conducted.

The following paragraphs will discuss some techniques that are used to test or obtain feedback in PSYOP communications. In addition to testing, the techniques are used for other purposes such as attitude measurement. Four techniques will be discussed: (a) the general sample survey, (b) the panel as a survey tool, (c) the in-depth interview, and (d) informal media testing as part of an interrogation or interview.

The General Sample Survey

The sample survey is perhaps the one best systematic method for determining effects of media content. Its application in military PSYOP is, of course, limited to those targets that are accessible to the surveyors. Certainly, in an insurgency environment, this technique can be used more frequently than in conventional military siutations.

The sample survey is usually conducted during and after the PSYOP campaign. By asking significant questions of a relatively small sample of persons, scientifically selected to insure a certain representativeness, the survey can obtain highly accurate information on the percentage of the audience actually reached by various communication channels, and how the audience is responding to the communication. The purposes of the survey technique in PSYOP testing are to determine if the messages are understood, to obtain clues about the credibility of content, to determine if the message evokes the desired response, and finally, to find out whether it has provoked any undesirable effects.

In considering the use of surveys in an insurgent environment, it is pertinent to note certain observations made by one of America's leading attitude research organizations. In its introduction to a 1967 attitude survey conducted by the Center for Vietnamese Studies, this firm commented that one major problem would be respondent suspicion of interviewer motives. As a result, it was thought respondents might alter their answers.[9] Such data can either be taken as a direct indication of the sample population's attitudes and beliefs or

> the data can be interpreted comparatively. That is, the majority of the respondents need not express a particular attitude for it to be regarded as an important finding. Whether a given datum is meaningful or not depends in part on the degree of support derived from other parts of the same study. To utilize this more modest definition of the study is to say that the findings *can yield considerable insight into the feelings of the people but will provide projectable information on the whole population within fairly broad tolerance limits.*[10] (Emphasis added.)

Finally, the study concluded that the interviews did constitute an acceptable reflection of reality.[11]

There is no doubt that there are many problems in polling overseas. In some countries, it is not feasible to go into the countryside; in others, especially those with autocratic governments, the population is afraid to answer questions, telling interviewers, when they do talk, what they think their government would like to hear them say. The best clues of the extent of bias are to be found in the survey findings themselves. Thus, for example, there have been surveys taken in semipolice states which revealed montonously regular approval of all government actions at close to the 95 percent level, clearly suggesting the absence of freedom of expression.

The United Sstates Information Agency is primarily responsible for conducting attitude surveys overseas. The world opinion surveys conducted by USIA are especially significant to PSYOP communication. They are available and used by other agencies of the government, including the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the Department of Defense, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The surveys cover questions from basic values to specific reactions to programs, media, or activities. Interviewing is usually done by indigenous personnel, sometimes by locally run public opinion organizations, and administered by contract professionals under the guidance of USIA staff personnel. Thomas Sorenson notes that a "confidential" policy statement spells out the use of surveys by USIA as follows:

> We use the public opinion poll abroad, in concert with other methods, to measure (1) understanding of and support for important U.S. policies and actions, (2) the standing in the public mind of the U.S. compared to ... other nations with respect to relative military power, scientific progress, economic growth, and the like, (3) attitudes on questions and personalities ... of significance to this country in the conduct of its foreign affairs, (4) the aspirations, fears and prejudices of the USIA target audiences, and (5) *the importance and credibility of the various communications media in different countries for different audiences.*[12] (Emphasis added.)

The scientifically planned survey is an important tool in providing data and material for the answers to PSYOP EEI and in testing the contents of PSYOP communications. It is important, however, that the surveys be programed for the widest variety of urban rural targets.

It is apparent that use of sampling procedures and implementation of attitude or opinion polls requires demographic data and professional skills. It is beyond the scope of this essay to consider the tools of field research and the specific techniques of the sample survey.

The Panel as a Survey Tool

The panel is a group of people chosen to represent in a scientific way some larger population segment. The difference between the panel as a testing or measuring instrument and the survey is that the panel involves interviewing the same population segment not just once but repeatedly at regular intervals.

This technique allows for the gathering of a great amount of relevant data, and provides for a better comparison of long-run and short-run effects on attitudes and behavior. The validity of the results is highly dependent on the scientific selection of the panel to insure that it represents a demographic cross section of the target or targets.[13] For example, the requirement might be for a series of panels that scientifically represents the major social groups and subgroups. These could include separate panels for communication directed to urban civilians, rural civilians, enemy military and paramilitary forces, refugees, and the like.

The survey method of data collection requires free access to the audience, with the members being checked for psychological representativeness. That is, are they the best and most recent sample available to represent the psychological environment of the target audience? It also requires skilled handling of what is called the "interviewer effect," that is, biases introduced into the responses of the panel members as a result of their repeated interviewing and consequent heightened awareness of the issues.

The In-depth Interview

An important technique used to obtain PSYOP intelligence, the in-depth interview is primarily used for post-testing and measuring attitude change and effect. Essentially, the in-depth interview is an outgrowth of the psychoanalytic interview, but is somewhat more directive, and of course not therapeutic in its aim.

During World War II, Dr. Henry V. Dicks (LTC,Royal British Medical Corps) was the first military psychiatrist to use in-depth interviews to support PSYOP programs. As in the psychoanalytic interview, the objective is to put the respondent at ease and get him to express himself as freely as possible on the subject at hand. If the interview is to progress satisfactorily, the psychological atmosphere must be permissive, and the respondent must be made to feel that nothing he says will be "used against him" or embarrass him in any way.

The purpose of the in-depth interview is to give insights into the deeper meanings that some objects and events hold for the respondent and to clarify the psychological process and mechanisms by which these meanings are formed, perpetuated, and changed. In order to gain insights of this kind from the in-depth interview, the interviewer must possess considerable psychological sophistication as well as a good grounding in the principles of modern dynamic psychology. Clumsy and aimless in-depth interviewing produces nothing, and its indiscriminate application by amateurs can result in more confusion than insight.

Informal Media Testing

The testing techniques discussed, to this point, are very sophisticated and require technical knowledge in both the planning and implementation of their use. Surveys and in-depth interviews should be methodically planned and tested prior to implementation. This takes time—something often lacking to a PSYOP programmer. Often an immediate test or evaluation of a leaflet or other item of communication is required. Therefore, if operational pressures do not permit the use of the formal techniques discussed above, the PSYOP programmer might elect to test the communication informally on:

Members of his local national staff, or
An accidental urban or rural sample, or
An accidental sample of prisoners or returness, or on all three

At times, informal testing or evaluation is accomplished after a leaflet is printed and distributed.

One respondent, a 22-year-old former Viet Cong and teacher of "politics, culture, and indoctrination," made the following significant comments concerning PSYOP leaflets:

> I propose that you use suitable terms in preparation of leaflets. It is natural that both sides try to abuse each other but we must speak ill of our opponent in an elegant manner. The picture must adhere to the truth because the readers will compare them with reality. If they find out that the leaflets are excessive, they will lose confidence. Most of the men from North Vietnam have a good culture and their general education level is equivalent to Junior High School, therefore, they can make a clear cut observation and analysis. Thus special attention must be paid to the text as well as to the pictures in the leaflet and efforts made to adhere to the truth as far as possible.[14]

This kind of feedback, obtained during an interrogation or interview, is useful to PSYOP media programmers. As noted before, however, it must be considered together with other data.[15]

Measuring the Effects of Communication

Variables

Measuring the effects of PSYOP communication is, of course, primarily of interest to commanders, planners, and communicators. The effect of communication is directly related to its purpose. It is difficult to learn the effect of persuasive communications, especially about targets in hostile areas, because, apart from the question of audience accessibility, media

effects are so diffuse and so variable in character that they defy simple analysis or uniform description. A complete inventory of the prerequisites needed to measure effects of PSYOP programs is yet to be formulated. In this regard, de Grazia presents some idea of the complexity:

> . . . responses to communications may be specific or general in nature; they may be of short or long duration; they may be of high or low intensity. In some instances a communication may produce a significant change in attitude with no accompanying change in observable behavior. In other instances, behavior appears to change markedly without any appreciable change in attitudes. Some intended effects may be produced in some people by carefully planned messages. In other audiences, the same messages may produce precisely opposite effects, or no effects at all. In short, the question that is of most interest to the psychological warfare operator, namely, that as to the target's intellectual and emotional responses to his messages, *is still largely unanswered by students of the human sciences.*[16] (Emphasis added.)

Although assessment is difficult, the data-gathering techniques and procedures discussed in the previous paragraphs are relevant in discovering whether communication media stimulated behavior or had a measurable effect on restructuring attitudes. As stated previously, it is important to consider attitudes as gradients or points along a continuous scale.

In analyzing the effect of PSYOP communication and strategy, there are many considerations. A partial list of the variables includes:

a. The type and location of the target
b. The number and variety of channels open to the target
c. The degree of program saturation over the various channels. (It is apparent that a PSYOP campaign that is given unlimited media support and money is likely to have greater impact than a limited effort.)
d. The degree to which the messages conform to group standards.

The techniques discussed in regard to target analysis and communication testing are applicable in measuring the effect of PSYOP programs. Where possible, a combination of data-gathering techniques should be employed. Some social psychologists profess that it is rarely possible to predict action behavior from "paper and pencil" (survey) responses. However, Samuel Flowerman maintains that:

> since all measurements, even in the physical sciences, are indirect measurements, we commit no violence to scientific method by urging additional criteria for estimating effectiveness of protolerance propaganda. . . . (Perhaps effectiveness in social psychology is like infinity in mathematics; we may approach it but never attain it. Yet this does not stop us from making progress.) . . . . We can accept as evidence the satisfaction of a reasonable number and kinds of criteria of effectiveness. Such reasoning would also enable us to make better comparisons between two different sets of propaganda symbols.[17]

Criteria of Effectiveness

Six indicators of the effectiveness of PSYOP will be discussed.

1. *Immediate Recall.* Other things being equal, the content of messages that are immediately recalled is more effective than that of messages that are not recalled (forgotten).

However, it appears that unfavorable messages as well as highly favorable messages are liable to be remembered.

2. *Delayed Recall.* Other things being equal, PSYOP messages that are remembered for a long time after exposure are more effective; usually the longer it is recalled the more effective the message.

3. *Repetition.* Other things being equal, messages that are repeated to others are more effective than those that are not so repeated. This can be developed further to take into account the circumstances of repetition, the number and kind of persons repeating the message, chains of repetition, and accuracy of repetition.

4. *"Paper and Pencil" Behavior (Attitude Surveys).* A significant measurement of the effectiveness of PSYOP messages and programs can be obtained from the responses to well-constructed questionnaires (surveys) and the development of appropriate scales for measuring key indicators of attitudes. For example, questions pertaining to the key attitude indicators would be included in a programed survey for a particular social group or geographical area, and the data would be collected prior to the initiation of the PSYOP program. After the data are collected, PSYOP target and effect analysis personnel would retrieve the data on the attitude indicators and it would be indexed according to an appropriate scale. This would represent an attitude rating prior to the initiation of the PSYOP program. Subsequent surveys conducted at appropriate intervals during the campaign would provide information about the progress or lack of progress concerning attitude change.

5. *Physical Response to a Message.* It was emphasized that the primary purpose of PSYOP is to influence the behavior of the audience; therefore, positive audience action is the final indicant of the effectiveness of PSYOP communication. When specific action, such as writing letters, voting, or defecting, is called for, and takes place, then the effectiveness of a given item of communication (or campaign) becomes apparent, although, of course, it must be demonstrated that the action was motivated by the message and not by some other factor in the situation. Sometimes, PSYOP messages serve as stimulants for future action.

6. *Content Analysis.* Indicators of PSYOP effectiveness can often be obtained from a content analysis of the monitoring of radio communication, newspapers and other publications, captured documents, enemy propaganda, and in-depth interviews and other intelligence reports.

CONCLUSION

In sum, PSYOP intelligence is vitally important to the development and the implementation of meaningful PSYOP programs. It is used to obtain current information about PSYOP targets, to test or obtain feedback with regard to message content and format, and to measure the effect of PSYOP messages and programs.

NOTES

1. Wilbur Schramm, *Mass Media and National Development* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 177.

2. Oriana Fallaci, " 'The Americans Will Lose' Says General Giap," *Washington Post,* Section V, April 6, 1969.

[3] Daniel Lerner, *Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D-Day to V-E Day (New York: George W. Stewart, Inc., 1949), pp. 135–136.*

[4] The terms "target analysis" and "audience research" are used in this report synonymously.

[5] See Phillip P. Katz, "PSYOP and Communication Theory," (Chapter II of this casebook).

[6] Ibid.

[7] United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, "Guide for Psychological Operations," April 27, 1968, p. IV–9.

[8] Alfred de Grazia, *Target Analysis and Media in Propaganda to Audiences Abroad* (ORO–T–222) (Chevy Chase, Md.: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, 1953), p. 57.

[9] Opinion Research Corporation, "The People of South Vietnam: How They Feel About the War," a CBS News Public Opinion Survey (Princeton, N.J.: Opinion Research Corporation, 1967 p. 1.

[10] Ibid., p. 3.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Thomas C. Sorensen, *The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 77.

[13] The panel design is the most vital component of the process. For an evaluation of the panel-impact design, see Donald Campbell and Keith N. Clayton, "Avoiding Regression Effects in Panel Studies of Communication Impact," *Studies in Public Communication,* 1961, no. 3, pp. 99–117.

[14] Office Memorandum. United States Government. From Colonel Johnston to Mr. Giebuhr, Subject: Evaluation Report, Leaflets. Evaluation of Leaflet SP–1069 September 1, 1966.

[15] There have been a number of studies dealing with techniques for pretesting leaflets. See H. C. Bush, *Pretesting PSYOPS Leaflets in Vietnam* (Honolulu, Hawaii, 1968).

[16] de Grazia, *Target Analysis,* p. 55.

[17] Samuel H. Flowerman, "Mass Propaganda in the War Against Bigotry," *Journal of Social Psychology,* XLII (1947), pp. 436–437. (Emphasis added.)

PSYOP Intelligence Requirements

Initial treatment in the intelligence portion of this chapter is given to intelligence requirements for psychological operations, specifically, the role of intelligence, planning requirements, language and interpretation, and, finally, timeliness.

The role of intelligence in PSYOP is similar to the overall role of intelligence in military operations. Although conceptually narrower—clearly, PSYOP intelligence concerns only that information relevant to PSYOP and excludes all other military intelligence—the intelligence potentially useful for effective psychological operations covers an extremely wide range of subject matter, probably broader than that useful for any other military task. This is evidenced by the EEI for PSYOP intelligence.

The role of doctrine and policy in PSYOP intelligence is to place limits on methods or sources, or to provide guidance with respect to the utilization of certain methods or sources. Doctrinal constraints are important, but our involvement in Vietnam clearly indicates that more emphasis needs to be placed upon the refinement and modification of doctrine and policy based upon experience in the field. (See Chapter III.)

The solution of the language usage problem can be the difference between successful and unsuccessful PSYOP campaigns. It is essential to use the idiom correctly. (See Chapter V and Martin F. Herz, "Lessons From VC/NVA Propaganda," Chapter VI.) It is also necessary to insure that the dialect is properly selected for the target group. The context of the language as used must also be proper in the minds of the target audience. The role of research in assuring these factors is to validate the use of the language, idiom, and dialect. Native language facility on the part of PSYOP personnel is highly desirable, but hardly ever exists; therefore, the use of interpreters is common. There are many problems associated with utilization of such an intermediary, among which are accuracy, target audience perception of the intermediary, and social position of the intermediary.

Timeliness is a major factor in both the production and the content of intelligence. While old data are not necessarily invalid data, constant vigilance must be exercised to insure that changes have not in fact invalidated intelligence material. For many categories of PSYOP intelligence—categories relating to the culture and economy of the audience, for example—change will not be rapid.

PSYOP depends upon adequate intelligence. Without it, adequate targeting, choice of the optional channel of communications, and message selection can never be systematically attained.

PSYOP ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION*

BY THE 7TH PSYOP GROUP

This enumeration of the PSYOP EEI analyzes the information required for effective PSYOP planning and comments on current military information collection activities relevant to psychological operations.

SUMMARY

Psychological operations research and analysis entails three major functions: Analysis of the target area; propaganda analysis; and evaluation of PSYOP media output through pre-testing and post-testing, and determination of reactions of inhabitants of the target area. Psychological operations research and analysis has particular information requirements which are different from those of combat and tactical intelligence. Briefly, psychological operations intelligence research and analysis needs to know about what it is like to live in the target area, about all aspects of life there so that psychological operations media output (leaflets, radio broadcasts, loudspeaker broadcasts, and so forth) can be developed which are suitable for the target area. This particular approach requires a large amount of detailed information about the life patterns and living conditions of people in various occupations and social levels in the target area.

*From "PSYOP Intelligence Notes," No. 62, by the Target Analysis Section, 7th PSYOP Group, 3 December 1968.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

At present information collection by military components is mostly centered around the obtaining and reporting of information about strictly military subjects. Only a small part of this kind of information has been found satisfactory for use in support of psychological operations. This brief guide tells the kinds of information which are useful in support of psychological operations. The following is a suggested list of PSYOP essential elements of information:

Social Organization. Composition of the society by ethnic group, age, sex, occupation, role, status, and so forth. Distribution of people by occupation and territorial location (that is urban, towns, villages). The family in the society. Method of reckoning kinship in the society (names of relationships used). Social stratification—levels, ranks, classes, and prerogatives, duties and privileges of each social level. Tensions between social groups. Methods of social control. Attitudes of each class. Suitable psychological operations messages, themes, and techniques. Best delivery techniques for psychological operations messages for each group. Accessibility of each group to PSYOP media output.

Daily Routine. Specify in detail all activities performed by a person on normal work days and on special days, giving approximate timetable, including the hours for rising and retiring, beginning and ending work, preparing and taking meals, time spent in recreation, meetings, shopping, cooking, washing, cleaning and conversation. Include seasonal variations, for example, the farmer's year may be broken down into the periods of preparation of fields, planting, growing season, harvesting, and the off season. Different routines for people in various occupations such as farmers, factory workers, miners, school children, army personnel, government workers, and administrative personnel at various levels; men, women, and children may have different patterns.

Habitual Customs. Habits in the individual's household with regard to food, sleep, bodily functions and cleanliness, and all forms of normal or customary behavior. Gestures. Postures. Bodily positions.

Etiquette. Standards of behavior and actual or normal behavior in relations between individuals, including with other members of the farm household and village, fellow factory workers, officials in higher positions, and the like. Include salutations, forms of address, special gestures, rules of hospitality, and politeness toward others in accordance with rank, age, sex, and relationship. Special forms of behavior and treatment of higher officials, old people, children, fellow workers.

Training and Education. Treatment and training of children. Children's activities. Nurseries, kindergartens, primary, and secondary schools—age of attendance, activities, subjects, text books, and other pertinent matters. Acquisition of traditional cultural patterns. Training in bodily habits, postures, language. Manifestations of fear, anxiety, and affection in children, and how handled by adults.

Life Cycle of Individuals. Conception, contraception, pregnancy, abortion, birth, infanticide, suckling, and naming. Childhood. Puberty. Adolescence. Sexual practices—including normal patterns and development, deviations from normal development, frigidity, impotence, bestiality, prostitution. Courtship. Age at marriage. Betrothal. Types of marriages and ceremonies. Divorce. Adulthood. Old age. Death. Suicide. Burial technique and disposal of the dead, including normal deaths, dead from epidemics, soldiers in war, enemy soldiers, infants, and other related matters. Ceremonies held at various stages of life cycle, including birth, transition from puberty to adulthood, marriage, attainment of old age (for example, 60th birthday in Korea), death, burial, and post-burial.

Political Organization. Systems and types of government at national, regional, provincial, township, and village levels. Political leadership and organizations at all levels. Prerogatives of leaders, special treatment. Obligations of leaders. Councils. Quasi-political associations, units, and organizations. Crime, law, and justice.

Economic Organization. Property. Types of property (real estate, household and occupational equipment, personal effects, ritual objects, foodstuffs, livestock). Rights to utilization of property. Inheritance. Land tenure. Production (industry, trade, agriculture, herding, fishing, hunting, and collecting). Seasonal variations of production. Participants in production. Complaints and stresses of people engaged in production. Organization of work. Distribution of products of the various forms of production. Stores and shops at all levels. Availability and scarcity of food and consumer goods. Stocks and prices of goods. Farmers markets. Monetary system. Remuneration for labor. Consumption of items produced, for instance, final uses. Rationing systems. Attitudes of people to all of above.

Ideological and Religious Beliefs and Practices. Beliefs about men and about the supernatural. Ceremonies, rituals, meetings, and detailed description of proceedings. Sacred or venerated objects. Culture heroes. Myths. Religious organizations and societies. Secret societies. Beliefs associated with warfare.

Knowledge. Methods of recording and communications (writing systems, languages, dialects, tape recorders, shorthand systems, motion pictures, photography). Methods of counting and reckoning. Measures of weights, distance, surface, capacity, time, and value. Seasons, weather, and climate. History and myths. Culture heroes. Stories, songs, and sayings.

Communications. TV and radio communications (numbers and types of broadcasting facilities). numbers, types, and distribution of receivers. Wire-diffusion systems. Publishing of books, magazines, of newspapers and their distribution. Literacy. Availability of foreign language published materials. Motion picture industry (languages, types of films, and distribution). Languages and types of recorded materials. Public information organizations in area and content of media. Censorship. Attitude,

reaction, and credibility of people to indigenous public information. Distribution of non-indigenous propaganda materials (leaflets, radio broadcasts, and loudspeaker broadcasts). Attitude, reaction, and credibility among local people. Numbers of people who listen to or see non-indigenous propaganda. Word-of-mouth communication and gossip systems. Meetings, speech making, and other modes of information dissemination. Postal system. Telephone system. Telegraph and teletype systems.

Personal Care and Decoration. Cleanliness. Perfumes. Sanitation. Personal apperance (hair-dressing, nails, teeth, cosmetics, tattoos, clothing, personal ornaments, recognition marks, and visible symbols of rank, emblems and badges, membership in organizations, status).

Housing. Patterns of housing in cities, towns, and villages. Description of interiors and exteriors of houses. Lists of and placement of all objects found in each room and in and around houses. Functions of each room of a house or apartment and facilities near the dwelling. Ownership of houses. Who lives in houses—family relationship. Assignment of houses. Arrangement of houses in villages. Other structures in villages. Urban dwellings—houses, apartments, and rooms. Relation of dwelling to place of employment. Shortage of houses. Attitude of people to housing.

Food. Foods and their preparation. Seasonal variations. Availability of food and drink. Preservation and storage of food. Cooking techniques. Nature and times of all meals. Condiments. Special customs. Rationing of food. Forbidden food. Food preferences. Water and other liquids consumed—source, availability, and preparation. Stimulants and narcotics. Attitudes of the people relating to all of the above.

Travel and Transportation. Modes of travel and transportation. Vehicles. Routes and roads. Restrictions and documentation related to travel and transportation. Resettlement of population. Migration.

The Arts. Drawing, painting, sculpture, music, musical instruments, dancing, singing, literature, poetry, drama, games, and amusements. Descriptions of the preceding. When and where do they take place? Sponsorship of such activities.

Health and Sanitation. Medical Practices. Modern and traditional medical techniques. Personal hygiene. Training of practitioners. Medical organization and system. Availability of medical service and supplies at all levels. Attitude and reaction of people to medical services.

THE NVA SOLDIER IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS A PSYOP TARGET*

BY THE JUSPAO PLANNING OFFICE

The presence of soldiers in a country other than that of their origin, even when this country of deployment has had a long history of close cultural contact with their country of origin, offers a variety of themes to PSYOP unavailable for use against indigenous forces.

*Excerpts from PSYOPS POLICY, No 59, 20 February 1968 JUSPAO Planning Office, Saigon, Republic of Vietnam.

PROBLEM

To focus PSYOP more effectively on the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) soldier in South Vietnam; devise surrender or defection appeals for dissemination to NVA units in South Vietnam (SVN); and provide field personnel with information on the most recent vulnerabilities and deterrents to surrender or defection in the psychological makeup of the NVA soldier.

DISCUSSION

The North Vietnamese soldier in South Vietnam presents a particularly difficult target for GVN/US PSYOP aimed at inducing surrender or defection. He has a relatively high state of indoctrination, reinforced by a range of psychological controls wielded by the cadre which include self-criticism sessions, the three-man cell, and the endless repetition of communist themes. A contributory reason for the resistance of the NVA soldier to Chieu Hoi inducements is that unlike the Viet Cong, defection for most does not hold the promise of an early family reunion.

Moreover, unlike the VC guerrilla who may be a teenager conscripted from his hamlet environment by VC "recruiters" and sent into battle without much party schooling and political indoctrination, the NVA soldier is the product of a closed, totalitarian society, subjected to communist indoctrination from his earliest school days. This makes him more resistant as a PSYOP target. Unlike the VC he finds himself fighting in a region unfamiliar and semi-antagonistic to him, usually in relatively uninhabited areas and with little chance for contact with the civilian population.

There are three options that should be pointed out to him in US/GVN PSYOP messages:

The first is to rally, take advantage of the Chieu Hoi program and in short order become a free citizen of the RVN. (Until further notice, only defection appeals as outlined in PSYOP Policy #57 of 8 Feb 68 are to be observed.)

Second is to surrender as a prisoner of war and await repatriation at the end of the war in the safety and relative comfort of a prisoner of war camp.

As a third alternative, until the opportunity of either rallying or surrendering may present itself, NVA soldiers should be counseled to devote all their efforts to individual survival rather than getting killed or maimed for an unjust cause. Malingering, the avoidance of risks, passive resistance to the exhortations of the cadre should be stressed as a way to survive the war. Even a partial success in this PSYOP effort will contribute to shortening the war by reducing the combat effectiveness of NVA units.

While a decision to rally will be personally more advantageous to the individual, it may involve too direct a renunciation of country, family and all past training to form the substance of a viable PSYOP appeal in every

instance. Whichever of the alternatives are offered to NVA soldiers in our PSYOP messages, the vulnerabilities which they exploit remain the same.

The NVA as a PSYOP Target

. . . . The most recent study shows that the age of infiltrators has dropped significantly. Prior to 1966, the most frequent age at infiltration was 22 years, with a lesser age peak for cadre at 25. By mid–1967 the age distribution had changed to a very sharp concentration at 19 with a much lesser age peak (again cadre) at 26 years. Further age drops are indicated. For instance, prisoners captured in July 1967 stated that 60 NVA replacements received by the battalion in June had all been 16 or 17 years old. Moreover, the composition of the NVA force has undergone a change from a majority of volunteers to over 70 percent draftees or former servicemen recalled to duty.

There is also some indication that soldiers with relatives in the South were included for the first time among the infiltrators, by mid–1967, although no estimate of their number is available. Previously, the NVA avoided sending to the South men whose immediate families regrouped to the South in 1954.

These factors would appear to reduce to some degree the responsiveness of the latest NVA infiltrators to cadre propaganda and provide greater opportunity for exploitation of vulnerabilities by US/GVN PSYOP techniques.

Vulnerabilities

The vulnerabilities themselves have not changed significantly over the past two years but they may have been intensified somewhat due to the change in the makeup of the force.

Separation from families, the hardships of infiltrations, fear of allied arms, and perhaps most significantly, the contrast between what they have been told by the cadre and what they experience themselves, are major exploitable weaknesses. For example:

NVA soldiers, told that most of South Viet Nam is already "liberated," come South and find that they must hide in the jungle and are stalked continuously by the heavy weapons of their adversaries.

They have been told by the cadre that the side which controls the people will win the war and that the VC have already won the support of more than two-thirds of the people and control four-fifths of the land. But instead of being welcomed by the people, NVA soldiers find that they must live in hiding, cut off from the people, who are sullen and seek to avoid contact with them. the recent NVA-VC Tet offensive, which failed in its aim to induce a general uprising, reinforces this vulnerability.

They have been force-fed in training and throughout the constant indoctrination sessions with tales of NVA/VC victories and GVN/U.S. defeats. According to the cadre, Americans have low morale and fighting

skill, cannot stand the climate, think only of going home. ARVN troops are reported to be poor fighters who are despised by the people. In the face of these optimistic forecasts, NVA soldiers find that they are subjected to incessant pounding and that the VC units to which they are attached or with which they operate are forever withdrawing from areas or hiding in the jungle.

They are told that the Americans, like the French before them, have enslaved the people, who are living in misery, exploited by the colonialists and the landlord class. These are the lackeys of the Americans and compose the puppet government in Saigon. Instead, on the rare occasions that NVA troops come in contact with the civilian population, they find them relatively well off, in possession of more material goods than are available in the North, and not interested in being 'liberated.' Though US/GVN media messages are in part discounted because of the training and indoctrination of NVA soldiers, our PSYOP products with which they come into occasional contact (leaflets, radio broadcasts, posters) may also give them pause for thought if they project convincingly an image of SVN well-being and confidence.

The party's concern for the soldiers is a standard indoctrination topic, the gist being that the party and the country are proud of the fighter who will be given a hero's welcome when he returns after the Americans are driven out, or if wounded along the way, he will be well taken care of, or if killed in battle, he will die a hero's death and will be buried with honor and live forever in the grateful memory of his countrymen. But NVA soldiers fear that they will get little care if wounded, might even be left behind on the battlefield, and if killed, might be hastily buried in unmarked graves, which their families will never find. They have this fear because they know that this is what happened to some of their comrades, contrary to what they had been taught to expect.

There is almost no mail connection with their families in the North. While several years ago letters could be sent to immediate families without limitation, latest interrogations state that only one letter on a single sheet can be sent North every six months, and mail from the families is similarly sparse, censored, and uncommunicative. This deprivation is intensely felt by the soldiers, most of whom despair of ever seeing their families again.

Deterrents

The endless repetition of the same communist themes by the cadre, by official publications and training documents, and in the cadre-managed self-criticism sessions sets up near automatic responses along the lines desired by the party, irrespective of objective reality. Because of this pattern, there is a tendency to reject Allied arguments out of hand. It is hard to break through to the NVA soldier with PSYOP messages because of this mental conditioning.

. . . .The capability of the party cadre to instill a spirit of self-sacrifice in

the minds of the troops is another of the strengths of its propaganda. To endure hardships, to be wounded or die for the just cause and live forever in the memory of the people as a hero of the revolution is a potent theme in talking to the young. By the time the trail and the hardships in the South have ground them down, they go on automatically. Each successive disillusionment alienates them further from the cause, but these doubts cannot be expressed to anyone, and with all the suffering and blood spilled for the cause, it is difficult for an NVA member to rationalize himself into defection.

A powerful cohesive element is the three-man cell system present throughout the NVA, by which political and disciplinary control is maintained. Though detested as a device to prove the cadre right most of the time, it serves the function of letting off steam, improving survival chances in combat, and responding to emotional needs as a kind of family substitute. But just as in the family group in a totalitarian state, innermost thoughts are kept to oneself.

Conclusion

While vulnerabilities among the NVA in South Viet Nam appear to be on the increase, units continue to show a remarkable degree of cohesion, largely due to the psychological controls and continuous group therapy (cell system, self-criticism sessions) to which they are exposed. However, according to the available evidence, NVA units and individual infiltrators are now younger and less conditioned than ever before. The effects of war weariness, disenchantment, and the nagging deprivations on these less seasoned troops should serve to make them a more promising PSYOP target than in the past.

GUIDANCE

In devising a PSYOP program aimed at NVA units and individual NVA infiltrators, both the elements of cohesion and the psychological vulnerabilities of the target audience will have to be taken into account. Whittling away at the indoctrinated response might be less productive in the short run than exploiting obvious vulnerabilities, but in the long run a weakening of the soldiers' psychological defenses, laboriously built by the cadre, may cause their entire world view to crumble. At any rate our approach should be in tandem. We deal here with the cohesive elements first, as they are harder to tackle.

Attacking Elements of Cohesion

The endless repetitions of communist themes of colonial oppression, liberation and revolutionary duty must be countered by patient, reasoned, and repetitive efforts to explain American policies and intentions in Vietnam simply and convincingly. That we seek no colonial status, no bases or special privileges, that we have solemnly stated we will withdraw when the Vietnamese people themselves have had a chance

to decide their own future without foreign pressure or interference, that the people of South Viet Nam need no liberation, that they are already free, with institutions chosen by majority rule, these are the points that need to be made continuously and persuasively.

The myth of cadre and party infallibility must be attacked over and over again by contrasting word with deed or fact. We must ask insistently whether the NVA soldier knows the real purpose of the three-man cell and the constant self-criticism sessions, namely to make him into a tool of his leaders and trick him into casting aside those doubts and hopes that do not correspond with the aims of the party. We must reassure him that his doubts and hopes are right that they are shared secretly by a majority of his comrades and openly by most of the world, and that the goals of the party are wrong, disruptive of harmony, destructive of family life, cruel, unjust, and therefore doomed to failure.

We must counter the mental conditioning against surrender or defection as a dishonorable act and the concomitant fear of mistreatment at GVN/U.S. hands, which have been drilled into NVA troops by their cadre. To do this effectively, we must provide potential ralliers both with a framework of sound rationalizations and detailed instructions on giving up the fight. We must persuade the NVA soldier that to surrender or rally will be neither dishonorable nor personally detrimental to him, on the contrary, that ending the bloodshed and suffering both individually and collectively, can only benefit the Vietnamese people.

Attacking Vulnerabilities

. . . . The vulnerabilities to be exploited are covered in some detail by the individual themes given below. In general they include separation from families, lack of mail, the daily hardships and risks which are particularly harsh on the unseasoned young troops now being brought into battle, poor or nonexistent medical care, and the wide contrasts between what they are taught to believe by the cadre and what they experience or see for themselves.

Now that there are indications that soldiers with relatives in the South are beginning to appear among the infiltrators, our range of PSYOP appeals should include some messages assuring reunion with these family members. A concerted effort should be made to identify NVA Hoi Chanh with relatives in the South and to obtain family reunion photos for use with these leaflets.

Different approaches should be used for PSYOP messages along the infiltration route and those to NVA units within the RVN. Trail leaflets might suggest ways to avoid service such as symptoms of grave sickness, straggling and desertion while still in North Vietnam.

THEMES

Attacking Vulnerabilities

Sympathize with the NVA soldier on the hardships he must undergo in

the South, give him credit for his courage and steadfastness, but prove to him that he has been misled, that the cause for which he is fighting is not just and not deserving the sacrifice of his young manhood. Couple with Chieu Hoi message.

* * * * *

Illustrate that NVA forces in the RVN face a formidable Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF) defense force, highly motivated because they are not attacking anyone else's territory but defending their own, equipped with the most modern weapons, aided by the most powerful nation in the world in an unbeatable combination. To avoid the death or mutilation which will become inevitable the longer he remains with the NVA or VC, offer the NVA soldier the advantages of the Chieu Hoi program.

* * * * *

Convey as often and as persuasively as possible the story of defeats suffered by NVA units in South Vietnam. Give credible details of these defeats and ask the recipient of the leaflet to reflect on his own whether or not the cadre are lying to him. Again, couple with surrender or Chieu Hoi appeals.

In case NVA soldiers do not have the opportunity to surrender or rally in the heat of battle, suggest that they permit themselves to be captured and provide full information on the treatment of prisoners of war by the GVN, including scrupulous observance of the Geneva Convention, ample food and medical care, educational and sports programs, mail privileges, Red Cross inspections and gifts, and eventual repatriation.

Remind NVA soldiers that they are wasting the best years of their lives away from families and friends in North Vietnam. Recall that the first NVA infiltrators were told in 1963 that South Vietnam would be "liberated" in that year. Pose the question of whether their sacrifice is justified and offer the Chieu Hoi program as an alternative.

* * * * *

Sympathize with the NVA soldiers' lack of working mail communication with their close families back home. Pose the question of whether the cadres do not want to keep them isolated from the world in order to shut out all unfavorable news and control them even more completely. Talk knowledgeably about their worry concerning the safety of relatives in the north, reiterate that only military targets are bombed by U.S. planes to make NVN stop its invasion of the South, but that the U.S. is cognizant that civilians living or working near military objectives may inadvertently suffer. State that their decision to rally or to get captured is an honorable way to shorten this bloody internecine war.

* * * * *

.... During future Tet seasons, utilize photos of ex-NVA soldiers enjoying life with a family in the South, grouped around a festive Tet table. Point up the complete disregard of the NVA/VC for Tet and its meaning as seen in the treacherous 1968 Tet offensive. The special family significance of Tet continues to have a hold on the emotions of NVA

members, and its celebration in the free South should be stressed. Offer the Chieu Hoi program as their way to a brighter future.

Attacking the Indoctrinated Response

The entire mental conditioning of NVA troops, pursued through political indoctrination sessions, the three-man cell system, and constant exhortation by the cadre, aims at achieving automatic responses reflecting the communist party view of world issues. This rote learning becomes a powerful cohesive element. It can be chipped at only by repeated discoveries that what has been studied and accepted as gospel truth does not accord with visible facts in the soldier's personal experience. We probably cannot hope to substitute printed arguments for personal experience, but can reinforce the secret doubts that may have been nagging typical target audience members.

We have to build confidence and reassure NVA soldiers that the secret doubts they have been harboring are correct and that they are secretly shared by their comrades. The three-man cell system is a cruel and dishonest game, we should tell them, to have them suppress legitimate doubts and make them putty in the hands of the cadre. Again, the Chieu Hoi program is a way to reassert that they are human beings instead of machines without a will of their own.

The themes of colonialism, U.S. aggression, SVN misery and exploitation, the hireling nature of the GVN, are the kinds that are drilled daily into NVA troops to trigger parrot responses and automatic rejection of contrary evidence. Our messages must whittle away at each of these themes.

We need to remind the NVA soldier continuously that although he is being told he is in South Vietnam to "liberate" his southern compatriots, the people do not need or want the kind of liberation he is ordered to bring them. He should be aware that he is rejected by the people whom he is sent to "liberate."

PSYOP messages should stress that the United States is not in South Vietnam for a colonialist purpose, but only to help the elected government to defend itself against aggression and the imposition of a communist system rejected by the majority. The United States is in Vietnam at the invitation of the GVN. It will leave when the GVN no longer requires U.S. assistance to defend itself and requests the departure of U.S. troops. United States leaders have stated America's intention to withdraw as soon as practicable after a settlement is reached with Hanoi.

The GVN and the United States have tried every possible way to get Hanoi to the conference table, but Ho Chi Minh and his government have not responded.

RVN prosperity and the development of representative institutions which give every man an opportunity to work, learn, and earn according to his free will and his personal ability instead of forever being told what to do, should be emphasized over and over again with photo illustrations where appropriate.

Repetitive use of messages showing plenty of consumer goods in the hands of the RVN people, such as private vehicles and appliances, plentiful food, entertainment and educational opportunities instead of the deprivation and drastic controls that are the rule in North Vietnam, should raise the question of which system performs better for the people.

Examples of the SVN National Assembly taking independent steps, reprimanding the government, or causing changes in government plans can be used to drive home odious comparisons with the totalitarian institutions of North Vietnam. Again, we should ask and answer: which regime serves the people better?

TRANSLATION PROBLEMS*

By Richard H. Orth

Although bilingual interactions will often escape precisely accurate translation, there are a number of steps the psyoperator can undertake to overcome or minimize this problem.

When the population studied speaks a foreign language, the problems of translation have to be faced. While it will not always be possible to obtain perfect translations, the PSYOP officer should strive to reach a reasonable approximation and to avoid known pitfalls. In some cases, the PSYOP officer may be fluent in the foreign language. In many instances he will have to rely on other U.S. Army or indigenous personnel who speak the local language or dialect. Some of the problems involved in translation and some solutions that have been developed by various researchers are considered below.

Problems of word meaning. In translations one seeks to get across the identical meaning from one language into another. There are several hurdles to the accomplishment of this end. A word may have two or more meanings. A word's meaning is affected and may be altered by the context. Words may carry the general meaning but differ in intensity—for example, "very good," "excellent," "outstanding." A word or statement carries with it a certain feeling tone and implied values and assumptions of which an outsider may not be aware.

Possible solutions to problems of word meaning. To counteract the above problems, the following methods have been developed on the basis of field experience. Two or more persons translate an item independently of each other so that any discrepancies can be checked and resolved.[1] "Back translations" are made. This means that in addition to the original translation from English into a foreign language, a retranslation is made by another person or persons into English. The original text and the "back translated" text should be practically identical in meaning. Any differences should then be resolved.[2] Translators should be especially sensitive to the intensity of a word. If time is available the translated wording can be tried out on some foreign nationals, and the interviewer may question them to see whether intended meanings come across. When

*Original essay by Richard H. Orth.

words and statements imply more than the direct literal translation, these implications must be spelled out.[3]

Problems of spoken versus written language. In every language, there are differences between the spoken and the written language. Such differences may reflect distinct functions; for example, the formal literary language may be used in legal and governmental relations, while the villagers discuss their problems among themselves in the vernacular or a dialect. Social class factors may be involved in the choice of words. Terms appropriate for legal matters may be quite unsuitable for a frank and unrestrained interview. In addition, certain items may be incomprehensible to local people. Although a word is listed in the dictionary, it may not be familiar to the rural dwellers. Such abstract concepts as "prestige," "problem," and "loyalty" may be meaningless to many rural people.[4]

Possible solutions to problems of spoken versus written language. To overcome the above difficulties, some solutions have been offered in social science literature. The use of persons familiar with the language or dialect is recommended. A try-out of the items is indicated with some persons who are as familiar as possible with the local language usage. In general, it would be well to keep in mind that rural people usually are not too familiar with the literary language. Therefore, it would be a good rule of thumb to use simple words and sentences in the translated text. Another practical solution is to use an illiterate translator immersed in the local culture who translates to a literate translator who in turn can write down the translation.[5] When unfamiliar concepts, for example, "prestige" or "loyalty" are to be translated, one may find a simpler synonym or define the term in simpler words.[6]

Problems of social context. The meaning of a word is affected not only by its place within a sentence or statement but also by the social and situational context in which it is spoken.

Possible solutions to problems of social context. To overcome these problems, it is advisable where possible to use personnel who have bicultural experience and can perceive the effects of the situation and the cultural setting of the words.[7]

Problems due to interviewers. Interviewers may influence the responses to a questionnaire or interview not only by their use of language but also by their personal effect on the respondent. For example, when city students from the capital are used to interview rural people, they may evoke a negative or suspicious set among the latter.

Possible solutions to problems due to interviewers. It has been proposed to have a native interviewer, even if he is illiterate, pose the questions and have the outside researcher (for example, a student) write down the responses. Another possiblity is to give a tape recorder to an illiterate local interviewer.

The quality of translations is limited by time, personnel, and budget. One cannot be certain of achieving ideal translations. One can, however, strive for a reasonable approximation of meaning by using the above suggestions within the given limitations.

When the respondents speak another language, the questions have to be translated. Translations should carry the precise meaning, yet often there is no one-to-one relationship of words in two languages. While the PSYOP officer may not find ideal conditions to solve these problems, a number of suggestions are offered to obtain reasonably accurate translations.

NOTES

1. Herbert P. Phillips, "Problems of Translation of Meaning in Field Work," *Human Organization*, XVIII, no. 4 (Winter 1959–60), pp. 184–192.
2. Eugene Jacobson, Hideya Kumata, and Jeanne E. Gullahern, "Cross-Cultural Contributions to Attitude Reasearch," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXIV (1960), pp. 205–223.
3. Phillips, "Problems of Translation."
4. Frederick W. Frey, "Surveying Peasant Attitudes in Turkey," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVII, (Fall 1963), pp. 335–355.
5. Susan Ervin, and Robert T. Bower, "Translation Problems in International Surveys," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XVI (1952), pp. 595–604.
6. Frey, "Surveying Peasant Attitudes."
7. Ervin and Bower, "Translation Problems."

TET IN VIET-NAM*

By Chuong Dac Long

Time is an important determinant in the receptivity of audiences to media as well as to messages. Analyses such as this one facilitate message composition and media selection.

The custom of celebrating Tet goes back to remote antiquity. Like many other Vietnamese traditions it was imported from China. . . . One of the best preserved rites of Tet is the celebration of the feast of the Jinni of the Home, on the 23rd day of the 12th month. This feast gradually lost its original meaning, even in China, and when it was imported into Viet-Nam, it underwent a profound change in the minds of the people and became simply a sentimental story.

The same may be said of nearly all the customs concerning Tet: originally they were imbued with lofty and precise philosophical significance, although usually disguised under a poetic parable. The incomprehension of later ages brought about profound transformation and alteration, and the customs became largely folk beliefs. They should be examined in this light, rather than rejected outright as beliefs of no value, unworthy of consideration. Nothing is more moving to Vietnamese than the permanence of these rites, they are like messages addressed to us by our ancestors from the distances of time.

*Excerpts from JUSPAO Field Memorandum, Number 31, November 28, 1966. JUSPAO Planning Office, Saigon.

One of the most characteristic customs of Tet consists in buying a flowering peach-tree branch that is placed in a vase for the duration of Tet. . . . Many people imagine that these branches have no other purpose than to add a graceful decoration to Vietnamese homes, and today, in fact, they have no other significance. Originally, however, they had the same effect as the *cay-neu* (a tall decorated pole erected before the house during Tet) and were used like them, to protect oneself from the visit of demons.

. . . According to the Chinese astrological calendar, time is circumscribed in revolutions of 60 years, divided into cycles of 12 years, each cycle containing 12 months, and the like. Years and months thus have the same names: there is the year *thin* (Dragon), just as there is the month *thin;* the year *ty* (Serpent), the month *ty*, the day *ty*, the hour *ty*, and the like.

A cycle of twelve years is placed under the sign of twelve supernatural powers (*hanh-khien*), some of whom are well-disposed and others hard and cruel. On the last night of the year, this power passes to the new power. The passing of service that is known as *giao-thua.*

In town and countryside, the head of each family; each mayor (*ly-truong*), each mandarin governing a province, the Emperor in his capital and all the pagodas, would offer a token sacrifice at the same moment to thank the old power *hanh-khien* and to welcome the new. This ceremony of *giao-thua* is performed in homes at midnight, the moment when the hour of the Pig (*gio hoi*) changes to that of the Rat (*gio ty*). It is carried out with great solemnity. In the old days it used to be accompanied by noisy and interminable fireworks and the beating of drums. This has given rise to the expression *"Trong keu ran nhu trong giao-thua"* ("A rolling of drums comparable to those of the giao-thua").

It is the custom at *giao-thua* for everyone to stay awake till morning so as to be prepared to welcome in the New Year. It is often amusing to see parents, as soon as the drums of the pagoda announce the arrival of the New Year, rush to wake up all the sleepy children in the house, sitting them up by force if necessary and, in spite of their cries and grumblings, so they too will not tempt fate by failing to observe this custom.

It is strictly forbidden to sweep the house (*after giaothua*) during the first day of the Tet. During the days that follow, sweeping is allowed but it is absolutely forbidden to gather up rubbish and throw it away.

. . . It is forbidden to touch a broom on this Tet day. Vietnamese children recite the following riddle: *"Trong nha co mot ba hay la liem,"* which means: "What person in the house scrounges all she wants?" The answer, of course is "The broom," it picks things up wherever it passes. The origin of the prohibition on removing household refuse is found in another Chinese legend. . . . .

. . . One of the customs concerning Tet has a curious resemblance to a practice taught by the Druids of ancient Gaul, who used to lead the people into the forest on the first day of the year seeking lucky branches of

mistletoe they would keep the following twelve months. The Chinese and Vietnamese are also expected to bring home from their first walk of the New Year a leafy branch, if possible covered with fruit and flowers (*canh-loc*). The heavier the branch, the greater will be the riches (*loc*) earned during the coming year. Today this belief has become a reason for people to go for walks in public gardens or the Vietnamese countryside.

. . . It is generally supposed that Tet in Viet-Nam begins on the first day of the first month of the lunar New Year. This is true in general, but there is an exception in certain provinces (Hadong, Son Tay and Thai Nguyen), where Tet is celebrated later, during the first month. This custom dates from the reign of the Emperor Tu-Duc and is thus 70 or 80 years old. We have heard of an explanation given by certain old men, survivors of this heroic period. Emperor Tu-Duc's reign was marked by numerous uprisings and especially by frequent raids by Chinese "black flag" pirates. These pirates knew that the Vietnamese, like the Chinese, were in the habit of holding sumptuous celebrations at Tet. This offered them a good occasion to loot, burn, rape and massacre the inhabitants of the coast. After several years of this treatment, the people got together and decided to adopt the practice of *Tet cung*, or "Delayed Tet." During the days when other Vietnamese were celebrating joyfully, these people would bury their valuables, leave their homes and hide in the woods and mountains. The arriving pirates, finding nothing of interest to them, would conclude that the region was so poor that its inhabitants could not even observe Tet. A few days later, the villagers would return and hold their feasts in peace, finding their pleasure even greater for the delay. They became so used to this "delayed Tet" that they continued the custom.

PSYOP Intelligence Sources

The sources of intelligence for psychological operations are several and varied. As Phillip Katz has indicated,[1] primary sources are (1) prisoners of war, (2) defectors and refugees, (3) the civilian population, and (4) broadcasts. Other sources, of different levels of importance, include (5) captured documents, (6) enemy propaganda, (7) intelligence reports, and (8) published and unpublished reports.

In this part of the chapter are articles dealing with or illustrating intelligence production from these sources. The methods used to derive useful information from the sources—to "exploit the sources"—are covered in the following subsection, "PSYOP Intelligence Methods."

The use of prisoners of war or defectors as intelligence resources hardly requires comment here. This practice is almost as old as the concept of warfare. Refined psychological techniques for extracting information from prisoners of war have been available for a number of years and are applied with varying degrees of success by all elements of the armed forces. Treatment of defectors does not generally pose the information extraction problems encountered when handling POWs. However the problem of overstatement or understatement by the defec-

tor, for the explicit purpose of telling his new-found friends what he thinks they might want to hear, cannot be discounted.

Civilians—friendly, hostile, or neutral—are an important potential source of PSYOP intelligence, particularly when, as in insurgency situations, the civilian population may be the only group in constant contact with the insurgents on other than military terms. Interviewing and sampling, two major approaches to intelligence collection from the civilian populace, are discussed in the section of this chapter dealing with "PSYOP Intelligence Methods." Similarly, travellers from among the target audience can be an important source of information on audience attitudes (though the representativeness of their views may be suspect) as well as on socioeconomic and political intelligence.[2]

Radio broadcasts within target areas are also a primary source of information. Monitoring such broadcasts—a newer source than those time-honored ones, such as prisoners of war and refugees—provides not only timely intelligence, but supplements, as well, the surveying of local newspapers, periodicals, and books to provide a good idea of the information locally available which helps shape the opinions of the audience.

Documents are sometimes narrowly defined as captured enemy secrets. This definition is far too narrow for intelligence purposes. Documents also include enemy-issued, or enemy-sponsored, public media pronouncements and communications to other governments. With respect to U.S. psychological operations, the amount of relevant information available from this source has often been overwhelmingly large, and therefore somewhat misused or unused. Advances in information storage and retrieval, as well as in content analysis, suggest that captured documents and public utterances of an enemy regime will be far more useful intelligence resources in future PSYOP campaign planning.

The use of original documentation as an intelligence assimilation method is historically one of the most successful techniques. It involves the careful analysis of written and verbal enemy messages. Capture of documents provides an analysis source that is usually too large in volume to process well. Major problems involve screening captured documents to select those which have the highest potential impact, reliability, and accuracy [3] and correlating analyses which might be based upon different and conflicting documents.

Propaganda can often appear in the form of enemy documents. In other cases, however, propaganda may take the form of rumors or other communications. (See Chapter VIII.) Enemy propaganda is one of the most fertile fields for PSYOP intelligence.[4]

Additional data for the psyoperator are contained in intelligence reports produced by U.S. or friendly intelligence agencies. These are secondary resource materials (that is, they are derived from other sources, covert or overt).

Other published and unpublished studies, reports, and documents are the last major source of intelligence. These include reporting in news-

papers, periodicals, and other media; books; theses; government or private studies or internal documents; and research findings. Like intelligence reports, these sources are usually secondary in nature (though they may incorporate primary research materials), and, again like intelligence documents, this may or may not include analysis. Inclusion of analytical comment in source material can be dangerous, since the analyses may be (1) directed toward an objective dissimilar from the one for which the document is later utilized, (2) outdated, or (3) inadequate as a result of time constraints exercised on the production of the document for its original purposes.

Sources of PSYOP intelligence often present one or two opposite problems: inadequacy or superfluity. The psyoperator may find that not enough of his material is relevant, that it is outdated, or that there is simply not enough for his needs. On the other hand, there may be so much relevant intelligence data that his primary problem is in ordering and analyzing the data in the time allowed. In either case, the information that he decides to use must be analyzed. The methodologies open to the psyoperator for analysis of his intelligence data are discussed in the following section.

NOTES

1. Phillip P. Katz, "A Survey of PSYOP Intelligence," in the beginning of this chapter.
2. See, for example, Radio Free Europe, "East European Attitudes to the Vietnam Conflict: A Study in Radio Effectiveness" and "Identification with North or South Vietnam in Eastern Europe." both in Chapter IX of this casebook.
3. See U.S. Army, FM 30–5, *Combat Intelligence.*
4. See "Know Thine Enemy: Estimate of the Enemy Situation," Chapter V of Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T. R. Bohannan, *Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1962).

Prisoners of War

PW AND CAPTURED DOCUMENT DOCTRINE*

By John A. Hemphill

Newly captured prisoners of war and documents are important sources of information. To maximize usefulness, particularly in stability operations, interrogation and document translation should begin as soon as possible after capture.

The problem of what to do with prisoners of war (PW's) has perplexed military commanders from the beginning of recorded history.... In modern times, steps have been taken to eliminate brutality and to standardize PW treatment. However, one part of the PW subject has not changed over the centuries—the PW continues to be a valuable source of information and an important link in the production of intelligence.

*Excerpts from "PW and Captured Document Doctrine," *Military Review,* XLIV, no. 11 (November 1969), pp. 65–71.

For the modern U.S. Army, operations such as in Vietnam are a new experience. In contrast to the two World Wars and the Korean Conflict, there are no frontlines, no adjacent friendly divisions, and no rear areas containing an echelon of higher headquarters. Instead, there is a fluid battlefield with an elusive enemy. The command and control pattern has changed with brigade command posts usually located at such a distance from division headquarters that the brigades conduct virtually independent operations.

The subordinate battalions of the brigade, often widely separated, conduct small-unit operations to find the insurgent forces. When a significant insurgent force has been located, the brigade, and its battalions build up firepower and conduct a coordinated operation. However, these operations are generally brigade controlled and not the multiple-division coordinated operations envisioned for higher intensity warfare.

Operating on a fluid battlefield, the brigade and battlion commanders require fresh information to keep pace with the fast tempo of operations. Newly captured PW's and documents are important sources of this information as they have been in past conflicts. But the commander must have the capability to obtain this information before its timeliness is lost. This capability should be provided for in U.S. Army doctrine.

ADEQUATE DOCTRINE?

Doctrine contains the fundamental principles guiding military actions. These principles provide the guidelines for organization and equipment that determine capability and operational procedure. U.S. Army doctrine for brigade and ballation PW and captured document operations was conceived for general and limited war. Is the doctrine adequate for stability operations?

The characteristics of internal defense have changed the military operational pattern. In general and limited war, the military forces create their own operational environment. Both sides have established frontlines and rear areas. Progress is marked by the capture of key terrain features which usually results in the tactical defeat or destruction of the defending enemy forces. The brigade and battalion commanders plan their operations based upon terrain-oriented objectives and intelligence of the defending enemy. If the enemy gives up the objective without a fight, this is a "plus" and generally accelerates the operation. But the characteristics of stability operations are different.

In stability operations, there are no well-defined frontlines and rear areas. All areas are an actual or potential battleground. The objectives are the insurgent's forces, underground infrastructure, logistic support system, and support by the population. From the brigade and battalion point of view, the predominant differences from general and limited war are the fluidity of the battlefield and the difficulty in fixing the location of the insurgent forces.

In over-all terms, the insurgent is generally the weaker military force. He cannot afford a major battle with stability forces until he gains a preponderance of strength. The insurgent must use mobility, clandestine locations, and advantageous terrain to offset the stability force's superiority. His is a war of continuous movement dictated by the capability of the terrain and population to shield his location. To prevent annihilation, the insurgent must retain the capability to strike and then withdraw before his initiative is lost or the stability forces can employ their superior firepower against him.

DIFFERENT PROBLEM

The stability force commanders have a different problem. They must find the insurgent and maintain contact until their superior firepower can be built up and employed. In a war with frontlines, enemy withdrawal is a battlefield victory. In stability operations, the withdrawal is the insurgent's way of changing the location of the conflict to another area where he will have the advantage.

In stability operations, the brigade and battalion commanders do not achieve success by taking a terrain objective or forcing an adversary to retreat. Success is gained only through the complete destruction of the insurgent force. To destroy the quarry, contact must be maintained with an effective pursuit. However, the insurgent has a variety of options to conduct his withdrawal. To counter, the stability force commander needs immediate, up-to-date information on the enemy's plans and strength. The brigade and battalion commanders cannot wait the time required for higher headquarters to develop intelligence for their next operational phase. The information is needed immediately if relentless pursuit is to be initiated without hesitation.

EVALUATE SOURCES

Captured insurgents, refugees, and defectors are firsthand, last-minute observers of the adversary's operations and plans. Also, documents and personal letters often are a valuable source of recent information. However, capture is not enough. The brigade and battalion commanders must have the available capability to screen, interrogate, translate, and evaluate their sources immediately after capture in order to obtain timely information. An hour's delay, especially when operating in difficult terrain or under the cover of darkness, is often enough time for the insurgent to slip away.

In Vietnam, it [was] not uncommon for a unit to spend over 90 percent of operational time searching for, and less than 10 percent fighting, the insurgents. Most contacts [were] broken by the insurgents under the cover of darkness. Prisoners and documents are of limited immediate value to the battalion commander who does not have the organic or attached capability to interrogate or translate thoroughly.

The U.S. Army's doctrine sets the guidelines for a commander's operational procedures and outlines his operational capability. This does not imply that the commander cannot use initiative and ingenuity, but doctrine places a limit on these attributes. To be effective, doctrine must conform and change with the operational environment.

U.S. Army doctrine concerning PW's is based upon the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949 (GPW) which prescribes the humane treatment of captives.

* * * * *

When U.S. military combat units were introduced into Vietnam in 1965, the U.S. command in Saigon announced that its soldiers would follow the GPW in the treatment of captives. This establishes the precedent for U.S. Army PW doctrine for stability operations to be based upon the GPW's principles.[1]

OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES

The objectives and principles of current U.S. Army PW doctrine are concerned with assisting friendly operations within the limits implied by the laws of land warfare to include the GPW. These objectives and principles set the goals and parameters for PW operations and guide the development of doctrine. These objectives are:

- Acquisition of maximum intelligence information within restrictions imposed by the law of land warfare.
- Prevention of escape and liberation.
- Promotion, through example, of proper treatment of U.S. personnel captured by the enemy.
- Weakening the will of the enemy to resist capture.
- Maximum use of PW's and civilian internees as a source of labor.

The principles are:

- Humane treatment.
- Prompt evacuation from the combat zone.
- Provisions of opportunity for prisoner interrogation.
- Instruction of troops in the provisions of international agreements and regulations relating to PW's and civilian internees.
- Integration of the procedures for evacuation, control, and administration of PW's and civilian internees with other combat service support operations.

With the exception of objectives regarding use of PW's as labor, these objectives and principles apply to the brigade and subordinate units. For brigade and battalion stability operations, there are contradictions between the second and third principles. The principle of providing for PW interrogation is primarily aimed at division and above. However, it does have applications to PW evacuation and control at all levels. In general, the objectives and principles are satisfactory for internal defense situations, but not all current U.S. Army PW doctrine developed within these guidelines is adequate for brigade and subordinate unit-level stability operations.

Prisoners are usually captured by the battalion's frontline troops. The doctrinal guidance to the capturing forces is to disarm and then to perform the five "S's"—search, silence, segregate, safeguard, and secure. During the search phase, the PW's and documents are tagged with a card giving pertinent facts concerning the capture. The documents are forwarded to the battalion intelligence officer (S2) and the prisoners are evacuated to the battalion PW collection point.

This doctrinal guidance is sound and simple to follow. Emphasis is placed upon preventing escape and evacuation to a place of less danger for interrogation. However, because of the quick evacuation and lack of interrogation capability, the company commander does not obtain the needed timely information.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

The company commander does not have an organic intelligence support capability, but the battalion has this capability in the intelligence officer and intelligence sergeant. The primary function of both is to advise the battalion and subordinate commanders on enemy intelligence and information, but neither is required to have the capability to interrogate PW's or to translate documents. This requires special qualifications—interrogator and interpreter—that are not organic to the combat battalion. The emphasis is to evacuate PW's and documents as quickly as possible to brigade and division for interrogation or translation. The principal tactical interrogation of PW's and evaluation of documents take place at division level.

The field army, or equivalent level headquarters, military intelligence (MI) battalion provides each division with an MI detachment. This detachment has the mission of providing specialized intelligence and counterintelligence functions which require special skills in the utilization of foreign languages.

The detachment includes an interrogation prisoner of war (IPW) section with interrogation and document translation capability. Although division is the tactical focal point for PW operations, the normal procedure is to attach IPW teams to committed brigades. This provides the capability to conduct formal interrogations and to scan documents for tactical information. The IPW teams are a valuable asset to the brigade commander and his staff.

Depending upon the number of interpreters, the IPW team usually consists of approximately four to eight people. The number of personnel limits the team's ability to screen and determine accurately the true intelligence value of each PW and document. The thorough analysis must be left to higher echelon where time is lost in transit, processing, and dissemination of the gained intelligence. When this intelligence arrives at the brigade and battalion level, it has become history and is of little [tactical] value.

SPECIALIZED OPERATIONS

U.S. Army doctrine envisions the temporary attachment of IPW personnel below the brigade level for specialized operations. But this is not encouraged. Also, the battalion commander may request brigade IPW teams to come forward to interrogate selected PW's before being evacuated from the battalion operational area. This has advantages in that the brigade interrogators should be familiar with the battalion's operation, and the PW's information should be up to date.

If IPW support cannot be obtained, the doctrinal guidance is for battalion and subordinate commanders to rely on assigned noninterrogator personnel who have a language capability and some interrogator experience. There is unlikely to be any personnel in a combat battalion with a significant interrogator or indigenous language capability. When required, battalion and lower units probably will be provided an interpreter. This appears to be a satisfactory solution, but much depends upon the capability of each individual interpreter. Logically, the better trained and more capable interpreters will be placed in higher priority assignments than with a combat battalion.

Interrogation is an art requiring special training in questioning and examining an individual. To be most effective, the interrogation of a PW should begin as soon as possible after capture. Being captured, even voluntarily, is a harrowing experience. At this time, the PW can be expected to talk more freely and to lack the ability to remember security lessons. To exploit this vulnerability, the interrogator should begin his examination with minimum delay.

PW interrogation and document translation immediately after capture would enhance the brigade and battalion capabilities to conduct a rapid pursuit and other operations with the least possible hesitation. To eliminate delay in obtaining this enemy information, the battalion and the brigade commander require an adequate IPW capability that will meet their stability operations requirements.

The U.S. Army's doctrinal principle of prompt evacuation from the combat zone states:

> Prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger.... Prisoners of war shall not be unnecessarily exposed to danger while awaiting evacuation from a fighting zone.[2]

Any point is a likely point of insurgent attack to include PW collecting points, higher headquarters, and PW compound locations. The GPW principles must be followed, but should be interpreted in accordance with the type conflict involved. GPW does not prohibit retaining a PW at brigade, battalion, or lower level for interrogation unless the PW would be subjected to danger from known or suspected combat. Unless there is continuous fighting, the point of conflict in a stability operation is difficult to predict. The brigade and battalions should not maintain PW compounds or hold documents for excessive periods. Both should be

evacuated to higher headquarters as soom as the command's tactical requirements are fulfilled.

In reevaluation of current doctrine, the emphasis must be placed upon the characteristics of internal defense conflicts and operational requirements of stability forces. The key to success in brigade and battalion stability operations is the capability to destroy the insurgents. This capability would be greatly enhanced with a PW and captured document doctrine conceived in context with the distinctive characteristics of internal defense stability operations.

NOTES

1. The United States, the Republic of Vietnam, and North Vietnam have ratified the GPW. Both the United States and the Republic of Vietnam are following the agreement's provisions while North Vietnam and the Viet Cong have refused to apply the GPW. The Vietnamese Communists have taken the position that they are not a signatory to the convention. North Vietnam contends that U.S. pilots captured in their territory are criminals and subject to North Vietnamese laws.

2. Field Manual 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 18 July 1966, p. 39.

Defectors

A NORTH KOREAN DEFECTOR*

BY the 7TH PSYOP GROUP

Defectors, agents, and prisoners of war can be a useful source of PSYOP intelligence. In this essay the defector provided information which could help (1) enhance communicator credibility, (2) lead to recommendations for operational changes to increase effectiveness, and (3) update available target group information.

The source was a male, who graduated from a North Korean agricultural college, was a former member of a North Korean economic planning unit, came to the Republic of Korea in July 1969.

PSYOP TARGET GROUPS IN NORTH KOREA

Based upon his knowledge of conditions and of categories of people in North Korea, he suggested the following as suitable target groups for PSYOP directed against North Korea:

1. Workers in factories, enterprises, mines.
2. Farmers
3. Students
4. Intellectuals
5. Government office workers
6. Full-time Party office workers
7. Military personnel

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*From "PSYOP Intelligence Notes," Nos. 249, 254, 253, 252, 255, the 7th PSYOP Group, 5–13, April 1971.

8. Office workers at factories and enterprises
9. Fishermen
10. Agent trainees
11. Repatriates from Japan

Workers in Factories-Enterprises-Mines

According to the source, North Korea defines workers as people who engage in work in the industrial field and who receive wages based on this manual or physical effort. Also classified in this group are farm workers (*nongup rodongja*) who are employed at state-run farms and receive wages rather than work points, as do farmers on cooperative farms. In North Korea, "workers" are treated as a basic class and a nucleus of the state because they are responsible for production.

Workers and their families can be classified according to their backgrounds into these groups: (1) those who have worked in factories and mines during and since the Japanese occupation; (2) those who were former landlords and capitalists during the Japanese occupation and became workers after it; (3) those who were formerly middle and small businessmen; (4) those who had family members who had defected to the ROK since the liberation from the Japanese; (5) those who had supported UN Forces during the Korean War; (6) those who had been purged from high official North Korean posts on charges of anti-Party activities or factionalism; (7) repatriates from Japan; (8) those formerly engaged in low-level labor such as A-frame porters and peddlers.

North Korean authorities claim in indoctrination programs that workers are the basic class. When this is closely examined, it is seen that workers are composed of people with a wide variety of family backgrounds (*songbun*). The source said that while workers can be termed a key production group, they can by no means be designated as a political unit. Except for those who were workers during and since the Japanese occupation, workers in the other categories listed above are distrusted politically by North Korean authorities. All of these groups of workers have grievances against the North Korean Government because they know that they and their children will not make any progress where they work or in North Korean society. People who were workers under the Japanese occupation can get and hold positions at all levels and can certainly be, at least, work team chiefs who may not be engaged in direct manual or physical work. Members of the other groups can never become work team chiefs. Workers aspire to progress and become work team chiefs, management workers,or office workers, but only those workers in the first group, those who have worked in factories and mines during and since the Japanese occupation, have the possibility of achieving their aspirations. Workers in the other groups cannot progress to such positions even though educated and qualified for them. The reason is political distrust because of the family background of all the groups except those who were workers during and since the Japanese occupation. The source

estimated that no more than one out of every four workers had a favorable family background bacause of having been a worker during and since the Japanese occupation. Consequently, the chance to improve their position is denied to the majority of North Korean workers. Educated and qualified workers who might otherwise progress see less well-qualified workers with good family backgrounds rise to positions above them. This has been a continuing source of resentment.

Farmers

The source separated farmers in North Korea into four categories according to backgrounds: (1) farmers now farming and whose families have been farmers for generations; (2) farmers and their families and people who have been sent by the North Korean regime to work on farms because of unfavorable family backgrounds, especially people who had made false statements or entries during family background investigations; (3) former urban dwellers and their families who committed political errors, engaged in anti-Party activities and factionalism, and who have been purged and punished by being sent to work as farmers; (4) people and their families who engaged in business during or after the Japanese occupation.

According to source, North Korean farmers, like those in the ROK, tend to be conservative and believe in the maintenance of traditional Korean cultural practices. They also have a strong desire for private ownership.

In the North Korean farming population women outnumber men. The reasons are: (1) during the Korean War many men were killed, leaving their widows on the farms; (2) for a while after the Korean War, men moved from the rural areas to cities to work in factories; (3) there was a tendency after the Korean War for men who had been discharged from the North Korean Army to go to jobs in factories; (4) there was a past pattern for students from rural areas on graduation to move to jobs in urban areas. At present, North Korea prevents the movement of people, especially males, from rural areas to the cities.

Farmers, particularly the young, would like, if they could, to go to cities as factory workers. Most girls in farming areas aspire to be urban dwellers so that they can escape living and working on farms. Some people would like to move to other farming areas where the land is more fertile so they can increase their incomes.

Older farmers would like to operate their own farms as they once did. They want to cultivate land and live on it as they did for generations —working hard on the land during the farming season, but relaxing, eating, drinking, and visiting during the farming off-season—in other words, to follow the traditional living pattern of Korean farmers.

Older farmers wish for return to the pattern of genial farm life, but former patterns are now extinct on North Korean farms. Now farmers in North Korea must work during the winter; formerly they had been able

to relax and engage in a variety of other activites. They are not allowed any freedom to travel or to visit friends and relatives now. If a factory worker misses a day's work for sickness or other valid reason, he receives 60 percent of his day's wage; but if a farmer misses a day's work, even for a valid reason, he receives no work points at all.

People who were sent from urban areas to work on farms are particularly suspect politically. Farmers, in general, believe that they are subject to political indifference by the Government. The source said he heard that in 1965 Kim Il-song said, after he visited a rural area, that there seemed to be no key people in farming areas who could lead farmers politically. The reason he was reported to have said this was that the farmers in the area visited by Kim Il-song had generally poor political backgrounds. The children of farmers with good political backgrounds and who had the talent and training had left the farms for work in urban areas. These children were later reported to have been recalled to their home farming areas.

The source said that the North Korean Government now had a policy of retaining people in rural areas, especially those with good political backgrounds and training. Authorities cut back the number of technical school graduates allowed to go on to senior technical schools. Instead of going on to more advanced education, technical school graduates were sent to work in rural areas.

Students

The source divided students into two categories: (1) those receiving nine years of compulsory education, and (2) those receiving higher education, including senior technical school and college. The source's remarks pertain to the second group of students.

The common grievance of students is that job assignments after graduation are influenced more by family background (*songbun*) than by academic record. There are no competitive test for jobs as in the ROK. Students graduate and are then assigned jobs. Political activity by students while at school is also a factor in future job assignments.

Students worry not about whether or not they will get a job, but rather about the type of job they will get. A person with a good family background will receive a good job; a student with a politically unfavorable family background, even though he has a good academic record, will receive a less attractive job, and perhaps in a remote area. Of course, to enter college a student must have a good family background, but even among good family backgrounds there are many gradations which influence a students's future in the North Korean social system.

The source remembered the case of an honor student at Kim Il-song University who had majored in languages and literature, but the student's father, the source believed, had been a refugee to the ROK during the Korean War. For this reason, the honor student was assigned as an ordinary worker in a construction materials factory in a rural area.

Source learned about this one day in Dec. 1967 when he went to visit his wife's parents and heard it from a former student who was there with the source's brother-in-law. The source asked him why he had a bandage on his hand, and the former honor student told his story. He had the bandage on his hand because of injuries caused by manual labor at his job. The onetime student was very dissatisfied with what had happened to him.

Students were also dissatisfied with the frequent and excessive compulsory social labor they had to do while attending school. In principle, college students had to engage in compulsory social labor for 30 days a year, divided into two 15-day periods, one during the rice-planting season and the other during the rice-harvesting season. In practice, however, students had to do more compulsory social labor at the rice-planting and rice-harvesting seasons than was specified. In addition, they had to spend a lot of time doing other forms of compulsory social labor throughout the year, both at school and elsewhere.

Students were dissatisfied with their overly organized and controlled life, which included compulsory attendance at many ideological indoctrination meetings, lectures, discussions, and rallies. Also, most college students had to live in dormitories at their school; there, life was strictly regulated.

College students were curious and interested in knowing what was happening in the world outside of North Korea, but under the North Korean system such information was not available.

Also, the source said that college students were romantic by nature, but the strict regultion of their lives and their education in required and ideological subjects prevented them from enjoying their youth, let alone experiencing the romantic aspects they hoped for.

Students during the compulsory nine years of education were still immature, accepting whatever was taught. They had not yet developed sufficiently and did not have enough experience to make significant complaints and adopt critical attitudes.

Intellectuals

The source separated intellectuals into two categories: old and young.

Old intellectuals

Old intellectuals (*nalgon inteli*) were those who received higher education during the Japanese occupation of Korea. Therefore, because most of these intellectuals had bourgeois parents, they were not considered by North Korean authorities as a key or basic class. They were targeted to be removed from their positions. In North Korea now, however, they are utilized as subjects for the North Korean program for reform of old intellectuals. Also, old intellectuals were the targets of ideological indoctrination activities under the slogan of revolutionization of intellectuals, which, according to the source, encompasses only old intellectuals. Gen-

erally, there has been a lot of unrest among intellectuals in their normal lives, and as a group they have been frustrated by the system. Accordingly, old intellectuals can be characterized by a passive attitude toward their jobs and activities and by a desire only to maintain the *status quo*. They are easygoing and do not seek any change in the system. They are "yes men" in responding to their supervisors. Most chief technicians at enterprises are old intellectuals. For example, a chief technician might develop a new idea and implement it. If he is successful, there is no problem. But if the idea is unsuccessful, he is severely criticized and held responsible for the failure. Authorities will criticize his failure by telling him that since he came from the old bourgeois class he was influenced by egoism and personal ambition. North Korean ideology says these qualities are commonly found in old intellectuals. Officials will also criticize the chief technician for wasting a lot of state property and materials. Therefore, knowing this will happen, most intellectuals adopt a passive attitude, lack enthusiasm, and try to maintain the *status quo* in their work. They are afraid to take chances and to dare to make improvements that might go awry.

A characteristic of old intellectuals who are writers is that their literary output is conservative and contains no innovations. Rather, they write with strict adherence to North Korean ideology, emphasizing class consciousness and Kim Il-song's teachings.

Source said that many old intellectuals, including artists, were purged after the Korean Labor Party's Congress in August 1956, when many politicians who were members of anti-Kim Il-song factions were also purged. At that time, North Korean authorities revealed to the North Korean people at meetings what anti-Party elements had done. Among these explanations, the source recalled one in the literary field in which a novel written by a purged writer was used as an example. The novel was about a mother whose only son joined the Army and went to a frontline unit. She worried very much about her son and prayed for his safety. The novelist stressed the mother's affection for her son. This was the main theme of the novel, but North Korean authorities criticized the book because of this theme and said the novel lacked class consciousness. Why should a mother in a socialist society worry about her son? Instead, said the official critics, the mother should have encouraged her son to join the glorious people's army to fight for the fatherland and the people. They also criticized the novel for developing people's hatred and pessimism toward war. They said the novel had no social value.

Old intellectuals are discontented because they are ignored, disregarded, and mistreated by Party workers who are even less educated themselves. Many old intellectuals are not satisfied with jobs they hold and therefore display little enthusiasm for the work. Because of this, old intellectuals are criticized and blamed for conservativism and for being indifferent to political activity.

Old intellectuals tend to be afraid of being replaced by young intellectuals, something happening gradually throughout North Korea.

Old intellectuals want the class policy (*gyekop chongchek*) of the North Korean Government to be ended. In North Korea, class is continually emphasized in all aspects of life, in propaganda, meetings, and indoctrination sessions. Old intellectuals want this ended along with restrictions on their advancement because of class and family background. They propose that people be allowed to progress in the society because of talent, performance, and ability.

Young Intellectuals

Young intellectuals (*jolmoon inteli*), as described by the source, are men and women educated in North Korea and in other Communist countries after the liberation of North Korea from Japanese occupation in 1945.

Young intellectuals, as are old intellectuals, are criticized for having a passive attitude toward their jobs. In North Korea, it is thought that in terms of technical knowledge, talent, and ability young intellectuals are inferior to old intellectuals. When young intellectuals are criticized for some error, they are also criticized for being inferior to old intellectuals and for the misuse of the Party and Government gift of an excellent education and much other assistance in their studies. Now, they have failed to pay back the Party and Government. Officials tell them that they are still inferior to old intellectuals despite what the Party and Government have done for them.

When young intellectuals who studied in other Communist countries are criticized for some error, officials contend that they have been influenced by "revisionism." There is a tendency for other intellectuals to envy young intellectuals who have had the opportunity to study abroad. Source said it was a common belief that young intellectuals who studied abroad were really not superior to those who had studied in North Korea. But young intellectuals who had studied abroad "put on airs" and considered themselves superior to those who had studied only in North Korea.

Old and young intellectuals, because of knowledge and educational background, had a keen perception of the realities of life in North Korea. They could see social, political, and economic contradictions and problems there. Because of this characteristic, they were apt to make accidental remarks in their normal conversation which revealed their inner awareness of problems in the system and to voice their complaints about it. The North Korean officialdom criticized them for this.

Government Office Workers

This group includes people who work in North Korean Government offices from the Cabinet down to the *ri* level. It does not include office workers in factories and enterprises or full-time workers in Party organizations.

North Korea builds up and reinforces the image of Government office workers as being the best qualified North Koreans because they work for the Government and as such as leaders of the masses. Because Government office workers are treated in such a way by North Korean authorities, they tend to become self-satisfied, and their perception and insight into the world around them are dulled.

The source emphasized that here lies the big difference in characteristics between Government office workers and intellectuals. Intellectuals are continually subjected to criticism, but their perception of reality is sharp. Government office workers are praised, but their perception of reality is blurred.

Government office workers, although they are praised as leaders of the masses, are continually assigned hard tasks and heavy workloads, and their pay in return is low—not much more than that of ordinary factory workers. Government office workers have to work long hours on their jobs and do not receive extra work allowances. But factory workers have rotating shifts and do get extra work allowances for high production.

Because of long hours and heavy workloads, many Government office workers suffer from poor health.

What Government office workers want is an opportunity for advancement and higher salaries. However, the criteria for promotion is based more on an employee's political activities than on his job performance.

Full-Time Party Office Workers

This group comprises Party members in full-time jobs in Party organizations from the Central Committee down to the *ri* level. Party office workers are considered key personnel and a nucleus in North Korean society. They are the most envied of all groups in North Korea. They enjoy more authority and influence than any other group in North Korean society and receive the best social treatment of all groups there. As a result, they are generally very enthusiastic about their work, apply themselves diligently, and have great personal dignity. Economically, however, they are not so well off as such occupational groups as factory workers, technicians, and engineers.

The source said that if Party office workers had grievances, they would be economic—that is, standard of living and salary.

Military Personnel

The source said that generally young officers and enlisted men, company grades and below, were influenced by and accepted what they were told in North Korean propaganda and indoctrination. For this reason, he believed they had no fear of war. They believe the propaganda that North Korean military forces are second to none. The source attributed this attitude to the fact the young officers and enlisted men had not actually experienced the horrors of war or of the Korean War. Also, they have no knowledge of the outside world. The actual strength and performance capabilities of military forces of other nations are unknown.

Yet young officers and enlisted men, according to the source, had a number of grievances because of their lives as soldiers. Promotions in the North Korean Army are slow because there is no war. Also, since members of this group are young, they are bored with the monotonous routine of military life; they want change, excitement. They have little opportunity to go on leave or to experience any North Korean life outside their confining military environment. The source thought this group would welcome war, even if all it did was end the boredom of their lives.

Office Workers at Factories and Enterprises

This group includes people who work in offices at enterprises and factories, but not office workers in Government and Party organizations. Economically, office workers in this category are not so well off as factory workers and technicians in factories, except for office workers in cadre or executive positions.

Office workers, unlike members of a work team who receive bonuses for overproduction, do not receive bonuses, except in cases when the whole enterprise or factory receives a bonus. Office workers are held responsible for what goes on in the enterprise or factory, even production, because they are considered responsible leaders. But they do not receive pay commensurate with the responsibility.

These office workers generally want to become qualified as technicians so that they can be reassigned to better jobs and earn more money. They, of course, would also like to be promoted in their present jobs, but in promotion, political activity is more important than job performance.

Fishermen

The source thought that significant grievances among fishermen included long hours of hard, dangerous and uncomfortable work, long days at sea and away from home, and the prohibition against taking any fish caught to their homes when they returned to port. He believed that many fishermen would prefer—even desire—to obtain jobs on land.

Agent Trainees

Agent trainees are commonly afraid they will be killed on their missions in the ROK. This fear grows on them after they have been in training for awhile and become aware of technical and operational problems associated with successfully conducting missions in the ROK. The source said that once agent trainees realize the difficulty of their missions, they became greatly concerned about their lives and lose confidence in their ability to accomplish their missions in the ROK. Source said that this is a common psychological attitude among agent trainees. Most of them put their faith in fate and luck and hope for a miracle in accomplishing their missions.

Another psychological problem for agent trainees is worry about and longing for their families, especially about what will happen to the

families if they fail while on their mission and are killed. These worries increase the longer they are in agent training.

Source said that, of course, while in training, agents are told that their job benefits the people and country and that they are revolutionaries. However, the source said, agent trainees still suffer from a growing worry about the future, about what will happen to them. This is aggravated when agent trainees, as part of their training, become more familiar with the situation they will face in the ROK. The source said some agent trainees pretend to be sick in an effort to obtain release from training and be sent home.

Repatriates from Japan

The source said that generally repatriates from Japan regretted that they had come to North Korea once they are aware of the generally low living standards and the many restrictions normally placed on people in North Korea. Some repatriates, of course, were happy in North Korea; these had mostly been peddlers, day-to-day workers, or jobless in Japan. It was this happy group that was exploited in North Korean propaganda.

RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT LEAFLET OPERATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST NORTH KOREA

The source reported that while in North Korea he had seen some leaflets from the ROK. Based upon his experience with them, he made a number of recommendations:

1. According to the source, in leaflet operations, as in radio broadcasting operations, three key points should always be considered: theme selection, credibility, and repetition and continuity in the dissemination of the message.

2. A leaflet should be simple and clear with regard to message. The text should not be long and small letters should not be used because then the leaflet cannot be read easily and quickly. If a leaflet is simple and clear, the person who picks up the leaflet should be able to catch the message and outline at a glance.

3. In North Korea, farmers and workers are enjoying some benefits—employment, education for their children, and welfare. Therefore they consider that their lot is now better than it would be under a capitalist society. They do not think that changing to a capitalist society would benefit them. The source recommended that leaflets convey messages to them to allay any fears they might have about living under a capitalist society and to show them that in actuality their circumstances would be improved.

4. When taking photographs for leaflets, care should be taken in selecting sites to be photographed that demonstrate real benefits to the people, rather than producing just a pretty picture.

5. In leaflets, where possible, use comparisons between the ROK and North Korea. To do this, review and analyze themes used in North

Korean propaganda output and other sources to determine North Korean vulnerabilities. Take those vulnerabilities with superior points found in the ROK. For example, North Korea emphasizes its education system in its propaganda; vulnerabilities should be found in North Korean education. Then leaflets can be prepared based upon these identified North Korean vulnerabilities, which emphasize the strong points on these specific topics in the ROK educational system.

North Korea continually emphasizes that life is better in North Korea than in the ROK; however, on closer scrutiny of both, it will be found that in the ROK things are generally superior to North Korea. For example, North Korea claims to stand for socialism and for the welfare of farmers and workers. In practice in North Korea, this is not true. The treatment of dead soldiers is an example of this fallacy. They are buried in unmarked graves on the battlefield; only high-ranking North Koreans are honored with tombs. In the ROK, however, those who die in the defense of their country, regardless of rank, are buried and honored by all at the national cemetery.

6. The source considered that for leaflets the following two themes were important: basic living conditions (food, clothing, and housing) of average people in the ROK; and social welfare, cultural, and material benefits of life in the ROK.

7. Regarding leaflet preparation, the source recommended that the best quality of paper be used. This will reinforce the idea of a prosperous paper industry in the ROK. Also, paper should be used that is durable so that the leaflet can be read even though exposed to the elements. Printing and photo reproduction should be clear. Color leaflets are preferable to black and white leaflets to attract the attention and interest of the target audience. Size of the leaflets is not important. Source said that the size of the leaflets from the ROK he had seen in North Korea was appropriate. Source said that the type faces used should be clear and attractive; small type should be avoided. Use short texts and an abundance of photos. If the text is too long the reader may become bored and not read the entire message. He suggested the use of photos with clear captions so that the meaning or message of the text can be caught at a glance. Source said that this was very important in leaflet operations, that long booklets with a lot of text would not be effective, but pamphlets printed on good paper with many color photos would make positive impressions.

8. Source recommended that special leaflets be prepared for use against North Korean soldiers. The upper half of the leaflet could have a calendar, photos of pretty female Korean movie stars, or photos of nude females. The lower half of the leaflet could contain the PSYOP message. Then the leaflet could be cut in half and the photos or calendar retained by the soldier, and the message disposed of after being read. Such leaflets could be printed on one or both sides. If printed on both sides, on the reverse side of the part bearing the photo or calendar could be printed the music and text of Korean popular songs, with the bottom half bearing a

PSYOP message. Source said that the reason for this suggestion was that he believed that not enough calendars were issued to North Korean army soldiers. Most young soldiers, while in the army, did not have much chance to see or be with girls, but they did think about them a lot. Therefore they would especially welcome color photos of the faces of pretty Korean girls and nude color photos. By printing the leaflet so that half could be disposed of and half retained, the soldiers would be able to keep the calendar or photos without danger to themselves. Source said that although some soldiers would interpret the use of nude photos as a sign of degeneracy of morals in the ROK, most North Korean soldiers would welcome the leaflet and not turn it in to their leaders.

The source said that North Korean soldiers learned the words of Korean popular songs by hearing them over ROK DMZ loudspeaker broadcasts. The use of printed versions of those songs on leaflets for North Korean soldiers near the DMZ would reinforce this.

9. Regarding dissemination of leaflets, the source said that massive dissemination of leaflets in one place at one time should be avoided for the reason that if it were done, social security authorities could easily have them all gathered up and confiscated.

The source considered the best time for disseminating leaflets to be at night, preferably after midnight and before dawn, so that the leaflets could not be seen falling to the ground.

He also recommended that leaflets not be disseminated in remote mountainous areas of low population density for the obvious reason that there were too few people to see them. On the other hand, leaflets should not be dropped on densely populated areas, because the number of people would inhibit reading of the leaflets because of observation by others. Therefore, he suggested that they be disseminated to areas of moderate population density where the person who found the leaflet would have a reasonable chance of reading the leaflet unobserved.

10. Although the source had never seen or heard about the use of plastic bags floating on water as a delivery means for leaflets and other materials, he said that type of operation was, in his opinion, excellent and a well-suited PSYOP delivery method to reach the target audience. He recommended as gift items for inclusion in the floating plastic bags the following:

Pojagi	A square cloth designed to carry articles. *Furushiki* in Japanese.
Indan case	Container for carrying a type of medicine used for sweet-smelling breath. *Indan* is available in North Korea, but the containers are not good.
Handkerchiefs	
Soap Containers	
Shoe horns	
Combs	

Certificate or money case
Children's toys
Children's fairy tale books
Picture books for children

Source recommended that in sending such gift items, the best quality items should be used for greater effectiveness. He said that this would achieve two purposes: (1) show the excellence and high quality of ROK goods to the target audience, and (2) create in the target audience dissatisfaction with North Korean goods, especially when in actual use the ROK items lasted much longer and were better than North Korean-made equivalents. If the aim is to create an immediate impression of excellence of the item, then the brand names of ROK manufacturers or some other indication of ROK origin should be clearly seen. But if the aim is to emphasize the superiority of the item based upon actual long term use, then there should be nothing on the item to indicate origin in the ROK.

RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT RADIO BROADCASTING OPERATIONS DIRECTED AT NORTH KOREA

The source provided a number of recommendations which he said should be considered in PSYOP radio broadcasts directed against North Korea.

1. Radio broadcasts have the capability to send messages covering a wide range of topics and themes to the North Korean target audience. However, only one topic should be treated in each program unit.
2. News programs, in particular, are very important for informing North Koreans about what is happening in the rest of the world. But because North Koreans find it difficult to listen to foreign radio broadcasts, it is very important to repeat news programs over and over so that the news will have a better chance of being heard. Repetition of a news broadcast ten or twenty times is good—the more repetition the better the chance that it will be heard.
3. The source recommended that priority be given in news selection to those themes listed in "PSYOP Themes for North Korea," *PSYOP Intelligence Notes*, No. 251.
4. The source reported that of all target groups in North Korea, agent trainees have the best opportunity to listen to radio broadcasts from the ROK. He recommended the use of special programs directed to agent trainees to induce their defection after they have been sent to the ROK. He stressed that programs should be built around the lives of North Korean agents and others who defected to the ROK. North Korean agents, according to source, do not know what treatment they will receive if they turn themselves in to the ROK Government. Therefore he recommended that special programs be regularly produced about benefits to agents who turn themselves in when they are sent to the ROK.

5. The source said the best time for listening to foreign broadcasts in North Korea was from 8:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M., because people are more likely to be at home during this time. Before 8:00 P.M. people are often still at work, meetings, or engaged in other activities. People usually have returned home for the night by 8:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. The time does not matter, really, to those who like to listen secretly to broadcasts from the ROK; they will do so when they can. Also, agent trainees have good opportunities to listen to ROK broadcasts at night.

6. Regarding sentence structure used in broadcasts, the source recommended the use of short sentences, rather than long complex ones. Short sentences are easier to understand than long ones with complex construction.

7. To attract the interest of the North Korean audience, the source suggested that Korean popular songs, especially those popular from the end of World War II until the end of the Korean war be used. Recent Korean popular songs can be used if they are in Korean rather than Western musical style. He advised against the use of recent Korean popular songs with Western musical arrangements and instruments.

CREDIBILITY IN PSYOP DIRECTED AGAINST NORTH KOREA

The source provided a number of recommendations regarding credibility in psychological operations against North Korea.

1. Cite or quote the objective views and opinions of foreigners about the subject matter: for example, their views about the ROK. He considered that the views of people from neutral nations would be more effective.

2. In developing, preparing, and editing programs care must be taken to insure that the content is not superficial and abstract. Exact sources, detailed statistical figures, concrete and actual examples should be provided, and all should be focused on a specific, limited topic or subject.

3. Terminology should be used which is easily understandable to all North Koreans. Avoid words of foreign origin because they may not be in use now in North Korea, and therefore not understandable to North Koreans. Add explanations where words are given that are used in the ROK but not in North Korea.

4. Use live interviews with people on the street in radio broadcasts to North Korea. If possible, interview working-level people such as factory workers and farmers, rather than high-level officials.

5. Avoid use of abusive words and slander in PSYOP output. Instead, take a sympathetic and polite position in order to persuade the target audience.

6. Use dialogues between two voices over radio rather than one person reading a script. This, the source said, will help overcome the monotonous effect of one person reading.

7. Announcers should use a clear, natural speaking style rather than a strident, ardent style. The source said that announcers on North Korean

radio used the strident, ardent style of agitators; he did not consider this to be effective. Instead he preferred the natural, calm voices of the announcers he had heard on stations from the ROK. The source said that while he was in North Korea, he listened mostly to news programs on KBS 1, but on many occasions he considered the announcer's reading speed so fast that it was difficult to follow what was being said. He, therefore, recommended that announcers avoid excessive speed. Also, he noticed that KBS 1 used many words of foreign origin; this also made the programs difficult to follow.

8. For credibility, the source recommended that programs should take a neutral, objective viewpoint. They should take a position between the Western countries and the Communist nations. In the period before 1965, North Koreans considered Japanese news reporting credible because North Koreans believed that the news took a neutral, objective position. As a result, North Koreans listened to and believed Japanese-originated news broadcasts. Since 1965, according to source, because of Japan's closer relations with the United States and the use of the theme of the revival of Japanese militarism in North Korean propaganda, the credibility of Japanese news among North Koreans has fallen.

9. The source recommended coverage of rural affairs as a way of enhancing credibility. Generally, North Koreans believe that under capitalist societies, cities are emphasized while rural areas have withered from lack of attention.

NORTH KOREAN PROPAGANDA DISSEMINATION TECHNIQUES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The source had some knowledge of the dissemination of North Korean propaganda materials in the ROK, gained through conversation with others while he was in North Korea.

He reported that North Korean leaflets were disseminated in the ROK through the use of balloons drifted down from North Korea, He knew that not only leaflets but also booklets and pamphlets were disseminated in this way. He believed that a certain section of the Liaison Department of the Central Party was responsible for such balloon operations.

The source also believed that some North Korean agents were used to disseminate materials in the ROK. He said that North Korea utilized two types of agents for propaganda dissemination in the ROK: long term, in-place agents, and those dispatched on missions to the ROK. In some cases, North Korean propaganda materials were carried into the ROK secretly by couriers and placed in caches. The agent-in-place was told by radio where the cache of propaganda materials was. He then went to recover them. In other cases, agents dispatched on missions to the ROK carried the propaganda materials with them.

The source mentioned as an example that in April or May 1967, six fellow trainees and himself were sent to a safe house in North Korea and divided into two teams, one of four men and the other of three. The two

teams were placed in separate rooms in the safe house. The source was assigned to the three-man team. On each team there was one man who had attended the "695", a special political school for indoctrinating agent trainees. These two persons arrived at the safe house first, and then the source and the others arrived. A package of North Korean propaganda materials was given to each two-man team, about 200 or 300 booklets. The plan was for each team to carry its package of propaganda materials to a location on the West Coast area of North Korea. The planned training exercise, however, was not carried out because other missions were given to several members of the teams.

The source mentioned that he believed that another method used to disseminate North Korean propaganda materials in the ROK was carried out from Japan through *Chosen Soren* (Association of Korean Residents of Japan).

According to the source there were two purposes in disseminating North Korean propaganda materials in the ROK: (1) to convey the leaflet and booklet themes to the ROK target audiences, and (2) as a communication means between a North Korean agent in the ROK and his headquarters in North Korea.

If a North Korean agent brought propaganda material with him into the ROK, he might disseminate it himself, get another person to disseminate it, or have an agent-in-place do the disseminating. Usually, agents or others disseminated the leaflets during the hours of darkness, but not during the ROK curfew, 12 midnight to 4:00 A.M., for fear of being caught by ROK police for violating the curfew. First, a target was selected where the leaflet was to be disseminated in accordance with the theme of the leaflet. For example, if the message attacked the United States, then the leaflet target would be a U.S. compound. The agent then tried to get the leaflets into office areas, toilets, desk drawers, and the like. On some occasions, leaflets were disseminated widely, regardless of the PSYOP theme, if there was a good opportunity for distribution. When there was no wind blowing an agent might put groups of leaflets on the top of walls, and when the wind came up later it would blow the leaflets around.

If the agent was busy with other missions, he might try to get someone else, such as an agent-in-place, to disseminate the leaflets. If an agent believed he had recruited someone as a potential North Korean agent, he might give the prospect the task of disseminating some leaflets to test him out. When giving the prospect the task, he was assigned an exact time and place to disseminate the leaflets, and then the North Korean agent would check to see that he carried out his mission.

A North Korean agent who did not have radio communication means could use leaflets to communicate with his headquarters. For example, at the end of some North Korean leaflets, on the back side, the agent would write the name of a certain society or association and some numbers to indicate that the agent desired to return to North Korea on a certain

date, for example, 11 Battalion, 5th District. In this case, "5th" means the month of May and "11th" means the 11th day of that month. The agent places this information on a number of leaflets which he then disseminates. North Korean agents believe that when leaflets are disseminated they are reported in ROK newspapers, or an agent-in-place might find the leaflet and report it to North Korea. In either case, the aim was to get information about the agent's desire to return to the proper authorities in North Korea. Each agent, before dispatch to the ROK, was given a different message to use on leaflets for communicating his desire to return to North Korea. Thus when such a message was acquired by North Korea, it was known which agent was communicating the message.

Broadcasts

RADIO BROADCAST MONITORING*

BY the 7TH PSYOP GROUP

An example of how content analysis of a radio braodcast, by indicating the relative emphasis that the source wishes to place on propaganda themes, may provide valuable insights into political objectives and strategy.

KHMER REPUBLIC

Stations considered in this report are *Hanoi* international, *Liberation, Voice of the National United Front of Kampuchea* (*VNUFK*), *Peking*, and *Moscow*. This report covers the period 11–17 December 1971. All broadcasts were in the Cambodian language.

Hanoi international and *Liberation* stressed continued support for peoples struggles. They stressed such topics as the downing of U.S. helicopters, comments by Sihanouk on the failing Lon Nol administration, combat victories of CNPLAF units, and a report in which a Vietnamese Student Association located in Hue condemned the use of Saigon troops in Cambodia. CNPLAF units claim total defeat of Lon Nol's CHENLA II operation.

VNUFK continued broadcasting about the combat victories of CNPLAF units. An 88–minute speech by Sihanouk (31st message, part II) was used to propogate support for people's struggles.

Peking placed primary emphasis on international prestige; however, the amount of time devoted to the attendant themes, support for people's struggles and negative treatment of an established government, were of significance. International affairs were the keynote this week with references to the People's Republic of China (PRC) ambassador's party in Hanoi, the Albanian visit to Peking, NUFK and RGNUC delegations to Pyongyang, and development of communications in the mountain regions of Chekiang Province. In support of people's struggles, *Peking* extolled the success of PLAF units for victories in Cambodia and Laos. Much time

*Excerpts from "Communist Propaganda Radio and News Service Highlights: Trends and Analysis," Issue no. 51–71, 27 January 1972, pp. 51–16 to 51–18.

Theme	*Hanoi*		*Liberation*		*VNUFK*		*Peking*		*Moscow*	
	I	M	I	M	I	M	I	M	I	M
Propagation of ideology	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	11
Glorification of the revolution	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Present success of socialism	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	9	11	25
Guidance for future success of socialism	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	11
International prestige	8	37	0	0	8	60	22	91	66	146
Support for people's struggles	36	84	33	137	18	249	14	78	27	51
Negative treatment of a government	13	34	6	13	7	66	13	73	27	82
TOTAL	57	155	41	156	33	375	53	251	137	326

Weekly Trend Analysis (11–17 December 1971). Broadcasting in the Cambodian language to the Khmer Republic.

was devoted to condemning the Indian and Soviet governments for involvement in the Indo-Pakistani war. It was claimed that Indian warplanes bombed Dacca and killed civilians. South Korean President Pak Chong-hui was denounced for declaring an emergency when China was admitted to the UN.

Moscow continued to expound on the Soviet Union's role in world affairs in its quest for international prestige. The USSR continues to condemn U.S. involvement in Indochina affairs and to attempt to align Peking in collusion with the United States in some items.

Comment

Hanoi international, *Liberation*, and *VNUFK* will continue to support people's struggles, with little or no change in future formats.

Peking will continue to stress international prestige; however, an increase in the negative treatment of the Soviet and U.S. governments has been noted. The split between Peking and the Soviet Union is still evidenced by such commentary as "The Soviet Social Imperialists are the Master of the Indian Expansionists."

Moscow continues to stress foreign relations and express Soviet gains in economic and industrial efforts. Under the new Five-Year Plan, the USSR promises to have one-third of the Moscow population in new housing. The soft landing on and exploration of Mars received extensive coverage. Negative treatment of the Peking and U.S. governments is becoming a recurrent theme. The USSR has persistently condemned U.S. involvement in Indochina, the hypocritical nature of the U.S. stance on the Indo-Pakistani conflict, and increased U.S. air activity in Indochina. The PRC was denounced for collusion with the US in an attempt to impede the Soviet disarmament conference.

Captured Documents

VIET CONG DOCUMENTS ON THE WAR (1)*

This report illustrates that document analysis is an important tool for understanding the target's perceptions as well as for remaining abreast of foreign military and political strategies and activities.

Since the early part of 1967 increasingly large quantities of Communist documents have been captured during military operations by American, South Vietnamese and Allied forces. Especially rich caches of highly-classified documents and operational directives were found in headquarters areas during operations "Cedar Falls" and "Junction City" directed against long-established Viet Cong base areas. Among these were top-level internal communications of the Viet Cong movement, many of which have been officially released for use by the press and by scholars.

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*Excerpts from "Viet Cong Documents on the War (1)," *Communist Affairs*, V, no. 5 (September-October 1967), pp. 18–24. Reprinted with the permission of *Communist Affairs*, copyright holder and the author, Hammond Rolph.

These documents range from general analysis of the world situation and the strategic role of the Vietnamese Communist revolution to the exposition of tactics for implementing the revolution in the villages and hamlets of South Vietnam. In this and the next issue, *Communist Affairs* will present excerpts from some of these lengthy documents, most of which have not been comprehensively quoted at any length in this country and are therefore still relatively unknown. The selections illustrate not only the policy problems and decisionmaking environment of the Viet Cong movement, but also convey something of the Vietnamese Communist's view of his world.

In general, the documents reveal or confirm the following: (1) the tight control of the levers of power in the Viet Cong movement by the *Lao Dong* Party of North Vietnam, and the insignificance of the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam as anything other than a tactic in the struggle; (2) the complete faith of the Vietnamese Communists in the doctrine and strategy of "people's war" as a road to certain victory; (3) a rather realistic sense of weakness in the Viet Cong movement, coupled with a grossly exaggerated view of the defeats and problems of the other side; (4) great stress by the Communists on a military victory within a relatively short time, while simultaneously preparing for protracted war and anticipating the use of the political weapon of negotiations at a propitious time; (5) emphasis on the international revolutionary role of Vietnamese communism; and (6) the absolute primacy of ideological motivation and purity in all aspects of the direction of the Viet Cong movement.

Chronologically the documents range from the end of 1963 to the spring of 1967. Thus they cover a period from Hanoi's confident decision to escalate the war decisively in the South following the death of Ngo Dinh Diem to the present situation of great difficulty for the Viet Cong.

LAO DONG PARTY SETS TONE OF WAR IN SOUTH

One of the basic documents captured in the field is the resolution of the ninth plenum of the Vietnam Workers Party (*Lao Dong*) Central Committee in Hanoi, passed in December 1963. Entitled "World Situation and Our Party's International Duties," it presents a lengthy philosophical and doctrinal rationale for the Vietnam struggle, largely in terms of the demands of "proletarian internationalism" and the global requirements of the socialist camp. The resolution was prepared in the immediate aftermath of the downfall of Ngo Dinh Diem, which undoubtedly somewhat weakened the basis of the Viet Cong movement through the removal of its chief target, and it seems to represent a call by Hanoi for acceleration of the armed struggle in the South despite the changed political situation. Adopted during the period of Hanoi's marked leaning toward the Chinese side of the Sino-Soviet dispute, it reflects a strongly hostile tone toward "revisionists," while at the same time expressing Hanoi's desire for a mediated truce which would restore the unity of world communism in pressing toward its national and international goals.

In the present human society, there are the following basic contradictions: (1) contradictions between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp; (2) contradictions between the working class and the bourgeoisie in capitalist countries; (3) contradictions between the oppressed people and the imperialists and colonialists; (4) contradictions between imperialists and imperialists, between one monopolist capitalist clique and another monopolist capitalist clique in imperialist countries.

The four above contradictions are basic contradictions in human society because they reflect the true nature of the era, they survive ...during the entire phase of evolution from capitalism to socialism throughout the world. The first group of basic contradictions belongs to the contradictions between two opposing international systems. The other basic contradictions belong to the internal contradictions of the international capitalist system.

CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM CARRIES OUT CENTRAL COMMITTEE DIRECTIVES

Following the earlier resolutions of the *Lao Dong* Central Committee, the situation in Vietnam underwent a great change. In response to increased North Vietnamese army participation in the Southern war, the United States began aerial bombardment of key North Vietnamese military targets in February 1965 and made a full-scale combat commitment of American troops in the South a few months later.

In the face of this massive American intervention, the Central Committee 12th plenum met in Hanoi in December 1965 to lay down new guidelines. These new policies were then translated into directives by the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), the Viet Cong's highest echelon of political and military direction (the NLF being a facade with no real power). COSVN, which is an integral part of the *Lao Dong's* interlocking machinery and which acts as a Central Committee for Southern operations, then called its fourth congress in March 1966 to translate the 12th plenum's guidelines into an all-encompassing "Resolution of the Central Office for South Vietnam." A copy of this top-secret document was seized on April 21, 1967, in Khanh Hoa Province by units of the 101st Airborne Division.

This resolution covers almost every aspect of Hanoi-COSVN plans and programs for the Viet Cong, from high-level matters such as peace negotiations to detailed village-level activities. Thus only a fraction of it can be quoted here. The document is quite open in discussing Hanoi's leadership of the war, and one of its central themes is the need to increase the Party's control of all Viet Cong activities. While pointing out the importance of the NLF as a useful united front tactic to be developed to the utmost, the resolution nowhere indicates that the Front has any real decision-making authority whatsoever.

First, the document reviews the military and political situation in 1965, both as to successes and failures, strengths as well as weaknesses.

1965 was also a year when we all marched forward to win victories. Our entire army, people, and Party strongly stepped up their activities in all fields and all the movements achieved great successes in the midst of an extremely arduous situation.

a. Our major success was in the military field.

All the three forces expanded and fought the enemy well. Our guerrillas succeeded in causing the attrition of and destruction to both the U.S. and puppet

regime armies with very brave and creative forms of combat in resisting mop-up efforts, attacking communications lines and the enemy's rear. But most outstanding of all were our regular forces which came upon the battlefield in a bigger operational force and with increasingly creative combat tactics. . . .

For that reason, in the effort to destroy the enemy, we overfulfilled the norm prescribed by the Central Office for South Vietnam at the beginning of the year. Concerning the build-up of the armed forces, we moved quickly, over-passing the regular force and regional force build-up requirements. . . .

b. Our second success was in the political field. . . .We broadened the National Front to unite all classes and social strata and ethnic minorities in the same effort of rising up against the Americans to save the country.

* * * *

In the disputed rural areas and at strategic hamlets, we continued to score successes.

* * * *

. . .in spite of the hard conditions, the morale of our partisans remained unshaken and united. . . .

. . .yet there were still deficiencies, difficulties, and weak points:

Our armed forces developed considerably but still did not meet the requirements of the situation.

Only half of our regular forces fought well. The regional forces mostly did not fight well and some of them hardly fought while others were so embarrassed that they could not fight. . . .

Political activities and Party tasks . . .were still poor among the regional forces in certain areas. Therefore, there were many incorrect displays of ideology, behavior, and activities. . . .

Although the liberated zone was expanded, it was not yet consolidated and no solid base was established there which could serve as a stable rear for the South.

* * * *

. . .The revolutionary base in the cities was still too weak.

* * * *

Political struggle activities were not brought up to the same rate as military activities and did not keep up with military achievements. . . . Not enough emphasis was given to the ideological leadership of the masses and to the task of breaking up the enemy's psywar and Chieu Hoi schemes [Editor's note: a program designed to encourage defection from Viet Cong ranks] and his peace trick swindles.

* * * *

. . .Mass organizations especially at the village levels were not well built.

Leadership and indoctrination of the masses were also weak. . . .

The unsatisfactory state of mass proselyting activities affected other activities, especially those pertaining to recruitment, conscription, finance, prevention of spies, protection of secrets, guerrilla warfare, etc.

Activities related to the building of the Party, especially those pertaining to organization, were still weak. . . .

Next came an evaluation of enemy intentions and the prescription of general strategy to counter them. Party leadership is emphasized in all aspects of struggle, particularly in the matter of peace negotiations.

In general, in 1966, the basic intention of the enemy will be to carry on the major plans laid down in 1965, but they will do it with new vigor, more wicked schemes and a higher determination. Therefore, the war will develop in a more fierce manner.

In the face of the new situation, the mission for the entire country as prescribed by the [12th] resolution of TW [Hanoi Party Central Committee] is as follows:

"All the Party, the army, and the people should exert the maximum effort and concentrate all forces to step up the armed and political struggles, to defeat the American imperialist aggressors and their henchmen on the main battlefield which is in the South.

In the North, the war of destruction of the American imperialists must be defeated, the achievements in the development of a socialist regime must be preserved, human and material resources must be mobilized for the liberation war in the South, and preparations must be made to defeat the enemy in case the local war is expanded throughout the country.

* * * *

. . .while continuing to acquire a thorough understanding of the long-term resistance slogan and in applying it, we must exert a maximum effort to concentrate the strength of both zones of our country in order to achieve a decisive victory on the Southern battlefield within a relatively short period of time.

. . .we are determined not to entertain any illusions concerning a negotiated settlement to the problem of Vietnam, and we must concentrate all our strength to destroy the enemy. Only when the American imperialists' aggressive will is crushed and the objectives of independence, peace, democracy, and neutrality of the South are guaranteed can we negotiate a settlement of the Vietnam problem.

. . .At a certain time, we can apply the strategy of fighting and negotiating at the same time, in order to support the armed struggle, and thus accelerate the disintegration of the puppet army and regime, and create more conditions favorable for our people to win a decisive victory.

. . .That objective can only be achieved if we coordinate very closely the armed struggle with the political struggle and psychological warfare. . . .

The Southern branch of the [Lao Dong] Party has extensive and solid foundations. It is a valiant vanguard element, thoroughly trained in combat, closely connected with the masses and fully trusted by them. It is well experienced in the matter of political and armed struggle and it is also closely led by the Party Central Committee."

In order to carry out the general mission, major tasks are then assigned in detail. Included among these assignments are build-up and deployment of the armed forces, political leadership in the armed forces, expansion of the united front under the Party's guidance, diplomatic efforts abroad, consolidation and expansion of the Viet Cong base areas, defeating the enemy in the contested areas, clarification of agrarian policies, improvement of mass proselyting [sic] campaigns and development of the Party's strength.

We must strongly emphasize armed warfare, build up our armed forces, expand the people's guerrilla movement, destroy a major portion of the American and puppet forces. During 1966, . . .we must try to inflict a loss of 30,000 or 40,000 American personnel, including the total destruction of about 10 battalions and some scores of companies. We must also destroy and distintegrate about 200,000 puppet troops, over a half of whom will be regulars, . . .

All the armed forces, from the regular forces to the regional forces, shall be responsible for participating in, assisting and emphasizing guerrilla warfare.

* * * *

. . . Regulars must retain the initiative in the attack to destroy the enemy. . . . Regular warfare must be active, mobile, flexible, aggressive and must be victorious.

* * * *

All our armed forces must be sharp instruments of both armed and political struggle. . . .

Efforts must be made toward mobilizing the youths and the populace to insure the replacement of regular forces and to provide vanguard elements and civilian manpower in service of the battlefield.

* * * *

Increase the Party's political and leadership activities in the armed forces.

. . . In the armed forces, maximum attention must be paid to building up the Party, especially the basic structures, . . .

In the field of leadership, class lines and the mass viewpoint must be maintained; . . .

The front for national unity, anti-American resistance, and national salvation must be expanded, the political and military proselyting [sic] movements must be intensified.

* * * *

We . . . have the capability to motivate the partiotic sentiments of the people in various social strata and walks of life, to win over even those in the puppet regime and army who follow a progressive trend . . . in order to expand the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, . . .

. . . we must try to implement democracy, step by step, to secure the interests of the working classes, especially the farmers. The expansion of a national solidarity front must be founded on the close unity of the masses and a consolidation of the workers-farmers alliance.

* * * *

. . . the Americans and puppet regime exhort their "peace trick" slogan, intensify their psywar and espionage activities, intimidate and bribe the people by flattering them with plans of "rural development," "social revolution," "democratic regime," etc. . . . hoping to deceive and lull all our people, weaken their combat morale, make them suspicious of our victory, and moving ahead with their Chieu Hoi plans. This dangerous plot of the enemy has somewhat affected the combat morale of our people in certain areas. Therefore, breaking up the enemy's political schemes and indoctrinating the people are two things that must be done on a regular basis. . . .

We must intensify our propaganda and diplomatic activities.

In our anti-American resistance for national salvation, we depend mainly on ourselves but we also need the sympathy and support of our friends in the world. Furthermore, our revolution is part of the world revolution. It is related to the movements of national liberation on the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and it is also related to the preservation of the socialist camp and world peace. For that reason, we must do our utmost to gain the support and assistance of the socialist camp, the people of the world, the American people. . . .

The diplomatic requirement at this stage is to concentrate all efforts . . . to gain the sympathy and support of the socialist countries, the people of the world, including the American people, and to isolate to the maximum degree the American imperialists and their henchmen.

* * * *

Consolidate and expand the liberated areas and establish bases to provide rear support of the revolution, destroy the enemy's pacification plan, continuously attack the enemy in cities and areas controlled by him, and restrict the enemy's rear.

* * * *

. . . in order to help our three strategic zones develop and support . . . the accomplishment of the mission prescribed by the Party for the Southern revolution, we must fully understand the following:

We must constantly seek to develop and expand our bases and liberated areas in both the jungle and delta and secure a solid base for the revolution. Along with that, we must continuously attack the urban areas and those enemy-controlled areas to disrupt and restrict the enemy's rear areas. Those are the two points of the party's great strategic mission. Accomplishment of one is not enough but would also be ineffective. [sic]

* * * *

. . . Defeating the enemy's pacification plan is an urgent requirement. If we cannot meet this requirement, we will be unable to build up our rear and disrupt and restrict the enemy's. Vice versa, if we cannot strengthen our rear areas, we will be unable to defeat the enemy's pacification plan. . . .

We must thoroughly understand the Party's general strategic principles concerning the leadership of the movements in the delta, the rural areas, the jungle and in the urban areas. . . .

. . . We must try to convert a major portion of the enemy-controlled areas into disputed areas (some into liberated areas controlled by us), to convert a major

portion of the presently disputed areas into liberated zones where our control would be firm, and at the same time, we must devote all our efforts toward securing, developing and expanding our liberated and base areas . . . so as to convert a major portion of the areas under his control into disputed areas or liberated areas controlled by us.

* * * *

Local and external forces must be coordinated and armed activities must be coordinated with local mass movements. Reactionary organizations must be destroyed. The tyrants and their public control organizations (including the police, security, pacification, and reactionary elements) must be attacked. . . .

In guiding all kinds of activity, we must always and steadily maintain the objective of the uprising in the rural areas. . . .

. . . we must cleverly maintain the legal status of the people, a positive legality, which would permit the constant carrying out of our political and armed struggle movements in pulling down the enemy's influence.

One of the decisive prerequisites is the development of sound political organizations to include strong Party chapters able to lead the masses in the fight against the enemy, and into which the masses themselves are organized.

* * * *

The requirements of the liberated rural areas consist in holding on to the land and people and making decided efforts to prevent the enemy from taking over additional land and herding the people to his areas. . . .

. . . Strive to ideologically motivate the people so that they will step up their resistance. . . .

We must realize that the main point in the defense of the liberated areas lies in the fact of maintaining our control over the population and, most of all, in nurturing the fighting spirit.

. . . People must be determined to struggle against the enemy, to cling at all costs to their paddies and villages, to step up production for national salvation, to tie their personal interests to those of the revolution and resistance. . . .

* * * *

Reality shows that recently in order to avoid airstrikes, the population have left their lands and fled to the enemy-controlled areas. They then become homeless and penniless and their lives are miserable. For this reason, if we can perform well the tasks of protecting the people's interests, lives and properties, and of production, suitably in the new situation, and the relations between the people and Party are close and firm, they then realize that the Party really cares for them and will cling at any cost to their native villages for combat and production.

* * * *

Great efforts must be made to achieve solidarity in the rural areas, to implement the Party's agrarian policy well and the Party's class lines which state that: "Based on the unity of poor, middle and rich peasants, we are trying to gradually topple the landlord class, to win over those landlords desirous of joining ranks, neutralize the fence-sitters and smash those wicked landlord agents of the American imperialists."

* * * *

The urban areas and cities have to meet the following requirements:

According to the situation in each locality, uninterrupted attacks in every form and size must be launched against the enemy in order to create constant disturbances even in the enemy's safest rear bases. Movements in the cities and urban areas must be encouraged to catch up with those in the rural areas.

. . . We must capitalize on the differences existing within the enemy's camp, isolate and divide the diehards, win over the neutralists' sympathy, persuade the fence-sitters to take sides . . . [and] . . . to continuously expand the movement and create conditions for the forthcoming general attack and uprising.

* * * *

We must create and develop the movements among various classes, the laborers, the needy urban people, the petit-bourgeoisie, the students, and then gradually associate them with other movements and organizations to form a coalition front for widespread action, proceeding toward the development of a united front

with a platform inferior to that of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam but endowed with the conditions to operate openly and to attract the above classes for a struggle against the Americans and their lackeys.

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It is apparent from the expression of tasks in the cities that the Viet Cong have made little headway in the urban areas, despite the existence of substantial anti-government feeling in the larger population centers. Viet Cong leaders have also been dissatisfied with results in general proselyting [sic] among the civilian population. Their dilemma has become evident. On the one hand, they have worked hard, and not with great success, to move the peasant out of his world of narrow self-interest and to mobilize him for the larger goals of the revolution; on the other, it has become plain that in the context of the very personal suffering of rural families in the war, this effort has led to some alienation from the movement. The following excerpts illustrate these points:

Intensification of Civilian Proselyting [sic] Activities.

. . . in the recent past, our civilian proselyting [sic] activities have been too weak. We have not fulfilled the task of motivating, indoctrinating and assisting the people to settle those complex problems created for them by the war so as to enable them to carry out the resistance activities.

* * * *

. . . Emphasis has been placed only on the mobilization task while the difficulties and problems of the masses remained incompletely understood.

The Party's cadres and personnel must remain close to the masses, particularly the workers and farmers, and must stand back to back with them, remain with them during moments of hardship and danger and not leave them in the lurch or stay aloof from them even under easy circumstances.

* * * * *

A large-scale mass motivation campaign must be opened . . . Nationalism must be promoted, sufferings pointed out, national and class hatred provoked. . . .

Mass organizations must be strengthened and developed, . . . so as to enable the Party to secure its control over the elements of the populace—farmers, youths, women in the rural areas, liberation unions and syndicates in cities. . . .

* * * *

The class factor must be viewed as the key factor. But due consideration must also be given to an individual's character, age, and walk of life. In the meantime, efforts must be made to attract and gain the middle classes.

* * * *

We must be more enlightened on the position of the farming class, comsolidate our control over the rural areas, strengthen the poor and middle farmers' unity and make them an active force of the Party in the rural areas. . . .

We must penetrate into the religious masses and motivate them, promote their nationalist spirit, . . . prevent them from being fooled by reactionary elements. . . .

With regard to the ethnic minorities . . . we must properly carry out the Party's ethnic policy, penetrate deeply into the masses . . .

With regard to the Chinese residents, we must continue to penetrate their masses and motivate them to unite with our people . . .

. . . The Labor Youth Group must have sound control over the youths, and must encourage them to join our ranks and in countering the enemy's conscription effort. We must motivate the women to participate in the political struggle . . . and assume activities in the rear area so that young men can go to the front.

Strengthening the Party, both ideologically and organizationally, is made the order of the day. Attention is to be concentrated on improving

the Party chapters, the key "grass roots" organization of the *Lao Dong* (or the People's Revolutionary Party, as its Southern branch is publicly known) in both the rural areas and towns. Again a dilemma appears. While the directive stresses the flexibility and initiative necessary to continue operation by lower echelons under difficult circumstances, it tends to defeat this purpose by calling at the same time for tight controls from the top. Thus it provides some explanation for reports from observers in the field that there is a considerable lower-level paralysis among the Viet Cong cadres in the absence of direction from above.

Increase the Party Development Activities

. . . Development must be efficient from both the ideological and organization standpoints so as to insure the unity of thought and action in the Party. Ideological development must be considered as the primary requirement.

First the entire Party, population and army must be indoctrinated so that all realize the sublime historical mission of our people. . . .

The effort of developing and promoting the class viewpoint among cadres and Party members in the days to come must satisfy the requirements of creating a spirit of perseverance, revolutionary optimism, readiness to overcome hardships and dangers and to accept sacrifices, determination to eradicate the enemy, to cling to one's area and to the populace, especially the workers and farmers, to share hardships with the people, to properly carry out every activity and not to be shaken by the enemy's peace trick arguments and his Chieu Hoi scheme. . . . Within the Party as well as among the population, the outstanding ideological problems, such as deviationism, conservatism, rightism, must be settled. . . .

* * * *

. . . we must see that the Party's political and ideological views are firmly upheld by using political and ideological indoctrination as a basic means to promote the position of the proletarian class in order to enhance revolutionary vigilance . . .

. . . we must increase counterintelligence and counterespionage activities. . . The Party's leadership activities must be increased. . . .

. . . it is necessary to improve our technique and to increase centralized leadership and, in particular, to strengthen the Party's absolute control over the armed forces. . . .

. . . In the days to come, the task of developing and consolidating the Party's chapters (especially in villages and cities) must be considered as a central effort in the task to develop the Party from the organizational standpoint.

* * * *

First we must start with improving each individual member of a Party chapter. This is accomplished by raising his political and ideological levels, making him thoroughly understand the situation and his mission, enhancing his will to attack and destroy the enemy, his determination to cling to the land, to the people, and to fight until the end. . . .

. . . Substantial assistance must be given to help each member of the Party to know what he is supposed to do daily, how to do it . . . we must proceed toward developing working methods, raising the political and organizational standards of committee chapters and chapter secretaries. Only thusly can we make the chapters capable of functioning by themselves under difficult circumstance and execute the policies from above without remaining passive as before.

* * * * *

Finally, a summary of the Viet Cong mission, in clarion tones:

. . . Our resistance for national salvation against the American imperialists, the most powerful and cruelest enemy of mankind, is occurring in the center of an area in which are concentrated the most serious contradictions in the world at the present time. Our resistance is part of the world revolution which is designed to liberate our people, and at the same time protect national independence, democracy and socialism throughout the world.

. . . the factors determining our ultimate victory are apparent. We have the correct domestic and foreign policies of a Marxist-Leninist party. We possess a

Central Committee which is clear-sighted and which is headed by Chairman Ho. We have the heroic army and people of the South, a people's war line which is matchless, a North which is solid and strong, and the increasing support of the socialist camp and people all over the world. . . .
. . . every individual leader and Party member must clearly perceive and be proud of his responsibility before history. . . .

Propaganda

ROMANIA—A CHINESE TOEHOLD?*

BY the 7TH PSYOP GROUP

As evidenced in this excerpt, careful analysis of propaganda and news in a society in which both are controlled by the government can yield results useful for political forecasting.

At the present time, Romania seems to be successful in treading a relatively impartial line between the USSR and Communist China. Or, as stated by Emil Bodnares, Vice President of the State Council of Romania, "Romania aims at developing friendship, alliance, and cooperation with all socialist states on the basis of equality and mutual respect."

On 25 March, *Radio Peking* announced ... that Cornel Burtica, head of the Romanian Trade Delegation and Minister of Foreign Trade, arrived at the Peking Airport. On 28 March, *Peking* reported that the Romanian trade official had met with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, and Acting Minister of Foreign Trade Lin Hai-yun. A second broadcast later the same day announced the signing of a trade agreement for 1970 by Burtica and Lin. On 1 April, the Romanian Trade Delegation left Peking by air, seen off by Romanian Ambassador to China, Aurel Duma, and Li Chiang, Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Trade.

A *Radio Peking* broadcast on 19 April carried an article from the Romanian paper *Scinteia* which warmly praised the friendly relations between Romania and Communist China. Referring to the trade agreement which had been signed some three weeks earlier, the article stated that goods to be exchanged between the two countries would continue to be increased and diversified. After mentioning the strides made by Communist China in the field of industry and agriculture, the article concluded by stating that Romania was convinced that "the friendship and cooperation between Romania and China will be further developed."

A 19 April *Radio Moscow* broadcast in Mandarin to China reported that Nikolae Ceausescu, Secretary-General of the Romania Communist Party and President of the State Council of the Romanian Republic, had said that "Romanian people join people of the Soviet Union and people of other countries in commemorating the great Communist theorist and the revolutionary leader of the proletariat, Lenin." The Moscow broadcast went on to state, "The Romanian Party activist and statesman emphatically point out that the Romanian Republic values its friendship with Lenin's country and will henceforth develop cooperation between the two

*Excerpts from "Communist Propaganda Highlights: Analysis and Trends," Issue No. 25–70, 19 June 1970, pp. 25–27—25–29.

countries in order to consolidate the world socialist system and promote universal peace."

On 9 June, *Radio Peking* ... reported the arrival of Emil Bodnares and the delegation of the Grand National Assembly of the Romanian Socialist Republic by special plane after concluding their visit to NK. On hand to greet them at the airport were Kang Sheng, Huang Yung-sheng, Li Hsien-nien, and Kuo Mo-jo. A second broadcast later the same day reported that Chou En-lai, Kang Sheng, Huang Yung-sheng, and Li Hsien-nien had held talks with Bodnares and Romanian Ambassador Aurel Duma. The speeches by Kang Sheng and Emil Bodnares at a dinner celebrating the arrival of the Romanian delegation that evening were carried the following day by *Radio Peking*.

The People's Daily carried a welcoming editorial on 9 June, which was broadcast over *Radio Peking* that day. The editorial praised Romania for maintaining its independence and sovereignty from "foreign aggression and interference." The editorial then concluded, "We believe that the coming friendly visit to our country ...is bound to strengthen the traditional friendship between the people of China and Romania still further and make a positive contribution to the militant unity among the revolutionary people of the world."

On 11 June, *Peking* domestic Chinese and NCNA English language service carried the texts of speeches made by Chou En-lai and Emil Bodnares at a banquet given by the Romanian Ambassador in honor of the visiting Romanian delegation. Chou reported that Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao had met with Bodnares and the other Romanian guests and that cordial and friendly talks had been held on those questions that "concerned them both" and that "positive results had been received thereby." Chou also took the opportunity to assail directly the US for its actions in Indochina. Without naming the Soviet Union, Chou alluded to US-USSR collusion in the division and maintenance of their respective spheres of influence and in their interference in the internal affairs of other nations.

For his part, Bodnares praised Communist China for its achievements in agriculture and industry, the launch of its first man-made satellite, and condemned the US for its actions in Indochina.

On 12 June, the departure of the Romanian delegation was reported on *Radio Peking's* English language service. The safe arrival of the delegation in Bucharest was carried by *Radio Peking* on 13 June.

Comment: Official claims by all concerned notwithstanding, there appears to be a definite bias in the activities of Romania in its relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China. This may be due in part to the rather hard line expressed by the Soviet Union in the past, typified by a UPI article dated 8 August 1969 from Bucharest, reporting that the Soviet delegate to the Romanian Communist Party Congress, Konstantin F. Katushev, walked out when a message from Communist China was read congratulating Romania on success in its "defense of national independence." Katushev later returned to the meeting and reportedly

warned that the Soviet Communist Party would use "any effort" to counter excessive independence or disunity within socialist ranks.

Resentment of such an attitude, encouraged by Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia and the no doubt gentle arguments of the Chinese Communist representatives in Bucharest and Peking, may have contributed to the two-year delay in the renewal of a treaty of friendship between the Soviet Union and Romania. The initial friendship treaty was signed in 1948 for a period of 20 years with a provision for renewal. At the present time, according to a *Japan Times* article dated 14 June, Leonid I. Brezhnev is planning to travel to Bucharest in early July to sign the treaty.

In the meanwhile, an extended and enlarged trade pact with Communist China has been in effect for almost three months, and the Chinese have contributed a reported 50,000,000 yuan ($20,000,000) for flood relief in Romania. Communist China's concern for Romania, its repeated praise of Romania's "defense of its national independence," and the assurances that China would support Romania in maintaining its freedom of action, tend to indicate a closer relationship than has previously been the case.

Although it is a bit early to say, it is not impossible that Chinese-Romanian relations may develop to the point that the Soviet Union may fear the establishment of another "Albanian situation." Additionally, the stated position of Romania that it would fight if Soviet troops crossed its borders would lead one to suspect that Romania was counting on something more than world opinion to discourage such adventurous moves by the Soviet Union.

Finally, the presence of Yuang Uung-sheng, Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, at the 9 June meeting between Chou En-lai, Kang Sheng, Li Hsien-nien, and Emil Bodnares and other unspecified members of the Romanian delegation at least opens the possibility of some type of Communist Chinese military aid or assistance agreement being offered to, if not yet accepted by, the Romanians.

Continued observation of relations between Romania, the Soviet Union and Communist China may disclose another "Albania," albeit a more independent one, in the making.

VOICE OF THE PEOPLE OF BURMA*
By the 7th PSYOP GROUP

Analysis of Burmese antigovernment clandestine radio provided an indication of the objectives and tactics of the radio's sponsors.

The *Voice of the People of Burma* (VPB) (clandestine) continued to berate the Ne Win military government. For the week of 12–17 December 1971 the station held true to its policy of repeating its programs over a two day period. All was transmitted in Burmese. Reception was poor.

*Excerpts from "Communist Propaganda Highlights, Trends and Analysis," Issue No. 51–71, December 1971, pp. 51–15—51–16.

The first item on 12 December 1971 dealt with the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) policy on the treatment and education of prisoners of war. *VPB* stated there were five basic principles followed in the treatment of captured Burmese soldiers. This lasted nine minutes. The Ne Win clique was criticized in San Yu's speech on defense expenditures and dependence on imperialists to build Burma's industries. Another program entitled "Military Clique Which Is Stepping Up Military Expenditures to Depend More on Imperialists and to Oppose the People" lasted for nine minutes. Another program, "Talk on Austerity Exposes Dogfight" lasted 7.5 minutes and stated that the military clique is corrupting itself from within at high levels by squandering the country's money. Lasting six minutes, the last program, "Who Suffers from a System of Providing Raw Materials and Procuring Finished Products?" dealt with the Goverment's poor system of distribution of finished products. Eleven minutes of victory news from Cambodia and Vietnam closed out the broadcasts. The program for 12 December 1971 was repeated on 14 December 1971.

On 16 December 1971, the broadcast opened with "Combat News" for 3.5 minutes. The first item, "Dogfight Within Ne Win's Military Clique," was a repeat of the topic of 12 December 1971. For 5.5 minutes, it treated the corruption of high level officials and predicted more political fights and power struggles. A seven-minute program, "Ne Win's Economic Plan Will End Up Like the Welfare State Plan" followed. Calling on the people facing housing problems to fight together, "Beware of the Dangers of Military Government, Rangoon Hut Dwellers" lasted 5.5 minutes. "The Growing Struggle of the Thai People against the US and Its Followers—The Thanom-Praphat Clique" continued the broadcast for four minutes. The usual Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung Thought program closed the broadcast period. The foregoing lasted 18 minutes and presented quotations from Lenin's teaching on the dictatorship of the proletariat. This program was repeated on 17 December 1971.

Comment. During this period *VPB* was stressing governmental graft and corruption. The attack is aimed at high level officials who are said to squander the Government's money on luxurious office equipment while preaching austerity to the people. This line may create more distrust and unrest among Burmese because many are discouraged by Burma's lack of progress. Nothing is known of the *VPB* audience. If only Communists listen, they are probably convinced already that Burma's only solution is Communism. *VPB* programs then serve to reaffirm the conviction. Whether the corruption charge is true or false in Burma is not really important. People in Burma, patient though they be, know that progress is minimal. To blame some of this on corruption is a way of saying that Communism is needed and is not corrupt. *VPB*, as usual, reports the strides forward in other nation's people's wars. There is no reason, *VPB* implies, that such progress will not occur in Burma, too.

VIEWS HELD BY NORTH KOREANS ABOUT FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES*

By the 7th PSYOP GROUP

This report gives an example of how intelligence reports can improve the audience information data on which PSYOP targeting is based.

1. UNITED STATES

Source said North Koreans believed that economically, militarily, scientifically, and in material wealth the United States was the most powerful nation in the world. The NK Government did not deny these facts about the US.

Older North Koreans had the opinion that Americans were humane and gentle, and in fact some other North Koreans believed this privately. They believed that the US engaged in international cooperation. But many North Koreans believed that the US had held a constant war aggression policy throughout its 200 year history. They also believe that the US, a mighty nation, was defeated by North Korea during the Korean War, and they are proud of this victory. Moreover, in connection with the Pueblo seizure and the shooting down of the EC 121, some unsophisticated North Koreans firmly believe that the US will never think lightly of the North Koreans. On the other hand, some intelligent North Koreans believe that the US has restrained itself and endured these events in a cautious, prudent way because the US wished to avoid further involvement in Asian wars, since it was already involved in Vietnam.

When many North Koreans think of the US, their first impression is imperialism. North Koreans do not know about the real functioning of the democratic system in the US. Many also believe, because of North Korean propaganda, that Americans outwardly are humane and cooperative toward underdeveloped and small nations, but in actuality are cunning and crafty. North Korean movies and plays portray Americans in this manner.

North Korean propaganda uses the theme that US forces are stationed in Korea (1) to exploit Korea and (2) because the Korean Peninsula is a strategic base for future US expansion on the Asian mainland in concert with the Japanese. Despite this propaganda, some North Koreans reason that US forces are stationed in the ROK to provide active and positive support to the ROK, to help the ROK develop into a more advanced nation, and to protect a friendly nation from the threat of Communism. On the other hand, source observed prior to his departure from NK in

*Excerpts from "Views Held by North Koreans About Foreign Countries and Peoples," PSYOP Intelligence Notes, No. 257, 17 May 1971.

July 1969 that some North Koreans complained about the passive attitude taken by the USSR and Communist China in supporting North Korea. The US has provided visible active support to its friend, the ROK, but Communist China and the USSR have provided only passive support to their friend, North Korea. Some intelligent North Koreans attribute their poor basic living conditions to the passive aid and support given North Korea by the USSR and Communist China.

2. USSR

Source provided some information about the attitudes of North Koreans about the USSR, but it should be noted that this is based upon his experience in NK before his departure for the ROK in July 1969, and therefore attitudes may have changed in some respects.

From the end of the Japanese occupation until the mid-1950s, North Koreans regarded the USSR as a very close and friendly socialist nation, in fact almost worshipping the USSR. However, their attitude toward the Russians changed to one of keeping the Russians at a distance. The reason for this, according to source, was that at first North Koreans greatly admired the Russians because they had come to North Korea as liberators, but this friendship was not based upon a long historical relation, instead upon the momentary assistance of the Russians in liberating Korea from the Japanese and in providing help during the Korean War. However, after the Korean War, when Khrushchev adopted revisionism and peaceful coexistence, North Korean leaders began to draw away from the Russians. The attitude of the North Korean leaders was spread among the people by the North Korean propaganda apparatus.

North Koreans believed that the USSR was the strongest and most powerful of all the socialist nations, but was not as economically powerful as the US. Some had believed that the USSR was the most powerful nation in the world, but they were surprised at Khruschev's announcement proposing peaceful coexistence, and that Russian productivity would catch up with US. In so doing, Khruschev admitted that the USSR was behind the US economically. This surprised many North Koreans.

However, in science, especially space science, most North Koreans still believe that the USSR is ahead of the US. The fact that the Russians put the first man in orbit around the earth, ahead of the US, had a terrific effect on this North Korean attitude.

Some North Koreans began to feel uneasy after their dependence on the USSR became less and less, and the USSR followed revisionism and adopted some capitalist concepts. Nowadays, under Kim Il-song's concept of *chuche*, North Korea has kept its independence of the USSR, economically, politically, and ideologically.

During the 1950s and even the early 1960s it was the ambition of young students to be able to go to Moscow to study, but now only a limited number of students go. Generally, learning from the Russians has

become less and less attractive, especially since the time Khruschev adopted peaceful coexistence, his trip to the US, and his humiliation in the Cuban crisis. Now, as far as source knew, there were almost no students from the USSR and the Eastern European satellite nations in North Korea. But there were some students from African nations and North Vietnam studying in North Korea.

North Koreans considered that the Russians were cowardly, selfish, and egotistical.

3. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Source provided some information about attitudes of North Koreans toward Communist China and the Communist Chinese, but this information is based upon his experience in North Korea up until he left there in July 1969. Since then based upon current relations between NK and Communist China, attitudes of North Koreans may have changed in some respects.

The first impression that North Koreans formed of the Communist Chinese was that they were "magnanimous" and "generous." Generally, North Koreans, both leaders and ordinary people, regard Mao Thought as the product of the dotage of an old man and the Cultural Revolution as an ultraleftist action. North Koreans, at the time of the Cultural Revolution, felt proud because they believed that only in North Korea was genuine Marxist-Leninist ideology being followed, the Russians having gone to the right, and the Communist Chinese to the ultraleft. North Koreans generally thought that the Cultural Revolution in Communist China brought shame upon the Communist Bloc, and that the Cultural Revolution, which they termed a riot, would stand in the way of the unification of Korea under North Korea. They considered that the cruel acts in the Cultural Revolution against the intelligentsia would stimulate negative reactions to Communism among the intelligentsia in the ROK.

According to source, a large number of people of Korean ethnic origin lived in the northeastern part of Communist China, but during the Cultural Revolution many cadres of Korean ethnic origin were purged. This also was a factor in worsening the attitude of North Koreans toward the Communist Chinese.

Source said that there had been many small incidents during the Cultural Revolution along the Communist Chinese-North Korean border. Once in August 1967, when source was at Hyesan on the Yalu River, he saw such an incident. There was a small island in the river, which, because of floods, was usually submerged. The North Koreans built an embankment from the river bank on their side of the island. As a result of the construction of the embankment, the Chinese Communist side of the river was flooded instead of the North Korean side. The Chinese Communists, to protect their side, built a stone and wood embankment out into the river. Then the North Korean side was flooded. As a result, the

North Koreans built out from the island an embankment of stone and wood jutting out into the river at an angle a little below the Chinese Communist embankment. This directed the flow of the flood back against the Chinese Communist side of the river. Then the Chinese Communists started building another embankment to correct the situation. At this point the North Koreans proposed negotiations with the Communist Chinese. A North Korean high level provincial official was selected to meet with a Communist Chinese representative who was from a low-level organization. The North Koreans, as a result, would not hold negotiations with the Chinese. Source did not know what happened further in the matter.

Source had heard that there were many small incidents provoked intentionally by the Communist Chinese against the North Koreans. Once three or four Communist Chinese soldiers waited in an ambush in a border area until North Korean trucks came by, then they threw stones at them.

On another occasion the Communist Chinese allowed some relatives of North Koreans to cross into North Korea where they actively promoted Mao Thought.

During the period 1963–1965, according to source, the Communist Chinese authorities put economic pressure on the North Koreans by stopping or postponing the regular or periodic shipment of oil, coke, and other materials for which North Korea depended upon Communist China. Such factors worsened relations and the attitude of the North Korean leaders and people toward the Communist Chinese. North Korea did not officially attack Communist China's move toward the ultraleft, but unofficially, anti-Communist Chinese remarks were spread among the North Korean people. Brotherly relations between the North Koreans and Communist Chinese, based upon help from the Communist Chinese during the Korean War, almost disappeared. The first impression the North Koreans had of the Communist Chinese as magnanimous and generous was replaced by feelings that they were foolish, stupid, and stubborn.

In the case of an emergency, such as an attack from the ROK, the North Koreans expected that they would receive manpower support from Communist China, with material, modern military equipment, coming from the USSR.

The Communist Chinese, source believed, thought badly of the North Koreans for their great idolization of Kim II-song. Source said that in March 1968, when he was in the Pyongyang Grand Theater where there was a drama being put on by the North Korean Army, he saw the Communist Chinese diplomats display a bad attitude in welcoming Kim II-song. There were a large number of foreign diplomats present, including the Communist Chinese. The area in the center of the front rows of the theater was occupied by the foreign diplomats. A large portrait of Kim II-song was hanging at the back of the stage, and at the beginning of the affair as was the custom in North Korea, a choral group sang "The

Song of Kim II-song." When Kim II-song came to deliver a speech or when "The Song of Kim II-song" was sung, it was the custom for everyone to applaud. At the time source was at the Pyongyang Grand Theater, when "The Song of Kim II-song" was sung, everyone in the theater stood up during the song and applauded when it was finished, except for the three Communist Chinese representatives.

Unpublished Studies

ATTITUDES, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA: FACTORS IN INSURGENCY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA*

By the U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

This report illustrates how an unpublished study, bringing together a number of communication findings, can constitute a compact sourcebook of PSYOP-related intelligence for field personnel, even though the report was prepared for other purposes.

ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION

Small increases in literacy and education, improved communication factilities and urbanization in the Far East have been responsible for a slow expansion of the base of public opinion. Young army officers, professionals, students, religious leaders, businessmen and trade union leaders all seek a voice in their future. Alien and competing foreign influences often reinforce these national groups, which are beginning to understand the nature of their influence and attempt to exert it more freely. Successful expression of opinion and influence is still sporadic, however, and suffers from official efforts to censor and repress in many countries.

Some of these primarily urbanized groups have begun to serve also as links back to the predominantly rural, more traditionally oriented sectors of their communities. They thus help to change the outlook and orientation of the rural masses. Often they interpret and communicate government policy and opinion to the masses, and are becoming increasingly influential opinion molders, creating as well as interpreting mass opinion for the government. These new groups represent a new type of nationalism; pragmatic but with a touch of idealism; cosmopolitan, but without a loss of patriotism; modern, yet somewhat tolerant of tradition. They are more interested in action and results than in the dogma and ideology of their elders. For them, integrity and competence count more than the traditional values based on kinship, status or wealth, and their actions indicate their anxiety to improve matters.

* * * * *

In general, where accommodation is made to the surge of opinion and change, transition can be orderly and peaceful; where opinion is suppres-

*Excerpts from "Attitudes, Communications and Communist Propaganda: Factors in Insurgency in Southeast Asia—1962, "R–76–62 (A), U.S. Information Agency, 1962, pp. 1–29.

sed or ignored, events are more likely to produce violence or upheaval. . . . In Japan [during 1961, for example], public opinion showed a more mature and responsible face. While the mechanisms for the expression of public opinion were relatively unchanged, evidence suggests that mass media, organized pressure groups, political parties and various front groups were forced to become more aware of and responsive to public opinion favoring moderation. This desire for moderation and public order was galvanized into forceful expression by the excesses of the 1960 anti-security treaty struggle.

The Japanese example provides a classic observation on the impact of opinion. When such crystallization of opinion takes place, all institutions must pay attention to closing the gap between popular sentiment and performance of the media, parties, etc. Only when opinion is in the process of formation, or when it is not held strongly, can the media or parties pursue an active course seeking to control and mold public opinion. Once opinion has crystallized, media and political leaders ignore it only at their peril.

BASIC FACTORS INFLUENCING OPINION

. . . Several environmental factors produce unique or special problems in all nations of the Far East and basically influence the general orientation of opinion. These include: The aftermath of colonialism during which most Southeast Asian nations are attempting to recover from the painful distortion of traditions resulting from automatic imitation of the West without adequate adaptation; demands of urban elites for rapid modernization of the economy; right wing resistance to reform; peasant pressures to secure social justice and agricultural reforms; attempts to form adequate administrations and the inability of some governments to exercise authority as in South Viet-Nam, Indonesia, Laos and Burma; internal warfare and subversion as in Laos, Thailand, South Viet-Nam; separatist movements and problems of national unity in Indonesia and Burma which weaken the central goverment and aid the Communists; ethnic and racial disputes as in Burma, Malaya, Singapore and Laos; outbursts of nationalist extremism as in Indonesia; regional antagonisms like that of the triangular struggle between Thailand, Cambodia and South Viet-Nam; tensions of the divided countries of Korea, Viet-Nam and Laos; contiguity of several Southeast Asian nations to Communist China and North Viet-Nam.

REGIONAL AND LOCAL ISSUES

Local and regional issues dominate the thinking of most Asians, whether they be political or "trained" elites, laborers or peasants. A brief listing of the prevailing regional and local concerns would include: (1) social change and dislocation caused by modernization, (2) economic orientation, (3) regionalism, (4) Communist threats, (5) separatist movements and problems of national unity and (6) tensions of divided countries and problems of guerrilla warfare.

It would be difficult to over-emphasize the problems and difficulties attendant on modernization and national development in the Far East. Demands for modernization are strong among urban elites, but weak from the primarily unreceptive rural sectors. Peasants prefer to secure social justice and agricultural reforms with few resultant changes in their traditional way of life. Yet, political leaders have over-extended themselves through efforts to modernize their country too rapidly. Some of them, however, like U Nu and Sihanouk, have realized that traditional mores also must be maintained and adapted to the times if stability is to be assured.

Meanwhile, the process of modernization has progressed enough to add new strains to the old as traditional and modern groups clash. Radical changes have produced expectant new social groups, plans without managers, factories without technicians and university graduates without jobs.

* * * * *

COMMUNICATION PATTERN

With the exception of Japan and the urban centers of the Far East, the communication pattern is far from adequate for the nations' needs. A low level of information is characteristic for all sectors except the small urban elites. The press remains limited largely to urban distribution and radio receivers are too few and not widely dispersed. Most information is still transmitted through informal channels. Mass media serve to feed an increasing amount of information into informal channels.

. . .Consequently, the effective utilization of the village council is of considerable importance to leadership as a source of feedback and as a molder of peasant opinion on the government's authority and programs. District leaders and provincial governors share an important role as a feedback source to the leadership and as molders of opinion.

With the exception of Japan, and possibly Malaya and the Philippines, the general communication process providing for a dialogue between decision makers and the public is best characterized as a "semi-closed" one; the public generally cannot express itself by pressure or representative strikes or press campaigns or non-manipulated elections. Yet street demonstrations—albeit ones often organized by political parties for their own benefit, expressions of opinion in the press and intellectual quarterlies and party conferences and conventions, serve to keep the communication process partially open.

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ATTITUDES

National Development, Economic and Technical Aid

In most of the Far East, expectations of social reform and desires for economic modernization exist among Westernized, urbanized elites. The

peasant masses seek land reform, agricultural credit and simple but modern tools, yet cling to the traditional values and social customs.

While the new governments find it difficult to administer even the most basic national functions, they encounter still greater difficulties when they try to initiate change. Efforts to carry out planned economic development become especially burdensome when communication facilities are inadequate and few competent administrators and technicians exist. Since accomplishment lags far behind promise, national discontent is intensified.

Yet "modernization" is an important political issue and a rallying point for intellectual leaders and modern elements of the new states. These are also the most active political elements who can make the issue of modernization a source of unrest, discontent and turmoil in the area.

The new nationalists are seeking ideological and cultural identity, a workable political and economic system, and determined, strong leaders. Their inward search for a national character leads them to probe for a synthesis of traditional and modern ideas. Since national unity is one of the most serious problems confronting these countries, the role of the military as an agent of nationalism in South Korea, South Viet-Nam, Burma, Thailand and Indonesia, cannot be overlooked. Military organizations, which often stage coups for nationalist reasons, have the discipline, talent, *esprit de corps* and coercive means to reorganize and operate their country more effectively than the diffuse bureaucracies. Yet military rule often creates political tension and an atmosphere more favorable to the growth of communism than democracy.

[International Issues]

There is a massive disinterest, even by Asian elites, in most international issues which do not directly impinge on their interests. The burning struggle in the world for them is not the Berlin crisis or even the ideological struggle between communism and democracy, but rather the development of their own new nations. They say so, quite vigorously.

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TARGET GROUPS

The following sections will discuss the various groups involved in change. The groups are discussed, for convenience, under the usual three major categories. The categories should be considered flexible, however, for the early stage of modernization and change has not yet produced definitive patterns and roles.

General Populace. This numerically preponderant group is generally inarticulate but capable of becoming a strong force if stirred by their leaders. It includes peasants, ethnic minorities, army enlisted men, and unskilled laborers. The great size of these masses contrasts sharply with the small number of elite who control the society.

Middle Class. This is an expanding group, containing articulate political forces, and one where the distinction between "westernized" and

"traditional" is more strikingly apparent. It includes professionals, the religious hierarchy, educators, students, communicators, civil servants, junior army officers, labor leaders and a growing group of businessmen.

Elite This includes top government officials, senior army officers and the monarchy.

Voluntary Associations and Interest Groups. A fourth category might deal with combinations of these population elements into voluntary associations and interest groups.

General Populace

Peasants. They comprise the bulk of Southeast Asian society and are often least receptive to change because of their lack of education, fears of the supernatural, devotion to religious principles and tradition. Although they are not directly involved in the structure of power or the process of government, their support is necessary for those in power. Thus, indirectly, they influence the government. Although the peasants are largely unorganized, cooperatives are gaining popularity and politicians—especially the Communists—are attempting to organize them. Among the peasantry, the village headman either because of his age, education or respectability, is given high credence and serves as a source of news and advice for the peasants.

Labor. A major problem for this group is created by the frequently abrupt transition many workers make from a more or less primitive rural subsistence economy to a technologically more advanced urban economy. Governments in the area are attempting to help them adjust to the requirements of an industrialized life in order to prevent them from becoming dissatisfied and a prey to opposition leaders. Labor, particularly plantation, dock and mine workers, has been a prime target for Communist infiltration tactics.

Urban Proletrariat. This urban, unskilled labor group, separate from the urban industrial labor force, includes, for example, street vendors and pedi-cab drivers, who have become socially mobile and are beginning to respond to and participate in political parties and small pressure groups. This group—breaking away from traditional social controls —has suffered personal maladjustment and disorganization; juvenile delinquency and unemployment frequently plague this group. As their desire for education and advancement increases along with their discontent, they will become increasingly important as a target for mass communicators, politicians and others competing for their support.

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Army Enlisted Men. The enlisted men come from the lower classes and have little chance for education, exert little influence and are more susceptible to blandishments from any side which can offer them a better life. They are important because they have roots in the local community and often carry information to it.

Ethnic Minorities. The number of indigenous tribal minority groups in Southeast Asia created by physical conditions and differences of race,

attitudes, beliefs, and language, is estimated in the hundreds. Sharply differentiated from one another, these tribal groups who generally live in a semi-savage state have in common a fierce pride in their own organizations and cultural patterns and an intense fear of being swallowed up by the alien culture of the majority. These do not include alien minorities such as the Chinese or Indians.

Although often small in number, the individual minority groups when combined account for a fairly large segment of the area population. They constitute elements in the society which are highly susceptible to dissident and subversive activities. If well organized and directed, these minority groups could exert considerable influence.

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Women. With increasing urbanization and improved education and organizational consciousness, women are assuming more active roles. Their influence is generally projected through women's organizations, but they are also important in some business circles and in education. Limited surveys to date show that women are a substantial and distinct target audience. It would be most difficult to reach both men and women of the non-elite group with a single program or magazine. Radio listening, which permits women to have contact with the outside world while performing their household duties, appears to be a major source of information for women who own sets.

Middle-Level Groups

Mass Communicators. Because of the relative lack of effective political opposition groups, civic and special interest associations or pressures from academic personnel or professional classes, newspaper editors and others in mass media work must carry the heavy burden of responsible instruction of public opinion.

Often, however, the government itself employs many of the nation's best publicists, and their consequent removal from journalistic action leaves the field open to less responsible, less educated journalists. In addition, the low status of journalists, in comparison with those into whose public conduct they would inquire, tends to hamper the press. Many reporters are critical of those they consider "politicians" but often their criticism is tempered by the relationship of the newspaper publisher or editor to a particular party or politician. The editorialists find it easier to write about Western foreign policies and problems than the current problems of their own societies; however, this does not mean that foreign news coverage is heavier than domestic coverage. There are exceptions, of course, and as the number of educated editors in Southeast Asia increases, they will be most influential in understanding and helping to advance modernization.

Religious Leaders. (Buddhist) Buddhist monks provide the largest number of public-opinion molders in Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and to a lesser extent, South Viet-Nam. The members of the *Sangha* (order of monks) belong to individual monasteries and sects but have a cohesive organization. The chief monk or abbot—head of the

local *wat* (pagoda)—possesses high prestige within the community, is a source of influence and information and is one of the few members of the village community (outside of the teachers) who reads newspapers and is a transmitter of new ideas.

Buddhist monks now receive training in state schools and indoctrination in secular thoughts and methods. Because of increasing social and political consciousness, the monks are attempting to keep abreast of modern learning and methods.

In addition to the role of the *Sangha*, powerful Buddhist societies of laymen, such as the *Sasana* council in Burma, play an important role as informal pressure groups. Although theoretically aloof from secular affairs, there is ample evidence in recent history to indicate that these groups respond dynamically to important issues such as the threat of local Communists to the Buddhist religion and the Communist threat to Buddhism in Tibet.

(*Islamic*) In the Muslim country of Indonesia, where religion is inextricably interwoven with politics, the role of the *ulema* (Muslim scholar and teacher) is not as influential as the monk in the Buddhist world. Ulemas are apparently more influential in the outer islands, where there are greater manifestations of devotion to religion, than in Java where political affiliations are as important as religious ones. The *ulemas* are frequently highly nationalistic and make their influence felt through the political party, the *Nahadatul Ulama*.

Divisions within Islam occur along two prominent lines. There is the social cleavage in Java between the communities of the *Santri* the devoutly Muslim persons often associated with town or village trade, and the communities of the intelligentsia or middle class of the cities and large towns who are nominally Muslim but accept most of the cultural content of Western civilization and are more receptive to change. A second type of cleavage has developed inside the Muslim *Santri* between modernism and religious reform as expressed by the urban small traders and the orthodox Masjumi Party. Such cleavages condition attitudes toward change and make different communications approaches necessary.

(*Catholic*) In the predominantly Catholic Philippines, the priests are very influential and the Church is a dominant force second only to political parties. In South Viet-Nam, although Catholics form only ten percent of the population, there is a large percentage of Catholics in high government positions.

Labor Leaders. They tend to be middle-class intellectuals strongly favoring economic development and change. They are becoming influential because of their affiliation with political parties and the support they can devliver by virtue of their control of mass organizations. Many have simply chosen the unions as an additional stepping-stone to power, prestige or just to provide a higher standard of living.

Junior Army Officers. Junior army officers, together with university

students, serve as major communication channels between Western influence and their own culture. Both junior and senior army officers have the added advantage of being well disciplined with both administrative capacity and responsibility. This demonstrated capacity is the more remarkable in a situation where decision-making by deliberation and compromise is neither customarily applied nor effective.

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Middle-echelon officers are trained primarily in their own countries and act as mediators between the top and lower levels. Often they are closer to the rural and urban middle classes and are influential in bringing about change.

In Burma, South Viet-Nam, Malaya, Laos, and the Philippines, middle-level army officers and the rank-and-file are coming into closer contact with the masses through civic action committees, or National Solidarity Councils (Burma) through which they attempt to curb insurgency, fight the Communists and at the same time promote citizenship and greater loyalty to the state. Through these activities, they gain greater status and authority and also become a more effective channel for information.

The development of a traditional, professional corps and the establishment of defense colleges and economic institutions—that is, National Defense College and Defense Services Institute of Burma—indicate an increasingly persuasive and possibly intellectual role for the Army. Certainly the Army can be expected to exert a far greater influence in civilian affairs than ever before.

Most decisive of all, will be the extent to which military leaders are able to broaden their own education so as to see their country in perspective and cope more effectively with the innumerable problems confronting their countries.

Small Businessmen. The economic and social "underdevelopment" of Southeast Asian countries is often reflected in the small size and structure of the middle class. The entrepreneurial classes tend to be more mercantile and financial, and these are not the fields in which economic progress is sought. Although there are numerous small retail traders, they are largely illiterate and have assimilated little modern culture. Government restrictions on foreign businessmen are gradually propelling indigenous groups to participate in the economic life of their countries. As they grow, so may their influence.

Overseas Chinese now control most of the trade in Southeast Asian countries, and although assimilation is taking place, they are likely to preseve a separate cultural identity for several more generations. Restrictive measures now being applied to Overseas Chinese in several countries are intended to offer new opportunities to indigenous businessmen, but these measures may cause more Overseas/Chinese to look toward Peking for support.

University Students. Students are among the foremost progenitors of change, the first to become disenchanted with the slowness of economic

and social progress and the first to revolt against tradition. The inadequate opportunities open to them after graduation may lead, and in some cases have already led, them to agitate for rapid change and to cooperate with groups advocating the overthrow of incumbent governments.

In Burma, Indonesia and Malaya, especially, student organizations have grown strong and are militantly anti-colonialist and nationalistic. Communist elements everywhere are ready to take advantage of and attempt to infiltrate these groups. For these reasons, ruling elites regard student groups as unruly, fear their power, question their political abilities and are currently making efforts either to silence them or appease them.

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Teachers and University Professors. Teachers throughout the rural areas of Southeast Asia traditionally hold a respected place in society and are important opinion leaders. In rural areas they are often the only newspaper readers and source of news and opinion. But in urban areas the traditional respect for teachers is being gradually transferred to political leaders. In Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya, teachers' unions are taking on the character of trade unions as they seek greater benefits for their members and try to promote better citizenship. Their cohesiveness and organization are not great, however, despite highly centralized educational systems.

University professors, many of whom are Western educated, ordinarily are not the leaders of the intelligentsia; government control of the universities often hampers the exercise of leadership and professors generally lack any power to alter the situation.

The major area of effectiveness of this group is as a channel of communication and influence for the intelligentsia and the students. But the wide gulf that exists between faculty and students—based on traditional deference to persons in authority—restricts their effectiveness and makes it only formal one-way communication. The influence of this group is thus based more on prestige than on power or action.

Elite-Level Groups

Intellectuals and Administrators. This important group's attitudes differ substantially from the general national attitudes with respect to goals and values, principally because of their Western training. They believe in the truth of science and in its application: the value of rational administration, written laws and orders, achievement and professionalism. Gradually they are beginning to place less emphasis upon religious and family affiliation, and believe more in progress, and, to a limited extent, planning on a long-term basis. They are somewhat delocalized, albeit less completely than they themselves think. The cleavage between them and the rest of the population is often apparent; their problem a universal one.

These intellectuals—though usually employed in the government

—are often distrusted by the politicians, who, although often intellectuals themselves, are more populistic and even demagogic. Criticism by political leaders has appeared to weaken the position of the intellectuals, making them less prone to oppose the often unrealistic aspirations of their political superiors. For all these reasons, effective criticism by these groups within the government is insufficient and ineffective.

Those intellectuals remaining outside the government often express themselves through organizations which could contribute to improvement of the quality of public opinion, providing as they do a vague, unorganized opposition to government. But for the most part, the intellectuals remain alienated from the centers of public life. They are disillusioned and unhappy about the course of events, including the government's inability to utilize their talents.

Intellectuals and Specialists: A new sector of the intellectual class is beginning to develop with chemists, engineers, accountants, statisticians, doctors, and lawyers forming the nucleus. This sector is more specialized and professional and less generally interested in cultural and political matters. It could, however, form the basis for future stable and progressive societies. Though small in number, the high prestige of these people, especially in the cities, enables them to influence acquaintances, clients and others outside of their professions. Nevertheless, they usually lack direct political influence and a popular following.

Overseas Chinese form a significant part of these intellectual groups only in Singapore and Malaya, where educated Chinese outnumber educated Malays. Elsewhere, in Southeast Asia, however, the professional classes include only a few Chinese members. In addition to the frustrations affecting other intellectuals, the Overseas Chinese intellectuals tend to be susceptible to the appeal of association with the mainland and fear discrimination because of their alien origin.

Upper-Rank Military Officers. Most of the upper-rank military officers are young men strongly desirous of technological improvements within the society. At present, many senior officers have been Western-trained either in the West or by Western methods; many have received a technical education in engineering colleges and are thus more favorably disposed toward Western life. If the Army itself is not in power, senior army officers often maintain close contact with the ruling elite.

Voluntary Associations and Interest Groups

There is a growing body of private and voluntary associations and interest groups whose influence will undoubtedly increase in the future. Although few in number at present, trade union and employers associations, professional and business associations, and welfare organizations perform significant functions on behalf of their members, including providing regulations for those within the association or

negotiating and bargaining with each other. Until recently, the family or village circle played this role and provided for such needs. Both the Philippines and Indonesia have a large number of such associations; their numbers are growing in Burma, South Viet-Nam and Malaya. In Thailand, Cambodia and Laos, individualism and ideas of personal responsibility make associations less popular.

These associations often are subject to governmental interference and political influence, but they constitute at best an extra arena for the practice of democracy and group responsibility outside the official life of the country.

VALUES

The transitional societies of Southeast Asia, contending with the disruptions accompanying modernization, appear simultaneously confounded, dismayed and enlightened by the changes occurring in their societies. As they become caught in the economic and social tide inseparable from the age of technology, many people undergoing urbanization remain uprooted and divorced from their traditional cultures and values, without acquiring adequate substitutes.

Practically all of the Southeast Asian nations are culturally and ethnically heterogeneous, traditional values strongly centered in religious orthodoxy are powerful among them, belief in the efficacy of supernatural forces is common, xenophobia is characteristic, kinship and stratification promote particularistic loyalties, lack of technological skills and illiteracy prevail and internal communications remain inadequate. Nearly all these nations confront a preponderant peasant majority, which, if it is not apathetic and withdrawn into its parochial life, is quietly or actively resistant to efforts to modernize it.

In efforts to bridge the gap between traditionalism and modernity, the influence of "modernizing" indigenous elites and interested Westerners appears most successful if it includes an appeal to the more deep-lying values which are part of a country's patterns. New norms are most likely to be acceptable when they are carefully designed to harmonize with selected traditional values. Successful change can occur within the society when types of resistance are recognized and understood, when technological innovations bring with them products valued in the culture, when innovations are carefully planned and when the elite and rising middle class work closely together.

Principal elements of Asian cultures and values will be examined in order to determine their importance in Southeast Asia and to weigh their resistance or adaptability to change. These principal values include moral, spiritual and religious; those relating to knowledge and education; social status and the family; attitudes toward authority, obedience and cooperation; and economic factors including attitudes toward work and leisure.

Contrary to the basic sense of individual determinism commonly accepted in the West, the Asian lives in a universe determined by the will of God, not man. Throughout the Buddhist-Hindu arc of Asia, there is widespread acceptance that the material world is merely an extension of the "real world" of the spirit and that all striving for material success is but an illusion. Thus, Asians see man's relationship to nature and the universe as pre-determined, which leads to a fatalistic acceptance of life as it is—Asia's law of *Karma*.

Spiritual values dominate the lives of Southeast Asian people: their religion provides a system of morality, a guiding philosophic principle for the sophisticated believer, a source of inspiration for ardent nationalists and meaningful symbols for the religious devotees. Despite acceptance of the formal religions of Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, and Islam, animistic beliefs are also dominant among a majority of people in Southeast Asia.

Buddhism. Buddhism is probably the most important unifying cultural force in Southeast Asia. It predominates in every country except Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines and is an integral part of an eclectic Confucianism in South Viet-Nam. In practice and theory, Buddhism is not necessarily incompatible with or opposed to the development of science and technology. Like Christianity, Buddhism cautions man against undue materialism and insists upon the dominance of spiritual values. Freedom of man is proclaimed to a high degree in Buddhism as the doctrine of individual self-development but is tempered by the doctrine of *Karma*.

Fundamentally Buddhism stresses the rational processes of the individual in attaining salvation by understanding, and above all it stresses the concept of knowledge as a part of this process. Its stress on complete equality of caste, color and creed, its real brotherhood of man and its fundamental anti-materialism discourage selfishness and provide the basis for a social conscience. Unfortunately, in its sojourn among authoritarian governments, these aspects of Buddhism have not always been developed. Because of its tenets, Buddhism has and may continue to be used to support policies of neutralism as a middle path in a changing world.

Buddhism and Change. Buddhism teaches the inevitability of change. Social mobility, either upward or downward, is to be expected, and is made possible through various combinations of religious achievement —merit-gaining, favorable marriage, political success, and, increasingly, secular education. In the Buddhist countries of Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and to a limited extent, South Viet-Nam, identification with any form of Buddhism inevitably invests the participant with a high degree of social acceptability and facilitates his achievement of status in society.

Nevertheless, a contradiction appears in Buddhist countries between the acceptance of change and anti-materialist teachings. As more mate-

rial goods become available—particularly in connection with Western aid programs—conflict occurs within society, primarily in the urban centers.

The temporary dominance of *Karma* and anti-materialism often justifies the lack of positive action by Asian administrators, which in turn aids in discouraging mass political participation in economic and social programs. The knowledge that the world is sorrow, that present suffering stems from a previous incarnation, that the only hope of peace of soul is not to improve this world, but to escape from it, are powerful reasons for inactivity, and often for passive acceptance of external phenomena. Disasters are met with relative equanimity because of the conviction that in the next cycle, a fresh start can be made. This frequent attitude of passivity and reliance upon providence often makes it difficult to help Asians help themselves.

Westerners, guided by a sense of responsibility for performance in a limited time, may encounter annoying barriers and setbacks, which are often erroneously attributed to laziness or indifference. Reference to the Buddhist belief in change may help in overcoming local indifference or resistance in such situations.

Leading Buddhists are becoming increasingly aware that traditional concepts must be modified to tolerate certain Western influences. Many Buddhist leaders have recognized that Buddhism must seek accommodations with Western-induced changes if it is to preserve itself and its influence in individual and national affairs.

Islam in Indonesia and Malaya. Religion in Indonesia is an inextricable partner in politics, and proponents of theocratic and secular philosophies vie with one another for favor of the masses. As in Malaya, where Islam is also the dominant religion, many still profess devotion to Islam but are less observant of its rituals.

Indonesian Muslims share something in their common faith, but for most of them, Islam is not the unifying force that it has been in much of the Middle East. In addition, the underlying paganism of the Indonesians gives Islam a different undertone from Islamic practice elsewhere in the world. And regional differences come into play. Thus, although Islam is undoubtedly an influential force in Javanese cultural development, it can best be described as "folk Islam," while an evangelical Islamic purism prevails elsewhere in Indonesia. Although Islam is dominant in Indonesia, it also confronts other religions such as the Hinduism of the Balinese and the Christianity of approximately 2,500,000 Indonesians.

Islam and Change. Islam leaves less room for change than does Buddhism and within Muslim communities there is a stronger desire to maintain a status-oriented society. Life moves from day to day, and Indonesians and Malays alike feel that there is little need to look into the future. Time is not the moving backdrop of action that it is in the West. An indirect and subtle approach to problems is traditionally valued above directness and speed. This is changing among urbanized Malays and Indonesians, yet while socialized planning is becoming a watchword, the concept evidently appeals more than the reality of the approach.

Philippine and Vietnamese Catholicism. Catholicism dominates thinking in the Philippines, is influential among a small minority in South Viet-Nam, and aids in offering the society a purposefulness not often seen elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Significantly, it is the Church which has become the most potent organized political force outside the political parties.

Confucian Vestiges in South Viet-Nam. The existence of an eclectic Confucian doctrine together with Buddhism and Catholicism is important in shaping not only religion but a way of life in South Viet-Nam. Social organization rests on the Confucian doctrine of universal harmony in which heaven, earth and man each have their appointed place and their minutely prescribed relationships with each other. Confucianism stresses individual perfection whereby each, through education, learns to fulfill properly the role necessary to continue universal balance.

As a result, the individual Vietnamese is frequently faced with the impossible dilemma growing out of conflict between his own necessities and values and those values imposed by society. Humanist, individual and Marxist values have been particularly difficult to harmonize with approved Confucian values. His attempt to obey all these conflicting values has helped to earn the Vietnamese a reputation for insincerity.

Attitudes of Youth toward Religion and Morality. Not surprisingly, it is among the younger generation that traditional religious values are being challenged and changed most. Problems of delinquency and declining moral standards of youth are becoming more common throughout the area, particularly in the cities.

Attitudes toward Knowledge and Education. As one of the highest values on the Asian social scale, education is one of the most potent single factors of common concern to the many and varied countries of Southeast Asia. Significantly Southeast Asia and the West differ in their attitudes concerning education. In the former, the value of education rests more on the status and prestige it confers than on the substantive learning which it implies. Education is relatively difficult to obtain and is therefore a necessary qualification for advancement. In Thailand, for example, civil service pay is largely regulated by the number of degrees which an individual holds.

Although education is also considered a means of advancement in the West, it is primarily valued for its substantive content. The spirit of Western intellectualism is little understood in Southeast Asia, while the American tradition of the uneducated "self-made man" is non-existent.

Education in Southeast Asia is increasingly valued as a patriotic duty. This involves not only the pride of nationalism—providing a more deep seated and durable basis for national loyalties—but also a genuine desire to enter a new and better era. The elites are anxious to borrow foreign educational methods primarily to bring their country up to date.

Furthermore, literacy has become the necessary lubricant in the development of modern political machinery throughout the area. Illiteracy

not only closes off valuable channels of communication but, more importantly, perpetuates the immaturity of peoples incapable of grasping the problems and necessities of modernization. Leaders are aware that an illiterate population is easy prey to every pretender offering a glittering promise of a bright tomorrow.

Relationship of Education to Communications. In the capital cities of most Southeast Asian countries, the mass media are an important influence on the educated. In the rural areas, the teacher, in addition to the Buddhist priest or the village headman, assumes a highly significant role as a source of information and knowledge. Teachers are often expected to take an active role in public affairs, serve on committees and act as inspectors at elections. The teachers are very influential in persuading villagers to obey government policies and in introducing Western ideas and products.

SOCIAL VALUES

The Family. The high value placed upon the family and loyalty to the family is an important factor to be understood by any alien group attempting to work with Southeast Asians. Close family ties with the ensuing high rate of social interaction, particularly in the villages, produce intimate communities with little privacy, where news of interest can be spread rapidly via the "rice harp" or "bamboo radio" of word-of-mouth communications.

Apart from work, religious observances and holidays and family observances continue to constitute the main fabric of village life in Asia. This pattern is more enthusiastically observed in the villages than in the cities.

The structure and organization of the family have been and continue to be diverse among Southeast Asian countries. In South Viet-Nam and to a limited extent in Burma, the family is an extended or joint one—including a number of generations and subject to the control of a patriarchal head commanding a strict sense of obligation and duty.

In Indonesia (Javanese family), and Thailand, however, the small conjugal family—parents and unmarried children—is prevalent and considerable latitude in behavior is permitted. In such a system, kin ties are relatively weak, and other factors such as wealth, class, status, age, education, occupation, and religious affiliation draw men together or set them apart. In Indonesia (Sumatra) and Malaya, the neighborhood community (*rukun tanggan*) is a territorial entity which acquires a kinship quality, and the sense of closeness and cultural obligation may be stronger between neighbors than between distant relatives—an important distinction for communicators.

As a result of urbanization, family life in Southeast Asia is changing rapidly. Change may be traced to disruption of the family as a producing economic unit caused by the migration of its members to the city, and by the increasing need to adapt to a monetary as distinguished from a subsistence economy. As the family system breaks down, and becomes less of a focal point, townsmen are disassociating themselves from tradi-

tional patterns and are beginning to respond to political parties, civic action groups and educational committees.

Particularly evident is the tendency for patriarchal authority to diminish, the status of women to be elevated, the high prestige of elders to wane, and increased individualism to characterize the society. This breakdown of informal social controls is manifest in problems of personal maladjustment and disorganization, juvenile delinquency, increased divorces, and in the acute nature of problems with which the changing family is often unable to cope in the urban setting, such as illness, unemployment and old age.

Some changes, howevever, must be recognized as desirable. These include the reduced despotism of the family head, the improved status of women and greater personal freedom. It becomes increasingly important for Asians to plan to use the new urban institutions such as schools, hospitals, playgrounds and day centers to deal with the problems of the changing family. There is a need to replace the disrupted social controls with such formal controls as police, courts, reformatories, prisons and child-women labor laws. Information on establishing these controls is often lacking and informational materials on how these controls operate in other countries are often sought.

Social Problems. Lack of information and the inability to deal with and recognize the causes of new social problems often lead these countries to single out a scapegoat for their frustrations or to make harsh judgments on foreign societies which have similar problems. American family life and cooperative community action programs are little understood in Asia. Many Asians visiting the United States criticize Americans for lack of closeness, homogeneity and responsibilities to the family. Even knowledgeable Asians criticize the seeming breakdown in authority in many American relationships, including those between parent-child, employer-employee, teacher-student, government-people, and management-labor.

Although delinquency is becoming a problem in Asian cities, due primarily to changes in society, Asian leaders often blame this on the influence of American culture and criticize the United States for its "glaring" delinquency. Many attribute these problems to the fact that women have so much freedom, work and thus spend less time with their families—a problem which Asians also are beginning to face.

Respect for Age. Respect for old age has been a traditional aspect of life in Asia and remains a significant social value. Dependent old people look to their children and grandchildren to support them. Formerly, old people were entitled to complete respect, but today, particularly in urban centers, how much is given varies with the circumstances. Burma is an example of a country which is unusually age-oriented and all social intercourse is governed by the preferential treatment accorded to senior members of a given group.

This respect for old age has application for foreign agencies operating

in Southeast Asia. For example, senior Asian officials accustomed to respect because of their age and status are often insulted when confronted with young persons from a foreign country sent to work with them on an equal basis. And Americans are often criticized by Asians visiting the United States for not paying greater deference to their elders, and for not sharing responsibility for them. To them it appears that old people are unloved and neglected, forced to get jobs and to shift for themselves in loneliness. It is difficult for them to comprehend the social mobility and occupational opportunities which take children away from their parents or the fact that old people often prefer to live an active and independent life after passing their prime.

The Nature of Authority. The predominant tendency in Asia is for authority to be hierarchical. The highly traditional nature of the society places decision-making in the hands of persons who achieved their position largely but not solely through the qualifications of kinship, age, and sex. Thus, whole sections of the population have no share in the exercise of public authority. The chief effect of this heirarchical structure of authority is to generate either excessive submissiveness among the ordinary people or an extremist egalitarianism, by way of reaction against it. The social organizations necessary for the pursuit of private interests and for the exercise of influence are lacking for the most part. Insofar as people are adjusted to this they have little interest in democracy, little concept of their rights as citizens and above all are little inclined, unless there has been a fundamental break with tradition, to speak out their own views and preferences.

Status and Power. People of Southeast Asian countries attach great importance to status and power both in social and political life. Considerations of status and power permeate human relationships, adherence to Buddhism notwithstanding. Southeast Asians define any social and political situation by the relative status and power involved, and then establish their relationship to it on the basis of these elements.

Class and status consciousness predominate in urban areas; in rural areas less emphasis is placed upon status, although respect for authority remains high. In the cities, many urbanites adopt Western material values to accrue status and thus climb the social ladder. This may contradict Buddhist tenets denying material gains, but urban elites often justify their conduct on the basis of gaining "merit" by rising in the social order. In rural areas, however, status comes more from the maintenance of spiritual tenets and morality than from material advance.

Social mobility is common in Burma, which lacks a well-defined class structure. This has bred social insecurity or *ahnade*. Many Burmans seek power to gain security from controversy and criticism.

In countries such as Cambodia, Laos, South Viet-Nam, Thailand, Indonesia, and to a limited extent, the Philippines, where there is little social mobility, the prerequisites for status are wealth, family, background, formal rank and office.

Practically applied, status-consciousness affects the entire question of

regionalism within Southeast Asia and makes cooperation difficult because elites of the various countries often consider their own nation eminently superior to that of their neighbors.

* * * * *

Cooperation and Consultation. Cooperation and consultation are strongly linked with familial respect and play an important part in the thinking of many Southeast Asians, especially the decision-makers. Often the desire for consultation and cooperation stems from the efforts of leaders to "save face," to prevent error and to avoid ridicule and criticism. But it must also be considered as part of the religious and kinship systems of the countries.

In Indonesia, great importance is attached to cooperation, consultation, avoidance of disharmony, and decision based on general agreement. These concepts operate principally in the communally-centered Javanese society and contrast sharply with the more individualistic areas in the outlying islands. *Gotong rojong*, the pattern of mutual aid, is a central theme in Javanese social life. It is institutionalized in almost every aspect of village life. . . .

Attitudes toward Work and Leisure. Hard work, diligence, perseverence and punctuality are doubtful values in Southeast Asia; one does not work except if one must. Frequently, religious values related to passivity and reliance on providence condition these attitudes. Many Asians can and will work hard by any standards, but only for foreseeable ends. Work is not valued as an end in itself, and the Western idea that one should be ashamed of idleness is not found in Asia.

Leisure, especially in rural areas, comes from seasonal variations in work output. Leisure as well as work may be pursued for relatively long periods of time. Thus, individuals, and sometimes the whole country, may be given to what a Western observer would describe as veritable orgies of work and entertainment.

Gradually, ideas of leisure are changing, especially for younger people in the cities. As new forms of recreation replace old ones, adjustments on the part of all segments of the society are necessary before fear and criticism of the effects of new forms can be dispelled.

Cultural Values. As these countries attempt to seek a *modus vivendi* with Western cultural values and attitudes, concurrent pride in their indigenous traditional art, music, sculpture and religious philosophies remains a dominant factor. Some intellectuals and the political elite, often xenophobic and nationalistic because of their struggle for independence, consider the introduction of alien culture a disruptive influence. Criticism of what they consider the "debasing" features of American culture manifests itself as in the "anti-yellow-culture campaigns" of Singapore and Indonesia. This approach conflicts with and hinders the development of outlook and knowledge necessary for a "modernizing" society. A fusion of the best of Western and Asian forms might be a desirable compromise; so far, however, both have blossomed in separate or conflicting existences.

Although there are many methods used to collect and analyze intelligence, only five of the most important are illustrated in this section: intuition, direct observation, interviewing, sampling, and content analysis.

Intuition

The use of intuitive judgments, based on physical evidence of some form, is sometimes confused with guess work. However, intuitive reasoning in the PSYOP intelligence process should not be undertaken by persons who do not have expertise in the subject. In other words, it is only on the basis of a firm background that one should attempt to extrapolate and produce from such extrapolations guidelines for psychological operations. Intuition is the method of producing intelligence that is least reliable.

Direct Observation

Direct observation is an obvious—but often impractical—method of obtaining intelligence. Observation is highly desirable, but clearly, a trained observer is necessary to obtain optimum benefit from observation possibilities in many situations. Observation need not be by nationals of the intelligence-gathering state. Other friendly or neutral observers can serve the purpose equally well. Indeed, captured or surrendered enemy may have had access to certain PSYOP-relevant information by observation. (See "Interviewing" below.)

Interviewing and Interrogation

As a method of converting information possessed by individuals into usable intelligence, interviews can be a valuable tool. Interviewing can take a number of forms and can be applied to friendly, neutral, and hostile respondents. Interrogation may be considered to be a specialized form of interview.

The structuring of the interview and instrument validation procedure are required in all interview situations, whether PSYOP related or not. These are the major problems of interviewing as an intelligence assimilation technique. Another problem associated with the use of interviews is language. Translation of questions or questionnaires can be a very difficult procedure.

In the case of captured personnel, the problems of obtaining false intelligence and extracting intelligence from them are both difficult. A reasonable assessment of the reliability of the source and accuracy of the information gathered must be attempted but cannot always be accomplished. For surrendered personnel, the desire to please the interrogators may influence the content of the information given and therefore an equally stringent assessment of reliability is required.

Sampling

Sampling may be used in conjunction with direct observation, document analysis, or interviewing. It is a demanding procedure, usually undertaken (or at least planned) by extensively trained professionals. An original essay on sampling is included in this section, in an attempt to present a brief, yet comprehensive picture of the major types of samples as well as common problems in sampling.

Content Analysis

Content analysis is a tool that has been refined and sophisticated for sociopolitical research over the years. It is now a powerful means of gathering information relevant to PSYOP. It can reveal the themes, appeals, and target audiences to which the psyoperator is directing his propaganda efforts, and it can also serve as a key indicator of enemy vulnerabilities, as seen by the enemy hierarchy. Content analysis also serves as a basis for counterpropaganda preparation. In spite of the sophistication of which content analysis is capable, it can also provide meaningful analyses without computerized support.

The papers in this section, then, illustrate but a few of the many possible methods of gathering and analyzing materials relevant to PSYOP intelligence needs.

METHODS FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF MAJOR PSYOP INFORMATION SOURCES*

BY PHILLIP P. KATZ

A discussion of the variety of methods available for deriving useful PSYOP-relevant information from a diversity of sources.

This essay will discuss major PSYOP intelligence sources and relate them to PSYOP EEI and the techniques used for gathering data. Figure 1** illustrates the PSYOP intelligence process and program implementation. This section will discuss only the first two elements of the scheme —information source and data collection and testing (method). As Figure 2 indicates, the information source plus the data-gathering technique provide the answers to the EEI for PSYOP intelligence. Both will be discussed. In addition, this section will relate the information source to the PSYOP target, utilization, and the appropriate collecting agency. (See Figure 3).

PSYOP intelligence input data are obtained from published (reference) material and current data sources. Current data are obtained from primary and other sources. Primary information sources are: (1) prisoners of

*Original essay by Phillip P. Katz.

**Repeated from opening essay in this chapter for reader's convenience.



Figure 1. A Schema of PSYOP Intelligence

INFORMATION SOURCE	DATA GATHERING TECHNIQUE: INTERROGATION	IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW	SAMPLE SURVEY INTERVIEW (General)	SAMPLE SURVEY INTERVIEW (panel)	SPECIAL SURVEY	CONTENT ANALYSIS
CIVILIAN (friendly)		●	●	●		*
CIVILIAN (neutral)		●	●	●		*
CIVILIAN (hostile)	●	●			●	*
DEFECTORS AND REFUGEES		●	●	●		*
PRISONER OF WAR	●	●			●	●*
CAPTURED DOCUMENTS						●
OTHER INTELLIGENCE REPORTS						●
BROADCAST MONITORING						●
NEWSPAPERS/ PERIODICALS						●
ENEMY PROPAGANDA						●
INTERCULTURAL GUIDES						●
HANDBOOKS						●
SPECIAL STUDIES						●

*Content analysis of reports and evaluations provided by interrogators.

Figure 2. Techniques and Information Sources Used to Obtain PSYOP Intelligence

	INFORMATION SOURCE	TARGET: Enemy Military or sponsor of Insurgency	TARGET: Insurgent	TARGET: Civilians (friendly)	TARGET: Civilians (enemy)	TARGET: Civilians (neutral)	TARGET: Defectors	UTILIZATION: Target Analysis	UTILIZATION: Testing	UTILIZATION: Measuring Effect
CURRENT	PRISONER OF WAR	●	●		●			●	●	●
	CIVILIAN (friendly)		●	●	●	●		●	●	●
	CIVILIAN (neutral)	●	●	●	●	●		●	●	●
	CIVILIAN (enemy)	●	●			●		●	●	●
	DEFECTOR	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	OTHER INTELLIGENCE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	BROADCAST MONITORING	●	●	●	●	●		●		●
	NEWSPAPERS/ PERIODICALS	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		●
	ENEMY PROPAGANDA	●	●		●					●
	UNPUBLISHED REPORTS	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		●
	CAPTURED DOCUMENTS	●	●		●		●	●		●
REFERENCE	COUNTRY STUDIES AND *FAS* HANDBOOKS	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
	IC GUIDES	●	●	●	●	●		●		
	NATIONAL INTEL-LIGENCE SURVEYS	●	●					●		
	PUBLISHED STATISTICS AND REPORTS	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		

Figure 3. PSYOP Information Sources

war, (2) defectors and refugees, (3) the friendly, neutral, and hostile civilian population, and (4) broadcast monitoring. A few of the other sources for PSYOP information are published and unpublished reports, captured documents, including enemy propaganda, newspapers and periodicals, and reports from other sources.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Prisoners of War

U.S. Army or other intelligence agencies are primarily responsible for the interrogation of prisoners of war. Such interrogation for PSYOP purposes requires that the individual interrogator have a reasonable

understanding of the communication process and the manner in which PSYOP media use prisoners in programing. Generally, this understanding of PSYOP media requirements cannot be obtained from a list of questions (EEI). In the PSYOP intelligence questioning some things cannot be asked directly, and it is necessary for the interrogator to understand the use of the information in PSYOP programing and work out his own method for eliciting the desired information accordingly. Most military intelligence interrogators have little or no training in PSYOP, because the primary focus of military intelligence as a collecting agency is on the conventional combat threat. EEI for military intelligence are primarily concerned with number and disposition of troops, types and location of weapons, enemy supply and logistics information, enemy morale, and order of battle.

Interrogation for PSYOP cannot be adequately accomplished mechanically; it requires human and empathic consideration. For example, in one instance in Vietnam, an NVA prisoner being interrogated at JUSPAO complained that he could not cooperate because he had severe headaches. He was give a medical examination and eyeglasses were prescribed. Subsequently, he became a lucrative source of information for PSYOP programs.

If meaningful PSYOP intelligence data are to be obtained from prisoners of war, more is needed than the aforementioned EEI checklist. The history of PSYOP since World War II clearly reveals that information has to be gathered chiefly by PSYOP interrogators who live in the prisoner-of-war camps or detention centers. For example, in Europe during World War II, the intelligence section of the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) had operational control of PSYOP prisoner-of-war interrogators and document analysts who were deployed in the field with the army groups and field armies. Moreover, soon after D-Day (the invasion of Europe), special teams of PSYOP interrogators, operating directly under SHAEF PSYOP, conducted objective interrogations of prisoners for the purpose of studying the morale of enemy forces with a view to projecting trends in morale.

As far as can be determined, no specific format or EEI have been developed for PSYOP interrogation of prisoners or civilians in an insurgency environment. A suggested format for PSYOP interrogation of prisoners of war is the "Dicks-Shils Questionnaire #3 which was the basic interrogation form used by PWD/SHAEF interrogators during World War II.[1] It employs, in part, the open-ended interview technique and is mostly concerned with tactical PSYOP. It is apparent that PSYOP interrogations for an insurgency environment require a different perspective and emphasis; and that a questionnaire developed in 1944 for World War II requires some change.

For the most part, PSYOP research during the Korean War concentrated on the use of interrogations and prisoner panels for testing leaflets.

These studies were limited largely to one PSYOP communication medium (leaflets), and to one audience (the enemy military). The research was not done in close proximity to the operator and results were nearly always made available too late to be useful.

For PSYOP intelligence analysis to be of significant value it is important that research findings be integrated into an operational complex. Otherwise the data collected are usually only of historical interest. As far as can be determined, no PSYOP information system or significant doctrinal guidance resulted from the Korean PSYOP studies.

Open-ended interrogation techniques, which allowed maximum freedom for respondents to describe the situation in which they found themselves prior to surrender, were used in Korea. Such interrogations yield large amounts of varied information, the analysis of which requires particular care. Specific PSYOP questions used in the open-ended interrogations late in the Korean War in the study of Chinese and North Korean prisoners are intermixed and deal with motivation patterns, PSYOP vulnerabilities, communication patterns, and the effect of PSYOP leaflets. It is interesting to note that the interrogations were conducted by Korean civilians employed locally who operated under the supervision of American civilian researchers, mostly professional psychologists.

A necessary and important consideration with regard to exploitation of prisoners of war for PSYOP purposes is the international treaty provisions concerning the questioning and treatment of prisoners of war. The 1949 Geneva conventions for the protection of war victims have been ratified by the United States and came into force on February 2, 1956. They state:

> Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information.[2]

Consequently, individual prisoners of war cannot be exploited for PSYOP unless they agree, and their exploitation is in accordance with policy guidance. However, it is important to understand that PSYOP can exploit prisoners of war in many ways: First, individual prisoners may agree to write and be photographed for PSYOP testimonials, preapre audio tapes, or assist in the preparation of PSYOP material (program implementation); second, prisoners may volunteer to provide information on the communication process, significant PSYOP targets, and the effect of PSYOP programs; third, prisoners may agree to cooperate in the testing of PSYOP communications, either individually or as members of a panel. In the first instance, the prisoner would be compromised and could be considered a traitor by his nation. However, as a technique to deter compromise, facial characteristics can be masked or blurred. The other ways of exploiting prisoners of war could be accomplished covertly, with little danger of compromise.

U.S. policy is that individual prisoners should not forcibly be exploited, but the good treatment of prisoners as a group is a PSYOP theme that should be exploited in a vigorous and aggressive manner.

As stated previously, during World War II, Dr. Dicks, the British military psychiatrist, used the technique of the in-depth interview on prisoners of war to construct what he termed the "psychological foundations of the Wehrmacht." This provided valuable insight into the attitudes and motivations of the German soldier. It also served to pinpoint PSYOP vulnerabilities that could be exploited by PSYOP programs (media).

The use of the in-depth interview requires highly qualified professionals; clumsy or aimless in-depth interviewers produce little if anything. This technique requires an officer qualified to use the latest clinical techniques. Moreover, he must have a thorough knowledge of the language and culture involved, and must intimately understand the target audience as a people. For example, William Daugherty writes that:

> In the prison camps Dr. Dicks did not disclose his status as a psychiatrist. He was introduced to the respondents as a welfare officer interested in their problems as a prisoner. He interrogated large numbers utilizing a carefully prepared schedule of questions, carried on informal and friendly interviews with many, and kept carefully recorded notes of mass observations. The facts thus gathered were analyzed against the background of such other knowledge available to him concerning the Germans.[3]

Needless to say, since World War II, the in-depth interview has not been used by the military for the gathering of data from PSYOP sources.

PWD/SHAEF conducted regular attitude surveys in the prisoner-of-war camps. The polls were important in that they provided a quantitative basis for results found qualitatively by individual interrogations. During the Korean War, considerable use was made of prisoner PSYWAR panels to pretest and post-test leaflets especially in the years 1951–1952. In addition, ORO conducted a number of research studies designed to produce a model of a prisoner-of-war panel system and to examine situational and personal factors associated with the act of surrendering. The latter group of interrogations often took place in rear area enclosures weeks after the prisoner had surrendered.

In the Vietnamese War of the 1960s prisoners of war were interrogated at the tactical level for military information. Tactical PSYOP program exploitation, if any, took place at this time. After prisoners were interned at corps POW camps, PSYOP exploitation usually ceased, because of U.S. policy to scrupulously abide by the 1949 Geneva conventions. Consequently, prisoners were seldom used as a source of information or for the preparation of PSYOP programs and messages.

Defectors and Refugees

Defectors and refugees are valuable sources of PSYOP information, especially in an insurgency environment. In Vietnam, Viet Cong or North Vietnamese soldiers who defected under the Chieu Hoi Program were not classified as prisoners; they could be exploited and used to obtain current information about the attitudes and motivation of the Viet Cong, to provide information on PSYOP vulnerabilities, to determine the best communication channels to reach the Viet Cong, to test communication

content, and to appear at mass rallies and in face-to-face communication programs.

Defectors and refugees can also be used as PSYOP writers, illustrators, announcers, and producers of programs. In fact, they can play an active role in all PSYOP programs.

Civilians

Friendly, neutral, and hostile civilians are important sources of information for PSYOP programs, with friendly civilians used extensively to provide information for all communication programs. Three profitable techniques for obtaining PSYOP data from friendly civilians are in-depth interviews, sample surveys, and panel surveys.

In addition to providing information, civilians can play a key part in social organizations and group discussions when they are used as programed communication channels for PSYOP. Hostile civilians are especially important to PSYOP in an insurgency environment, but have been used infrequently. One of the basic principles for PSYOP-sponsored group discussions is that the "study" be collective—a truly group effort. The groups should be small and have a definite membership, with the same people meeting together over an extended period of time. Each group should have designated leader, who supervises the discussion sessions. Thoughts and ideas are expressed verbally and every member is encouraged to participate. Informal yet controlled, this technique usually finds acceptance among both rural and urban groups and provides for an extension of the more formal PSYOP media channels. Group discussion, as a PSYOP technique, is extensively employed by the Communist agitprop cadres. This technique and channel could be a significant link in the communication chain for the restructuring of attitudes.

In some environments, opinion surveys (attitude reports) can be conducted on a regular or irregular basis. Such surveys may give a general (or quite accurate) impression of the attitudes of selected groups of the population on subjects of current interest.

The questioning of hostile civilian detainees is a police, not a military function. However, during sweeps, civilians are detained and questioned by the military concerning tactical information. Again it is stressed that PSYOP exploitation of certain civilian targets can be as important as the exploitation of military targets. For example, the civilian infrastructure is a vital element in the total insurgent movement and should be a key target for PSYOP exploitation. The civilian infrastructure is probably the most difficult audience to reach, since it is hardcore and highly motivated to support the insurgent cause. Consequently, current PSYOP-related data are needed to exploit both the infrastructure and that portion of the civilian population in contested areas that supports the insurgency.

Travelers and refugees provide significant current information that can be used to piece together the conditions of daily life in hostile areas, and sometimes it is possible to project the attitudes obtained from such people to the general population in in hostile areas. PSYOP is concerned with the

total picture of society from the individual as well as the group viewpoint. To this end, current information is needed on the nature of the daily occurrences and relationships among the primary groups, secondary group, and the enemy administration. Specific and detailed information is needed on a variety of subject such as: (a) personal security, (b) travel restrictions, (c) police methods and surveillance, (d) the role of religion and the religious leader, (e) traditional versus "progressive" social patterns, (f) the role of the small entrepreneur in the "new social order," (g) specific prohibitions in connection with the communication process, (h) the "tone of social control, (i) the role of education in the "new order," and (j) the extent and adequacy of social services.

Broadcast Monitoring

Broadcast monitoring is conducted by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) of the U.S. government on a worldwide basis. In addition to selected radio broadcasts, news and wire service transmissions are also monitored on a daily basis for analysis purposes.

OTHER SOURCES

Captured Documents

Next to interrogation of prisoners and defectors, captured documents are probably the most important source for PSYOP data. PSYOP intelligence has found that some of the most effective communication delivered to the Viet Cong and NVA has been based on material from captured letters and diaries. For example, the slogan "Born in the North to die in the South," widely used in PSYOP publications, was obtained from a diary of a North Vietnamese soldier. Also, nostalgic poems and letters written by VC and NVA soldiers have frequently been mentioned by returnees and prisoners as having had great psychological impact on them. It has already been mentioned that content analysis of official reports and other documents prepared by VC cadres provides significant information concerning: VC morale, the effect of GVN PSYOP programs, and definitive data on social, military, and political activities of the enemy.

Intelligence Sources

As of 1969 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) were the only contributors of intelligence for overt PSYOP programs. They provided the bulk of the current information needed to conduct overt PSYOP in denied or enemy-controlled areas in that they provided such information as we now have in regard to target analysis, testing,and the measuring of effect of communication.

Overt PSYOP communication channels directed to denied areas primarily employ radio (shortwave and medium-wave bands) and printed matter. In order to effectively use radio as a PSYOP channel, it is necessary to know:

a. The quantity and type (SW or MW) of receivers available to significant target groups;
b. The listening habits—what are the prime hours for listening to broadcasts;
c. What are the prohibitions and restrictions in owning and listening to "enemy" radio broadcasts;
d. What is the strength (clarity of audio signal) for each station;
e. What jamming techniques are used, and what is the pattern of jamming;
f. What specific programs appeal to each target (news, drama, opera, and the like);
g. What is the best length for an average program? can the target audience listen for five minutes or five hours; and
h. What is the reaction of the power elite and specific target groups to the program.

In addition, to prepare appealing and credible radio programs, a great deal of information is needed about the everyday activities of average people in the society. This requires large quantities of information that can be used as the basis for political commentaries, skits, discussions, and "letters of complaint." As far as can be determined, this type of information is not currently available to support PSYOP programs.

Furthermore, information of the following types is needed for PSYOP printed media programs directed to hostile and denied areas:

a. The pattern and area covered by specific leaflet drops;
b. The method used by the hostile regime to recover leaflets; do they use the police, security forces, school children, or others to pick up leaflets?
c. The prohibitions imposed on the retention of leaflets;
d. The reaction of the general population to the messages;
e. The reaction of the power elite to message content and programs;
f. The reaction of specific targets to message content and programs.

Of course, data concerning the above questions are obtained from overt as well as from covert sources. For example, data on PSYOP leaflet and radio programs directed to North Korea are obtained from interrogation of captured agents as well as from political defectors. In addition, some information is obtained from content analysis of newspapers and documents, and still more comes from broadcast monitoring. Radio Free Europe, a private radio network in Europe, has a vast network of correspondents stationed along the rim of the iron curtain who interview travelers and refugees and exploit other sources of information from Communist countries in order to gauge the effect of their broadcasts. Consequently, the exploitation of covert sources is essential, if consistent, rather than random, feedback is to be obtained. In theory, it is possible for a covert intelligence system to provide information on PSYOP programs by using the full range of exploitation techniques,

In perspective, research and analysis of USIA are concerned with the total aspects of PSYOP intelligence. The foci of PSYOP EEI contained in the PSYOP intelligence model of this report are of prime interest to international communication organizations, and in particular to the USIA. For example, Robert Elder notes the following research priorities within USIA:

a. Studies of effectiveness of Agency programs (EEI No.5 in figure 1);
b. Attitude studies designed to test Agency objectives, audiences, and themes (EEI No. 5);
c. Studies of communication principles, techniques, and environment (EEI No. 4);
d. Media reaction reports (EEI No.5);
e. Studies of Communist and other propaganda activities (EEI Nos. 2 and 3).[4]

The USIA is not an intelligence-gathering agency and it is, rightfully, very sensitive about this. However, it is concerned with communication research and analysis, and it conducts scientific surveys and prepares appropriate studies and reports. Moreover, in addition to its formal research, the daily contacts of USIA officers constitute a lucrative source of information for PSYOP. Valuable information is obtained from: field posts, contacts with the local press, contacts with the international press, activities in binational cultural centers, reports from local national employees, and contacts with the local bureaucracy.

In Vietnam the combined (military) intelligence centers (CIC), starting at corps level, produced intelligence in response to requirements generated by MACV J2 (U.S. military intelligence) and the J2 of the RVN military intelligence. The centers were responsible for gathering and reporting on a variety of information related to PSYOP programs. For example, the Research and Analysis Branch of the CIC was concerned with such subjects as order of battle, strategic intelligence, area analysis, the development of targets, technical intelligence (VC taxation, food, medicine, and the like), political intelligence, sociological intelligence (information on social and ethnic groups), and PSYOP intelligence for strategic programs. Studies produced by CIC dealt with:

a. Effects of B–52 strikes;
b. VC infrastructure;
c. VC manpower procurement;
d. VC outlook on life;
e. VC tax collection in RVN;
f. Vulnerability of NVA soldier in Vietnam;
g. VC financial and economic structure.

Through content analysis, these reports reveal valuable information for PSYOP target analysis and possibly the effect of communication programs, and this data can be put into the PSYOP data bank.

Published Material

Published material contains the basic data that are the starting point for obtaining the answers to PSYOP EEI. Naturally, it does not provide current data about existing attitudes and the effect of PSYOP programs. However, an example of its importance is the library of the research element of Radio Free Europe. It contains over 34,000 volumes, over half of which are in the languages of the target nations, and the rest in Western languages. About 4,000 new volumes are received each year. In addition to books, the library handles the subscriptions and distribution of 700 Western and 550 Eastern European periodicals. Every month about 3,000 copies of various publications are routed through the library to the various editors, evaluators, and researchers.[5]

Foreign Area Studies of The American University publishes handbooks on many foreign countries that contain information on the general character of the society, the physical environment, historical setting, ethnic groups and languages, social structure, social values, political values, economic systems and values, and public information and propaganda.

In a similar way, the American Institutes for Research (AIR) Intercultural Communication Guides provide a source for political information, major social characteristics, cultural factors relevant to the communication process, and psychological principles for effective communication. They provide an introduction and clues to target analysis and the development of communication strategy.

The *National Intelligence Survey* provides information concerning military, political, and economic aspects of a particular national society. This information provides significant insights into PSYOP targets and communication media.

Publications from the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Department of State, USIA, the United Nations, and other private research organizations are also valuable sources of information in analyzing targets. Often published texts, scholarly journals, novels, and other literature can provide important insights into the society and the communication process. However, published material should be thoroughly analyzed, evaluated, and the data confirmed prior to use in PSYOP programing.

SUMMARY

The function of PSYOP is the use of communication to influence behavior. Human communication involves action; it is not mystical or magical. To understand communications one must, in a very real sense, understand people. PSYOP intelligence is the basis for understanding human actions in PSYOP.

The essential or basic elements of information required from PSYOP intelligence are: (1) a definition of key audiences; (2) an understanding of the attitudes and motivation of the individuals and groups in the selected

audience; (3) an analysis of PSYOP vulnerabilities; (4) a determination of appropriate message content and the best communication channels to reach the audience; and (5) a measurement of the effect of PSYOP programs.

PSYOP target analysis is important in order to identify meaningful population groups and subgroups as specific PSYOP targets. Further, target analysis provides important clues about the attitudes of the selected audience. In addition, it provides the data needed to anticipate possible resistance to communication content and the data for determining the most meaningful and effective communication strategy for a particular target. In sum, target analysis tends to bring the selected target closer to the PSYOP communicator.

In testing messages it is important to check the respondents for psychological as well as sociological representativeness. Moreover, in testing there are no clear-cut rules because each instance is unique. Before an estimate can be made of the reliability of a proposed test, careful consideration should be given to the following: (a) the nature of the communication, (b) the type of respondents available, (c) the overall psychological atmosphere in which the test is to be conducted, and (d) the techniques used to obtain the information.

Measuring the effects of PSYOP programs is of great interest to commanders, planners, and PSYOP programing personnel. Indicators of the effectiveness of PSYOP include immediate recall, delayed recall, repetition, "paper and pencil" behavior, physical response to the message, and content analysis.

This essay has discussed the exploitation of major PSYOP intelligence sources and related them to the PSYOP EEI. The various PSYOP exploitation techniques were discussed as they relate to: (1) prisoners of war, (2) defectors and refugees, (3) civilians (friendly, enemy, neutral), (4) broadcast monitoring, and other sources such as captured documents, intelligence sources, governmental and intergovernmental sources, and published and unpublished material.

NOTES

[1] This refers to the "Dicks' Questionnaire No. 3," which Dicks brought to its final stage as a "structured interview susceptible to quantification, in collaboration with Edward A. Shils. It was authorized for PWI use in POW enclosures on the continent by Colonel Gurfein. It was administered mainly by the Special PWI Team at SHAEF ('Kampfguppe Rosenberg') and their results were tabulated and evaluated by Morris Janowitz." See Daniel S. Lerner, *Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D–Day to V–E Day* (New York: George W. Stewart, Inc., 1949), pp. 121–124.

[2] Department of the Army, Field Manual 27–10, *The Law of Land Warfare*, July 1956, para. 93, p. 37.

[3] William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), pp. 447–458.

[4] Robert E. Elder, *The Information Machine: The United States Information Agency and American Foreign Policy* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1968), p. 114.

[5] Robert T. Holt, *Radio Free Europe* (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 110.

ASIATIC GUERRILLA MOTIVATION*

By John M. Little

An example of intuitive analysis with major PSYOP implications for appealing to insurgents.

Though underfed, poorly-equipped, ill-trained, and forced to inhabit the least desirable areas of a country, Asiatic guerrillas fight extremely well. What makes possible the achievements of these semi-literate peasants who lack air cover, high-speed mobility, artillery, and the other refinements of more sophisticated armies?

Promises or threats of terror do not seem nearly adequate in explaining why.

Most of our literature on counterinsurgency simply ignores the prime factor—motivation. We are much concerned with tactics and techniques for guerrilla fighters, but we seldom dig into motivation, the real soil from which successful military effort must grow.

The enemy pays considerable attention to combat motivation and discipline. Mao Tse Tung and Vo Nguyen Giap in particular emphasize and reemphasize it. Moreover, they do not just mention it in passing and then move on to tactics and grand strategy. Detailed concern with human behavior permeates their writing. Its effect in turning out first-rate regular and irregular fighters in Asia was seen in China, Korea, Malaya, Vietnam (*Viet Minh*), Laos, the Indian Frontier, and now again in Vietnam (*Viet Cong*).

We have attempted to rationalize their success at motivating their fighters, but not to explain it.

. . . . In describing motivation and discipline, the enemy speaks of it as "internal democracy" or "democratic centralism." Perhaps the use of such terms in a system so totalitarian as Communism causes us to overlook their real meaning. Being products of our system, a representative-type democracy, we immediately shrink from this as meaning that the troops will elect their officers and vote on which objective to hit or which column to ambush. We brush it aside as obvious propaganda. We must remember, however, that when Mao or Vo speak of democracy they speak of Communist democracy and not our system. Nor do they mean the ideal of Communism where the "utopia" is achieved and a "dictatorship of the proletariat" is the government. They mean democracy in the practical, present-day revolutionary sense of Communism where members are encouraged to criticize themselves and others, but within bounds of the party line. This is the meaning of the terms "internal" and "centralism."

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*Excerpts from "Asiatic Guerrilla Motivation," *Infantry*; LVI (January-February 1966), p. 83. Reprinted with permission of *Infantry* Magazine, copyright holder.

The individual is encouraged to participate critically in discussing the means, but is not allowed for a moment to consider the end. That has been decided for him. They have no concept of parliamentary balloting in the ranks, and the performance of their armies should make this quite clear.

The enemy outlines this "democracy" as a critique, plain and simple, but with all unit members being encouraged to participate. Rather than a debriefing or critique by a superior to subordinates, it is a unit discussion group, guided by the superior, of course. Once again, grave doubts arise in our American minds for we visualize the pointless "gripe" session which many of us have seen tried, usually only once, by a well-meaning superior. This is not at all the case.

The discussion and criticisms are directed specifically toward the military soundness of actions and orders in an exercise, move or battle. Though political results are the ultimate end and are given lip service in revolutionary slogans, the individual is guided toward constructive criticism of tactical decisions and choice or application of techniques. Though the guerrilla is expected to end his statement with something like "we must avoid petty-bourgeois individualism," "to crush the national and class enemies," or "in the process of its transformation (*Viet Minh*) into a regular and modern army, our army always remains a revolutionary army, a people's army," he is also expected and encouraged to give of himself to that "great cause."

Even if little value comes from suggestions made or errors brought out by privates, though this possibility should not be too readily discounted, the 5 or 10 or 15 individuals in the unit are made to publicly belong, almost completely. *This is the essence of their combat motivation.* Once recruited by whatever means, the individual strips himself naked before his comrades, admits his own weaknesses, and vows to strive for better accomplishment of the mission in the future. He has subordinated his individuality to the unit and is under much greater pressure to make good the vow "next time," since all his teammates have heard him make it. He is much more highly motivated now than if it was a personal, secret vow made to himself while a superior was chastising him in a standard debriefing. Each individual in turn faces his fellow soldiers and speaks out, sharing with them the very personal fears, anxieties and emotional reactions or physical failings experienced under fire or in a gruelling march. They share these experiences and in so doing they weld themselves together. As most combat veterans in our own ranks will agree, the bonds between men who have been under fire together are strong indeed.

In this way the enemy draws his small units together into tight, cohesive groups that strive toward what we frequently call "fanatical" performance. They fight like this because they know that their comrades' eyes are upon them and they are going to have to face up to their conduct publicly at the first break in the action.

They fight like this because the semi-literate peasant of Asia has

recognized quite clearly what our highly-educated researchers have been telling us since early in World War II. Namely, that men fight, whether enlisted or drafted, primarily for the men they fight beside and for the image they present to their fellow soldiers. All the tactics and techniques and training in the world won't move a man against enemy fire with firm purpose if he doesn't care what his buddies think. He is not an unthinking, Prussianized robot. He is very, very conscious of the group and his place in it.

Direct Observation

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE—THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ROLE OF SPECIAL FORCES*

BY WILLIAM P. YARBOROUGH

Special Forces are often in a position to observe developments that may have important ramifications on the attitudes of target areas, as well as the actual audience attitudes.

The Special Forces of the United States Army were designed for employment in serveral types of environments each having pronounced psychological overtones. In their primary role, that of unconventional warfare, Special Forces will be in contact with friendly guerrilla forces and will provide a positive link between the irregulars and the conventional commands. The nature of the unconventional warfare structure, which produces the guerrillas with which Special Forces work, must be understood in order to appreciate the importance of the psychological component of the Green Beret's make-up.

Guerrillas are an action element of the total unconventional warfare system but they do not comprise it entirely. Moreover, guerrillas will not appear as the first manifestation of a well-conceived and organized resistance movement.

A guerrilla warfare capability of any significance is normally based on a broad clandestine and covert support structure. The latter is rooted in the civilian population and usually numbers many times the strength of the guerrilla units it serves. The underground which makes guerrilla operations feasible does not develop automatically nor spontaneously. A great deal of careful, sophisticated, patient and time-consuming work on the part of highly motivated resistance architects goes into its design.

Members of a resistance underground live and work surrounded by great danger to themselves and to their families. It is evident, therefore, that the stakes for which they are willing to risk everything must be high. These are usually political. Sacrifice in serving in an underground organization that is hounded by special police and by counterintelligence agents can be justified in the minds of those who feel most deeply that their

*Original essay by Lt. Gen. (Ret.) William P. Yarborough.

future and the future of their country can be made better through their efforts. Guerrilla forces which grow from the underground recruiting processes must have the same convictions—many with a firm political base. The mechanics of keeping guerrilla and underground forces' zeal at the required level must involve inspirational approaches which are simple, powerful, consistent, and persistent.

It is necessary for the outside forces who work with guerrillas to understand the vital part that belief in cause plays in the making of an irregular soldier. Granted, there are classical pressures which are used to force an individual into guerrilla ranks against his will. Frequently a combination of inspiration and terror are used to move a "volunteer" from his village to a guerrilla camp in the jungle. In any case, both the guerrilla and the vast infrastructure which supports him are dependent upon pyschological considerations more than any other.

The history of resistance movements shows conclusively that guerrilla leadership must be indigenous—not imported from outside. This being the case, U.S. Special Forces would be ill advised to seek command of guerrilla forces with which they have been placed in contact. Nevertheless, the interests of the United States, which in the first place led to the introduction of the Special Forces teams, must be appropriately served. It follows that the Special Forces soldier must have a clear understanding of what his country's interests are and he must seek, with judgement, finesse, firmness, and diplomacy to serve them in dealing with the guerrilla leaders. He can, of course, attempt to guide the indigenous guerrilla leader toward disired tactical objectives by regulating the flow of supplies and resources from U.S. stockpiles. This kind of persuasion, powerful as it is, may not always work.

The greatest guarantee of cooperation from irregular forces can come from the close personal rapport which a mature, carefully selected and trained Special Forces team leader can develop with the guerrilla leader. Even when the relationship is close and there is a mutual respect and confidence, the nature of the guerrilla's commitment to his political cause and future may preclude his acceding in every respect to the United States' requirements voiced through the Special Forces Commander. The latter must be the type of individual who can understand the nuances and intangibles that make his role in the irregular warfare scheme so different from that of a liaison officer with foreign conventional forces. Historical accounts of problems stemming from personality clashes between Draza Mihailovic and Colonel Bailey, the British liaison officer to the Yugoslav partisan headquarters during World War II, point up the extra-ordinary impact that human emotions can have on official negotiations.[1]

United States Special Forces introduced into a conflict arena to work with guerrillas could find themselves enmeshed in several kinds of situations, none of them simple. The guerrillas may be fighting for their own government under siege by an invading enemy. In this case, the motivational propaganda which sustains them would come from that govern-

ment. The latter would of necessity be compatible enough with U.S. aims to have warranted introduction of U.S. Special Forces in its support. In such an environment, U.S. Special Forces would be expected to do nothing which would interfere with the mental conditioning of the indigenous resistance mechanism. Here the requirement for intensive indoctrination and meticulous selection of the Americans is apparent.

In recognition of the difficulties surrounding psychological operations carried out by resistance forces, U.S. Special Forces should provide appropriate assistance beginning with matériel and instruction in its use. Guerrilla forces should be taught field expedients for leaflet production and distribution. The value of simple slogans painted on walls and of face-to-face persuasion should be stressed. Finished intelligence, received through the U.S. link with Special Forces Operations Base and which can assist in psychological targeting, can be provided by the U.S. Special Forces to the guerrilla leaders.

Generally, the propaganda content of guerrilla psychological operations activities should not come from U.S. Special Forces. Rather it should come from the guerrillas' own government through the established communications system of the friendly underground. Thus the U.S. Special Forces contribution would consist largely of advice in planning, training in simple techniques, and provision of certain supplies and equipment from U.S. resources.

Another type of unconventional warfare situation in which U.S. Special Forces might be used could be that in which guerrilla forces supported by an underground resistance movement were challenging a government, which for various reasons was unacceptable to the people of the country. In such a case, the introduction of U.S. Special Forces would be preceded by the most exhaustive analysis of the situation to determine whether U.S. interests actually demanded involvement in what might seem to be another country's internal affairs. Lessons of current history seem to place this kind of projection of Special Forces use fairly low on the probability scale. In the event, however, that Special Forces were used, their psychological role would probably not be limited to the provision of training and materials to the forces of the resistance. Certain aspects of the United States own psychological campaign against the enemy government could be reflected through Special Forces to the friendly guerrillas and their supporting infastructure.

Intelligence is the life blood of effective psychological operations. Special Forces deployed in contact with guerrilla forces are in a position to gather the kind of intelligence that bears most intimately upon the attitudes of the people at grass-roots level. Propaganda programs which are shaped in the absence of extensive knowledge of feelings and persuasions of human target groups are likely to succeed only through rare luck and in defiance of the laws of probability.

In his classical work, *Psychological Warfare,* Paul M. A. Linebarger points out that some of the worst blunders of history have arisen from

miscalculations of the enemy state of mind. He indicates that psychologists can set up techniques for determining how people really feel about certain conditions and situations. Special Forces, in carrying out the psychological aspects of their unconventional warfare missions, need to be trained in or at least familiar with such techniques so that the products of their intelligence collection can be usable for something other than order of battle refinement.

The opportunities for intelligence collection concerning popular attitudes are widely available to Special Forces assigned to missions bearing upon internal defense and stability of an ailing foreign country. The activity, which was once termed "counter-insurgency" by the United States Army and which involves everything from civic action to counter-guerrilla warfare, is still carried as a valid type of employment for Green Berets. Students of "counter-insurgency" will recognize immediately the pitfalls inherent in the application of the accepted doctrine which has developed during the last decade. Nonetheless, certain aspects of what is held as valid and is taught in internal defense and stability instruction are being implemented quietly and with success. In every case, the acceptability of the Special Forces personnel in the country where they are to operate is of overriding importance.

NOTES

[1] C. N. M. Blair, *Guerrilla Warfare*, London: Ministry of Defense, 1957.

Interviewing

EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION BY AMERICANS WITH THAI*

By Imogene E. Okes**

After researchers determined the objectives of American communications in a foreign country, they evolved a multi-step research method. This approach channeled the knowledge of experts to ascertain whom the Americans should contact, what they should say, and how their messages should be presented.

....A psychologist, a social psychologist, sociologists, an historian and international relations scholars devised the research method. The problem was to (1) realize the American's objectives, (2) select the audiences most susceptible to his objectives and, at the same time, most effective in taking action on those objectives, (3) reduce the number of objective-audience combinations to those desirable for intensive study, (4) develop ideas appropriate for appealing to the audiences, (5) identify the key symbols in the appeal ideas, and (6) provide information regarding media and communication customs to be observed in transmitting the ideas.

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*Excerpts from "Effective Communications by Americans with Thai," *Journalism Quarterly*, XXXVIII (1961), pp. 337–341. Reprinted with permission of *Journalism Quarterly*, copyright holder.

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USE OF CONSULTANTS AND MAILED QUESTIONNAIRES

Considering the limitations of budget, research staff and time, it was decided the most effective and economical method for systematic collection of objective data would be to use American consultants as sources of information and mailed questionnaires as research instruments.

Americans familiar with the country could supply an abundance of current information. Use of numerous consultants would serve as a safeguard for objectivity. Agreement among experts would enhance the probability of the results being valid.

Questionnaires would stimulate the thinking of the American specialists and channel their knowledge so that the desired information could be obtained and the responses compared. The research would be conducted in phases as dictated by the several parts of the total problem. Within each phase, there would be a series of steps: a great volume of information would be collected; this would be sifted; only the data surviving evaluation would be offered as the basis for the next phase of the research.

By mailing the forms to the respondents, they would be able to work alone beyond possible biasing by other consultants or by the researcher. Furthermore, a large number of respondents could be utilized inexpensively by resorting to correspondence.

Forty-one Americans proficient in Thai affairs participated in one or more phases of the research. Their names had been secured from bibliographic listings, government offices, private foundations, professional organizations and nominations by other consultants. They had quite varied backgrounds. All were college graduates and 17 held doctorates. They had first-hand knowledge of Thailand from having resided there recently for an average of three years.

ENUMERATION OF OBJECTIVES

The research committee, very realistically appraising the current competitive international situation, listed 10 objectives for the American communicator in Thailand. These are, briefly, as follows: promote good will toward the United States, promote expectation of success for the United States and its friends, encourage cooperation with the United States, show importance of developing new energy sources, arouse hostility toward Chinese Communists, discredit the Communists, show appreciation for Thai accomplishments, convince of non-interference by the United States in internal affairs of Thailand, instill hope for the future and strengthen common ideals for Thai and Americans.

SELECTION OF AUDIENCES

In selecting audiences best suited for American purposes, researchers scanned the literature and made up an initial list of 16 identifiable groups. They were categorized as occupational, ethnic, religious, family-kinship, political, liesure time, social class and age-sex. Each was described ac-

cording to physical appearance, ethnic origin, language spoken, occupation, level of education, etc. The list of 16 audiences was expanded to 24 by consultants.

In the next step, consultants ranked and rated audiences for effectiveness [1] within their own country and for susceptibility [2] to American overtures. Since research resources were limited, this procedure permitted focusing on the audiences most valuable for communication purposes.

At this stage of the research, a statistical technique [3] was employed to ascertain the degree of agreement among consultants. Average intercorrelations between the seven consultants ranking effectiveness was +.63. Had the research results been compared with those of another seve consultants, the predicted correlation for effectiveness would be +.92. Average intercorrelation between the seven consultants rating susceptibility was +.54. Had the research results been compared with those of another seven consultants, the predicted correlation for susceptibility would be +.89.

Adding the statistically converted consultant opinions on effectiveness to those on susceptibility and arranging the results in numerical order produced a ranking of audiences according to importance for purposes of the research. The 10 specific audiences selected [4] were Administrators, Buddist Priests, Central Thai, Chinese, Mass Media Personnel, Military-Political Forces, Professional Classes, Royalists, University Faculties and Students, and Western Educated Elite. To provide information for the country generally, Thailand as a Whole was added.

Communication specialists rank ordered the objectives according to relative importance. Again observing research limitations, there followed another reduction step which served to focus energies of consultants on the most important objective-audience combinations. (Here, and in the ensuing research, assignments were made to consultants according to their self-appraised knowledge of specific audiences considered in the study.) Obviously, all objectives should be covered for Thailand as a Whole. Consultants were then asked to register their opinions as to the feasibility of accomplishment of each of the 10 objectives by each of the 10 specific audiences. Of the 110 possible objective-audience combinations, only 43 were selected for intensive stude.[5]

DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION OF APPEAL IDEAS

For the 43 objective-audience combinations consultants were asked to develop appeal ideas which would gain and hold attention, be readily and completely understood, be believed and accepted, arouse appropriate motives and emotions, affect all members of a particular group similarly, and be effective in the foreseeable future. Consultants were also asked to explain the appeal idea in terms of cultural factors relevant to the particular audience.

Since the key symbol often is solely responsible for inducing the desired response from a particular audience, the identification of the key symbol

by the appeal writer was especially important, The key symbol is considered potent when it causes audience identification, automatic acceptance of the appeal, predisposition toward the objectives of the communicator and/or strong emotional response consistent with the appeal.

The 150 appeal ideas developed were rated by another group of consultants for persuasiveness or the likelihood that the appeal idea would lead the audience to think, feel and/or act favorably toward the American objective. An appeal idea created by one person was evaluated by three other consultants. Appeal ideas of low persuasiveness or boomerang effect were eliminated. Fifty-seven appeal ideas survived this screening; 39 were for the four most important objectives.

Researchers stressed that the resultant appeals were merely ideas intended only as guides for the American communicator and were not to be considered as finished messages ready for transmittal.

Typical of appeals rated relatively high is the idea developed for Professional Classes in order to show American appreciation for Thai achievements. The audience would be reminded of the words to the chorus of the popular song, "Thai Ancestors," in which Thai are challenged to uphold the tradition set by their ancestors who were bold and steadfast in their determination to preserve Thai territory for their descendants.

A highly evaluated appeal idea suitable to Thailand as a Whole for arousing hostility toward Communist China would be a picture of a Red Chinese dragon (with North Korea, Tibet and North Viet Nam in its belly) attacking a Thai. The caption would read, "The Chinese dragon has always sought to gobble up Asia." Consultants said that a crocodile could be used instead of a dragon as both are symbols of greed. This appeal idea should remind the Thai that Chinese expansionism today is a continuation of past policies.

All the 83 key symbols identified in the appeals were indexed by word association, by category and by picture for the convenience of the communicator. He was reminded that symbols can change meaning according to context and consequently must be used with caution if employed for purposes other than those indicated.

An analysis of the 57 appeal ideas revealed that they were based on six main themes: equality, economic strength, friendship, nationalism, anti-Chinese Communism and self-interest.

INFORMATION REGARDING MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION CUSTOMS

In an effort to gather information of value to the American communicator in transmitting his messages, consultants were given a questionnaire designed to draw out their knowledge regarding mass media and communication customs. Though information was solicited for specific audiences, it was generally found that the data were applicable to all audiences. Information for a particular audience was given when it was

especially significant. Some sample findings were that word of mouth is still the best means of communication in Thailand, that movies are popular throughout the country, and that radio receiving sets are widespread. Printed materials have less appeal since the people are not conscientious readers.

Thai would consider the cartoonist rude who characterized a man, even one greatly disliked, as an animal. By custom, the Thai expect modesty and courtesy in personal conduct and place emphasis on usage of titles. Their tonal language easily lends itself to double meaning. Thai gestures, especially those pertaining to the head (respected) and the feet (contemptuous) carry much significance. The Thai place great faith in supernatural beings.

Though Thai take pride in their own culture and uphold certain traditions, they generally tend to look to the future. Thai are very curious about all things in the United States; they are critical of American lack of knowledge about Thailand and Asia; but so admiring of some American ways as to imitate them.

CONCLUSION

By a multi-phase process, information was obtained for the American communicator regarding his objectives, audiences, appeal ideas, symbols, and media and communication customs. Series of questionnaires within each phase of the research permitted the collection of a wealth of material from numerous area experts and evaluation of their data. By this funneling process, only potentially useful material was offered to the American as guides to more effective communication in the foreign country.

The important attribute is that the systematic and objective method devised for the research can be readily adapted to similar studies.

NOTES

1. For details, see Imogence E. Okes, "Effective Communication by Americans with Thai" (unpublished Master's thesis, The American University, Washington, D.C., 1960), p. 16.
2. *Ibid*, p. 17.
3. Charles C. Peters and Walter R. Van Voorhis, *Statistical Procedures and their Mathematical Bases* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1940), pp. 193–201.
4. Okes, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–24.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 27–32.

Sampling

THE SAMPLING PROCESS FOR PSYOPERATORS*

BY RICHARD H. ORTH

Good sampling is an effective means of reducing the number of persons contacted to develop a relatively accurate picture of the sample populations's attitude and opinion.

*Original essay by Richard H. Orth.

INTRODUCTION

The basic unit for a survey is the population of the area in which it is being performed. It is not usually possible to include the entire population; rather, people are selectively chosen to participate in a survey. Because the way in which these people are selected to participate is very important to the utility of the results, great care must be used in the selection process. This essay discusses the problems that are involved in deciding who will be in the survey and who will not be in the survey and also what kinds of selection procedures the PSYOP analyst can use.

WHY USE SAMPLES?

The basic notion behind sampling is that an analyst can gain accurate knowledge about a population by measuring only a portion--or sample--of it. There may be some instances when one would not wish to sample--for instance, when the population is a very small village or when social or religious customs do not allow certain persons to be interviewed. Also, in some cases, interviewing a few, well-informed persons may be more efficient than taking a sample of the whole population. In most cases, however, there are good reasons for sampling, one of the foremost being cost limitations in terms of effort, time, and money spent. Clearly, the more people included in a survey, the greater the cost. Another reason for sampling is that when one wishes to assess a change in the attitudes of a population, the initial assessment of the attitudes may well spoil the accuracy of the second measurement. Thus, if the entire population were used in the initial assessment, it should not be used in a second assessment to determine the amount of change. There are several reasons that people generally perform differently on a second attitude questionnaire than they do on the first:

1. They may be able to determine the kinds of answers that the tester is most pleased with.
2. They may become aware of things that they were not aware of before but were brought out by the questions that were asked.
3. Performance changes with practice.

The second reason mentioned above is often called sensitization. As an example, suppose that a PSYOP campaign is being carried over a specific radio program. In attempting to measure the success of that campaign, people within the broadcast area are asked if they listen to the program. This would give some indication of how well the campaign is reaching the target. This could easily arouse the interest of some persons who would not otherwise have been interested and therefore would not have listened to the program. On the follow-up measure, consequently, there may result an artificially high success rate because more people tuned in to the program than would normally be the case. (It should be noted that this may be used as a device to obtain listnership, but it could backfire if used too often.)

The way to solve this difficulty is to use only a part of the population--by sampling, the analyst may greatly reduce his costs and not "spoil" the entire population for repeated measurement.

There are several problems involved in sampling, and great care must be taken in using sampling techniques. One must face, from the beginning, the question of accuracy. It is easy to see how the measurement of only a portion of the population could greatly reduce the accuracy of the results. Besides the size of the sample, another factor that can operate to reduce accuracy is the representativeness of the sample. Both size and representativeness affect the applicability of the generalization to the population as a whole. When the analyst chooses a sample from a population, his purpose is to be able to generalize--to derive a general conclusion from particulars (the sample)--to the whole population. A generalization is justified to the extent that the sample represents the population. In the following portions of this essay, size and representativeness will be discussed in greater detail along with different types of samples and when and how to use them.

DEFINING THE POPULATION

The first thing the PSYOP analyst must do is to define the population he wishes to study. To do so he must ask himself three questions:

1. "What am I trying to find out?"
2. "Who can tell me what I want to know?"
3. "To what population do I want to generalize?"

The answers to these three questions provide the information for defining the population. The following the sequence of questions shows how this works. Assume the answer to the first question is "The effectiveness of a PSYOP campaign aimed at a particular tribe in South Vietnam." The answer to the second question will then be "The members of that tribe." The answer to the third question will be: "The tribe." Therefore, the population is defined as the tribe. Rather than questions number two and three always being the same, they provide an interative process that allows resolving the difference between availability of individuals and the generality of the results.

TYPES OF SAMPLES

After defining the population, the PSYOP officer must then decide what kind of sample he will draw. Ideally, he will seek a sample that is as efficient and inexpensive as possible while still being representative of the population. There are basically two kinds of samples: *nonprobability* samples and *probability* samples.

Two terms that will frequently come up in the following discussion of different samples are: (1) *random* and (2) *chance*. There is often a problem associated with their use in that they have common-language connotations as well as their denotative meanings which come from statistics and mathematics. As used in the following discussion, the terms will be

used only in their denotative sense. Thus, random refers to an unknown probability level that can be calculated only if all the elements of the universe can be specified. However, it is sufficient to say that each element has an equal likelihood of appearing on any one trial. If one has an infinite number of trials, each element will have appeared the same number of times. On the other hand the term "chance" is usually used as an adjunct to an implicitly or explicitly known probability level. Thus, one can say that there is a 20 percent chance of rain today. It must be noted that both of these terms imply an orderly occurring set of events that can be reduced to mathematical equations.

Nonprobability Samples

Accidental Sample

The accidental sample is the easiest to select, but it usually is not representative of the population from which it is drawn. (In fact the ease of selection is due to the fact that there is no overt selection. Only individuals who come to you are included.) For example, an accidental sample may be drawn by going to a street corner and interviewing every person who goes by. Many people believe that because the interviewer cannot control whom he interviews that this is a random sample. Although there is an appearance of certain amount of chance attached to the drawing of an accidental sample, actually it is not a random process, because one cannot determine the probability of any person being included in the sample. In other words, this kind of sample does not meet the requirements of a random sample. The accidental sample may not represent a population fairly but rather may be seriously biased, because the sample will represent only those people who are in a particular place at a specific time. Many kinds of people may never go to that street corner; the ones who do go may be of a type not representative of the whole population.

When Should An Accidental Sample Be Used? Almost never, or only when no alternative seems available. However, it may be better to have poor data than no data at all. If this method is used, one must keep in mind its lack of representativeness. Poor data are, in fact, worse than no data at all.

Quota Sample

A second type of nonprobability sample is called the quota sample. This means that each interviewer is given a number of persons of a specific type, for example, farmers, merchants, ex-soldiers, women, or elders to interview. The advantage of the quota sample over the accidental sample is that the former is designed to include desired numbers or proportions of different types of persons. In the accidental sample, on the other hand, there is no assurance whatsoever of representativeness, so that certain types of persons may be missed completely.

In the quota sample, the person who will actually be interviewed is decided upon by the interviewer in the field. For example, he may wish to compare the reasons that North Vietnamese soldiers entered the Chieu Hoi Program with the reasons that the Viet Cong entered the Chieu Hoi Program. Since these people (called *hoi chan*) remain in the camp only a short time, it would be very difficult to perform a carefully drawn random sample, which involves having a list of the population. Therefore, the PSYOP analyst may simply say that he would like to have a certain number of North Vietnamese defectors and Viet Cong defectors interviewed. The interviewer then enters the camp, finds out into which category (North Vietnamese or Viet Cong) the particular individual he is addressing falls. He indicates the category on his interview record and proceeds with the interview. If he already has his quota from the category this individual is in, he can skip this interview. When he has filled the quotas of both North Vietnamese and Viet Cong (the number of each type that the analyst requested), the data collection part of the study is completed.

There are obviously some problems associated with this sampling technique. One must consider the representativeness of a sample drawn in this manner. The major threat to representativeness is the manner in which the interviewer obtains the sample. Most likely he will administer the instrument to those people who are most available or willing to talk. Clearly, they constitute a special segment of the population. Nevertheless, this limitation does not rule out the utility of quota samples in many instances.

When Should a Quota Sample Be Used? Only when the analyst knows exactly what type of person he wants to interview; this type is fairly easily recognized. The advantage of quota sampling is that it does not require the population lists or dwelling-unit maps that are needed for probability sampling. The disadvantage is that there are some doubts about the representativeness of the population. It would be better to use a probability sample if the situation allows.

Probability Samples

The next three types of samples are probability samples. This means that each element of the population has a known probability of being included in the sample. The PSYOP analyst must draw a probability sample if he wants to be able to generalize to the whole population from which the sample is drawn. The nonprobability samples just discussed (the accidental sample and the quota sample) do not give him any knowledge of the probability of any person in the population being included in the sample.

Simple Random Sample

In a simple random sample each person in the population has an equal probability of being included in the sample. For example, if a sample of ten persons were to be drawn from a population of 100 in a simple random

sample, each person in the population has a known 1/10 or .10 percent chance of being in the sample because of the way the sample is drawn.

The drawing of a simple random sample proceeds as follows. Assume that there is a population of 600 and that the analyst wants to choose a sample of 100. Thus he wants to take every sixth person. Imagine that he has a six-sided die with a number on each side from one to six, with no number repeated. He also has a list of the people in the population, a residence list, or a list of numbers taken from a numbered dwelling-unit map (see the following section on population lists and dwelling-unit maps). He tosses the die and starts in the population list at the number that comes up taking every sixth name. Now it can easily be seen that any side of the die has the same chance of coming up as any other side. Thus, the starting point on the list could have been any of the first six names, with an equal chance for each name. Finally, since all the other names depend on the first, they also are determined by chance.

The same thing can be done by having slips of paper numbered from 1 to 6, in this case mixing them up in a container and drawing one of them out to determine the starting point. The total number to use is determined by the size of the sample needed (see the section on sample size) and the size of the population. Another aternative, of course, would be to put a number for each individual in the population on a slip of paper. One can draw out enough slips of paper to cover the entire sample. However, this method usually takes much longer and does not insure any more "randomness."

When Should a Simple Random Sample Be Used? When one wants to be able to generalize to the whole population from which the sample is drawn, or when one wants to use inferential statistical techniques, this is the simplest kind of probability sample. It requires no knowledge of the population other than a list of its members or dwelling units.

Stratified Random Sample

There is another kind of probability sample called a stratified random sample. Here, each individual in the population does not have an equal chance of being in the sample. The analyst divides the population into two or more strata on the basis of one or more characteristics. Each stratum then is treated like a different population, and a simple random sample is drawn for each. These subsamples are then combined to form the total sample.

For example, assume that the analyst wants to find out the relationship between amount of wealth and certain attitudes and he knows that there are (in a population of 100) 20 wealthy, 60 average, and 20 poor persons. Then, in a simple random sample, there is too little chance for the wealthy or the poor to be included. Because he is studying the attitudes of the total population, he wants information on all income groups. Thus he needs a sufficient number from every group to be relatively confident that their views are accurately expressed. The population is divided by the

characteristic of wealth into the above three groups, and same number of each subgroup is sampled separately.

When Should a Stratified Random Sample Be Used? The stratified random sample may be used when it is known in advance that a special segment of the population would not have enough persons in the sample if a simple random sample were drawn. As prerequisite for this type of sample one must know the characteristics on which the strata are chosen and one must have a population or residence list.

Cluster Sample

A third type of probability sample is the cluster sample. It is often profitable to do the sample on a cluster basis when the population from which a sample is to be drawn is very large and distributed over a large area. This means that the population is divided into geographic areas. The sampling process is the same as it is when individuals are being sampled, except that it is geographic regions that are being sampled. As the sampling proceeds the areas become progressively smaller as the following example illustrates. First, draw a random sample of states, provinces, or large regions, as described under random sampling. Then, in the states or large regions that were drawn in the samples, repeat the process for countries or smaller areas, then cites or villages, and, finally, for persons within each of the cities or villages. If the sampling is done on a random basis at each step, the end-result will be a random sample of people in the country. In this way, the need for population lists for the entire country is avoided. Population lists are not needed until relatively small geographic regions are arrived at.

When Should a Cluster Sample Be Used? When the population to be sampled is very large. It requires a population list or a dwelling-unit map of the city or village, but not for the entire country.

POPULATION LISTS AND DWELLING-UNIT MAPS—TOOLS FOR SAMPLING

Most of the sampling theory and practice has evolved in the United States and other developed nations. Consequently, many problems arise when using them in developing countries. For example, one of the most common assumptions in sampling theory and practice is the availability of census data such as population list, residence lists, or dwelling-unit maps. While these are readily available in the United States, reliable lists or maps are often unavailable in developing countries, and thus a probability sample is often impossible to obtain.

Another problem of sampling on the basis of population lists is ending up with respondents who are great distances apart. In such a case, the PSYOP officer might do well to phase the survey so that he reaches the people in one region during one phase and the people in another region during another phase. This solution is not without its problems. For example, suppose that you are doing an attitude survey in South Vietnam

and you want to determine how the people feel about retaliatory B-52 strikes against North Vietnam. If you do the study in two phases (it could actually be any reasonable number of phases), something could occur during the time interval that would result in a change in the attitudes--that is, a village in the area you are testing could have been bombed by accident. Because of the time factor, a preferred technique would be to divide the staff between the two areas and to sample concurrently but independently. Although this could cause some difficulties in the administration of the survey, it could yield quicker and more germane results.

If population or residence lists are not available, the most obvious solution is for the analyst to draw up his own list. This, however, is usually too costly, since it amounts to taking a census for the area. One alternative is to use dwelling-unit maps of the area, although there are some areas in which obtaining a map is not the simple process that it is in the United States. Also, if the area studied has a high proportion of nomadic people, dwellings may appear and disappear at very short intervals, making any dwelling-unit map quickly outdated.

Under the above circumstances, the most convenient method of obtaining a dwelling-unit map may be as follows. In most areas where military intelligence is gathered, the military has aerial photographs of that area. If the PSYOP analyst can get copies of these photographs, they can be used as maps or as the basis for maps. In fact, military intelligence units often will construct the maps from such photographs.

If dwelling-unit maps are not available, the PSYOP analyst, if he wishes to expend the time and money, can draw accurate maps from a survey of the area. Alternatively, he can go through the streets of the villages and lay out the dwellings on a map that contains only gross characteristics of the area to locate the residence pattern according to landmarks as in the following figure.

Once a map is obtained, give each residence on the map a number, make a list of the numbers, and draw the sample of dwelling units like a random sample.

Still another technique to help in drawing the sample is the grid method.[1] This method requires any drawn-to-scale grid map of the area being studied. The number of intersections on the grid must be more than the sample size. Then, one randomly picks an intersection on the grid and samples the nearest dwelling to that intersection (by use of triangulation and a pedometer, for example). The random selection of points on the grid is done in the same way as the random selection of people described above or by using a random number table. All that the grid method really does is to approximate a map of the dwelling units of the area, for if the grid were sufficiently accurate each dwelling would be represented by an intersection on the grid.

The type of person to be interviewed in a particular dwelling unit—that is, head of household, first person seen—must be chosen beforehand.



Dwelling-Unit Map

Devices exist that can be used to select the specific individual according to some known probability pattern. However, there are several pitfalls for using such a method in another culture or in a region in which little data exist about household characteristics. For example, there may be religious or other reasons for a woman's not talking to strange men, or women may hold a place in the culture that makes them noncredible sources. Under such circumstances it may be better to limit the individuals interviewed to those who represent the household and to guard against making generalizations beyond heads of households. The basic point is that the PSYOP analyst must have some knowledge of the culture before deciding upon the individuals to be included in the sample.

SIZE OF THE SAMPLE

A final step in the sampling process is determining how many people will be included in the sample. It may be beneficial to begin discussing sample size by using an analogy. As an illustration suppose a man owns a car that rattles every time he hits a bump. He takes it to a body shop and one of the men there takes the car on a road test. The tester must drive the car far enough to be able to hear the rattle, for if he drove it only one block, and the road was smooth, the rattle might not be detected. On the other hand, he does not want the tester to drive the car 50 miles because that would be a waste of his time and money. The size of a sample must, likewise, strike the appropriate balance. It must be large enough to do the job, but small enough to be workable.

In this regard, cost and accuracy should be considered when determining the size of the sample. Although these factors will be treated separately here for ease of discourse, the analyst must keep in mind the fact that they impact on each other.

Since cost limitations are usually available before the survey begins, these will be discussed first. Thus, the psyoperator should consider the cost per person interviewed when deciding on the size of the sample and, further, he should determine the number of man-hours that will be spent in collecting the data. Once transportation to the locale has been provided, later interviews may be less expensive than the first ones. One item that is all too frequently overlooked is the cost of analysis of the data that have been gathered. Even though the data collection phase of the survey may be very inexpensive, the analysis of those data may be quite costly. In other words, the analyst must consider the cost of the entire survey, not only the cost of the data collection. The same argument can be made in terms of time. The psyoperator may have a limited amount of time to complete the survey and to perform the analyses. This means that the sample size must be guided by the usable resources of the person who is conducting the survey.

On the other side of the coin is the degree of accuracy desired or demanded by the survey. Recall the analogy to road-testing a car. The farther the repairman drives the car, presumably the more accurate his

judgment will be about the location of the problem. In sampling, it is obvious that the greatest precision will be achieved when the entire population is tested, and as the proportion sampled gets smaller, so will the precision of the results.

There is an additional consideration that affects the number of individuals needed for accuracy, and that is the way the population is expected to divide in their responses. Suppose the analyst asks a sample of people a question that can be answered with one of two alternatives. He wants to be quite certain that the percentages in the sample really represent the population percentages. (In survey research, 95 percent certainty is the usual goal.) The size of the sample depends on the amount of difference in the percentages and on how accurate the analyst wishes to be.[2]

Table 1 shows that if there are large differences in the population, a small sample will bring this out clearly; but, if the differences are small a larger sample is required. To summarize, the important thing to remember when thinking about the size of a sample is that accuracy and cost are often in conflict. The PSYOP analyst must achieve a balance between the two.

Table 2 is an overview intended to help the analyst decide on the sample technique he will use. It should not be considered as a substitute for the preceding text, nor should it be used uncritically. Recall that the accidental and quota samples (numbers 1 and 2 in Table 2) are nonprobability samples: there is no knowledge of the probability of an element of the population being included in the sample. They should be used only when a probability sample is not possible. Simple random, stratified random, and cluster samples (numbers 3, 4, and 5 in Table 2) are probability samples: each element of the population has a known probability of being included in the sample. They should be used when one wants to be able to generalize to the whole population from which the sample was drawn. The table below shows sample sizes for 3 levels of accuracy and two statements about the distribution of responses. Clearly, it is very useful to have some idea about response distribution.

TABLE 1 [3]

SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION, ACCURACY, AND SIZE

Certainty that the sample mean is within .1 standard deviation of the population mean	No assumption about the distribution of responses	Assume that the responses are normally distributed
90%	1,000	272
95%	2,000	384
99%	10,000	707

TABLE 2

SAMPLE TYPES

Sample Type	*Characteristics*	*Example*	*When to Use*
1. Accidental	Haphazardly drawn, with no consideration given to the population to which generalization will be made.	Going to the street corner and sampling the persons that walk by.	Almost never, only when no alternative seems available. It may be better to have poor data than no data at all. If this method is used, one must keep in mind its lack of representativeness.
2. Quota	Each person in the sample is selected by the interviewer, but he is constrained by rules of inclusion that are determined by the study director. The individual is selected on the basis of some characteristic that he possesses. The number of persons of each type is determined by the study director on the basis of the needs of the analysis. The probability of a person's inclusion is not known.	If someone wanted to compare the attitudes of village headmen with attitudes of the religious leaders in a certain area, he could simply instruct his interviewers to go out and get responses from, say, 30 of each.	A probability sample would be better, since there are some doubts about the representativeness of the sample of the population. It can be used only when the important characteristics are known and fairly easily recognizable. It does not require the population lists or the dwelling-unit maps that are needed for probability sampling.
3. Simple random	Every person in the population has an equal and known probability of being included in the sample.	If there are 100 persons in the population and the sample is of 20 persons, then each individual has a .20 or 1/5 chance of being sampled.	This is the simplest probability design and requires no knowledge of the population other than who the members are. It must be used for inferential statistics and generalization to the whole population.
4. Stratified random	The population is divided on some known characteristic and each portion is sampled on a simple random basis.	If there are in population of 100, 20 wealthy, 60 average, and 20 poor persons, then, in a simple random sample there is too little chance for the wealthy or the poor to be included. If the population were divided and then each segment were sampled separately, enough of the extreme cases would be included for analysis.	When it is known in advance that a special segment of the population would not have enough persons in the sample if the sample were drawn randomly. It also allows the use of inferential statistics.
5. Cluster	The ultimate set of persons is determined by a series of probability samples from increasingly smaller geographic areas.	First a sample of large areas is chosen, then a set of smaller areas from this sample, and so on until the final set of persons is decided upon.	When the population to be sampled is very large. It requires a list of persons or a dwelling-unit map. This sample also allows the use of inferential statistics.

SUMMARY,

In summary, samples are used to gain reasonably accurate knowledge about a population without having to interview every single member. There are several types of samples. First, the *accidental sample* is easy to obtain but can be seriously biased and misleading. Second, the *quota sample* includes predetermined numbers or proportions of different types of persons. The selection of individual persons within each type is left to the interviewer's discretion. Third, the *simple random* sample gives each member of a population a known chance to be selected. Fourth, the *stratified random sample* includes proportions of a population divided on known characteristics in order to not underrepresent any relevant subgroups. Fifth, the *cluster sample* starts with a country or large area and progressively samples smaller areas. Although random samples are generally more accurate, the PSYOP officer with limited time or resources may find it necessary to use the less accurate quota sample. Methods of drawing the samples using population lists and dwelling-unit maps were considered with discussion of field problems. There was also a discussion of cost and accuracy factors that enter into the decision regarding the size of the sample to be used.

NOTES

[1] C. W. McNett, Jr. and R.E. Kirk, "Drawing Random Samples in Cross-Cultural Studies: A Suggested Method, "*American Anthropologist*, LXX (February 1968), pp. 50–55.

[2] Wilbur Schramm, *An Introduction to Communication Research for Developing Nations* (Stanford, Calif.: Institute for Communication Research, 1967).

[3] Ibid. p. 60.

Content Analysis

FACTORS INFLUENCING NORTH VIETNAMESE MORALE*

BY the 7TH PSYOP GROUP

Content analysis is illustrated in this article. The technique is used to study the will of Ho Chi Minh and to relate his last testment to psychological factors affecting North Vietnamese morale.

In his last will and testament, executed a few months before his death in September 1969, Ho Chi Minh exhorted his people to continue the fight until the goal of national independence was achieved, until the last foreign troops were driven from Vietnamese soil. To realize this goal, the Vietnamese people are asked to be prepared to continue fighting for another 15 or 20 years, more if necessary.

Prospects of 15 to 20 additional years of war would appear at first examination to be extremely discouraging to a people who have been in

*From "PSYOP Intelligence," a Special Report (SRI–71) of the Research and Analysis Branch of the Research Intelligence Division, 7th PSYOP Group, 11 February 1971.

an almost continual state of war since 1945. Ho's statement appeared to present opportunities to opponents of North Vietnam to mount a psychological campaign against the North Vietnamese. Indeed this seemingly demoralizing pronouncement on the possible duration of the Vietnam War has been seized upon by U.S. and allied propagandists in efforts to weaken the fighting spirit of VC and NVA troops in South Vietnam as well as civilian support of the war effort in North Vietnam.

Ho Chi Minh has been labeled many things by his opponents throughout his long political career, but never a fool. Both the message and the vehicle that conveyed his last admonition were selected for the greatest impact on the North Vietnamese people. Ho Chi Minh was loved and truly venerated by his people almost to the point of being considered a god. The last will and testament was his final formal communication to his people, an expression of what he wanted to be carried out after his death. This testament is constantly referred to in North Vietnamese mass media. The Hanoi leadership effectively invokes the memory of Ho in attempts to motivate the population to greater efforts in all aspects of national life.

In making such a last statement, Ho Chi Minh was drawing heavily upon the Vietnamese past. He was reminding people of the tactics by which the Vietnamese people have won wars throughout history. Usually faced with an enemy vastly superior in strength and arms, as the Chinese or more recently the French, the Vietnamese have traditionally employed the only resources available to them: terrain suitable to their tactics; a brave determined people; and time.

To the Vietnamese the most important of these was time. The Vietnamese have won wars throughout their history by fighting for a longer time than their opponents thought possible. Seven Chinese invasions were successfully repulsed. The Vietnamese struggle with the Mongol hordes lasted 31 years before the Vietnamese drove them from their territory. Wars lasting 30 to 40 years are not uncommon in Vietnamese history. The ability to wage such protracted wars, the tenacity with which the Vietnamese continue to fight, regardless of the time required to defeat the enemy, is the quality with which the Vietnamese people have won their wars.

The Vietnamese people, both North and South, are intensely proud of their history. Until modern times, and with the exception of brief periods of Chinese domination, the Vietnamese have maintained their national independence. They have always maintained their identity as a people regardless of the political situation. Pride in history and military achievements is shown by the manner in which streets in both Vietnams are named. Almost without exception streets are named honoring military and political heroes who have led the people against foreign invaders, usually the Chinese.

Given this apparent ability to outlast the opponent, it is of interest to note Hanoi's thinking about the American people in this regard. A basic

tenet on which Hanoi strategists have based their present war tactics, protracted warfare, is the conviction that the American people are psychologically incapable of staying with a long-term war. The North Vietnamese predicted early in the conflict that the American people would soon tire of the war. The U.S. public would eventually react against rising casualties and rising war costs and force the U.S. government to end the war, thought North Vietnamese strategists.

Accurately gauging the present state of morale in North Vietnam is a difficult task. Government control of the communication media, the small number of vistors permitted in the country, restriction on the travel of the visitors, and particularly the complete absence of unsupervised contacts with ordinary citizens are factors contributing to the scarcity of information.

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A French reporter, who traveled extensively in North Vietnam on two different occasions stated that his most vivid impression on the second trip, six weeks after Ho's death, was the absence of change throughout the country. Everywhere he traveled he saw again the same posters seen during the bombing period urging the population to remain war-conscious, warning against any relaxation while the enemy still threatens. Bomb shelters were much in evidence, as were antiaircraft sites, which were constantly manned. Almost no effort had been made to reconstruct destroyed or damaged buildings although main arteries of transportation were restored or under repair.

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The draft in North Vietnam is not popular. However, there is no indication of efforts to avoid conscription. Correspondence from troops outside the country is infrequent, although exploits and resounding victories of Peoples' Liberation Armed Foreces of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are continually related to the population through the mass media.

There is no question that the vast majority of North Vietnamese people want peace. They have suffered much as a result of two decades or more of war. An entire generation has never known peace. Notwithstanding the desire for peace and relief from the hardships borne by the people as a result of the war, there is little evidence to indicate that popular resolve to support the North Vietnamese Government's war policy has been appreciably lessened.

SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, AND PSYOP, INTRODUCTION PERSUASION*

By Irving L. Janis

An overview of recent research and conceptualization in the field of persuasive communication, a major area of PSYOP.

The art of "winning men's minds by words" has occupied the attention of philosophers since long before the time of Plato's and Aristotle's commentaries on rhetoric. But not until the twentieth century has there been any concerted effort of empirically oriented scholars to describe objectively the conditions under which persuasion succeeds or fails.

Pioneering contributions. In a recent survey of current knowlege about persuasive communication, four social scientists who made pioneering contributions during the first half of this century have been singled out as the founding fathers of the new field of research on persuasive communication (Schramm 1963). One is the political scientist Harold D. Lasswell, who carried out the first detailed descriptive studies of major propaganda campaigns, focusing on the communications issued by national elites during World War I and by totalitarian movements that tried to influence the masses during the period of the great depression. Lasswell formulated a set of theoretical categories for analyzing the effects of persuasive communications and initiated the development of systematic techniques of content analysis (Lasswell et al. 1949).

A second major figure is the sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld, who worked out new methods for investigating the impact of mass media on voting behavior and on the beliefs, judgments, and values of the mass audience. Using poll data from U.S. election campaigns and panel surveys of public reactions to a wide variety of radio programs, Lazarsfeld and his colleagues have described the complex communication networks and cross pressures that exist in modern communities. Their studies (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955) highlight the influential role of local opinion leaders, who function as "gatekeepers" by promoting or rejecting the evaluative judgments transmitted in the mass media by political parties, business organizations, public welfare authorities, and intellectuals.

A third outstanding contributor to scientific research on social influence is the psychologist Kurt Lewin, whose studies emphasized the powerful barriers to change that are created by the primary and secondary groups with which the individual is affiliated. One of his major

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*Excerpts from "Persuasion," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 12, The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, New York, 1968, pp. 55–63. "Persuasion" by Irving L. Janis. Reprinted with permission of the Publisher from THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, David L. Sills, Editor-in Chief. Volume 12, pages 53 to 63. Copyright © 1968 by Crowell Collier and Macmillan, Inc.

explanatory concepts to account for resistance to new sources of social pressure is the counterpressure arising from the existence of group norms, in which attitudes are anchored. When attempting to understand why a person accepts or rejects a persuasive message, according to Lewin (1947), the investigator should examine the person's anticipations about whether or not he will be diverging from the norms of his reference groups, such as his family, his work group, and the social organizations with which he identifies. . . .

Another psychologist, Carl I. Hovland, is the fourth contributor to have helped build up systematic knowledge about communication effects and the processes of persuasion. Hovland initiated broad programs of experimental research designed to test general hypotheses concerning the factors that determine whether or not the recipients of a persuasive message will be influenced. Some of the studies by Hovland and his collaborators (see, e.g., *Personality and Persuasibility* 1959) bear directly on the hypotheses put forth by Lasswell, Lazarsfeld, and Lewin, while others have led to unexpected discoveries and new theoretical analyses of the psychological processes underlying successful persuasion. . . .

The sections that follow present some of the main generalizations drawn from these and other studies in order to indicate representative hypotheses and empirical findings. . . .

Resistance to persuasion. During recent decades many self-styled experts in propaganda, journalism, advertising, and public relations have promoted an image of modern man as highly gullible. The new field of mass-communications research, which developed from the work of these four pioneering social scientists, has shattered this image along with other popular preconceptions concering the alleged power of the mass media to manipulate, exploit, or "brainwash" the public. A review of the evidence accumulated from relevant research studies indicates that mass communications generally fail to produce any marked changes in social attitudes or actions (see Klapper 1960). The slight effects produced by the press, films, radio, and television are usually limited to a reinforcement of the pre-existing beliefs and values of the audience. Campaigns designed to persuade people to change their values, to modify social stereotypes, or to foster a new political ideology generally mobilize powerful resistances in the public. So pervasive are these resistances, according to the documented accounts of numerous investigators, that one could characterize "successful persuasion" by the mass media as a relatively rare social phenomenon.

Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953), in their analysis of factors that influence attention, comprehension, and acceptance of persuasive messages, call attention to essential differences between educational instruction and persuasion. Most of the differences pertain to the audience's initial expectations, which have a marked influence on motivation to accept or reject the communicator's conclusions. In the case of instruc-

tional communications, where high acceptance is readily elicited, the educational setting is typically one in which the members of the audience anticipate that the communicator is trying to help them, that his conclusions are incontrovertible, and that they will be socially rewarded rather than punished for adhering to his conclusions. In persuasive situations, on the other hand, interfering expectations are aroused, and these operate as resistances. The authors point out that the findings from experiments on communication effects seem to converge upon three types of interfering expectations that operate to decrease the degree of acceptance: (1) expectations of being manipulated by the communicator (e.g., being made a "sucker" by an untrustworthy source, who has ulterior economic or political motives for trying to persuade others to support his position); (2) expectations of being "wrong" (e.g., making incorrect judgments on a controversial political issue or overlooking antithetical evidence that would be grounds for a more cautious or compromise position); and (3) expectations of social disapproval (e.g., from the local community or from a primary group whose norms are not in accord with the communicator's position).

This third type of resistance, which reflects Lewin's "social anchorage" concept, has been most extensively investigated. Many studies indicate that when the members of an audience are exposed to a communication advocating a position that goes counter to the norms of one or more of their reference groups, their resistance will vary directly with the strength of the formal and informal sanctions put forth by the norm-setting group. Quite aside from any special sanctions applied to those who violate the group norms, the mere perception that the vast majority of other members accept a given norm operates as a powerful force on the individual to conform to that norm (Lewin 1947; Asch 1952; Kiesler & Corbin 1965).

DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESSFUL PERSUASION

Most of the substantiated propositions about successful persuasion designate factors that help to decrease psychological resistances when the recipients are exposed to a persuasive communication (see Janis & Smith 1965). Exposure requires not only adequate physical transmission of the message but also audience attention, which will not be elicited if the communication is perceived as deviating markedly from pre-existing attitudes and values or as violating the norms of an important reference group. If a persuasive communication evokes sufficient attention to surmount the exposure hurdle, its success will then depend upon *comprehension* (i.e., the extent to which the audience grasps the essential meanings the communicator intended to convey) and *acceptance* (i.e., the degree to which the audience is convinced by the arguments and/or is responsive to the motivational appeals presented in the communication).

The main types of factors that have been investigated are those specified by Lasswell's classic formula for communications analysis: *Who*

says *what* to *whom* with *what effect*? Janis and Holvand (1959) present a paradigm of interacting factors that enter into successful persuasion (see Figure 1). Communicator characteristics, the content of the message, the manner of presentation, and other crucial situational factors shown in column 1 are considered to be stimulus variables capable of touching off the key mediating processes (represented in column 3)—attention, comprehension, and acceptance—that give rise to the various effects designated as attitude change (column 4). The magnitude of the influence exerted by the stimulus variables also depends on different types of predispositional variables (represented in column 2).



* The categories and subcategories are not necessarily exhaustive but highlight the major types of stimulus variables that play a role in producing changes in verbalizable attitudes.

Source: Based on Janis and Hovland 1959.

Figure 1—Major factors in persuasion

Communicator and content factors. The most thoroughly investigated propositions bearing on the processes of persuasion are those that specify how one or another of the stimulus attributes is related to successful persuasion. Sometimes communications research has merely confirmed certain of the well-known prescriptions formulated by experts in the art of persuasion. But research occasionally leads to the discovery of unexpected limiting conditions or hitherto unknown relationships that call into question the commonly accepted assumptions about how people can be influenced to change their beliefs or attitudes.

Prestige and "sleeper" effects. Studies of prestige effects have confirmed some "obvious" assumptions and refuted other, equally "obvious" ones. Several communication experiments have shown, as might be expected, that there is an immediate gain in acceptance of persuasive communications when the message is given by someone who is initially accorded relatively high prestige by the audience or when the arguments are attributed to a relatively trustworthy source. But, contrary to expectations, it has been found that in the long run, persuasive communications from low-prestige sources turn out to be just as effective as those from high-prestige sources. This phenomenon has been termed the "sleeper" effect (see Hovland et al. 1953, pp. 254–259; Kelman & Hovland 1953). Both positive and negative prestige effects seem to wear off over a period of several weeks. When a communication comes from a nonprestigious or distrusted source, the audience tends at first to reject the message. But as time goes on, acceptance of the originally discounted statements has been found to *increase*, evidently because with the passage of time, the content of the message is no longer spontaneously associated with the source.

One-sided versus two-sided presentations. Another issue that has been systematically investigated is whether persuasion is more effective when it concentrates exclusively on the arguments supporting the propagandist's position or when it includes discussion of the opposing arguments. Hitler and other Nazi propaganda strategists have claimed that in appealing for a specific line of action, no rival or opposing ideas should ever be mentioned, because they invite comparisons, hesitation, and doubt. But the available evidence indicates that this principle holds true only under very limited conditions, such as when the audience is unaware of the arguments for the other side of the issue. When the audience is strongly opposed to the position being advocated, a persuasive message is generally more effective if it includes the opposing arguments than if it presents only the arguments in favor of one side of the issue (see Hovland et al. 1953, pp. 105–110; Hovland et al. 1949, pp. 201–227; Klapper 1960, pp. 113–116). Moreover, even when the audience is not initially opposed to the communicator's position, a two-sided presentation will be more effective in creating sustained changes in attitudes if the communication is given under conditions where the audience will subsequently be exposed to countercommunications presenting the opposing arguments.

Inoculation devices. When the members of an audience are pre-exposed to the opposing arguments along with some refutations, they are to some extent "inoculated" against subsequent countercommunications, because the new arguments will be much less impressive and more readily discounted (see Lumsdaine & Janis 1953). This type of inoculation has been found to produce a "generalized immunization effect" under certain conditions, notably when a communication advocates recommendations that the audience already regards as being in line with commonly accepted norms, such as simple health rules. Thus, inclusion of a few arguments that momentarily shake the confidence of members of the audience in cultural truisms they had always taken for granted will reduce the chances of their being influenced by subsequent counterpropaganda, because they become more resistant both to the counterarguments specifically mentioned and refuted in the original two-sided communication and to new counterarguments which might otherwise shake their beliefs (McGuire 1961).

Another simple inoculation device has been found to be effective in reducing the influence of unconventional communications that take issue with cultural truisms of the type that people are seldom or never called upon to defend. This device consists of stimulating the members of an audience to build up defenses by warning them in advance that their hitherto unchallenged beliefs will soon be exposed to strong attack (McGuire 1961; 1964; McGuire & Papageorgis 1962).

The well-known "freezing" effects of public commitment to a newly adopted policy or course of action form the basis for another type of communication device that prevents backsliding. Experimental studies indicate that resistance to subsequent countercommunications can be built up if, after presenting impressive arguments and appeals, the communicator uses his persuasive influence to induce his listeners to endorse the position publicly—for example, by voting openly for it, signing a petition, or showing other overt signs of acceptance that will be seen by people in their community (see Lewin 1947; *Attitude Organization and Change* 1960).

Other types of inoculation procedures have been studied to determine the conditions under which acceptance of a new attitude or policy recommendation will be sustained despite subsequent exposure to frustrations, threats, or setbacks that arouse strong negative effects. For example, after having been persuaded to adopt a communicator's recommendations, the audience may subsequently be exposed to warnings or punishments that stimulate avoidance of the recommendations. The emotional impact of the subsequent setback will tend to be reduced if the audience has been given inoculating communications that predict the threatening event in advance, thus eliminating the element of surprise and, at the same time, stimulating appropriate defenses (see Janis 1962). Similarly, in the case of "bad news" events that generate pessimistic expectations about the future, preparatory communications that present grounds for

maintaining optimistic expectations can help soften the blow and enable the audience to resist being unduly influenced by the impact of the disturbance (Janis et al. 1951). In general, the eventual success of any attempt at persuading people to carry out a given course of action is likely to be attained if the communicator frankly discusses the possible subsequent difficulties and countercommunications, presenting them in a way that helps to create a cognitive frame of reference for discounting or minimizing them if they do, in fact, materialize.

Effectiveness of "primacy." Since most inoculation devices involve familiarizing the audience with counteraguments, two-sided communications might be more advantageous in the long run, even in circumstances where a one-sided communication could be expected to be more successful in producing immediate changes in a higher proportion of the audience. There are, of course, many different ways of arranging the opposing arguments in a two-sided communication, and some ways of inserting them have been found to be more effective than others. For example, when the audience is not familiar with the opposing arguments, a two-sided communication from an authoritative source tends to be more effective if the opposing arguments are presented *after*, rather than before, the favorable arguments that support the communicator's conclusion. By giving strong favorable arguments first, the communication arouses the audience's motivation to accept the communicator's conclusion, so that when the negative material subsequently occurs, it can be better tolerated. Furthermore, if a strong case is made for the communicator's position at the outset, there is a greater likelihood that the recipient will make an early decision to accept the communicator's position and thereafter tend to minimize dissonance or conflict by ignoring the opposing ideas (see Brehm & Cohen 1962; Festinger 1957; 1964; Janis 1957; 1959). This *primacy effect*, when tested with communications designed to induce opposing attitudes toward the same social objects or policies, proved to be extremely pronounced under conditiions where the contradictory material was not spontaneously salient and there was no time interval between the first set of arguments and the second, contradictory set (Asch 1946; Luchins 1957a; 1957b; Janis & Feierabend 1957). Under other conditions, however, such as where the audience is very familiar with the opposing arguments and has initial doubts about the communicator's honesty, a *recency effect* might predominate, making it more advantageous to give the counterarguments first, with the main affirmative arguments saved for the end of the communication (see Hovland et al. 1957, pp. 130–147.)

Emotional appeals. It is commonly recognized that when a person remains unmoved by repeated attempts to persuade him with rational arguments, he might nevertheless show a marked change as soon as emotional appeals are introduced. Probably the most widespread form of emotional appeal in modern Western culture involves the arousal of fear by emphasizing anticipated threats. Antiwar propaganda, public health

campaigns, and other efforts at mass persuasion frequently rely upon emotional shock devices to motivate people to carry out preventive measures or to support policies designed to avert potential dangers (for example, promoting a ban against a nuclear weapons test by emphasizing the horrors of war).For maximal effectiveness, this device requires not only that the communications succeed in arousing fear but also that the recommendations function as effective *reassurances*. The latter term refers to verbal statements—plans, resolutions, judgments, evaluations—that are capable of alleviating or reducing emotional tension. Many communication experiments have been designed to test popular claims about the effectiveness of emotional appeals and to determine objectively the conditions under which such appeals are successful.

Political leaders and public health authorities often assume that the protective actions or practical solutions they advocate will be more readily accepted, the more they succeed in frightening the audience about the dangerous consequences of failing to adhere to their recommendations. This assumption may occasionally be correct, as in the case of recommendations concerning immediate escape actions (e.g., evacuation of a danger area within a few minutes after an emergency warning is issued). But the assumption appears to be questionable in many instances, especially when the goal is to induce delayed actions or sustained attitudes (e.g., evacuating at some future date, if the threat materializes; supporting a disarmament movement; favoring prodemocratic policies). The available evidence indicates that presenting fear-arousing material in a persuasive communication tends to stimulate the recipient's vigilance and his need for reassurance. But this does not necessarily increase his motivation to accept authoritative recommendations about ways to avert or cope with the danger, since the person may find other ways to reduce his fear. Whenever fear is aroused to a very high level, resistances tend to be strongly mobilized. This will reduce the effectiveness of a persuasive communication, unless it is outweighed by certain other factors that could facilitate attitude change (Hovland et al. 1953, pp. 56-98; Leventhal 1965). Among the facilitating conditions that increase an audience's tolerance for a strong dosage of fear-arousing material in a persuasive message is the inclusion of one or more highly specific recommendations that offer an apparently good solution to the problems posed by the threat, with no obvious loopholes (Leventhal et al. 1965). When this condition is not met, as is often the case in "scare" propaganda, the use of a strong emotional appeal may produce much less acceptance of the communicator's recommendations than a milder appeal, since the audience will then become motivated to attach little importance to the the threat or develop some other form of defensive avoidance that enables them to alleviate their fear. Sometimes strong emotional appeals attain spectacular persuasive effects, but it is difficult to predict accurately that a very high dosage of fear will not exceed the optimal level. Preliminary "program assessment" research with cross-sectional samples of the intended

audience is usually needed to make sure that the version of the communication containing a strong appeal is more effective than a version containing a more moderate appeal.

Implici. versus explicit conclusions. Many claims are made about effective strategies for inducing people to change their attitudes and values, but some of these claims are difficult to assess empirically. One such notion is that a *nondirective* approach—similar to that used by many counselors and psychotherapists when dealing with people who seek help in making conflictful decisions of an upsetting nature—will generally be more effective in mass communications than a more directive approach . . . One testable implication of this notion is that a mass communication will sway more people if instead of stating an explicit conclusion, the communicator allows the audience to draw its own conclusions from the facts, arguments, and appeals that he presents. Undoubtedly, there are some circumstances where direct suggestions are likely to meet with such insurmountable resistances that an indirect approach is the only hope for exerting any influence whatsoever. But for informative communications dealing with relatively impersonal issues, the available research evidence indicates that it is generally more effective to state the conclusions or recommendations *explicitly*, even when the propagandist is regarded as biased or untrustworthy (see Hovland et al. 1953, pp. 100-105; Klapper 1960, pp. 84-91, 116-117). One of the main advantages of stating the conclusions explicitly is that it helps to prevent the audience from missing or distorting the essential point of the arguments.

Effects of role playing. One type of indirect persuasion that has been carefully investigated involves the use of a special role-playing technique. It has been repeatedly found that when a person is required to play a role entailing the presentation of a persuasive message to others in his own words, he will be more influenced than if he were passively exposed to the same message. This "saying is believing" tendency has been found to occur even when role playing is artifically induced by asking people to take part in a test of their public-speaking ability or to write essays (Janis & King 1954; Kelman 1953). Experimental evidence indicates that mere repetition of a persuasive message has little effect as compared with an improvised restatement and elaboration of the arguments and conclusions (King & Janis 1956). The success of improvised role playing might be attributed to several different psychological processes. Festinger (1957) suggests that the primary gain from role playing comes from efforts to reduce dissonance between what one is saying publicly and what one actually believes, and a number of experiments offer some supporting evidence (e.g., Brehm & Cohen 1962; Festinger & Carlsmith 1959; Festinger 1964). An alternative explanation is in terms of self-persuasion; when attempting to convey the message to others, the role player is likely to think up new formulations of the arguments, new illustrations and appeals. These are likely to be convincing incentives to himself, especially if he regards the improvised ideas as his "own" (see Hovland et al. 1953,

pp. 228–237; Janis & Gilmore 1965; Elms & Janis 1965). This theoretical issue has not yet been settled, and the differential predictions from the alternative explanations are currently under investigation (see Carlsmith et al. 1966; Rosenburg 1965).

Personality factors. Numerous studies have shown that social attitudes are frequently resistant to persuasion because they satisfy deep-seated personality needs. Such attitudes are likely to remain unchanged unless self-insight techniques or special types of persuasive appeals are used that take account of the adjustive and ego-defensive functions of these attitudes (see Katz & Stotland 1959; Lasswell 1930-1951; Smith et al. 1956). It is logical, therefore, that assessment of personality attributes should help in predicting whether a given person will be responsive to persuasive messages that deal with a particular topic or that employ one or another type of argument. Studies of authoritarian personalities, for example, indicate that any communication fostering rigid, antidemocratic controls over political dissenters and minority out-groups will tend to be more readily accepted by one particular type of personality (see Adorno et al. 1950). An outstanding characteristic of this personality is a strong latent need to displace hostility away from in-groups toward out-groups—as manifested by symptoms of intense ambivalence toward parents, bosses, and other authority figures, combined with a high degree of inhibition of normal sexual and aggressive activities.

Table 1 shows a set of hypothetical diagnostic categories, worked out by Katz (1960), that might prove to be useful for predicting individual differences in responsiveness to persuasion on important social issues. The first step would be to determine which of the four basic types of functions (column 1) is served by the person's current attitude on the issue in question. The type of need fulfilled by each function is shown in the second column of the table. If one could assess the status of these needs accurately, one would presumably be able to predict the types of situations that would arouse the attitude (column 3) and the general conditions that would have to be met in order to change each individual's attitude (column 4).

One of the main reasons why Katz's hypothetical schema is regarded as a promising functional approach to the study of attitude change is that it helps to explain why the conditions required for changing certain attitudes, particularly those diagnosed as serving an ego-defensive function, are not satisfied by the usual forms of persuasion to be found in the mass media. The material in this table carries the implication that no simple psychological formula can be expected to subsume all instances of attitude change. This implication confirms clinical observations, which indicate that unconscious dynamics as well as conscious processes are sometimes involved when a person clings unyieldingly to his stand in the face of strong persuasive arguments or when he readily gives in, without any opposition, on an important social or political issue (see Lasswell 1930–1951). It also agrees with experimental evidence indicating that

even when dealing with conscious attitudes, we cannot expect to find only one type of cognitive process that will account for successful persuasion. For example, the striving for consistency among cognitions bearing on the same issue—which Heider (1958) has postulated as a fundamental human tendency in response to all meaningful communications—sometimes appears to be an important determinant of reactions to persuasion, but it does not account for certain instances where other motivational factors, such as pleasurable anticipations of gain, may become the dominant determinants (see Rosenberg & Abelson 1960).

Individual differences are to be expected, not only in response to persuasive pressures from agruments that create cognitive imbalances but also in response to emotional appeals (see Janis & Feshbach 1954) and group pressures induced by giving information about the consensus of judgments made by one's peers (see Crutchfield 1955); these are called "content-bound" predispositions. Some research evidence also points to specific personality needs, preferences, and sensitivities that predispose certain persons to be highly responsive to one or another limited type of communicator (Janis & Hovland 1959); these are termed "communicator-bound" predispositions. In Figure 1, all such sources of individual differences are represented in the second column by the box labeled "specific predispositions."

In addition to specific types of predispositional factors, there are also certain personality attributes that predispose people to be swayed by, or to be resistant to, *any* persuasive message, irrespective of what is said, how it is said, or who says it. This *general persuasibility* factor (represented by the box at the top of the second column in Figure 1) has been inferred from research on the consistency of individual differences. Such research indicates that when a large audience is exposed to many different types of persuasive communications on many different types of issues, some persons are consistently resistant, whereas others are moderately persuasible, and still others are highly persuasible (see Abelson & Lesser 1959a; Janis & Field 1959a; 1959b). Among the personaltiy factors found to be predictive of low resistance to all forms of persuasive influence are (1) low self-esteem; (2) inhibition of overt aggressive behavior; (3) high fantasy imagery and strong empathic responses to symbolic representations; and (4) other-directed rather than inner-directed orientation, that is, a value system stressing adaptation to the social environment rather than inner standards for regulating one's conduct. It is a puzzling fact, however, that these relationships have been found only in samples of men, since no such relationships have been found as yet in samples of women. These findings have been attributed to differences in the social roles prescribed for women and men in our society, which may also account for the repeated finding that women are more persuasible than men on social and political issues (see Hovland & Janis 1959).

Table 1—Determinants of attitude formation, arousal, and change in relation to type of function

Function	Origin and Dynamics	Arousal Conditions	Change Conditions
Adjustment	The object of the attitude has proved to be useful for satisfying important needs; it increases one's chances of gaining rewards or decreases one's chances of being punished.	1. Activation of needs. 2. Salience of cues associated with need satisfaction.	1. Failure to gain usual satisfactions from the attitude. 2. Creation of new needs and new levels of aspiration that are not satisfied by the attitude. 3. Shifting of rewards and punishments so that the attitude is no longer reinforced. 4. Impressive demonstration of new and better paths for need satisfaction.
Ego defense	The attitude helps to protect the person from internal conflicts or from becoming highly disturbed by external dangers.	1. Posing of threats. 2. Appeals to hatred and repressed impulses. 3. Rise in frustrations. 4. Use of authoritarian suggestion.	1. Removal of threats. 2. Catharsis which reduces the need for defense against pent-up impulses. 3. Opportunity for development of self-insight.
Value expression	The attitude helps the person to maintain his self-identity and his self-esteem; it allows him to express himself or gives him a sense of independence.	1. Salience of cues associated with values. 2. Appeals to individual to reassert self-image. 3. Ambiguities which threaten self concept.	1. Some degree of dissatisfaction with the self. 2. Impressive demonstration of the greater appropriateness of a new attitude for enhancing one's self-image. 3. Loss of usual environmental supports to such an extent that old values are undermined.
Knowledge	The attitude satisfies the needs for understanding, for meaningful cognitive organization, and for consistency and clarity.	1. Re-encounters with the original problem that required a solution or encounters with related problems.	1. Ambiguity created by new information or by a marked change in environment. 2. Meaningful information about a different way of analyzing the problem or about new ways of solving it.

Source: From Katz 1960, p. 192.

CURRENT STATUS OF RESEARCH

The hypotheses summarized in the foregoing review of social-psychological studies of persuasion do not constitute an exhaustive propositional inventory of all available findings but, rather, serve to highlight major relationships that have emerged from systematic research. Supporting evidence comes from carefully controlled experiments, but the studies usually have been carried out with small subpopulation samples, most often limited to American high school or college students in a classroom situation. Consequently, the generaltiy of the hypotheses and the limiting conditions under which they hold true have not yet been adequately explored. There is some reason to expect, however, that the relationships initially observed in the limited experimental situations will have fairly wide applicability because: (a) they appear to be in line with observations from other, less well-controlled investigations of social influence (such as panel studies of opinion trends during political campaigns, market research surveys on widely advertised products, and case studies of responsiveness to psychological counseling or psychotherapy); and (b) in a number of instances where replications have been carried out with other subpopulations in other types of communication situations, confirmatory evidence has been obtained (see Janis & Smith 1965).

In any case, the development of experimental techniques, attitude scales, and sophisticated methods for analyzing the effects of many different causal factors and their interactions have now reached the point where we can obtain relevant and cumulative knowledge from systematic studies of the conditions under which persuasive communications are effective or ineffective (see Campbell 1963). As new techniques and methods are used in the rapidly expanding field of communications research, we can expect a fuller account of the influence of the variables discussed, as well as new discoveries concerning the ways in which communication stimuli and predispositional factors interact in the processes of persuasion.

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ANTHOLOGIES, SYNTHESES, AND EXPLORATIONS:

AN ATTITUDE CHANGE SAMPLER*

BY GERALD R. MILLER

Social science research on attitude change is particularly relevant to PSYOP. This article reviews the subject of attitude change from several perspectives.

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As I have indicated in a recent *QJS* (*Quarterly Journal of Speech*) article, the study of human communication, from Aristotle to the analysis of variance, has reflected a pervasive interest in the persuasive process. In particular, the past several decades have produced a printed explosion consisting of both new insights and old ideas revisited—insights and ideas ranging from grandiose theorizing to microscopic empiricism. As Gustav Bergmann would put it, both the "cloudhoppers" and the "clodhoppers" have had their say.

The 14 books reviewed below—all published within the last five years—capture the flavor of this ongoing scholarly dialogue on persuasion. While they represent a collective outpouring of 4008 pages, they do not exhaust the behaviorally-oriented volumes on attitudes and attitude change printed during this time span. Moreover, spatial limitations have necessitated exclusion of two types of works: those which contain considerable material appropriate to the study of attitude change but which deal with other problems as well (e.g., Feldman, ed., *Cognitive Consistency*) and those which note relevant theories and research but which emphasize the practice of persuasive communication (e.g., Minnick, *The Art of Persuasion*).

For purposes of convenience, the books are grouped in three categories, although no claim is made for either their exclusivity or their exhaustiveness. Five of the volumes are *Anthologies*; they are primarily collections of earlier published articles. Four are *Syntheses*; they represent attempts to organize, combine, and present diverse theoretical, empirical, and methodological writings. Finally, five of the works are *Exploratory*; they seek to expand the frontiers of knowledge concerning processes of attitude formation, attitude change, and persuasion.

ANTHOLOGIES

Two of the more ambitious anthologies are Fishbein's *Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement* and Rosnow and Robinson's *Experiments in Persuasion*. The former contains eight articles dealing with historical foundations of the study of attitudes, 23 concerning various methodological aspects of attitude measurement, and 20 describing differing theories of attitude formation and change. The latter assembles 30 well-known studies dealing with the effects of certain source, message, recipient, and channel variables on the process of persuasion.

Examination of the Fishbein volume impresses the reader with the amount of material that has been written about attitude measurement. Even here, as Fishbein points out, the articles chosen cover only part of the territory; they deal exclusively "with the theory underlying attitude measurement rather than with the measurement process per se." The classic articles on standardized measurement techniques are all included: the interested reader can discover the genesis of the Bogardus Social Distance Scale; Thurstone and Likert-type scales; Guttman scaling, and the semantic differential. In addition, there are articles dealing with

multidimensional measurement techniques, alternative measurement techniques, and problems and prospects in attitude measurement.

The fact that 21 of the 23 articles deal entirely with scaling and measurement problems which use as their data base some form of paper-and pencil response is more a commentary on the state of the art than on the representativeness of the selections. The two exceptions are an article by Campbell on the indirect assessment of social attitudes, which takes note of doll-play techniques, and one by Cooper and Pollock, which discusses the use of galvanic skin response to identify prejudicial attitudes. While one or two other articles might conceivably have been included (e.g., Eckard Hess' work with pupilary dilation could not be reprinted due to copyright problems), the conclusion is inescapable that we know much more about measuring verbal indicants of an attitude than we do about measuring other attitudinal behaviors. Elsewhere, I have stressed the need to rectify this shortcoming.

The section dealing with differing theoretical approaches to the study of attitudes strikes an appropriate balance between various strains of theorizing. There are eight articles on consistency theories, an approach that in recent years has undoubtedly spawned the largest research literature. Five of the articles are rooted in behavior theories; while a final section, "Problems, Prospects, and Alternatives in Attitude Theory," not only contains articles presenting the peculiar contributions of such theorists as Bem, Katz, and Kelman but also provides several papers appraising the present status of the most popular theoretical viewpoints.

While Fishbein's volume stresses attitude measurement and attitude theory, Rosnow and Robinson focus on the experimental literature dealing with the persuasive process. The book's organization conforms with Smith, Lasswell, and Casey's famous definition of communication: "*Who* (Source section) says *what* (Message section) to *whom* (Recipient section) through which *medium* (Channel section) with what *effect* (Effects section)."This organizational approach makes generally good sense, with the possible exception of the Effects section. Here, the articles included struck me as a persuasive potpourri covering a variety of problems. Moreover, labeling one section "Effects" is somewhat misleading, for the staple commodity of all five major divisions of the volume is effects-centered research.

Each section contains a number of landmark studies—in some instances, I would have preferred less reliance on the old standards and more attention to research of recent vintage—plus several original summaries, prepared by the editors, of the various research enterprises. These summaries are one of the book's major assets; they produce a sense of unity often lacking in collections of reprinted articles.

Both the Fishbein and Rosnow and Robinson volumes are useful additions to the literature for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate persuasion courses. Their utility is partially dependent upon experienced instructors, although the original summaries in Rosnow and

Robinson might permit its use by a teacher with less grounding in the behavioral study of persuasion.

Jahoda and Warrent's paperback, *Attitudes*, is an anthology in the fullest sense. Except for a brief introduction and seven one paragraph statements preceding each of the major sections, the book contains no original material. There are 27 classic articles, most of them excerpted, dealing with such topics as the concept of attitude, attitude research, attitude theory, and attitude research metholology.

The volume will make a useful supplement in beginning courses in persuasion or public opinion and propaganda. Its use in advanced classes could contribute to poor scholarly habits, primarily because of the brevity of the excerpts. For example, Campbell's 70 page *tour de force*, "Social Attitudes and Other Acquired Behavioral Dispositions," is represented by a single page. As I recall, such "quickie" summaries used to be eagerly sought out by harried doctoral students preparing for comprehensives. Hopefully, times have changed.

In attempting to produce a volume suitable for unified, indepth undergraduate and graduate study of attitude change, Wagner and Sherwood's *The Study of Attitude Change* juxtaposes theoretical and research articles. Beginning with a well-written introduction by Wagner, the book's general pattern is to present a particular theoretical position, followed by a study generated by that position. While most of the articles are reprinted, there is a good orginal paper on cognitive dissonance by Sherwood, Barron, and Fitch. To illustrate how results of a given study can be interpreted in more than one way, Bem's elaboration of self-perception as an alternative to cognitive dissonance and Brehm's criticism of Elms and Janis' incentive theory explanation of counter-attitudinal role-playing are included in the volume. Finally, McGuire's article on inducing resistance to persuasion and Howland's classic reconciliation of experimental and survey approaches to the study of attitude change are deemed to be of sufficient general interest to warrant inclusion.

The book's most serious shortcoming is its minimal attention to learning-behavior theories of attitude change. In fact, save for the inclusion of one or two articles, it would have been appropriate to insert the inevitable scholarly colon at the title's end and to have appended a subtitle noting the cognitive theory bias. On the plus side, Wagner and Sherwood's volume, like Rosnow and Robinson's *Experiments in Persuasion*, possesses the virtue of unity. Moreover, the scope of the book permits thorough coverage of its contents in a one-term course in persuasion. On balance, it is a useful addition to the literature.

The last of the five anthologies, Elms' *Role Playing Reward, and Attitude Change* reflects the inevitable outgrowth of constantly increasing specialization in the study of persuasion. All of the 15 articles are concerned with one problem: variables influencing attitude change following an individual's active involvement in counter-attitudinal role-playing. Elms justifies this specialized approach by asserting that "this is an

exciting area of social psychological research. The central issues are not difficult to grasp, and the implications are of broad importance."

For the initiated reader, the controversies are familiar. Beginning with the classic study by Festinger and Carlsmith, the volume captures the continuing debate about the role of justification in inducting attitude change following counterattitudinal role-playing. Both the dissonance theorists—e.g., Cohen and Brehm—and the incentive theorists—e.g., Janis and Gilmore and Elms and Janis—are given their intellectual day in court. In addition, there are articles on the role of relative anonymity and of desicion freedom in the process of counterattitudinal advocacy, as well as Bem's familiar interpretation of the process from a self-perception framework.

Obviously, the volume is too narrowly focused for a survey course in behavioral persuasion research. For advanced classes that concentrate on the problem of counterattitudinal role-playing, the book is a valuable instructional asset. Moreover, it effectively demonstrates the theoretical disagreements often accompanying a body of accepted research findings. In all of the articles, the disagreements are not about what is observed, but rather about how to interpret and explain these observations. In fact, skeptical readers may conclude that the book is little more than a scholarly tempest in a teapot, that researchers should be more concerned with their findings and less engrossed with the interpretation of them.

My one general criticism of these five anthologies concerns their redundancy. Three contain some version of McGuire's paper on inducing resistance to persuasion and of Bem's self-perception analysis of the role of justification in counterattitudinal advocacy. Numerous articles are duplicated in at least two of the anthologies. To argue against such repetition is not to detract from the scholarly stature of these popular papers; rather, it represents a pragmatic pitch for maximum availability and coverage. Hopefully, forthcoming collections will result in a better balance of academic supply and demand in the attitude change market.

SYNTHESES

The four books categorized as syntheses differ widely in scope and purpose. Two of the titles suggest primary concern with the critical analysis of theories of attitude formation and change, and the fourth emphasizes practical dimensions of the influence process.

While the Insko volume is titled *Theories of Attitude Change*, its author indicates he is at least equally concerned with summarizing the research literature generated by each of the theoretical positions—that a theory-centered organization of the literature was chosen in preference to a problem-centered approach. Following an introductory chapter that probes some of the problems of attitude research methodology, there are 12 chapters dealing with contemporary theories of attitude change. The book concludes with a brief evaluative chapter on the general historical development of attitude theory and research.

The 12 theory chapters have identical organization: first, the essentials of the theory are presented; next, relevant research is summarized; and finally, the theory's current status is evaluated. The chapters cover reinforcement theory, assimilation-contrast (social judgment) theory, adaptation-level theory, logical-affective consistency theory, congruity theory, belief congruence theory, balance theories, affective-cognitive consistency theory, dissonance theory, psychoanalytic theory, inoculation theory, and several type theories.

The book's strongest point is its comprehensive, detailed summary of the research literature; it provides an excellent synthesis of the work through 1965. For instance, the chapter on dissonance theory—granted, it is one of the longest—contains a 75 page research review. Even though McGuire's recent excellent synthesis in the second edition of the *Handbook of Social Psychology* is more current and wide-ranging, Insko's thoroughness is praiseworthy.

A prevailing ponderous, dry style represents the volume's greatest liability; insomniacs will likely discover that it beats counting sheep hollow. This criticism reflects more than the reactions of a cantankerous reviewer, for I have used the book in a graduate course and numerous students have commented on its dullness. Perhaps Insko's awareness of this characteristic led to his remark that "In describing the research it would have been very easy to summarize and comment upon a group of experiments without going into the details of procedures, statistical tests, etc. Indeed many readers may strongly wish such an approach had been taken. *Certainly this would have made the book more entertaining and readable* (italics mine)."

Whether the objective of detail could have been achieved without such a complete sacrifice of lively style is for the reader to decide. Still, in fairness to Insko, my decision to adopt the book reveals that, for me, its strengths exceed its stylistic shortcomings. One caveat: the book should not be assigned to beginning students not only because the detail may prove formidable but also because it is apt to convince them that the study of persuasion is not much fun.

Keisler, Collins, and Miller attribute *Attitude Change* to their conviction that "very little detailed criticism of individual theories or comparison among the several disparate approaches was available." Certainly, their volume makes considerable headway in eliminating his vacuum; in fact, I was uncertain as to whether it should be categorized as a synthesis or an exploratory work. Final consignment to the *Syntheses* section is, at best, an arbitrary judgment.

The book opens with chapters on the concept and measurement of attitude change. The authors next turn to detailed discussions of stimulus-response and behavioristic theories, consistency theories, dissonance theory, social judgment theory, and functional theories. Although the literature summaries are not as comprehensive as those of Insko, *Attitude Change* is eminently more readable. At times, the book

wanders organizationally; for instance, although the authors offer a lame excuse for its inclusion, the summary of Campbell's paper on acquired behavioral disposition seems out-of-place. Perhaps his position as one of the volume's two patron saints best explains this organizational decision.

One other negative reaction is worth noting. Several of the authors' statements reveal a tendency to conceive of the behavioral study of persuasions as mysticism, rather than science. Consider, for instance, this assertion, which I found particularly perplexing: "Since there is often more to a theory than is publicly recorded, an experimenter 'trained' in a theoretical tradition is probably more likely to replicate than an investigator who must rely on publicly recorded versions of the theory" (p. 65). For my money, this strange view of science—which, unfortunately, seems to be in vogue among disciples of certain research positions—is poor stuff for fledgling persuasion researchers to consume. What "more" is there to a scientific theory than its publicly specified primitives, constructs, logical operators, formal relationships, and bridging principles? Is the invariateness of a scientific law dependent on a particular scientist's intellectual alma mater? Must I have studied with Galileo to replicate his experiments on inclined planes? Obviously, by all rational definitions of science, the answers to these questions are negative. The beauty of scientific method lies in its publicness and reproducibility. If certain experiments fail to meet these criteria, their scholarly advocates should subject them to re-examination, instead of invoking mystical, extra-empirical defenses.

Still, this occasional tendency to rely on nonscientific rebuttal is more than offset by the excellent research summaries and thoughtful criticism accompanying the discussion of the various theories of attitude change. Teachers of advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate courses in persuasion should welcome the addition of *Attitude Change* to the available literature.

Halloran's *Attitude Formation and Change*, written under the auspices of a British Televison Research Committee is one of a series of papers investigating "the extent to which the developing techniques of research of the social sciences can be used to examine the influence of television on the formation or altering of attitudes and moral concepts" (p. 7). The book rudimentarily treats such topics as the study of attitudes, their nature, their formation, their functions, and variables influencing attitude change. Numerous landmark studies are cited, and there is a useful appendix by Jahoda acquainting the consumer of research with the steps involved in formulating and investigating a research problem. The volume is neither comprehensive nor current enough for an advanced class, but it could be used in an introductory course.

The final synthetic work, Zimbardo and Ebbsesn's *Influencing Attitudes and Changing Behavior*, is unique because of its emphasis on the research utilizer: the communication practitioner whose task is to apply the results of behavioral persuasion research to solving policy questions and developing communication strategies. This does not imply that the

book is of no value to potential researchers, for the authors describe their twofold purpose as follows: "to turn the reader on to the potential value and excitement inherent in the study of attitude change, and to provide the serious student with a primer which may be an impetus to further academic study."

The first five sections of the book closely parallel numerous other volumes reviewed above. The first section discusses approaches to posing problems in attitude and behavior modification, the second deals with available resources for answering these questions, the third examines the experiment as a possible source of information, the fourth provides a framework for critically analyzing attitude research, and the fifth discusses the role of theory in attitude research. In all cases, the material is readable and interesting.

It is primarily in Section 6, "Focusing upon Practical Applications of Principles of Attitude and Behavior Change," that the volume makes its unique contribution. Specific practical problems are posed, and the application of research knowledge to problem solution is then illustrated. For example, a case situation with the intriguing title, "When It's April in Uruguay, Only Science Sells Curtains," first details some of the sales problems faced by an upholstery firm in Montevideo, problems stemming from a conflict between the firm's preferred selling policies and purchasing habits of Montevideo's residents. The next several pages are devoted to a cogent analysis of strategies available to the company, with emphasis placed on the centrality of attitude research in strategy formulation. Repetition of this approach across several case situations convincingly illustrates that research can contribute to the solution of "real world" problems, if ingenuity is used in applying results to these problems.

The book concludes with four *Postscripts*, the most valuable of which details a method for outlining experiments. The interesting mixture of scholarly material and application procedures results in a book of potential utility in a variety of classes ranging from beginning courses for individuals primarily concerned with knowledge utilization. The authors have achieved a balanced, interesting approach.

Taken together, the four synthetic works reviewed provoke several generalizations. First, the interested reader is likely to be impressed by the number of studies conducted in the last 30 years. Moreover, as the volumes ably document, there is no shortage of competing theoretical positions; persuasive outcomes can be explained in various ways. Still, with all the sound and fury, there remains the uncomfortable feeling that we are not very confident about many of our findings and that the parts have yet to be fitted into a satisfactory whole. Perhaps the synthetic volume of a decade hence, buttressed by the kinds of exploratory ventures reviewed in the section below, will assuage this discomfort. Or on the other hand, since the behavioral study of persuasion is an ongoing process, such uncertainty may be a healthy omen.

EXPLORATORY WORKS

The works reviewed above paint a backdrop picturing where the behavioral study of persuasion has been; the volumes reviewed below provide a glimpse of where it is going. Of course, not all of the material found in the five exploratory works is new or revolutionary; obviously, any faltering steps forward must proceed from the groundwork of past accomplishments. Still, numerous fresh insights are contained in these books; insights that may serve as intellectual signposts for behavioral persuasion scholars of the 1970's.

The Greenwald, Brock, and Ostrom volume, *Psychological Foundations of Attitudes*, emerged partially as a reaction to the recent scholarly dominance of consistency theories. The editors assert that "While the cognitive consistency principle has done the valuable service of attracting much attention to the psychological study of atttiudes, at the same time this attention has tended to obscure a number of important attitude-theoretical developments that do not make references to the consistency principle."

The book has four major sections: an historical introduction to the development of attitude theory, a section on the contributions of learning-behavior theories to attitude theory, a section on the contributions of cognitive integration theories, and a concluding section dealing with definition of the *attitude* construction. The contributors to the theory chapters interlace explication of the major theoretical propositions with summaries of prior relevant research and suggestions for future inquiry.

Each reader's theoretical biases will dictate his chapter preferences. In the realm of learning-behavior theories, I found the chapters by Staats and by McGuire particularly interesting: the former describes some ingeneous [sic] applications of Hull-Spence learning theory to attitude research, and the later represents an impressive effort to introduce the *systems* concept to the study of attitudes. In the cognitive integration section, Brock's chapter on the implications of commodity theory for value change and Baron's functional analysis of attitude change following counterattitudinal advocacy struck me as especially provocative.

The volume provides a lively stimulus for persuasion researchers and is likely to determine many future empirical thrusts. Instructors of advanced courses who want their students to be on the frontiers of attitude theorizing should read the volume carefully, for there is much to both stimulate and excite.

Two selections deal with the contributions of the Sherifs to attitude theory and research. The first, Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall's *Attitude and Attitude Change* explicates the social judgment theory of attitude change and reports previously unpublished research bearing on the theory. The chapter headings convey the basic dimensions of, and the critical variables associated with, the social judgment theory. Following a general introduction, there are chapters on latitudes of acceptance and

rejection, ego-involved judgmental priorities, evaluation based on own categories, assimilation and contrast, and the frame of reference for attitude change. The volume concludes with a summary statement about the theory's contemporary status and its relevance to attitude change research.

Attitude, Ego-Involvement, and Change, edited by Sherif and Sherif, contains 13 original papers, four of which are primarily concerned with the social judgment theory of attitude change. The Sherifs present a restatement of the theory, along with some relevant research findings; Diab reports the results of a study comparing social judgment-involvement and semantic differential measurement procedures; Whittaker provides further data on the relevance of social judgment theory to the issue of communicator-communicatee attitude discrepancy, and Bieri examines the relationship between latitude of acceptance—a key construct in the Sherifs' theory—and affective arousal. In addition, there are interesting papers on such topics as attitude formation in children, conceptual systems and attitude change, the components of interpersonal attitudes, and political attitudes of emerging nations.

Those familiar with the Sherifs' writings know that their style is lively and their ideas controversial. Ringing loudly throughout both volumes is a plea for the importance of ego-involvement: for recognizing that in everyday human affairs, certain attitudes are more central and important than others. While a WCTU member may favor both prohibition and ratification of a fishing treaty between the United States and Canada, she is likely to respond differently to communications arguing against implementation of the two policies. If this fact is not recognized, and if researchers concern themselves only with her attitudes toward fishing treaties, the danger exists, as Nebergall has suggested, that we will develop theories of communication dealing only with trivial issues.

Their concern for relevance and importance is doubly manifested in the Sherifs' research: First, they conduct studies on highly ego-involved issues; and second, they rely heavily on field, rather than laboratory experimentation. These procedural preferences led to their 1960 field studies of the presidential election, studies sampling from strongly committed Democrats and Republicans. This research, reported in Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, convincingly illustrates the significance of ego-involvement in determining latitudes of acceptance, noncommitment, and rejection for incoming persuasive communications.

To be sure, others have offered criticisms of the method used to measure ego-involvement. Still, the Sherifs have unquestionably put their fingers on an important variable, one that will command much attention in future research. All serious students of persuasion should read these two volumes, for they underscore a dimension of the attitude change problem not widely recognized in other selections.

Rokeach's *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values* is reviewed in this section with some trepidation, since the volume consists mostly of previously

published papers. Included are chapters on the organization and modification of beliefs, experimental analysis of the organization of belief systems, the effects of race versus shared beliefs in determining social choice, the comparative predictive power of the belief congruence and congruity models, the nature of attitudes, attitude change and behavioral change, and organization and change within value-attitude systems. Finally, there are two appendices: one applying some of the theoretical material to advertising communications and the second exploring some paradoxes of religious belief.

In Chapter 7, Rokeach argues that *value* should replace *attitude* as the central construct for persuasion researchers. This departure from tradition is primarily responsible for my decision to define the book as an exploratory work. Rokeach presents three reasons for his proposed change: First, value is a more dynamic concept than attitude; second, value psychologically encompasses attitude; it is a determinant of both attitude and behavior; and third, since people have fewer values than attitudes, value is a more economical theoretical construct. Rokeach goes on to state that emphasizing values would reduce concern with problems of *persuasion* and heighten interest in problems of *education.*

Whether Rokeach's elevation of the value construct to primary importance marks a significant breakthrough in persuasion research remains to be seen. Certainly, many readers may agree with him that the attitude construct has produced a scientific dead-end, that it is of limited fertility. Other more cautious readers may hold that intellectual infancy, rather than construct inadequacy, best explains the paucity of knowledge about persuasion. Or Rokeach may be over-optimistic, for the same problems plaguing attitude researchers may rear their ugly heads for the value researcher. Whatever one's position on the intellectual issues, his proposed reorientation will likely have practical implications for future persuasion research. Interested students should, therefore, be conversant with his position.

The final book reviewed, Bem's *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs,* also defies clear categorization. Although much of the volume's material is synthetic, numerous extended examples both suggest avenues for future research, and as Bem puts it, "make it (the book) unmistakably a personal essay." For instance, a paper—not surprisingly it is coauthored by Bem's wife—"Case Study of a Nonconscious Ideology: Training the Woman to Know Her Place," provides grist for persuasion researchers and the Women's Liberation Front alike. Likewise, the brief discussion of the relevance of determinism to the political preferences of behavioral scientists, while not novel, struck me as both insightful and interesting.

Bem's lively and often humorous style ensure the book's popularity in undergraduate courses in persuasion. But hidden among the colorful adjectives and the amusing quips are many suggestions for potentially fruitful research lines. As a result, more sophisticated readers should also examine the volume carefully.

Lacking omniscience, I cannot predict which, if any, of the five exploratory works will capture the imagination of tomorrow's persuasion researchers or furnish the impetus for major scientific accomplishments. One thing is certain: opportunities for exploration and accomplishment are there for ambitious scholars of persuasion to seize. Hopefully, the books reviewed above will provide them with some of the conceptual, methodological, and empirical tools necessary to expand the frontiers of knowledge about the persuasion process—a process central to man's continued existence and betterment.

BOOKS REVIEWED

ATTITUDE AND ATTITUDE CHANGE. By Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafer Sherif, and Roger Nebergall. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1965; pp. v+264. $11.45.

ATTITUDE CHANGE. By Charles A. Kiesler, Barry, E. Collins, and Norman Miller. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1969; pp. vii+386. $8.95.

ATTITUDE, EGO-INVOLVEMENT, AND CHANGE. By Carolyn W. Sherif and Muzafer Sherif. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967; pp. v+316. $9.95.

ATTITUDE FORMATION AND CHANGE. By J. D. Halloran. Leicester, Great Britain: Leicester University Press, 1967; pp. 167. $4.00.

ATTITUDE. By Marie Jahoda and Neil Warren. Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, Inc., 1966; pp. 375. $1.95.

BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND HUMAN AFFAIRS. By Daryl L. Bem. Belmont, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1970; pp. v+114. $2.25.

BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND VALUES. By Milton Rokeach. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1968; pp. ix+214. $6.95.

EXPERIMENTS IN PERSUASION. By Ralph L. Rosnow and Edward J. Robinson. New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1967; pp. vii+519. $8.95.

INFLUENCING ATTITUDES AND CHANGING BEHAVIOR. By Philip Zimbardo and Ebbe B. Ebbesen. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969; pp. v+148. $1.95.

PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ATTITUDES. By Anthony G. Greenwald, Timothy C. Brock, and Thomas M. Ostrom. New York: Academic Press, 1968; pp. v+407. $12.50.

READINGS IN ATTITUDE THEORY & MEASUREMENT. By Martin Fishbein. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967; pp. v+499. $10.95.

ROLE PLAYING, REWARD, AND ATTITUDE CHANGE. By Alan C. Elms. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969; pp. iii+232. $2.50.

THE STUDY OF ATTITUDE CHANGE. By Richard V. Wagner and John L. Sherwood. Belmont, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1969; pp. v+213. $3.25.

THEORIES OF ATTITUDE CHANGE. By Chester A. Insko. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967; pp. v+374. $7.50.

A MODEL OF COMMUNICATION EFFECTIVENESS*

By A. Edward Foote

An effort to develop a mathematical model of interpersonal and mass media communication effectiveness is described.

Since Shannon and Weaver's [1] introduction of a mathematical theory of communication two decades ago, many speech and communication theorists have acknowledged that it would be beneficial to be able to relate quantitatively the factors that compose the communication process. However, the absence of any simple mathematical model of interpersonal and mass media communication effectiveness is not surprising. Most speech and communication theorists shy away from any commitment to a rigid, quantitative approach to an area with so many nebulous variables; nevertheless, several have hesitatingly explored the applications of such a model. For example, Harrah [2] made a definite contribution with his model, which is based primarily on mathematical set theory, and Cherry [3], Osgood [4], Stephenson [5], and others have recognized the desirability of measurement and quantification of some of the variables that are the determinants of effectiveness.

But a simple mathematical model, which could improve the understanding and prediction of communication effectiveness, has seemed to elude most scholars in the field. Abelson [6] probably provides the best quantitative insight into the relationships among message determinants of effectiveness in a computer simulation model, but even he does not present a symbolic representation of effectiveness. Although Abelson does not develop a desirable codification for effectiveness, his propositions help clarify the direct and inverse mathematical variations. For example, he makes these axiomatic statements:

> Individual i will be more apt to accept assertions made by s (sender) the more favorable i's attitude toward s and the higher i's receptivity to s.
>
> An assertion is especially apt to be accepted by i if it is consistent with his predisposition toward that assertion, and under no circumstances will be accepted if it runs counter to his predisposition.
>
> An assertion is less apt to be accepted by i if it is inconsistent with his position on the issue.
>
> When i's attitude toward s is negative and his receptivity to s is very low, assertions made by s not previously encountered by i and not consistent with his position will tend to promote acceptance by i of converse assertions.
>
> The direction of such attitude position change is toward s if i's attitude toward s was initially positive, and away from s if i's attitude toward s was initially negative; the degree of such change is a direct function of the difference between the positions of i and s [6].

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*Excerpts from "A Model of Communication Effectiveness," *The Journal of Communication*, XX (March 1970), pp. 81–91. Reprinted with the permission of *The Journal of Communication*, copyright holder and the courtesy of the author.

In transferring the dependent and independent variables into information processing language, Abelson has attempted to satisfy four desiderata:

> (1) Influence will be successful (i.e., new assertions will be accepted) under a fairly wide range of conditions, particularly when the influencee has a mild position on the issue but is sufficiently interested to have exposed himself to . . .stimuli.
>
> (2) However, there are definite resistances to influence, particularly when the influencee has a strong position on the issue and, or a negative attitude toward the communicator.
>
> (3) If resistances are very strong, there may be a "boomerang effect" whereby the influencee accepts new assertions opposite to those intended and a new position farther away from that of the communicator.
>
> (4) However, there is some way of influencing almost everybody to some degree [6].

These four criteria and the 49 axiomatic statements were freely consulted in designing the theoretical framework of the proposed model, which mathematically relates the variables of the communication process, including the amount of information, the sender and receiver's places in the social-psychological system both real and preceived, and the effectiveness of the message, in a simple straightforward manner.

The communication represented in the model is restricted to a persuasive message, and the destination of the message must be an individual instead of a machine. A horizontal line, designated AB and composed of many sub-continuums, is used to signify the master continuum on which every person finds himself in relationship to all other people. For example, a sub-continuum a_1 b_1 might be considered as the limits of all political positions in this country from "far left" to "far right." Each individual can be placed somewhere on a_1 b_1 relative to all others in the population. The political spectrum can then be represented like this:



In every case, a person's position on this hypothetical scale is determined by his socioeconomic status, group memberships, heredity, and all the experiences that go to make each one of us different. If an individual's position relative to others can be placed on a hypothetical scale for politics, it can be placed on a hypothetical scale that stands for degrees of differences from "far left" to "far right" for each possible existing variation affecting our relationship with others. The summation of all these hypothetical scales, each weighted according to its importance in influencing the real position of the receiver, is the continuum AB, which can be stated symbolically as:

$$AB = f_1 (a_1, b_1) + f_2 (a_2, b_2) + \ldots f_n (a_n, b_n).$$

A prospective receiver's position on this line is not static, because the

individual is in a constant state of readjustment of his position. Many of these changes are so minute that they are quite immeasurable with existing methodology. The forces, which must assume a state of equilibrium with respect to the AB component, determine an individual's location on the continuum and are signified by R_1, R_2, R_3, ... R_n. When a state of imbalance exists the receiver will readjust his position until the AB component reaches required equilibrium. Generally speaking, this portion of the model is in agreement with the tradition of the "balance" theorists, including Heider [7], Newcomb [8], and Festinger [9].



The sender's position on the AB continuum is at a point where it is preceived by the receiver. The subject of the message, and in turn the content used to support it, may be two of the strongest influences determining the social and psychological distance, as perceived by Q. Other variables, including the speaker's introduction, his ethos, personality, etc., influence the distance between the real position of the receiver and the perceived position of the sender significantly.

In addition to the horizontal component, each of the forces has a vertical component whose total CD is defined as Q's predispositions on some subject J_k.



As a result of forces R_1, R_2, R_3, ... R_n, there will be predispositions, the CD component, either in the positive direction, in the negative direction, not at all, or in both directions. In reality a CD component probably will not exist for each and every force, since the CD component is present only when the force R_1 affects an individual's predispositions on subject J_k. For example, membership in a car pool may have absolutely no effect on religious predispositions, and yet, this same membership may have great effect on political predispositions, depending on the topics of discus-

sion, other group memberships, and a finite number of other variables.

From the model it becomes clear that predispositions are completely independent of the social and psychological distance, because prior attitudes can only be determined by the real position of the receiver, a resultant of the R_n forces. In other words, predispositions are not altered in intensity by the perceived s-p distance from the sender. Since receiver Q cannot move in the CD direction, neither are the predispositions toward subject J_k of opposite signs necessarily equal. Assume that two individuals are located on the scale AB with S the sender and Q the receiver, keeping in mind that the position of S is important only as perceived by Q. Then, assigning the letter Y as the difference on the continuum between the receiver and the perceived position of the sender, the formula becomes:

$$Y = Q - S.$$

Also let us assume that a message of magnitude M is sent by the sender S and received by Q.



This message is either reinforced or depreciated by the resultant of the positive and negative predispositions, and therefore,

$$X = M + P_1 + P_2.$$

P_1 and P_2 are the magnitudes of the positive and negative predispositions.

The positive direction is selected as being in the direction of the intended effect as preceived by the sender. For example, if the sender is attempting to gain votes against a proposed ordinance, the direction remains positive so long as that is the direction of the effect intended by the sender. Likewise, negative dispositions refer to those predispositions whose force is in the direction opposite to the intended effect of the message.

Now, with the relationships among message, predispositions and the sender's perceived location on the continuum defined, it is easy enough to define the effectiveness of the communication M. This effectiveness is the ratio

$$\frac{X}{Y}$$

Since mathematically, Tan θ = (X/Y) and θ = Arctan (X/Y), the degree of effectiveness of a communication is defined as the number of degrees in the angle θ, and the angle θ is referred to as the *Angle of Effect.* The size of the angle results directly from combining quantitatively the factors generally accepted as influencing the effect of the message.

The model can best be represented in this form:



WHERE:

AB = continuum
S = sender
Q = receiver
θ = angle of effectiveness
P_1 = predisposition in positive direction
P_2 = predisposition in negative direction
X = message plus predispositions
Y = difference in S and Q on the continuum
CD = vertical coordinate

NOT SHOWN:

Rn = forces (see text)
M = message
Jk = subject of message

From the model, it immediately becomes apparent why messages directed to other cultures often have little effect. In such cases, the difference between S and Q on the scale AB approaches or may even reach infinity, and regardless of the magnitude of the message M, the communication cannot be effective, since θ approaches O as Y approaches infinity. What happens to the effectiveness of the same message on two different receivers, Q_1 and Q_2? If Q_1 is located close to the sender on the hypothetical scale AB, and Q_2 is located far away from the sender, the same message will have much greater effect on Q^1, even when both have equal predispositions. Being dependent on the magnitude of the predispositions, a message will often have a total negative rather than a positive effect. Since

$$X = M + P_1 + P_2,$$

X will take a negative sign and θ will become negative when the magnitude of P_2 is greater than $M + P_1$, resulting in a "boomerang" effect. With an inverse relationship between social-psychological distance and the negative or "boomerang" effect, the size of the angle becomes the number of degrees in the complement angle ($90° - \theta$) and takes a negative



b = complement angle

If the message has an effect opposite to that intended by the sender, then the greater the social and psychological distance, the greater will be the *Angle of effect.* A message is incorporated as a force R_n from the sender's beginning assertions; therefore, in addition to its attitude changing strength, the message has a strong influence on the social-psychological distance. With the receiver in constant readjustment of his position and re-evaluation of the s-p distance from the sender, the early portions of a message may well increase this distance and directly reduce its overall effectiveness, or indeed the opposite may occur.

The introduction of this model raises many interesting questions: What units of measurement must be used if the proposed formulae are to be algebraically manipulated? Do overt and covert effect ranges overlap? At what angle does the effect become behavioral? The significance of the model lies in its apparent usefulness for predicting communication effectiveness. Theorists have developed many valid models, but the concept of an *Angle of Effect* is new to communication theory. Obviously the concept is useful in reaching a total Theory of Communication Effectiveness, which can only come after additional discussion.

A model that attempts to relate so many variables in a rigid, mathematical way cannot be completely free of weaknesses and errors; therefore, criticisms are justified. However, with an "anchor point" established, a more refined mathematical model can now evolve, where previously the prospects were limited at best.

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THE MEASUREMENT OF SPEAKER CREDIBILITY*

BY R. BARRY FULTON

The author contends that the credibility dimensions of agreeableness, conscientiousness, and culture are positively and significantly related to an independent measure of the attractiveness of a public speaker who is judged only by those overt cues which the listener perceives during the speech act.

Trustworthiness and expertness, the two factors of credibility suggested in 1953 by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley,[1] have been identified more recently in factor analytic studies reported by McCroskey[2] and by Bowers and Phillips.[3]Nevertheless, there are those who insist that this representation of credibility doesn't capture the full complexity of the phenomenon. For example, in a study conducted by Schweitzer and Ginsburg, 28 different factors emerged in the rotated factor matrix for the low-credibility condition, accounting for 74 percent of the variance; under the high-credibility condition, 27 factors accounted for only 60 percent of the variance.[4] Although Schweitzer and Ginsburg reasonably conclude from this interpretation of their data that the factors of trustworthiness and expertness do not adequately represent the complexity of the concept "credibility," their analysis does little to explicate the underlying relationship.

Lying between the reported extremes are a number of factor analytic studies which appear to systematically represent a greater portion of the complexity involved in a judgment of credibility. Berlo and Lemert reported a factor analysis study in which three dimensions were found: trustworthiness, competence, and dynamism[5]. In addition to these three factors, Whitehead has found a fourth major factor: objectivity.[6] Norman and his associates have identified five factors in a series of studies which have served as the basis for the research reported here. These five factors along with the scale items used in their measurement are compared in Table 1 to factors found in two of the other studies mentioned above.

The genesis of the dimensions which emerge from any factor analytic study is not an unimportant consideration in their acceptance, for no factor analysis can extract factors which were not represented in the original scale items. The Norman scale items had their origin in Allport and Odbert's search for personality traits in a standard dictionary; in 1936 they reported finding some 18,000 terms. From the 4,504 terms which

*Excerpts from "The Measurement of Speaker Credibility," *The Journal of Communication,* XX (September 1970), pp. 270–279. Reprinted with the permission of *The Journal of Communication,* copyright holder.

Allport described as the "real" traits of personality, Cattell selected 171 terms to represent synonym groups. By means of cluster analysis, Cattell further reduced this number of 36 bipolar pairs from which he has reported finding 12 stable personality factors. Analyses by other researchers have revealed as few as five recurrent factors.[7]

Norman used four scales from each of the five dimensions in a number of studies in which subjects nominated one-third of the members of some peer group on Pole "A" and one-third on Pole "B" of each scale. A varimax rotation of a factor analysis of the data revealed, as hypothesized, five orthogonal personality factors.[8] In a later study by Passini and Norman, the same five factors emerged with subjects whose contact was limited to being together for less than 15 minutes without opportunity for verbal communications.[9].

Table 1

A Comparison of Hypothesized Dimensions of Credibility

BERLO-LEMERT	NORMAN	McCROSKEY
Trustworthiness	Conscientiousness	Character
Just-unjust	Responsible-undependable	
Kind-cruel	Scrupulous-unscrupulous	Honest-dishonest
Admirable-contemptible	Persevering-quitting, fickle	Virtuous-sinful
Honest-dishonest	Fussy, tidy-careless	Unselfish-selfish
		Friendly-unfriendly
		Nice-awful
	Agreeableness	Pleasant-unpleasant
	Good-natured-irritable	
	Not jealous-jealous	
	Mild-headstrong	
	Cooperative-negativistic	
Competence	Culture	Authoritativeness
Experienced-inexperienced	Intellectual-unreflective, narrow	Qualified-unqualified
Expert-ignorant	Polished, refined-crude, boorish	Expert-inexpert
Trained-untrained	Imaginative-simple, direct	Informed-uninformed
Competent-incompetent	Artistically sensitive-artistically insensitive	Valuable-worthless
		Intelligent-unintelligent
		Reliable-unreliable
Dynamism	Extroversion	
	Talkative-silent	
	Frank, open-secretive	
Aggressive-meek	Adventurous-cautious	
Bold-timid	Sociable-reclusive	
Energetic-tired		
Extroverted-introverted	Emotional Stability	
	Poised-nervous, tense	
	Calm-anxious	
	Composed-excitable	
	Non-hypochondriacal-hypochondriacal	

A follow-up analysis by Norman and Goldberg revealed that, even with this minimal contact among subjects, there was some degree of ratee relevance in the choice of scale items. Their explanation for this relevance is based on what Cronbach has termed an "implicit personality theory":

> If, for example, it were generally held within the implicit personality theories of these raters that persons who are *irresponsible* and *undependable* are also *careless, unscrupulous, fickle,* and *slovenly* and if the shared stereotype of the person who is *careless* and *slovenly* included aspects of dress and grooming, then a ratee who gave such an appearance in this setting was, in the absence of more specifically relevant information, apt to be rated as possessing all traits in the set.[10]

If the five factors of personality reported by Norman and associates are accepted, it follows that these same factors might operate as underlying dimensions of credibility during the speech act; this proposition is explored in this article.

EXPERIMENT I

Through an analysis of the literature on interpersonal attraction an attempt was made to identify those *credibility cues* which might serve as indicators to a respondent of some set of underlying *credibility dimensions.*[11] The suggested pairing follows:

Credibility Dimension	*Credibility Cue*
Agreeableness	Disposition, Manner
Conscientiousness	Dress, Physical bearing
Culture	Language
Extroversion	Body type, Delivery
Emotional stability	Delivery

Method

Two speakers, undergraduates chosen for their speaking and acting abilities, were trained to represent opposite poles of the five dimensions by speaking and behaving in such a way as to provide for their listeners the cues suggested above. Each of 246 undergraduate subjects heard one of the two speakers deliver (in person) an eight-minute persuasive speech prepared by the experimenter.

The abbreviated scale labels for the 20 items used in the Norman studies were used as labels for opposite ends of 20 semantic differential-type scales. By assigning values of one through seven for each of the responses by subjects and summing for each of the five dimensions, responses to the two speakers could be compared. Subjects also responded to the following two scales: "I feel that I would probably like this person very much" vs. "I feel that I would probably dislike this person very much," and "I believe that I would very much enjoy working with this person in an experiment" vs. "I believe that I would very much dislike working with this person in an experiment."[12] These poles were placed at opposite ends of semantic differential-type scales; responses were scored by assigning values of one through seven and summing as a measure of *attraction.*

Results and Discussion

For each of the dimensions except *agreeableness*, the two groups of subjects differ significantly on their responses to the two speakers. Likewise, the speakers were judged to be significantly different on the measure of *attraction*. The results are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2
Mean Ratings of Attraction and Five Dimensions of Credibility for Positive (P) and Negative (N) Speakers

Condition	*N*	Mean	S.D.	*t*
Attraction				
P	119	9.41	2.37	5.37*
N	127	7.84	2.21	
Agreeableness				
P	119	17.97	3.05	0.88
N	127	17.65	2.70	
Conscientiousness				
P	119	20.41	2.67	11.93*
N	127	15.91	3.20	
Culture				
P	119	20.09	3.06	11.84*
N	127	14.76	3.92	
Extroversion				
P	119	18.39	3.35	5.19*
N	127	15.92	4.07	
Emotional Stability				
P	119	21.19	3.29	7.15*
N	127	17.87	3.93	

*$p<.01$, one-tailed t test.

A multiple correlation analysis was conducted using *attraction* as the dependent variable and five credibility dimensions as independent variables. The following relationship was found to be significant at the .01 level ($F = 4.48$, $df = 3/242$) with a multiple correlation coefficient of .65.

$$\text{Attraction} = .29\ \text{Agreeableness} + .10\ \text{Conscientiousness} + .20\ \text{Culture} - 1.68$$

A second multiple correlation program was run in which the five dimensions of credibility, their inverse, their natural logs, and all pairwise multiples were used as independent variables. The following relationship was also significant at the .01 level ($F = 5.46$, $df = 2/243$); once again, the multiple correlation coefficient was .65.

$$\text{Attraction} = .01\ \text{Agreeableness}\ (\text{Culture} + \tfrac{1}{2}\ \text{Conscientiousness}) + 3.46$$

As both of the equations account for the same amount of variance, the choice between them is rather arbitrary. While the first is simpler be-

cause it expresses a linear relationship, the later is more interesting simply because *agreeableness* appears as a multiplier of the two factors most often cited in the literature on credibility: *competence* and *trustworthiness* (or, as here labeled, *culture* and *conscientiousness*).

It is shown in this analysis that three of the five credibility dimensions are positively and significantly related to an independent measure of the attractiveness of a public speaker who is judged only by those overt cues which the listener perceives during the speech act. One's assessment of interpersonal attraction will change as more information becomes available; this information will in turn intereact with existing judgments to modify or reinforce the evaluation of *agreeableness*, *conscientiousness*, and *culture*. Since those additional variables which contribute to attraction (e.g., shared attitudes, propinquity) may be assumed to have been constant among groups in the experimental study, the dependent variable in the equations above is more properly identified as *credibility*, a subset of *attraction*. The following study is an attempt to substaniate the validity of this relationship.

EXPERIMENT II

Using the findings of the previous analysis, a second study was directed at examining the credibility of the seven leading Presidential candidates (November 1967) in terms of the three dimensions which were found to be significantly related to attraction.

Method

As the study described here was used to illustrate and partially validate the means of measurement described above rather than to provide a comprehensive assessment of the credibility of the various candidates, no effort was made to select a sample of some voting population. Instead, 126 undergraduates at the University of Illinois were asked to judge one of the seven men on the 12 scales which represent the three dimensions which were being studied. In addition, each subject was asked to rank the seven candidates in order of his preference for President in 1968. The sample included 59 Republicans, 42 Democrats, and 25 who were Independents or expressed no political preference. In order to balance the analysis, the responses of 17 Republican subjects were randomly discarded; there remained an equal number of Republicans and Democrats in the sample. Responses were made between November 13–21, 1967.

Results and Discussion

The mean ratings for the seven candidates on each of the three dimensions of credibility are represented graphically in Figure 1; each of the dimension evaluations has been normalized to fall within a range of -3 to $+3$. (The numbers in Figure 1 designate the various candidates by rank order of credibility, represented above in Table 3).

For each of the candidates, the mean ratings on each of the dimensions were used in the following equation to arrive at a quantitative measure of credibility:

$$\text{Credibility} = .01\ \text{Agreeableness (Culture} + \tfrac{1}{2}\ \text{Conscientiousness)} + 3.5$$

The scores for the seven candidates appear in rank order in Table 3.



Figure 1
The Positions of Seven Presidential Candidates on Three Dimensions of Credibility

Table 3
Credibility Scores Calculated by Multiple Regression Equation

Rank	Candidate	Score
1	Percy	10.16
2	Reagan	8.94
3	Kennedy	8.72
4	Rockefeller	8.61
5	Romney	8.38
6	Nixon	8.29
7	Johnson	7.22

A comparison of the rank orders of the credibility scores and the Presidential preference scores revealed a significant ($p<.05$) Spearman correlation of .38. Although this empirical relation may partially validate the methodology, more convincing is a subjective examination of Table 3 and Figure 1. The reader will probably find the results intuitively reasonable for a November 1967 sample of midwestern undergraduates. Because of the insufficiency of the sample in regard to actual voters, a systematic comparison of these findings with nationwide popularity polls could contribute little to the argument being made here.

CONCLUSIONS

Five personality factors were suggested as underlying dimensions of credibility. Three of these dimensions were found to be significantly related to attraction in an experimental study in which two speakers had been trained to represent the opposite poles of the five hypothesized dimensions. The resulting relationship, expressed as a nonlinear regression equation, was used to assess the credibility of the seven leading Presidential candidates among a sample of University of Illinois undergraduates in November, 1967. The analysis was not meant to represent a particular voter group, but instead to illustrate and partially validate the three dimensions—*agreeableness*, *conscientiousness*, and *culture*—and their relationship to *credibility*. While it seems reasonable to suggest that the same three dimensions may be applicable to the study of credibility and interpersonal attraction within a given culture, it seems just as reasonable that the relationship among these dimensions may differ significantly among different subcultures. Nevertheless, a framework is suggested here for the study of credibility and interpersonal attraction which could serve as a basis for theoretical description and further empirical study.

That the dimension of *agreeableness* is significantly related to *credibility* seems to be of some significance in a field of study which has essentially ignored this nonrational dimension. Indeed, without this dimension it becomes impossible to explain the charismatic appeal of some speakers. In summary, the isolation here of three dimensions of credibility provides empirical support for the three constituents of *ethos* suggested by Aristotle: "As for the speakers themselves, the sources of our trust in them are there, for apart from the arguments there are three things that gain our belief, namely, intelligence, character, and good will."[13]

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CHAPTER VIII

MEDIA, METHODS, AND TECHNIQUES

INTRODUCTION

After policy objectives and operational goals have been established (see Chapter VI) and at least part of the intelligence requirements have been met (see Chapter VII), difficult decisions about media, methods, and techniques need to be made. These decisions must in large part focus on at least three areas of concern: (1) the selection of the audience; (2) message composition—that is, the preparation, development, and production of the message; and (3) the channels of communication.

Operationally, to achieve a predetermined purpose, the communicator selects a target toward which to direct the message. He develops a theme and writes a message. He then decides on one or more appropriate channels through which to deliver the message, adapting the channels and selecting the time of delivery according to the particular characteristics of the target. Because there are no predetermined intellectual formulas in the preparation and delivery of a PSYOP message or appeal, all of these areas of concern must be carefully considered in each situation faced by the planner. Decisions should be supported by previous experience, but the last two decades have shown clearly that a message or appeal that was highly effective with one target group may not work as well with another. An effective message or appeal communicated by radio may be totally ineffective when communicated by other means. A message or appeal may be more effective with a certain target group when delivered to coincide with a religious or political event, or at a certain time of day or year. When few ordinary channels seem appropriate, the innovative PSYOP planner may fall back on improvised programs or devices, some of which are risky, but may, under the right circumstances, prove effective.

Audience Selection

Broadly speaking, psychological operations is an attempt to influence opinions, attitudes, emotions, and behavior; and in very simple terms, the target or audience is the individual or group of individuals whose attitudes or actions the psyoperator wishes to influence.

The target of psychological operations may encompass an entire society, or it may be made up of a very small and select group of individuals. As part of the total process of planning a PSYOP campaign, the communicator first decides on what changes need to be produced to accomplish the objectives of the campaign. Then he decides which audience in the larger population should be reached and influenced to produce such change, and whether to appeal directly to the target group or through existing channels such as prestigious persons or key communicators.

Because the audience is the key to the desired change, it becomes quite evident that target selection based on a sound understanding of how individuals within the target group think and behave under certain conditions is a critical aspect of PSYOP.

Certain factors in communication related to the psychological and physical set of the population positively or negatively predispose the receptivity of target groups to specific kinds of messages. For example, reference groups play a particularly important role in establishing the delivery circumstances of a PSYOP campaign. Membership in a group requires some commitment on the part of the members, and the success of a psyoperator in drawing an individual away from his group will depend heavily on the kinds of pressures exerted by the group on its individual members. Commitment may be lessened by environmental conditions. In this connection, we have learned from post-World War II experience that the drudgery of jungle warfare in an intolerable conflict situation, where the health and well-being of individuals are threatened, may render them malleable to outside inducements to give up, no matter how highly committed they were previously.

Timing is also an important consideration in the planning of psychological operations. Time of day, time of year—along with the physical and social setting—all contribute in some way to the receptivity of the target group and thus to the success or failure of the campaign.

A proper balancing of these and other factors will depend in large part on the psyoperator's knowledge of the target population. He is not only responsible for determining which group to direct the message or appeal to, but also the most propitious time for doing so.

Message Composition

When planning a PSYOP campaign, a message must be designed to stimulate the desired change in attitudes, opinion, or behavior. Depending on which channel is selected, the message will be composed of spoken or printed words, pictures, sounds, or acts, or a combination of these and perhaps other devices used in PSYOP.

Whatever the techniques used, however, the message or appeal must perform three tasks: it must find, attract the attention of, and be received by, the selected target population; it must be simple enough so that its meaning is understood by the target population; and it must provide enough stimulus to get the target population thinking or behaving in the preplanned direction.

To achieve all of this, the PSYOP planner must give attention to some important factors. Care should be taken with language, where a minor blunder may destroy a well-planned campaign. The planner must pay attention to content so that the message is culturally acceptable, geared to the needs of the reader, balanced in logic and emotion, mainly positive in approach, and consistent with past and future communications. He must attend to style, presentation, and tone so that the message will gain

the respect of the target audience and the planner will gain credibility as a source of information. And finally, the PSYOP planner must have some method of pretesting his messages so that he can determine in advance what effect they will have on the target population. He can do this through area experts, surveys of persons similar to the target population, or use of enemy sources such as defectors and POWs.

Exploitation of Channels of Communication

At the same time, the psyoperator must select the means through which his message or appeal will be conveyed to the target group. Essentially, he must adapt the media to the audience (targeting). Because the target group is the key to the desired change, the media should be selected to suit the target group. Two primary factors limit the range of media choice: the ability of the target group to receive and understand the message and the availability of facilities. In this sense media choice is situationally influenced. The ingenuity of the PSYOP planner in devising unorthodox methods for unusual circumstances may reduce the external controls on media selection, however.

Communication channels may be directed toward targets varying in size from an individual to large groups. Moreover, they may allow simultaneous emission and reception of the message, or its transmission may be delayed. Further, channels of communication may concentrate on any of the senses—sight, hearing, touch, taste—although the choice is usually between printed and audio visual channels.

The choice among the various channels available is often determined actually by the nature of the situation. Formerly, radio was less useful than leaflets in tactical PSYOP. However, technological innovation has made radio-based appeals highly useful in some tactical situations in Vietnam. (See "Earlyword" in this chapter and Colburn B. Lovett, "Effective Combat PSYOP in the Delta," Chapter VI of this casebook.) Face-to-face PSYOP is conducive to the transference of ideological motivation by revolutionary groups.

Unorthodox Techniques

Very often the PSYOP planner is faced with unusual circumstances where traditional or ordinary PSYOP methods and techniques do not seem to be appropriate or where innovative approaches will have a particularly high pay-off. In situations like this, the planner must depend on his own ingenuity to improvise and develop what may be considered as gimmicky ways of reaching the target group. These devices may be either verbal or nonverbal forms of communicating. The use of gossip and rumor and "black" propaganda are illustrations of the verbal type; symbolic acts, especially fear-arousal acts such as terrorism and saturation bombing, are of the nonverbal type. In any case, their purpose is to arouse an emotional state or a series of memories, which, when touched off, will elicit the desired change in attitude and behavior.

Some of these techniques have been used successfully; others have led to negative results. Controlled gossip, for example, is one of the methods that has been used successfully under the right conditions. Threats and terrorism,[1] or any other kinds of fear-inducing acts, although used successfully in some situations, are potentially dangerous and susceptible to boomerang effects. They have been shown to be of little long term value in changing opinion.

NOTES

[1] See Thomas Perry Thornton, "Terror As a Weapon of Political Agitation," in Chapter VI of this casebook.

AUDIENCE SELECTION

The essays in this section emphasize the need for a proper understanding and selection of target groups in PSYOP campaigns. The lead essay, "Groups and Attitude Change," explains how groups exert pressures on members in a way that tends to generate resistance against persuasive messages and appeals originating from outside the group. "Prestigious Persons and Key Communicators" characterizes the influential persons in a society who function as information "gatekeepers" and opinion leaders with respect to the flow of information. "Reindoctrination Centers" suggests that in some situations the selection of a smaller, more homogenous group is required for effective persuasion. In spite of the effort that may go into selecting a discrete target group for a specifically tailored propaganda message, other groups not intended to be part of the target may also receive the message. Such groups and the problems related to them are discussed in "The Unintended Audience." Consideration of the environmental conditions affecting the receptivity of target groups to PSYOP messages and appeals is the focus of "The Decision to Defect."

GROUPS AND ATTITUDE CHANGE*

BY RICHARD H. ORTH

This essay explores the effects that groups have on the perpetuation of people's attitudes and on their resistance to attitude change. This purpose should be considered within the context of the basic principles of the formation of norms and group needs.

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A person's reference group ** provides his social identity. When he

*Original essay by Richard H. Orth.

**Reference group is a group serving an individual as his frame of reference for self-evaluation and attitude formation (cf. Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* [New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957]).

asks "Who am I?" or when he is asked "Who are you?", most often the answer will be in terms of his reference group. Thus, overseas he may reply "I am an American," when this reference group is the most salient, that is, the one that is most obviously called upon in the situation. He is just as likely to reply "I am a soldier," if the military is his most salient reference group in the context of the question. Simply stated then, the reference groups provide social identification for the member, even though the particular group that serves as the person's reference varies, depending on which one is most salient at the moment.

GROUP ACHIEVEMENT

A group often helps to achieve some goal. The individual who is a member of the group (sharing the goals of the group) thus benefits from the achievement orientation of the group. For example, a labor union serves its members in gaining economic goals. To the extent that the individual member ties his goals to the achievement of the group, he is reminded of his group membership when these goals are the part of any communication directed at him.

GROUP COHESIVENESS

Another principle of groups and group membership involves the cohesiveness of the group: the more cohesive the group, the more power it has over its members. There are many sources of cohesiveness. For example, a group may be cohesive due to: (1) personal attraction among its members, (2) effective performance in a task, or (3) prestige accrued to individuals by the fact of membership. In any of these cases, the group provides satisfaction for its membership. Because it provides satisfaction, the group takes on the values of the members. The members, then, are really conforming to their own values as embodied by the group.

There is some variation in the degree to which individual members adhere to the values of the group. The member who is confident of his place within the group does not feel as much pressure to conform as one who is not confident of his place. In other words, in order to further benefit from the activities of the group, those individuals who feel that their group position is tenuous strive to solidify their positions by adhering firmly to group norms.

Moreover, when attraction within a group is strong, a favorable disposition toward other members of the group develops. Consequently, members of the group will show more trust and attribute more credibility to each other as sources of information than they will to individuals from outside the group. In the process of changing attitudes or opinions, this means that communicators from inside the group will be more effective in influencing that change than communicators from outside the group.

SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION AND PERSUASION

What does the fact that reference groups provide social identification mean to the process of changing attitudes? Clearly, a person's attitudes are in large part determined by his self-perceptions. He must act and feel in accordance with what he thinks he is. For example, if a man perceives himself to be a soldier, he acts and feels as a soldier, not as a civilian. We have often seen how a soldier out of uniform may temporarily act somewhat differently, but when he is reminded of his reference group, he will quickly revert to the behavior expected of him. This consideration is most important in attempting to change the attitudes of an individual to a point where they are in opposition to those sanctioned by his reference group. One factor that clearly enters the picture here is the salience of the group. As the situation above illustrates, when the salience of the group is low, its effects on the individual are also low. Assuming an individual can be made to forget that the military is his reference group, his attitudes formed as a result of membership in that group will be much more vulnerable to change than they would otherwise. However, manipulating the salience of the individual's group is difficult at best, and hence the PSYOP planner must usually work within the existing framework of group salience.

For example, a labor union often serves as an individual's reference group. His attitudes toward management in industry are guided by the union. In order for that individual's attitudes toward management to change, the union's power over him must decline or the union must cease to be his reference group. If he meets socially with people from management, he may be more likely to express favorable attitudes toward management. Indeed, the farther removed from reminders of his union membership, the more amenable he will be to attitudes contrary to those supported by the union. However, when a reminder of his union appears, it may bring about a multitude of other behaviors congruent with his reference group. He may suddenly begin to recall arguments against management that have been provided him by the union and may begin to use them to counter any management arguments in support of changing attitudes.

DEFENSE MECHANISMS

In addition to providing identity for its members, the group also provides defense mechanisms that aid in the perpetuation of group-centered attitudes. One such mechanism is the counterargument which in effect provides alternatives to the content of appeals persuading members to take on attitudes different from those in support of the group. If an individual is made aware of the fact that he is a member of a labor union, he begins to recall arguments in support of that role, using them to counter anti-union statements. These arguments often do not occur to him in the presence of other union members, or when his identity as a member of this group is not salient to him.

FORCED MEMBERSHIP AND PERSUASION

It should not be assumed from the foregoing that the easiest way to influence as individual is to try to cut him off from the other members of his group. As mentioned previously, an individual whose membership in the group is threatened usually adheres more strongly to the values of that group than members who feel their group position secure. Indeed, members of the group who operate on its periphery, if they value their membership in that group, are usually most adamant about adhering to group values. Furthermore, persuasion that runs counter to group values may be resisted even if membership in the group is compulsory rather than voluntary. For instance, an individual may be a member of a group because the group holds a threat over the individual. That does not mean that the individual enjoys membership, but he may be nonetheless committed to remain a member of the group. Ordinarily, the less an individual is committed—for whatever reasons—to remaining in the group, the more susceptible he is to persuasion that is counter to group-supported attitudes. If he is committed to the group *either* for personal gratification *or* because the group holds a threat over him, then he will be highly resistant to persuasion that is counter to the group's attitude.

In an insurgency environment, this is clearly a problem for the psyoperator. He fully understands that a local population not supportive of an insurgent group in the area should be favorably disposed toward anti-insurgent propaganda. However, so long as the insurgents have control over or are active in an area, the local population may be coerced into some level of commitment and resist persuasion from the outside. In such a situation, it must be demonstrated to the local population that the insurgents do not have the capability to enforce commitment to their side before any successful PSYOP campaign can be launched. Again, this applies to individuals who are not attracted to the insurgent group.

In an environment where group pressures must be overcome, what hope does a psyoperator have of reaching individuals with his persuasion? First of all, he must know at whom to aim his campaigns. Often, there is a temptation to aim campaigns at individuals who are not in the core of the target group. Nothing could be more erroneous. Any argument that goes counter to the attitudes of a group should be aimed primarily at those individuals who are certain of their position. These persons operate with much more freedom than do peripheral members. They are much more innovative and likely to adopt new ideas. Moreover, they spread the more positive new ideas to other members of the group, and, by means of their central position within the group, they exercise a great deal of persuasiveness.

CULTURAL TRUISMS AND PERSUASION

Another factor mentioned above that must be kept in mind is that reemergence of the awareness of group membership will often bring with it recollection of group-supported arguments. These arguments can be

used to counter attempts at persuasion. However, there are some attitudes so universally held in a group that they are never threatened. Consequently, no arguments relating to them are ever presented. These are known as "cultural truisms." An example in American culture is the value of brushing teeth. Since no argument is ever brought up against brushing teeth, no counters to such an argument are readily available. If the psyoperator can locate such universally held attitudes, he may find a fertile area for persuasion campaigns. In this case, the saliency of the group to the individual would not matter.

SUMMARY

Several problems that membership in a group poses for effective persuasion have been discussed without entering into detail concerning the effects different kinds of groups may have on individual members (that is, potential differences between reference groups and membership groups, or between primary groups and secondary groups). It is enough for the psyoperator to be aware of the presence of group pressures on individuals to conform to the norms, values, and attitudes of the groups, and the effect this might have on PSYOP campaigns. Some sources of group pressures were mentioned in the hope that the psyoperator will use these to his benefit. However, many of these forces are interrelated and should be considered in terms of their potential consequences for each other. In the final analysis, it is not that communication will necessarily be ineffective in the face of group pressures. These pressures only require more work to overcome, and they limit the areas in which any effect can be expected.

PRESTIGIOUS PERSONS AND KEY COMMUNICATORS*

By Richard H. Orth

The prestigious persons and key communicators who are most likely to be perceived as trustworthy and credible communicants in their own social grouping are important in persuasion and may at times be crucial. They are central figures who have a large voice in determining the direction of future attitude trends.

PRESTIGIOUS PERSONS

The basis of difference between the prestigious person and the population on the whole is demographic, that is, the former tends, generally, to be richer, older, and better educated. To locate the prestigious person, a single classification is not sufficient. For example, although prestige is often associated with being a male, this does not mean that in certain cultures *only* males have prestige, nor does it mean that in *all* cultures

*Original essay by Richard H. Orth.

the prestigious persons are males. There societies in which a woman may have high prestige as monarch or prime minister.

Another reason for not classifying persons as prestigious on the basis of one factor alone is the prestige enjoyed by the clergy of most nations. A specific instance of this is shown by the Buddhist monks of certain areas in Asia. Even though these monks do not have any material possessions, they clearly enjoy a great deal of prestige.

It is often said that the community or area leaders are the prestigious persons. While prestige is often associated with leadership, not all prestigious persons have an official designation. This can be thought of in terms of two sets of people in the larger of which are all the prestigious persons and in the smaller, all the leaders in an area:



The figure above indicates that community leadership is a subset of the larger set of the prestigious persons in an area. In other words, to locate the prestigious persons in an area, always consider the factors that are outlined above, and do not stop with merely locating the political leaders.

Thus, although there are certain factors, such as sex, wealth, age, education, and leadership that are generally associated with prestige, these factors should not be taken individually to determine who the prestigious persons are. It is best to take all the factors in combination or to use as many as the situation will permit.

Another method that has been used to locate the prestigious persons is called the *nomination technique*—asking the people in the area who the prestigious people are. In conjunction with this approach, one can also use what is called a self-nomination technique, that is, asking people if they consider themselves to be prestigious persons.

The nomination technique proceeds as follows. One decides on the specific type of prestigious person one wants to locate—for example, political leader or wealthy person. Then, one asks local people about who is the village headman, who is the landowner, who owns the radio, and the like. It might be that a single characteristic will enable them to tell the PSYOP officer who is the person being sought, or it may require a combination of factors. In either case, the PSYOP officer must be aware of the characteristics he is interested in before he tries to locate the prestigious person according to the nomination method. Often several persons may be nominated by an individual, but there should be enough

agreement on one person for the officer to be sure that he is the one being sought.

KEY COMMUNICATORS

The key communicator is more difficult to differentiate from the rest of the society than the prestigious person. In the most general sense, a key communicator is a person who has the function of spreading information to the various segments of the group to which he belongs. More specifically, the characteristics of the key communicator are as follows:

- He is more highly exposed to the mass media and other sources of information and is usually the one who receives the news from the mass media and spreads it to the rest of the group, at the same time interpreting it for them so they can understand it.[1]
- He is usually the one who begins the process of popularizing a technological advancement.
- Although found at all social and economic levels, he has a central place in the society. He tends to be socially integrated to a greater degree than most other members of the group; that is, he more closely represents the values of the group. One of his main characteristics is that he tends to be more like the group within which he functions than the prestigious person.
- In the spheres of public affairs, agriculture, and medicine, he tends to be high in socioeconomic status.
- He tends to be well-educated.
- He tends to be young.

There are two types of key communicators: (a) those who have influence in one sphere of influence, and (b) those who have influence in several spheres. In traditional societies, key communicators are more likely to be influential in several areas, whereas in transitional or modern societies the other type is more prevalent.[2]

Although the key communicator is sometimes referred to as an "opinion leader," one must not confuse him with the innovator, that is, the one who tends to be first in adopting new things. The latter is usually somewhat of a deviate from society, while the key communicator is not. Once an innovation is acceptable, however, the key communicator spreads information about it.

A study of urban Thailand found the key communicators to be, in order of importance: monks; professionals; military officials; and, to a lesser degree, government officials; teachers; and merchants.[3] Education was a highly important characteristic of Thai key communicators. Younger persons tended to be more aware of foreign news than older persons. Thai key communicators in general were (1) heavily exposed to the mass media (especially printed media), (2) had responsible roles, and (3) were advice-givers in word-of-mouth communications.

To summarize, the key communicator is generally a frequent user of

the mass media, is better educated, and possesses a central place in the society.

How does one locate key communicators? Three methods of identification have been distinguished: [4]

1. In the sociometric technique, members of a group are asked to whom they would go for advice or information on a topic;
2. In the key informants method, the surveyor selects persons who appear well-informed and asks them who the key communicators are;
3. In the self-designating technique, a respondent is asked a number of questions that bear on his quality of being a key communicator. In one study, for example, respondents were asked: "In the last six months, were there persons who sought you out in order to discuss their serious problems with you?" and "Are there any persons whom you know who consider you a reliable source of news?" [5]

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE PRESTIGIOUS PERSON AND THE KEY COMMUNICATOR

It is often important to distinguish between the prestigious person and the key communicator. One source of distinction is the function that each serves in the society with respect to the flow of information. Oftentimes the prestigious person has been called a *gatekeeper*. He decides what is passed on to the ordinary people from a higher echelon than his. For example, in developing nations he may decide for the people which advances they should know about and which ones they should not know about. By controlling the flow of information, he controls the movement and the direction of the movement of the particular society.

In a sense the key communicator also controls the movement of a particular society. However, in the key communicator's function as *opinion leader*, he contributes to the flow rather than the control of information. By the fact that he is integrated into the society, he has a great amount of influence and uses this influence. He is usually considered to be an intermediary between the people and the mass media.

There is a two-step flow between the mass media and the people.[6] Although people may have direct access to the mass media, they may still want what is said in the media to be interpreted by the key communicator.

In summary, the two types of persons may be distinguished from each other on the basis of their communicative relationships with the rest of the society. In addition, they may be distinguished on the basis of their degree of social integration in terms of their adherence to the norms of the society. The key communicator more closely represents the values of the group than does the prestigious person. The difference between key communicators and prestigious persons is not always strong, however. Moreover, there are key communicators among the prestigious people just as there are among other groups.

NOTES

[1] Mayone J. Stykos, "Patterns of Communication in a Rural Greek Village," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1952), pp. 59–70.

[2] Everett M. Rogers and D.C. Cartano, "Methods of Measuring Opinion Leadership," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVI (1962), pp. 435–441.

[3] Milton Jacobs, Farhad Farzanegan, and Alexander R. Askenasy, "A Study of Key Communicators in Urban Thailand," *Social Forces*, XLV, No. 2 (December 1966), pp. 192–199.

[4] Rogers and Cartano, "Methods of Measuring Opinion Leadership."

[5] Jacobs, Farganegan, and Askenasy, "A Study of Key Communicators."

[6] Elihu Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-to-Date Report on an Hypothesis," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXI (1957), pp. 61–67.

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNINTENDED AUDIENCE*

BY PAUL M.A. LINEBARGER

Despite the best efforts of the communicator, the target of a propaganda message may not always exactly coincide with the actual audience receiving the message; some members of the audience will receive the communicator's message whether he intends them to or not.

One of the continuing problems of mass communications in military situations is that of the unintended audience. The unintended audience can, in one form, come in by listening to radio broadcasts which are not meant for him, by reading our own newspapers and magazines addressed to our home public or our own troops, or even by seeing American movies which have not been edited for specific foreign areas. The other kind of unintended audience can get the American action and words second-hand. Messages originally meant for Americans cross, either in the original English or in translation, into another culture and produce results far from the original utterance. Humor suffers badly in this transition, as it almost always does when transferred from one culture to another. The statement of General Joseph Stilwell, "I claim we took a beating," was meaningless in Chinese, either in a word-to-word translation or in any sort of reasonable context; his statement, which was pleasantly idiomatic and robust for the home audience and for other American soldiers, was weird and inexplicable by the time it reached the unintended audiences.

In a later context, the use of the term "special warfare" by the American Armed Forces in 1961–62 may easily have produced apprehension in the Far Eastern area. "Special" means "secret police," "through bribery and assassination," or by means of espionage"—in the light of the particular use made of the word "special" in the experience of the former Imperial Japanese Army, or in the "special" sections of the Kuomintang party network when it was ruler of the mainland of China. This kind of unintended reaction may be prevented in a few cases. Given a world

*Excerpts from "Essays on Military Psychological Operations," unpublished study, 1965, pp. 52–56.

audience, it is impossible to prevent some misunderstandings from arising. The two most effective defenses against this could be found in:

First, sustained coordination with the Voice of America for the dissemination of acceptable translations of new American terms, slogans, and particular symbols;

Second, clearance through Pentagon level of the approved Army translations into foreign languages, for major audiences at least, of new military terms which may touch unintended audiences in the wrong way.

This problem, while annoying, is less than catastrophic.

The larger problem of "unintended audience" is more serious. *Partial understanding of the United States, taken directly from American channels, can lead to an extreme hostility toward the United States for reasons which are misconceived or merely verbal.* The audience which does not even think that it understands Americans may be animated by a human curiosity or even by an elementary friendliness toward something novel and entertaining. This is the group which believes that it understands Americans, but does so on incorrect conceptions which have been derived from American sources. The fact that the source is itself American makes the misunderstanding so much the harder to cure.

An extreme case of this can be taken from India and Pakistan, both beneficiaries of the United States. The fact that English is the common elite language in each of them makes Indians and Pakistani feel that they already understand Americans. They cannot get much unintended Russian-to-Russian material, because very few of them know enough of the language to intercept intra-Soviet mass communications, whether newspapers, magazines, or radio. America, they are sure they understand—and they are more wrong than right. The word "socialism," has come to India and Pakistan from British English; in their context it means *social welfare* plus a modicum of public ownership, not much more. By their own definition, the United States ought to be recognized as the most "socialist" nation on earth, since our welfare expenditures certainly surpass those of the USSR. But the Americans themselves deny that they are "socialist." This simple twisting of an apparently familiar word puts the Americans in the position, year after year, of seeming to insist that we want our poor suffering, our old suffering, our old starving, our sick neglected or in debt, and our children unprotected. We mean no such thing. The misunderstanding persists and in the case of many Indians and Pakistani, even a visit to the United States does not cure the trouble.

Here the trouble does not lie in translation but in the English itself. There is needed a dictionary of ideas, supplementary to the various country handbooks for which the Army has already contracted, to indicate major sectors of misunderstanding which come from the unexpected eavesdropping of foreign audiences on American-to-American communications. A civic action program will have to de-gauss, as it were, the magnetic fields of rigid misunderstanding which Americans carry with them. The problem, one might hasten to add, is particularly an *American*

one, because—of all the empire-builders and peace-keepers the world has ever known—it is we, more than Macedonians, Romans, Franks, French, or British, who feel the need to be understood and to be liked. The British felt it was enough to be respected and feared. We, in our time carry the neighborliness of our inward traditions with us and insist on making friends with our allies and even with our enemies, once we have conquered them. Much of the resistance to us comes from people who —meeting American friendliness and activity for the first time—mistake it for blood-brotherhood, for an immediate crusade, or for some other element in their own culture. The partially "Americanized" personality is a more formidable, more misleading antagonist than the person who has nothing but Soviet lies on which to base his misconceptions of the United States.

Part of the remedy for this situation would consist of a more careful checking of the foreign press in areas where U.S. forces are stationed, or expected, to make sure *military professionalism* is included in almost every story concerning our trained units. Their home state, their commander's personality, their marvelous new equipment, their previous assignment—all these are secondary to the critical issue: "Will they fight well, if they must?" Unless this question is answered, and answered very well, the rest of our overseas public relations might as well go by the board.

THE DECISION TO DEFECT*

By Lawrence E. Grinter

PSYOP planners, particularly in tactical operations, must take into detailed account the physical as well as the psychological environment of the audience so that messages do not require physically impractical responses.

When a member of the Viet Cong decides to break with his old way of life and ask the GVN for amnesty, he must consider the safest way to leave the insurgent organization. In this regard many problems immediately arise. The act of surrender can be very dangerous. If communist cadres realize that a man is wavering toward surrender, they usually take immediate action, such as "reeducation," imprisonment or worse. Many *hoi chanh* (ralliers) were interviewed who had waited months before slipping away because of the lack of opportunity or the fear of discovery. Even when they did leave the Viet Cong, it could be difficult getting safely into Government areas. The following story seemed typical of the kind of problems that often arose.

One defector explained:

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*Excerpts from "Amnesty in South Viet Nam: An Analysis of the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program in the Republic of Viet Nam," M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1967. Reprinted with the permission of the author, copyright holder.

It is never easy to rally. I walked up to a Popular Force soldier and I told him, "I am a Viet Cong and I want to surrender." He was quite frightened. I did not know how to say *hoi chanh*, so he pulled out a pistol and pointed it at me. I told him to search me, that I wanted to surrender. He wasn't entirely ready to believe me. He went and got a platoon of Popular Force soldiers and they found my buried documents and gun and then they believed me.[1]

Another rallier who worked as a communication agent in Phu Yen province was typically pessimistic about the ease of escaping.

There's no generally safe way. Since many Viet Cong have rallied, the VC maintain a much tighter control. Even if you want to go fifty meters away from your unit, you have to inform the squad leader. A Viet Cong can only escape when he goes on a mission to some village.[2]

One officer, who became a commander of an Armed Propaganda Team in Hué, found that the necessity of producing a Safe Conduct Pass (SCP) to GVN authorities as a guarantee of intentions added to the difficulties of defecting. While it is doubtful that the pass hindered defection more than it aided it, the officer's experience was duplicated time and again during the defection process. For example, a number of *hoi chanh* indicated that they had to hide SCP's in their shirt cuffs or collars, especially when V.C. cadres had just witnessed leaflet drops.

Some *hoi chanh* never were able to defect. For example, in the summer of 1966 in Binh Duong province, forty-one Viet Cong Phu Loi Batallion soldiers were killed in action with safe conduct passes hidden on their bodies.

The decision to defect from the Viet Cong often became a time of agonizing delay. The insurgent was not sure; often he was barraged with feelings of uncertainty and doubt.

I waited for five months before rallying because I was very suspicious. I told no one—not even my children. I was afraid they would talk about it. Finally, I told my wife I could not stay with the Viet Cong any longer. She came with me.[3]

Another rallier responded this way:

Q. Was it hard for you to rally once you decided to do so?
A. It was two months between the time I decided [to rally] and the time I actually did. The difficulties were the battle in my own mind; for example, I had doubts as to whether the Government would treat me well or not, and I also had trouble because I was so well indoctrinated and had been in the Party so long. I had been in Communist ranks for twenty years and eight months.[4]

When *hoi chanh* did defect, they usually came out alone or sometimes with token help from a relative or friend. This rallier, a Viet Cong village chief, had a plan:

I sent a letter to the Chief of Police in Long An by way of an ex-policeman whom I knew very well, and we specified a place. I went to that place and the Chief sent a policeman to greet me there.[5]

Thus the problem of making the process of defection simpler does not seem to be remediable by the Government. The GVN has broadcast numerous methods whereby ralliers can defect more safely, but in the final instance it all depends upon the rallier and his ingenuity in evading the Communist control system and convincing local GVN authorities he is sincere.

NOTES

[1] C. H. 7, p. 32. Notes refer to unpublished interview schedules administered during interview sessions with *hoi chanh*. The interviews were conducted by the SIMULMATICS CORPORATION in South Vietnam June 1966-January 1967. Title of the project was: "Improving the Effectiveness of the *Chieu Hoi* Program" OSD/ARPA-AGILE ARO #877, August 1967.

[2] C.H. 44, p. 25.

[3] C.H. 17, p. 7.

[4] C.H. 66, p. 49.

[5] C.H. 64, p. 25.

MESSAGE COMPOSITION

The articles below emphasize different aspects of message preparation, development, and production. Simple and obvious themes should be used, appealing to human emotions in a manner congenial to the particular cultures involved in PSYOP campaigns. The effects of appeals showing a favorable attitude toward the audience are illustrated in, "The Soviet 'Peace and Progress' Broadcasts."

The proper idiom, language, and accent are called for in "Brief Observation on the Importance of Up to Date Language in 'Black' or 'Grey' Propaganda." "Films From the Viet Cong" illustrates the point that overemphasis of themes, along with poor production qualities, may fail to arouse the desired emotions among members of the target groups. In "The Viet Cong Slogan Slip" and "Leaflets at a Glance," the view is advanced that short and punchy messages, easily received, visible, and readable, may be more effective with some target groups than more elaborate and expensively produced messages. The importance of offering alternatives to the audience, the mediating qualities of prior communications, and the timing of the communication with certain auspicious events are underscored in "Golden Bridges," "Incitement to Revolt," and "Sihanouk's Appeal to the Monks of Cambodia."

In spite of the precautions taken in the preparation of persuasive political communications material, the effects of psychological operations are apt to be fortuitous and unpredictable. For this reason, message content should be pretested in order to estimate the effects of a PSYWAR campaign in advance.

SELECTION OF THEMES*

BY CARL BERGER

Leaflet messages, particularly in tactical leaflets, should avoid ridicule of the target and use of sophisticated political propaganda themes, and should concentrate on the use of simple messages directed to the target's basic and immediate needs and wants.

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*Excerpts from *An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets*, Documentary Study No. 1, The American University, Special Operations Research Office, Washington, D.C., 1959, AD 220 821, pp. 27–33.

In writing or preparing a propaganda leaflet, it is clear that there are no hard-and-fast principles one can follow. The final report of the Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF, states flatly, "There can be little descriptive material on the subject of how to write a leaflet," and suggests the propagandist simply must stay alert to the changing military picture, must study the intelligence reports on the various target groups, and must be aware of the limitations under which he is operating (that is, his government's policies).[1]

However, the leaflet writer should be aware of some general approaches which have proved profitable in the past. For example, there is a recommended approach for appealing to enemy troops in the field. According to Richard Crossman, under these circumstances the whole art of the leaflet "is to appear as a simple, honourable offer by one honourable soldier to another, saying, "You have fought very gallantly; now is the time when you have a perfectly good reason for giving in a little earlier." [2] Crossman's view is endorsed by the experiences gained by other Allied propagandists of World War II. The Fifth Army Combat Propaganda Team reported on its experiences against the Germans:

> We have learned, partly from the effect of German leaflets on our own troops, partly from other evidence, that hostile, condescending or sarcastic leaflets—no matter how much fun to write—defeat their own purpose. In a war among soldiers, recognition of the enemy's soldierly qualities, credit for bravery, soldier-to-soldier talk (where these matters are pertinent and justifiable) are like butter on bread —they make it swallow easier.[3]

Similarly, in the Leyte campaign during the liberation of the Philippines, a Seventh Division leaflet writer strongly objected to the sarcastic approach to the Japanese soldiers. "Why," he asked, "should we address them as 'Rats in a Trap' or caricature them as 'Sad Sacks?' These things only infuriate them and provide their officers with something to create unity in trying circumstances and to further their resistance." [4] Language specialists with the Seventh Division, who interrogated Japanese prisoners, agreed that American leaflets should include such things as praise for the Japanese soldier for his heroic conduct and a brief statement of the tactical situation, without exaggeration. "Any ridicule of the individual Japanese soldiers," they reported, "belittlement of his equipment, or insulting his leaders was found to create an adverse effect." [5]

Rule Number One, then appears to be: In a tactical leaflet, ridicule should be avoided and the writer should stick to the military facts. The enemy should be treated as honorable soldiers who are not to blame for the unfavorable circumstances they find themselves in. [Italics added.]

Another general leaflet rule is: The simpler and more direct a leaflet is in language, the more chance it has of being understood by the target audience. Long political harangues would seem to have little place in leaflets. [Italics added.] This is true of both tactical and strategic propaganda. For example, the early British leaflets dropped on Germany in September and October 1939 were made up of long political arguments. One such leaflet stated (excerpts):

German Men and Women: The Government of the Reich has, with cold deliberation, forced war upon Great Britain. It has done so knowing that it must involve mankind in a calamity worse than that of 1914. The assurances of peaceful intentions the Fuehrer gave to you and to the world in April have proved as worthless as his words at the *Sportspalast* last September, when he said, "We have no more territorial claims to make in Europe."

Never before has any government ordered subjects to their death with less excuse. This war is utterly unnecessary. Germany was in no way threatened or deprived of justice.

Was she not allowed to reenter the Rhineland, to achieve the *Anschluss* and to take back the Sudeten German in peace? Neither we nor any other nation would have sought to limit her advance so long as she did not violate independent non-German peoples. . . .

It is not us, but you they have deceived. For years their iron censorship has kept from you truths that even uncivilized peoples know. It has imprisoned your minds in a concentration camp. Otherwise, they would not have dared to misrepresent the combination of peaceful peoples to secure peace as hostile encirclement. . . . [6]

An American travelling by train through Germany in the last months of 1939 reported one German fellow passenger's reaction to the British propaganda: "How foolish it is of the British to think that by their stupid leaflets they can separate the German people from their Fuehrer!" [7] These early strategic leaflets may have satisfied the soul of the writer, but they had no noticeable effect on the German people. Indeed, in England a story began to make the rounds about the first bombs dropped on Germany, carrying the label: "You are lucky; this might have been a leaflet." [8] Needless to say, British propaganda quickly took on a more appealing tone.

The Soviets in particular during World War II were addicted to stuffing their leaflets with long political harangues, full of Communist verbiage and Marxist dogma. Many Soviet political officers insisted that the Red leaflets dropped on the German soldiers be "revolutionary," when battle conditions made such ideological leaflets meaningless. Similarly, the Chinese Communists in their leaflets to the American soldiers during the Korean War spoke of "Wall Street imperialists," and the like, to no meaningful purpose. Toward the end of both wars, however, Russian and Chinese leaflets began to improve when the Communists came to understand the necessity of divorcing ideological themes from combat propaganda.

Concerning the subject matter of tactical leaflets, Martin Herz, chief leaflet writer of the Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF, commented that "there is in most cases no need for sophisticated political propaganda themes. The soldier in battle has a closely restricted horizon. When high explosive shells are bursting around him and he hears our tanks moving up, ideological considerations take a distinctly secondary place in his mind." [9]

At least one enemy soldier of World War II, a Japanese captured on Tinian Island in August 1944, held the same opinion. Questioned by Allied interrogators, this prisoner offered the view that conflicting ideologies of war had little relation to the practical problem of inducing troops to surrender. He said that the Japanese of Tinian treated American leaflets

as a joke; he objected in particular to appeals made on political or ideological grounds (for example, "You have been misled by the military clique"). The Japanese soldier, he reported, was not interested in the crimes of the military caste; he was simply fighting for his country and regarded as nonsense any suggestion that he do otherwise.[10]

In general, ideological approaches should be avoided in propaganda aimed at enemy soldiers. In the final report on U.S. Army operations against the Germans in World War I, the writers responsible for the U.S. leaflet operation suggested their rules for future Army leaflets. They should contain simple, accurate statements calculated to suggest the thought of surrender to the average private. In addition, leaflets should take into consideration the condition of enemy morale, the general military situation, and the special character of the enemy unit aimed at. These recommendations may still constitute the best "rules" to follow in the preparation of tactical leaflets.

NOTES

1. *SHAEF PWD Report*, p. 34.
2. R. H. S. Crossman, "Psychological Warfare," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, 97 (August 1952), p.324.
3. Psychological Warfare Branch Hq. Fifth Army, *Functions of the 5th Army Combat Propaganda Team* (April 1944), p. 16.
4. Hqs. Seventh Infantry Division (G2), letter to ACofS, G2, USAFPOA, 10 Jan. 1945, sub: *Psychological Warfare*. In Hq SWPacArea Records Group No. 975–A45–43, Drawer No. 1, No. 650.1, Folder 4, "Effectiveness of Frontline Broadcasts in Inducing Surrender and Lowering Enemy Morale," p. 70, Federal Records Center, hereafter FRC.
5. Ibid.
6. Robert Powell, "Warfare by Leaflet," *Living Age*, 357 (Dec. 1939), p. 326.
7. Oswald Garrison Villard, "German-British Propaganda Duel," *Living Age*, 357 (Feb. 1940), pp. 508–11.
8. Lindley Fraser, *Propaganda* (London: 1957), p. 111.
9. Martin F. Herz, "The Combat Leaflet—Weapon of Persuasion," *Army Information Digest* (June 1950), pp. 37–43.
10. "Reaction to Propaganda, Fifteenth Report," 15 Dec 1944. In Hq SWPA Records Group No. 975–A45–43, Drawer No 1, No. 650.1, Folder 4, "Effectiveness of Frontline Broadcasts in Inducing Surrender and Lowering Enemy Morale," p. 173, FRC.

ONE PAIR OF SHOES*

By Reuben S. Nathan

PSYOP should cater to man's deep psychological needs, his inability to understand the events that create anxiety. It is the task of the psyoperator to lower the level of this anxiety by simple appeals to fundamental human needs.

The most significant sentence I ever found in an interrogation came from a Viet Cong defector, a naive and not overly intelligent fellow, who, when asked why he had defected, said: "You must understand that here

*Original essay by Reuben S. Nathan.

in Vietnam people do not like to be killed. . . ." He reduced many questions to a fundamental human element, an element so pathetically obvious that it is often forgotten.

THE HUMAN EQUATION

The psyoperator seeks the human equation. Only great writers can get at the basics of the human mind. Lesser men need at least a measure of empathy with others, a deep concern with the human condition, and love of one's fellow man to understand what makes him tick. Hatred yields nothing of value—yet, as PSYWAR is usually concerned with enemies, much of PSYOP intelligence is tainted by enmity. How then does one get at the truth on which effective PSYOP must be based? How many sources possess the required empathy with other men, not to mention enemies? How many dare to love in war, to take a chance on being considered weak or ridiculous? It is safer to rely on statistics or on the techniques of public opinion polls—no matter how unreliable. Quantitative approaches are in vogue.

Yet the fact is that the answers to the really important questions lie largely in ourselves. To be effective, PSYOP must appeal to fundamental human emotions. These are the same everywhere: hope and fear; wanting to live; to have a chance, if not for oneself then for one's children. Germans, Poles, Chinese, Cambodians—all fall in love precisely the way we do. People everywhere aspire to the recognition of their dignity.

Kipling was wrong when he claimed that East is East and West is West and that the twain shall never meet. They have met: close to a billion Asians live by the concepts of a white German, Karl Marx, if only because they must. It is true enough that historical, cultural, political, climatic, and other differences exist but they represent a relatively thin layer superimposed on the essential identity of mankind. It is important to know of these differences because they dictate the language one must speak. But it is even more important to realize that these differences matter less than the basic human condition—of which we know because we share it. The American Indians have a prayer: "Grant that I may not criticize my neighbor until I have walked a mile in his mocassins." An Estimate of the Psychological Situation cannot be too far off if one concludes from one's own emotions about those of the enemy, provided one defines correctly the conditions under which he lives and puts oneself in his mocassins.

SIMPLE AND OBVIOUS THEMES

There are, after all, so many ingredients of our art that are as yet hardly understood. I had a visitor, a senior government officer, FSO (Foreign Service Officer)-1. We had worked together many years before. He read my PSYOP plan for the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and confessed to being disappointed. "When I heard you had been recalled," he told me,

"I had visions of a truly sophisticated program. Instead you came up with only such simple and obvious themes."

He was quite right. But I was not ashamed of the simplicity of my annex, I was proud of it. In the business of propaganda and PSYOP, simplicity is the apex of sophistication, the result of the most painstaking efforts. This is in fact one of the very few things on which Madison Avenue and PSYOP are in agreement.

It is essential to reduce complex appeals to what I call the terms of one pair of shoes. When our troops entered Auschwitz, one of the Nazi extermination camps, they found two mountains of children's shoes, 600,000 altogether. Photographs of these pitiful monuments to the horror of Nazi barbarism appeared in many newspapers. But what could the readers do? Nobody is capable of facing up to the murder of 300,000 little kids, to the misery of their last hours, alone, terrified, uncomprehending. So one turns the page, has another cup of coffee and tries to forget. But when some time later the press reported that a little boy by the name of Nubby was doomed to die of leukemia and that his parents had decided to give him a last Christmas many months before the real Christmas would come around, tens of thousands of people sent him presents. People can identify with one little child, with one father's and one mother's grief, but not with the fate of hundreds of thousands. That is why good propaganda must talk in terms of one pair of shoes, in terms people can easily understand and accept.

But there are other reasons for the utmost simplicity. The most effective medium of propaganda is face-to-face persuasion. That means that the essential message must be so formulated that it can be projected by great numbers of people—not all of whom are sophisticated enough to communicate involved appeals. Repetition is the mother of propaganda, and who could, or would, repeat complex claims ad infinitum?

I had long before started preaching that the secret of good propaganda is the reduction of the scores of possible appeals, which usually emerge from a sound PSYOP plan, to the smallest possible number of the simplest possible themes. When one finally defines them and puts them on paper, they look very easy, obvious, and unimpressive. That accounted for my friend's criticism and the small regard in which he held my annex. Things like that can hurt one's pride. But then, if "a policeman's lot is not a happy one," that of a conscientious psyoperator is even more trying. We must console ourselves with the feeling that we are trail blazers. We may yet be making the grade. Meanwhile we had better learn to live with the probability that there are no Distinguished Service Medals in our immediate future.

THE SOVIET "PEACE AND PROGRESS" BROADCASTS*

BY the 7TH PSYOP GROUP

The receptivity of the audience to a message or appeal may hinge, at least initially, on the perceived attitude of the communicator. A radio broadcast projecting a favorable attitude toward the target audience, depicting the motive to communicate as altruistic, portraying communicator objectives as being in the intellectual and social interest of the target audience, and making no appeals for radical behavior may be viewed by the target audience as congenial communication and should be more favorably received than a neutral or hostile one.

On 1 March, a special broadcast in Mandarin for the "Chinese People" was inaugurated in Moscow. The broadcast is called "Peace and Progress" and is a definite Soviet psychological operation against the present Government of the Chinese People's Republic. The sponsor's appeal to the listeners in inaugurating the "Peace and Progress" broadcast is important and interesting. It spells out Soviet guide-lines and goals for this propaganda action, and gives some idea what Soviet experts on China believe might win over Chinese. For this reason, the entire text of the 1 March broadcast is reproduced here:

We representatives of Soviet mass organizations would like to extend our hand of friendship to you heroic Chinese working class and the glorious millions in the rank and file of Chinese Communist fighters. To the diligent Chinese peasants, we send you our regards and earnest affection.

To our fraternal Chinese younger generation, listen, here is our appeal to you Chinese young men and women: Mao Tse-tung and his clique are attempting to dislodge you from the right track, that is, the revolutionary path.

We also send our regards to the members of the Chinese people's Liberation Army which in the past has always been together with the people and fought for their freedom and happiness.

May our voice also reach you Chinese activists of literature and arts.

This *Peace and Progress* station has been created to express the Russian people's friendship and sense of justice to Chinese friends.

In these programs we shall introduce to you Soviet public opinions toward the undertakings of your country. You shall hear of the Soviet people's growing anxiety and concern for the Chinese people. In our programs we shall voice the opinions of the representatives of the Soviet people, their indignation and denunciation of the attempt by Mao Tse-tung and his clique to undermine the fraternal friendship of the two peoples which was forged with the red blood of their distinguished children shed in the struggle against the common enemy and for their common undertaking.

This station shall alert you to (the) danger of Mao Tse-tung's policy to the Chinese people and the fruits of the Chinese revolution. We shall introduce to you the truth about the events taking place in your country, although Mao Tse-tung and his cronies are attempting to conceal them by keeping mum.

* * * * *

We shall report to you news made available to us concerning the events taking place throughout your great country, and introduce to you materials on Chinese events as reported by mass communication media of other foreign countries,

*Excerpts from "The Soviet 'Peace and Progress' Broadcasts," Communist Propaganda Trends," Issue No. 628 (January 1968), pp. 14–16.

including those of the capitalist countries. You shall be informed of the happiness enjoyed by the enemies, the imperialist countries, as a result of Mao Tse-tung's betrayal and splittist policy. Mao Tse-tung is carrying out an anti-people struggle, splitting the revolutionary anti-imperialist united front, and sabotaging the support for the struggling Vietnamese.

Our station shall invite world Communists and progressive activists to convey to you at length their opinions on the events in your country. All of you shall know that the hearts of all the righteous in the world are with the Chinese people, and all progressive people are unanimously denouncing Mao Tse-tung's policy and his struggle against the socialist states and fraternal parties.

We believe that the voice of our station shall become the symbol of support of the Soviet people and all contemporary revolutionary forces for our Chinese friends, and a symbol of our concern.

We believe that the great Chinese people, under the leadership of China's genuine Communists, will be able to put their country back on the road of friendship and fraternal solidarity with the Soviet and world socialist peoples, and all revolutionary anti-imperialist forces.

Comment: This presents an opportunity to analyze Soviet propaganda efforts aimed at mainland China. The source is of course the USSR. This government-sponsored program probably is the result of a good amount of time and money, in planning and in future projection. It can also be thought, it would seem, that the organization behind this project is the part of the USSR propaganda machine with established intelligence and information channels, the China propaganda section. The source makes no attempt to conceal its identity despite personal attacks on Mao; the program uses what authority the Soviet Government may have to increase its credibility.

The content of this propaganda seeks to establish the source as an all-knowing organization in possession of the "big picture" and true facts about all agents in China. Not only does the "Peace and Progress" station have these facts, it seeks to share them in a friendly manner with the isolated Chinese audience. The content seems aimed at stimulating a normal human thirst for knowledge; for the knowledge-starved mainland China audience "Peace and Progress" promises to utilize communication resources of the Soviet Union to give people the truth that the Chinese Government attempts to conceal. The content reveals the results of Soviet analysis and evaluation of the susceptibilities of the mainland Chinese audience.

While the Soviet propagandists desire to appeal to an entire cross section of the Chinese population, three specific target groups are mentioned: youths, intellectuals, and the army. The selection of these target groups evidently indicates that Soviet propaganda analysts believe these three groups have promise of being susceptible and are effective anti-Mao groups in Chinese Communist society. The People's Liberation Army, "which in the past has always been together with the people and fought for their freedom and happiness," would seem to be a criticism of the PLA's present status.

In summary, "Peace and Progress" might be fairly effective. Even the name "Peace and Progress" was probably derived from a study of Chinese mainland attitudes. . . .The problem is whether wide listener-

ship can be achieved. During this [Cultural Revolution] crisis, and possible future troubles, the Chinese population itself probably becomes the world's greatest "China-watcher" and will welcome information from any source. Possibly, surveillance of foreign radio listeners will be lax. The Soviet Union is trying to exploit this, possibly, and also the world brotherhood of Communism against charges of excesses committed by . . . [Chinese leaders]. Chinese individuals might listen to these broadcasts if they are aware of them and have access to a radio. The "Peace and Progress" project might become a "symbol" for some anti-Government activities, even though this opposition remains Communist.

BRIEF OBSERVATION ON THE IMPORTANCE OF UP TO DATE LANGUAGE IN "BLACK" OR "GREY" PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS*

By Martin F. Herz

Inattention to language style and usage defeats covert propaganda campaigns.

During World War II the Americans dropped some leaflets on Japanese cities in the form of "Extra" editions of Japanese newspapers. I have two such leaflets in my collection, each headlining bombing attacks. One was supposed to be an extra edition of the Asahi Shimbun, the other of the Osaka Asahi Shimbun. The language of both of them was archaic, and easily determined to be the work of emigrants.

The Asahi Shimbun facsimile leaflet reads as follows in translation: "ANOTHER NATION-WIDE AIR RAID. OUR PRESS CANNOT KEEP SILENT ANY LONGER. The Government authorities may misunderstand our belief which comes from sincere patriotism. Our press may be closed down. But come what may, we consider it our duty as a newspaper to report the truth. THE MILITARISTS CONCEAL THEIR DEFEAT AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN VICTORY FROM THE EYES OF THE NATION. It has been a well-known fact, even before the war, that the American 'flying fortresses' are capable of bombing our country."

"Our occupied territories in the South Seas do not and cannot serve the purpose of outposts against the American air raids of our country. Our industries will be bombed again all over the country in the near future. EVACUATE THE INDUSTRIAL AREAS. SAVE YOUR INVALUABLE LIFE. The militarists started the war to satisfy their rapacious greed, We cannot remain silent, even if it means the violation of wartime regulations."

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*From *Falling Leaf Magazine*, VIII, no. 1 (March 1967), pp. 19–20. Reprinted with the permission of the author and courtesy of *Falling Leaf Magazine*.

Recently I showed this leaflet to a colleague in the Japanese Embassy and asked him to help me in translating it. His observations are given below:

"This leaflet, though its Japanese is excellent, is written predominantly in the style of 'bongobun' (the literary form of the Japanese language) with a slight admixture of 'kogobun' (the oral form). This was the style of Japanese newspapers in the second and third decades of this century. Toward the end of the twenties, they switched completely to 'kogobun.'

"The peculiar and obsolete style of the leaflet is exactly that of the Japanese newspapers published for the American-Japanese community in the States, which was a constant source of amusement to us when I served in Washington. All these papers were edited and published by old 'issei' (first-generation Japanese immigrants) who had been doing small-time local newspaper work in Japan before coming over to the States and who were unable to discard the style to which they were accustomed."

My Japanese friend pointed out, in particular, two words which he regarded as immediate give-aways of the origin of the leaflets. The word air-raid in the leaflet was rendered in Chinese characters as "ku-geki," consisting of "ku" meaning sky and "geki" meaning raid. He commented on this as follows:

"Ku-geki is a perfectly possible combination, but the fact is that we Japanese simply do not use this word. We would have said either 'ku-shu,' meaning air-attack, or 'baku-geki,' meaning bombing attack."

Another instance was the rendering of the term "flying fortress" into Japanese. The writers of the leaflets used "tobu-yosai" (from "tobu" for flying, and "yosai" for fortress). While this was not incorrect linguistically, it simply did not correspond to actual Japanese usage. The term used in Japan was "sora-tobu-yosai," "sora" meaning sky.

The meticulous attention to language in leaflets of all kinds, but the special importance of using the enemy's terminology in "black" or "grey" leaflets, has often been remarked upon. As a former writer of German combat leaflets in World War II, I know that we were guilty of occasional use of incorrect terms also in the European theatre. To avoid this, we often checked our leaflets with cooperative prisoners. To know the enemy's language is not enough; one has to be up-to-date in the latest changes of his spoken word.

Nothing made our American soldiers laugh more, for instance, than the use of the term "doughboys" in some early German propaganda leaflets. Eventually, the Germans realized that the new term was "G.I.," but up to the end of the war there were numerous solecisms in German propaganda leaflets.

FILMS FROM THE VIETCONG*

By Peter Gessner

The use of films as a propaganda device may lose its impact on an audience because of overemphasized themes and poor production techniques.

Some half-dozen films produced by the National Liberation Front of Vietnam are making their way around the country, shown for the most part in poor screening conditions to limited audiences. . . . Despite the difficulties imposed by a sound track loaded with hyperbole and slogans (the English narrations have all the literary grace of a pamphlet), and despite the deteriorated physical condition of the films which makes many of these screenings little more than mysterious lantern shows, the very existence of these films merits attention.

As a record of the face of the war in Vietnam, and even more as an indication of what the film makers want "us" to know about them, the NLF films are a humbling experience to the viewer. In one (dated 1965), there is a brief sequence in a Vietcong-held village where, during a lull in the fighting, a Western-style ballet is performed within a ring of watching guerrillas. Even the hardened view which says that such things don't happen spontaneously, that they are arranged for the visiting camera, must cope with the fact that these people, the Vietcong, engaged in a brutalizing struggle, have thought it important to include dance in the midst of footage of a vicious guerrilla war.

If this instance indicates that the Vietcong's vision of itself in some sense includes an awareness of the human implications of the kind of war it is forced to fight, its interpretation of events in the United States appears to be filtered through the prism of ideology. For example, one is saddened by repeated references throughout these films to the "progressive American peoples" linked to shots of domestic anti-war demonstrations. Rather than realistically assessing the size and shape of current anti-war sentiment in this country, the film makers seem to have chosen to plug in the appropriate ideological platitude. It may be that, as James Cameron put it in his recent series of articles in *The New York Times*, "too many officials speak an English or French that was actually learned in slogans"; one also suspects that the twenty-year heritage of civil war brings with it a certain hardening of thought, an impatience with the niceties of language and distinction-making.

Once the narration is peeled away, and the images themselves are allowed to live for what they are, the texture of life in Vietnam forces its way through. Another film contains an extended sequence about captured equipment which begins as an apparent ode to self-sufficiency, only to move in a quite unexpected direction. From neatly stacked piles of guns and machinery, the camera turns to people making candleholders from

*Excerpts from "Films from the Vietcong," *The Nation*, 202, no.4 (January 24, 1966) pp. 110–111. Reprinted with the permission of *The Nation*, copyright holder.

what seem to be spent shells, to still others cutting jeep tires into sandal patterns. For a moment, the gulf between these people and a civilization which, even in peacetime, has managed to institutionalize the notion that *things* wear out, seems to loom larger than any logistical speculations about how the Vietcong supply themselves.

Of the six or so films now making the rounds, only one seems to go beyond the momentary revelatory glimpse to create a more whole impact. It was produced, probably by the NLF or a militant wing of the Buddhists, sometime after 1963 (there is no more precise internal evidence), and deals with the wave of demonstrations which followed the Diem government's suppression of the Buddhists.

It begins with what is a prologue of almost abstract battle footage: a montage of swooping planes, machinegun rattles and barbed wire, not unlike Lewis Milestone's *All Quiet on the Western Front*. Abruptly, we are swept into a slow processional of Buddhist priests going out into the streets of Saigon to demonstrate for what, to Americans, would seem to be the most basic of liberties—the freedom to worship. Great bales of barbed wire are unrolled in front of them by soldiers; the younger priests, whose faces strangely recall those of the early civil rights workers in the American South, quietly place their hands around the wire as the soldiers begin to try to cordon them off. A tear-gas grenade lunges across the street, streaming white smoke like some kind of mythic Oriental paper beast.

The Diem soldiers, in camouflaged battle dress and holding shields which resemble the tops of garbage cans and which they seem to use to ward off objects thrown at them by the crowd, begin to move against the priests; at this point, the film takes on the qualities of an ominous pageant play. Oddly incongrous Western symphonic music replaces the English narrator (who with good sense, has kept quiet throughout most of the demonstration sequence), and an unpredictable concordance of sound and image occurs: stock movie music joined with startling images raises the film to an entirely new level, toward a totality of emotion quite difficult to describe precisely. It is one of those rare moments in motion pictures when one plus one equals three. (Something of the sort happens in Luis Bunuel's *Land Without Bread*, a 1932 documentary of an impoverished region in Spain, in which Brahms's *Fourth Symphony* is used throughout the film *not* as a handy contrast but rather in an almost architectual way to provide a vaulting, an unattainable ceiling of emotion which hovers over the sordid level of human action.) Generally, the NLF film makers do not employ music in such ways; the music in other films is of an indeterminate martial nature, used conventionally to fill in behind the narrator.

The Buddhist film, in many ways the most successful of the NLF group, seems to have received less circulation than what is perhaps the most widely seen but unfortunately the least interesting of the lot. This picture, dated 1965 and bearing the title "Foreign Correspondents Visit the

National Liberation Front" (at any rate, something like that), records *Humanité* correspondents Wilfred Burchette and Madeleine Riffaud eating and singing with happy peasants. The film is almost completely uninformative and comes close to being embarrassing—Mlle. Riffaud is more than effuse in her desire to kiss and fondle young Vietcong guerrillas. The quality of the print is mercifully poor and a good portion of all this is practically invisible.

* * * * *

Although the NLF movies draw unexpectedly large audiences (mostly students) wherever they are shown, their net effect is ambiguous at best. They seldom exploit the motion picture as a particular form of communication, nor do they explore the special qualities that set it off from pamphlets or slide shows. The films do not achieve a sense of the camera's own participation in events, a sense present in the footage of volunteer cameramen for the Spanish Republic (*To Die in Madrid*). Judged by the standards we apply to works of art, or even against the more vague measure of some kind of immediacy of feeling, the work is crude and conventional. One responds with something of the suspicion Trotsky felt, perhaps unjustly, for the work of the poet Mayakovsky: "[he] shouts too often where one should speak; and so his cry, where cry is needed, sounds inadequate."

* * * * *

THE VIET CONG SLOGAN SLIP*

BY the JUSPAO PLANNING STAFF

The slogan slip, containing short and succinct messages and appeals, has, because of its size, the advantage of being covertly distributed in enemy-held areas.

[One] tool in the Viet Cong communication armory is the slogan slip. This is a small slip of paper (some as small as two by three inches) which contains a short message expressing one idea. The most terse, for example, might read, "Down With the U.S.-Lackey Clique." Use of the slogan slip apparently stems from the experiences gained by the Soviet communists who have raised sloganeering to a high pitch. Of course revolutionaries have for generations used the slogan as a rallying cry, particularly among the less educated. For example, Patrick Henry's "Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death." Or the Loyalist slogan of the Spanish Civil War: "It is better to die on your feet than live on your knees." Or Lenin's cry: "Land to the Tillers." Or almost anything from Madison Avenue.

One of the primary uses for [the] slogan slip by Viet Cong cadres is to help raise revolutionary consciousness. Villagers are encouraged to draft, produce and distribute slogan slips.

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*Excerpts from "The Viet Cong Slogan Slip," JUSPAO Memorandum, February 9, 1966.

A captured Viet Cong directive for example declared that:

> The slogan is a form of agitation that concentrates the determination of the masses to struggle, expresses the attitudes and actions of the masses to make revolution, and lowers the prestige and power of the enemy . . . They are of three types: those which praise our policies; those which express hatred especially for enemy crimes; and those which support the *binh van* proselyting movement.

It went on to say that slogans could be written on paper, on wood panels, carved into tree trunks and also lettered on walls or on large banners to be hung across roads leading into villages. The directive added:

> Slogans may be written in the form of poetry, in verses of six or eight words, or in the form of words to popular songs. . .But all slogans must be written in serious and dignified form and not scrawled. Many slogans now used are disorderly. These must be improved. The masses must be taught to write slogans properly, hang them in public places, and protect them from enemy soldiers during clearing operations.

The directive gave an example of villagers protecting their slogan:

> In one village the people wrote slogans on the bark of tree trunks. The enemy soldiers came to the village and saw the slogans on the tree and said, "We think we should cut down these trees with those offending words." The people replied to them: "If the Liberation soldiers had written the slogans on bridges would you blow up the bridges?" The soldiers were forced by this logic to withdraw, without cutting down the trees.

Slogan slips are generally distributed covertly. They are slipped into women's shopping baskets at markets, tossed in parked vehicles in the cities, placed at night in school room desks or simply scattered along paths and walks where they are apt to be found by pedestrians.

A . . . study . . . of 144 slogan slips, collected at random from throughout the country, indicates both the priority of audiences currently maintained by the Viet Cong as well as a general overview of current themes.

As far as language was concerned the vast majority of the slogan slips, about 90 percent, were in Vietnamese, with Montagnard dialects and English following in that order. The largest single target for the slogan slip was the general rural population; fifty percent were omnidirectional. The largest single target was members of ARVN, with Montagnards, youth, specifically rural, civil servants, Americans and Hoa Hao.

More than two thirds of the total number of slogan slips were devoted to two themes: support for the Viet Cong effort and proselyting of military and civil servants; these ranked about 40 percent and 30 percent respectively. Then came anti-U.S. themes of 12 percent (although anti-U.S. themes appeared as secondary themes in a majority of the sample), followed by 15 other themes of less than three percent each.

LEAFLETS AT A GLANCE

BY the EDITORS

Bold lettered leaflets were used in Vietnam to gain the attention of an audience in a rigidly controlled environment.

Even the most carefully designed message satisfying well-known effectiveness criteria such as comprehension and appeal may be a wasted effort. An essential condition for effective communication is that the attention of the audience is secured. In the case of printed matter, the minimal condition is that the message at least be seen; the desired effect is that the audience also read the message.

Seeing a message is no problem if the targeting is accurate; reading it, on the other hand, may constitute a grave danger to the recipients if the audience is in a controlled environment. For example, leaders of Axis and Communist forces in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam imposed severe penalties for reading Allied propaganda. Interviews with captured North Vietnamese and Viet Cong prisoners as well as captured enemy documents revealed that the reading of Allied propaganda could lead to harsh punishment, and possession of such leaflets could even mean death. Quite understandably, then, many of those disenchanted with their conditions were fearful of being caught by their leaders reading or possessing Allied leaflets.

A major problem facing psyoperators in Vietnam, as well as in earlier conflicts, was how to induce cadres in enemy ranks to read a message in an environment that was rigidly controlled. Allied psyoperators tried many techniques to overcome enemy countermeasures, and certainly one of the most interesting of these was "Leaflets-at-a-Glance" material. They were printed in bold letters so that they could be read from a distance with minimal danger to the audience. Of course, leaflets of this type are usually not suitable for directive purposes in a controlled environment; they are clumsy to carry or hide. They can, however, lower morale by reinforcing existing feelings of suspicion or duress. Moreover, "Leaflets-at-a-Glance" can fulfill a specific informational objective such as indicating where to look for or hide other Allied messages.

GOLDEN BRIDGES*

BY REUBEN S. NATHAN

Because one of the important elements of PSYOP is offering options, the absence of reasonable alternatives in the content of the communicator's message is counterproductive: in a conflict situation, for instance, it often leaves the target audience little choice but to rally behind parties against whom the communicator was directing his message, whether they want to or not.

*Original essay by Reuben S. Nathan.

One of the main objectives of propaganda in times of war is to build Golden Bridges, to persuade the enemy that there is a way out, that there is no need to fight to the end. Leaving room for maneuver does not mean abandoning national objectives. War aims at changing governments, at eliminating hostile regimes which resist an equitable peace. People are eternal—they will be there after they and their governments have been defeated; they will continue to live and must be lived with. That is why good propaganda must see to it that they are not cornered, for cornered people will fight and kill until they die, and the people they kill will be one's own.

WORLD WAR II

We sensed at the time of the Casablanca conference—and we now know this supposition was correct—that the demand for unconditional surrender would make it next to impossible for the Germans opposing Hitler to overthrow him. They had nothing to offer to the people, no expectation that they would be able to negotiate an acceptable compromise.

Deprived of the opportunity to build Golden Bridges by the call for unconditional surrender, the Allied propagandists of World War II were severely limited in potential effectiveness. The war would be decided by guns; words that might conceivably have shortened it and so saved lives, had been disarmed.

> According to Robert E. Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins*[1], President Roosevelt told his aide "We had so much trouble getting those two French generals [Giraud and de Gaulle] together that I thought to myself that this was as difficult as arranging the meeting of Grant and Lee—and then suddenly, the press conference was on, and Winston and I had had no time to prepare for it, and the thought popped into my mind that they had called Grant 'Old Unconditional Surrender,' and the next thing I knew I had said it."

In other words, the most important PSYWAR decision of World War II had not been the result of deliberate PSYWAR thinking. It had just "popped" into the President's mind. Admittedly, there were very few PSYWAR experts on the Allied side, apparently none on the staff of any of the leaders who met at Casablanca. One wonders whether Hitler would have made an equally momentous decision without consulting with Dr. Goebbels. One need not wonder what Stalin would have done for that is a matter of record. When the armies of the Soviet Union entered Germany, Ilja Ehrenburg's blunt anti-German line was abruptly dropped. Soviet propaganda instead proclaimed that Moscow had been fighting the Nazis but was aware that Nazis come and go and that the German people would remain—to be lived with. Soviet propaganda did not go in for brainstorms. Totalitarian propaganda seldom does. It relies on experts.

NORTH VIETNAM

Less than ten years ago we faced a similar situation in the decision to bomb North Vietnam. We know[2] that the first strikes were ordered in retaliation for attacks on U.S. barracks in Pleiku, and the following

"sustained reprisals" in response to increasing Viet Cong violence and direct North Vietnamese involvement in the war. The situation in South Vietnam was deteriorating; a close advisor to the president felt that defeat was "inevitable" unless the United States put pressure on Hanoi. If there was any reference to psychological considerations, they came from former President Eisenhower who did not think that air strikes against the North could prevent the North Vietnamese from infiltrating men and supplies in to the South, but who seemed to feel that they would help South Vietnamese morale.

There is no mention that U.S. Information Agency directors attempted to present the case for psychological operations. Yet, there was a case to be made. It is possible that it should have been overruled for compelling military and political reasons, and probable that it would have been overruled, but it had sufficient merits to be taken into consideration.

First, we had, at least theoretically, an excellent opportunity to demoralize North Vietnamese troops fighting in South Vietnam. They had had a very hard time getting to South Vietnam. Presumably, many of them were tired and ill. They were cut off from their families, not even permitted to write home or receive letters, and their lines of resupply were tenuous. They had been told that they would fight imperialist American aggressors but there were not many Americans in Vietnam in the Spring and Summer of 1965, and they found themselves fighting other Vietnamese. Many of them may not have understood why. They were, in sum, tailor-made targets for PSYWAR, the operator's wishdream.

Bombing North Vietnam changed that. Suddenly all North Vietnamese soldiers in South Vietnam had a reason to fight, a reason any one of them could understand. The Americans were threatening the lives, limbs, and homes of their families. Fathers, husbands, brothers, sons began to have a personal stake in the war.

Second, the air strikes put an end to any hopes to divide the people of North Vietnam at home. It is axiomatic that there is no such thing as a permanently united nation. Even the most fanatic totalitarian governments face a domestic opposition—voiceless, it is true, but opposition nevertheless. We might have strengthened that opposition by making people question the wisdom of Hanoi's warring in South Vietnam—the casualties, the draft, the cost, the sacrifices, the austerity. But it is also axiomatic that bombing attacks make people rally behind their government whether they like it or not. There is nowhere else to look for leadership and protection. The British were never as united as they were behind Winston Churchill while German bombers, buzzbombs, and rockets threatened their lives. Yet only a few months after the threat had ended, they repudiated the man who had united them. They returned to "normalcy," division, and opposition. It is interesting to note that the termination of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam immediately created problems for Hanoi. French and Canadian reporters related them: black-marketeering, indifference of youth, goldbricking, a

slackening of disciplined production. Hanoi was forced, time and again, to remind the people that the war was still on and that they had duties.

Nobody can say whether we would have succeeded in demoralizing North Vietnamese troops or in driving wedges between the people and the government of North Vietnam; the point is that there was a chance to do so, that this chance might have weakened Hanoi significantly, and that the bombing of North Vietnam deprived us of that chance. It follows that the case should at least have been given a hearing. We had no such hearing in Casablanca, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, or when the decision to bomb North Vietnam was made. This must change if the enormous capabilities of PSYWAR are to come into their own.

NOTES

1. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1950), p. 696.

2. Lyndon B. Johnson, *Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 124 ff.*

SIHANOUK'S APPEAL TO THE MONKS OF CAMBODIA*

By the 7TH PSYOP GROUP

Because the success of PSYOP depends heavily on the receptivity of the target audience, a good sense of timing and skill in exploiting an opportunity become important elements in the delivery of a message or appeal.

Peking NCNA International carried a message from Prince Norodom Sihanouk to the Khmer Buddhist monks on September 17th. In his message [one of four] he asked the monks of Cambodia to join him in his struggle to regain his throne.

The gist of his message was designed to impress upon the Buddhist monks their duty to stand on the side of the city poor, the exploited workers, and the peasants rather than with people who "have sold the country to U.S. neo-colonialism." In this regard, he felt that the Lon Nol group did not deserve support from monks because of the manner in which it took over the reigns of government.

> In order to oppose this neo-colonialist undertaking of the Americans, [Sihanouk continued,] it is necessary for the people of Asia to reconcile with one another, unite and fight together, regardless of their beliefs and ideology. It is absolutely wrong to distinguish believers from atheists, non-Communist from Communist. For the safety, freedom and independence of our Asian countries, it is necessary for us to create a union and solidarity among all the Asians determined to fight for an Asia free from imperialism and neo-colonialism. It is necessary for us to expose the renegades in Asia and to fight against those who, prompted by ambitions and personal interests, serve the unjustifiable cause of U.S. imperialism.

In the next portion of Sihanouk's message he points out five cases in which people with seemingly good paying jobs and happy families have

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*Excerpted and adapted from "Sihanouk's Appeal to the Monks of Cambodia," "Communist Propaganda Highlights: Trends and Analysis," Issue No. 41–70 (9 October 1970), pp. 41-4—41-9.

left their jobs and family to join him. According to Sihanouk these people now have only very modest pay but feel they are working for a good cause. "In one case," Sihanouk said, "those students living abroad who agree to support Lon Nol have received big rewards (some have even been given 300 U.S. dollars each). In Europe, the student members of the National United Front of Kampuchea (NUFK) remain poor. They lack money, and sometimes they have only one meal a day."

> Let our monks and Samdech, head of the sect, take pains to ask themselves why all these young and old patriots agree to such sacrifices and such hardships. Let them ask themselves why our citizens of the provinces, young and old, men and women, yesterday in hundreds and today in thousands, agree spontaneously to leave their houses, rice fields, farmland, livestock and carts, etc., in order to join the people's heroes Khieu Samphan Hu Nim, and Hou Youn in the jungle.
>
> * * * * *
>
> In this regard, I would like to state precisely for our Buddhist monks that first, the said Communist states of Eastern Europe have not given their official recognition to the Lon Nol government which was born of the coup of last 18 Mar; secondly, some of these very European Communist states have recognized officially, while others admitted publicly, that Nordom Sihanouk remains the legal head of state of Cambodia; thirdly, the political parties, the people's fronts, and the people of these very countries have officially given their recognition to the NUFK as the only representative of the Khmer people and have time and again and most expressly affirmed their support to our people and their NUFK in our struggle against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys and for national salvation and the liberation of the Khmer motherland; fourthly, the refusal by certain European Communist governments to recognize the RGNUK by no means signifies that they support or like the regime of Lon Nol.
>
> This refusal might be explained by certain interests of their own of these governments. This should lead our Buddhist monks to think over the policies, attitudes, maneuvers, and actions of certain powers in Asia which seem unwilling to see the Asians become complete masters of the destinies of their Asia and of their Asian countries.
>
> * * * * *
>
> Therefore, [said Sihanouk in closing,] if our Buddhist monks and Samdech, head of the sect, like our nation, agree to look these realities straight in the face, I am sure that they will not fail to march on the just roads towards a future which would not be in contradiction to the national ideals of pure patriotism, peoples democracy and genuine freedom.

Comment: Sihanouk broadcast his speeches at a time when the people were about to observe their oldest and most significant Buddhist ceremony, the Festival of the Dead. Offerings of food and garments are made to the monks during the first 15 days of the tenth lunar month. The reasoning behind the broadcast of the speeches at this time is that the monks have a great deal of influence on the people and many of them probably have not lost all loyalty to Sihanouk. He knows that if he can possibly get the support of the monks at this time, he would also keep the support of a large majority of the people.

The four speeches, employing kaleidoscopic verbosity, suggest that the people come back to the pure and simple life. He appears to be trying to sway the Khmer by explaining that others in seemingly good paying jobs have given up everything to support him, hoping that the monks and their followers might heed the advice and actions of these people and join him. Sihanouk would like the Khmer to think if they do not join him they will be dishonoring the Kingdom of Cambodia and the sacred Buddha.

There are several points of view about Sihanouk and the Buddhists. Some say the Buddhist clergy no longer are charmed by Sihanouk and thus would be unlikely to try to persuade their followers. Others believe that Sihanouk still has a pretty strong hold on the Buddhist clergy and, through them, on the people.

THE FAMOUS "MIG" LEAFLET*

By Carl Berger

Subsequent results of messages will not always be predictable; it is therefore incumbent upon the communicator to scrutinize messages carefully and attempt to detect the potential for unintended effects, both positive and negative.

Occasionally, a special leaflet operation will produce important side effects. This was the case with the special offer made by the U.N. Command in April and May 1953, an offer of $50,000 to any Communist pilot who would deliver a MIG jet fighter or other modern Soviet jet to the United Nations forces in Korea. An additional bonus of $50,000 was promised the first pilot to bring in a plane.

The offer was disseminated by airdrops of special leaflets written in Korean, Chinese, and Russian. In addition, the offer was carried in these languages over the U.N. radio network. Both the leaflet and radio media gave detailed flight plans whereby Communist pilots could bring in planes safely under escort by U.N. fighters.

Not until several weeks after the July 1953 Armistice in Korea, did a North Korean jet pilot zoom out of the skies, land at Kimpo airfield near Seoul, and ask for political asylum. The pilot said he had never heard of the jet offer, but since American truthfulness was at stake, the U.S. Air Force paid the pilot the $100,000 reward and the offer was withdrawn. But this was not the whole story. General Mark Clark, U.N. Commander, later reported that the Air Force not only got its $100,000 worth in information from tests on the Russian jet, but the operation had had important military side effects.

According to Clark, the Communists' first reaction to the offer

> was to ground all MIGs for eight days. It might have been because of the weather, or because they wanted time to screen out the politically unreliable pilots. Most likely, it was the latter. An eight-day break in MIG operations in Korea was most unusual. ... For whatever reason, the Communist MIG pilots who were permitted to fly after the offer was made were the worst—on their record— of the whole Korean War. They flew far fewer missions in those last ninety days than in the preceding three months, but American Sabrejet pilots shot down twice as many planes. In fact, the Sabres destroyed 165 MIGs against three friendly combat losses—a record ratio of 55 to one.[1]

Conceding that the pilots knew of the offer—and Communist reactions appear to grant that point—here was an instance of a measurably successful psychological operation.

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*Excerpts from *An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets*, Documentary Study No. 1, The American University, Special Operations Research Office, Washington, D.C., 1959, AD 220 821, pp. 74–76.

Since 1953 this type of leaflet operation has been used by the Chinese Nationalists, who have dropped leaflets over the Communist mainland, offering Red pilots who defected to Taiwan with MIG planes from 1,000 to 4,000 ounces of gold, depending on the model plane they brought in. As far as is known, no Chinese Communist pilots have taken advantage of the offer. The Nationalists also have scattered leaflets offering Chinese Communist naval personnel up to 100,000 ounces of gold ($3,500,000) if they brought in a light cruiser.

NOTES

1. Mark Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York: 1954), pp. 205–207.

PRETESTING THE PRODUCT*

By Wilbur Schramm

Pretesting the content of propaganda messages to assess in advance their potential impact on an audience will increase the chances of their being effective.

The problem in all types of psywar operations is to predict or estimate the effect of a psywar operation without being able to measure freely the actual responses of the target audience.

There are, in general, three ways to evaluate the effect of a psywar product in this difficult situation. Admittedly each one is only an approximation. None of them is as satisfactory as an uninhibited study of the target audience itself would be. Yet an evaluation of what psywar is accomplishing is so enormously important to planning and practice that any psywar operation stands to gain tremendously from whatever it can learn from these methods.

EXPERTS

The simplest of these methods is the *jury of experts*. These should be persons who are thoroughly acquainted with the target country, its culture, and its people. They should preferably have lived in the target country for a long time and should have left it only very recently. Ideally they should be natives of the target country. Their absolute loyalty to the country that wants to use them as jury members must, however, be beyond question.

The procedure is for this jury to be asked to read or listen to the psywar material being directed at the target in question and predict what its effect will be within the target. Will it attract attention? Will it be understood? What reaction will it produce? Will it be accepted and believed? Will it change any minds or lead anyone to take the action desired? How could it be made more effective?

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*Excerpts from *The Nature of Psychological Warfare*, Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, Md., September 1953.

The jury, of course, can be asked to *pretest* as well as to posttest the psywar output. That is, a leaflet designed for the target can be shown to the jury *before* it has been disseminated, and the criticisms and predictions of the experts can be used either in revising it or in deciding when and where to disseminate it. This is also possible, though less convenient, in the case of radio broadcasts.

The report of the jury will be valid only to the extent that the jury is truly expert, that is, to the extent to which it can put itself in the place of the target audience and anticipate the processes by which the audience will respond to the psywar material.

SAMPLE OF PERSONS

A second method of evaluation is the use of a *sample of persons as similar as possible to the target audience.* These can be refugees, defectors, POWs, or other natives available to the psywar planners. Continuous effort should be made to match the sample as closely as possible to the actual target audience. For example, if there is any reason to think that different groups within the target might react in different ways to the propaganda, then representatives of each of these groups should be included in the sample. Thus if three-fifths of the target population is illiterate, a sizable proportion (ideally, three-fifths) of the sample should be illiterate, so that their reactions will be reflected more prominently in the results than the reactions of literates. If there is a powerful trade union group in the target, with opinions and probable reactions of their own, then trade unionists should be represented in some such proportion in the sample.

Ideally, then, the sample should be a perfect miniature of the target audience. The picture as regards sex distribution, age distribution, geographical distribution, occupation distribution, economic status, educational levels, political viewpoints, and the like, should be the same as within the target. Practically, this is very hard if not impossible to achieve. It is considerably harder to put together a reliable miniature sample than to put together a panel of experts, for the miniature sample is only as good as it is really representative.

But if a representative sample can be obtained, then very useful results can be expected. The procedure is simply to expose the panel to the psywar material, and find out, from responses to before-and-after questions, what happens to the readers or listeners. Did they read or listen to all of it? What did they think of it? Did they understand it? Did they change any opinions as a reulst of it? What made them believe it, or kept them from believing it?

There are some real dangers involved in both methods, even when the experts using them are really expert and the sample is really representative. One of these dangers is that the members of the jury or the sample may give the opinions they think the questioner wants to hear. This is especially likely when the respondents are impoverished and insecure (for

example, refugees, defectors, and prisoners highly dependent on the income or preferment promised them for their cooperation and perhaps reluctant to criticize the questioners' propaganda unfavorably). It is still more likely when prisoners of war are used for the jury or the sample, since they may give deliberately false answers in the hope of making the propaganda ineffective. The evaluators must therefore investigate potential jury or sample members as carefully as possible before retaining them. Subsequently, these members must be tested from time to time with, for example, deliberately planted propaganda that is known to be poor or to differ in some important way from the material previously given, so as to find out whether their answers change with the changing material.

ENEMY SOURCES

The third kind of evaluation consists of a number of techniques, all of which in one way or other belong under the rubric of *intelligence*. The psywar unit should use every available avenue of intelligence in its attempt to find out about the effects of its propaganda on the target. Here are some of the ways in which intelligence sources can be used: [See Chapter VII of this casebook.]

Undercover Agents. These can be used as participant observers to report on the way psywar material is being received in their areas, and on the effects it produces. This is perhaps the most reliable single device; the agent can discuss the psywar with members of the target audience, listen in on conversations about it, and observe any actions that appear to result from it. All this calls, of course, both for an able agent and a good channel through which he can report.

Prisoners of War. These can be interviewed soon after capture. They can be asked what psywar material has come to their attention, what their own reactions are to it, what are the reactions of their fellow soldiers and superior officers, and what is the general state of opinion and morale in their military units.

Routine Intelligence. News, intercepted letters, captured documents, statistical reports, and information from defectors and other persons interviewed can and should be screened for information bearing upon the effectiveness of our psywar.

The Enemy's Actions. These often tell us something about the effects of our psywar messages. For example, variations in the number of surrenders are often revealing. So are the enemy's countermeasures. His counterpropaganda, monitored and analyzed, sometimes tells us which of our campaigns are proving especially bothersome. In the case of broadcasting, the programs he jams may tell us what we are accomplishing with what messages.

No psywar unit will rely on any one of these methods exclusively. Not to use all possible evaluative information out of available intelligence is inexcusable. Any operation will be able, without too much trouble, to set

up a small jury of expert observers; a representative sample is not beyond the resources of most field operations. But the information obtained from any one of these methods ought to be checked against what comes from the others; for example, what the jury says about a leaflet ought to be checked as often as possible with POWs who are being interviewed, and also with the information that comes out of the target country. When the judgments from the various methods tally, the presumption in favor of their validity is greatly increased.

EXPLOITATION OF CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION

Use of different media forms to simplify the flow of messages and appeals from communicator to target is discussed in the papers in this section. The psyoperator's choice of media will depend on the size and distribution of the target and the cultural ways of the audience. In some cases the audiences for the same message will be diverse, yet circumstances may preclude tailoring the message to individual groups within the larger audience. The use of visual communications in the Nigerian civil war is an example of such a situation.

The third essay points out that media choice should also depend on the control authorities may have over the means of communication. This is a special consideration, particularly when developing propaganda campaigns for totalitarian societies. "News Broadcasting on Soviet Radio and Television" indicates the specific place radio and television broadcasting have in Soviet agitation and propaganda.

Leaflets, magazines, and wall posters are three widely used channels of communicating propaganda messages and appeals through printed matter. Technical matters such as the attention-getting features of magazine content, particularly when geared to intellectual groups, are of major importance. The wall poster, as illustrated in "Tatzepao: Medium of Conflict in China's Cultural Revolution'," one form of mass media which does not depend on a high degree of literacy and availability of receivers, is one of the most dramatic means of communicating political ideas.

Accessibility of the target to the psyoperator's messages and appeals has been a serious problem in PSYOP campaigns. Some unusual techniques include the use of loudspeakers in broadcasting appeals from captured enemies, the use of postage stamps, and the use of cannon and balloons. The Vietnam experience in the development of aircraft as a PSYOP medium is reviewed in "Psychological Operations and Air Power: Its Hits and Misses."

Culturally designed techniques of communicating political ideas have been used extensively in Southeast Asia. Theater is not widely used as a propaganda device in the Western world, but in some cultures where the tradition is strong, drama teams, as political communications, may be one of the most important means of reaching a largely illiterate rural population if the messages are congenial to audience predispositions. Similarly, the North Vietnamese government uses songs to generate greater loyalty among its citizens.

The symbolic act may be referred to as a form of nonverbal communication. The authors of "Symbolic Acts as Psyop" see the importance of the symbolic in the meaning that it conveys to the target group and not in the physical impact that may result from it.

The use of individuals as channels for communicating messages and appeals is taken up in the last two essays of this section. "The Older Vietnamese as a Communicant" ascribes to aged individuals in Vietnamese society the role of disseminating ideas. In "An Unknown Warrior," the use of ralliers or returnees as a medium for reaching guerrillas and their families is discussed.

Many of these essays focus on a single incident or technique. In the final essay of this section, Morris Davis indicates the diverse communication interaction taking place simultaneously in the course of a civil conflict.

COMMUNICATION AND THE USE OF MASS MEDIA*

By John Dennis Lanigan

Making it easy for the target audience to receive a propaganda message or appeal will depend in large part on the communicator's choice of media.

No matter how primitive or oppressed a society is, there will normally be more communication presented to it than can possibly be received by everyone. We can only listen to one radio station at a time and can only read so much material in a day. . . . Hence, communicators (propagandists, of course included) should attempt to make it easy and beneficial for a target audience to "tune in." That is, they want to decrease the effort required to receive a message and increase the expectation of reward that will accrue from having received it. [Although] the problem of increasing the expectation of reward is primarily one of message content, . . . decreasing the effort required to receive a message is highly dependent on the media used to propagate it. . . . For this reason, we shall discuss the types of mass media in some detail.

THE MASS MEDIA

Numerous studies have been conducted to test the effects of the various forms of mass media on the understanding and retentive capabilities of a target audience. Such studies and experiments should be interpreted carefully. Laboratory tests may suggest that television is the most effective means of electronic communication. However, this result would prove to be virtually meaningless if the "real world" audience with which we wished to communicate had different characteristics than the "test" audience; or, in the extreme, if there was only one television set per

*Excerpts from "A Media Allocation Model for Psychological Operations," M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterrey, California, June 1968. AD 841104. Reprinted with the permission of the author.

million people in the "real world" audience. The point to be made is that laboratory results do not necessarily reflect "real world" happenings. There is no hard and fast set of rules to govern choice of media. The attributes and drawbacks of the various forms of mass media will take on different values for different target audiences. For instance, depth of treatment is considered to be one of the attributes of print, but this "attribute" would be of minimal import if the target audience was illiterate. Hence, the general considerations of each form of mass media discussed below should be interpreted liberally.

FACE-TO-FACE DISCOURSE

Almost all studies on the subject of advertising or psychological operations are in agreement that face-to-face discourse is the most effective individual instrument of persuasion. The following psychological advantages are considered to be the primary reasons for its success:

1. It is more casually engaged in and will often attract an audience that would not trouble itself to receive the same information by other forms of mass communication.
2. The perpetrator of face-to-face discourse can mold his manner of presentation to suit a particular target audience. In this way, he can largely reduce resistance to his message.
3. By expressions of pleasure or displeasure, the target audience can be rewarded or punished for their reaction.
4. The source of face-to-face discourse may be a trusted or intimate friend of the target audience from whom information is believable; e.g., a clergyman.
5. It is sometimes possible to accomplish objectives without first instilling conviction. For instance, if the leader of a local young men's organization tells its members to sign up for service in the militia, some may join just to keep from discrediting themselves in the eyes of their leader.

We recognize that there are many cases when face-to-face discourse is not a practical method of communicating with a target audience. It would hardly be worthwhile for the United States to try to infiltrate men behind the "Iron Curtain" or into Communist China to start a program of face-to-face confrontations on the evils of communism and benefits of "free world" life. The costs would be great and the gains comparatively small. The Nationalist Chinese have on occasion attempted to infiltrate men into the mainland of China to instigate dissatisfaction in the populace. In every recorded case they have been captured almost immediately upon entering the country.[23] (We pre-suppose that the people of Communist China are more afraid of the consequences of not reporting an intruder than they are willing to chance a possibility of bettering their way of life; that is, the expectation of reward is negligible as compared to the effort required.)

Face-to-face discourse may also be considered to include the spectrum of discussions that take place daily throughout the world. Tests have

shown that casual conversations, as differentiated from formal addresses, are potentially more influential than any form of formal communication.[23] For this reason, the proponents of a propaganda campaign should be careful not to alienate any major fraction of the target audience, for the initial harm done could be greatly magnified through dissemination of discontent from that portion of the target audience alienated.

RADIO

In the recent past, radio proved to be an efficient means of mass communication to various target audiences. In the field of psychological operations, Radio Free Europe and The Voice of America have been broadcasting for years in an effort to "educate" peoples of the Communist world. The advantages of radio include: [2]

1. The number of people that can be reached at one time is usually large.
2. The propagandist can gain a nation-wide audience by using networks or by increasing the power of this transmitter. He can also pinpoint a specific target audience by properly establishing a low-power transmitter.
3. Audience selectively can also be gained by scheduling at different times and by use of different types of radio programs.
4. It has a special persuasive quality as a companion, a friend, and a prime source of information for the listener.

When we consider the use of radio in communicating with a target audience we should not only be concerned with the present density of radios within the population. We should also project the costs and benefits that would accrue if we were to distribute radios to members of the population. In some cases it may be more cost-effective to give ten or twenty radios to every village within a country than it would be to attempt to communicate with the people by any other means. Of course, if we are considering giving away radios we must also consider that our intended audience may, in fact, use the radios to tune in on our enemies.

PRINT

The printed word, whether it be in the form of newspapers, magazines, leaflets, or any other form, has distinct advantages over the other types of media. The primary ones are: [23]

1. The reader is able to pace himself as he desires. He can ponder over important points and skip those that hold no interest for him.
2. Printed matter remains available for the reader to peruse for months or even years after the initial reading.
3. Difficult or complex topics can be treated in depth for the reasons given in (1) and (2) above.
4. It is possible to specialize appeals by utilizing the knowledge that certain people read particular types of magazines or sections of the newspaper.

5. Print may have greater prestige than the other forms of mass media. This is attributed to the fact that it is one of the oldest of the mass media and that print and "culture" have been traditionally associated.

A recent radio advertisement stated, "Montaigne once wrote, 'What do we do about those people who will not believe anything unless they see it in print?' " The advertisment went on to give the answer, "Print it, of course." As one might guess the advertisement was for a printing and lithographic company. However, it is probably true that some of these people who will not believe anything unless they see it in writing, will believe anything that is written.

When planning the use of print, we must take into account the literacy of the target audience. (The fact that a certain audience may be illiterate may not negate the use of print but it will certainly affect the amount of pictorial or symbolic material required.) We also need to consider the ease of dissemination. If we control the press it will certainly be much easier to reach the people than if we have to rely on covert publications or leaflet drops.

SCREEN

When we consider the use of screen, television or movies we are implicitly assuming that our audience is indigenous to a contry in which we have some degree of control. The present state of the art in television is such that signals cannot be projected satisfactorily over great distances without a purposeful receiving station in the proximity of the target audience. Further, a television signal is considerably easier to "jam" and the prevalence of television sets in the areas of the world that are of major concern in our propaganda efforts is low. Likewise, there is little opportunity to show movies favorable to the "free world" in such countries as Cuba, Russia or Communist China. Hence, the benefits that we ascribe to the screen are greatly diluted by the opportunity for its use. The benefits are: [2]

1. Concrete visual material is presented.
2. Recall of what has been seen is generally excellent.
3. Children are particularly impressed by what they see.

INTERACTIONS AMONG MASS MEDIA

Almost every propaganda campaign will include the use of more than one type of media to communicate with the target audience. If the target audience receives the same message by more than one medium, his belief in what he is receiving will normally be fortified. However, if different messages relating to the same incident or different interpretations on a particular propaganda theme are received via two different media, then, the target audience becomes confused, probably believes neither message, and loses some faith in both media. Credibility is hard to establish initially, but virtually impossible to re-establish once it is lost; hence, a cardinal rule for the use of mass media is to be consistent in all communication.

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VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR*

BY MORRIS DAVIS

Pictures may well be "worth a thousand words" in impact, but they are not necessarily an objective source of information.

Like Vietnam, the Nigerian-Biafran War involved not only men and material and words, but widely disseminated visual representations. It was a television war, a picture-magazine war, a newspaper-photographs war. Nigerian officials never really understood this sector of communications. When (to demonstrate their quick justice) they executed before the cameras the Nigerian officer who had a short time earlier (to show his serious intent) executed before the camera a captured Biafran, all they accomplished for most viewers was the piling of one revulsion upon another. The Biafrans, too, did not fully appreciate the graphic media. They rarely disseminated pictures, either directly or through the Bernhardt agency [see Chapter IV of this casebook]. Nor did they carry through with Robert Goldstein's plans for a full-length color film. But they really did not have to accomplish any of this for themselves. The sole necessity was that photographers and cameramen be let in; and that Biafra quickly learned to do.

In visual reporting, Nigeria could not win and Biafra could not lose. Pictures of nice Nigerian soldiers feeding and playing with smiling children in recaptured areas of the East looked phony and staged, no matter how frequent and genuine such conciliatory practices may have been. Pictures of malnourished, pain-wracked, half-dead Biafran children were instantaneously moving and plausible. Some of the imbalance in photo-coverage, to be sure, was due to Nigerian failures to cooperate with visiting crews. (The C.B.S. program "60 Minutes" struggled manfully in order to present a balanced report from both Biafra and Nigeria.) But even if Nigeria had been more adept and open-armed, its Biafran opposition would still have garnered most of the favorable visual reporting.

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*Excerpts from "The Structuring of International Communications about the Nigeria-Biafra War," a paper prepared for delivery at the Eighth European Conference, Peace Research Society (International), London School of Economics, August 20, 1971. Reprinted with the permission of The Peace Research Society (International), copyright holder, and the courtesy of the author.

Television presentations were often compelling enough to stir other significant actors to important decisions. An ITN telecast viewed by an Oxfam staff member was apparently a major contributory factor in that organization's precipitous mounting of a large relief campaign. (Oxfam, incidentally, found to its surprise that Biafran officials in London could provide it with no pictures at all of starving children—the only photographs they had were of the 1966 massacres—and it had to rely on friends in the popular press for the picture which, in a cropped form, it featured in its publicity materials.) Similarly, a New York television appearance by Abie Nathan in late 1968 was seen by a member of . . . [a U.S. Senator's] staff and was responsible for a chain of conversations which awoke the Senator to the importance of the war and convinced him to visit the area early next year. Quite obviously, the mass media did not communicate just with the masses.

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MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION AND PROPAGANDA*

By B. S. Murty

The choice of means to communicate a message or appeal across national boundaries will often depend on the control the communicator has over these means.

The medium employed indicates the speed and reach of the communication and the expectations likely to be formed about its impact on the audience. The following are the most common media of communication employed by the strategists:

HUMAN BEINGS

. . . .Travelers, traders, students, scholars, agents of political parties, people working in secret intelligence services, public information agencies of governments, all serve the function of channels of dissemination and /or intelligence. The extent to which each of these classes of persons functions, and their efficacy, indeed vary. [There are] advantages that strategists may derive by organizing or disintegrating groups, and by controlling intragroup communication processes.

. . . The elite which vigorously employs the ideological strategy generally takes to organization of strictly disciplined groups in its own state and in the opposing states. It also builds transnational political parties and tries to infiltrate men into other groups, either to disintegrate or gain control over them.[1]

MAILS

In addition to written and printed materials transmitted through the mails, postal markings and stamps may be used to disseminate prop-

*Excerpts from *Propaganda and World Public Order*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1968. Reprinted with the permission of Yale University Press, copyright holder.

aganda symbols.[2] As a means of transnational communication the potentiality of mails is limited, for the territorial authority may censor, refuse to transmit, or confiscate the mails if anything is found in or on them prejudicial to its interests.

Censorship of mail serves another purpose also, and that is to learn some secret information which the opponent is suppressing. Especially during war, censoring of mail may yield considerable useful information regarding the enemy.[3]

PRINTED MATERIALS

These constitute a very important medium of communication. When used as a means of transnational communication, the effectiveness of the medium can be minimized by the government of the territory to which the materials are despatched by adopting measures such as seizure at the customs posts.[4] If the opposing elite tightens the frontier controls, printed materials may be transmitted by air-dropping, shooting leaflet-shells, and dropping by means of plastic balloons.[5]

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Under this head may be included telegraph, telephone, and wireless communications transmitted either in Morse code, or by teleprinter, or in the form of multidirectional radio communications.[6] Although these channels provide very rapid means of transmission of intelligence to processing centers and the processed materials to centers of dissemination, the extent to which strategists could use them in ideological strategy is limited by one factor: the government of the territory in which the transmission or reception points are located may exercise a high degree of control, weeding out anything likely to prejudice the government's interests.

RADIO BROADCASTING

This is by far the most effective means of mass communication available now to reach instantaneously audiences practically all over the world, and is believed to be the most efficacious means of transnational communication. The government that does not make use of this medium is exceptional. The Soviet Union initiated its use for transnational propaganda and all the leading states have, since the 1930s, copied its example.[7]

The government of the state to which transmission is made may, however, attempt to prevent its people from listening to the broadcasts by prohibiting listening to foreign broadcasts, jamming the radio waves, and denying to the people radio sets capable of receiving foreign broadcasts. Limiting reception to transmission by wire is another device. It was reported in 1951 that in the Soviet Union 18 percent of the receiving sets were capable of direct reception and the rest were useful only for reception by wire.[8] In addition, the Soviet Union's jamming operations were at one time employed on a colossal scale.[9] However, restrictive

measures such as these to prevent listening to foreign broadcasts may rouse the curiosity of the audience and induce them to adopt a good number of devious methods to circumvent the measures.

TELEVISION

Television may, for all practical purposes, be included in the category of radio broadcasting. It supplies additionally the advantage of combining visual image with aural communication.[10] The advent of the communication satellites has tremendously increased the reach of television broadcasting.

MOVIES

Movies are a very effective medium of mass communication. But they can be used in an opposing state only within the limits permitted by its government.

It is not possible to say categorically that one medium of communication is more effective than another. Each has its merits and shortcomings. There is little doubt, however, that the most effective means of influencing the audience are communication by mass media followed by face-to-face contact by human agents.[11]

* * * * *

NOTES

1. See generally, Sington and Weidenfeld.

2. For instances, see *New York Times*, March 27, 1957; the Crusade for Freedom postmarks were placed on mails transmitted from the U.S.A. to Hungary and stopped by the Hungarian government. For controversy between the governments of India and Pakistan over similar use of postal markings by Pakistan, see *6 Foreign Affairs Record 86* (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Extern Publicity Division, 1960). See also in this connection the editorial in the *New York Times*, April 19, 1962, on Communist propaganda through mails.

3. See Koop, p. 5 et seq.

4. In September 1963, Soviet officials searched 92 Chinese passengers, army officers proceeding to the U.S.S.R. for training, at the railway station at Zabaikalski; when they refused to surrender some newspapers and printed materials alleged to be anti-Soviet, they were not permitted to proceed further and were sent back. See *New York Times*, Sept. 14, 1963.

5. For a description of the operations of leaflet drops by plastic balloons, see *New York Times*, February 11, 1956; balloons were used as early as 1871 (Whitton and Larson, p. 24).

6. For a description of the various means by which telecommunications are currently used to transmit news, see F. Williams, *Transmitting World News, A Study of Telecommunications and the Press* (Paris: UNESCO, 1953).

7. The Voice of America, in 1956, broadcast in 43 languages to Europe, Latin America, the Near East, South Asia, Africa, and the Far East; see Martin, p. 28. The B.B.C., by 1946, was broadcasting on 31 transmitters, in 46 languages, for 616 hours weekly; ibid. p. 38. In regard to the U.S.S.R., see ibid. p. 47; Whitton and Larson, p. 50; regarding Communist China, see Houn, pp. 156-58.

8. Inkeles, p. 238; also see H. N. Graves, Jr., *War on the Short-Wave*, Foreign Policy Headline Series No. 30 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1941), p. 52. The author says that the Nazis introduced a receiving set called the "People's Set" which was incapable of receiving foreign transmissions. In 1938, only about one third of the sets in Germany were capable of receiving foreign transmissions. After the war broke out, listening to

foreign broadcasts was banned. See also Sington and Weidenfeld, p. 145. In Japan, from 1933, possession of short-wave sets was banned and penalties were provided for listening to foreign broadcasts. In occupied territories, as for example in Burma, the receiving sets of the people were remodeled. See Peter de Mendelssohn, *Japan's Political Warfare* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1944), p. 33; Communist China uses extensively wire-transmission (Houn, pp. 162-66).

9. For details of the transmitters used for jamming when the cold war was intensifying, see 21 *Dept. of State Bull.* 312 (1949); also, the speech of the U.S. representative before the U.N. General Assembly (G.A.O.R., Fifth Sess., 3rd Committee, 1950, p. 279). However, in recent years there has been a progressive decrease in jamming operations. President Kennedy reported at a press conference on October 10, 1963, that for many months the Voice of America broadcasts had not been jammed by the Soviet Union. See *The Hindu*, Oct. 11, 1963.

10. It is said that at present, apart from the United States, 82 nations have television broadcasting. There are about 56 million receiving sets and 996 broadcasting stations outside the United States. In the United States there are over 500 TV broadcasting stations. See Gordon, Falk, and Hodapp, pp. 137-38.

11. For detailed information see J. T. Klapper, "The Comparative Effects of the Various Media," W. Schramm, ed., *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication*, pp. 104-05, and the editorial note, p. 91 et seq. Four factors, it is said, are relevant in this context: (1) *time-space* (i. e. whether the communicator has control over the material to be communicated and when to introduce it); (2) *participation* (by the audience in the communication process); (3) *speed*; and (4) *permanence*. Printed material has the advantage of fairly good time-space control and of permanence, but is not useful if the audience cannot read, and is slower than radio broadcasting. In favor of radio broadcasting are factors 2 and 3, but not 1 and 4. Human agents have in their favor factors 1 and 2.

NONGOVERNMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR*

By Morris Davis

A discussion of the multiplicity of communication channels in an internationalized "domestic" crisis.

To describe accurately and clearly so complex a quasi-system as that of the [unofficial] international communications about the Nigerian-Biafran War involves difficulties not unlike Joyce's attempt to convey the boredom of church sermons in his *Portrait of an Artist* without at the same time boring the reader. Phenomena and their descriptions are, to be sure, separate in theory, but their separation is in practice still quite difficult to achieve. In the comments below we shall try to describe facts usefully and yet not impose more of a "system" on activities than they reasonably bear.

* * * * *

*Excerpts from "The Structuring of International Communications about the Nigeria-Biafra War," a paper prepared for delivery at the Eighth European Conference, Peace Research Society (International), London School of Economics, August 20, 1971, pp. 1–12. Reprinted with the permission of The Peace Research Society (International), copyright holder and the courtesty of the author.

STUDENTS ABROAD

Many Nigerians and Biafrans—particularly students—lived away from their homeland during the war. Often they kept in touch with their government's local officials and would receive various propaganda material. For at least two interconnected reasons, however, they were rarely crucial communicators in their country of domicile. On the one hand, the withdrawal of Ibo leaders left most overseas Nigerian organizations without sophisticated and experienced direction. On the other hand, students loyal to Biafra were politically inhibited by the fact that continued residence under a Nigerian passport was somewhat a matter of sufferance.

The extent of the inactivity should not be exaggerated. Nigerian students from the Rivers State, for example, managed to form a cause group in Britian that attracted considerable notice; and they received material encouragement from the High Commissioner and his public relations advisers. Some members of the Biafra Union were similarly willing to be demonstration fodder at Trafalgar Square rallies, at Whitehall burnings in effigy, and at Shell petition marches. In general, though, the fairly dense network of Nigerian and Biafran organizations abroad strove after mutual support and good fellowship. Their members were better at running dances in St. Pancras than lobbying or pamphleteering. They were bound to be ineffective communicators anyway, since—as foreigners—their interventions in domestic politics would tend to be either resented or ignored. They were really nobody's constituents; and their communications influence has surely been much overstated.

FOREIGN PRESSURE GROUPS

Indigenous pressure groups were politically better situated to communicate in their own countries about the Nigerian-Biafran War. This fact, reinforced perhaps by Ibo clannishness, helps explain why the "Biafra lobby" in Britain (to use that country as an example) was so lily-white. Of those groups which arose solely because of the Gowon-Ojukwu* struggle, only the Friends of Biafra, a relatively minor organization, had a sizeable African component. The others—the Britain-Biafra Association, Save Biafra Committee, Biafra '69, an unnamed association of ex-colonial officials, and even the rather tardily arranged and short-lived Coordinating Committee for Action on Nigeria/Biafra—were almost entirely Caucasian. An occasional foreigner, from Israel perhaps or from the United States or Germany, participated prominently, just as a person from Britain might play an important role in a counterpart American group; but the overwhelming impression is that the Biafra lobby exemplified typical British cause group development.

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*Nigerian Prime Minister, Lt. Gen. Yakubu Gowon and Biafran Chief of State C. Odumegwu Ojukwu.

With rare exceptions, all persons who mattered in the Biafra lobby had had a previous material connection with Nigeria, often an extended period of residence or travel in the former Eastern Region. Their experience made it easier for them to champion Biafra authoritatively; but it also made them less susceptible to outside control or direction. They were certainly not tools of the Biafran government or its London office. Biafra did not arrange for the pressure groups to be established nor did it intervene in their policies or funding. Indeed, the groups were usually shoe-string affairs; and what little monetary flow there was moved in the other direction, small sums occasionally being raised for Biafran humanitarian or political purposes. Individual lobby members did not lack informative ties to the Biafran government—they were in frequent contact with Biafra House, sometimes met visiting Biafran officials, and on rare occasions even made brief sorties into the enclave—but it was generally they and not Biafran officialdom who initiated and shaped the interactions.

The multiplicity of Biafra lobby organizations in Britain reflects disorganized competitiveness as well as yeasty enthusiasm. Their variability, however, also permitted a useful division of labor. The ex-colonial officials, for example, utilized long-standing relationships with persons in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, prepared lengthy and reasoned position papers, and circulated petitioning letters to Members of Parliament. The Britain-Biafra Association published intelligently partisan booklets and circularized a handy and usually reliable weekly newsletter specifically aimed at a British readership. (Initially, the BBA based its news of events inside Biafra on Bernhardt releases mailed from Geneva; but later it discovered that it could obtain almost identical material days earlier from telex messages posted in Biafra House.) The Association also attempted some low-keyed contacts in Parliament. Other Biafra lobby groups adopted more overt or impassioned communications. Biafra '69, for example, tapped a moneyed stratum through champagne dances and Albert Hall musicals, while the Save Biafra Committee . . . engaged in rallies, marches, sit-ins, and similar forms of pseudo-violence.

As with many other cause groups, the leaders of the Biafra lobby frequently lacked normal family lives. With depressing regularity they were divorced, separated, unmarried. Still, this did mean that they could put their whole heart into their organization's communicative work and into monitoring the activities of friend and foe. Not until the last half-year of the war, to be sure, did most of the lobby groups (and others) join any formal Coordinating Committee. And not until a ayear after that did three still extant groups—the Britain-Biafra Association, Friends of Biafra, and Save Biafra Committee—meld their efforts in a single project, a rather wan exhibition about the war and its origins. The leading lights in the various organizations had been keeping in touch all along, however, through telephone messages from house to house, casual or arranged meetings, conversational linkages provided by concerned ex-

perts like news analyst Suzanne Cronje and economic consultant George Knapp, and in due course reading about one another's activities in the pages of the militantly pacificist journal, *Peace News*.

Similar judgments—about white dominance, independence of Biafran governmental control, complexity of structure, functional division of labor, and only partial and often informal coordination—apply to the emergent American, Canadian, and Dutch pro-Biafran group ensembles of which I have knowledge; and I would imagine that analogous comments apply elsewhere in Europe. Pressure groups that arose to favor the Federal Nigerian casue, by contrast, were scarce indeed. The only such organization I know of in Britain is the United Nigeria Group; and it began in fact as a front inspired by Nigeria's public relations consultant. Its small membership included establishment types with business, military, and government backgrounds, who were easily discouraged when their turgid pronouncements were not eagerly accepted by a grateful press; who usually had wives and children and a normal life to engross them; and whose performance, however sincere their views, was characterized by a zealous concern for personal thrift and by yawning lassitude. In all this they resembled, for good or ill, the Federal regime they ostensibly supported.

FOREIGN LEGISLATORS

Legislators, especially but not exclusively those who favored Biafra, often saw in the war a vehicle they could ride to prominence in hearings and debates, and hence in the media and in the minds of their constituents. . . . And even when constituency pressures were absent, . . . it was the legislator who chose his own approach in the light of his own preconceived doctrines. Members of Parliament . . . who visited Nigeria and/or Biafra, played a featured part in the many debates and questions on the Biafran struggle that roiled the Commons after the first year of the war had passed. They were also able to get letters and articles about their trips into the press and their views fleetingly memorialized on radio and television. American Congressmen . . . who journeyed to Africa . . . received similar though muted coverage, the United States all during this time being primarily concerned with . . . Vietnam.

Except for personal visits, most ordinary legislators, in Britain and elsewhere, were limited to much the same sources of information as lay publics. They could listen to the pronouncements of Gowon or Ojukwu and their entourages, though these would be subjected to a heavy, almost total, discount. They received professionally edited materials from the public relations firms retained by the governments—a little for Nigeria, a mountainous heap for Biafra—but these too, with the exception of some Galitzine-produced materials that a few M.P.'s found signally worthwhile, they almost automatically consigned to their "circular files." (Many pro-Biafran M.P.'s considered the snowdrift of releases blowing in from Geneva a dysfunctional embarrassment.) They could rely

on the position statements offered by their own government, or by their party leaders, or by their party research offices, all of which supported a generally pro-FMG [Federal Military Government] postion. They could rely on one another, either through open debates recorded in Hansard, or private conversations singly and in unofficial parlimentary and semi-parliamentary committees. (The three committees most relevant to this narrative were all on the Federal Nigerian side. Biafran sympathizers in Parliament made do with informal tête-à-têtes. This off-the-record communicating was not accessible to large publics.) Legislators who favored Biafra could also obtain information processed by indigenous pressure groups, receiving it either directly or through intermediaries whose sound judgment they particularly trusted. Finally and perhaps most crucially, newsmakers though they were, it was to the news media, and particularly the quality press, that M.P.'s turned both for reporting (which in its most arresting versions . . . often had a strongly pro-Biafran slant) and for editorial opinion (usually subtly pro-Nigerian, but sometimes . . . blatantly so).

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Elected and appointed governmental executives supplemented public sources of information with more discreet materials. Diplomatic cables and reports moved continually between the Nigerian land-mass and the home capital. International comity being what it is, most Western countries sustained better contacts with the authorized Lagos government than with its Biafran rival. And even in that Federal domain, views and facts were usually obtained only from a narrow, establishment-favoring stratum. Conflicting accounts from Nigeria, and almost everything issuing from Biafra, were typically suppressed or ignored. Nonetheless, executives in the United States, Holland, Britain, and elsewhere could speak with genuine assuredness, since they did have access to otherwise unavailable information—or at any rate to otherwise unavailable devices for carrying that information. . . .

The authoritative tone which the executive branch adopted on Nigeria-Biafra, as on foreign policy questions generally, was enhanced by a feeling common in Western capitals that the Nigerian government was incapable of presenting its side of events. Biafra, in the view of many foreign ministries and of the State Department, was good at self-justification, and Nigeria simply was not. What Nigeria could not do alone, therefore, the friendly Western governments tried to do for it. Their bureaucracies issued statements, speeches, bulletins, and even booklets defending the Nigerian cause—which was, after all, their cause, too. They affected diplomatic reporting and editorial policies by constant thematic reiterations at open news conferences and closed background sessions. They subjected newsmen returned from Biafra to hostile debriefing sessions, while they deftly manipulated their much prized relationships with other correspondents in order to moderate criticism and induce more

favorable evaluations. In all this the British government apparently took the lead, while the behavior of the United States and other Western countries was similar but fainter. At the least, America's "policy of not intervening in the internal affairs of African nations while at the same time, distinguishing between non-interference politically and the humanitarian obligation to help lessen human suffering," to quote a former State Department official, meant that it would do nothing to staunch the British flow of material and verbal support for Lagos, that indeed its own gentler trend of language and action would move along nearly the same lines.

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

Foreign businesses like Shell and United Africa Company lay low during the war. Their business, so they think, is business, not politics; and a native war was not seen as a boon to them. Fundamentally, they wanted to be on a profitable footing no matter how the war ended. Except for certain grudges against the Ibos, they did not care much who won the struggle or what the ultimate political map of Nigeria resembled. Their greatest desire was to retain their customers, markets, and skilled workers throughout the entire area. As a result, expatriate firms (until close to the end of the war) generally avoided public statements about the struggle. In private they were more ready communicators. They were willing to meet with Biafran officials and their lawyers during the early days of that regime and discuss oil royalties and rents. They were willing a year later to endure a harsh tongue-lashing by Nigeria's Chief Enahoro in the City of London. Not unlike canny operators making political contributions in American two-party cities, they understood the advantages in extending financial support to students from both Biafra and Nigeria who were taking courses abroad. Such communication was careful and quiet. Its obvious aim was to reduce the intensity of public discussion about the war.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS

Relief and eleemosynary organizations played their role far more openly. Some with particularly close links to government did prefer impermeable modes of communication—thus, the Presbyterian Church in Canada and the Save the Children Federation in Britain—but most turned skillfully to the mass media. Religious groups often used these public channels more effectively than their secular counterparts; but the excellent, though shortlived, propaganda efforts of Oxfam indicate that religiosity was scarcely a necessary condition for such an ability. A better explanation for much of the difference is that responsiblity for relief efforts behind the Federal lines, where needs were less sensational and where only natural and bureaucratic obstacles, not anti-aircraft fire, impeded logistics, fell to a largely secular consortium headed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Relief efforts in

Biafra, where the story was far more colorful, were by contrast most notably undertaken by an ecumenically Protestant-Catholic organization, Joint Church Aid (JCA).

Organizational proclivities and human resources within the ICRC and JCA themselves, however, also help explain their differing communicative behavior. The ICRC was centralized, ponderous, and bureaucratic. It was enmeshed in a time-honored legalistic ("juridique") tradition. Its past achievements and future intentions made it leery of being considered partisanly political; but that is precisely what its preoccupation with international legal norms constrained it to become. (The result was that ICRC efforts were an adjunct of Nigerian, but not Biafran, activities. The howl that emanated from ICRC headquarters, when the organization was charged by the *Nigerian* government with political interference and bias is, therefore, sadly understandable.) As for JCA, many of its constituent groups worked in Federal Nigeria as well as Biafra; but the consortium itself, unlike the Red Cross, never entertained any vain hope of operating simultaneously effectively in both jurisdictions. It had no need, therefore, continually to strike poses of objectivity; and it readily became identified as a Biafran champion.

To obtain funds the ICRC activated many time-worn connections to Western governments; but it also avoided behavior that might jeopardize that network for the future. JCA—as a temporary, one-cause group—was less inhibited. Through secondment it enjoyed the talents of component organizations in Holland, Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, and Italy, as well as those of distribution teams in Biafra and of many religious groups throughout the world. Leaders in JCA . . . quickly learned how to make descriptively harrowing and numerically impressive statements to the press. It was to such religious figures, too, rather than to Biafra's special representatives or its public relations firms, that newsmen increasingly turned for information or for help in obtaining entry into the Biafran enclave. Even more impressive in their totality were discussions and articles and fund drives at the parish and local church levels. For while JCA, like the ICRC, depended primarily on governments to fund its relief activities, it always sought a wide constituency of private contributors as well.

Despite JCA's genuinely ecumenical structure, many persons viewed Biafran relief as primarily Catholic in inspiration. The prominence of Catholicism in Biafra helps explain this, as does the anti-Catholicism expressed by some of its opponents. . . . The exceptional communicative skills of many Catholic spokesmen also pressed in the same direction. One can cite in evidence many Holy Ghost Fathers, in Biafra and Fernando Po and in the sorties outside; the film "Flight to Uli," which focused on that Order's activities; JCA press releases issued in Geneva by the Overseas Office of Catholic Relief Services, [and the like]. . . . Such a superabundance of talent became almost too good for its own advantage.

OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Other international bodies besides the relief agencies also commented publicly and effectively on the Nigerian-Biafran war. The three to be discussed here—and the three most important . . .—all furnished crucial support to Nigeria's regime.

The United Nations, in the person of U Thant, came down squarely in favor of Nigerian territorial integrity. The failure of the issue to be debated in any United Nations forum worked more subtly to the same end, for it deprived Biafra's supporters of a floodlit opportunity to present their views. The frequently reiterated stand of the Organization of African Unity, favoring the Federal regime and requesting a virtually unnegotiated Biafran surrender, helped justify U Thant's position as well as that of most Western governments.

It was Nigeria's canny decision in late 1968 to invite an international team of military observers into the country, though, that was most instrumental in re-establishing the moral probity of the Lagos government. One can justifiably object to the ease with which the Team was satisfied on evidence as well as the narrow syllogism with which it apparently reasoned (a. Wartime conditions are usually hell; b. Things are hell in Nigeria; c. Everything is as it should be); but clearly the Team's several Reports did help undercut Biafra's genocide claims. Indeed, *this* genocide charge, unlike an earlier one stemming from the 1966 massacres, was so easily deflated that one must view its propagation as a serious communications blunder.

In any event, the excellent (from a Nigerian standpoint) and consistent findings of the International Observer Team, findings that were reprinted by the Nigerian government in batches of 50,000 and widely quoted by leaders of friendly countries and the world's press, and the care with which the U.K., Poland, Canada, and Sweden were selected as Team members, have led some analysts to see in this the Machiavellian hand of Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office. It was too brilliant a stroke, they think, for Nigeria to have hit upon itself. Such a conclusion is hardly fair. The Federal Military Government was, throughout the war, better at high-level than widely publicized communications. And besides, even if they were acting on Britain's suggestion, they did at least exhibit a rare capacity for accepting good advice when offered it.

THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS

From the beginning, Biafra was more concerned than Nigeria about the foreign press. Even before secession the Ojukwu regime had issued many booklets and communiques, while the Lagos government sniffed about washing dirty linen in public and retreated into virtual silence. That kind of difference persisted all during the war too. Nigeria rarely welcomed journalists. It was often achingly slow about issuing entry permits; and when it did welcome an occasional reporter or news team, it usually was discouraged by the results and became even less cooperative

in the future. The protracted post-war exclusion of journalists from the former combat areas, and especially from the East-Central State, after a brief period in which barriers to reporting had been removed, strikingly illustrates this persistent Nigerian tendency.

Biafra, by contrast, continually courted outside newsmen. During the first year of the war it leaned heavily on its public relations firms. Robert Goldstein, for example, helped organize a press conference for Ojukwu in Biafra, reporters from Canada, the United States, France, and Britain being in attendance. With great care the Bernhardt staff subsequently arranged for a select group of British journalists to tour the country during the week of April 21, and to dispatch a dramatic drumroll of stories to their papers. As the war continued, however, Biafra got the hang of inviting and squiring reporters by itself, while they in turn resorted to Biafra's special representatives or to church officials with Biafran ties in order to obtain an entry permit.

Throughout the war Biafra was good copy. It was a plucky and determined nation fighting against great odds. Its leadership was articulate and dynamic. An aroma of oil pervaded the whole contest, while the struggle not only saw brave soldiers fighting and dying but civilian installations undergoing wanton and terrorist bombings. In the midst of all this there arose the specter of mass starvation and the cowboy exploits of the international relief operation. The alarming and horrific facts could be handled in a brashly sensational manner by the popular press and in a quietly sensational manner by its quality counterpart. The Biafran government made the filing of stories easier by giving reporters access to its telecommunications link with Geneva on a daily basis, without censorship, and at standard rates. Biafra's success with newsmen sometimes induced Nigeria to follow suit, as when it had its public relations firm arrange for British journalists to tour its domain a month after Bernhardt's master stroke. But because Nigeria's efforts were half-hearted and its story less interesting to relate,the results usually discouraged it from sustaining a receptive attitude.

Nigerians could take solace from the sympathy accorded them by crucial portions of the press, even though most reporting proceeded otherwise. Thus, it received constant editorial support from the *New York Times*, despite the often hostile war coverage in its news sections. It obtained favorably balanced coverage in the establishment weekly *West Africa*, and insightful analysis by the *Financial Times* correspondent. . . . An occasional defection in the ranks of Catholic journalism . . . also gave Lagos reason to rejoice.

While the bulk of press commentary unquestionably favored the Biafran side, the breadth and dependability of the commitment should not be exaggerated. Biafra was lauded as a brave country, valiantly fighting against insuperable odds and struggling to retain semblances of normalcy even under wartime chaos. Its dead and dying, and especially its displaced and starving civilians, evoked great cries of sympathy. Such facts

moved humanitarian organizations to prodigious labors and caused common folk to dig deep into their pockets. Yet, these same facts neither convinced governments to come to Biafra's *political* aid nor induced their mass citizenry to insist upon that choice. Valor and decimation, after all, cut both ways. If they furnished reasons for Nigeria to relent, they also furnished reasons for Biafra to surrender. As Ibo leaders like Asika and Azikiwe, who came over to the Federal cause kept remarking: "Enough is enough." To many Ojukwu's determination to continue resistance eventually suggested a callous disregard of his people's survival; and when, for alleged military and security reasons, he rejected the daylight relief flights into Uli that the FMG announced it would permit, nearly all his friends in the press began deserting him. Biafra's genocide-starvation theme thus revealed itself as doubly unwise. It comported poorly with elite-centered *Realpolitik*, for it was an argument from dire weakness. It was also a dubious choice for broad-scale communication, since its logic required that the Biafran regime appear morally superior to its opponent. Once that was no longer so evident, the theme in fact became a serious obstacle to sustained public support for Biafra's separate existence.

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NEWS BROADCASTING ON SOVIET RADIO AND TELEVISION*

By F. Gayle Durham

Domestic news broadcasting in the Soviet Union serves to generate political support for governmental policies and programs and further the development of a Communist society.

We may gain a direct insight into the Soviet conception of the functions of radio and television from the following explicit statements made in a resolution by the Party Central Committee:

> The main task of Soviet radio broadcasting and television is the *mobilization*** of our country's working people for the successful implementation of the Seven-Year Plan and the entire program of the comprehensive construction of Communism in the USSR for raising labor productivity and stepping up progress in all branches of the national economy . . . Radio and television must *inculcate* in all Soviet people a Communist attitude toward labor and the need for participation of every Soviet person in socially useful work. Radio and television must *demonstrate* the people's condemnation of loafers and good-for-nothings who try to live at the expense of others and must describe in concrete terms how labor becomes a need of Soviet people.

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*Excerpts from "News Broadcasting on Soviet Radio and Television," Research Program on Problems of Communication and International Security, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massaachusetts. June 1965. The research for this paper was sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense. Reprinted with the permission of the author, copyright holder.

**Italics are author's.

> Radio broadcast must *help people to think through* the historical changes in the life of mankind that have occurred mainly through the heroic deeds of the Soviet people who are building the most advanced and just society. It must tell of the advantages of socialism over capitalism, *unmask* the falsity of imperialist propaganda, and *train* Soviet people to be irreconcilable toward bourgeois ideology. It must *educate* them in a spirit of pride in their motherland, and in their work, and in a spirit of patriotism and internationalism.[1]

The very verbs used to indicate the functions of these two media show the breadth of influence which they are expected to play in the lives of their listeners. Far from being instruments of passive entertainment or of education in an informative sense, radio and television in the U.S.S.R. are pledged to act as active instruments of socialization for Soviet citizens in order to speed up the formation of the "future Communist society." They are viewed as instruments of indoctrination in Communist values and ideology as interpreted by the Party leadership at any given time, and as translated into economic, social, or political policy; further, they are agents of agitation for implementation of those policies. Not surprisingly, newscasts as a component part of "political broadcasting" play a leading role in this propaganda and agitation.

The specific place of radio and television in the network of mass media which report news has fluctuated considerably from time to time, depending upon the rigidity of censorship at any given period. Thus, for example, complaints were rampant during the early and middle fifties that news broadcast on radio and television was simply a rehash of those items which had appeared earlier in the pages of *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. The reasons for this are related to the sources of information and mechanisms of clearing of content of broadcasts. At certain times the main source for approach and commentary, and often for the actual news item itself, was the official Party organ, *Pravda*. Whatever items *Pravda* selected for emphasis, and whatever view *Pravda* took for presentation and interpretation served as the governing approach for radio and later, television newscasts as well. Thus, radio could not perform the functional role in news reporting which it has traditionally occupied in the Western mass media system—that of being able to present the news almost as soon as it happened, "ahead of the headlines." Complaints of the tardiness of broadcast news became widespread, not only among members of the populace at large, but increasingly among members of the radio and journalistic professions. Gradually the complaints crystallized, and the result was the official, published resolutions of 1960 stating the following change in policy:

> The central radio stations in Moscow must first of all assure timely broadcasts of important political information, effective commentary on domestic and foreign events, and the organization of various artistic programs . . . Because radio should give the population the important news before the newspapers do, TASS has been instructed to transmit news immediately to central and local radio stations.[2]

The handbook prepared by the State Committee on Radio and Television, published in 1963, specifically states: "Radio should communicate to the population all important news earlier than do the newspapers." [3] Recent audience research has indicated that news broadcasts now rank among

the most listened-to programs. Because of their frequency and because news begins and ends the broadcasting day, for most citizens the news provides a framework for the entire broadcasting day.

Besides providing the population at large with information on and interpretation of events, news broadcasts also serve the very influential function of acting as an important source of interpretation for the widespread network of Party agitators and other specific segments of the population. These agitators learn a great deal about selection of items for emphasis and Party policy from the approach which a radio newscast or commentary takes toward any specific event. Thus the news items broadcast are expanded, amplified, and elucidated by the personal efforts of agitators.

NOTES

1. In the Party Central Committee: "On Improving Soviet Radio Broadcasting and on Further Developing Television," *Partiinaya Zhizn*, No. 4, February, 1960, pp. 26–34.
2. Ibid.
3. Boglovskii, T., and L'vov, Z., *Posledniye Izvestia po Radio (The "Latest News" on Radio)*, published by the Scientific-Methodological Department of the State Committee on Radio and Television, USSR, 1963, p. 5.

STRATEGIC LEAFLETS*

BY CARL BERGER

Strategic leaflets have been employed for varied purposes such as news, directives, and political arguments and for appeals to target groups to prepare them for certain military activities.

In both World War II and the Korean conflict, the strategic leaflet came into play soon after the outbreak of fighting. Ninety-six hours after Hitler's armies marched into Poland in September 1939 and set off World War II, Britain's Royal Air Force dropped six million leaflets on Germany.[1] Their purpose was strategic—to explain to the indoctrinated German people the British version of the causes of the war and to warn of the consequences of continued support of the Nazi regime. The bulk of all Allied leaflets used in Europe continued in fact to be strategic until after the successful D-Day landings had changed the military situation to a more fluid state, in which tactical leaflets would be appropriate and useful. Similarly, in late June 1950, within 72 hours after the Communists launched their Aggression against the Republic of Korea, the U.S. Far East Air Force began disseminating 100,000,000 leaflets over the peninsula, telling of the "cease fire" orders of the United Nations, revealing to the North Koreans "the duplicity of their leaders," and bringing "encouragement to the people of the Republic of Korea." [2]

*Excerpts from *An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets*, Documentary Study No. 1, the American University, Special Operations Research Office, Washington, D.C., 1959 AD 220 821, pp.7–19.

In both cases the start of hostilities provided an opportunity, not usually found in peacetime, to break the totalitarian monopoly of news and information; that is, to speak directly to enemy peoples through the printed word. (Radio, of course, is available in both peace and war but, enemy jamming efforts aside, one can rarely be certain who is listening.) These early strategic leaflets, besides trying to restore a balance to the distorted version of events given the people, also sought to undermine confidence in the existing regimes. As the fighting continued, leaflets were used for a variety of military and humanitarian purposes, for example, to give bomb warnings to specific communities, to disrupt enemy factory production, or to cause internal dissension.

Most strategic leaflets of recent international wars were prepared, written, and printed in rear areas, where the necessary large production facilities existed. Paris and London were the centers for the large-scale production of Allied leaflets in World War I, while in the second World War the bulk of the leaflets dropped over Europe was produced in London. In the war against Japan large printing facilities in Australia, Hawaii, and the United States also produced millions of leaflets for strategic purposes. Japan was the center of U.N. leaflet production during the Korean War.

The purpose of disseminating strategic leaflets to occupied and presumably friendly countries has often been simply to give news of the outside world in an effort to keep up morale and encourage the people not to give in to the enemy. In World War II, prior to the Allied landings in Europe, about half of the Allied strategic leaflets went to Germany, about 43 percent to occupied France, and 7 percent to the Low Countries. But once the Allies were back on the European mainland, 90 percent of the strategic leaflets were directed against German targets and the remainder against the French, Belgians, and Dutch.[3]

During Britain's struggle against Communist terrorists in the Malayan jungles, the bulk of leaflets dropped was strategic and long-term in the following sense: their primary aim was "to condition the minds of the Communist terrorists in such a way that when affected by physical factors, such as food shortages, pressure by Security Forces, or internal dissension, they would defect and take advantage of the Government's invitation to surrender.[4]

* * * * *

During the Middle East crisis of July-August 1958, the strategic leaflet was brought into play by the United States government. A million copies of an Arabic-language special leaflet, signed by President Eisenhower and illustrated with his photograph, were disseminated by aircraft over Lebanon. The English text was as follows:

> TO THE CITIZENS OF LEBANON:
> The forces of the United States have entered your country at the request of your own established government. These forces are here to assist you in your efforts to maintain the independence of Lebanon against those who desire to interfere with your affairs and who have endangered the peace and security of your homeland.

The American officers and men have left their homes to assist in the protection of your way of life, your prosperity and your families. They will leave your country as soon as the United Nations has taken measures assuring the independence of Lebanon.

The American government has acted in response to an appeal for help from a peaceful nation which has long had ties of closest friendship with the United States.[5]

This leaflet is an excellent example of the uses to which the strategic leaflet can be put. Leaflets of this nature have been described as "long-range in scope and . . . designed to orient the opinions, attitudes, emotions and ultimately the behavior of the target audience towards the broad objectives of United States policy.[6] Used in wartime against an enemy target, strategic leaflets are aimed at increasing tensions and thus decreasing the enemy's emotional and productive capacity to wage war.

It is not surprising that the same strategic leaflet themes have recurred in various conflicts. For example, Allied propagandists in the first World War published the following leaflet in late 1917, reminding their German readers of the suffering they had undergone:

YOU POOR GERMAN PEOPLE!

Already you are in the 4th year of this war. One shudders to think of your suffering, which will increase this year. To the hunger, the pestilence, the cold, will be added the terrible campaigns on the front and the aeroplane attacks on your cities. . . .

Three million dead, the flower of your nation, the future of your land, rest in foreign fields; one million of your best sons languish in prisons; millions of your children will have become poor, helpless orphans. . . .[7]

In the Korean action, American propagandists returned to a similar theme in strategic leaflets dropped on North Korean targets. In October 1952, their pungently worded leaflet, headed "A Third Winter of the Communists' War," bluntly charged: "Your bosses condemn you to a third winter of war—of death and misery! The Communists ignore your suffering. On orders from their Chinese and Russian masters, they refuse to accept a just and honorable peace. They prolong the war that lays waste to your land. They prolong your suffering. They bring death to your people . . ." [8]

Although the tone of these leaflets differ greatly, both were aimed at creating tensions within the enemy camp and lowering morale.

Another strategic leaflet dropped on the Japanese mainland in the summer of 1945 had as its purpose clarification of the Allied policy of "unconditional surrender." This leaflet, in the form of a special statement to the Japanese by President Truman, explained the phrase as follows:

What does military unconditional surrender mean to the Japanese people? It means the end of the fighting and the termination of the power of the militarists who have led Japan to the brink of destruction.

Again, it is the first step in returning soldiers and sailors to their families, their farming villages, and to the places where each has his job.

Furthermore, it means not prolonging the agony and suffering of the Japanese people, who are clinging to the dream of victory. It does not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people.[9]

The themes examined above are but a few of those which have been used in strategic leaflets in the past. It is clear that the theme of the strategic leaflet, under normal circumstances, reflects the nation's political and military situation.

NOTES

1. *The New York Times*, September 5, 1939, p. 1.
2. United Nations Command, Report of the . . . to the Security Council, August 16, 1950, in U.S. Senate, *Military Situation in the Far East*, Part 5, 82nd Cong., 1st Session (Washington: 1951), p. 3392.
3. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., *Europe, Argument to V-E Day*, Vol. 3 of *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 494.
4. *Federation of Malaya Annual Report, 1954* (Kuala Lumpur: G. A. Smith, 1955), p. 403.
5. *The Psywar Society Bulletin*, No. 4 (Dec. 1958), p. 9.
6. Dept. of the Army, FM 33–5, *Psychological Warfare Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 138.
7. George G. Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918* (Stanford University Press, 1938), p. 106.
8. Far East Command, First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, Leaflet No. 1229, "Third Winter of Death," 24 October 1952.
9. Psychological Warfare Branch, U.S. Army Forces Pacific Area, Leaflet No. 137–J–1, "Significance of Unconditional Surrender," n.d.

THE NLF LEAFLET*

By Douglas Pike

The frequency in the use of the propaganda leaflet by a revolutionary movement may be realated to the development of the movement's organizational structure. The more highly developed the organizational structure, the more selective, less random, and less important does leaflet distribution become.

The traditional communicational tool of the revolutionary, the clandestine leaflet, was the major mass medium of the [National Liberation Front] (NLF) in its earliest days. Leaflets collected by the [Government of Vietnam] (GVN) in the 1958–1960 period were usually signed "Liberation Forces of the South" or Lao Dong Party. Typical titles were "Letters from Long An Lao Dong Provincial Committee to Rural Compatriots on the Thirty-Ninth Anniversary of the Founding of the Party" and "An Appeal by the Lao Dong Party South Vietnamese Executive Committee to Compatriots in the South." Many of these contained Ho Chi Minh's picture and at least one was issued to mark his birthday. Apparently they served chiefly to advertise the fact that the Lao Dong Party continued to exist in the South.

The NLF leaflet program reached its zenith of utility in mid-1963, after which it declined. The leaflets usually took the form of a two- or four-page

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*Excerpts from *Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1966, Appendix B. Reprinted with the permission of M.I.T. Press, copyright holder.

tract containing several thousand words of text; a small leaflet (about 3 by 5 inches) containing a much shorter message; or a slogan slip, which was a strip of paper on which a single slogan was written. The leaflets were usually the work of cadres. The slogan slip was the work of the people themselves, usually as part of a struggle movement, and was a device highly prized by the leadership.

The tract and the miniature leaflet were usually written at the inter-zone agit-prop section and sent to the district or village where they were reproduced and distributed by local cadres. It is difficult to determine the scope of this leaflet activity; a *quy chanh* who had worked in the Kien Hoa provincial agit-prop section said that in September 1961, probably the high point of the NLF leaflet program, the provincial agit-prop section issued 500,000 leaflets of ten different types. An NLF internal report said that the Central Nambo zonal central committee produced three million leaflets dealing with the GVN's April 1961 elections.

> The cadre directive stated that leaflets were to be used in areas where we are not able to organize demonstrations. They have the purpose of causing the masses to stand up and struggle. They are used in areas where we have no organization or only a weak one, such as a provincial capital. Butterfly leaflets create a willingness among the people to struggle against the enemy and heighten the prestige of the Revolution. In the areas where we are organized but the enemy still is in control we can use leaflets to make propaganda for our organizations. This should be the main objective in the use of leaflets. But also they should arouse public opinion, create confusion among the people, and give the masses subjects to discuss. . . . Leaflets disseminate only general policies. Detailed treatment of a subject should be done in face-to-face agit-prop work. Do not rely too much on leaflets.

Leaflets were scattered by hand at night by agit-prop teams. They were surreptitiously placed in women's shopping baskets in small-town markets or left in public places, on buses and trains, in schoolrooms, or sent through the mail. Kites and balloons were flown over towns and military posts, carrying leaflets that were scattered by the wind when a mechanism released them from their airborne conveyors. In cities and towns cadres at night would soak leaflets in water and secretly spread them on the roofs of the taller buildings, the morning sun would dry them; they would come loose from the roof tiles and flow over the town. The NLF also employed a special hand grenade that exploded without injuring anyone and scattered leaflets over a wide area.

NFL cadres estimated that in a random leaflet-scattering operation in a GVN-controlled area, not 10 percent got into the hands of the population. Leaflets became less important as the organizational structure developed. A 1964 memorandum noted,

> When we started [the NLF] we had no firm foundation and therefore needed many tracts and leaflets. Now we do not need as many. We need not distribute them in all places, only in the towns and in areas where the enemy is in firm control, in army posts, in refugee villages, and among religious groups. We do not need them in the liberated area . . . except when enemy troops come through.

* * * * *

USIA's "LITTLE" MAGAZINE*

By Nathan Glick

If educated groups from different cultures share particular interests or characteristics, printed matter such as the magazine representing these interests and characteristics will be better received by their cross-national audience and more likely to be effective in influencing opinion than communications directed at the larger public.

Government sponsorship of magazines for foreign readers is not a new idea. The Soviet Union has been conducting such a program for many decades, and its highly ideological style has been emulated by Communist China and several East European governments. Before *Dialogue*, [a USIA publication launched in the spring of 1968], US publications for foreign audiences were mainly aimed at specific countries or areas. *America Illustrated*, a handsomely designed monthly which resembles *Life* in format, is distributed in the Soviet Union and Poland under a formal cultural exchange agreement. *Topic* is aimed at African readers, *Horizons* at Asians, and a number of USIS posts publish magazines for distribution within a single country. The only early exception to this area-targeted rule was *Problems of Communism*, a bi-monthly survey of developments in the Communist world, which started in 1952 as a product of the cold war but has since become widely regarded in academic circles as the most authoritative journal in its field.

Against this background, *Dialogue* was novel in avoiding any specialization of either audience or subject matter. Its outlook and ambitions were suggested in the editor's "note to the reader" in the first issue, which said in part:

> *Dialogue* addresses itself to what one writer recently called the "intellectual public," those readers who have a compelling interest in ideas, social problems, literature and art. We hope to avoid facile popularization and irrelevant scholarship, and to publish articles that link special knowledge to wider cultural influences or pressing human needs. Our title refers primarily to the continuing discussion among Americans of matters ranging from education and culture to politics and economic development. But there is also a reciprocal character to intellectual discourse which leaps the barriers of geographical frontiers of political systems. One of the redeeming features of man's often melancholy history has been the international fraternity of intellectuals—a common concern for humane values and a common responsiveness to imaginative art. . . . We hope that our magazine will contribute to this international dialogue of ideas and aspirations.

Having been involved in magazine work most of my adult life, and having some knowledge of the short and inglorious histories of many high-minded publications, I was acutely aware of the shadows that could fall between conception and creation. The first shadow requiring exorcism was the widespread suspicion in USIA that no single magazine could meet the interests of readers from very different backgrounds in five

*Excerpts from "USIA's Little Magazine," *Cultural Affairs* 12, Associated Councils of the Arts, New York, 1970.

continents and more than a hundred countries. The response to the first issue provided a rather persuasive answer. Asians, Africans, Latin Americans, Europeans and Canadians—ranging from an avant-garde playwright in Brazil to an army general in Malaysia—seemed equally pleased with the magazine. Clearly, there existed a fairly homogeneous international audience at the university-educated level. None other than Professor Shils had remarked, in an article called "The Intellectual in Developing Nations" which *Dialogue* printed, that the educated classes in such countries have either been trained in the West or taught at home by Westerners or pupils of Westerners; and that their drive toward modernity is strongly influenced by Western standards. Beyond this ecumenical aspect of university education, there is the fact of almost instantaneous international communication which, at least superficially, provides the educated publics around the world with a common background of information and concerns.

Specifically, some of the most important ideas about modernization (economic, political or social) have been spawned in the technologically developed nations and perhaps most of all in the United States, which has the material affluence and political incentive to support a large corps of development specialists in the universities, AID, the World Bank, and elsewhere. Since by far the larger part of *Dialogue's* audience lives in the developing world, and since one of the main purposes of the magazine is to share useful and stimulating ideas, every issue so far has carried at least one article on problems of economic development. These articles have elicited more involved response than those on any other single theme—as judged by letters to the editor, reprints in indigenous publications, and extended comment in newspapers and journals.

* * * * *

At *Dialogue* we are very much aware that those we refer to as intellectuals in our own country and abroad are no longer members of a leisure class, but often excessively busy professionals who have the taste and capacity for intellectual stimulation along with limited time and patience. We have therefore experimented with editorial, visual and typographical approaches intended to make the magazine more attractive and serviceable. Although I am suspicious of the current tendency to view "communications" as a separate and special discipline, the experience of editing *Dialogue* has made me acutely aware of the pitfalls that lie in wait for the international communicator. At the same time it has convinced me that there is a widespread hunger for dialogue (with a small "d"), for a sense of participation in the contemporary issues that cross national boundaries and touch on men's common concern for social justice and their common responsiveness to imaginative art.

U.S.-SOVIET MAGAZINE PROPAGANDA:

AMERICA ILLUSTRATED AND USSR*

By Anita Mallinckrodt Dasbach

Covert propaganda containing messages that are not favorable to the predispoitions of the target audiences may gain the selective attention and interests of the target audiences when built into an overt framework.

PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES

The messages propagandists use to convey themes aimed at inducing modifications of belief in audiences often are subtle and covert, frequently imbedded deeply in the body of an article. Significant, therefore, is the message's overt framework, built to capture the initial attention and interest of the reader, as well as to convey an impression of its own.

SUBJECT MATTER

An important part of the message's framework is subject matter. For instance, by presenting articles about new developments in various fields of the arts, a propagandist conveys the impression of a cultured communicator. He also gains the attention of readers interested in the arts. Once their attention is won by an article which promises subject matter attractive to them, they begin to read and so are exposed to the theme the propagandist has woven into the article.

What subjects, then, are U.S. and Soviet propagandists presenting to win and hold their audiences and to convey desired impressions? In brief, the 1960 and 1963 samples used in this study show *USSR* decreasing its emphasis on Government and Foreign Relations subjects and increasing emphasis on such subject matter areas as People and Science. Meanwhile, in 1963 *America Illustrated* increased its already heavy emphasis on Arts and Culture while talking somewhat less about Education, Foreign Relations, Government and other areas.

* * * * *

REPRINTS

In addition to subject matter, which can serve to gain reader attention, credibility, which gains reader acceptance, is another important aspect of the framework the propagandist constructs around his message. It has been felt, for instance, that if *America Illustrated* used articles reprinted from national U.S. magazines, Soviet readers would feel they were reading what Americans themselves read, rather than pieces tailored for Soviet consumption and so more "propagandistic." With this philosophy in mind, *America Illustrated*, in the four-issue basic sample covering the

*Excerpts from "U.S.-Soviet Magazine Propaganda:" "*America Illustrated*" and "*USSR*," *Journalism Quarterly*, XLIII, No. 1 (Spring 1966), pp. 73–84. Reprinted with the permission of *Journalism Quarterly*, copyright holder, and the courtesy of the author.

1960 period, used reprints for 24% of the articles it published. By the 1963 period, the reprint rate has gone up to 32% for the basic four-issue sample.

NEGATIVE COMMENT

If *USSR* and *America Illustrated* are overwhelmingly dedicated to building a favorable national self-image, . . . one would expect the magazines' tone to be rosy, or what is termed "putting the best foot forward." This, indeed, is the impression gained from a casual reading of both magazines, as contrasted to, for instance, mass-circulation domestic American magazines.

However, even within the predominantly positive approach of both magazines, a reader spots negative comment. Two questions arise:

How much of the negative comment detracts from the "best foot forward" approach, as by presenting negative contemporary self-image, including even self-criticism?

This content is especially important because it is directly related to credibility, a high-priority goal among propagandists. For instance, many Soviet citizens believe the United States has problems, perhaps partially because their government has often said so. If we do not discuss problems when we write about our country, Soviet readers may feel we are evading the issue. Thus, without candor we may lose credibility. Furthermore by permitting the Soviet government's allegations regarding our problems to go unchallenged we miss an opportunity to put the problems in perspective. However, there are some who argue that if the magazine acknowledges the existence of U.S. problems such as slums, unemployment and racial discord, the Soviet reader will think, "Well, our government was right all along; race relations are a serious problem in the United States. In fact, if the U.S. magazine mentions this problem at all it must be even worse than they say it is, because that's how our government operates." While this argument may have some validity, it seems more risky to ignore social problems, and to avoid the negative comment necessary in their discussion, than to present them in perspective. Furthermore, by doing so, we have the advantage of disarming Soviet readers by our frankness.

What does the negative comment of political significance but of non-contemporary or non-self-critical nature say?

This area of negative comment has significance because it may reveal how propagandists see their nations's past, the world as a whole or a nation's citizens. In discussing these broader aspects having political significance, the use of negative comment lends an air of reality to the magazine. A magazine attempting to portray the life of a nation cannot do it in overwhelmingly rosy tones and expect to be believed. Simple logic says life just isn't like that.

* * * * *

TATZEPAO: MEDIUM OF CONFLICT IN CHINA'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"*

By Barry M. Broman**

The wall poster is one form of mass media which does not depend on a high degree of literacy and availability of receivers, and is one of the most dramatic means of political communication.

One of the oldest forms of communication in China is the *tatzepao* or wall poster (sometimes called the big-character poster). Dating from imperial times when royal edicts were posted on village walls, *tatzepao* have played a variety of communication roles in China.[1] Under the Communists *tatzepao* became an efficient medium of mass persuasion guided by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter, the Propaganda Department). In the summer of 1966, as the conflict within China's highest political echelon reached crisis proportions, a new and radically different function was assigned to *tatzepao*.

This paper examines the phenomenon of *tatzepao* as an instrument of conflict during the so-called Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It looks at *tatzepao* as a unique form of mass communication which helps to explain the nature of the recent struggle inside Communist China.

Intimately linked with any discussion of tatzepao must be a discussion of the active agents in the cultural revolution, the Red Guards. The study focuses on a critical period of the cultural revolution beginning in June 1966, when Red Guard units began to appear and *tatzepao* emerged as their primary weapon, until early 1967, when the Red Guards were dispersed and the cultural revolution entered a new phase.

* * * * *

Broadly speaking, the cultural revolution was a struggle for the reins of leadership at the apex of the political pyramid. The conflict centered on two rival factions, with Mao-Tse-tung heading a Leninist-Stalinist minority faction. Supported by a small circle of intimates,[2] Mao managed to survive through the aid of Lin Piao and a substantial segment of the army—and the Red Guards, an organization Mao created in 1966 to prosecute the cultural revolution. Opposed to the Maoists was a diverse group of party faithful which foreign observers have united by the term "anti-Maoist." Under the nominal leadership of Liu Shao-ch'i this group,

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*Excerpts from "Tatzepao: Medium of Conflict in China's 'Cultural Revolution,' "*Journalism Quarterly*, 146, No. 1 (Spring 1969), pp. 100–104, 127. Reprinted with the permission of *Journalism Quarterly*, copyright holder, and the courtesy of the author.

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which is believed to include the majority of party leaders, sought to follow a policy line toward modernity that the Maoists branded "revisionist."

* * * * *

With large segments of the official media "captured" by anti-Maoists, Mao Tse-tung faced a difficult task in attempting to reach the masses whom he considered the crucial link in effecting his "revolution." The monolithic structure of the Propaganda Department further frustrated the Maoists since the department functioned hierarchically down to the village level through millions of cadres making up a "closed" [3] communications network. The system oriented all provincial propaganda departments toward Peking whence every important policy message originated. This structure was of critical political importance. Maoist attempts to regain control of the Propaganda Department apparently failed, necessitating the creation of a rival apparatus. The Red Guards emerged as the counterpart to the official propagandists, in function if not in form, and *tatzepao* became their primary medium.

Tatzepao brought the power struggle into the open on May 25, 1966, when, symbolically, the "first" wall poster of the cultural revolution was written. Its primary author was Nieh Yuan-tzu, a woman teaching assistant in the philosophy department at Peking University who, acting apparently on Mao's personal instructions, attacked the University's president and others. Among the indictments was a charge that University officials had discouraged support for Mao and discouraged the writing of *tatzepao:*

> To counter-attack the sinister gang which has frantically attacked the Party, socialism, and Mao Tse-tung's thought is a life-and-death class struggle. The revolutionary people must be fully aroused to vigorously and angrily denounce them, and to hold big meetings and put up big-character posters is one of the best ways for the masses to do battle.[4]

This poster signaled a deluge of *tatzepao* and set the stage for the pattern of conflict to follow. Mao Tse-tung personally was credited with having "discovered (this) the first Marxist-Leninist big-character poster in the country and approved its publication for the country and the world." [5]

Soon more posters appeared attacking anti-Maoists by name. Typical of these was a poster entitled "Important Directive Given by Chairman Mao at the Central Committee Cultural Revolution Meeting on 8 September (1966)" in which two powerful anti-Maoists were attacked.[6]

. . . . Unlike the official media, which referred vaguely to "those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road," *tatzepao* attacked the anti-Maoists by name, frequently citing "crimes" of doubtful authenticity.

. . . .The conflict thus was brought into the open through *tatzepao* in a manner that left those condemned defenseless against the relentless and often anonymous charges.

* * * * *

The choice of *tatzepao* by Mao as the medium through which to "reveal" his enemies to the people is understandable. Eight years earlier he had expressed his faith in the utility of the medium as an instrument of conflict:[7]

> The big-character poster is an extremely useful new type of weapon. It can be used in cities and the countryside, government and other organizations, army units and streets, in short, wherever the masses are. Now that it has been widely used, people should go on using it constantly.[8]

Accordingly, on August 5, 1966, as the battle lines of the conflict were being drawn at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, a wall poster bearing Mao's own signature appeared. Entitled "Bombard the Headquarters—My Big-Character Poster," according to a Maoist source, it "blasted the lid off the struggle between the proletarian revolutionary line and the bourgeoisie headquarters [i.e., the anti-Maoists] which had existed in the party for a long time." [9]

* * * * *

The Maoists hoped that the pressures brought about by the *tatzepao* and Red Guard violence would reduce the effectiveness if not the will of the anti-Maoists, but the degree to which the leaders of the cultural revolution could control the Red Guards decreased rapidly as schools closed and millions of youths surged forward to wage "revolution." In short, the campaign got out of hand.

Apart from the small group that was charged with directing the cultural revolution there was little direct control by Maoist forces over the Red Guards. What controls that existed were rapidly dissipated in the days following the massive August rallies as the ranks of the Red Guards expanded faster than the Maoist organization could assimilate them. At this point Red Guard newspapers emerged in an attempt to give direction to the increasingly ill-disciplined youths who roamed throughout China leaving havoc in their wake. The appearance of these newspapers signaled the institutionalization of the cultural revolution.

The newspapers became the internal control medium for the mobilization of youths and a link between the Maoists' leadership and the rank-and-file Red Guards. They enjoyed a wide geographical distribution and established policy for the Red Guards. The small-circulation publications were circulated by hand to cadres and to a lesser extent to the Red Guard masses.[10]

By the end of 1966, with the aid of *tatzepao*, over 250 leading editors, propagandists, and leaders of the arts had been removed from their posts,[11] including men who had held key positions within the party since the hard days of Yenan before the Second World War.

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NOTES

[1.] For a discussion of communications in imperial China, see James Markham, *Voices of the Red Giants* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1967). For a treatment of *tatzepao* under the Communists prior to the cultural revolution, see Vincent King, *Propaganda Campaigns in Communist China* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965) and Frederick T.C. Yu, "Campaigns, Communications and Change in Communist China," in Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm (eds.), *Communications and Change in the Developing Countries* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967).

[2.] Besides Lin, Mao gathered around him Chiang Ch'ing (Mao's wife) and Ch'en Po-ta (Mao's former secretary) both of whom held key posts in the special group that was charged to direct the cultural revolution.

[3.] This term is used with reference to the special training and vocabulary required of cadres in interpreting messages of the Propaganda Department. See Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 58.

[4.] Quoted in *Peking Review*, Sept. 9, 1966, p. 20.

[5.] *Peking Review*, March 10, 1967, p. 5.

[6.] T'ao Ghu was the short-lived director of the Propaganda Department between June-Nov. 1966. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Party Secretary General, is considered one of Mao's most influential opponents.

[7.] It is interesting to note that Mao's first public writing was in the form of a *tatzepao*. The poster was written when Mao was about seventeen and it proposed that Sun Yat-sen be made President of China. Mao later described it as "somewhat muddled." Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1963), p. 136.

[8.] Mao Tse-tung. "Introducing a Co-operative," April 15, 1958, quoted in *Peking Review*, Sept. 11, 1967, p. 16.

[9.] *Peking Review*, Sept. 11, 1967, p. 8.

[10.] A Japanese journalist, Miss Chie Nishio, reports that the only Red Guard newspapers she saw during an extensive tour of China in early 1967 were at Peking University but that she was not permitted to read them. Personal communication.

[11.] For a description of the pattern of purge, see "The Cultural Revolution Broom," *China News Analysis*, Nov. 18, 1966.

EARLYWORD

By the Editors

A key concept behind Earlyword was that using recently captured or surrendered personnel to appeal directly to former comrades would enhance the timeliness and therefore the credibility of the message.

Vietnam proved no exception to the problems associated with the PSYOP targeting of swiftly moving adversaries. Reaching the audience with credible appeals was often futile in tactical PSYOP unless the messages were timely. The Allied quick-reaction capability was poor —especially early in the conflict—largely because of a lack of understanding of, or an inability to meet, the basic conditions for effective combat propaganda. Often, the problems began with the exploitation of recently captured enemy soldiers.

Particularly in the early stages of American involvement in Vietnam, the typical priority was to exploit a captive for battlefield intelligence. Even if the prisoner were captured by American elements, he usually

was turned over to the Vietnamese National Police or ARVN who interrogated him for a lengthy period. After the interrogation period, the captive was placed in a camp with other prisoners. There, the prisoner could learn from fellow inmates the words and actions that would be most likely to elicit the desired responses from his captors. By the time psyoperators were able to take their turn at interrogating him, the prisoner was usually "stale," particularly from a tactical vantage point: He might no longer know where his former unit was operating; he would be less aware of the prevailing mood and dispositions of even his closest comrades; and he was likely to be influenced in his reponses to questions by a modified state of expectations, in part learned from fellow prisoners. In many critical respects, then, the captive was no longer "typical" of even his closest former comrades.

"Earlyword" was an Air Force-devised system with the objective of enhancing the Allied tactical propaganda capability. The captive would speak into a standard military ground radio and the voice appeal would be picked up and broadcast on either live or delayed basis through the Earlyword's 1800-watt speaker system as the aircraft circled the location of the enemy unit. With the introduction of Earlyword in 1969, it became possible for a *Hoi Chanh* (rallier) in Allied hands on the ground to speak directly to his former comrades within minutes after rallying. No single technique can assure effectiveness, but Earlyword at least significantly increased the timeliness of tactical PSYOP.

POSTAL SUBVERSION*

BY MICHAEL CHOUKAS

Stamps can be an effective medium of communication. In this case, the attempted counteraction helped broaden the potential audience.

Not all groups are equally accessible to a propagandist; nor can they be reached by the same means. The group to be manipulated may be an enemy group, a neutral one, or the propagandist's own group, perhaps even a subgroup within these groups. Facilities of communication will differ from group to group, and so will other aspects of group life such as values, predispositions, current problems and issues. The questions that propagandists will have to answer are: How accessible is the group? What is the best way to contact it? And how can manipulation of it best be pursued? The answers, naturally, tend to differ from case to case.

Take our desire to reach those behind the Iron Curtain. Access to those people through the modern media of communication has been denied to, or made most difficult for our propagandists, both official and private. However, the latter did succeed in overcoming such obstacles and estab-

*Excerpts from *Propaganda Comes of Age*, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1965. Reprinted with the permission of Public Affairs Press, copyright holder.

lishing a sort of psychological "beachhead" across the Iron Curtain by utilizing channels that were still open. In the press one reads, for example:

> HUNGARY PROTESTS POSTAL "SUBVERSION"
>
> Budapest, March 8 (AP). The Foreign Ministry protested to the United States and Canada today over the cancellation marks of stamps of letters received in Hungary.
>
> The postmarks were illustrated in the Communist newspapers Nepszabadsag. The one from the United States said "Support your Crusade for Freedom." The Canadian envelope bore the legend "Pourquoi attendre au printemps (Why wait for spring?) Do it now."
>
> "What else does that imply," the newspaper asked, "but the most outspoken, in fact amazingly unconcealed interference in the domestic affairs of another state?" [1]

From another newspaper account,[2] one learns that the permission to have the "Support Your Crusade for Freedom" postmark used by the Post Office Department for a specified time (January 1 to March 31, 1957), was officially granted to the Crusade for Freedom organization, a private group supporting Radio Free Equope and Free Europe Press; also, that "The organization (Crusade for Freedom) has been denounced by the Soviet Union on the ground it is trying to incite subversive activity within Communist countries."

Our propagandists not only managed to send their message to the Hungarian people but, by the counteraction they aroused, they succeeded in having it spread widely among other people as well. The Communists were in fact shortsighted in giving the message such wide publicity. They apparently did forget a basic maxim of successful propaganda, not to argue the opponent's case in public.

NOTES

1. Associated Press Dispatch, March 8, 1957.
2. *New York Times.* March 31, 1957.

MAINLAND POUNDED BY BALLOONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE*

An old technique of message dissemination is vigorously used by the government of the Repbulic of China.

The Psychological Warfare Department of the Defence Ministry disclosed in Taipei recently that the government has sent 101,614,528 balloons to Mainland China in the past seventeen years.

The load carried by these balloons ranges from 35 grammes to 4,763 grammes. The two large-sized balloons, measuring 10 x 13 feet and 10 x

*Excerpts from the Cosmorama Pictorial, reproduced in *Falling Leaf Magazine*, IX, No. 2 (June 1968), p. 53. Reprinted with the permission of the Chinese Information Service, copyright holder.

18 feet, can rise as high as 40,000 feet and fly to reach as far as Tibet and Sinkiang.

More than 213,000,000 pamphlets were flown to Mainland China by these balloons. They carried messages aiming not only at inspiring the people with enmity towards the Mao Tse-tung regime but also of bringing good tidings from the Republic of China. The recent shooting down of the two Communist MIG-19 jets was among the news spread by these balloons.

Apart from pamphlets, the balloons also dropped food, toys, household goods, daily commodities and national flags. Another item included in the delivery is a 'passport' which permits would-be defectors to come safely to Taiwan. Many former Communist airmen, journalists and Red Guards have already landed in Taiwan with these passports.

QUEMOY: POP GOES THE PROPAGANDA*

BY LEE LESCAZE

Propaganda exchanges are often an alternative to hostilities and provide a means of saving faces short of backing down completely.

QUEMOY—Remember Quemoy? Not so long ago, it was widely hailed in the United States and elsewhere as a pivotal frontier of freedom—an outpost as important as West Berlin. When President Eisenhower visited Taiwan in June, 1960, Communist Chinese artillery batteries fired 174,854 rounds at Quemoy in protest. Later that year, presidential candidate Richard M. Nixon's conviction that Quemoy and Matsu had to be defended became a central part of his televised debates with John F. Kennedy.

Quemoy is still being defended by a large but secret number of Nationalist Chinese soldiers plus five U.S. army advisers, and there is still shelling from Chinese guns. But the last explosive shells were those Peking fired in anger over the Eisenhower visit, and President Nixon's trip to Peking [1972] did not spark any artillery protest by Nationalist China.

Now following a well-established and comfortably lived-with pattern, the Communist guns fire only shells containing propaganda leaflets and the Nationalist guns here give counter-battery fire in kind. This shelling is restricted to odd-numbered days and the object is to avoid causing any damage.

"Of course it hurts people if they get hit with a fragment or a bundle of leaflets, which would be bad propaganda, so the Communists try to avoid that and we do the same thing," a Nationalist army officer explains.

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*Excerpts from "Quemoy: Pop Goes the Propaganda, "*The Washington Post*, March 12, 1972, p. C–5. Reprinted with the permission of *The Washington Post*, ©, copyright holder.

SMALL VICTORIES

Quemoy's propaganda battles are, perhaps unavoidably, a matter of small victories. Although it is not official Taiwan policy, it appears the officers here try to insure that their guns get off a few more leaflet shells than the Communist's each firing day. Last Monday, for example, the Communists lobbed in 46 rounds and the Nationalists quickly returned 50.

The fall-out from the shells provides various sector commanders and their men with grounds-keeping chores. All Communist leaflets are picked up as quickly as possible and soldiers here assume that their counterparts on the mainland are also busy part of every odd-numbered day rounding up the debris.

Leaflets are also exchanged by "air-floating and sea-floating." Balloons of three sizes, with the largest able to carry 178 pounds of leaflets up to 72 hours, are released from Quemoy whenever the wind is favorable which is generally from April to October, a briefing officer says.

The sea-floating operation is more aggressive. Speedboats manned by frogmen maneuver as close as is deemed prudent to the Chinese coast and jettison their cargoes of plastic leaflet containers, bottles and inflatable toys. The narrow strait separating Quemoy from China is undoubtedly the only line of armed confrontation in the world that without vigilant beachcombing would be littered with plastic ducks.

Yet despite the 12 years that have passed since the last high-explosive shell was fired, confrontation is still very real and very armed here.

Although officials refuse to put a number to Quemoy's garrison, well-informed sources say close to 100,000 Nationalist soldiers are on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu north of here.

One of the primary missions for these troops, briefing officers say, is to tie down "hundreds of thousands" of Communist Chinese soldiers who, the officer adds, would otherwise be free to "cause trouble for another part of the Free World."

Quemoy, which is a string of 12 small islands uninhabited by civilians, has gone underground since the late 1950s, when it was a headline story and presidential campaign issue—at least the army defenders have.

They live and stand guard in dozens of strongpoints dug deep into the main island and sometimes tunnelled into mountains.

. . . . Strongpoint 133 is one of the frontline defenses of Quemoy. Its three tiers of firing positions look out over white sand and blue water at Communist-held islands and the Chinese mainland several thousand yards away. Its depth underground is secret, but officers say it is stocked with enough ammunition, food and water to fight without outside support for three to four months.

. . . . At its closest point, Quemoy's main island is 2,310 meters from the nearest Chinese Communist territory. The spot, called Mashan, is the site for one of Quemoy's four loudspeaker installations—another aspect of the psychological warfare program here.

The Mashan loudspeakers are powerful enough to be heard 20,000 meters away, and they shout their message 18 hours a day.

Chinese Communist loudspeakers across the channel shout their message back, but the Nationalist officers say that the Communist speakers are much weaker. They are primarily designed not to reach Quemoy listeners, but to make enough noise on the Communist side to drown out Taiwan's message, officers explain.

A loudspeaker victory was scored during the last Mid-Autumn Festival, one officer says. The festival was a holiday for everyone in Taiwan and the loudspeaker operators made much of this, knowing that Mid-Autumn Festival was not being observed across the water.

"The Communists had to rush out and buy some noon-cakes (the festival's traditional treat) for the people within our range," a loudspeaker officer says happily.

Defectors and fishermen from China provide Taiwan with the best gauge of its psychological warfare program's efficiency. Briefing officers report that these people say they listen to Quemoy's loudspeakers and its radio and are "encouraged to choose freedom."

The last defector to Quemoy was a Chinese Communist soldier who swam to the island last September, officers say. A group of 30 fishermen got caught by bad weather and came ashore last December. They were the most recent visitors from China, and they chose to return after the Nationalists fed them and gave them small presents, in keeping with the government's policy.

* * * * *

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND AIR POWER: ITS HITS AND MISSES*

By Robert L. Gleason

Although the Air Force has achieved significant PSYOP successes, the challenge remains to seek out more fully the PSYOP potential of aircraft as a medium of communication.

* * * * *

[VIETNAM]

In reviewing United States military experience in Vietnam, one is impressed with the vastly increased importance that must be attached to the psychological aspects of that conflict. These aspects emerge as both challenges and opportunities. In many cases the challenge has not been fully met, nor have the opportunities been fully exploited.

* * * * *

*This article was adapted from an address given to the graduation classes of the U.S. Army Psychological Operations Unit Officer Course and the Political Warfare Advisor Course, U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 25 June 1970. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Dr. Robert F. Futrell for his assistance in obtaining source material and for his critical review. The article was reprinted in *Air University Review*, XXII, No. 3 (March-April 1971), pp. 34–46. Reprinted with the permission of *Air University Review*, March-April 1971, Vol. XXII No. 3.

In 1961, in response to President Kennedy's order to all services to bolster their counterinsurgency capability, the USAF established the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron. Known as Jungle Jim, it later became the 1st Air Commando Squadron and finally evolved into the present Special Operations Air Force. Its original mission gave high priority to the conduct of psychological operations. Because of scarcity of experience in psyops, the Jungle Jim personnel turned to the [then] U.S. Army Special Warfare Center for some accelerated instruction in the subject. On 15 November 1961 they deployed to South Vietnam. On 4 December they flew our first psyops mission in C–47s equipped with belly-mounted loudspeakers, following the idea conceived during the Korean War. This mistake cost us about two years in redesign time. The systems proved to be totally unfeasible because of the Doppler effect. Like the train blowing its whistle as it comes down the track, the voice from the air kept changing pitch as the aircraft approached and departed, leaving no more than two or three intelligible words out of a complete sentence. Of course with the speakers protruding down and directly to the rear of the aircraft, circling techniques were out of the question. So back to the drawing board.

In 1964 the Air Force, still searching for its legitimate and complete requirement in the psyops area, contracted with . . . [a private firm] to survey just what was needed. Although the report identified many areas for USAF concentration and application, implementation of these recommendations has been slow and hesitant. For example, establishment of a USAF psyops school was recommended, but only one or possibly two classes were conducted. One reason might be the belief of some in the Air Force that we should merely be concerned with flying aircraft and that someone else will assure that the total psychological impact inherent in the tactical employment of aircraft will be properly calculated. Therefore, if the psychological aspects of air power or air operations are to be maximized, most of the impetus, at least at present, must come from graduates of non-USAF psyops schools. Many of these officers (members of all services) will find themselves on joint staffs where they will have an opportunity to parlay their special talents by applying them to the extensive potential of air power. There is room for questioning whether this has always been adequatley done in South Vietnam (SVN).

Besides the early SVN problems already mentioned, many people more recently have expressed disappointment at the failure of the limited bombing of North Vietnam (NVN) to completely disintegrate the morale of the North Vietnamese. Perhaps an indication of what we should have expected can be found by again reviewing the findings of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey [USSBS]. In brief, it found that although the demoralizing effect of the bombing of Germany was almost complete, there were certain categories of people who retained an exceptionally high degree of resistance to morale erosion.[1] They can be categorized in three groups: (1) highly disciplined Nazi party members, (2) firm converts

to the philosophy of Nazism whether or not a party member, and (3) those who were convinced in their own minds that their government was doing everything possible to protect them from the bombing raids. Another point made by the Survey was that the psywarfare effect (not necessarily the total military effect) can reach a saturation point under prolonged and incessant bombing. This is brought about by the fact that after a period of time most of the vulnerable and weaker elements of a society flee from the cities and only the strong-willed and dedicated elements remain. This, of course, makes the psywar warrior's job much more difficult, for among other things it reduces the contagious effect of demoralization. A third significant finding of the USSBS was that a government can do much to prepare its citizens psychologically for nonatomic air attacks.[2]

Applying these lessons to the North Vietnamese campaign is rather provocative. We know, for example, that the North Vietnamese government was given ample time and warning by the slowly escalating nature of the U.S. air attacks, and did, in fact, move great numbers of people into the countryside before intense raids commenced. They also had ample time to prepare those remaining psychologically. Additionally, we expended a considerable amount of rhetoric describing the intense aircraft defense system employed in NVN. Was this not in effect telling the people of North Vietnam just how well their government was trying to protect them? Perhaps instead we should have launched a psychological campaign emphasizing that their defense was unable to halt our penetrations, that no single authorized target was spared, and that their government was not doing all it could to defend its people, for example, "Where was North Vietnam's air force?"

Many other parallels or reciprocals can be drawn between psyops past and present. The purpose of this article is to direct attention to the facts that in new and changing situations military planners must constantly re-evaluate their techniques and that in so doing they should not ignore the lessons of history. If they apply, we should use them. If they do not. we should disregard them. But in either event, we should consciously examine them.

[THE NEW CHALLENGE]

A new challenge facing psychological operations officers concerns the nature of today's conflicts. Before the advent of nuclear weapons, most wars involving major powers were fought to a conclusion: victory for one side, defeat for the other. Deficiencies and omissions that may have occurred in conducting the psychological aspects of those wars were to a great extent obscured by the euphoria surrounding the final and total surrender of the enemy. Today's conflicts are not fought to such black-and-white resolutions. Indeed, in today's wars a military operation may be judged a success or failure not by its tactical accomplishments but by the effectiveness of the psywarfare and military/political actions that

accompany it. Put more bluntly, many victories are victories because one side convinces the other, or neutrals, that this is so.

This situation places psywar in an entirely new context and demands a greater awareness of both the favorable and unfavorable psychological impact of every military action, even, for example, the selection of operational nicknames. Richard H. S. Crossman, the British authority, points out, "The central substance of effective propaganda is hard, correct information . . . and it is necessary to make truth sound believable to the enemy."[3] Therefore, while such a name as "Operation Total Victory" (for the U.S. sweep into Cambodia [in 1970]) may have a euphemistic sound when used by friendly troops, it may provide grist for the enemy propaganda mill if the operation does not achieve the goal the nickname portends. This is not the first occasion when the choice of a nickname has been questioned from a psychological warfare viewpoint. In February 1951 the Eighth Army in Korea launched "Operation Killer," a nickname obviously in conflict with the accompanying psywar effort to persuade the Chinese troops to surrender. Similarly, the Fifth Air Force in Korea launched a railroad interdiction campaign as "Operation Strangle," a name that was counterproductive in that those who did not understand the real objective of interdiction were given a vehicle for proclaiming its failure.[4]

Finally, the psyops officer is challenged to conduct his programs and develop his themes in a manner to avoid their neutralization by information emanating from other sources. According to Sir Stewart Campbell, a British psywar expert, "There must be no conflicting arguments not only between outputs from the same sources but also those of different sources." [5] Every conflict fought since the Crimean War (when the invention of the telegraph first allowed war correspondents to communicate on a daily basis with their home editors) has been subject to criticism from the press as well as the loyal opposition within the government.[6] In wars where the vital interest of the United States is obvious, such as World Wars I and II, criticism from these sources has been minimal. In conflicts where our vital interest has been more obscured (albeit just as legitimate), the criticism can be expected to be more vocal and persistent. The psyops officer's challenge is to avoid the vitiating effects of this criticism to the extent possible and, above all, to resist the temptation to use the psyops arena to engage the press in any semblance of a military/political psyops argument. Steps in this direction would include limiting psyops actions as much as possible to military objectives and continually soliciting the cooperation of the press in the conduct of these efforts. This latter suggestion lends itself more to psyops activities than to conventional military actions, for the essence of psychological warfare is subtlety and truth, not secrecy or deception.

[CONCLUSION]

If this discourse appears somewhat critical of . . . Air Force participation in psywar operations, it is not intended to detract from the dedication

of aircrews performing these missions. In fact the first USAF crew lost to presumed enemy ground fire in South Vietnam during the early phases of the current conflict was on a psyops mission. This occurred on 11 February 1962.

* * * * *

Despite its initial shortcomings, the air psyops campaign has proved productive. For example, over ninety percent of the Chieu Hoi defectors first learned of that program from air-dispersed leaflets.[7] More revealing are the reactions of the Communist world to our psyops efforts. One can easily detect a "whistling in the dark" attitude in an article contained in the *World Marxist Review* in which the author says,". . . moreover [s] cattering leaflets urging the population to turn against their government in areas that were the cradle of the Vietnamese revolution is one of the stupidest blunders the 'psychological war' experts ever made." [8] One wonders just what part this "blunder" played in causing North Vietnam to issue its infamous decrees "on the punishment of Counterrevolutionary Crimes" a few years later. These decrees list fifteen specific crimes that needed special attention and punishment, including treason, plotting to overthrow the people's democratic power, espionage, defecting to the enemy, undermining the people's solidarity, disseminating counter-revolutionary propaganda, and others.[9] The necessity of issuing these strongly antipsywar decrees in the "cradle of the Vietnamese revolution" is perhaps our best evidence that our air war and psywar campaigns were having a telling effect against North Vietnam. The vastly increased importance of psychological warfare, especially in a restricted Vietnam-type war environment, is illuminated in the remarks of General Van Tien Dung, chief of staff of the North Vietnamese army, when he repeated an often emphasized theme that it is "the people, not the weapons, who form the backbone of [North Vietnam's] air defense."[10] We should also remember that it is the people, not the weapons, who are targeted through psychological warfare.

NOTES

1. Bernard Peters, Major, USAF, "The USAF and Psychological Warfare," *Air University Quarterly Review*, II, 4 (Spring 1949), p. 5.
2. Peters, p. 15.
3. From an address by Richard H. S. Crossman to the British Royal United Services Institute, quoted by William E. Daugherty, "The Creed of a Modern Propagandist," in William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958), pp. 38 and 41.
4. Dr. Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), p. 436.
5. John C. W. Field, *Aerial Propaganda Leaflets* (Francis J. Field, Ltd., Kent, England, n.d.), p. 10.
6. Timothy Gowing, Sergeant Major, *Voice from the Ranks* (London: The Folio Society, 1954), p. xii.
7. Press Release, Director of Information, Hq Seventh Air Force, 2 January 1967.
8. Michel Vincent, "Vietnam Fights Back," *World Marxist Review*, VIII, 8 (August 1965).

[9] *Vietnam: Documents and Research Notes*, U.S. Mission, Saigon, 1968, pp. 1–2.
[10] "China and U.S. Far East Policy, 1945–1967," *Congressional Quarterly Background* (Washington Quarterly Service, 1967), p. 220j.

CHINA'S USE OF CULTURE FOR PROPAGANDA*

By John S. Barr

Recognizing that the relative effectiveness of media varies significantly between different population groupings, mainland Chinese leaders employed a variety of media in order to reach and appeal to different population sectors.

When the Chinese Communists set up their regime in Peking in October, 1949, they established a Ministry of Culture and local bureaux of culture throughout the country, emphasizing the importance they gave to culture—partly or largely for propaganda. One very clever aspect of their cultural methods was that their variety enabled them to appeal to different sections of the population, but with a rather special attraction for youth. This article describes the initial methods used in the period 1949–1952.

FOLK DANCING

Folk dancing's natural appeal made it an ideal channel for propaganda. One dance for instance depicted the actions of a girl tending a machine in a cotton factory. This dance was rather beautiful, and many in the audience could understand and appreciate the significance of the simple movements. A similar appreciation was shown of a dance portraying the picking of tea leaves from the teabushes. Young men were also trained to perform some sort of military dance, falling down on the ground and pretending to be digging a trench on one side and then on the other. This militaristic feature went further when a jazz orchestra blared out patriotic song-music for social dancing.

One of the most spectacular examples of mass dancing was in the celebration of the National Day, October 1st, in 1952. The winter and spring of that year had seen the Five Anti Movement sweep all over the country, so that by the end of the summer, gloom and dismay were widespread. Deliberately, therefore, the keynote for the celebration was happiness, and for that purpose all the people were to be taught a simple dance. "all" meant all. The dance was extremely simple, The movements of the dance were taught—in the days preceding October 1st—to grandmothers and children, to housewives and to peasant women, to factory workers and to office staffs.

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*Excerpts from "China's Use of Culture for Propaganda," *Eastern World* XXI, No. 11/12 (Nov./Dec. 1967), pp. 10–11. Reprinted with the permission of Foreign Correspondents, Ltd., copyright holder.

The songs that were taught were simple, tuneful and patriotic, and they were broadcast incessantly. For the celebration of October 1st in 1951, all the people were taught three short songs. Each factory would have its little band or orchestra, and the musicians would be dressed in colourful costumes. Red, in Chinese symbolism, stands for happiness. Not a trick was missed in the presentation of these new songs. Most meetings were opened with a practice of the current popular songs. Large numbers of people would sing in unison, and as in Western evangelistic campaigns or at football matches, the participation by a crowd of tens of thousands aroused emotions. A new National Anthem was taught, which had a rousing tune too; Arise was its opening word.

At first, all the emphasis was on training the masses to sing. The National Conservatoire was ordered to make this their first aim rather than concentrate on a few artistes.

THEATRE

Chinese love going to the theatre, and not a few are born actors; whether they understand all the words or actions is sometimes irrelevant. Shaoshing opera and Peking opera have been famous for many years and have always attracted large crowds. The Chinese Communists cleverly encouraged the continuance of the presentation of the old plays but—of course—favoured those in which the villain was a landlord or someone of that ilk. Many new plays were put on. Chinese people have a great sense of tragedy, so they would appreciate a tragedy showing sufferings inflicted by cruel landlords or Japanese militarists. As melodrama is also applauded, plays with an "American imperialist" as the villain were also very popular.

China is a vast country, and Westerners find it hard to believe that plays found in Peking or in Shanghai are also to be found in the countryside. But, the Communist regime saw to it that small troupes of actors would tour the rural areas and that scripts of new plays would be broadcast to outlying parts of the country.

CINEMA

Once again, a Westerner was at a loss in this field too. In the West, the cinema is an entertainment. A movie star will assert that his aim is to make people "happy"—that is to help them to forget their troubles. In China, the Communist aim was and is to use movies for propaganda almost exclusively, and rather cleverly. For example, during the Five Anti Movement, documentaries were made. When Shanghai people saw on the screen the misdeeds of a well-known drug factory, they were greatly impressed. A picture would be shown of a "wicked capitalist factory owner" who painted over rusty old chains that subsequently broke when in use in the fighting in Korea.

During the first two or three years after 1949, the best acting, musical and circus troupes were sent abroad, e.g., to Moscow and to Paris. When

the Chinese in the cities of China saw on the screen a documentary of their troupe being given vociferous applause in Russia and in France, their patriotic pride was naturally aroused with widespread effect. Popular documentaries dealing with current themes were shown simultaneously in 15 or more theatres. Group tickets issued through the schools and factories were extremely cheap, so that the percentage of the population who saw such films was high. Virtually all new films had patriotic themes as "The New-Man Village," "The Dove of Peace," "Stand Up, Sisters."

MINORITIES CULTURAL TROUPES

Cultural troupes included those of the Chinese Minorities as well as troupes invited from foreign Communist countries, such as North Korea or Eastern European States like Poland. In the years preceding the Communist regime the previous Chinese governments had paid little attention to the minorities—of whom the Communists listed more than forty—but the Communists straight away spent considerable money, time and effort on bringing minorities dancing and singing groups from the outlying areas of the country to tour all over China. This had the immediate effect of increasing the patriotic fervour, making the people appreciate the greatness of their nation in many new areas. Chinese appreciate colour, and the costumes of these troupes were decidedly colourful.

The visits of foreign troupes, in the early 1950s, was an adroit move. Peking had not been invited to join the UN; the U.S. had put on embargos; foreign tourists and connections were not too common. Hence, the appearance of these foreign artistes showed the Chinese masses that they did have friends in some foreign countries. This was complemented by the showing of films of Chinese troupes performing in these same countries. Chinese have been famous for their skill in acrobatics for a long time. With their ability in organisation, the Communists were able to procure outstanding performers from all over the country in acrobatics, in conjuring, in Chinese sword dancing. The result was that the performance was of such outstanding merit that it brought tremendous credit and fame to new China. In one circus troupe, one of the acts was performed by an old man and his two sons. The old man was about five feet three inches in height, and was quite slender. The climax of that act was when the old man sat on the floor, and drawing a small hoop—with a diameter of possibly eighteen inches—over his feet and legs, proceeded to squeeze his whole body through this hoop. A popular story had it that when this circus had performed in Moscow, the Russians had asked that this old man be X-rayed.

EXHIBITIONS

The Chinese used exhibitions in a big way, similar to their use of the cinema and radio for propaganda. For instance, the Land Reform Exhibition showed in clear, direct manner the way in which the peasants had

formerly been exploited by the landlords. Pictures, charts and implements all told an easily-understood situation. One could hear the onlookers comment, "Oh, yes, I knew this. I saw that." Skill in the technique of getting across a political message was also shown when there was an Agriculture and Forestry Exhibition. Special charts and pictures were supplied to illustrate how the urban folk could help those in the rural areas, and vice versa.

RADIO

Perhaps it is in the use of radio that the Communists have reached heights—or depths?—that would seem unbelievable to Westerners. Take the celebration of Labour Day, May 1st, in 1951, as one example. A two-day programme was put on, lasting four hours, from 6:30 p.m. to 10:30. Twenty-two items were listed for the first day, including speeches, shouting of slogans, band music, solos, etc. All factories and schools were expected to use their loudspeaker system for listening-in. The programme was designed to whip up enthusiasm for increased production, so that, say after one hour, one factory would telephone in and say, "We have been stimulated to pledge to increase production by ten percent." This, naturally, was immediately reported over the radio. Soon after, another factory would respond and go further by pledging to increase its production by fifteen percent.

In October, 1952, there was a Peace Conference in Peking and after that conference, Shanghai delegates reported it over the radio. Town women sat outside their houses on benches and seats to listen to these reports, and this was repeated all over the country. During one of the early thought-reform campaigns, the children of a prominent "reactionary" were even brought to the broadcasting studio to broadcast an appeal to their father to repent and reform. Another development was the seven o'clock morning physical exercises broadcast over the radio—exercises which were being performed in most parts of the country.

WALL NEWSPAPERS

After the Communist Government was installed in Peking, all aspects of life came under government control with politics pervading the daily life of China to an extent that would not be believed in Western countries.

One of the cleverest devices was in the use of wall newspapers, which might be on a wall or a blackboard or hoarding. Chinese people admire and love good calligraphy. The trick was to get the best calligraphist in the neighbourhood, whose writing was admired, and his material was supplied to him by a politically-progressive cadre. Usually a cartoon or funny picture was added for good measure to attract the passers-by. Also a special section might be devoted to services for the neighbours such as "lost and found," "to let." Items of particular interest to housewives might be added, such as "the daily menu," "how to weave."

In their first five years of government, the Chinese put out more issues of new stamps than many other countries would put out in ten years. These issues commemorated the birthday of Lenin, or a big Communist meeting in Peking, or tractors, or athletes, or the famous murals in the Tung Huang Caves. Matchbox covers had pictures of new factories or of tractors in the field. Wrappings for sweets would have similar scenes, and so would banknotes. Pocket diaries were produced and at the foot of each page covering one week, there would be a saying from Lenin or Stalin, or Mao Tse-tung, or some other Chinese Communist leader.

The lengths to which an individual in any particular walk of life would go to show his political progressiveness can well be illustrated by the following true story. One night in the spring of 1952, in a Chinese restaurant in Shanghai, a feast was being served at two tables. One of the dishes was a watermelon cooked in the Cantonese style. When the two melons were brought in, one for each table, it was observed that the chef had skillfully ornamented the rims not by a fretwork design but by carving out on one melon four Chinese characters for Resist America, Aid Korea, and on the other melon, Protect the Motherland, Assist the Nation.

The Chinese Communists are masters of the art of propaganda. They assign much time and personnel to political propaganda, and many people are employed full time in the propagation of the Party doctrines. For example, in one single district of Shanghai, 25 Youth League Workers who were subsidised by the government had as their full-time job the task of going to the Party branches or organisations in the factories and schools and lanes in their district to demonstrate the latest dances or songs or plays or to tell about radio programmes and the like.

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PLAYS AND PROPAGANDA: THEATRE AS A COMMUNICATION MEDIUM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA*

By James R. Brandon

An account of the use of theatre to convey political themes in Southeast Asia.

In all countries of Southeast Asia theatre has been more than just entertainment. In addition to providing aesthetic pleasure, emotional release through empathic response, and even a means for accomplishing communal celebration of ritual events, theatre has always functioned as a channel for communication. Traditionally, three major channels were open to southeast Asian ruling elites through which they could disseminate their ideas, beliefs, and value systems: the religious hierarchy,

*Excerpts from "Past and Present," chapter 15 in *Theatre in Southeast Asia*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1967, pp. 277–301. Copyright 1967 by the president and fellows of Harvard College.

scholars and scribes, and theatrical performances.[1] Of these, theatre has unquestionably been the most important in reaching the largely illiterate populations of the countryside and the cities. Priests, monks, and religious teachers have played their role in propagating religious ideas to large numbers of people but their work has often centered at court or in urban communities. The influence of the scholars and scribes has always been limited to the very small group of elite who could read and write. The use of theatre to educate and instruct an audience is not unique to Southeast Asia. Greek citizens were educated en masse at communally sponsored tragic festivals. Horace said Roman drama should "entertain and instruct." Through Morality and Mystery plays in the Middle Ages, pagans were instructed in Christian doctrine and practicing Christians were sustained in their beliefs. In modern times playwrights from Ibsen to Shaw to Brecht, Miller, and Genet have used the stage as a pulpit. Groups of all kinds, from the Nazis and the Communists to Moral Rearmament, have used theatre as well. What is notable about the theatre in Southeast Asia, as compared with Europe or America, is the degree to which it is involved in the educative process. It is not an exaggeration to say that, had the theatre not existed as a powerful channel for communicating to large groups of people, Southeast Asian civilization would not be what it is today. Through the medium of theatre performances, the complex religious, metaphysical, social, and intellectual values of the ruling elite were disseminated to the most unsophisticated villagers in the most remote areas.

The Khmer kings of Cambodia and the Brahmanic priestly class used theatre performances as a part of the ritual worship of the god-king. . . . The kings of Java, Bali, Sunda, Sumatra, and Malaya encouraged and sponsored recitations and performances of local versions of the same epics.

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Drama was the main medium through which Javanese, Sudanese, and Balinese religious and philosophic systems were taught to the people.

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On the Malay Peninsula, Islamic teachings penetrated . . . drama . . . deeply. . . .

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In Thailand, Burma, Laos, and Cambodia, Buddhist . . . stories have been widely performed for several centuries. . . .

To a certain extent Catholic missionaries utilized the appeal of theatre to gain converts to Christianity in the Philippines. Their aims were similar to those of the Moslem missionaries in Indonesia and Buddhist missionaries on the mainland of Southeast Asia. Their methods were not much different.

* * * * *

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when European countries and the United States had colonized most of Southeast Asia, local nationalists sometimes tried to use theatre performances as a means of arousing the people against foreign rule. Troupes performing at court . . . were seldom involved, for their repertories consisted of classic plays and their livelihood depended upon court favor. Most anticolonial, pro-nationalistic plays were staged by troupes in the popular tradition. . . . Colonial authorities watched closely for any hint of opposition in theatre performances so that criticism was usually indirect or phrased as double-entendre language which European officials would have a hard time unraveling. . . . However, theatre was not an important weapon of nationalist leaders in their campaigns of harassment and agitation against colonial rule in pre-World War II days. The small nationalist movements were not prepared to use theatre as a propaganda medium in any major way. It would have been difficult to mount a concerted theatrical effort in the face of stern government controls. And, in any case, the nationalist leaders had little time to think of theatre; often it was all they could do to stay alive and out of prison, to say nothing of staging plays.

The largest concerted effort in modern times to utilize theatre as a propaganda medium in Southeast Asia was that of the Japanese occupation forces during World War II. Between 1940 and 1945 the Japanese gained control of every government in Southeast Asia. Through both civil and military channels, Japanese authorities pressed theatre into service to help explain the aims of their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Western countries were vilified through the drama, and Asian nations glorified. The Japanese clearly recognized the communication potential of the theatre and assigned considerable sums of money and numbers of personnel to the task.

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Few governments in Southeast Asia today attempt to use theatre as a medium of communication in Southeast Asia. In the Philippines, in Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, governments rarely educate, inform, or indoctrinate people through dramatic performances. Only in Indonesia and in Vietnam is government propaganda regularly disseminated via the stage.[2] Civil ministries and the armed forces in both these countries organize and operate propaganda theatre troupes, and their efforts to harness the communication potential of theatre for national purposes are extremely interesting.

The largest theatre-as-propaganda program within the Indonesian government is administered by the Ministry of Information through its network of offices beginning on the national and provincial level, extending through regional, district, and city levels, and reaching down as far as the sub-district and the village. Most of the government's theatre efforts

are concentrated on the island of Java, where theatre traditions are strong and where more than half the population of the country lives. In its theatre program the Ministry has adopted an indirect and a direct approach. In its indirect approach the Ministry works through existing professional troupes. . . . Low-level Ministry of Information officials pass along propaganda material to professional troupes, hoping they will put the material in their plays. Materials usually are prepared at the provincial level by officials of the People's Information Section. They may be merely statements of government policy or they may be play scripts and scenarios which incorporate the desired propaganda themes. Up through the 1950's a good deal of effort went into the indirect approach. Many troupes were regularly contacted by information officials. . . . Efforts to work through professional troops have fallen off in recent years.

The Ministry's direct approach is to set up and run its own propaganda theatre troupes. Professional performers are hired as officials of the Ministry of Information. Their full-time job is to write, direct, or perform propaganda plays. The Ministry of Information got into the theatre business during the years of the Revolution (1945–1949), when Indonesia's struggling nationalist government sought ways of rallying the people's support. Conventional mass media—radio, motion pictures, the press—were in the hands of the Dutch. Nothing was more natural than to turn to . . . shadow drama, the traditional mode of cultural expression of the Javanese, as a means of telling the people about government policy. . . . Puppets were flat leather cutouts. . . . But they represented contemporary figures—Soekarno, Nehru, soldiers, Dutchmen, peasants—and they were cut and painted in realistic fashion. The puppets told stories of "national leaders and guerrilla soldiers in their struggle to obtain independence for their country." [3] . . . . The Dutch controlled the cities, but it was easy for student-guerrillas to tote a dozen leather puppets, a small screen, and a lamp along backcountry trails. In villages along the route of their march the soldiers performed rousing stories of the fight against the Dutch. Plays were short, for the guerrillas often had little time; they were simple, so unsophisticated peasants could understand them. It is difficult to estimate how many troupes were operating during the Revolution. The Dutch thought . . . [these plays] effective enough to take the trouble, during the Second Military Action of 1948, to search for, confiscate, and destroy several hundred . . . puppets. When the Revolution ended in 1949 the main reason for [the plays] . . . ended as well. People began to see and to care that the puppets were crude and the stories blatant, and no audience would pay to have . . . [these plays] performed. [They were] kept alive only through performances sponsored and paid for by the Ministry of Information.

As the deficiencies of *wayang suluh* became more apparent, a new form of . . . [drama] was created which, it was hoped, would retain the mystic appeal and artistic excellence of traditional . . . [shadow play] while conveying a modern social and political message. This remarkable crea-

tion was called *wayang Pantja Sila*. It was conceived by Mr. Harsono Hadisoeseno, puppeteer and leader of a government information unit. . . . According to Javanese mystic thought there are 144 human passions and characteristics. Puppet figures visually represent all these traits in traditional . . . [theatre]. It was not difficult, therefore, to select appropriate puppet figures to symbolize all the modern concepts of *wayang Pantja Sila*. Just as the puppets of . . . five . . . brothers [in a traditional epic] symbolized the five principles of the Pantja Sila, other traditionally "good" puppet figures symbolized Miss Freedom, Health Services, Education, Agriculture, and so on, while traditional demon puppet figures symbolized evils such as Plant Disease, Devaluation, Inflation, and Loss of Moral Standards, as well as the competing ideologies of Feudalism, Marxism, Individualism, Intellectualism, and others.

Wayang Pantja Sila was created by the Ministry of Information for its own performers, but it was hoped that audiences would take to the new form and that professional *dalang* would begin to perform it. This did not happen. Like . . . [its predecessor] and a dozen . . . [drama] forms created by Javanese princes in past centuries to glorify themselves, *wayang Pantja Sila* never caught on with the public. Likely its elaborate symbolism was too complex for villagers to understand (though in theory its symbolism was the strongest point in its favor). Perhaps professional . . . [puppeteers] shied away from it because it was so closely tied to government sponsorship. Government support for *wayang Pantja Sila* has declined drastically in recent years. Its mild, democratically inclined message is out of date.

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Concurrent with its efforts to develop . . . [these theatre forms] as communication media, the Ministry of Information has hired troupes of various standard genres to tell the government's story. . . . [Paper-scroll play] was experimented with, largely because it was simple and inexpensive to perform. A puppeteer to tell the story, some pictures painted on paper, and perhaps an assistant or two were all that was needed. Troupes of . . . comedians were sent touring though Central and East Java. *Dagelan* are the clown roles in *Ludruk* and *Ketoprak*; a dagelan troupe is made up of four or five performers, all of whom play comic roles. These troupes proved extremely successful with village audiences.

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In addition to the Ministry of Information in Indonesia, the armed services also operate a few theatre troupes. The army especially is in a powerful position within the government. Its budget is by far the largest of any branch of the government. . . . Each major command of the army has a Morale Unit (URRIL) whose assignment is to entertain troops in the command. Soldiers assigned to a URRIL unit are performers of one kind or another, and each unit maintains several more or less separate

groups of performers. . . . URRIL officers say they usually choose "patriotic or fight" plays ... as appropriate for their military audience. The primary function of military theatre troups is to entertain. Their secondary function is to inform. . . . Similar morale units are found in all the armed services. Army, navy, and air force headquarters in Djakarta also sometimes send out professional troupes for one- to two-month tours of military posts on the outer islands.

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[Specific coverage of the theatre as a communication medium in other Southeast Asian countries has been omitted from this article.]

NOTES

1. Robert Redfield, *Peasant Society and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Civilization* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 98, quoting Milton Singer regarding India. The same can be said of Southeast Asia.

2. The Burmese government may also be using theatre for propaganda purposes. Lack of reliable information on Burma at the moment makes it impossible to say for certain.

3. Indonesian Embassy, Washington, D. C., The Arts of Indonesia, mimeograph, n.d., p. 12.

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF US-SUPPORTED CULTURE-DRAMA TEAMS*

By the JUSPAO Planning Office

By establishing closer identification with the local population and clothing messages and appeals in traditional culture form, culture drama teams provide a congenial setting for the presentation of political communication. Under these conditions, the target population is more likely to be attentive to the messages and appeals.

INTRODUCTION

Culture-drama entertainment in rural hamlets is a traditional expression of culture in Vietnam. Roaming culture-drama teams began to operate in the days of Chinese domination and this tradition has continued through modern times. Because of the widespread familiarity of the peasant with the culture-drama and his wide acceptance of this traditional culture form, the Communists seized upon the concept and developed it into a PSYOP weapon. The Communist forces in Vietnam presently use culture-drama to bolster the morale of both combatants and noncombatants, to instill attitudes favorable to their cause, and to sustain *their attack on the political, military, social, and economic objectives* of the Government of Vietnam.

During recent years the Government of Vietnam, with support from United States organizations, has employed culture-drama teams to assist in accomplishment of its objectives. These teams have had varying de-

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*Excerpts from "Organization and Operation of U.S.-Supported Culture-Drama Teams," JUSPAO Field Memorandum Number 57 (Saigon: JUSPAO Planning Office, August 21, 1968), pp. 1–8.

grees of success. The most successful program to date has been the U.S.-supported Van Tac Vu program, which over the past two years has operated from 13 to 20 teams, of from six to eight members each, in remote hamlets of South Vietnam.

Early in 1968 Van Tac Vu teams were increased from 13 to 20 and the plan was to effect an increase up to 26 by December 1968. This plan was rendered impracticable by national mobilization. Military conscription of Van Tac Vu personnel reduced the program from 20 field teams in March to 11 in May 1968; and by 1 August 1968 the number had been reduced to five.

In order to keep the culture-drama program operating at an effective level, it becomes necessary to identify or organize teams in the provinces, consisting of personnel assigned to ARVN military organizations, Revolutionary Development cadre, CIDG or Armed Propaganda Teams, and other personnel who are draft exempt or have draft deferment status.

A culture-drama team is a group of young and talented artists, organized to conduct PSYOP programs through the medium of entertainment. Each team should be composed of from five to nine members. Experience has revealed that a good balance is achieved by the formula of two-thirds male members, one third female. These teams tour the hamlets of remote and contested rural areas, entertaining the people and using entertainment as a medium for PSYOP messages in support of programs and objectives of the Government of Vietnam. Such programs and objectives include, but are not necessarily limited to, those of National Reconciliation and Chieu Hoi, Revolutionary Development, the GVN Image, the Refugee and Police Programs, Phoenix, RF/PF and other pacification efforts. The teams perform not only in village/hamlets, but also in refugee and Chieu Hoi Centers and at RF/PF outposts. When necessary and feasible they operate in direct support of military operations.

GOALS OF CULTURE-DRAMA TEAMS

1. To revive the native culture-drama tradition and forge it into a tool of combat; in other words, to create a National Combat Culture-Drama.
2. To counter alien culture-drama forces adopted by the Communists.
3. To provide a medium whereby, through entertainment, PSYOP support may be provided to programs and objectives of the Government of Vietnam.

RESPONSIBILITIES

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United States organizations—military or civilian—which conduct psychological operations are encouraged to organize and/or support culture-drama teams at the province level, each to operate within a province. Such U.S.-supported teams should operate under the control of a local agency of the Government of Vietnam but may be supported

entirely or in part, according to need, by U.S. organizations. In no case should a culture-drama team use the title of a U.S. supporting agency in its publicity or during performances. Continuation of support must, of course, be determined on the basis of the effectiveness of the teams, as determined by the supporting organization.

THE PROGRAM OF THE CULTURE/DRAMA TEAMS

Culture-Drama Performances

The basic mission of a culture-drama team is to perform for populations of village complexes. Such teams normally perform once or twice a day. If the security situation permits, they conduct night performances.

The typical performance lasts for an hour or more and includes modern and traditional VN songs, a magic show, skits, plays and humorous tales. Dances may be performed if the requisite talent exists. Virtually all of the material is PSYOP-oriented, i.e., it serves the objectives of GVN programs.

Cultural Seed Planting

This activity is directed toward school children and other youngsters of elementary and early secondary school age. In Cultural Seed Planting sessions, children learn patriotic songs and develop pride in being citizens of Vietnam. Woven into the singing sessions are lessons designed to encourage children to respect their teachers, to obey their parents, to get along with their friends, to love their native country, and to identify themselves clearly with the elected Government of the Republic of Vietnam. Parallels are drawn between the present defense against aggression and struggles in past centuries against other invaders.

Cultural Seed Planting is conducted at schools, in parks, in orphanages and at any other location where children may be assembled. This is a regular, daily task for the teams. A normal session lasts from one to two hours.

PSYOP Civic Action Activities

In addition to the PSYOP content of their performances, culture-drama teams, by the nature of their operations, have an unusual opportunity to disseminate information and publications at the "rice-roots" level. This also is a daily major assignment.

Before leaving the provincial capital on an operation, the team should contact organizations conducting PSYOP in the province and pick up leaflets, posters, magazines, and other materials supporting current PSYOP programs for distribution in rural areas.

Culture-drama team members may conduct Chieu Hoi broadcasts at night, when the situation warrants, over ground public address systems. They attempt to communicate with the Viet Cong and with VC-connected families to explain the Chieu Hoi program and in this way to persuade members of the Viet Cong to return to the Government of Vietnam.

In order to create a strong identification between the people and the team, the team cadre engage in manual labor on small projects designed to help the people of the hamlet. They clear and dig drainage ditches, repair fences, sweep out marketplaces, help improve roads, wash babies, and tend to sick and wounded soldiers. In short, they perform any helpful task that is within their capabilities. Such activities are conducted daily—they are symbols of the bond that joins the culture-drama team members to the people. This spiritual aspect of their work is more important than the practical significance of the tasks performed, although each task must have practical benefit if the teams are to communicate with the villagers.

Popularization of Culture-Drama

A culture-drama team may organize local artists into hamlet and village culture-drama teams. Through this means, songs and dramas are woven into the daily lives of the rural population. Further, the formation of village/hamlet culture-drama teams opens up new possibilities for information and PSYOP activities. Culture-drama team cadre are able to concentrate on Cultural Seed Planting over longer periods of time and thereby to promote a more deeply-rooted sense of patriotism among young people.

To accomplish this task a team must live in a hamlet over an extended period of time. The goal was successfully reached by Van Tac Vu Teams at three experimental locations. However, this success engendered particularly strong and violent reactions from the Viet Cong and the program had to be suspended temporarily under 1968 post-TET security conditions.

This activity should be resumed as soon as practicable, since popularization of culture-drama can assist in accomplishing the pacification objectives of the GVN. The basis of this concept is: The strength of any given program is limited, but the ultimate strength of the people is boundless. Culture-drama aims to tap the strength of the people. At the same time it seeks to guide and motivate the people to identify themselves with the Government of Vietnam.

FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF OR ASSISTANCE TO TEAMS

Financial assistance to or support of culture-drama teams must be based clearly and directly on their effectiveness in psychological operations in support of GVN objectives. There is no justification for using U.S. funds for support of mere entertainment troupes.

U.S. organizations supporting culture-drama teams in whole or in part must provide adequate funds for such support. The cost of maintaining one team of eight members for one year is, at present wage levels, approximately one million piasters, not including any initial cost of equipment.

. . . . All pay systems should be as uniform as circumstances permit.

There should be no competing for talent by one organization offering higher pay than another.

In any case, it is essential that the pay scale adopted by any organization incorporate some kind of incentive pay, modeled after that applying to Van Tac Vu Teams. The incentive pay system has been a vital element in the success of the Van Tac Vu program.

Provincial-level teams may be composite in nature, i.e., composed of personnel drawing salaries from different organizations. In such cases, personnel whose basic salaries are lower than the standard for culture-drama team members should be brought up to the team level by augmentation of their pay, and all personnel on a team must have equal opportunity to earn incentive pay.

BASIC PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

Experience has revealed certain principles of organization and operation which are fundamental to the success of a culture-drama program. U.S. organizations should support only those programs which meet, or show definite promises of meeting, these basic principles.

It is essential that culture-drama teams live among village/hamlet populations. . . .

Culture-drama work must be fulltime employment, not an afterhours' activity [of] students. . . .

Appearances of culture-drama teams at social functions of GVN or U.S. organizations should be limited to those necessary for public relations purposes, i.e., to gain support. . . .

Team members must be dedicated, patriotic citizens of the Republic of Vietnam. . . .

Team members must be of high moral character. . . .

Team members should have the ability, or the potential to develop the ability, to establish strong identification with the rural population, to win their favor, and to establish a channel of communication from the Government of Vietnam to these rural audiences.

Teams must earn their pay. . . .

It is not sound to assume that musical or acting ability is the sole requirement for becoming a member of a culture-drama team. . . .

Membership on a culture-drama team must not be permitted to serve the financial interests of the team members or the sponsors.

The basic requirements for employment on a team must be talent and proper attitudes. . . .

It is essential that team members, while operatng in the field, function as a family. . . .

Programming, within the general themes and objectives outlines by a supporting organization, should be left largely up to the team members.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Experience has revealed that a culture-drama team should operate within a defined monthly cycle. The cycle established for Van Tac Vu teams is cited here as an example only. These teams generally depart from their headquarters, usually the province capital, for field operations on the fifth day of each month. They spend 20 days in intensive operations in the hamlets. On the 25th day of the month they report back to their headquarters and file their report on operations and the team's diary with the sponsor. Payment of salaries is made at this time, since the amount of incentive pay due cannot determined until the report is filed. The team leader is reimbursed at this time for costs of transportation and other allowable team operational costs.

After the 25th of the month the team members are allowed five days for recuperation.The first five days of the subsequent month are spent in rehearsal of songs, skits, plays and other program material for use in the upcoming monthly program.

Material used by culture-drama teams must be unsophisticated, i.e., it must be aimed at rural audiences rather than at urban people. The music selected for presentation must be inherently Vietnamese, classic and modern. In the past, some teams have consistently appealed to the tastes of urban audiences influenced by Western culture. This kind of music, particularly including the modern popular music imported from the U-nited States and featured in city night clubs, does not serve the purposes of the culture-drama program.

Operational schedules should be drawn up well in advance of each operational month, in consultation between the supporting organization and the team leader. This schedule should list the hamlets, refugee centers, outposts and other locations to be included in the itinerary. Program content also should be planned in advance, including "themes of the month." In developing monthly plans, it may be helpful to consider the content of the *Van Tac Vu Magazine*, which is a primary source of program material.

The sponsors must provide the maximum attainable security for the team, since it will be a target for the Viet Cong.

Experience has revealed that it is a bad practice to lend money to or provide advance payments to team members. This practice has invariably had an adverse effect on cadre discipline and morale.

NORTH VIETNAMESE AND NFLSV SONGS AS PROPAGANDA*

By the 7TH PSYOP GROUP

Songs are an important medium of communication in many cultures. Singing often accompanies work routine and thus can become a significant medium not only for communicating messages, but also for reenforcing ideas.

*Excerpts from "Communist Propaganda Trends," Issue no. 608, pp. 11–15.

Two song books were issued in 1966 in Hanoi—one is devoted to songs used by the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) and the other book contains songs sung in North Vietnam itself.

LIBERATING THE SOUTH

The first songbook is called "Liberating the South." On a green cover the words "Vietnamese Songs" are written in Spanish, French, English, Chinese, and Russian. The majority of the songs used to "liberate the south" are understandably marches.

The first song in this book is dedicated to the NFLSV and called "Liberating the South." It is described as the official song of the "South Vietnam Liberation National Front". The sentiment in this song is perhaps exemplified by a few quotes from the English words that North Vietnam has supplied for its English-language songsters. Among the words of the lyrics are such stout-hearted appeals as "together we advance resolutely. . . to annihilate U.S. imperialism . . . for so many years, our rivers and mountains have been divided." The writer of the lyrics takes pride in the geography of Vietnam and refers to the "majestic Mekong River" and the "glorious Truong Son range."

The song concludes with a refrain which calls upon the "heroic southern people" to rise up because "the sun is rising everywhere and we pledge ourselves to build our country and make it bright and lively forever." As will be noted, this song contains such propaganda themes as anti-imperialism, a call for the unification of Vietnam, and pride in majesty of the nation. This song is a call to people in South Vietnam and makes no reference in the English lyrics to Communism or North Vietnam.

The next song in the book, not a march, is entitled "Uncle Ho's Voice".* The lyrics tell us of the tender voice from "beloved North Vietnam" that reaches South Vietnam, "our native land." Uncle Ho's voice is described as filled with love and bright as the morning sun. As the bringer of tremendous hope, Uncle Ho speaks with a dear voice, the voice of a tender mother. Quite understandably to certain groups of Vietnamese, perhaps, this voice penetrates deeply. Any singer of this song informs Uncle Ho that the South Vietnamese people are rising up against the wicked enemy and they are marching forward under the "national liberation flag" and that millions of people believe in "Him." Uncle Ho, presumably an atheist, might be surprised to know that Hanoi translators in the English lyrics thought it proper to use the capital letter denoting a Deity for the pronoun "Him" in referring to Uncle Ho.

The next two songs are called "The March of Liberation" and simply "The March." These are what [the NFLSV] probably mean by people's songs, full of such popular gusto as "hatred makes us strong," "we go to kill the last of the Yankee imperialists," "we sing songs of optimism,

*"Uncle Ho" refers to Ho Chi Minh, North Vietnamese leader.

although our people are suffering too much," but nevertheless "hatred is burning in our hearts."

A song called "The Hour of Action" is apparently a battle chant. The lyrics say that the NFLSV cannot soften its hatred, that its soldiers must live and that the enemy must die, and that the "new wind from the five continents is supporting us in our just struggle." It soars in fervor to say, "the revolutionary tide is surging, Rise up!"

"Spring at the Resistance Base" is a pastoral ballad of the guerrilla soldier who contemplates the songs of the birds, the bursting forth of the flowers, and the wind in the forest trees. He admits that he is homesick, but more important, he remains resolute in his determination to wipe out the enemy.

A song called "The Bamboo Spike" is a eulogy on the efficacy of bamboo spikes that draw the enemy's blood. This song is apparently designed for a chorale. There is a solo part, a part for all, a part for the men, and a final section that is described for "two bands." The song seemingly requires one of the chorus to hold up a spike, for it says that "this spike is no doubt a bamboo spike . . . it is the spike which yesterday killed the enemy who came and ransacked our village." One solo part goes, "Brothers! Let's plant the long spike in the deep trap." The chorus cuts in, "Long spike, short spike, everywhere spike, spike bristling upwards or planted in the deep trap." The finale reasserts the theme: "This is the spike to kill the enemy and protect our village, Oh! bamboo spike!"

The girl heroine seems to be popular in Vietnamese song and story, and the NFLSV would not be without a heroine. A tune called "The Everlasting Song" is, according to its lyrics, the song of a girl from Quang Nam, a heroic South Vietnamese girl. The words go on to say, "Miss Van! Your song will last forever . . . your heroism will be admired by generations to come . . . the whole South Vietnam is aroused with indignation and sings your everlasting song." The final line gives the heroine's name: "Tran-Thi-Van, your name will live forever."

"Jacket Making Song" is a panegyric to the dedication of the home front. The singer declares that whether it is bitter cold or sweltering heat, those at home will continue to make "jackets" so that their fighters will be resolute and kill the enemy. A third refrain goes: "Speed up your work, oh brothers and sisters." The jackets are said to clothe "the liberation fighters" and the home front wants to express hatred "in silk."

The last song of the NFLSV book is called "Longing for the Liberation Soldier." This is a hymn to the greatness of one NFLSV fighter. It contains such lines as "I love the liberation soldier and miss him when he fleaves . . . a liberation soldier is soon going to annihilate the U.S. imperialist . . . all our people march to annihilate the enemy . . . and make spike traps to defend our villages . . . for the day of reunification of all the people, north and south . . . and all our people will live under the same roof."

The foregoing song collection has been brought out, it is presumed, because the songs are the favorites of the NFLSV.

READY TO STRUGGLE

The second book is devoted to songs sung in the North. It follows the same format, having on the cover the words "Vietnamese Songs" written in Chinese, Russian, French, English, Spanish, and of course, Vietnamese. The title of the book is *Ready to Struggle*, and on the blue cover is a drawing of a U.S. aircraft seen in a gunsight with its wing shot off and falling towards the earth, apparently an exemplification of the dedicated antiaircraft skill of the North Vietnamese antiaircraft unit.

The first song in the book is called "Ready to Struggle." It tells us to music that the people in the north are holding sickles, hammers, or pens in their hands, and they are vying with each other to boost production either in the fields or at construction sites. Like the NFLSV, their hearts are "filled with hatred" and all are anxious to deal deadly blows to the U.S. aggressors. The lyrics call for the transformation of pens into guns since only through struggle can the people grow up quickly. According to the song, the people in the north want to sacrifice their lives for the fatherland; they are unafraid of hardships and difficulties. The singer calls to North Vietnamese youths: "Let's rise up and defend our bright sky."

The second song is pep chant to antiaircraft and other weapons. It is called "Strike Them Accurately." Characteristic of this song is "Our sea is not their pond . . . don't let them soil our air . . . shoot them down . . annihilate them . . . let us smash their aggressive scheme."

The first two songs are marches, as is the third, in which North Vietnam in song tells the south, "O South, We are Ready." The lyrics point out that "the south is calling upon us, and at this call from you (the south) immediately will start to resist the enemy." The refrain goes: "Just a call from you and we will start to reach our native south."

In a more bellicose vein, is the next aria, "Ready! Fire!" The singer tells how Vietnamese antiaircraft units are smashing "U.S. piratical planes", and how the whole north is "red with flags and soaked in sweat." The singer ends by declaring that the battery in the north is always ready to aim and fire at U.S. imperialists.

Among the North Vietnamese songs is one entitled "Cling to the Sea of Our Homeland." It is devoted not only to the defense of the sea but to the triumphs of the fishing industry. The lyrics begin by describing northern boats going out to sea and when they come back,"our boats will be full of fish." The boats will go "everywhere, pursuing the streams of fish to find things to make our life more joyful." The lyric writer declares that the enemy tries to send over "a lot of spies," but bearing deep in our heart our hatred, "we will force them to pay." In other words, no matter what happens, the message continues "defend our fatherland."

"Quang Binh, O My Homeland" extols an aria. The lyrics laud the good rice plants there, a militia girl who acts as a sentry on the coast, and the songs of fishermen of the cooperatives "who share the sky and the sea and have a rich income." Here also toil young women drying salt along the shore and woodworkers busy in the forests. The English version used the

word "hallelujah" after various lines, but the hallelujah seems to follow no real pattern and is an odd choice for atheistic Communists. The song goes on to tell how mothers and sisters have sacrificed and saved rice to feed the troops. Although Quang Binh is the homeland of the narrator who will defend it because he loves it, he wants to send to the south his true feelings since someday "all will meet again in one home, the day of great victory."

North Vietnam has made a national hero of Nguyen Van Troi, who attempted to assassinate U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara, was caught, and executed in Saigon. A stamp has been issued in North Vietnam honoring Nguyen Van Troi and also a song entitled "Your Words Will Echo Forever." The lyrics say that Nguyen Van Troi, a worker of Saigon City, faced the enemy guns and is now known all over the world through words that echo "until Venezuela." The song tells us that millions will follow the example of Nguyen Van Troi, who has become as "iron and steel" in the effort to kill the U.S. aggressors. The lyrics predict that Nguyen Van Troi's words "Long Live Vietnam" will echo forever.

"Starlights," a love song, talks about the perfume of the night scent, lamps shining, and millions of stars in the sky. The homes in North Vietnam are described as warm with love, where couples may live in love, and where they have pledged to build more and more houses so that they can live in a homeland where one day there will be more songs of love. The singer thinks of home in the south and one day hopes to return there "when millions of stars will shine again to embroider the dark." The lyrics say, "O my sweetheart, we are separated by two zones and partition tears down our hearts," but one day this will all be over.

The song "On Our Way Forward" is dedicated to construction of many kinds. The jungles will be turned into corn and rice fields; new sites will go up everywhere. In the past the singer has fought the enemy; he has fought by the banks of the Mekong River, but today he is standing on the banks of the Red River in North Vietnam, building a new nation that will be filled with joyful songs.

The last song in the book, "Wherever the Difficulties Are, There the Youth Will Be", is a lyric in praise of young fighters. The words say, "We follow the path of revolution and we forget ourselves . . . we are determined to fight, overcoming hardships, we advance to the future towards the bright society . . . when the Party needs us we are ready . . . wherever the difficulties are, there the youth will be."

COMMENT

Not one of these 20 songs is devoted to peace. There are some nostalgic bits about the homeland, but nowhere [in the books] do any . . . lyrics writers hope for peace except on North Vietnamese terms of total victory. The songs are bulging with Communist ideas of self-reliance; dependence on Party leadership; the glorious joys of construction, whether in town or on farm; and the intrepid qualities of Communist guerrillas.

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SYMBOLIC ACTS AS PSYOP*

By Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde

A simple symbolic act (propaganda of the deed) will often carry a message that will have greater impact in influencing people's thinking and behavior than an elaborately planned propaganda campaign.

Meaning, of course, can be "transferred" through various types of action. Indeed, all foreign policy operations have a symbolic impact over and above their physical impact. But we are not imperialist enough to claim, therefore, that all foreign policy acts belong ultimately in the bag of techniques to be used in psychological operations. There are, however, instances when physical operations are important primarily for the meaning they convey rather than for the change in the material world which they bring about. Some of the Commando raids in France and the Low Countries in 1942 and 1943 were of primary importance not because of the physical damage that was done or because of the information gained about German defenses. But they suggested to the German High Command that an invasion was in the offing and thus tied down troops which could have been effectively used on the eastern or Mediterranean fronts. They also perhaps encouraged the captive populations to resist and harass their German masters. The Doolittle raid on Tokyo in 1942 is another example. The impact on meaning throughout the world was far greater in its implications than was the damage done to Tokyo.

There are also a number of peacetime examples of activities whose symbolic impact is of primary significance. The Moslem festival of *Id al Adha* is the time when thousands of Moslems journey to Mecca. In 1952 *Id al Adha* fell on Friday the twenty-ninth of August, but Mecca's gates were to close on the twenty-seventh. Less than a week before the gates closed, there were more than 4,000 pilgrims stranded in Beirut—800 miles from the holy city. All had air tickets but the local airlines simply could not handle a fraction of that number before the deadline. After some amazingly fast and thoughtful work by the American legation in Beirut and by the departments of Defense and State in Washington, the Air Force rushed fourteen C–54's to Lebanon and began to airlift the pilgrims into a city only 40 miles from Mecca. Flying around the clock, they made it possible for all the pilgrims to get into the holy city before the gates closed. The story of the airlift "magic carpet" was told in the Moslem press throughout the world, and the United States received favorable editorial treatment in a press that had been noted for its hostility.[1]

Although military aircraft were used, one could hardly argue that this was a military operation. It was an operation that indicated to Moslems in

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*Extracts from *Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy*, University of Chicago Press, 1960, pp. 31–33. © 1960 by the University of Chicago. Published 1960. Second Impression 1964. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press, and the courtesy of the author.

Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, and Afghanistan that the United States, a foreign policy giant in the world, would keep an eye out for the "little guy" and was willing to help him if he got in a tight spot. It is difficult to conceive how much propaganda, rumor, and personal contact would have been necessary to get this message across in the absence of the airlift. Its impact was primarily symbolic. On the other hand, although the Berlin airlift had tremendously important symbolic effects throughout the world, one cannot say that its primary purpose was psychological. Once the Allied decision to stay in Berlin was made, the airlift became a necessity for circumventing the Soviet blockade.

In these kinds of physical operations it is extremely difficult to draw a clear line between a psychological operation and a military or economic one. But it is important to recognize that some desired changes in the apparent world can most effectively be provoked by a physical operation and that some of these techniques ought to be at the disposal of those responsible for psychological operation.

NOTES

[1] W.E.D., "Operation 'Magic Carpet'," *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, edited by William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (Bethesda, Maryland: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, March 1958), pp. 337–342.

THE OLDER VIETNAMESE AS A COMMUNICANT*

BY THE JUSPAO PLANNING OFFICE

A person with prestige among members of an audience, or one who speaks with recognized authority, has an advantage in persuasion. Age is one relevant factor to prestige in communication; older persons generally tend to be more influential than younger persons advice, with some exceptions, is often sought from older persons.

Age commands great respect in Vietnam. The aged are honored members of the family, the village, and society in general. Traditionally they are entitled to the best food, the best clothing, the best treatment, and deserve honor on all occasions. In old Vietnam elderly men invariably were the heads of their households. This great respect for the aged continues today to a large degree in the rural areas of South Vietnam. In the cities of the South young people are breaking away from family control. In North Vietnam Young people are being taught to turn against the family and parental authority.

* * * * *

Undoubtedly the most important force for harmony in traditional Vietnamese society—one which remains strong today—was family loyalty.

*Excerpts from "The Older Vietnamese as a Communicant," JUSPAO Field Memorandum No. 27, October 4, 1966.

Upon the kinship system rested the entire society, which fostered and cherished it. The basic social unit was the large household of an older man and wife, their married sons, daughters-in-law, and grandchildren. While today this extended social unit is less common, family ties still reach out as they have for thousands of years in Vietnam even beyond the large family to a far wider group of relatives. Traditionally, the family system was strengthened by the pattern of landholding. Most land was owned in small family parcels—only in the last century did large plantations develop. The Vietnamese farmer-family traditionally raised or made nearly everthing it used.

To build upon this foundation of family life, the Confucian philosophers found their mortar in *hieu* [or filial piety]. Taking for their premise that feelings of love and respect for parents were innately ingrained in people, they built an entire system of social relations. A proper son, one who cultivated his natural feelings of respect for his father, would as a consequence be a useful member of the community and a dutiful subject of the king. The most important religious ceremonies in Vietnam are rites for family ancestors in which feelings of filial piety are manifested by veneration of departed ancestors. This is the so-called "ancestor worship" which strongly influences Vietnamese thought patterns. The belief is that each person is a link in the endless chain of humanity. One's family therefore includes not only those alive tooday, but past generations and even the unborn to come. A person's fate upon death—whether he becomes a good spirit or a demon—depends not only on his behavior during life on earth, but also on the solicitude with which his descendants honor him. The highest achievement of *hieu* is to serve the dead as though they were the living. This attitude has the effect of inculcating a strong sense of timelessness which stresses the importance of those who have gone before, of elderly people, alive and even dead.

There are certain countervailing factors with respect to Vietnamese youth. One is the normal "war between generations" in which neither the old nor the new generations knows quite what to make of the other. Another factor, for Vietnam, is a byproduct of the modernization process in which a society finds that its traditional virtues are breaking down because, particularly to the young, they seem no longer adequate guides to behavior. This manifests itself in such phenomena as the "Saigon cowboy," brother to the American [hippie]. A more fundamental countervailing factor is the age median in Vietnam. Vietnam is a young nation in terms of age distribution. Half the people are eighteen years of age or under (as compared with the U.S., itself a relatively youthful nation, where half the population is 25 years of age or under.) And finally there is among Vietnamese city youth a widespread and deeply ingrained suspicion, distrust and cynicism for elders, particularly for elderly politicians. Youth here tend to believe that all Vietnamese who have engaged in political activity during the past twenty years or so, have been tainted and compromised and are unworthy of respect or even attention. This

amounts almost to a prejudice since little effort is made to distinguish one individual from another; the condemnation tends to be a blanket one.

The Communists have asserted that the Vietnamese family system is the source of great social injustice in Vietnam and note the Vietnamese proverb: The son of the emperor is crown prince, and the son of a temple guard spends his life sweeping banyan leaves. The Communists argue that the system causes sons of influential persons to get preferred treatment in business or appointment to high position in government, which discriminates against those whose families are not affluent or politically powerful. While there is something to this assertion—just as it has some validity in the United States—on balance it appears that the Communist attack on the concept of *hieu* has not profited them. As one Vietnamese noted: "*Hieu* is like a gulf stream, on the surface a merely peaceful concept like other traditional streams of thought in Vietnam. In reality however it is strong enough even to resist tyranny." Most Vietnamese were horrified by the Communists' so-called "denunciation movement" in North Vietnam in 1953-54 in which children were encouraged to denounce their parents to the state.

An elderly traditional-minded Vietnamese is impressed most by [individuals] who combined the traits of dignity, humility, wisdom and self-control. Such[individuals] always are calm and unruffled. They never lose their temper. They never shout. They always have a wise and philosophic word to say about events and people. . . . He will impress a Vietnamese as a man of eminent character and honor. . . . It is not that Vietnamese are not materialistic, for they are. But they still do not have the same attitude toward progress as do Americans. This is not because they are against progress, but because they conceive of it—and indeed the whole universe—in different terms and using different concepts.

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To the elderly Vietnamese the best and proper behavior consists in knowing and understanding the world, and having understood it, adjusting intelligently to it. To a large degree this means learning how to accept the blows of a capricious fate with decorum. The wise man does not try to change his universe, he adapts to it. Bend as does the bamboo in the wind, say the Vietnamese. . . .What Vietnamese see as suppleness we see as duplicity, what they see as tranquility of spirit we see as lack of concern. And what we see as resolution, the Vietnamese see as intractability; what we see as boldly meeting challenge, they see as disrupting of the harmony of the universe.

* * * * *

If you treat elderly Vietnamese with genuine consideration for their feelings, if you behave toward them at all times as if they were dignified persons worthy of respect, if you simply practice good manners, you cannot go seriously wrong. But this behavior in the final analysis is a

function of your underlying attitude toward the Vietnamese. Vietnamese are unbelievably sensitive to whether or not a foreigner *likes* them as a group. If you do, they will know it, and make all sorts of allowances for your unintentional errors or even your loss of temper. If you don't like them, you will never be able to hide that fact.

AN UNKNOWN WARRIOR*

BY EDWARD J. CLARKSON

Rallies of returnees engaged in direct contact with families and friends of known guerrillas have unmatched potential for reaching insurgent ranks with propaganda messages and appeals.

Individuals who have served the Viet Cong or the North Vietnamese Army in South Vietnam may join the Government of Vietnam and be welcomed as citizens of the Republic of Vietnam, so states the Chieu Hoi policy of the government of Vietnam.

This policy was adopted by the government early in 1963. Americans, who had gained experience working with and observing defection programs in the Philippines (HUKS) and in Malaya with the British, suggested a similar program and assisted in establishing it.

The rationale is that an enemy force can be weakened by creating opportunities for defection. If the enemy soldier has no alternative to remaining, the enemy force is strengthened. But if an attractive visible alternative exists, the enemy's problems are compounded to a point where almost anyone is suspect. Such a pattern imposes on the enemy a requirement for additional manpower to observe their fellow soldiers.

The Chieu Hoi program aims at projecting the government to the people in a confident and humane light, reversing the process whereby the enemy, having gained a recruit, claims his family's loyalty as well. It provides the family with a means to appeal to him to return home, as the returnee is offered a personal amnesty and a means to return to normal life away from deprivations and hardships of guerrilla existence.

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The task of informing and persuading the Viet Cong and their comrades to rally is called the "inducement phase." Inducement is accomplished primarily by the use of airdropped leaflets; by aerial broadcast from low flying planes, and by appealing to units and individuals, by name, if known.

Possibly an even more effective method of inducement [than airdropped leaflets and aerial broadcasts from low flying planes] is direct personal contact. This is accomplished by armed propaganda teams, composed of former Viet Cong who volunteer to go out into insecure territory and VC-terrorized areas to tell the people of the Chieu Hoi program. Gener-

*Excerpts from "An Unknown Warrior," *Marine Corps Gazette*, LIV (August 1970), pp. 38–43. Reprinted by permission of the copyright holder, the Marine Corps Association, publishers of the Marine Corps Gazette, professional journal for Marines. Copyright © August 1970, by the Marine Corps Association.

ally a team is composed of five to eight men, all lightly armed for self-protection. They may spend anywhere from a number of hours to a few weeks living and conversing with the population of a particular village. They may conduct rallies and distribute informative literature about the government. They may distribute food commodities in short supply. These men, organized loosely along military lines, provide visible proof to the population that the government backs up the policy of the Chieu Hoi program. At the same time, by just being there they point up the fallacy of VC propaganda, which states defectors are tortured, imprisoned and generally, shot.

Each province and the city of Danang in I Corps has an armed propaganda company composed of Hoi Chanh (returnees) who are trained and equipped to conduct face-to-face propaganda operations. These teams have proved their value by assisting in the control, interrogation and propagandizing of the local populace; by applying their knowledge of VC tactics to locate mines, booby traps and caches; by gathering intelligence from the populace with whom they come in contact; and by spotting VC suspects.

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UNORTHODOX TECHNIQUES

Some of the unusual means of communicating messages and appeals include the use of deception, poison pens, mournful sounds over loudspeakers during the night, gossip, superstitions, and rumors. The first two essays recount incidents in which deception was used effectively, and discuss conditions for its use. In "Our Poison Pen War Against the Nazis," a gimmick for unwittingly exposing a target group to PSYOP messages and appeals is described. "Psychological Warfare Unit Sends Out Mournful Sounds" briefly covers unusual themes used over loudspeakers at night in Vietnam. Superstitions are useful to psyoperators because they are closely related to audience predispositions. Also related to audience predispositions, rumors spread because they are congenial to members of the target group and are passed on by them. "Rumors and How to Counter Them" describes how rumors change in the process of being passed on to others and indicates the kinds of defenses that can be used against rumors. In a similar way, "Intra-Group Communication and Induced Change" relates how positive gossip is utilized for spreading ideas and how an established information flow can prevent rumors from spreading.

TACTICS OF DECEPTION IN PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS*

By Robert I. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde

Tactics of deception in psychological operations are often uncertain and become effective in influencing behavior and at the same time maintaining communication credibility only if three general rules are followed.

Tactics of deception attempt to make the audience build up a psychological environment which differs from the material environment. In the terms of perceptual psychology, tactics of deception try to provoke . . . [illusory] percepts. . . .

There are many examples of the use of the tactics of deception. Much of Hitler's success in the late thirties was due to the fact that the official decision-makers in Britain and France defined the situation (particularly in regard to Hitler's goals) in a manner which deviated disastrously from reality.

There were many instances during World War II when deception was used effectively by both sides. Deception is responsible in some degree for the reputation of "evil" which tends to surround the psychological instrument. Indeed, among some people whose understanding of the dynamics of human behavior is meager and whose knowledge of world affairs is parochial, "psychological operations" are understandable only in what they refer to as "the dirty tricks department." All other aspects of the psychological instrument are apt to be scathingly referred to as "globaloney."

One of the most famous and successful uses of deception was the British "Operation Mincemeat"—the case of *The Man Who Never Was*. After the Allies had driven German and Italian military forces from North Africa, the next step in the Allied offensive was obvious to both them and the Germans. Before the Mediterranean could be available for shipping, Sicily had to be taken. The move was so obvious that the Germans could be expected to mass their defensive forces there and make the invasion, even if successful, extremely costly. The value of making the Germans think that the blow would come elsewhere was apparent. Operation Mincemeat was an attempt to do just this.

It involved releasing a corpse, dressed as a major of the Royal Marines, from a submarine off the coast of Spain. A "Most Secret" letter was planted in a dispatch case attached to the body. It appeared to be from General Sir Archibald Nye, the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff to General Sir Harold Alexander, who commanded an army in Tunisia. The letter indicated that there would be a major Allied offensive against Greece. Other documents on the body were designed to lead the Germans

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*Excerpts from *Strategic Psychological Opeations and American Foreign Policy*, The University of Chicago Press, 1960, pp. 33–35. ©1960 by the University of Chicago. Published 1960. Second Impression 1964. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press.

to believe that the major was being flown into the Eastern Mediterranean on a plane that crashed off the coast of Spain.

The body was picked up by Spanish officials and the documents handed over temporarily to a German agent who made copies that were sent on to Berlin. After the war, captured documents proved that the German intelligence service believed the documents and convinced the High Command that the Allies would make their major attack in the Eastern Mediterranean. Military and naval forces were sent to Greece and held there even after the invasion of Sicily, because Hitler and the High Command were convinced that the attack on Sicily was diversionary.[1]

There were also a number of "black" propaganda operations undertaken by the Allies in World War II which employed the tactic of deception. "Operation Annie" and "Gustav Siegfried Eins" are examples of two radio stations that operated as if they were broadcasting from inside Germany. Their success was predicated on getting the Germans to believe that they were not Allied stations.[2]

There are three basic rules that must be followed if deception is to be an effective way of influencing behavior. First, the deception must be "reasonable." The success of Operation Mincemeat was due to the fact that it was entirely reasonable that a Royal Marine officer would be flying to North Africa with special messages in a plane that crashed, and that an Allied invasion in the Eastern Mediterranean was a reasonable if not the most likely move from Africa.

A second rule of deception is that there must be no simple way of checking what the facts in the case really are.

A third rule is that the use of deception should not descredit a source which may have valuable future potential. Deception is usually discovered eventually and the more successful the deception the more likely is the source to be discredited. In World War II the "black" Allied station, Operation Annie, was once used to direct a Nazi column into Allied hands. The deception was excellent, but it completely destroyed the future of the station. It is usually unwise to use a newspaper or radio station which built up a large audience for purposes of deception.

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NOTES

1. E. Montagu, *The Man Who Never Was* (London, 1953).

2. Howard Becker, "Nature and the Consequences of Black Propaganda." *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, edited by William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (Bethesda, Maryland: Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, March 1958), pp. 672–677.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VIETMINH*

BY EDWARD GEARY LANSDALE

Unusual situations and traditions may provide the opportunity for ingenuity in the development of PSYOP initiations. This account describes the exploitation of an historic moment and of local superstition for PSYOP purposes.

. . . Just before the French quit the city of Hanoi and turned over control to the Vietminh, . . . the Communist apparatus inside the city was busy with secret plans to ready the population to welcome the entry of Vietminh troops. I suggested that my nationalist friends issue a fake Communist manifesto, ordering everyone in the city except essential hospital employees to be out on the streets not just for a few hours of welcome but for a week-long celebration. In actuality this would mean a seven-day work stoppage. Transportation, electric power, and communication services would be suspended. This simple enlargement of plans already afoot should give the Communists an unexpectedly vexing problem as they started their rule.

An authentic-looking manifesto was printed and distributed during the hours of darkness on the second night before the scheduled entry of the Vietminh. The nationalists had assured me that they could distribute it safely because the chief of police in Hanoi was a close friend of theirs and would rescue any of them who might be caught and arrested. The next day the inhabitants of Hanoi read the fake manifesto and arranged to be away from homes and jobs for a one-week spree in the streets. The manifesto looked so authentic that the Communist cadre within the city bossily made sure, block by block, that the turnout would be 100 percent. A last-minute radio message from the Communists outside the city, ordering the Communists inside to disregard this manifesto, was taken to be a French attempt at counterpropaganda and was patriotically ignored. When the Vietminh forces finally arrived in Hanoi, their leaders began the touchy business of ordering people back to work. It took them three days to restore public services. A three-day work stoppage was a substantial achievement for a piece of paper.

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[A] second idea utilized Vietnamese superstitions in an American form. I had noted that there were many soothsayers in Vietnam doing a thriving business, but I had never seen any of their predictions published. Why not print an almanac for 1955 containing the predictions of the most famous astrologers and other arcane notables, especially those who foresaw a dark future for the Communists? Modestly priced—gratis copies would smack too much of propaganda—it could be sold in the North before the last areas there were evacuated. If it were well done,

*Excerpts from *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia*, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1972, pp. 225–227. Reprinted with the permission of the author, copyright owner.

copies would probably pass from hand to hand and be spread all over the Communist-controlled regions.

The result was a hastily printed almanac filled with predictions about forthcoming events in 1955, including troubled times for the people in Communist areas and fights among the Communist leadership. To my own amazement, it foretold some things that actually happened (such as the bloody suppression of farmers who opposed the poorly-executed land reforms and the splits in the Politburo). The almanac became a best seller in Haiphong, the major refugee port. Even a large reprint order was sold out as soon as it hit the stands. My nationalist friends told me that it was the first such almanac seen in Vietnam in modern times. They were embarrassed to discover that a handsome profit had been made from what they had intended as a patriotic contribution to the nationalist cause. Unobtrusively, they donated this money to the funds helping the refugees from the North.

OUR POISON PEN WAR AGAINST THE NAZIS*

BY BRIAN MOYNAHAN

Target audiences will unwittingly expose themselves to propaganda messages and appeals not in line with their predispositions if the messages and appeals are subtle and presented in ordinary, normal, or routine fashion.

One of the most ingenious bits of propaganda used by the Allies during World War II was called "Operation Cornflakes." Its details were never released, and it is still on the U.S. secret list. But recently an international stamp actioneer, Mr. Robson Lowe, came across a sheaf of documents and stamps describing it, and next month they will go on show in South Africa.

"Cornflakes" had a beautiful simplicity to it. Dropping leaflets indiscriminately was expensive and largely ineffective. The Germans knew it was Allied propaganda and treated it as such. But if it were to arrive normally, through the German mail, on their breakfast table (hence "Cornflakes"), then most Germans would think that it had come from a resistance group inside the country. This would be a far more shattering blow to their self-confidence.

The idea, conceived by the Americans, was to bomb mail trains northward bound for the Reich with Italian based P-38 fighter bombers. The P–38s would stop the train and damage it heavily with strafing. Then mail bags containing the propaganda letters would be dropped amongst the wreckage. When they found them, the Germans would presume they came from the train and deliver them as normal mail.

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*From *The Sunday Times* [London] 2 May 1971, reproduced in *Falling Leaf Magazine*, XII, No. 2 (June 1971), pp. 64–65. Reprinted with the permission of *The Sunday Times* (London), copyright holder.

A vast amount of work went into the scheme. German POWS who had been postal clerks were questioned on regulations, details of postal cancellations, correct methods of packing and labelling mail sacks. Aircraft of the U.S. 14th Fighter Group, assigned to the mission, practised daily.

Forgery began on a large scale in the summer of 1944. Near-perfect fakes of 12 and 6 pfennig Hitler stamps were run off; a propaganda parody of the stamp showing Hitler as a Death's Head was also made. German envelopes were printed. The material inside looked authentically German; much of it was crudely produced, as one would expect from a clandestine group operating from inside the Reich.

Over two million names and addresses were chosen from the telephone books of Berlin, Dresden, Vienna, Hamburg and Stuttgart. An army of clerks and typists was used to address 15,000 envelopes a week—different typewriters and handwriting had to be used to avoid suspicion.

The first mission was on 5 February, 1945. A mail train on its way to Linz in Austria was attacked, and the engine destroyed. Eight mail bags, each with about 800 letters, were dropped on target. The mail was carefully prepared to coincide with towns on the route of the target train. Envelopes were franked immediately prior to take-off to ensure the correct date appeared.

They were addressed to troops as well as to civilians. A newsletter—Der Jager der Sudfront, the South Front Hunter—was sent to troops on the Italian front. Forged military envelopes had messages from the "League of German Partisans," suggesting that there was a widespread peace movement in the Army. A special newspaper, Das Neue Deutschland, was printed and dropped. It was effective enough for Himmler's paper, Das Schwarze Korps, to spend two pages denouncing it and its treacherous authors.

The propaganda itself was ingenious and highly varied. "The League of Lonely Women" was invented, which sent combat troops a highly enticing, printed letter. "When are you coming on leave? . . . We are waiting for you in any strange town you may pass through. Cut off the League symbol from the letter. Stick it on your glass when you are in any cafe, in any bar near a station. Soon a member will be with you, and all the traumas of fighting will disappear in the beauty of one night." The kick, of course, came in the tail: Don't be shy, "your wife, sister or loved one is also one of us." Scarcely a thought to keep up the morale of a jealous, worried soldier fighting on the Russian front.

Austrians were urged to master phrases like, "Mej ai slap dse dorti proschn?" (May I slap the dirty Prussian.") But one section shows how serious was the intent behind Operation Cornflakes. "Please Sir, may we hang the Gauleiter ourselves? The executioner lives right around the corner. We will provide the rope. The rope is too thin—too thick—too long—too short. The gallows is not high enough, the Gestapo functionary is too high."

It is almost impossible to tell how effective the scheme was. Only 120

mail bags had been dropped on wrecked trains when the war ended. It is known that copies of Das Neue Deutschland reached troops through the German post in Italy, that it was read by troops as far north as the Baltic, and that 90 percent of prisoners who had read it thought it either genuinely came from Germany or from Switzerland. But the secret has been kept too long to check back on the real impact.

RUMORS AND HOW TO COUNTER THEM*

BY WILBUR SCHRAMM

Rumor, limited in its audience, can be a very effective instrument of psychological operations if the communicator has an understanding of how the message is likely to be received by members of the target audience.

One of the best illustrations of how perception works, and also one of the aspects of human behavior that the psywar operator needs to understand most thoroughly, is the growth and passage of rumors. The most extensive work on rumor has been done by Allport and Postman,[1] who have studied the problem not only by observing rumors in society but by setting up experimental rumor passages in the laboratory. One of the rumors they studied during the war had to do with a Chinese teacher on vacation who, shortly before Japan's surrender, drove his car into a Maine village and asked his way to a hilltop from which he could see a view that a tourist guide had told him about. "Someone showed him the way," say Allport and Postman, "but within an hour the community was buzzing with the story that a Japanese spy had ascended the hill to take pictures of the region."

What happened? Someone told the story. It was told over and over again. And as it passed from person to person, three things were happening to it. So, at least, Allport and Postman concluded from their analysis of the case.

In the first place, it was being *leveled*. Details were being omitted:

> The courteous and timid, but withal honest, approach of the visitor to the native of whom he inquired his way; the fact that although he was certainly Oriental his precise nationality was unknown. Likewise not mentioned was the fact that the visitor had allowed himself to be readily identified by people along the way; and that no one had seen a camera in his possession.

In the second place, the story was being *sharpened*:

> Having accepted their special interpretation of the Chinese scholar's visit, the rumor agents accentuated certain features while minimizing others. The sharpening of selected details accounts for the overdrawn dramatic quality of the final story. What in the original situation was Oriental became specified as Japanese; what was merely a "man" became a special kind of man, a "spy." The harmless holiday pursuit of viewing the scenery became the much sharper, sinister purpose of espionage. The truth that the visitor had a picture in his hand became sharpened into the act of "taking pictures." The objective fact that no pictures of any possible value to the enemy could be taken from that particular rural location was overlooked.

*Excerpts from *The Nature of Psychological Warfare*, Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Chevy Chase, Md., 1953, pp. 64-68.

In the third place, the story was *assimilated*:

In the Maine countryside resident natives have had little contact with Orientals. Like most Occidentals they are unable to distinguish a Chinese person from a Japanese. They had only one available rubric for Orientals, firmly implanted in their minds by wartime news and stories: the "Japanese spy." No other category was available for the classification of this unusual visitation.

A Chinese teacher-on-a-holdiay was a concept that could not arise in the minds of most farmers, for they did not know that some American universities employ Chinese scholars on their staffs and that these scholars, like other teachers, are entitled to summer holidays. The novel situation was perforce *assimilated* in terms of the most available frames of reference.

This process—leveling, sharpening, and assimilation—seems to characterize the passage of all rumors. You can test it yourself, as Allport and Postman did, by playing a kind of parlor game: write a brief story; then whisper it word for word to a guest, who will whisper it to the guest on the side of him, and so around the room. When the story comes back to you, compare it with the original. This has been done in the laboratory many times, in the transmission of both pictures and words, and the same general principles of perception seem to apply.

Consider what was happening in the incident of the Chinese teacher. The villagers were trying to give the incident a meaning. They perceived those details that added up to a meaning, selecting some details, rejecting others, distorting some, adding some (for example, the camera). The important question, of course, is this: what controlled their selection? They were obviously selecting in terms of the frames of reference available to them (which did not include Chinese teachers on vacation in Maine), and in terms of their needs, moods, and anxieties as that moment. The war was much on their minds. Japanese were objects of fear, distrust, and hate. Protecting their country was a high value of great importance to them. Their suspicion of foreigners was of long standing. They had been exposed to the Government's campaign for security of information, to spy movies, to the knowledge that cameras were prohibited around defense installations. And all this added up to a frame of reference, in terms of which they perceived this new event. As Allport and Postman put it:

A yellow man—a Jap—a spy—photographic espionage. One idea led to the other with almost mechanical inevitability until the final conclusion emerged . . . . The three-pronged process of leveling, sharpening, and assimilation reflects the rumor agents' "effort after meaning." The facts of the situation, but dimly understood, did not provide the meaning that the strange visitation required. Hence a single directive idea took hold—the *spy motif*—and in accordance with it, discordant details were leveled out, incidents sharpened to fit the chosen theme, and the episode as a whole assimilated to the pre-existing structure of feeling and thought characterisitc of the members of the group among whom the rumor spread.

Rumors are clearly an important weapon of psywar. But let us look at them here only in terms of the perceptual processes they illustrate and of what they mean to the psywar operator who wants to know how a message is likely to be received.

If you want to anticipate how an intelligent enemy will defend himself you can look at some of America's experiences in rumor defense during World War II.

In general, this country used two kinds of defense against rumor. The government agencies preferred the indirect method of smothering rumors with facts, that is, they did not repeat rumors even for the purpose of refuting them. The theory behind this defense is (a) that "rumor flies in the absence of news" and (b) that to repeat a rumor even for refutation may spread it farther. Therefore agencies like OWI, when they learned of a dangerous rumor, would release facts in answer to it without ever mentioning the rumor.

On the other hand, nongovernmental organizations and civilians put their faith in rumor clinics, which chiefly took the form of newspaper columns or radio programs in which rumors were selected for ridicule and refutation. The theory here was to bring rumors out into the open into a climate of fact and understanding, where they could not flourish. Such evaluation and study of these rumor clinics as was made indicates that (a) there was no evidence that newspaper rumor clinics, filled with ridicule and negation as they were, actually served to spread any rumors farther; (b) however, it was regarded as possibly dangerous to print a rumor in bold-face type, or to repeat the rhythms and slogan-like qualities of some of the more effective rumors; (c) it was felt that radio rumor clinics were more likely than printed clinics to spread a rumor, because of the dial-twisting habits of American listeners; and (d) there was some slight evidence that the clinics impeded the spread of rumor, and no doubt whatsoever that they succeeded in making their communities rumor-conscious.

Along with these defenses, of course, there was a poster, newspaper, and radio campaign aimed at security of information. Typical slogans were "Think before you talk," "Enemy ears are listening," "Don't kill her daddy with careless talk." This is standing operating procedure (SOP) for any country at war.

NOTES

1. G. Allport and L. Postman, *The Psychology of Rumor* (New York: Holt, 1947).

"PRACTICAL JOKES"*

By Edward Geary Lansdale

Some inactive avenues are opened when PSYOP is thought of as an opportunity to play "practical jokes." Results often justify the concept.

Conventional military men think of combat psywar almost exclusively in terms of leaflets or broadcasts appealing to the enemy to surrender. Early on, I realized that pyswar had a wider potential than that. A whole

*Excerpts from *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia*, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1972, pp. 71–75. Reprinted with the permission of the author, copyright holder.

new approach opens up, for example, when one thinks of psywar in terms of playing a practical joke. We all know that many people risk their lives and safety to paint slogans and appeals on walls in forbidden territory, motivated as much by anticipation of the antics of their outraged enemies as by ideology or patriotism. Low humor seems an appropriate response, somehow, to the glum and deadly practices of Communists and other authoritarians. (I recall a case in Europe once, when militant youths were to partake in a massive street demonstration. The Communist party had followed the book, systematically placing its cadre to incite the demonstrators into acts of violence. Police and military forces were ready to prevent this with tear gas, rifles, and bayonets. But bloodshed was avoided. A ribald benefactor brought out cauldrons of hot chocolate and coffee and invited the would-be demonstrators to share his brews—which he had laced generously with a powerful laxative. The militants found themselves with more urgent business to attend to than street brawls.) When I introduced the practical-joke aspect of psywar to the Philippine Army, it stimulated some imaginative operations that were remarkably effective.

To the superstitious, the Huk battleground was a haunted place filled with ghosts and eerie creatures. Some of its aura of mystery was imparted to me on my own visits there. Goosebumps rose on my arms on moonless nights in Huk territory as I listened to the haunting minor notes of trumpets playing Pampanguena dirges in the barrios or to the mournful singing of men and women known as *nangangaluluwa* as they walked from house to house on All Saints' night telling of lost and hungry souls. Even Magsaysay believed in the apparition called a *kapre*, a huge black man said to walk through tall grass at dusk to make it stir or to sit in a tree or astride a roof smoking a large cigar.

One psywar operation played upon the popular dread of an *asuang*, or vampire, to solve a difficult problem. Local politicians opposed Magsaysay's plan of moving more troops out of defensive garrisons to form further mobile and aggressive BCTs [battalion combat teams], and in one town the local bigwigs pointed out that a Huk squadron was based on a hill near town. If the troops left, they were sure the Huks would swoop down on the town and the bigwigs would be their victims. Only if the Huk squadron left the vicinity would they agree to the removal of the guarding troops. The problem, therefore, was to get the Huks to move. The local troops had not been able to do this.

A combat psywar squad was brought in. It planted stories among town residents of an *asuang* living on the hill where the Huks were based. Two nights later, after giving the stories time to circulate among Huk sympathizers in the town and make their way up to the hill camp, the psywar squad set up an ambush along a trail used by the Huks. When a Huk patrol came along the trail, the ambushers silently snatched the last man of the patrol, their move unseen in the dark night. They punctured his neck with two holes, vampire-fashion, held the body up by the heels,

drained it of blood, and put the corpse back on the trail. When the Huks returned to look for the missing man and found their bloodless comrade, every member of the patrol believed that the *asuang* had got him and that one of them would be next if they remained on that hill. When daylight came, the whole Huk squadron moved out of the vicinity. Another day passed before the local people were convinced that they were really gone. Then Magsaysay moved the troops who were guarding the town into a BCT.

Another combat psywar operation used the "eye of God" technique, which I had heard about when it was used at the siege of Caen, and from its use by spotter aircraft-loudspeaker tank teams in World War II in Europe. The idea was to get exact information about the enemy and then broadcast it through loudspeakers in combat situations, making individual enemy soldiers feel that they couldn't hide from an all-seeing eye and had to follow the directions of the broadcasts. In the siege of Caen, a German officer would be told by name that he was the next to die because he refused to surrender, and moments later an artillery shell would hit his house or headquarters. In the air-tank technique, the loudspeaker tank would call out to German soldiers hidden in defensive positions but visible from the air, claiming to see individual soldiers, describing what they were doing at the moment, announcing that they didn't have a chance, and telling them to come out and surrender. Both examples made effective use of fresh combat intelligence about the enemy.

The only equipment that the Philippine Army had for making broadcasts to Huk guerrillas under combat conditions was a handful of U.S. Navy loud-hailers (bull horns), designed for use by beachmasters in amphibious landings, which I had scrounged in Washington and brought with me. I had planned for them to be used by infantry, but it was found that they could be used from the light liaison aircraft assigned to BCTs, when flying at low altitudes. . . . I had distributed this equipment to each of the first BCTs formed. One day, a Philippine officer made use of the bull horn, the light aircraft, and the "eye of God" technique in an unusual way, thanks to his BCT's collection of detailed information about the enemy.

On this day a Huk squadron was being pursued by an infantry company from a BCT, which had not been able to make contact with the elusive guerrillas. The officer went up in the aircraft to see if he could spot the Huks from the air. He saw them, and he saw also that his troops were helplessly, behind in their pursuit. Frustrated, he looked around in the aircraft for something to throw at the Huks below him—and found a bull horn stowed behind the seat. Inspiration came. Through the bull horn he shouted down at the Huks below, telling them that they were doomed because he and his troops knew all about them and soon would catch them. He cudgeled his brains for what the BCT's intelligence officer had told him about this Huk squadron, and he remembered some of the names on its roster. He called down to the Huks by name, pretending to

recognize individuals. As the aircraft made a final circle, the bull horn sent his amplified voice down with these parting words: "Thank you, our friend in your squadron, for all the information." Then he flew away chuckling over his final broadcast. The BCT found out later that the mention of a mysterious "friend" in their ranks had aroused the Huk's darkest suspicions of one another. Three of them were singled out and executed on the spot. The words had inflicted as many casualties on the enemy as troops could have done in a running fight.

The name of this technique, "the eye of God," reminded me of the ancient Egyptian practice of painting watchful guardian eyes over the tombs of the pharaohs. The painting was stylized to give the eye a baleful glare to scare away grave robbers. Recalling its appearance, I made some sketches until I recaptured the essence of its forbidding look, and I handed over the final drawing to the Philippine Army with suggestions for its use. It was mainly useful in towns where some of the inhabitants were known to be helping the Huks secretly. The army would warn these people that they were under suspicion. At night, when the town was asleep, a psywar team would creep into town and paint an eye on a wall facing the house of each suspect. The mysterious presence of these malevolent eyes the next morning had a sharply sobering effect.

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INTRA-GROUP COMMUNICATION AND INDUCED CHANGE*

By Arthur H. Niehoff

The establishment of efficient information flow between the communicator and the target audience can assist the communicatior in two ways: it can be used as a communication feedback mechanism for warding off rumormongering; it can be used as potentially routine gossip for spreading ideas.

The one absolutely essential technique [in helping to produce adoption of new ideas or practices in developing areas] is the establishment of effective communication, for it is the means by which knowledge of the new idea or practice is transferred. . . . We believe there are, basically, three types of relevant communication: input, the movement of information from the change agent to the potential adopters; feedback, the response from the potential adopters back to the change agent; and gossip, or intra-group communication, among the potential adopters regarding the innovation. . . .

Although a change agent may establish channels of communication to transfer his ideas to potential adopters (input), as well as channels for feedback, the interaction process does not stop at this point. When any significant event occurs in a local community, the members of that community invariably begin a process of communication about it among

*Excerpts from "Intra-Group Communication and Induced Change," Professional Paper 25-67, Human Resources Research Office, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C., June 1967, AD 654124, pp. 1-9.

themselves. We wish to show that such informal conversation, or gossip, is a powerful force in the process of decision-making in small groups, and thus is significant to induced change projects.

* * * * *

[One] project in which intra-group [or informal] communication was instrumental in helping achieve the goals set by the change agent was an effort to promote modern household practices in Southern Uganda through the establishment of women's clubs.[1] The change agent's first step was to hold a meeting of interested people, including men, in a local house, school, or community hall. She would give a talk on the proposal and answer all questions, after which the women could decide whether they wanted a club. If a club was established, regular teaching sessions, particularly in sewing, were begun. The women had to pay the equivalent of ten cents per week for membership and buy their own cloth. There were perceived practical benefits, both in the clothing the women were able to make for themselves, and in small rewards, such as needles and thread. An additional motivation was the status obtained by being a member and having a club in the community. The local chiefs came to feel "behind the times" if they did not have such a club in their district. This came about primarily as a result of the gossip of the women about their activities, substantiated by showing off their new dresses. Consequently, within a four-year period 40 such clubs were organized with 30–50 members each.

Except for a few projects in which information was given to students with the hope that they would transmit it to their parents, we found only one in which the change agents consciously depended on gossip as a means of spreading an innovation.[2] This was a pilot project in family planning in Taiwan, and, not surprisingly, the change agents were communication specialists. The change agents used a wide variety of communication techniques at first, but depended on female gossip to carry the knowledge beyond the families contacted directly. An evaluation study later revealed that about 20 % of the women who accepted contraceptives had never been directly contacted by the change agents but had learned about the innovation through gossip.

Most of the projects during which harmful rumors were reported succeeded despite the malicious gossip. However, most of these rumors occurred in the initial stages of the projects' implementation and their effects were neutralized by improved communication. Probably in most instances where rumors were instrumental in halting projects, the change agents never learned of their existence.

Almost all the rumors were a result of communication insufficient for the local people to learn the projects' goals clearly, added to their basic skepticism toward powerful outsiders. It is hypothesized that rumors will rarely occur if there is efficient communication input and feedback. If local people feel confident enough in their relationships with outsiders to express their opinions of proposed changes, they need not depend exclusively on generation of explanations with one another. Unfortunately,

such feedback channels frequently do not exist, and when they do not, rumors can be expected to occur. These will probably tend to be malicious or harmful to the projects' goals in proportion to the perceived threat of the outside influences.

Some harmful rumors that we have found in published case histories sound far-fetched, but they give an indication of what local people think when they are first approached with a novel idea, only partly communicated, that they perceive as potentially dangerous. An illustration of this occurred in an early hookworm treatment campaign in Ceylon.[3] Information was initially collected [about] the incidence of the disease, which made the villagers uneasy, as they were afraid it was being collected for tax or military draft purposes. When treatment, which was free, was offered, it was in the form of capsules. The rumor was generated and spread that the capsules contained little bombs which would explode after being swallowed. In spite of this, due principally to the establishment of better communication and the utilization of local leaders to sanction the idea, treatment was later accepted by many. Probably what is most significant in regard to this rumor type is that peasant villagers are usually very suspicious of information collectors unless relatively durable contacts are established.

Another series of harmful rumors emerged in a community development project in Cali, Colombia, again where there was inefficient communication of the project's goals and a perceived threat to the local way of life.[4] The potential participants were squatters in urban slums who lacked confidence in municipal authorities, since their community had been neglected for years. Because they had no legal title to their land, they were afraid that the suggestions to build a bridge, road, and drainage canals were preparations to convert their neighborhood into a residential zone for the wealthy. In particular, their fears grew when the change agency began conducting a survey of the local environment. However, these fears were allayed by persistent efforts to inform the local people that the real goal was improvement for the squatters themselves and by adroit utilization of local leaders to sanction the project. Ultimately the physical improvements were carried out on a self-help basis through locally organized committees.

Potential loss of land is undoubtedly one of the most vital fears of the poor people in non-industrial countries, whether these are slum squatters, village peasants, or tribal people. Another project where this type of fear occurred was a community development effort in Nigeria.[5] Although the goal was to build roads, schools, bridges, markets, and other communal structures, some land was usually involved. A number of villagers dropped out in the first stages because of a rumor that the whole project was merely a pretext to take away people's land. Another rumor based on fear of losing land occurred in a land rehabilitation project in Jordan, where the Bedouins thought the construction of dikes and growing of grass was to settle refugees from Palestine.[6]

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In all the cases except the land rehabilitation project in Jordan, the goals were in the main achieved, and in all instances the way this was done was by improving communication with the potential adopters and/or by working through local leaders. We wish to reemphasize the significant fact that in these cases the rumors were known, and that similar or more damaging ones usually occurred in projects which failed but were not learned about because communication was not effectively established.

In summary, it is our belief that gossip, or intra-group communication, has two facets of significance to the change process. Positive gossip, favorable to project goals, is an index of the establishment of efficient information flow, both of communication input and feedback, as well as a perception by villagers that the project goals would be beneficial to them. Moreover, such gossip can be deliberately used by change agents as a method of information dissemination.

Negative gossip, or rumormongering, is a product of lack of information flow between the change agent and the potential adopters and/or no perceived advantages from the project goals by the local people.

NOTES

1. P. Hastie, "Women's Clubs in Uganda, "*Community Development Bulletin* (London) (December 1950), pp. 4–6.
2. Bernard Berelson and Ronald Freedman, "A Study in Fertility Control," *Scientific American*, 210, No. 5 (May 1964), pp. 29–37.
3. Jane Philips, "The Hookworm Campaign in Ceylon," in *Hands Across Frontiers*, Howard M. Teaf, Jr. (ed.) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955), pp. 267–302.
4. Centro Interamericana de Vivienda y Planeamiento (O.A.S.). Siloe: The Process of Community Development Applied to an Urban Renewal Project (English condensation), Bogota, 1958.
5. E.R. Chadwick, "Fundamental Education in Udi Division," *Fundamental Education*, UNESCO, Paris (October 1949), pp. 627–644.
6. Stanley Andrews, *Technical Assistance Case Reports*, International Cooperation Administration, Washington. 1960, pp. 19–22.

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CHAPTER IX
PSYOP EFFECTIVENESS

In the evaluation of psychological operations the analyst can now employ tools and methodologies unavailable before the computer age. Moreover, specialists have conceptualized the process of communications in ways more amenable to social science and related research[1]—research in sociology and psychology, for example—which has led to new understanding of "hows" and "whys" in the study of persuasive communications.

Perhaps the most common approach to the communications process is the question framed by Harold D. Lasswell:

"Who [Sources]
"Says What [Content]
"In Which Channel [Media]
"To Whom [Audience]
"With What Effect? [Effect]"[2]

Although weaknesses in the formula have been cited by many scholars, the Lasswell model has not been replaced by one that approaches it in adherents. For that reason, the functional categories of the Lasswell model have been used, in slightly rearranged format, in this chapter: Source, Content, Audience, Media, and Effects—or SCAME.*

Apart from the enthusiasm demonstrated by the proponents of particular theories or procedures, dissatisfaction with the analysis of PSYOP is widespread. Theoretical models and concepts are in dispute, and basic questions of definition are also subject to debate. Even in the face of methodological progress, "there are," as David Robinson points out, "few, if any, technically acceptable criteria for the evaluation of psychological warfare programs. . . ." [3]

The dissatisfaction with the state of the analytical art in PSYOP is especially pronounced in evaluation of effectiveness. The many studies of source, message, channel, and receiver factors in attitude change are inconclusive or have led to inconsistent conclusions.

> To understand the effects on persuasion of manipulations such as communicator credibility or distraction, a number of stages in the persuasion process must be considered. . . .Needless to say, a large body of conflicting findings must result from . . . accumulation of confounding factors: different types of messages, different dependent variables, different assumptions linking the supportive message to the dependent measure of persuasion, and failure to measure acceptance of supportive beliefs or indirect effects of the message.[4]

These shortcomings must be judged against the methodological and conceptual advances adverted to previously, advances which have enabled analysts to better understand attitude change processes. Further progress in these areas of advance is prerequisite to the development of adequate evaluative programs for PSYOP.

*This approach has also been employed in the Army field manual, FM 33–5, *Psychological Operations—Techniques and Procedures,* Chapter 9.

The essays in this chapter, organized along the SCAME formula, provide methodological, analytical, and illustrative insights into the evaluation of persuasive communications.

NOTES

1. See "Social Science Research and PSYOP," in Chapter VII of this casebook.
2. Harold D. Lasswell, "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society," in Lyman Bryson, ed., *The Communication of Ideas* (New York: Harper & Row, 1948), p. 37.
3. David D. Robinson, "A Brief Review Study of the Problems of Criteria in Psychological Warfare," in this chapter.
4. Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen, "Attitudes and Opinions," *Annual Review of Psychology*, vol. XXIII (1972) (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1972), p. 521.

INTRODUCTION

A BRIEF REVIEW STUDY OF THE PROBLEMS OF CRITERIA IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE*

BY DAVID D. ROBINSON

There are presently few acceptable criteria for PSYOP evaluation. Various techniques of evaluation have been utilized, but no scientific approach for the evaluation of an entire PSYOP program has been found. Perhaps the most that can be aspired to in the current state of the art is evaluation of individual parts of a total PSYOP program.

FOREWORD

At the present time [1967] there are few, if any, technically acceptable criteria for the evaluation of psychological warfare programs, nor are there adequate techniques available for developing criteria for the evaluation of a *total* psywar program. A number of criteria have been used to evaluate selected aspects of psywar in the past, but most have been unsatisfactory for reasons that will be discussed. In most areas of behavioral science, the problems of criteria remain unsolved, but when situations are highly structured and well defined, and a reasonable degree of experimental control is possible, adequate criteria can be constructed. To the extent that such definition and control are lacking, so are the possibilities for developing adequate criteria. War, by its very nature, prevents the investigator from structuring the situation to any great degree and from being able to control the relevant variables. Mainly for this reason, the state of the art of the development of criteria for the evaluation of psychological warfare is low.

This report will examine some of the problems associated with the evaluation of psychological warfare using examples since World War II. It is necessarily of limited scope, and the review of the open and classified literature has not been exhaustive; nevertheless, it is possible to make

*Prepared for the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, by the Remote Area Conflict Information Center, Battelle Memorial Institute, R-896, March 10, 1967.

definite conclusions about the state of the art of criterion development in psywar.

* * * * *

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

The proof of the effectiveness of most of the techniques of applied behavioral sciences, including those of psychological warfare, rests on the ability to provide adequate criteria of effectiveness. The criterion is the crucial element in most studies of effectiveness, but it is surprising to note the dearth of adequate research or pertinent articles in the professional literature on this subject. Obviously not all the problems of criterion definition or criterion development are resolved, and yet there has been a diminution of interest in the area. For example, the index for the *Psychological Abstracts* shows the following number of entries under the heading "Criterion" for the following years:

1951	7
1952	0
1953	6
1954	6
1955	11
1956	5
1957	2
1958	1
1959–65	1

This dearth of entries suggests neither attraction nor interest in this vital area. One investigator has remarked that we often act as though criteria are either God given, or just to be found lying around somewhere.[1]

This deficient state of our knowledge has been discussed in many quarters, and pleas for attention to research in the area are heard on every hand. It is frequently stated that much more attention is given to the construction of predictor elements, for example, than in the development of criteria. We find ourselves with predictors that have been refined to a psychological hair—reliability coefficients on the order of 0.90, successive attempts to increase reliabilities by a few points, and elaborate attempts to establish norms; but still we are tied to primitive criteria in most cases. In the sphere of psychological warfare, the problem is especially acute. A critical examination of methods used to evaluate psywar programs since World War II follows.

AN EXAMINATION OF METHOD USED TO EVALUATE PSYWAR PROGRAMS SINCE WORLD WAR II

Many psywar programs have developed haphazardly, and evaluation of their success, in cases where evaluation has been attempted, has not been scientifically rigorous. There are cases in which psywar activities have been totally unsuccessful. In one instance, an aircraft was outfitted with a loudspeaker system and used for four months before it was discovered that the broadcasts were totally inaudible to people on the ground.[2] Other

cases are on record in which techniques produced results directly opposite to those intended. FM 33–5, "Psychological Warfare Operations", presents only a skeleton account of effects analysis.[3] Obviously a need for a program of criterion development exists.

Daugherty [4] has pointed out three major reasons why evaluation efforts of the past have been of limited value. First, those who have been responsible for psychological operations or for post-operation evaluation have not possessed a clear and consistent understanding of the nature and mission of the activity. Second, no clear or acceptable criteria exist for measuring psychological effects except in limited situations. Third, even if the problems of psywar were understood, and even if adequate tools were available for effectiveness measurement, there would be other factors that would greatly limit the success of evaluators, e.g., combat conditions, logistical problems, etc., which would bring about inevitable compromises with scientific rigor.

Assessing the Impact of Psywar Efforts

Among the methods of evaluating the success of psywar efforts have been the following: content analysis of intercepted mail, captured military documents, monitored radio broadcasts, newspapers and magazines printed in the target area; questionnaires and interviews of captured enemy personnel or of enemy civilians in areas recently coming under friendly control; and observation by nonparticipant or participant observers. Most of these methods suffer from two problems: the lack of representative sampling and the lack of an integrated approach to evaluation. Adequate samples can be drawn of enemy civilians living in areas controlled by friendly forces, but several problems are encountered: often they are unwilling to cooperate and in many instances a period of time has intervened between reception of psywar messages and their capture. The fragmented approach to evaluation could be improved if each method could be weighted according to its worth and employed accordingly. These methods are indirect, but are probably as direct as one could hope for since target populations are usually hostile and therefore unapproachable. One segment of the enemy population is approachable, however, and often serves as subject for research: that of prisoners.

Prisoners of War

Prisoners of war have been used in the evaluation of psywar materials, but the tendency has been to give undue weight to this group. The difficulty in generalizing from the prisoner group to the enemy population is that the prisoner group is not a representative sample of the total enemy population. The very fact that a man is captured may reflect an inherent difference between him and his comrade who has managed to evade captivity. Once captured, even the nearly successful evader may change psychologically. For him the war is over. Good food, safety, medical treatment, and so on may change his attitude significantly, espe-

cially after the initial fear of death and torture at the hands of his captors has dissipated.

Shils and Janowitz [5] developed a taxonomy of social disintegration within the Wehrmacht during the closing days of World War II which could be of value in judging surrender behavior. . .:

1. Desertion
   a. Individual
      (1) After discussion with comrades
      (2) After no discussion
   b. By groups in concert
2. Active surrender (deliberately signaling, sending emissaries, etc.)
   a. Individual
   b. By the group as a unit
      (1) By mutual agreement
      (2) By order of, or with approval of, NCO or officer
3. Passive surrender
   a. By individuals acting alone
      (1) Non-resistance
      (2) Token resistance
   b. By plurality of uncoordinated individuals
4. Routine resistance
5. Last-ditch resistance

This taxonomy could be used as the basis for a scale of "willingness to fight" which could be related to the intensity of their exposure to the psywar campaign.

Efforts to find grist for the psywar mill have sometimes involved interviewing prisoners to find why they surrendered. This technique can be effective, but there are potential problems in using it. It is often impossible to ascribe motives to a surrendering prisoner since he, himself, may be unaware of the reason for his surrender. Was it because of fatigue, hunger, lack of ammunition, or other "objective" factors; or was it because he became "fed up" with the war because of exposure to psywar ploys? It has been pointed out that prisoners will not admit to deserting or allowing themselves to be captured because of guilt feelings over dereliction of duty. They would rather admit to "falling asleep in a cellar and waking up in the midst of enemy troops" or "getting lost and blundering into the enemy" than admitting that they sought out the enemy and surrendered to him. There have been cases of enemy commanders refusing to surrender towns or fortifications until a single shell was fired into it.[6] Such symbolic resistance is a balm to the conscience of surrendering forces.

"Most Like" and "Qualified Judge" Approaches to Pretesting

The psywar operator is faced with the problem of obtaining accurate information about large populations without systematic use of the populations. There are two possible approaches to solving the problem which

may be called the "most like" approach and the "qualified judge" approach. The most-like approach consists of using respondents who, while not being "the same as" the target population, can be considered most like it. The rationale is that people who are culturally similar will be psychologically similar—a tenuous assumption—but perhaps a necessary one. In order to evaluate the effects of broadcasting to [the People's Republic of] China, for example, the broadcasts could be pretested on refugee groups, citizens of Taiwan, or, if the budget was low, Chinese living in the United States. The second approach, the qualified-judge approach, involves asking a person who knows the group in question to make certain estimates about the inaccessible group. In the example above, a person grounded in Chinese history, language, religion, and other aspects of that culture may serve as the qualified judge.

Sometimes enemy prisoners are used as most-like groups, but there are pitfalls in this approach. Pretesting inevitably involves some question-and-answer procedure, but when the cultures of the interrogator and the subject are different, the reliability and validity of the responses may be compromised. For example, as Daugherty has pointed out:

> The average person in Asia, including those who serve in the armed forces of their country, is a simple-minded, semiliterate individual, who is seldom if ever consulted for opinions on any matter.
>
> Thus when someone approaches him concerning his views on the contents of a proposed communication, he understandably may hesitate to go on record as either approving or disapproving a suggested course of action. He surely would hesitate to express an adverse opinion on any action he believed to have originated on a higher level in the social scale from that which he occupies.
>
> Almost universally when such individuals are asked to talk about such matters, there is an apparent eagerness to say that which is designed to please the questioner. As a matter of fact, in all Oriental societies it is considered to be a mark of bad manners for one to appear to be vocally critical of the efforts of another, especially if expressed openly to his face. Among prisoners of war there is likely always to be the further consideration that one should not slap the hand that feeds him.
>
> The people in Asia have been told for centuries what to do, and in many cases what to think. The democratic precepts of the worth of individual opinions are entirely foreign to an Oriental's mental processes. Among the more highly educated classes, basic concepts of politeness prevail to such an extent that they are apt to color any expressions of opinion that are made. Under the very best of conditions it is difficult to get more than a rough approximation of what an Oriental thinks on a controversial item by questioning him about it.
>
> Working through native interpreters further complicates the procedure, for the interpreter, in common with his fellow countryman, will hesitate to be brutally frank at the cost of being seemingly impolite. There is also the further problem of being certain that the ideas are communicated accurately in interpreting what is asked and in reporting the answers given.[7]

The qualified-judge approach suffers from the obvious handicap that the judge may suffer from nearsightedness, bias, or any of a number of ills to which human judgment is subject. Yet, in the absence of a most-like group, or an actual sample of the target audience, the qualified-judge approach may be the only one available.

Examples of Effectiveness Research

There have been no systematic, i.e., controlled, studies of the effec-

tiveness of a total psywar effort, but there are a scattered few that consider a portion of the total. One of the best examples of a controlled study of effectiveness is a study by Andrews, Smith, and Kahn.[8] These investigators hypothesized that the fundamental effects of psywar can be characterized in psychological form, and that they are predictable in terms of the attitudes, motives, and experiences of the recipients. It was also hypothesized that psywar efforts can affect an individual only in certain optimal conditions. They developed scales that attempted to measure nine factors, including the degree to which the individual, before the Korean War, was in accord with the ideology and war aim of the Peoples Government; the degree to which, and frequency with which, the individual had experienced intensive fear during battle; the degree to which the individual felt he had been poorly treated and physically cared for by his own forces during the war, and so on. Two of the nine scales were criterion scales which measured his willingness to defect or surrender. The scales were intercorrelated (each scale was correlated with every other scale) and subsequent analysis appeared to corroborate the major hypotheses. This study was replicated using another target group, Communist Terrorists in Malaya, with essentially the same results.[9]

A number of studies have investigated the effectiveness of radio broadcasting and films, and their methodologies are similar. In the usual case, groups are assembled and hear tapes of the broadcasts. After hearing the tapes, they either discuss the merits and shortcomings of the broadcast in a panel discussion or in individual interviews, or variations thereof. The lack of precision and control in such procedures is evident, but they could be useful in preliminary work.

Evaluation of psywar efforts has largely been a catch-as-catch-can proposition. Most of the evaluative follow-up work, when there has been evaluation, has come as an afterthought or as a more-or-less unplanned adjunct to psychological and non-psychological military operations. To date, there has not been a concentrated effort to develop criteria of success, and this is one of the reasons why previous efforts have come up with so little.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

At the present time there are few, if any, technically acceptable criteria for the evaluation of psychological warfare programs, nor are there adequate techniques available for developing criteria for the evaluation of a *total* psywar program. Most psywar programs have developed haphazardly, and evaluation, if it has been undertaken, has not been scientifically rigorous. Those who have attempted to research the problem have not had the responsibility for psychological operations and have not possessed a clear and consistent understanding of that activity, and the very nature of war has prevented the precision and control necessary to obtain adequate measures.

Some methods of evaluation have been tried using content analysis,

questionnaire and interviewing techniques, and observation by nonparticipant or participant observers. Prisoners of war have been used as "most like" groups, but they are not always satisfactory because they are not representative of the enemy population as a whole.

It is probably impossible to develop a criterion to evaluate the success of a total psywar effort because of the extreme complexity of the subject. However, selected aspects of the psywar effort can probably be evaluated with techniques we have at hand, if proper consideration is given to the difficulties inherent in the task, and if the shortcomings of past efforts are heeded. However, it is clear at this point that we have many more questions than answers.

NOTES

1. Jenkins, J.G., "Validity for What?", *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, Vol. 10, 1946, pp 93–98.
2. Daughtery, W.E., "Checking Operational Efficiency of Loudspeaker Equipment," *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, W.E. Daugherty and M. Janowitz, Editors, Operations Research Office, Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins Press, 1958.
3. "Psychological Warfare Operations,", U. S. Army Field Manual FM 33–5, October 1966.
4. Daugherty, "Checking Operational Efficiency."
5. Shils, E.A., and Janowitz, M., "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 12, 1948, pp 280–315.
6. *Ibid.*
7. Daugherty, "Checking Operational Efficiency."
8. Andrews, T. G., Smith, D. D., and Kahn, L. A., "An Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of Psychological Warfare", *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 38, 1954, pp 240–44.
9. Kahn, L. A., and Andrews, T. G., "A Further Analysis of the Effectiveness of Psychological Warfare", *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 39, 1955, pp 368–74.

THE PUEBLO FILM*

BY THE 7TH PSYOP GROUP

This analysis of a North Korean film illustrates the integrated use of the SCAME formula for evaluative purposes.

SUMMARY

Much propaganda "hay" has been made by North Korea of the capture of the *USS Pueblo*. *Pyongyang* wire service mentions the "intrusion of the U.S. imperialist armed spy ship" almost daily. The domestic daily newspapers, *Nodong Sinmun* and *Minju Chosen*, also give extensive coverage to the circumstances surrounding the *Pueblo*. The two dailies are a Party organ and a Government organ, and, therfore, propaganda oriented. North Korea also sends propaganda abroad, especially when, in the NK view, such a U.S. vulnerability as the *Pueblo* can be exploited.

*Excerpts from "The Pueblo Film," 7th PSYOP Group, 15th PSYOP Detachment, "Communist Propaganda Trends," SD 69–13, 22 August 1968.

The magazine, *Korean Youth and Students*, No. 92, 1968, gave the crew's confessions and carried pictures of the captured crew members. *Pyongyang Times* gave extensive coverage to the capture and subsequent happenings. However, North Korean propaganda aimed at foreign targets reached its zenith in a film produced by "2.8 Studio" of the North Korean People's Army (KPA) entitled "*Pueblo*, Armed Spy Ship of the U.S. Imperialist Aggressors."

This film is probably one of the most traveled films in the world. It has been shown in Communist and non-Communist countries throughout the world.

* * * * *

Recently, the film found its way, or rather, it was directed on its way by North Korean Communists, to the Japan-North Korea Association in Japan. Here, the Nihon Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) televised the hour long film in an abbreviated twenty minute capsule. This was the first known public showing of the film outside North Korea. The NHK narrator introduced the film in the Japanese language; however, the actual North Korean film was in English. This included the narration by the North Koreans and the voices of various officers and crewmen.

Since video-taping procedures are rather simple, it was possible for non-official Americans, for the first time, to view this piece of North Korean propaganda. North Koreans, as is well known, say the *Pueblo* was in territorial waters, and claim that the crew admits this. This analysis does not delve into the pros and cons of this claim. Nor will any effort be made about the possibilities of "brainwashing" or coercion to get the crew's confession and appeal to President Johnson.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the film as propaganda, to describe, in empirical terms, the appearance of the crew and their environment, and in conclusion, compare the film with other North Korean propaganda methods and themes.

The analysis of the propaganda film will follow the "SCAME" formula. That is, the analysis will be made in regard to Source, Content, Audience, Media, and Effects.

[SOURCE ANALYSIS]

The source of this propaganda is identified by the narrator as the 2.8 (founding day of KPA) Studio of the North Korean People's Army. This, it would seem, gives credibility to the film since the KPA is the source. The KPA, which includes all North Korea's military services, captured the *Pueblo*. KPA identify closely with the North Korean Labor Party (KLP), which is, in turn, easily identified with Kim Il-song, who is said to have founded KPA and KLP. Therefore, the credibility of this film is enhanced since the source captured the *Pueblo*, and who else could better film the story? KPA is closely identified with the North Korean leader, Kim Il-song. In summary, the source, KPA, is an indication that the film

originated from an official voice. This gives the film a more potent effect than might be the case of a supposed commerical film.

[CONTENT ANALYSIS]

Content analysis of the film's script is based on a direct translation of the Japanese language narration of the film. The subject matter of this film can be divided into four categories:

1. The *Pueblo*, acting under orders from the U.S. Government, intruded into North Korean territorial waters.
2. The *Pueblo* was engaged in espionage activities against North Korea.
3. The United States Government must apologize for this activity.
4. The crewmen are being treated well by the North Korean Government.

The North Korean method of describing these four categories is the next step in a content analysis. The first category, the *Pueblo* intruded into North Korean territorial waters, is "proven" by several methods. The captain of the *Pueblo*, Commander Lloyd Bucher, admits that he "intruded deep into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea . . ." He also states that the *Pueblo* sailed within 7.6 miles of Ryodo Island. Then the navigator, Navy Lt. Murphy, describes both verbally and visually, by tracing on a wall map, the course of the *Pueblo* and its intrusions into North Korean territorial waters. From the script, one can distinguish at least six intrusions as described by Murphy.

The final bit of North Korean evidence of a territorial-water intrusion was in the letter signed by the crew and addressed to the President. The letter states that the U.S. must admit "the *Pueblo's* infiltration into the North Korean territorial waters." The film shows the officers and crew filing by to sign this appeal to the President.

The fact that the *Pueblo* was acting on orders from Rear Admiral Johnson, U.S. Navy, is attested by Captain Bucher. He said that he was to collect various oceanographic information in the "the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with radars and various kinds of observatory instruments in a clandestine manner at Chongjin, Wonson, and several other points." And in the letter to the President, it is stated again that the assignment of the *Pueblo* was given by the U.S. Government.

The second content category is that the *Pueblo* was engaging in espionage activities. One North Korean propaganda technique is to compare a slogan and use it over and over. In the case of the *Pueblo* this has been done again and again. "The armed intelligence ship of the U.S. imperialist aggressor" has become almost a proverb in North Korea. Captain Bucher, in his confession which he reads aloud in the film, says that "we spied on various military installations and the distribution of industries, and the deployment of armed forces . . ." The contents of the letter to the

President, which Bucher also reads aloud, reiterates the espionage mission of the *Pueblo*.

The North Korean insistence that the U.S. apologize for the intrusion and activities is manifested primarily in the open letter to President Johnson. Bucher reads, "Our repatriation will be realized only in the case that the Government of the United States admits, not only the Pueblo's infiltration..., but hostile acts, and sincerely apologizes for these acts and gives assurance that they will not be repeated ..." The letter then gives an emotional call for the crew's quick repatriation.

The fourth content category is that North Korea is treating the crewmen humanely, in spite of the crew's admitted criminal acts. The crew is seen eating breakfast while sitting at Western-style tables and chairs. The crew is shown reading North Korean books printed in English. Recreation is provided for all crew members and officers in the form of cards and physical conditioning exercises. One sequence of pictures illustrates the medical care being afforded the men by their North Korean captor.

The crewmen had rooms which appeared to be individual type rooms. They were furnished with Western-style furniture and beds. It was noted that the rooms appeared ready for a "White-glove" inspection.

[AUDIENCE ANALYSIS]

In audience analysis of the "SCAME" formula, it is found that this film has been shown in a myriad of countries. It must be assumed that the term *audience* takes on a very broad connotation. However, there are at least several common characteristics that can be found in all of the diverse audiences. For one thing, the film is, say the North Koreans, shown at embassies or official functions. The other is that all of the countries have some level of relations with North Korea. This might well predispose viewers to be more receptive to anti-U.S. propaganda.

There is also the possibility that there is more than one intended audience. It is obvious that the countries where this film is shown are the apparent audience group. However, it would appear that North Korea hopes to influence other world people who are either neutral or even pro-U.S. at this time. Japan, for instance, has no official relations with North Korea. Such areas may, in fact, be North Korea's ultimate audience. One thing not yet mentioned is the possibility that this film may be targeted for the U.S. The effect may be fairly great even though the U.S. does not see the film. This may seem incongruous at first glance, but this still may be the case. If North Korea could add to internal dissension in the U.S. by sowing doubts as to whether the *Pueblo* was in international waters, there is little doubt that North Korea would do so. Yet, how could this benefit North Korea? Two ways, one direct, one indirect. First, if doubts were implanted in the minds of Americans concerning U.S. military involvement in Korea, there might be a "pull-out of South Korea movement" similar to the case with Vietnam now.

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ments is very seldom used in the Western world. For instance, the North Korean Government insists on being called the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and, as can be seen in the movie script, this phrase is used at least seven times by Bucher and Murphy, the ship's navigator. It is obvious that some North Korean "guidance" had to be given to these two men, since the North Korean Government will not allow itself to be referred to as anything but the DPRK. Western nations do not usually use DPRK.

A final incongruity involves the crew's living quarters. The quarters were unquestionably adequate, almost plush. However, one might question the fact that the rooms appeared "white-glove" inspection-ready. It is to be expected that the men would have to keep their rooms straight, for morale purposes, if nothing else. However, the fact that nothing was out of place makes one wonder if these quarters are really used by the crew.

In conclusion, it is obvious that the North Koreans have used the *Pueblo* incident to great benefit. The film "*Pueblo*, Armed Spy Ship of the U.S. Imperialist Aggressors," is "good" propaganda, at least as far as North Koreans are concerned.

[The analysis is followed by a translated script of the film.]

* * * * *

SOURCE ANALYSIS

Analysis of the source of a communication focuses on the relationship of the source and the audience and often involves the question of "credibility." In other words, although source prestige and other variables may be relevant considerations in the analysis, they are insufficient without data on the audience attitudes by which those variables may be affected or which they may affect. Most of the conclusions regarding attributes of the source that may be important in determining his credibility are tentative: research findings of scientists in the communications field seem to conflict. Richard H. Orth, in the first of two essays in this section that deal with source attributes and audience credibility, discusses some of the more important conclusions research has indicated. A contribution by R. Barry Fulton describes one method used to measure credibility. Radio Free Europe's (RFE's) sampling techniques also illustrate a means to measure the relationship of the audience to persuasive appeals from various countries.

Source analysis need not focus solely on the audience-source relationship, although this is usually the subject on which it seeks to shed light. Study of the role of the communicator may also involve its relationship to a political hierarchy or its philosophies, attitudes, or operational methods. Valyuzenich's polemical description of the American organization for, and approach to, international political communications is an example of such analysis.

The concluding essay in this section provides an additional example of

how the evaluation of the communicator's objectives and technique can contribute to nonhostile source analysis.

SOURCE FACTORS IN PERSUASION*

By Richard H. Orth

In developing a persuasive appeal, PSYOP planners must carefully consider the attributes of the source as a significant desideratum is receptivity to the message.

In their classic summary of source effect, Hovland, Janis, and Kelley suggest that the term "source" can subsume under it more specific elements of the communications process such as the originator and channel.[1] They further state that most probably the same basic factors that apply to persons will apply to other elements such as the medium used. For the purposes of this essay, the distinction among the various types of sources has little importance. The main principle is that the nature of the source ought to be considered before a campaign is initiated.

Hovland, Janis, and Kelley mention only some basic considerations: [2] Communicator credibility and trustworthiness and the duration of the effects brought about by the credibility and/or trustworthiness of the communicator. Most of the results of their work have become a standard caveat among individuals involved in both the basic and applied fields of attitude change. However, further inroads have been made by looking into the concept of credibility in more detail.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOURCE: SIMILARITY

There should be some basis for similarity of interest between the source of the message and the target. Moreover, the similarity should occur in an area relevant to the issue. One issue that has come to the fore concerns the similarity of the source and the receiver. It appears that when the two enjoy some area of shared characteristics, the source has more success in persuading the target. Before accepting such a statement, one must examine more closely how similarity affects persuasiveness. For example, Mills and Jellison found that if the sender has an occupation similar to that of the target, he is more persuasive.[3] Interestingly enough, the similarity in occupation did not increase persuasiveness by making the source seem more credible. Rather, the increased persuasiveness derived from the medium of shared experiences. A study by Berscheid found that a similarity in values helped boost the effectiveness of the source.[4] Moreover, Berscheid showed that similarity of values is more important if that similarity occurs in an area relevant to the issue on which the persuasion is being attempted.[5]

In a further investigation of the similarity issue, Brock showed that fine discriminations were made by the receiver,[6] thus suggesting that the

*Original essay by Richard H. Orth.

closer the source and the receiver are, the better the chance of influencing the receiver.

It should be noted for practical application of such research that the similarity that is being discussed is specifically concerned with the values held by the source and the receiver. Thus, the psyoperator must be very careful if he chooses to base a campaign on the similarity between a source and a target. For example, it may seem intuitively correct to use a defector as the source of a message urging surrender. However, a question that must be asked is: "Do this source and the proposed target hold similar values regarding surrender?" The evidence, by the fact that the source defected while the target did not, suggests that they have different values about surrendering to an enemy force. As shown below, this fact need not, by itself, rule defectors out as sources in PSYOP campaigns. However, their use must be carefully weighed in terms of the potential benefit and potential harm to the campaign from the receiver's evaluations.

INTENT

The source's intentions are important to the success of a persuasion campaign. If the intent to persuade is obvious, the PSYOP communicator can circumvent the suspicion of an audience by presenting the message in a particular framework that can override the obvious intent. Another characteristic of the source that has received some attention since the original concerns expressed by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley is the intent of the communicator.[7] The question here is whether a communication that is an avowed attempt to persuade is more successful than one in which the objective (persuasion) is hidden. Intent could be examined in more general terms, but most frequently it concerns an individual's assessment of what the source is attempting to accomplish by engaging in the communication process. One need only consider his own behavior when reading or watching television. An advertisement or political statement is interpreted by the audience as an attempt to persuade. Of course, if the receiver's attitude is already in line with the message, the judgment may be (and usually is) different. There is little chance that the receiver will assess the source as one who is trying to convince him to change his attitude. However, if the source advocates a position different from that of the receiver, the latter will accuse the source of trying to sway his feelings. Usually when this occurs, very little opinion change takes place. There is evidence for this phenomenon. For example, it has been shown that a communicator is more effective when he is overheard than when he confronts the receiver.[8] Another study showed that taking a receiver's mind off the fact that a persuasion attempt is being made resulted in greater attitude change than allowing him to concentrate on the persuasion.[9] Interestingly enough, this was found to be true only when there was strong reason to feel that the receivers were involved in the issue over which the change was advocated. This latter point further

supports the contention that intent becomes a factor only when there is a change advocated by the source.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the intent issue for the psyoperator is that the receiver will surely attribute intent to persuade to any effort directed at him from an enemy force. Thus, the psyoperator must keep in mind that his efforts to persuade the enemy soldiers begin with a major handicap.

One effective technique to overcome this handicap is to convince the receiver that the intent to convince him is undertaken because the source actually likes the receiver.[10] In other words, a receiver who thinks that the source likes him even though he is trying to persuade him to alter his opinion will be more likely to change. Intuitively, this makes sense. The receiver would have to ask why someone who likes him would want him to change his opinion. There are only two responses to the question. On one hand, the source might not know what he talking about. On the other hand, if the source does know what he is talking about, he must be thinking about the best interests of the receiver. This thought process demonstrates that one must be wary of simply using a source who is known to be friendly to the target; he must also be considered to have some expertise on the issue of the attempted persuasion.

DISCREPANCY

The discrepancy between the source and the receiver should be at a level where there can be some basis for mutuality. The primary question concerning discrepancy involves the relationship of the amount of difference between the source and the receiver to the degree of receiver attitude change. Generally, the greatest amount of change will take place at the intermediate level of discrepancy. Figure 1 demonstrates this relationship graphically. It should be obvious that if there is no discrepancy, there can be no change. Moreover, as the amount of discrepancy increases, so does the amount of change. This is true only up to a point: Thereafter, the amount of change begins to decrease as the discrepancy becomes even larger.



Figure 1

This is a very familiar process, exemplified in bargaining situations. In such a case, the buyer meets the price asked up to a point. Past that point, he begins to bargain with the seller to see if they can reach a mutually satisfactory price. In this context, the more the seller sees that his price is beyond the buyer's reach, the more he will tend to lower his price. In essence, the roles of source and receiver keep reversing until agreement is reached. However, if the price that the two parties have in mind is the same, there will be no bargaining. Similarly, if the prices are too far apart there is little change that bargaining will occur. If either the buyer or seller perceives that the latter is true, there will be little hope of reaching agreement.

Thus, it behooves the psyoperator to insure that the source he uses is seen as being within the scope (usually referred to as the "latitude of acceptance") of the receiver. Unlike the bargaining situation, there is little chance that the source can move toward the receiver in his attitude. In other words, change on the part of the receiver will usually be a major change.

Yet, it might be worthwhile for a PSYOP campaign to try the bargaining approach. However, it has been shown that when there is a great deal of difference between the source and the receiver, the receiver will attempt to derogate the source. That is, rather than trying to think up counterarguments, the receiver will reject the source as being either noncredible or unknowledgeable. If this is true, then a change in the extremity of the source's position may give credence to the receiver's earlier judgment. This would then make the receiver even more likely to reject the qualification of the source.

CREDIBILITY

The source must be credible to the receiver. Credibility has traditionally been discussed in terms of trustworthiness and expertise. For example, a source that is shown to be trustworthy is more credible than one that is shown to be untrustworthy. However, trustworthiness is an attribute of the source that is attributed by the receiver. Thus, a Communist newspaper may be seen as untrustworthy by non-Communists but as trustworthy by Communists; the obverse might be true of a non-Communist newspaper. The psyoperator must be aware of this phenomenon. It may operate even more subtly: A source considered trustworthy by a particular receiver in one situation may not be considered so in another situation. For example, an enemy officer may be a highly trusted source for his men about the course of a war when he is their commander. However, should this same officer defect, his comments on the course of the war may easily be dismissed because of his defection. Thus, it is not only necessary for the psyoperator to keep in mind the problem of how trustworthy the source is, but he also must be aware of the limitations of trustworthiness. Moreover, he must analyze the trustworthiness of a source—not from his own perspective, but from the view of the receiver

of the message. Trustworthiness is attributed to the source by the receiver based on his analysis of a multitude of characteristics either actually possessed or assumed to be possessed by the source.

EXPERTISE

The source must exhibit some expertise in the field he is discussing. Another area of credibility that we have ignored thus far is that of expertise. It is common sense that one is much more likely to follow the advice of an expert than that of a novice. The expertise requirement has received ample treatment elsewhere, and there is little need to dwell on it. The psyoperator must utilize a source that is knowledgeable on the issue on which persuasion is attempted. Although demonstrated expertise in a related area may enhance the source somewhat, it is preferable that his expertise be precisely in the issue being discussed.

THE SOURCE AND THE MESSAGE

Especially in PSYWAR situations, it is from the message that the receiver infers the credibility of the source. We have thus far concerned ourselves primarily with characteristics of the source. These characteristics are either possessed by him or they are attributed to him by the receiver. In this context, the question arises: "How does the receiver attribute the characteristics to the source?" Oftentimes, the attribution originates simply in observation. For example, racial or ethnic similarity is often visible to the receiver. Other characteristics can be attributed to the source by knowledge of the position he holds. For example, expertise can be attributed to a college instructor because he is a teacher and, therefore, different from someone who speaks in a social situation.

In a practical sense, however, such clear-cut situations are not often available to the psyoperator. Messages are conveyed in such a manner that the source is usually not clearly identified. This does not mean that the receiver will not attend to the source of the message but rather that he determines on a subjective basis who the source is. One device that is available to the receiver is the message. He may reasonably ask "Who would want to say this to me?" or "Who would want me to perform the acts suggested in the message?" For example, a leaflet suggesting surrender to soldiers of the enemy forces will obviously be attributed to the forces suggesting the surrender. He will then compare the reasons given for the need to surrender with what he knows to exist. On the basis of this comparison, he will make a judgment about the credibility of the source (It must be noted that the credibility attributed to the source from this single compariosn is likely to persist for some time, especially if it is negative. This should not be confused with the dissociation of source from content which also operates over time).

Earlier in this discussion the effect of the similarity between the source and the receiver was discussed, and the discrepancy between the stand of the source and the stand of the receiver was examined. The similarity can

be attributed by a variety of means, including observation. The discrepancy, on the other hand, is attributed usually on the basis of the message from the source to the receiver. What happens when the receiver sees the source as being similar to himself, and then when the message is received, he sees a large discrepancy between himself and the source? He has two alternatives available. First, he could determine that the source has more knowledge than he does and will thus change his attitudes. The latter could be done with the least psychological cost. The receiver could think that the source was forced into saying something he did not really believe because he was forced to do so by someone with control over the fate of the source. In a situation where the source is being held by the enemy forces, this has a great deal of credence, as in the case of a captured comrade. The psyoperator must be aware of the latter possibility even when the campaign is aimed at friendly or neutral people. However, in this situation he can increase the psychological cost of the second alternative by loading the source with credibility that would be difficult to discredit.

Another area where the message can affect the rating of the source is in the nature of the language used. If the message is difficult to understand (too complex) or is stylistically incongruent with the source, the receiver is likely to question the quality of the source. For example, if the source is presented as being similar to the receiver and uses a language style that is very dissimilar from that used by the receiver, the intended similarity will quite likely be ineffective, the whole result being a futile PSYOP appeal.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is clear that the characteristics of the source are important to the potential effectiveness of a PSYOP appeal. We discussed some characteristics other than the usual trustworthiness and expertise factors. We do not minimize the importance of these two characteristics, but we must recognize that the source characteristics important to successful PSYOP appeals are many and that all are important. Moreover, the psyoperator must be careful not to isolate source characteristics as being the only relevant factors. Quite often all the care taken to insure a good source can be lost by selecting a message that results in the receiver's derogating the source. The qualities of the source and the content of the message must be congruent if any attitude change is to result.

NOTES

1. C. I. Hovland, I. L. Janis, and H. H. Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion.* New Haven, Comm.: Yale University Press, 1953.

2. Ibid.

3. J. Mills, and J. Jellison, "Effect on Opinion Change of How Desirable the Communication is to the Audience the Communicator Addressed," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (1967), pp. 98–101.

4. Ellen Berscheid, "Opinion Change and Communicator/Communicatee Similarity and Dissimilarity," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, IV (1966), pp. 670-680.

[5] Ibid.
[6] T. C. Brook, "Communicator-Recipient Similarity and Decision Change," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, I (1965) pp. 650-654.
[7] Hovland, et al., *Communication.*
[8] Elaine Walster and L. Festinger "The Effectiveness of 'Overhead' Persuasive Communications," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 65 (1962) pp. 395-402.*
[9] L. Festinger and N. Maccoby, "On Resistance to Persuasive Communication," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 68 (1964) pp. 359–366.
[10] J. Mills, "Opinion Change as a Function of the Communicator's Desire to Influence and Liking for the Audience," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, II, (1966) pp. 152–159.

THE LIKABILITY AND SELF-INTEREST OF THE SOURCE IN ATTITUDE CHANGE*

BY VERNON A. STONE
AND
HARROGADDE S. ESWARA

Evidence provided reveals that it is not always safe to assume that a likable source will be more effective than an unlikable source, and that self-interest (as reflected by occupation) interacts with other source variables rather than manifesting itself as a main effect.

Recent studies have shown that the most favorable source is not always the most effective agent of persuasion. Bauer has found that enduring attitude change in the face of counterpropaganda may be better wrought in some cases by a source of questionable trustworthiness than by a high-trust source.[1] Also in contradiction to common sense notions, Walster, Aronson and Abrahams have found that in some cases a low prestige source may be more persuasive than a high prestige communicator.[2]

The latter finding came in a test of the hypothesis that "regardless of his prestige, a communicator will gain in effectiveness when he advocates a position opposed to his own best interests and will lose effectiveness when he advocates a selfish positon." [3] To test this hypothesis, the Walster group used a prosecutor as the high prestige source and a criminal as the low prestige source. The topic was court power—whether there should be more of it, which would presumably be in the best interest of the prosecutor, or less court power, in the best interest of the criminal. There were four conditions, each source taking each side of the argument. As predicted, the criminal was more effective in changing attitudes when he argued against his best interest. But contrary to expectations, the prosectuor was almost equally effective whichever way he argued. This indicated an interaction between prestige and self-interest whereby the

*From "The Likability and Self-Interest of the Source in Attitude Change," *Journalism Quarterly*, XLVI, No. 1 (Spring 1969), pp. 61–68. Reprinted with the permission of *Journalism Quarterly*, copyright holder.

low prestige source gained in effectiveness by arguing against his own best interests, but made no difference for the high prestige source.

Walster and her associates did not accept the interaction interpretation, however. They held the results might have been in part an artifact of the high school student subjects' being more familiar with arguments for strong courts than with arguments against them. They conducted a second experiment in which the sources were a prosecutor and a criminal from the supposedly less familiar Portuguese court system. In this experiment, as predicted, each source was more effective when he argued against his self-interest. Support was claimed for the hypothesis that such will be the case regardless of prestige.

A test of that hypothesis would demand that there indeed be differences in the perceived prestige of the sources. In the first experiment by the Walster group, the prosecutor was clearly rated higher than the criminal on prestige. But in the second experiment, with the setting shifted to Portugal, the criminal was rated almost as high as the prosecutor. It appeared possible that prestige differences might have interacted with self-interest in the first experiment but were too small to do so in the second.

The present study was addressed to the conflicting questions posed by the two earlier experiments: Does arguing against his best interest enhance the persuasiveness of a communicator, regardless of his prestige? Or does such enhancement come only for low prestige sources?

The approach taken here differed from that of Walster and her associates in three basic ways. First, to rule out the possibility of differential effectiveness of messages arguing for and against an issue, the same message was used in all conditions. Second, occupation was used for the manipulation of self-interest rather than of prestige; the manipulation of positive and negative source characteristics was undertaken independently of occupation. Third, in ascribing the source characteristics constituting global prestige, credibility and personal likability were manipulated separately.

The latter strategy was intended to provide a test of the relative effects of credibility and likability on attitude change. The source characteristics of expertness, honesty and influence which constituted the prestige index used by the Walster group may be seen as essentially components of credibility in that they deal with the credentials of the source in relation to the message. But Aronson and Golden have demonstrated that opinion change may be influenced by characteristics of the source which are more or less irrelevant to his credentials.[4] Moreover, Rarick has separated "cognitive" and "affective" components of source prestige and found both to be positively related to attitude change.[5]

Credibility, in turn, may be considered in terms of such components as expertness and trustworthiness. Although probably closely related in most cases, they do not necessarily have to be. One can conceive of a source which is considered highly expert but untrustworthy and another

which is trustworthy but inept. The credibility component chosen for manipulation in the present investigation was professional expertness.

Likability was treated as including only those characteristics which generally are considered to make a person personally likable but are not necessarily related to his expertness in a profession or an area of knowledge.

Predictions were made for expertness rather than likability because expertness was considered closer to the global prestige variable used in the study suggesting the present one. The main objective was a test of the opposing predictions suggested by data from the study by Walster and associates. The prediction derived from their hypothesis was for a main effect of self-interest whereby a source arguing for such self-interest would be more persuasive than a source arguing for such self-interest, regardless of expertness. The opposing prediction, suggested by the first experiment by the Walster group, was for an interaction whereby an inexpert source would be more effective when arguing against than when arguing for his best interests, but an expert source would be equally effective whichever way he argued.

METHOD

Subjects were 95 male and 73 female students enrolled in an undergraduate radio-television course at the University of Wisconsin. The experiment was conducted by the senior author during a regular class period.

Subjects were randomly assigned to the eight experimental conditions in a 2x2x2 factorial design. The manipulated variables were (1) the self-interest (occupation), (2) the expertness and (3) the likability of the source. The main dependent variable in the before-after design was attitude change on the issue of courtroom television.

All materials were contained in a single mimeographed booklet titled "Free Press-Fair Trial Study."[6] Booklets for the eight conditions were identical except for the page describing the source.

The attitude change message was represented to the subjects as one of the responses in a nationwide survey requesting opinions on the issue of television in the courtroom from a random sample of lawyers and newsmen. The message, a 36-line argument against courtroom television, was constructed largely of excerpts from the United States Supreme Court decision of 1965 in the Billie Sol Estes case.

To point up the self-interest differences of the occupational variable, the booklet's introduction explicitly noted that television journalists generally consider it against their best interest to have their cameras banned from courtrooms and that criminal lawyers generally favor such a ban on grounds that the presence of television cameras may interfere with a fair trial for their clients. It was also noted that the news media and the bar have collided on the issue many times in recent years.

The source was introduced as JRB, a respondent in the nationwide

survey. At the start of a two-paragraph description, he was further introduced as either (1) a television journalist or (2) a lawyer specializing in criminal cases.

Expertness was manipulated in the first paragraph by describing the source as either (1) a successful practitioner in his profession who had received high recognition from his colleagues or (2) an unsuccessful practitioner who had been described by colleagues as "lacking in sound judgement and professional competence." Thus professional prestige was used as an indicator of expertness.

Likability was manipulated in the second paragraph of the source description by noting that "people who know JRB on a day-to-day basis" describe him as either (1) pleasant, unpretentious, sensitive to the feelings of others, etc., or (2) unpleasant, pretentious, insensitive, etc., characteristics which would tend to make a person unlikable though he might be a highly respected expert in his profession.

No explicit information was provided regarding the source's trustworthiness. Any perceptions of trustworthiness were left to be inferred from the descriptions of the professional expertness and personal likability of the communicator.

All attitudes were assessed on bipolar 7-point scales before and after the attitude change message was read. Attitude toward the issue was assessed by four agree-disagree items expressing the issue of television and free press-fair trial in slightly different ways. The source was evaluated on six dimensions: (1) his reliability as a source of information on the issue at hand, (2) expertness on the issue, (3) bias, (4) trustworthiness, (5) likability as a person and (6) general attractiveness. The message was evaluated by (1) how well made and (2) how sincere were the arguments.[7]

RESULTS

Source Evaluation Factors. A factor analysis of correlations between source evaluation items yielded two factors (Table 1). Reliability and expertness loaded high on the first factor; scores on those two items were summed for the expertness used in the study. Likability and attractiveness evaluations loaded high on the second factor and were summed for likability scores. Because the loadings for trustworthiness and bias were distributed equally between the two factors at the start of the experiment, those characteristics were treated separately.

Manipulation Checks. The pre-message ratings in Table 2 show that the source manipulations yielded the intended high-low distinctions both in the expertness and likability conditions. The midpoint of each evaluation continuum was 8. The mean initial expertness rating given sources in high expert conditions was 9.48 and in low expert conditions 5.79. The difference between likability ratings in the likability conditions was even greater—a mean of 10.21 for subjects who read the high likability source description as against 4.74 for those reading the low likability description.

TABLE 1

Factor Analyses [A] of Perceived Source Characteristics

	Pre-Message Factors		*Post-Message Factors*	
	I	*II*	*I*	*II*
Traits				
Reliability	.88	.26	.87	.16
Expertness	.89	.08	.85	.16
Likability	.04	.93	.09	.94
Attractiveness	.35	.85	.17	.93
Trustworthiness	.61	.62	.69	.36
Unbiased	.38	.35	.66	−.05
% of total variance	36.8	36.3	40.6	32.3
% of common variance	50.4	49.6	55.7	44.3

[A] A principal components solution with varimax rotation was used.

TABLE 2

Mean Pre- and Post-Message Evaluation of Sources

	By Expertness Conditions				*By Likability Conditions*			
Traits and	*Pre*		*Post*		*Pre*		*Post*	
Occupations [A]	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
Expertness								
Journalist	9.43	4.79	10.60	8.86	7.69	6.52	9.55	9.90
Lawyer	9.52	6.79	10.76	9.67	8.88	7.43	10.14	10.29
Likability								
Journalist	7.95	5.98	9.19	8.67	9.74	4.19	10.26	7.59
Lawyer	8.93	7.05	9.81	8.50	10.69	5.29	10.69	7.62
Trustworthiness								
Journalist	4.43	2.95	5.00	4.05	4.38	3.00	4.64	4.40
Lawyer	4.50	3.36	5.24	4.14	4.79	3.07	4.86	4.52
Unbiased								
Journalist	3.19	2.83	4.07	3.98	3.31	2.71	3.88	4.17
Lawyer	3.50	2.71	4.02	3.29	3.55	2.67	3.38	3.93

[A] Expertness scores represent the sum of two 7-point scales (expertness and reliability). Likability scores represent the sum of separate 7-point scales for likability and attractiveness. Trustworthiness and Unbiased scores are by single 7-point scales. N = 42 per mean.

TABLE 3

Mean Message Evaluations

Criteria and Source Occupations	*By Expertness Conditions*		*By Likability Conditions*	
	High	*Low*	*High*	*Low*
Arguments well made [A]				
Journalist	6.17	6.14	5.93	6.38
Lawyer	6.21	5.83	6.02	6.02
Arguments sincere [A]				
Journalist	5.93	5.55	5.83	5.64
Lawyer	6.00	5.07	5.81	5.26

[A] Scores are by 7-point scales. N = 42 per mean.

There was a fairly high correlation (.41) between the effects of the separate expertness and likability manipulations. Table 2 shows that likability as well as expertness was higher in the high than in the low expert conditions. Similarly, perceived expertness was higher in the high likability conditions. Ratings on trustworthiness and lack of bias were also higher when the source had been described as either expert or likable.

An unexpected result was some initial confounding of occupation with the other source variables. The lawyer was initially rated higher than the journalist on both expertness ($F = 7.68$, $df = 1/160$, $p < .01$) and likability ($F = 9.51$, $df = 1/60$, $p < .01$). Occupational differences in ratings on trustworthiness and lack of bias, while not significant, were also initially in the direction favoring the lawyer. One possible explanation is that the issue involved was essentially a legal one and thus a lawyer might be expected to be better qualified on it. An alternative explanation is that the subjects may have perceived criminal law as a more prestigious profession than television journalism.

Message Evaluation. Table 3 shows that, regardless of what the subjects thought of the source initially, they perceived his message as highly expert. The mean rating given the arguments of the attitude change message on the "how well made" criterion was 6.09 on a 7-point scale. The sincerity of the arguments was also rated highly, the over-all mean being 5.65. Although there were some variations by conditions, the mean message ratings were all high.

Source Evaluation Change. A comparison of pre- and post-message evaluations in Table 2 shows that the message, which was the only variable intervening between the two ratings of the source, substantially changed perceptions of the communicator. Ratings of his expertness and, to a lesser extent, his likability went up in almost every cell following the highly rated message. Both for expertness and likability, evaluations of initially low-rated sources changed more than those for sources rated high initially.[8]

One effect of these changes was the elimination of any significant over-all differences between the journalist and the lawyer on expertness ($F = 1.95$, $df = 1/160$, n.s.) and likability ($F < 1$) ratings. Occupation was intended to serve only as the manipulation of self-interest and not to be confounded with the other source variables. The data indicate that no such confounding existed at the time attitude change was recorded.

However, another effect of the source evaluation changes proved adverse from the standpoint of testing the main prediction. The highly rated message also eliminated the high-low expertness distinction initially achieved by the source descriptions. When his message had been read, the source was perceived on the expert (>8) side of the continuum both by subjects in the expert condition ($M = 10.68$) and by those in the intended inexpert condition ($M = 9.26$). Thus, as in the second experi-

ment by Walster and his associates, differences in perceived professional expertness or prestige of the source were quite small.

Table 2 shows that the source likability distinction remained following the message, though the high-low gap was reduced considerably. The intended unlikable source remained slightly on the unlikable side (M = 7.61) and the intended likable source was clearly on the likable side (M = 10.48) of the continuum.

The message, then, can be seen as having a more pronounced effect on the content-directed (cognitive) source variable of expertness than on the purely source-directed (affective) variable of likability. The message also appears to have reduced the overlap between the cognitive and affective evaluations. The correlation between likability and expertness dropped from an initial .41 to a post-message .28. Furthermore, as Table 1 shows, the message changed the source evaluation factor structure. The content-related traits of trustworthiness and bias, which had loaded equally on both factors initially, moved clearly to the credibility factor following the message.

Attitude Change. The existing beliefs of the majority of the subjects were congruent with the position taken in the attitude change. Seventy percent were on the low (anti-television) side of the midpoint of 16 on the against-for continuum. The mean initial attitude level was 13.06 and the median was 12.54.

The four items assessing attitude toward the issue of courtroom television were summed, and attitude change was calculated by subtracting total attitude following the message from total initial attitude.

An analysis of variance (Table 4) failed to yield the main effect of self-interest which the Walster group's hypothesis would have predicted.[9] The analysis also failed to yield the interaction between self-interest and expertness predicted under the alternative hypothesis that arguing against his best interest will enhance persuasiveness for an inexpert source but not for an expert source. The fact that sources in both expertness conditions were rated expert at the time attitude change was recorded can be seen as militating against differences due to expertness.

Self-interest interacted with likability, and the direction of the interaction was the one predicted for expertness. The means in Table 4 show that the low likable source arguing against his self-interest was more effective than the low likable source arguing for his self-interest. In the high likability condition, on the other hand, the communicator arguing for his self-interest (the lawyer) was as effective as the one arguing against his self-interest (the journalist). Furthermore, using identical arguments, the low likable journalist was more effective than the high likable journalist.

DISCUSSION

The evidence indicates that self-interest—at least the kind reflected by occupation—interacts with other source variables rather than manifest-

TABLE 4

Summary of Analysis of Variance of Attitude Change and Means of Interaction between Self-Interest and Likability

Source of Variance	*df*	*MS*	*F*
Self-interest (A)	1	10.01	1.07
Expertness (B)	1	22.15	2.37
Likability (C)	1	22.15	2.37
A x B	1	1.72	1
A x C	1	41.01	4.38*
B x C	1	18.01	1.92
A x B x C	1	.29	1
Error	160	9.36	

Means

How Message Relates to Source Self-Interest	*Source Likability* [A]	
	High	*Low*
Against (journalist)	1.45_{A}	3.26_{B}
For (lawyer)	$2.29_{A\ B}$	1.69_{A}

*$p<.05$

[A] Means bearing the same subscript do not differ at the .05 level by Duncan multiple-range test. N = 42 per cell.

ing itself as a main effect. Although the interaction between self-interest and likability was not the one for which predictions were made, the pattern was the same as had been predicted between self-interest and expertness. The unlikable source enhanced his effectiveness by arguing against his best interests, but such was not the case for the likable source. As for the predicted interaction involving expertness, it probably was not given an adequate test in this experiment because the expert-inexpert distinction initially achieved was not retained through the crucial period of a attitude change.

How far this evidence can be generalized depends upon the extent to which the intended variables were indeed manipulated. Checks of the expertness and likability manipulations showed that they produced the desired perceptions of those variables. But were the differences produced by occupations primarily due to perceptions of self-interest? Or did other variables associated with the occupations contribute substantially to the interaction with likability? Had the sources been union and industry officials and the issue open-shop legislation, for example, would the results have been the same? In view of the explicit information given in the test booklets and the fact that the subjects were students midway through a radio-television course, it appears most unlikely that they could have failed to associate the appropriate professional self-interest in the issue of courtroom television with the occupations of lawyer and TV journalist. Whether other occupational connotations acted as variables confounded with professional self-interest is unknown. This is a hazard of using occupations as indicators of self-interest.

Be that as it may, the attitude change interaction is clear evidence that it is not always safe to make the common sense assumption that a likable

source will be more effective than an unlikable source. If the choice is between personally likable and unlikable sources who are willing to argue against their professional self-interest, the evidence here recommends the unlikable one. This further bolsters the notion forwarded by Walster and her associates that in some cases a low prestige source may be even more effective than a high prestige communicator.[10]

Why should this be the case? Why should the unlikable journalist, rated lowest of all sources initially, tend to be more effective than any other source in the experiment? A search for correlates revealed that, although the attitude change message was the same for all sources, the arguments tended to be rated best made (Table 3) when they came from the unlikable journalist. The 6.38 rating given his arguments is significantly different ($p<.05$ by 2-tailed t test) from the 5.93 rating given the same arguments from the likable journalist. The correlation between attitude change and argument effectiveness ratings was .22 ($p<.05$). Should this appear to belabor the obvious, it is noted that other variables which might have been expected to correlate with attitude change did not. Evaluations of expertness, bias and trustworthiness of the sources, changes in these evaluations and ratings of argument sincerity yielded no correlations with attitude change. The only other measured source or message variable correlating with attitude change was change in likability ($r = .21$, $p < .05$). Here again, the greatest change was toward the unlikable journalist, initially rated least likable of all sources.

The fact that the message was congruent with existing attitudes of the majority of the subjects was considered as a possible partial explanation of the results. However, this was discounted when an analysis of covariance adjusting for initial attitude levels yielded the same interaction pattern, as did a separate check of the 41 subjects for whom the message was incongruent with initial beliefs, i.e., they favored courtroom television.

Relationships between the various components of source and message evaluation are of interest in their own right. The evidence suggests that it is well to consider the message-related (credibility) and purely source-related (likability) components of source evaluation separately. Although there may be some overlap between credibility and likability, they appear to operate independently enough to warrant separate consideration.

Perhaps the evidence pointing most strongly to a specific area of further research is that which showed the message to have such pronounced effects on source perception. Although such a change in source evaluation is not surprising in view of congruity theory,[11] most investigators have studied only the effects of initial credibility and other source variables upon message acceptance and attitude change and have ignored the effects these processes may have upon how the source is perceived. The present study demonstrates that the communicator may be seen quite differently before and after his message is received. Such evidence

argues against the procedure of assessing only initial attitudes toward sources.

Finally, the pre- and post-message factor analyses of source evaluations indicate that when explicit information regarding expertness and likability but not trustworthiness is available, people tend to draw equally upon cues from the other characteristics in estimating trustworthiness. However, a message judged highly expert and sincere can move trustworthiness clearly into the credibility factor. The question of how trustworthiness is related to other variables also warrants further study.

NOTES

[1] Raymond A. Bauer, "Personality, Perception of Source, and Persuasibility," in Joseph W. Newman, ed., *On Knowing the Consumer* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 83–89.

[2] Elaine Walster, Elliott Aronson and Darcy Abrahams, "On Increasing the Persuasiveness of a Low Prestige Communicator," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 2:325–42 (1966).

[3] Ibid., p. 338.

[4] Elliott Aronson and Burton W. Golden, "The Effect of Relevant and Irrelevant Aspects of Communicator Credibility on Opinion Change," *Journal of Personality*, 30:135–46 (1962).

[5] Galen R. Rarick, "Effects of Two Components of Communicator Prestige," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1963.

[6] Copies of materials are available from the senior author at the School of Journalism, University of Wisconsin, Madison 53706.

[7] Examples of attitude assessment items:

In general, courtroom coverage by television cameras should be permitted.

strongly disagree ---------- strongly agree

How likable do you think you would find JRB as a person?

very unlikable ---------- very likable

[8] An analysis of variance of expertness change scores yielded an F ratio of 13.61 ($df=1/160$, $p<.01$) for the differences by expertness conditions and a F of 30.18 ($df=1/160$, $p<.01$) for the difference by likability conditions. An analysis of variance of likability change scores yielded an F of 46.53 ($df=1/160$, $p<.01$) for likability conditions and an F of 1.31 (n.s.) for expertness conditions.

[9] Walster, *et al.*, *op. cit.*

[10] Ibid.

[11] Charles E. Osgood and Percy H. Tannenbaum, "The Principle of Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude Change," *Psychological Review*, 62:42–55 (1955).

THE HUNGARIAN SELF-IMAGE AND THE HUGARIAN IMAGE OF AMERICANS AND RUSSIANS*

BY RADIO FREE EUROPE

Findings, in part, indicate, but do not prove conclusively, that stereotypes cannot be changed by a radio station's efforts alone; however, at least to some extent, the young and the better-educated are less given to extreme national stereotyping.

INTRODUCTION

This report investigates the Hungarians' image of themselves and of two other nationalities: the Americans and Russians.

It is part of a research series examining national Auto- and Hetero-Stereotypes in Eastern Europe and follows the study "The Polish Self-Image and the Polish Image of Americans, Russians, Chinese, Germans, and Czechs," published in January 1969.

Like the previous study, this one is based on the Buchanan-Cantril "Adjective Check List."[1] The respondents are handed a list of adjectives and asked to select those that in their opinion apply to their own countrymen. They are then asked to do the same for each of the foreign nationalities.

The Buchanan-Cantril "Adjective Check List" consists of twelve adjectives:

Hard-working	Self-controlled
Intelligent	Peace-loving
Practical	Conceited
Generous	Cruel
Brave	Domineering
Progressive	Backward

For this study the list had to be slightly adjusted: "Self-controlled" was eliminated because pre-test results showed that the interviewees were not sure just what it denotes. "Progressive" was replaced by "Advanced" because of the tendentious connotations of "Progressive" in Communist countires.

The idea underlying the employment of the "Adjective Check List" is based on the observation that people tend to ascribe to their own social or national group a set of characteristics generally different from the character traits they ascribe to other groups or nations. The resulting self-image ("Auto-Stereotype") is predominantly flattering, while their picture of "others" ("Hetero-Stereotype") is strongly influenced by how much they imagine those others to be like themselves.

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*Excerpts from "The Hungarian Self-Image and the Hungarian Image of Americans, Russians, Germans, Rumanians, and Chinese," Radio Free Europe, Audience and Public Opinion Research Department, February 1970.

Thus the relative "similarity" or "dissimilarity" between group stereotypes is a useful indicator of the degree of friendliness or dislike between groups or nations.

Extensive research in this field has led to three conclusions:

(a) Hetero-Stereotypes are seldom based on objective assessments; as a result the tendency to extreme stereotyping reveals the existence of strong emotions between social or national groups.

(b) Established *social* Hetero-Stereotypes resist change. Even the recognition of individual differences among members of the "other" group rarely affects the Hetero-Stereotypes of the group as a whole ("Some of my best friends are ....., but .....").

(c) *National* Hetero-Stereotypes are sometimes less rigid, especially when formed as the result of specific and extraordinary situations and if they are of recent origin. As Cantril and associates noted, the temporarily positive American Hetero-Stereotype of the Russians deteriorated significantly between the joint-war-effort year of 1942 and the cold-war year of 1948. This sharp change occurred because the Russian actions during the cold-war period were contrary to U.S. policy *and* the American self-image.[2]

However, long established national Hetero-Stereotypes are as difficult to change as social ones. They are almost immune to change when this is attempted by a government which does not have the support of its nation. It is known that the policy of the Hungarian regime toward most Western nations conflicts with popular sentiment.

The survey findings will be analyzed in two ways:

(a) All eleven adjectives will be treated as an entity and the *overall* findings for one nation or social subgroup will be compared with the overall findings for another.

(b) The adjectives will be grouped into and analyzed in the following four categories:

(1) Hard-working Intelligent Practical	*Positive Unemotional*
(2) Brave Peace-loving Generous	*Positive Emotional*
(3) Advanced Backward	*Level of Development*
(4) Conceited Domineering Cruel	*Negative Emotional*

The first section of the report compares the Hungarian self-image with the Hungarian image of the other nations in toto. [Other] sections will

treat each nationality in greater detail with special emphasis on how age and educational background affect the attitudes.

SAMPLE AND METHOD

This report is based on a survey of 1,055 Hungarian nationals interviewed ... by independent opinion research institutes in seven West European countries. The interviewers were not identified with Radio Free Europe.

Most of the respondents were visiting the West as tourists (41%) or as guests of families living in the West (36%). Regime officials and members of regime-sponsored groups accounted for 8%. Fifteen percent were refugees or legal emigrants.

Certain population groups (people with lower educational and occupational attainments and rural residents) were underrepresented in the sample. Other groups (urbanites and the educational and occupational elites) were overrepresented. To bring the sample results into line with the population at large, these disproportions were corrected ex post facto: the weights of the underrepresented groups were appropriately increased and those of the overrepresented groups decreased to conform with their distribution in the entire population.

The COMPARATIVE AND CONTINUAL SAMPLING method was applied. This method stipulates that analysis can be undertaken only if *all* findings based on the different and independent samples obtained in the various interviewing areas agree to a significant extent.

* * * * *

I. How the Hungarians Compare Themselves to the Americans and Russians

The respondents were handed the list of eleven adjectives and told:

> Here is a list of words by which one can describe people. Please go through this list carefully and select all the words from it which apply to your countrymen.

The process was then repeated *separately* for . . . Americans, Russians, Germans, Rumanians, and Chinese.

Table 1 lists the findings for all six nations:

Table 1

	Hungarian Self-Image %	Hungarian Hetero-Stereotypes of: Americans %	Germans %	Russians %	Rumanians %	Chinese %
Hard-working	69	53	82	23	8	45
Intelligent	74	51	71	13	11	13
Practical	43	71	67	26	18	20
Brave	79	29	57	27	4	17
Peace-loving	67	41	20	28	15	3
Generous	68	63	13	8	4	1
Advanced	49	52	38	17	14	5
Backward	8	1	1	49	61	59
Conceited	23	32	57	44	37	28
Domineering	4	11	30	58	40	44
Cruel	3	6	35	49	46	64

As Table 1 shows, there were side differences in how the Hungarians looked at the five foreign nations.

To assess relative degrees of sympathy or antipathy, the Hungarian Auto-Stereotype was correlated with each of the five Hetero-Stereotypes. The correlation coefficients had a potential range from +1.00 (total identity) to −1.00 (total contrast).

The resultant correlation can be interpreted in terms of the basic theory outlined in the introduction, namely that the degree of similarity or dissimilarity between a national Auto-Stereotype and a national Hetero-Stereotype is indicative of the character of feelings between nations.

Table 2

Hungarian Auto-Stereotype	: American Hetero-Stereotype	= +0.71
Hungarian Auto-Stereotype	: German Hetero-Stereotype	= +0.40
Hungarian Auto-Stereotype	: Russian Hetero-Stereotype	= −0.67
Hungarian Auto-Stereotype	: Chinese Hetero-Stereotype	= −0.76
Hungarian Auto-Stereotype	: Rumanian Hetero-Stereotype	= −0.92

The Hungarian Auto-Stereotype correlates positively only with the American Hetero-Stereotype (+0.71) and, to a lesser degree, with the German (+0.40). In other words, the Hungarians ascribe to the Americans many, and to the Germans some, of the characteristics they ascribe to themselves.

The three other correlation coefficients were negative: the Russians (−0.67), the Chinese (−0.76), and the Rumanians (−0.92); they showed a marked contrast to the Hungarian self-image and thus antipathetic sentiments.

However, a more qualitative analysis of the assessments reveals that the correlation coefficients fail to tell the whole story. Because emotionality is probably the major determinant of stereotyping, an attempt was made to isolate the emotionally charged adjectives in the "Adjective Check List" and consider them separately—i.e., to compare Their prevalence in the Hungarian self-image with their prevalence in the five Hetero-Stereotypes. An average score was computed for the three positive emotional adjectives in the list ("brave," "peace-loving," and "generous"), and the three negative emotional adjectives ("conceited," "domineering," and "cruel").

Graph 1 shows the following results:

The high "positive emotional" score for the Hungarian Atuo-Stereotype indicates that the traditional national virtues of bravery and generosity and also love of peace continue to stir the Hungarians.

Scrutiny of the various Hungarian Hetero-Stereotypes gives the following picture:

(1) The Hungarians' emotional attitude toward the Americans was the *only* positive one, the ratio between "positive emotional" evaluation and negative being 2.75: 1. In all other Hetero-Stereotypes the



Graph 1.

Degree of Emotionality in the Hungarian Self-Image and in the Hungarian Hetero-Stereotype of Five Other Nations.

negative emotionality exceeded the positive, with variations from nationality to nationality.

(2) Hungarian sentiments toward the Germans were ambivalent (ratio of positive: negative = 1:1.4), but the degree of emotional involvement was considerable: 71% (positive score = 30; negative score= 41).

(3) The Hungarian attitude toward the Russians was predominantly negative (ratio positive: negative = 1:2.4), but it was marked by the same high degree of emotional involvement as the German Hetero-Stereotype was, 71% (positive score = 21; negative score = 50).

(4) The "emotional" Hetero-Stereotypes of both the Rumanians and the Chinese were almost exclusively negative (the ratio positive: negative for the Rumanians being 1:5, for the Chinese 1:6.4). Half the sample revealed emotional involvement in their attitude toward these two nationalities. For the Rumanians 49% (positive score = 8; negative score = 41), for the Chinese 52% (positive score = 7; negative score = 45).

The findings may be interpreted as follows:

The *Americans*, in the eyes of the majority of Hungarians, possess to a relatively high degree two of the character traits that Hungarians consider themselves to possess—"generosity" and "love of peace," but this "positive emotional" image was incomplete: only a minority of Hungarians (29%) attributed to the Americans the most highly regarded virtue in the Hungarian self-image, "bravery." The low "bravery" evaluation is no doubt a heritage from the 1956 Hungarian revolution: many Hungarians still seem to blame the West, especially the U.S., for withholding aid against the Soviets during that crisis. Nevertheless, few Hungarians attributed to the Americans such "negative emotional" characteristics as "conceited" (32%), "domineering" (11%) and "cruel" (6%). In fact, they saw these character traits almost as frequently in themselves.

The Hungarians' emotional attitude toward the *Germans* was ambivalent. On the one hand, the Germans drew the highest rating for "bravery," the most valued trait in the Hungarian self-image; on the other hand, the Germans ranked very low in other assumed positive Hungarian characteristics: "generosity" (13%) and "love of peace" (20%). The high rating for "bravery" must be partially traceable to the Hungarian-German military cooperation in World Wars I and II. Nevertheless, the Germans' relatively high showing for "negative emotional" characteristics—"conceited" (57%), "cruel" (35%) and "domineering" (30%)—indicates an emotionally unfriendly attitude. As will appear later, the relatively positive image that, overall, the Hungarians hold of the Germans is due to "positive unemotional" traits of character.

There is nothing surprising in the Hungarians' strong emotional involvement with the *Russians*, or in the fact that those emotions are predominantly negative. One has only to recall the Soviet occupation of their country during World War II, the establishment of a Soviet-sponsored political system, and the Soviet suppression of the 1956 Hungarian revolution. "Domineering" (58%), "cruel" (49%) and "conceited" (44%) were the Russians' most frequently mentioned "emotional" attitudes.

The Hungarian Hetero-Stereotype of the *Rumanians* reflects the long-standing territorial dispute between the two countries and the problem of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. The Rumanians were seen as lacking all the traditional character strengths of the Hungarians ("bravery," 17%; "generosity," 1%; "love of peace," 3%), and as possessing such "negative emotional" characteristics as "cruelty" (46%), "domineeringness" (40%) and "conceit" (37%).

Although the *Chinese* are far away and the Hungarians' personal experience with them is nil, this Hetero-Stereotype is predominantly negative. "Cruelty" was the most frequently mentioned character trait—a reflection no doubt of a traditional fear of the "Yellow Peril"—as well as of a repugnance for the political dogmatism and intrasigence of the Chinese leadership, evocative as they are of the worst periods of the Stalinist era.

Graph 2 shows how the Hungarians assessed themselves and the five other nationalities with regard to their "level of development"—i.e., how often they used "advanced" and "backward" to describe their own nation and the others.

The Hungarians' image of their own level of national development, as depicted in Graph 2, reflects the tendency of all social or national groups to flatter themselves. The positive/negative ratio of 6:1 (49% to 8%) is very favorable.

The assessments of the five foreign nations show a clear-cut split: everything west of Hungary was considered highly advanced, everything east backward. The Americans led all other nations, including Hungary, in their assumed level of development. The Germans approximated the Hungarian self-image. The Russians, in spite of their considerable technological achievements, were regarded as being rather backward. Traditional superiority feelings toward the Rumanians colored that image. The Chinese—as the most "Eastern" of the five nationalities—were considered the most backward.

Net scores for the level of advancement for the six nationalities—arrived at by deducting the "backward" scores from the "advanced"—clearly show this split:

Americans	+ 51
Hungarians	+ 41
Germans	+ 37
Russians	− 32
Rumanians	− 47
Chinese	− 54

II. The Hungarian Self-Image

Now we shall submit the Hungarian self-image to closer scrutiny, paying particular attention to differences related to such factors as age and education.

Both the "positive emotional: and the "positive unemotional" groups of adjectives dominated the Hungarian Auto-Stereotype (Graph 3). The attributes that the Hungarians most frequently ascribed to themselves were: "brave" (79%), "intelligent" (74%), "hard-working" (69%), "generous" (68%) and "peace-loving" (67%).

Among the "negative emotional" characteristics, "conceited" was mentioned by 23% of the respondents. This and the fact that less than half the interviewees considered the Hungarians to be "advanced" (49%) and

Graph 2.



"practical" (43%) shows that the Hungarian self-image was not completely uncritical.

Graph 4 shows a remarkable similarity between young and old, in other words a strong consistency in the Hungarian national self-image. In spite of this general consistency, the young Hungarians considered their compartiots less "hard-working," less "generous" and less "brave" than the older generation did—the skepticism of the youth of today.

Graph 5 compares the Auto-Stereotype of the well-educated Hungarians with that of the less well–educated.

Graph 3.



While age did not significantly affect the Hungarian self-image, education did:

Graph 5 shows that the members of the educational elite viewed their countrymen much more critically than the non-elite did—most significantly in respect to the following attributes: "hard-working" (educational elite = 48%, non-elite = 82%), "brave" (64% to 90%), "practical" (36% to 51%), "advanced" (42% to 54%), "peace-loving" (63% to 72%) and "conceited" (36% to 19%).

Graph 6 shows that in the breakdown by education the *young* Hungarians followed the pattern of the overall sample: The more educated were more self-critical.

III. The Hungarian Image of the Americans

Graph 7 depicts the favorable Hungarian hetero-stereotype of the Ameri-

Graph 4.

The Hungarian Self-Image

(According to Age)



cans which evidently exists in both the emotional and unemotional perceptual areas.

Graph 7 shows that the Hungarians viewed the Americans as "practical" (71%), "generous" (63%), "hard-working" (53%), "advanced (52%), and "intelligent" (51%)—mostly "positive unemotional" characteristics. However, the high "level of development" assigned to the Americans and the important "positive emotional" attribute "generous," one of the most treasured traits in the Hungarian self-image, contributed to the favorable overall image.

Moreover, the Americans' positive image was untarnished by strong "negative emotional" sentiments. Only 32% regarded the Americans as

Graph 5.

The Hungarian Self-Image

(According to Education).



"conceited," 11% as "domineering," and 6% as "cruel." "Conceited" and "domineering" are attributes very likely to be attached to a world power, but they were mentioned by surprisingly few respondents—not so very many more than ascribed them to their own countrymen ("conceited," 23% "domineering," 4%). It is noteworthy that in spite of the incessant regime propaganda about American "war crimes" in Vietnam, only six out of one hundred Hungarians considered cruelty part of the American national character.

Graph 8 compares how Hungarians with only a basic education differed from the better-educated in their view of the Americans. Hungarians with a university education considered the Americans significantly more "practical," "brave," and "generous" but also more "conceited" than the

Graph 6

The Hungarian Self-Image

(According to Education—
of Those up to 25 Years of Age Only).



non-elite did. Concerning the two "positive emotional" characteristics--"brave" and "generous"—the attitudes toward the West developed during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 may very well be mainly responsible for the differences: Hungarians with only a basic education probably regard the U.S. inaction during that crisis as having been motivated by cowardice anf selfishness, wheras their better-educated compatriots see a less simplified picture.

Graph 9 shows that the young educated showed the same pattern as the older educated. By the same token, young people with lower education held nevertheless the same attitudes as the old lower educated respondents.

Graph 7.



Graph 9 shows that the young educated showed the same pattern as the older educated. By the same token, young people with lower education held nevertheless the same attitudes as the old lower educated respondents.

As Graph 10 shows, the Hungarian Hetero-Stereotype of the Russians is dominated by "negative emotional" sentiments. The Russians were described as "domineering" (58%), "cruel" (49%), "backward" (49%), and "conceited" (44%). Only a tenth to a quarter of the respondents saw "positive emotional" traits in them, suggesting that the majority of Hungarians feel toward the Russians a mixture of cultural superiority and a strong antipathy.

As Graph 11 shows, the older respondents were more negative about the Russians than the younger generation was. The two age groups differed most on emotional characteristics: more young respondents described the Russians as "brave" and "peace-loving." Conversely, the over-40 group tended to regard the Russians as more "cruel" and "domineering."

Graph 8.

The Hungarian Image of the Americans

(According to Education)



No significant differences in feeling toward the Russians could be elicited from Hungarians of different educational backgrounds.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The Auto-Stereotype and the various Hetero-Stereotypes of RFE listeners and of non-listeners differed only slightly. Where statistically significant differences could be established, it was not the factor of listening or non-listening which produced them but other factors unrelated to Radio Free Europe's impact. The data indicate but do not conclusively prove that stereotypes cannot be changed by a radio station's efforts alone.

Graph 9.

The Hungarian Image of the Americans

(According to Education—
of Those up to 25 Years of Age only).



IV. THE HUNGARIAN IMAGE OF THE RUSSIANS

Graph 10 suggests that most Hungarians have strong negative emotions toward the Russians and feel culturally superior to them.

These findings, like those in the first major APOR study of national stereotypes—"The Polish Self-Image and the Polish Image of Americans, Russians, Chinese, Germans and Czechs," January 1969—reaffirm the basic theory put forth in the Introduction: Established Hetero-Stereotypes resist change, and even the recognition of individual differences among members of the "other" group rarely affects the Hetero-Stereotype as a whole. This report showed, too, that a negative national

Graph 10.



Hetero-Stereotype is especially firmly entrenched when it has been formed by a historical enmity and feeling of cultural superitoity, as the Hungarian attitude toward the Rumanians has been.

However, the findings also revealed that, at least to some extent, the young and the better-educated are less given to extreme national stereotyping, although the two concurred in the negative appraisal of the Rumanians.

In this context it was of particular significance to note that no amount of regime indoctrination of the older or the young succeeded in establishing "Socialist Solidarity" or erasing national prejudices. As was stated before, this state of affairs will have to be taken into account in the decision-making processes of leaders East and West.

Graph 11.

The Hungarian Image of the Russians

(According to Age)



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WAYS AND MEANS OF U.S. IDEOLOGICAL EXPANSION*

By A. Valyuzhenich

A current Soviet analysis of the philosophy and organization of U.S. international political communications.

* * * * *

U.S. ideological expansion based on anti-Communism is apparent in new components in foreign policy machinery, as well as in intensification of the propaganda functions of U.S. government bodies. An important role is also assigned to various private and semi-official organisations, charity funds, educational and cultural institutions. The ways and means of U.S. ideological expansion are most clearly manifest in the activities of the three main centres of American foreign propaganda—the United States Information Agency (USIA), the Pentagon and the State Department.

The president of the U.S. has charged the USIA with the mission of elaborating and implementing foreign policy propaganda programmes and actions; it coordinates the propaganda of all other U.S. government bodies with the exception of the Pentagon and CIA and works closely with the propaganda services of other imperialist states, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular. The basic documents of the USIA, founded in 1953, naturally contain no references to "psychological warfare" or propaganda in general. These words are replaced by the more neutral and flexible word "information." Thus, U.S. legislators sought, as much as possible, to dissociate themselves from the "psychological warfare" methods which had been compromised back in the Truman presidency. They also tried to gloss over the class meaning of their propaganda and persuade other nations that the United States furnishes unbiased information, particularly emphasising the USIA's chief aim of telling "the American story to the World".

According to Perusse, a former long-standing USIA propagandist, "the entire task of dealing with foreign people will be made easier" if the corresponding services of the United States will "go along with a tide of public opinion at home and abroad and drop the word [propaganda] completely. . ." Perusse made it clear that from a strictly professional viewpoint, "this is 'psychological warfare', pure and simple, as everyone who has engaged in any aspect of such activity will recognise".[1]

That USIA propaganda has long been called "overseas information", "international communication" and "international information" demonstrates that such reommendations of the "psychological operations" experts have won approval. Only under the Kennedy Administration was USIA activity overtly called propaganda. The USIA participation in the

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*Excerpts from "Ways and Means of U.S. Ideological Expansion," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 2, February 1971, pp. 63–68.

"psychological operations" carried out by the U.S. military in Vietnam has generally revealed the shameful role of the USIA in fabricating and putting about all kinds of slander to whitewash the criminal U.S. aggression in Indochina.

In preparing news and comment for the Voice of America radio station, TV broadcasts, films, displays, magazines, booklets and other publications, the USIA propagandists pursue the same objectives that are dictated by U.S. military-political strategy aimed at interfering in the domestic affairs of soverign states. Lecturers, teachers and tourists going abroad receive similar instructions in propaganda.

Blatant propaganda moves which may clearly compromise the U.S. Administration in the eyes of the world are frequently carried on not by USIA but by organisations and centres with private signboards such as "Radio Liberty" or "Radio Free Europe". The CIA, which maintains close contacts with the USIA, is charged with carrying out the most important ideological subversion.

* * * * *

Everday news released by the USIA and other American propaganda services is called "managed news". Miles Johnson, a journalist writing on international affairs and familiar with "the management of news," wrote that it implied "all of the means, direct and indirect, the government employs to manufacture, control, manipulate, and shape the news relating to its activities so as to affect opinion, either at home or abroad, in a manner advantageous to itself".[2]

Two Washington journalists exposed the alleged objectivity of the U.S. ruling circles' "information policy," when they wrote of U.S. foreign policy in the 1960s: "Repeatedly the government of the United States has been caught in the act of telling lies to its citizens and to the world. Not euphemisms or exaggerations, not the deft distortions and slick simplifications that constitute the fine art of propaganda, but deliberate and flagrant lies. Three successive national administrations have made the device of outright deception their method of choice in dealing with foreign affairs crises." [3]

U.S. propaganda today frequently employs the "soft sell" method. U.S. ideologists had used "hard sell" at the height of the cold war when the overtly aggressive strategies of "containment", "rolling back", and "liberating" were proclaimed.

The "soft sell" has many versions, but all of them have been most often used in ideological subversion against the socialist community gradually to erode and undermine the foundations of socialism. In other words, they are part of the notorious "bridge-building" strategy.

The manner of U.S. propaganda against socialist countries has changed correspondingly. In the past, it was primarily meant for socialism's opponents, the remnants of the exploiting classes and people who felt "socially depressed"; these sections of the population were supposed to undermine

the system from within. U.S. propaganda is now, however, making a play for other sections of the population brought up under socialism; it is counting on a long-term process of "transformation" of socialism. The propagandists have particularly been keen to extol the scientific and technological achievement of capitalist countries expecting them to cause disillusion with socialism thereby impelling the sections towards "integration" with Western countries, and breaking up the socialist community.

To make their material and broadcasts convincing, U.S. propagandists assume an attitude of defending "true socialist ideals" by condemning all adherents of "conservatism", "sectarianism," "dogmatism" and other "isms" they themselves have invented. Imperialist propaganda has always attached major importance to whipping up nationalism and chauvinism, counterposing them to socialist proletarian internationalism.

USIA activity is based on the strategy and tactics of U.S. foreign policy propaganda. Strategic propaganda is meant to create a situation conducive to the attainment of U.S. foreign policy goals in a given period, while tactical propaganda is concentrated on solving current political problems. U.S. strategic propaganda is addressed to comparatively small groups of people capable of influencing public opinion or the government of the particular country. It is for them that the bulk of books, learned journals and other academic publications are as a rule intended. Cultural and educational exchanges serve the same purpose. The main function of U.S. tactical propaganda is interference in specific current events, their comment and appeals to the broadest possible audience through newspapers, radio and television.

U.S. propaganda services devote special attention to determining the appropriate object for propaganda and the most feasible means of carrying it out. For instance, printed matter is preferred if a country is highly literate; radio, television and propaganda films are preferred if literacy is low.

Since the launching of the Echo-I satellite in the 1960s, the U.S. press has debated opportunities for using outer space for broadcasting propaganda round the world by furnishing the communication satellites with up-to-date electronic equipment capable of generating powerful signals and thus making it possible to receive directly from the comsats without any relay stations. General Electric has estimated that in the early 1970s the USIA will have a system of communication satellites capable of broadcasting radio and TV programmes at frequencies and with scanning typical of the receivers in America and Europe.[4]

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In 1968 . . . [in] a learned survey—*United States Foreign Policy* . . . [the author] wrote:

> . . . The immediate aims of United States propaganda programmes might range from building support for an existing government to promoting its overthrow or urging its citizens to defect; from encouraging a climate of opinion which will enable a friendly government to contribute military forces to the war in Vietnam to encouraging an Eastern European Communist Country to assert increasing independence from the Soviet Union; from promoting attitudes conducive to economic development in a new African State to minimising support for Castroism in parts of Latin America.[5]

The propaganda services of the [current] Administration are sparing no efforts to implement these subversive aims of U.S. foreign policy propaganda. The . . . U.S. "information facilities" continue to serve the global aspirations of U.S. imperialism. They still seek importunately, though vainly, to create in people's minds an embellished image of the U.S. as the "world leader". But all "psychological efforts" of U.S. imperialism's ideologists are futile.

In the spring of 1969, the U.S. Congress published a collection of documents, a sequel to the studies conducted by leading American experts on the U.S. "image" abroad. The collection also included recommendations aimed at improving the "Image." A very important goal of U.S. propaganda has always been to create an embellished U.S. "image" and a distorted "image" of its ideological adversary, corresponding to the general political lines and interests of the U.S. ruling circles.

The above-mentioned collection, entitled *The Future of the United States Public Diplomacy*,[6] contains numerous facts attesting to the sharp deterioration of U.S. "image" in recent years and failures of U.S. foreign policy propaganda; the U.S. "image" abroad has considerably deteriorated owing to such events as U.S. aggression in Indochina, racial unrest and the increasing crime rate. The aforesaid experts conclude: "The mental picture that many foreigners have of our nation is increasingly that of a violent, lawless, overbearing, even a sick society."

They blame this unsatisfactory state of affairs partly on "modern communications" which tend to "stagger negativism". However, the conclusions also contain some rational ideas, such as, that foreign policy "begins at home", that foreigners judge the U.S. on its record not on its words, and that "propaganda of action is far more powerful, expressive, and persuasive than words." At the same time, these experts propose that the government should intensify efforts to prepare and implement all aspects of foreign policy propaganda, which, as they hold, ought to improve the U.S. "image" abroad and, as far as possible, denigrate socialism and the socialist community.

The Pentagon and all the forces that make up the U.S. military-industrial complex are playing a leading role in the ideological explansion of U.S. imperialsim. Pentagon propaganda is not only militaristic; it also fully reflects the viewpoint of the forces which comprise this complex and provide it with ideas.

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Pentagon foreign propaganda aims to uphold the morale of U.S. servicemen as well as to "manage" public opinion in the countries where U.S. troops are stationed. According to the information released by the Pen-

tagon, the radio and television services of the U.S. armed forces, numbering more than 350 radio and 90 TV stations, work for U.S. troops abroad.[7] This vast radio and TV network is intended both to brainwash U.S. Defence Department personnel and to maintain the cold war and war hysteria atmosphere abroad.

Special groups of war correspondents are busy producing anti-communist films which also praise militarism and other "blessings" of the American way of life. For instance, Pentagon film-shooting groups brought 118 films from Vietnam in 1968 alone. Not one film, however, attempted to give an objective notion of the Vietnamese war . . . An international affairs expert at the University of Maryland observes that all films are nothing but dirty propaganda about the U.S. servicemen's "noble mission" in Indochina.

The Pentagon also puts out films which, at first glance, are unconnected with military affairs, yet incite blind hatred for Communism. They include *Free People* (the script written in the spirit of rabid anti-Communism cynically slanders life in socialist countries), *The Line is Drawn*, *The Road to the Well*, and other similarly stereotyped productions.

Pentagon military-propaganda services produce their own films and help private companies whose films are of interest to the Defence Department. Thus, in the spring of 1969, [a] congressman . . . openly condemned the backing lent by the Pentagon to actor John Wayne and his company in the filming of the ultra-militaristic film *The Green Berets* glorifying the "feats" of the U.S. Task Force in Vietnam. [The author] stressed that "the glorified portrayal of the Vietnam War, which is the heart of this film, raises serious questions about the Defence Department's role in using tax funds for direct propaganda purposes. . . . This alliance of Hollywood and the Pentagon seems to have brought out the worst in both institutions."

CBS, NBC, ABC and U.S. private corporations supply their productions to Pentagon radio and television services free of charge. The Pentagon also uses The Voice of America, operated by the USIA. The magazines' and books' divisions of the Pentagon Office of Public Affairs puts out special military and military-propagandist publications. The Defence Information Office holds press-conferences and publishes and distributes pamphlets, books, magazines and newspapers under more than 125 titles with a total circulation of close to ten million copies.

The reporters of U.S. newspapers and magazines who write "favourably" about Pentagon activities are asked to write for military magazines which pay them substantial fees. At the same time, the journalists who cover events objectively, the war in Vietnam in particular, find themselves under the surveillance of the Pentagon security service. Such measures by the Pentagon special services make the civilian mass media distribute the information which comes directly from the Department of Defence or the newspapermen who are very close to it and have won a reputation as ultra-patriots.

The Pentagon special services try hard to influence the younger generation outside the U.S. ideologically and psychologically, achieving this through the Defence Information School of the Defence Department. It was set up soon after the Second World War and now covers 28 countries on three continents where 8,000 Pentagon-appointed instructors teach over a million U.S. servicemen's and local children.

. . . .The dangerous influence of this "state within a state," is increasingly more openly discussed in U.S sociopolitical and academic circles. A conference on U.S. national goals and war budget was held in Washington in March 1969. The 45 Congressmen and 19 academics and experts who took part in the conference severely criticised Pentagon activities. Pentagon leaders, however, ignore U.S. public criticism. Speculating on the "Communist menace" and fanning chauvinism and obscurantism, Pentagon top-brass and the military-industrial complex seek to fashion the American way of life after a pattern of a "garrison state."

The ramified apparatus of the U.S. State Department, which of late has been more widely used for foreign policy propaganda, is one of the most important channels of U.S. ideological expansion.

The speeches and statements of the Secretary of State and other U.S. foreign policy leaders, as well as the messages sent to heads of state, are invariably meant to influence public opinion in those countries. At press-conferences regularly held by the State Department, its high-ranking officials brief reporters on various aspects of U.S foreign policy. Even in the U.S. the substance and quality of information given to the reporters at those press-conferences are often severely criticised. . . .Washington correspondents often feel that the State Department "is seeking to use them as instruments of psychological warfare." [8]

The ideological and "psychological" action of the State Department is not confined to press-conferences and briefings. It is also evident in the practical measures carried out in cultural and educational exchange arranged, as a rule, jointly with the USIA. As an important form of foreign policy propaganda, such exchanges have served and continue to serve the global aims of U.S. foreign policy. A report of the Bureau of the Budget of the House of Representatives in charge of the State Departments's budget openly stated: "Culture for culture's sake has no place in the United States Information and Educational Exchange Program . . . cultural activities are indispensable to all propaganda . . . ".[9]

. . . [A] former U.S. Ambassador to the UN . . . has said that contacts with East European states are not "awards" conferred on communist governments but a means of getting Western ideas through to Eastern Europe and diminishing dependence on the Soviet Union. It was hardly surprising therefore that . . . [the] former head of Radio Free Europe, one of the main centres of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet propaganda, was appointed Assistant-Secretary of State for cultural and Educational exchange.

The notorious American aid to foreign countries administered through the Agency for International Development (AID), a special body of the

State Department, is but a poorly camouflaged political diversion by U.S. imperialism against peaceloving peoples. A professor who served for many years in the State Department, the AID, Department of Trade and the CIA, disclosed the ideological and political meaning of the aid when he said that its most important function was "to counter the spread of Communism," and emphasised that it was just these considerations that are "preponderant in decisions to provide aid" [10] to a particular country.

Specialists from developing countries who come to the U.S. under the AID exchange programme are taught not so much technical subjects as unquestioning admiration for the virtues of the American way of life. On the other hand, U.S.specialists sent abroad take special courses of training in accordance with the ideological and political policies of the U.S. State Department.

The Peace Corps comes under the State Department and is an instrument of ideological expansion in developing countries. Its volunteers are often regarded by the governments of the recipient countries as subversive and, consequently, as having nothing in common with "strengthening mutual understanding" avowed by the Corps Charter.

The most important objective of U.S. ideological expansion carried out by the strategists and tacticians of American foreign policy propaganda is to split the ranks of imperialism's opponents and to sow discord between the socialist countries, to poison the minds of workers, and to denigrate socialism. Bourgeois propaganda seeks to break up the common front of struggle for peace and socialism by appealing to nationalistic and chauvinistic feelings, juggling with all manner of anti-socialist ideas and trends and speculating on the slightest errors of its ideological adversaries.

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The world balance of forces is continuing to change in socialism's favor. Despite all their variegated attempts, the capitalist ideologists are incapable of turning the clock back. The influence of the noble and lofty Communist ideas on world sociopolitical development is irreversible.

NOTES

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3. W. McGaffin and E. Knoll, *Anthing but the Truth*, New York, 1968, p. 64.
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5. S. Appleton, *United States Foreign Policy*, Boston, 1968, p. 570.
6. *The Future of the United States Public Diplomacy*, Report No. 6, Together with Part XI of the *Hearings on Winning the Cold War: the U.S. Ideological Offensive*, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969, pp. 1R, 3R, 4R.
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INFLUENCING POLITICAL CHANGE BY BROADCASTING TO THE SOVIET UNION*

By Robert L. Tuck**

There is competition for the ear of the Soviet listener in international broadcasts. Listeners are becoming more discriminating and expect to hear more interesting programs than before. The role of international radio is that of a source of information and ideas, rather than an instrument of mass persuasion.

ABSTRACT

External communications are an increasingly important factor for influencing political change in the USSR. The number of citizens who can hear radio broadcasts from abroad has increased fifteen times since Sta-

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***Author's Note:*

When this paper was written in 1966, there was only scattered evidence of efforts by individual Soviet citizens to challenge the regime by insisting on their legal rights to justice and freedom, that is, to work for political change in their own interests. The paper was, therefore, an outline of assumptons and suggested methods and techniques for communicating with the Soviet listener to overcome his isolation and to broadcast relevant information and ideas which would help him in his own efforts toward political reform.

During the intervening six years it has become possible to test these assumptions and the broadcasting methods and techniques to an increasing amount of concrete documentation—that is, to *samizdat*, the "self-published" and distributed materials of dissent and protest which describe the thinking and actions of individuals who contribute to a small but vital democratic movement within the USSR.

Samizdat is a communication among the democrats; they take considerable risks to get documents to the West to inform and win support of world opinion; they depend on radio from abroad for further dissemination back within their own country. (As author Alexander Solzhenitsyn stated in his interview in *The New York Times* of April 3, 1972, "If we ever hear anything about events in this country, it's through them," referring to Radio Liberty.)

As *samizdat* documents arrive in the West they provide the broadcaster with program content to inform Soviet listeners about the efforts of the democrats and to win support for their often heroic insistence that legal guarantees of individual rights be implemented for all Soviet citizens.

This mutual interplay and interaction of supporting information and ideas between external broadcasters and their Soviet listeners has become a unique form of communication. By studying and broadcasting *samizdat* documents along with other relevant information and ideas denied the audience by a regime which insists there can be no "peaceful coexistence" in ideology, today's international broadcaster has an unprecedented opportunity to help his Soviet listeners in their own quest for justice and freedom—and therefore to hasten political change. [April 1972]

lin's death. The Soviet regime has been slowly yielding to the demands of modern industrial society for a freer interplay of economic forces and individual initiative; these pressures for economic reform point toward corresponding relaxation in the political sphere.

A radio broadcaster therefore can play a role in influencing political change (1) by regarding international radio as a source for stimulating information and ideas rather than an instrument of mass persuasion or manipulation; (2) by continual analysis and reassessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system and regime policy; (3) by continual study of the attitudes and aspirations of the vast complex of Soviet listeners (the younger generation, rank-and-file Party members, the technical and creative intelligentsia, et al); (4) by formulating broadcasting objectives which conform to the aspirations of the audience for faster political, economic, and social reform; and (5) by presenting his material in an effective manner which appeals to the basic patriotism of his listeners and their own best human instincts and self-interest.

* * * * *

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL RADIO

International radio is a source of information and ideas, rather than an instrument of mass persuasion. There are some 26 million radio sets in the USSR capable of receiving short-wave broadcasts. [In 1971 the estimate was 30 million.] They are in the hands of individuals who exercise some freedom of choice in what programs they listen to and who are not captive to the local networks of loudspeakers which the regime saturates with its official line. The omissions, distortions, and dreary political fare of Radio Moscow very often encourage Soviet listeners to seek foreign stations in preference, but listeners will not continue to search for other stations which do not satisfy their wish for stimulating information and ideas.

Radio broadcasts in themselves are unlikely to result in overt political action by Soviet citizens against a regime which has kept itself in power by a tightly controlled party and police apparatus for almost 50 years—nor should this be intended. Appeals for direct action would, in all probability, disappoint the broadcaster by their lack of success. Whether supporters of the regime or its committed opponents, Soviet listeners would rsent calls from abroad [that would] expose them to regime retaliation or punishment, and [furthermore they would] tend to discount all other ideas and information broadcast by the same station as, in their minds, similarly irresponsible.

Thus, any suspicion in a listener's mind that a station is trying to manipulate him for its own purposes would be ruinous to the station's credibility, and credibility is the *sine qua non* of audience impact.

The broadcaster must therefore accept the more modest—and more challenging—role of trying to stimulate independent thinking on the part of the individual members of his audience. Listening to broadcasts from abroad is now easier and no longer as dangerous to Soviet listeners as it

was in the past. There is more competition for the listener's ear from both other international broadcasters and from Soviet media which offer television and entertainment. The broadcaster must therefore assume that listeners are becoming more discriminating and expect to hear more interesting programs than ever before.

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SOVIET LISTENERS.

In addressing the Soviet audience as a whole, one must bear in mind that it is basically patriotic, young, and therefore future-oriented, and made up of varying interest groups. Broadcasts can be directed at, but cannot be limited to, specific categories of listeners; anyone with a receiver might hear them, and thus nobody should be unnecessarily or carelessly excluded and thereby, perhaps, offended.

At the same time, a broadcaster who wishes to influence political change in the USSR must select program material on the basis of its appeal, either directly or indirectly, to those groups of listeners who have political potential: the younger generation, rank-and-file members of the Communist Party; certain occupational groups, some of primary, some of secondary potential; and the various nationality groups of the USSR.

Appealing to politically influential listeners is a challenge, because many of them have a vested interest, active or latent, in the present system; they may simply not be interested in fundamental change, they may fear it. The basically patriotic majority frequently identify their own interests with those of the regime and tend to react defensively to criticism of that regime. Therefore they must be appealed to on the basis of their own patriotism and self-interest and be persuaded that many of the regime's policies are not in the best interests of either their country or themselves. Many, if not most, of them are already well aware of the shortcomings of Soviet society and are trying to improve their situation. The broadcaster's greatest challenge today is to follow these trends in listener attitudes, understand them, and then help his Soviet listeners by supplying them with new and pertinent information and ideas with which to work for faster and more lasting improvement.

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BROADCASTING OBJECTIVES

In formulating and implementing his objectives, the broadcaster will necessarily exercise some value judgments of his own. His program must be directed toward a definite goal and it must indicate some sense of mission, if there is to be a direction and purpose about his work. But the broadcaster cannot impose his own values on his listeners; his values must coincide with those of his listeners, if he is to influence political change inside the target area.

The aspirations of Soviet citizens are in the direction of freedom and democratic political institutions which represent the best interests of the majority of citizens and peoples of the USSR; therefore, this should be the goal of the broadcaster. It follows that his mission should be to

encourage and help his listeners to work toward replacing the present oligarchical political system with one which is representative of and responsive to the will and aspirations of the entire population of the USSR; [and] to provide his listeners with information and ideas which will enable them to work more effectively for change in their own interest.

Broadcasting objectives which would fulfill this mission would encourage (1) practical, democratic political alternatives to present Soviet practice; (2) social and economic reform in the interests of the population of the USSR; and (3) cultural diversity and freedom of exchange of information and travel for Soviet citizens. Another objective would be to correct omissions and distortions of official Soviet media and try to undermine Communist ideology, not by arguing with it in its own terms but from the point of view of showing that it is irrelevant and a bar to serving the real needs of the people.

In the writing of scripts it is necessary to concentrate on specific themes which encourage political, economic, and social reform and freedom of information and travel. On the eve of a CPSU Congress or Central Committee plenun the broadcaster should show the need for true inner-party democracy instead of "democratic centralism," [and] for hastening the course of de-Stalinization by opening party and state archives to facilitate writing the full history of the 1930s, etc. When it became apparent that the writers, Sinyavsky and Daniel, were to be tried, broadcasters used this occasion to carry foreign press reaction and comment in defense of the two as artists and patriots. . . . It is not often that individual broadcasts themselves can be measured for their direct audience impact; occasionally, however, as with the coverage of the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, the heated rebuttals by official Soviet media indicate their effectiveness.

PRESENTATION OF BROADCAST MATERIAL

The soundest objectives based on the best possible analysis of the Soviet internal situation become academic if the presentation of individual scripts is not effective. If the attitudes of listeners toward their own situation and toward the broadcaster are disregarded, if scripts are not tailored directly to the attitudes and aspirations of a particular audience, there is little hope of any effect, to say nothing of influencing political change.

In addition to sound radio production and journalistic techniques to capture the listener's attention, to entertain and stimulate by effective argumentation, and to present a convincing case; a special dimension is required for the Soviet listener. Despite widespread discontent and the numerous tensions in Soviet society, the bulk of the evidence indicates that typical Soviet listeners are deeply, if not fiercely, patriotic. Indeed, the sacrifices and repressions of recent decades followed now by the realization that the USSR lags far behind other industrialized countries in

its standard of living seems to spur Soviet citizens to greater efforts. While often very critical of the Communist regime and its policies, they are also quick to defend the USSR against foreign critics.

The question of the tone of broadcasts thus becomes of paramount importance for anyone trying to influence political change inside the USSR. All criticism of Soviet reality must be clearly in the interests of Soviet citizens. It must encourage constructive change and not simply denounce the negative aspects of Soviet life. The temptation to quote internal criticism in the official Soviet press at length to the Soviet audience should be resisted—because the listener has already read it or heard it and because the regime uses this criticism as a device to build up support for its own purposes. Instead the broadcaster should help the Soviet citizen to read his own press critically and in his own interest, asking whether official explanations are the correct ones, suggesting other more basic reasons, and supporting trends toward specific reforms which are being discussed inside the USSR and abroad. When warranted and the facts are convincingly presented, he can also suggest that limited, piece-meal reforms have only a limited effect and that more basic changes in the system are necessary to achieve lasting results.

At the same time the broadcaster must refrain from appearing to exploit positive internal developments for what may appear to be his own "anti-Soviet propaganda" purposes. Such treatment could be dangerous to those Soviet citizens who are working for constructive change and could hinder their efforts. Thus, when a Soviet writer produces a new work which challenges some aspects of the system, when an economist advocates decentralization of planning and controls, when a party member calls for more inner-party democracy, etc.; the radio commentator should not suggest that such developments are anti-regime acts, but rather treat them as attempts to help Soviet society, and as being motivated by more patriotism than is shown by the party bureaucrats who oppose such innovations.

By consistently taking this approach, the broadcaster avoids giving his internal Soviet critics grounds for accusations that he engages in "anti-Soviet propaganda," and perhaps hindering the forces of constructive change already at work inside the USSR.

[CONCLUSION]

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the individual broadcaster himself is the most important, and yet most intangible, element working to influence political change in the USSR by external communications. He must be an effective communicator possessing the technical skills of writing and speaking, but most important is his attitude toward his audience. He must be motivated not so much by hatred of Communism and the Soviet regime as by dedication to the cause of freedom for people who want it badly enough to work continually toward it. He must be committed to the possibility of fundamental change on a long term basis in

Soviet society. He must be patient and not discouraged at the lack of visible progress; when setbacks occur he must not let himself or his listener become frustrated and apathetic but should encourage the search for yet new approaches. And he must develop the knack of vicariously sensing the opportunities which his listener can use, suggesting them to the listener without overtly telling him what to do or how to do it, and thereby helping the listener to help himself in his own interest.

The increasing opportunities for political change which have emerged in Soviet society in recent years offer encouraging prospects for the future.

By continually studying and refining his own assumptions about the role of radio communication per se, the actual political situation in the target area, and the complex of varied attitudes of his many listeners toward that situation and their own aspirations; by formulating objectives which coincide with the basic human instincts and self-interest of his Soviet listeners; and by presenting his material to the audience in a corresponding manner, the broadcaster can effectively hasten political change in the USSR by external communication.

CONTENT ANALYSIS

Analysis of content, unlike source analysis, focuses upon the message. Beyond that generalization, however, content analysis is characterized by diversity in objective, method, and results.

Although content analysis is one of the oldest forms of propaganda evaluation, the advent of the computer to assist the human mind has made the use of previously impractical methodologies now eminently feasible. This is largely the result of the machine's ability to process, store, and retrieve massive amounts of information with great speed.

The lead-off article in this section discusses the use of computers in the coding and analysis of materials on the People's Republic of China. Both of the first two papers utilize quantitative content analysis. Although quantification has undeniable advantages for certain objectives,[1] the use of qualitative techniques is equally important and may be preferable in individual cases. The last three selections illustrate the varied uses of qualitative analysis of propaganda content.

NOTES

[1] See Harold D. Lasswell, "Why Be Quantitative?" in Lasswell et al., *Language of Politics* (George W. Stewart, Publisher, Inc., 1949), pp. 40–52.

CODING AND ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY MATERIALS FROM COMMUNIST CHINA*

BY PAUL WONG

The methods of survey analysis are adapted to an analysis of documentary materials. The author contends that the two major types of content analysis—qualitative and quantitative—are indispensable. Both should be used in conjunction with each other.

In this paper the argument is made that the utilization of a qualitative-quantitative mode of analysis may yield valuable insights on the social, economic and political developments in Communist China. The method of coding involved in the qualitative-quantitative mode of analysis is discussed. Concrete examples are drawn from a content analysis project currently in progress at the University of California at Berkeley.[1] Finally, several specific hypotheses encountered in the content analysis project are presented to demonstrate the utility of the qualitative-quantitative mode of analysis.

DISPARITIES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF DATA

The most important source of empirical data on Communist China comes from documentary materials such as the *People's Daily* (Jih-min Jih-pao). Researchers spend long periods *scanning* through Chinese Communist documents and other potential sources of data. The difference between "Datum" and "material" must be maintained and clarified. By material is meant a document in its original form such as an editorial in the *People's Daily*. Materials are transformed into data by some scheme of categorization. Materials are, therefore, the sources of data. Data are generally at a higher level of abstraction than materials, and are, in general, more applicable for scientific investigation. Indeed, one of the shortcomings of research on Communist China has been the failure to transform materials into data before using them for scientific investigations.

There are disparities in the degree of availability of data for the three different but highly correlated dimensions of the Chinese Communist social system—that is, the political, social and economic dimensions.[2] It is proposed here that an effort should be made to collect systematic data on economic, social and political structure and dynamics on Communist China on both regional and national levels. In so doing, the gaps or disparities in the availability of data would diminish. Furthermore, a general analysis of some problems employing data from all three dimensions would become possible.

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*Excerpts from "Coding and Analysis of Documentary Materials from Communist China," *Asian Survey*, VII, No. 3 (March 1967), pp. 198–211. Reprinted with the permission of *Asian Survey*.

A SYNTHESIS OF QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES

Experienced researchers have the capacity to "read the lines" to analyze overt meanings as well as "between the lines" to ascertain less obvious implications and inferences. At the same time, it is essential to raise the question of objectivity. Qualitative treatment of documentary materials is indispensable, but it is argued here that the reliability and validity of qualitative analysis can be increased and its importance and value enhanced by means of a quantitative analysis of the same materials and then synthesizing the results achieved through both approaches.

It is particularly in the coding and classification of documentary materials from totalitarian or closed societies that quantitative content analysis can make a lasting contribution. To some extent, this is a consequence of the fact that many methods of social science research are not applicable to closed societies. Quantitative content analysis was used extensively during W.W. II to study Nazi propaganda, but there was a period of about ten to fifteen years thereafter during which there was a decrease in the number of projects using content analysis methods. The reasons for this decrease were: (1) manual coding and analysis placed a serious limitation on the amount of materials which could be treated in any single project; (2) traditional content analysis involved essentially the inspection of univariate distributions (technically called "marginals"), or, at most, bivariate distributions (technically called "zero-order" relationships). Many researchers felt that the analysis of marginals and zero-order relationships did not provide an adequate explanation of the empirical phenomena in which they were interested; and (3) the lack of foundation support on content analysis projects.

In the past five years, there has been a reemergence of interest in content analysis, facilitated by the rapid development in data processing facilities and computer applications in the social sciences. In the area of content analysis, the development of social-psycholinguistic dictionaries has made possible the machine coding of original materials–especially in English but even in some foreign languages. Due to the extraordinarily complicated structure of the Chinese language, machine coding of original documents is not yet feasible. But recent development in optical scanning devices indicates that it is likely that machine coding of original Chinese documents will be possible before too much longer.

The present project may be regarded as an intermediate stage between traditional content analysis and machine content analysis in that the coding is done manually but the analysis is done entirely by high-speed electronic computers. Already in the pilot study, 2,316 articles or cases have been coded. In the larger study, more than 35,000 cases will be coded, making it the most extensive systematic content analysis ever attempted on a single polity.

The inclusion of diverse but systematic queries in the coding schemes

means that an analysis of a total society will be possible. Although a manual coding system is used, this also has some advantages in that it facilitates the inclusion of both rigidly structured and open-ended items in the coding schemes. In this manner, some significant but unforeseen information will not be lost. One major methodological assumption in this study is that an article or speech in a newspaper is similar in many ways to a human respondent. The researcher can literally "ask" the article both structured and open-ended questions; the answers to these questions may be coded in the same way as a respondent's answers to interview questions in survey research. A major difference between a survey interview and coding of content materials is that whereas in the former the human respondent is asked to answer questions about social background and attitudes toward various subjects for most of which he has answers, in the latter the coding scheme tends to include a great number of items which only inquire about their presence or absence.

Methods of survey analysis are to some extent applicable to content analysis. I have in mind especially the method of "elaboration" developed at Columbia University.[3] Essentially, the method of elaboration attempts to ascertain the validity of a relationship between two variables by controlling other variables. The relationship between two variables is called a bivariate or zero-order relationship. In controlling each additional variable in the same table, the order is raised by one. If used carefully, the method of elaboration may be of immense value in content analysis; it may also make possible the application of content analysis for explanatory purposes.

The crucial point raised in this paper is not that qualitative methods should be rejected. On the contrary, qualitative considerations, in principle, should temporally precede quantitative considerations, although not infrequently *ex post facto* hypotheses are discovered after the analysis of quantitative data. In effect, a synthesis of the two methods should be attempted, particularly in the area of research on Communist China. This synthesis may perform one or more of the following functions:

1. Compare and contrast the results obtained from the two analyses, and thus facilitate the validation of research findings.
2. To provide fresh insights and hypotheses for the quantitative analysis, and vice versa.
3. To synthesize hypotheses suggested by current research literature and hypotheses suggested by quantitative analysis. In this respect, quantitative analysis performs an explanatory function–that is, it helps in providing a systematic framework upon which a logical explanation of some aspects of the total social system can be based.
4. From this synthesis of ideas and the systematic framework resulting from it, new hypotheses may be derived for further research.
5. Through quantification, an immense amount of documentary materials can be transformed into data, which may be used for secondary analyses.

6. Criteria for distinguishing the difference between "manifest content" and "latent meanings" can be provided.

METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

The content analysis project on Communist China covers a number of time periods. A great deal of attention is naturally given to the *People's Daily*, the official organ of the Communist regime. In addition, a number of other newspapers have been selected to study internal variations, including geographical and ideological variations. The examples presented in a later section of this paper relied only upon data collected for May, August, and December in 1957. The data consist of headlines of the *People's Daily* appearing in the *People's Daily Monthly Index*. In sum, 2,316 headlines of articles were coded, and constitute the "cases" for this paper. The sample consits of all headlines appearing in every fourth daily edition of the *People's Daily*. For this content analysis study, two general coding schemes were devised. In this paper, only a minute portion of the results obtained by means of the first coding scheme are presented for the purpose of illustration.

The coding schemes were developed on the assumption that newspapers, or any medium of mass communication, are subject to internal and external influence and are sensitive to such influence. In Communist China in 1957, newspapers were, on the whole, effectively controlled by the regime. The *People's Daily* as the official party and governmental organ, functioned in propagating the official policies of the regime, in eliciting mass participation, and as an agent of social control. One can, therefore, classify the news items appearing in the newspaper and on the basis of this information make inferences concerning the conditions of the system. In this respect, one assumes that the newspaper, as a product of the system, at the same time plays a role in shaping the system. What appears in the newspaper is of tremendous value in studying conditions of society, especially in Communist China—a relatively "closed" society from which interview data connot easily be obtained.

An important aspect of the coding schemes is the classification of subject matter categories appearing in the *People's Daily*. After experimenting with different methods of classification, we decided to use, by and large, the same categories as those appearing in the *People's Daily Monthly Index*. This classification may be regarded as the Chiniese Communist elite's "perception of the situation." The number of items devoted to specific subject matters may be regarded as an index of the amount of attention focused on these subjects by the leadership. Aside from the subject matter categories, we have also included geographical, individual, organizational institutional, and other social, economic and political categories.

Our data were coded in such a manner that the same data may be analyzed in several different ways by using a different "unit of analysis":

1. The headline or article as the unit of analysis.

2. The person as the unit of analysis. For every case we include all the information about the person together with the information about the headline or article in which the person's name appeared. Note that since a person's name may be mentioned in different articles (contexts), the data offer an opportunity to study specific persons under varying contexts. In this manner, we may be able to examine how, for example, a Central Committee member is related to different policies.
3. The organization as the unit of analysis. This is similar to the explanation given for the person as the unit of analysis.

In addition, we may use groups of persons as the unit of analysis—for example, Central Committee members in comparison with non-members. Also, we may use type of organizations as the unit of analysis—for example, political in comparison with non-political organizations.

ARTICLE AS THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS

In this section, we will report on some empirical findings using the headline as the unit of analysis. We have a total of 2,316 cases. The headline as the unit of analysis is not to be confused with individuals mentioned in the headline as the unit of analysis. In the former case, our interest lies in characterizing the content of the headline; in the latter case we want to characterize the individuals in terms of two sets of data. The first set of data refers to the socio-political-economic background of the individuals, which are more or less constant in a given period. The second set of data relates the individual back to the content of the headlines to ask questions such as in what type of news content is the individual most likely to be mentioned. Analysis using the individual as the unit may be considered as a study of leadership structure and decision processes. Analysis using the article as the unit may be regarded as a study of the Chinese Communist's "definition of the situation." In this respect, the two analyses supplement one another in facilitating an interpretation of the Chinese Communist world view and domestic outlook. The analysis on organizational structure and processes adds a third dimension to the interpretation.

INDICES OF IDEOLOGY

Definitions: Schurmann's definition of ideology as the manner of thinking characteristic of an organization has been followed.[4] The pervasiveness of ideology in Communist China cannot be denied. Although ideological discussion and education permeate every level and aspect of life, the number of references to ideology in the 1957 issues of the *People's Daily* used for this study was not great. This was not surprising, given the fact that every reference to ideology in the *People's Daily* had to be considered authoritative.[5] To an experienced Western observer or a Chinese "sensitized" to the Chinese Communist documents, the appearance of even a single term such as *lilun* (roughly translated as theory) is of

paramount importance in explaining or predicting changes in ideology. To some extent, the small number of references is also a consequence of the fact that a rigid definition of ideology is used here. Ideology, in this context, refers to any of the various "isms" and "thought." Types of ideology are classified according to the charismatic leader who is associated with the particular "ism" or "thought." For example. Maoist thought is classified as Chinese, while Leninism is classified as Russian. General ideology does not refer to any specific individual. While it is plausible that an ideology may, at some point in its development, transcend the confines of national boundary and become universal, it is maintained that, at least in Communist China, the nationalistic element in different ideologies can still be distinguished from their universal meaning. For example, Marxism-Leninism is still foreign and Russian, while Maoist thought is Chinese, in spite of their presumed universal applicability.

Analysis: Of the eighteen references to ideology in the May, August and December 1957 issues of the *People's Daily*, eleven referred to Chinese ideology, three to foreign ideology, and four to general ideology. The fact that Chinese ideology predominated supports Schurmann's hypothesis concerning decentralization policies in the latter part of 1957 as well as the fact that these policies coincided with a conscious attempt to develop an economic model which was not merely a mirror image of the Soviet economic model.[6] Change in emphasis on different types of ideology was but one of the many changes which occurred in 1957. Schurmann pointed out that during the first fourteen years of the Chinese People's Republic, the leadership applied two distinct developmental strategies, one for each of the two five-year plan periods.[7] The terminal year of the First Five-Year Plan, 1957, was crucial not only for economists, but also for sociologists and political scientists since many social and political changes occurred. In the present discussion, we are only interested in the ideological dimension. A detailed examination of the hypotheses raised by Schurmann will be treated elsewhere.

In a strict sense, our data on Chinese versus foreign ideology do not enable us to test the hypothesis that there was a shift in ideology accompanying the transition from the First to the Second Five-Year Plan period. Schurmann postulated that China had gone through two radical phases, one during the First Five-Year Plan period when the Chinese Communists tried to repeat the Soviet experience of industrialization, and the second during the Great Leap Forward when they used their own mobilizational techniques to try to achieve an economic breakthrough.[8] Our corollary to this general postulate is that the transition from the First to the Second Five-Year Plan period was also accompanied by a change in ideology. To test this corollary, data from the First Five-Year Plan period are needed. But until data for 1952 are available and analyzed, such a comparison is not possible.

Since the Foreign Ideology Index is not made up exclusively of

categories on Soviet Ideology, it would be interesting to look at the statistical variation of Soviet ideology categories in comparison with those for Chinese ideology (see Table I).

This table reveals several striking facts. First, there was only one reference to Soviet ideology in the entire sample. This discovery seems to be relevant in the interpretation of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Although a general break in Sino-Soviet relations did not occur until years later, it has been suggested that changes in Sino-Soviet relations began as early as 1956 in connection with the problems of de-Stalinization and with crises in Poland and Hungary. In the early period, according to one authority, it was very much a conflict over the question of the "correct" ideology, although the fact that economic problems were involved—including the stopping of Soviet loans and the disillusionment with the Soviet economic model—cannot be denied.[9] Another striking fact in Table I is the variation in references to ideology by month; this variation seems to be related to the timing of the "Hundred Flowers" campaign and the anti-rightist campaign which followed. MacFarquhar stated that anything printed before June 8 in the *People's Daily* can be taken to have been straight reporting, June 8 being the day on which the *People's Daily* initiated the counter-attack. Our data show that in May there were nine references to ideology, for August there was none, and for December there were 3. To interpret this variation, let us divide the general event period covering the "Flowers" campaign into four sub-periods:

1. February to April—period of anxiety following Mao's speech on contradictions in February 1957.
2. May and part of June—blooming and contending period during which there was a liberalized policy on ideological debates.
3. Part of June, July and August—period of the anti-rightist campaign.
4. September to December—aftermath.

Our data cover sub-periods 2, 3, and 4. During the period of liberalization on communication, the number of references to ideology was largest.

TABLE I

*REFERENCES TO CHINESE VERSUS SOVIET IDEOLOGIES, BY MONTH**

Type of Ideology	May	August	December	Total	Test of Significance** (row difference)
Chinese	9	0	2	11	$p > .01$
	(11.7)	(0)	(2)	(13.7)	
Soviet	0	0	1	1	not significant
	(0)	(0)	(1)	(1)	
Total	9	0	3	12	$p > .01$
	(11.7)	(0)	(3)	(14.7)	
Test of significance** (column difference)	$p > .01$	----	not significant	$p > .01$	

*Figures in parentheses represent number of references after adjustment for variation in sample size (adjustment ratios for May, August, December, equal to 1.30, 1.07, 1.00 respectively). Tests of significance are based on adjusted figures.
**Kolmogorov-Smirnov 1-sample test for row or column difference.

During the most intensive period, the anti-rightist campaign, there was no reference to ideology at all. Finally, there was a limited reemergence of ideological discussion in December. In May, many individuals openly attacked the regime and its ideology; study groups (*Hsiao-tsu*) were formed and mass mettings were held to discuss alternative ideologies and practices. But after June 8, intellectuals, with the exception of the students, became more apprehensive and reserved. After July 20, when a government resolution was passed whereby in future every student has to produce proof of ideological reliability before he can obtain a job, the students also became more quiescent. It was only toward the end of the year that the situation began to calm down, and even some of those who had been singled out for special reprimand turned up again in public life, although shorn of all influence.[10]

Thus there tends to be a minimization of communication about the source and focal point of failure during a crisis situation, especially the role which the elite played in contributing to this failure. However, while there is a *minimization* of communication about the elite's role in policy failure, there is also a *maximization* of statements blaming "others" for this failure. "Others," in this sense, may refer to individuals groups, nations or even abstract ideas.[11] There was a tremendous increase in references to the campaigns against counter-revolutionaries (*sufan*) and references to antirightist campaigns in August 1957.

The findings on minimization and maximization of communication, in terms of the number of references in the *People's Daily*, may be expressed in the form of a general hypothesis:

> If a policy fails, the system tends to *minimize* communication about the source and focal point of this failure, *minimize* communication about the role the elite played in contributing to the failure, but *maximize* communication in blaming "others" for the failure.

In the case of ideology, the "Flowers" campaign was formally endorsed by Mao; moreover, the effects of the campaign were viewed as extremely unfavorable for the entire system; consequently the restriction on discussion about ideology was so great that there was no reference to ideology at all in the entire sample for August. In December, the threat of the consequences of general discontent became less pronounced, as evidenced by the reappearance of a limited number of references to ideology.

It is by no means assumed that the data on ideology conclusively confirmed the minimization hypothesis mentioned previously; a confirmation of this hypothesis requires testing against a variety of different situations, different types of policies, and different time periods. A comparison of the references to the ideology of Mao, Engels, Stalin, and Lenin reveals three important facts. First, nine of the ten references to ideology of individuals concerned Maoist ideology. Second, there was no reference to ideology of any individual either in August or December. The last fact, when combined with our finding that there was a limited reappearance of references to ideology in December, means that this reap-

pearance was limited to general ideology; apparently ideology of specific individuals was still too sensitive an issue to be discussed in the press.

THE POLITICAL PARTY INDEX

The political Party Index consists of three categories: The CCP (Chinese Communist Party), Communist parties of other countries, and workers' parties of other countries (see Table II). First of all, looking at the total column for all months, we find that of the 209 references to parties, 186 referred to the CCP. On the basis of our limited data, we must accept the validity of the postulate that the Chinese Communist spokesmen consider the Chinese Communist movement as part of the world Communist movement. On a *long-term* basis, this postulate is probably true. It was certainly not accidental that Teng Hsiao-Ping, in an article written for the *Pravda* in celebration of the 10th anniversary of the People's Republic of China in 1957, stated that:

> We stand for proletarian internationalism as opposed to all kinds of bourgeois reactionary ideologies of big-nation chauvinism and narrow nationalism. The modern revisionists, as represented by the Yugoslav ruling clique, use bourgeois nationalism to oppose proletarian internationalism, use the nation as cover to oppose international solidarity and have fully become an echo of imperialism. . . .[12]

In fact, Teng's article is a reflection of a more general ideological stand which emphasizes the interdependence of the Chinese Communist and world Communist movements on a long-term basis.

While, on the one hand, we can speak of a *long-term* ideological stand, at the same time, *short-run* fluctuations may occur due to practical considerations made necessary by such problems as domestic crises. In our sample for the latter part of 1957, for example, there was a preponderant number of references to the CCP as opposed to references to foreign Communist and workers' parties. The nature of such short-run

TABLE II

*REFERENCES TO POLITICAL PARTIES, BY MONTH**

Party	May	August	December	Total	Test of Significance** (row difference)
C.C.P.	112	4	70	186	p> .01
	(145.6)	(4.1)	(70)	(219.9)	
Foreign C.P.'s	2	4	9	15	not significant
	(2.6)	(4.5)	(9)	(15.9)	
Foreign worker's	8	0	0	8	p> .01
Parties	(10.4)	(0)	(0)	(10.4)	
All Parties	122	8	79	209	p> .01
	(158.6)	(8.6)	(79)	(246.2)	
Test of significance** (Column difference)	p> .01	not significant	p> .01	p>.01	

*Figures in parentheses represent number of references after adjustment for variation in sample size (adjustment ratios for May, August, December, equal to 1.30, 1.07, 1.00 respectively). Tests of significance are based on adjusted figures.

**Kolmogorov-Smirnov 1-sample test for row or column difference.

fluctuations is worth exploring in future research, although it will be, undoubtedly, a tedious and costly job. In order to distinguish between short-run fluctuations and sudden changes, one must also have detailed knowledge of the long-term developmental patterns. Methodologically, one should study long-term patterns in detail qualitatively and, at the same time, select a large sample of documentary materials covering a number of years for quantitative analyses. What we have said for time-variation holds, of course, also for regional variation.

Looking at the total number of references to all parties, we found that, in comparing the distribution for the three months, our hypothesis on minimization in communication in periods of stress is again confirmed. There were 122 references in May, but the number was reduced to 8 for August, and finally there was a reemergence of references to political parties in December, the number being 79. Looking at the distribution by month for each party, we found that for the CCP the restriction in communication hypothesis is also confirmed; with 112 references for May, 4 for August, and 70 for December. The number of references to foreign Communist parties or foreign workers' parties during the three months were too few in number to warrant speculation.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION IN 1957

If the proposition that decentralization occurred late in 1957 is valid, then a comparison of the three time periods in our sample with regard to a series of indicators about decentralization in its various manifestations should provide evidence that in the later months of 1957, decentralization was much more widespread than the earlier months of the year. Since our sample consists of three months in 1957—namely, May, August, and December—we will be satisfied if, in fact, there were more indicators of decentralization such as a decrease in emphasis on cen-

TABLE III

*REFERENCES TO LOCAL AND NATIONAL AUTHORITATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS, BY MONTH**

Type of Organization	May	August	December	Total	Test of Significance** (row difference)
National	5	3	8	16	not significant
	(6.5)	(3.2)	(8)	(17.7)	
Local	1	8	14	23	$p > .05$
	(1.3)	(8.6)	(14)	(23.9)	
Total	6	11	22	39	$.10 < p < .05$
	(7.8)	(11.8)	(22)	(41.6)	
Test of significance** (column difference)	not significant	not significant	not significant	not significant	

*Figures in parentheses represent number of references after adjustment for variation in sample size (adjustment ratios for May, August, December, equal to 1.30, 1.07, 1.00 respectively). Tests of significance are based on adjusted figures.

**Kolmogorov-Smirnov 1-sample test for row or column difference.

tralized administration and an increase in emphasis on downward transfer of authority, in the later months. Our data on administrative organization show quite clearly that there was a tremendous increase in the references to local authoritative and administrative organization in the later months when compared with May. In May, only one out of six references are on local organization; but in August eight out of 11, and in December, 14 out of 22 references are on local organization. The number of references to national organization in August was the smallest of the three months; this was likely to be related to the minimization of communication in the rectification campaign. Since central or national authority and administration were challenged in the "Flowers" campaign, there was consequently a greater restriction on the discussion of national organization in the rectification period. This restriction in communication on topics related to the sources of strain in the system again confirms the minimization of communication hypothesis formulated earlier.

REFERENCES TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

On the basis of favorable, neutral and unfavorable references to foreign countries in the *People's Daily*, an index of evaluation of foreign countries was computed using the following formula: (favorable references multiplied by 1) plus (unfavorable references multiplied by -1) divided by all references.

The range of the index is from 1.000 to −1.000 (i.e., from completely favorable to completely unfavorable). Using this index, we found in Table IV that in comparing the countries which recognized Communist China in 1957, Asian countries received the most positive evaluation, African countries second, and European countries the least. It is suggested that the "Bandung spirit," together with the historically-rooted suspicion of European nations may be the cause of the variation in evaluation.[13] With regard to the countries which recognized neither Communist China nor

TABLE IV

REFERENCES TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES IN THE PEOPLE'S DAILY BY EVALUATION, BY CONTINENT, AND BY RECOGNITION IN MAY, AUGUST, AND DECEMBER, 1957

Continent	Score on Evaluation Index Countries which recognized: Communist China	Neither	Taiwan
North America	-----*	-----	−0.5091
Central America	-----	-----	−0.4000
South America	-----	-----	0.0000
Europe	+0.067	−0.1833	−0.0767
Asia	+0.2306	+0.1500	+0.1041
Africa	+0.1714	+0.1667	-----
Oceania	-----	-----	-----

*denotes not enough cases.

Taiwan, a similar pattern prevails, but evaluation of European countries had become definitely negative. Looking at countries which recognized Taiwan, we find again a similar pattern for Europe and Asia. For countries in the Americas, an additional factor of geo-politics seems to be operating: Central America, being closer to the United States, was given a highly positive evaluation while South America was given a neutral evaluation. The highly positive evaluation seems to be related to an effort to persuade the countries of "Central America"[14] to join the world Communist movement, thus isolating the United States from her neighbors.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, an effort has been made to adopt the methods of survey analysis to the analysis of documentary materials from Communist China. Combining the traditional qualitative method with a quantitative treatment of the same materials, we have shown that, with proper treatment, documents provide not only "impressionistic evidence" but may be used as a tool to give a meaningful and logical "explanation" of empirical phenomena occuring in Communist China.

One critic of quantitative analysis has maintained that this mode of analysis tends to preclude a judicious appraisal of the role which qualitative consideration might play. At the same time, however, he admits that:

> quantitative analysis includes qualitative aspects, for it both originates and culminates in qualitative considerations. On the other hand, qualitative analysis proper often requires quantification in the interest of exhaustive treatment. Far from being alternatives the two approaches actually overlap. . . . [15]

Therefore, the problem is not to make a choice between qualitative and quantitiative analyses—since both are obviously indispensable—but to use both in conjunction with each other. In this respect, quantitative treatment of documentary materials is similar to analysis of standardized questionnaires, while qualitative treatment of documentary materials is similar to the analysis of depth interviews in survey research.

NOTES

1. The project is being conducted in collaboration with Charles Y. Glock and Franz Schurmann, directors of the the University of California's Survey Research Center and the Center for Chinese Studies, respectively. Their advice in reading an earlier draft of this paper is gratefully acknowledged. I also wish to thank my wife for valuable comments. This is publication A-69 of the Survey Research Center.

2. See *The Chinese Communist Social System: A Content Analysis Study*, forthcoming, December 1967. Chapter I, "Maturation of a Special Area Study: The Presentation of Evidence."

3. See, for example, Herbert Hyman, *Survey Design and Analysis* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955).

4. H.F. Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 18.

5. Until attacked by the regime in 1966, the *People's Daily* had enjoyed a privileged position in its relation with the party.

[6] See Franz Schurmann, "Economic Policy and Political Power in Communist China," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 349 (September, 1963), pp. 49–69.

[7] Ibid.

[8] See Franz Schurmann, "China's New Economic Policy'—Transition or Beginning," in *The China Quarterly* (January-March 1964), p. 65.

[9] See A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China In Prespective* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 82.

[10] Klaus Mehnert, *Peking and Moscow* (New York: Mentor, 1964), p. 211.

[11] In a personal communication, Professor Robert Scalapino informed me that in his study of North Korea, he found a similar pattern in that, during an economic crisis, statements blaming the government were minimized while those persuading the people to work harder were maximized.

[12] Quoted in Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China," in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson (eds.), *Foreign Policies in a World of Change* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 555–6.

[13] Methodologically, we controlled for the variable of political recognition, and looked at the remaining variation.

[14] Central America, in Chinese Communist political geography, includes Mexico, Cuba and other Caribbean countries as well as the Central American States.

[15] See Siegfried Kracauer, "The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis," in Leo Lowenthal (guest editor), *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Special Issue on International Communications Research (Winter 1962–63), p. 634.

POLITE PROPAGANDA: "USSR" AND "AMERICA ILLUSTRATED"*

BY RICHARD A. GARVER

Content analysis showed that the picture magazine produced for U.S. readers by the Soviet Union emphasized such "American" values as industrial growth and a high standard of living. In contrast, the U.S. periodical distributed in Russia portrayed Americans as cultured and imbued with esthetic interests. Unanswered are the questions: Do reader interest and copy sales imply propaganda success? Does a gentlemanly, "non-propagandistic" approach sway readers?

In October 1956 there was distributed in 84 cities of the Soviet Union the first issue of a new publication, *America Illustrated.* A slick, pictorial magazine created by the United States Information Agency, it was reported sold out within a few hours.[1] At the same time, a Soviet publication, *USSR*, was made available at most metropolitan newstands throughout the United States. The two magazines were highly similar: a *Life* magazine format minus the advertising, wide use of color throughout the issue and a gentlemanly reticence in purveying their respective country's wares; i.e., the propaganda was polite.[2]

This was not the first experience for the U.S. in printing a Russian language magazine for mass distribution in the Soviet Union. From 1945 to 1952 this country had circulated the publication, *Amerika*, in quan-

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*Excerpts from "Polite Propaganda: 'USSR' and 'America Illustrated'," *Journalism Quarterly* XXXVIII, pp. 446–484. Reprinted with the permission of *Journalism Quarterly*, copyright holder.

tities ranging from 10,000 to 50,000 copies per issue. Censorship problems and distribution difficulties created by the Russians had stopped the magazine after 53 issues. During this same period the Russians had circulated from their embassy in Washington the *USSR Information Bulletin*. Circulation of the *Bulletin* was stopped in this country when *Amerika* was cut off in Russia.[3]

After a three-year lapse, an agreement by Washington and Moscow late in 1955 laid the groundwork for a renewal of the publication exchange. This time the publications were to be concerned exclusively with the life and culture (not politics) of the two peoples.

Here, then, was an opportunity to observe a reciprocal propaganda operation in action, an interesting arrangment in which the two opposing political powers agreed to allow the enemy in the "home camp" as long as he employed what might be called in political double-talk, non-propagandistic propaganda. The situation for comparing the two publications was ideal because of the similarity in their formats.

A content analysis was undertaken concerned with a comparison of topics and themes in the two magazines. Although similar in format, were the publications different in content? If so, how?

PROCEDURE

The first 12 issues of each montly publication were analyzed.[4] All editorial material was coded for subject and theme content. The basis for theme categorization was Berelson's definition, '. . . a summary or abstracted sentence, under which a wide range of specific formulations can be subsumed."[5]

Pictures were not coded individually but were used as an aid in coding the textual material. Two *a priori* codes for subject and theme content were developed and added to, as needed, while the coding was in progress. The subject code ultimately consisted of 20 major headings with 102 subcategories and the theme code consisted of 45 themes covering 9 areas of human activity. The coding was accomplished in a graduate seminar in communications.

Each story or article was tabulated on an individual card with the coder noting topic, theme, story length, number and size of accompanying pictures and page location. Coders were instructed to code only what they thought was the major topic of the article and the single, overriding theme. While there obviously was a multiplicity of themes presented in some single articles, the fairly high coder agreement obtained indicates this stricture on coding does not make impossible the handling of multi-subject and multi-theme materials.[6]

RESULTS

Content of Magazines

Content of the two magazines can best be described in terms of

similarities and differences. Topical composition of the two magazines is summarized in table 1.

Similarities

There was agreement between the two magazines as to the subjects which hold greatest interest for the readers. In both magazines the subjects with highest rate of incidence were Economics (95 articles), Culture (68) and Human Interest (66).

In Economics, both magazines stressed industrial development. Although there were 17 subcategories under Economics, 12 of the 48 *USSR* articles and 13 of *America Illustrated* articles concerned growing industry ("Harnessing the Volga's Power" versus "St. Lawrence Seaway"!). While other articles in the Economics category ranged from automation to labor organizations, the predominant image in both magazines of such material was of a vital, growing industrial society.

In the other two categories played heavily by the magazines, there were some differences as to what material was stressed. In Culture, for example, the *USSR* concentrated on literature ("Novelist Mikhail Sholokhov"), while the American publication stressed music ("Jazz in Color").

Other classifications in the culture category were art, classical dance, drama and folklore. And in the third popular category, Human Interest,

TABLE 1

Topical Content in "America Illustrated" and "USSR"

Topic of Article	America Illust. (N = 218)	USSR (N = 282)
Agriculture	10%	6%
Architecture	*	1
Culture	15	12
Communication	2	3
Economics	22	17
Education	4	3
Geography	3	9
Government	3	4
History	*	*
Human Interest	12	14
Living Standards	4	2
Military	*	1
Religion	*	*
Science	8	7
Social Life	1	1
Sports, Recreation	9	15
Weather	*	1
Fiction	2	1
Humor	4	2
Miscellaneous	1	1
	100%	100%

*Less than .5%.

an interesting difference was observed. The *USSR* emphasized Babies and Children ("Children Get Special Vacation Care") while *America Illustrated* stressed Adults ("Everybody Bowls"). Perhaps the Russians are well aware of the dominant place children in America occupy.

Differences

The differences in subject content were, however, more striking than similarities. The Russians made great use of material in categories of Sports and Geography, which, in comparison, the American publication did not. It was apparent from magazine content that the Russians believe Americans have slight knowledge of the Soviet Union. *USSR* set out to educate the reader on this subject. It also was evident that American interest in sports is not wasted on the Russians. There were 43 sports items in the first 12 issues of *USSR*. In contrast, the American publication used 17 such items.

The Americans, in their publication, placed greater emphasis on Agriculture and Living Standards than did the Russians. Particular stress was placed on Agriculture: "Farm Wife of Today"; "Life on the Farm"; "Young Cattlemen"; "Farm Girls' Fashions," to cite a few. Living Standards also was a more frequent subject in *America Illustrated*. But in this category the American publication attempted to make its point gently and without angering the Russian reader or making him incredulous.

Theme Content

Aside from a single category—Social Relations—there were distinct differences in theme content of the two magazines. (See table 2). The Russian publication emphasized increasing prosperity ("Amateur Movie Makers"), extensive social care ("All Kinds of Summer Vacations") and the longing for peace ("An Arms Plant Converts for Peace"). This was done with a dominance of themes in the categories of Economic Development, Government and International Relations.

Thirty-six of the 45 mentions of economic themes concerned progress in elevating living standards and expanding industrial output: new apartment developments and low cost housing are being made available; the country's industrial might is burgeoning; the stores are well-stocked; it's a busy but happy life. *USSR* seemed to have borrowed a somewhat reconstituted but easily recognized image of the United States.

In theme material concerning government, the picture of good care for the old and sick, payment of child-rearing costs and the development of a wide variety of other social welfare programs was heavily drawn: "School for Millions"; "The Right to Security"; "In Life's Sunset—an Old People's Home."

A secondary but prominent theme concerning government involved the democratic nature of Russian government: "American Judge Visits a Moscow Court—'I Would Have Passed the Same Sentence,' Says Judge

TABLE 2

Theme Content in "America Illustrated" and "USSR"

Theme of Article*	America Illustrated (N = 218)	USSR (N = 282)
Social Relations		
(Old people are respected)	21%	22%
Human Resources		
(Nation's youth has great promise)	35	21
Economic Development		
(Economic planning is yielding results)	10	16
Government		
(Legal justice is available to all)	6	15
International Relations		
(Nation's armed force is being reduced)	3	9
Patriotism		
(Nation has a proud history)	3	4
Culture		
(Citizens have interest in art)	11	5
Miscellaneous	5	3
No theme	6	5
	100%	100%

*Themes were consolidated into general areas of subject matter, such as Social Relations, and the theme appearing here under each subject heading is merely a representative specimen of each category. There were 45 individual themes.

William Clark of Princeton"; "The Soviet Parliament"; "How I Became a Legislator." Here the reader found that Russian government, particularly at the local level, is run most democratically—and many times by women.

The Russian people were not pictured, however, as totally occupied by narrow national interests. There is a great popular longing for friendlier relations with other nations and a particular desire to increase contacts between the U.S.S.R. and the United States: "Foreign Visitors Are Welcome"; "We Are Willing to Trade with All Countries"; "The International Geophysical Year"; "Atoms for Peace."

In summation, the reader of *USSR* found the Russian people increasingly prosperous, well cared for, democratic and friendly to foreigners.

America Illustrated took quite a different tack, centering on two areas not so heavily emphasized by the Russians: Human Resources and Culture. Great pride was exhibited in the large number of highly creative persons in this country who are allowed to pursue their own interests and thus achieve the highest development of their talents: "They Tread New Paths in Music–Contemporary American Composers Enjoy Great Popularity"; "Jan Peerce"; "Carl Sandburg"; "He's Changing the Face of the Earth—Robert G. Le Tourneau"; "Korczak Ziolkowski: Mountain Carver." This natural talent, coupled with an innate desire for adventure and challenge, was pictured as responsible for turning many Americans into world figures in science, industry and the arts.

Related to this picture of talent, enthusiasm and individual freedom was a strong emphasis on the cultural life of Americans. Twenty of the 23 items in the theme category, Culture, contained the dominant thought that American music and art are developed to a high level, enjoyed by many of our citizens and much liked by citizens of other countries, namely Russians.

CONCLUSIONS

A content analysis of the first year's issues of the two propaganda magazines, *USSR* and *America Illustrated*, indicated a considerable difference in emphasis. A study of theme and topic content of articles showed that the general impact one receives in reading *USSR* is of a nation concerned with materialistic things: progress, consumer goods, job benefits, vacations. It does not seem an overstatement to say that one can see an obvious reflection of the United States in *USSR* content. It is a calculated effort to show that things Russian are much like things American.

The over-all tone of *America Illustrated*, however, is not of materialism but of *Kultur*. Content reminds one of a symphony: *allegro (we're talented); adagio* (we're cultured); *scherzo* (we're free); *allegro presto* (we're enthusiastic). While the American magazine may discreetly advertise our high living standards, the major effort being made is to convince the Russian reader that we are a diverse people with many interests, including a keen taste for life's esthetic adventures.

Both magazines do a creditable job. Forgetting reality for a moment, the Soviet Union appears to be a jolly fine place in which to live—things are progressing so—and the United States shines as an oasis of artistic sensibilities.

One can scarcely guess at the effectiveness of the two magazines. Do reader interest and copy sales imply propaganda success? Does a gentlemanly, "non-propagandistic" approach sway readers? These remain most difficult, unanswered questions.

* * * * *

NOTES

1. Floyd G. Arpan, "American Tells Its Story Behind Iron Curtain in New 'Slick' Magazine," *Quill*, January 1957, pp. 9 ff.

2. Arpan in his article indicates a type of doublethink used by the *America Illustrated* staff when he writes "*America Illustrated* was to be nonpropagandistic . . . The staff was told to make the magazine 'the next best thing to a visit to the United States' and yet to avoid propaganda." Ibid., p.11.

3. "The Russian-Language Magazine 'Amerika,' " in *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, eds. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), pp. 589–97.

4. The author wishes to express his appreciation for the cooperation of the United States Information Agency in providing him with translations of the Russian next of *America Illustrated.*

5. Bernard Berelson, *Content Analysis in Communication Research* (Glencoe, Ill.; The Free Press, 1952), p. 138.

6. A check on coder reliability was made by having all persons code a particular issue in

addition to other issues coded. Initial agreement on theme coding was approximately 85%; i.e., there were two or more coders in disagreement on 15% of the items. Discussion of disagreements reduced this to less than 1%. Initial agreement on subject coding, a simpler mater, was 95%.

PUPPET REGIME CLINGS TO PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE*

By the 7th PSYOP Group

Auditing adversary broadcasts can indicate the strengths and weaknesses of friendly PSYOP.

REPORT

The Cambodian Information Agency (AIC) (clandestine) in French to Southeast Asia and the Far East, on 2 May said that the traitorous clique of Lon Nol, in its last gasp of agony, is desperately clinging to its only remaining arm, psychological warfare.

AIC stated that the Phnom Penh regime hoped to reverse its desperate situation by pouring out a flood of slander and lies every day by trying to distort the truth by transforming political isolation into popularity, famine into abundance, corruption into honesty, fascism into nationalism, dictatorship into liberty, defeat into victory, and treason into patriotism. *AIC* compared this to a boomerang and to an imbecile who spat toward the sky, because in both cases that which is tossed out will return to the individual. *AIC* promised that the lies of the Phnom Penh clique would also return to it.

AIC stated that the propaganda uttered by the Republic of Khmer has become so voluminous and boisterous that the few remaining people outside the liberated areas no longer believe such lies.

Cut off and completely isolated from the masses, Cambodia's traitors do not know who they can trust, even among their associates. Specializing in treason themselves, they smell treason everywhere around them. *AIC* said high-ranking officials had been tried and shot, but these were the lucky ones because they received some publicity. Others had simply disappeared, not on the battlefield, but in broad daylight on the streets of the capital, never to be seen again. *AIC* insisted that an atmosphere of mistrust and terror existed in Phnom Penh and that many intellectuals had been arrested and shot for not aligning themselves with the puppet regime.

It is this lamentable situation that the political propaganda apparatus of the traitors tries to camouflage to the eyes of the public. *AIC* said the clique had built a shaky cardboard castle that masses will destroy. Defeated militarily, isolated politically, suffocated economically, and de-

*Excerpts from "Communist Propaganda Highlights and Trends Analyses," Issue No. 18–71, 7 May 1971, pp. 18–30—18–31.

pressed psychologically, this regime of traitors sold itself to the U.S. imperialists and lives on borrowed time—this explains the confusion and discord in its ranks. No political propaganda, no matter how clever it may be, can deny this old proverb: "When the ship is wrecked, the rats jump into the sea."

COMMENT

Communist propagandists, such as the Chicom-controlled *AIC*, usually do not specifically mention what is considered by them to be enemy PSYOP. This indicates that *AIC* not only listens to what the Khmer Republic says but is concerned enough to call Khmer programs a pack of lies, conscious deceit, and other derogatory terms. Communist propaganda spends most of its time on Communist successes and is positive to the point of insanity—not realizing in Communist fervor that nothing ever has or ever will be as perfect as the Communists say Communism is. Evidently the Communists have been quite concerned about the effect these Khmer PSYOP programs are having on the people. The Communists must know that Khmer people are listening. Virulent counter-propaganda is usually a sort of "dying gasp," to use a Communist term. After all, the Communists say that success is everywhere, all is well, and getting better. But is it? *AIC* said there were only a few people remaining outside the "liberated areas" which is untrue in itself, but an effort to disguise the fact that in the "liberated areas," thousands upon thousands are dissatisfied. They are probably trying to listen to republic of Khmer PSYOP. They know that what the Communists say is not true where they live. These Cambodians also know that they, like other Cambodians, do not find North Vietnamese to be Cambodian liberators.

U.S. VULNERABILITIES AS PORTRAYED IN THE EAST GERMAN TELEVISION FILM, "PILOTS IN PAJAMAS"*

BY HARLEY O. PRESTON, JAMES L. MONROE, and ALDO L. RAFFA

Valuable information can be obtained from the careful analysis of the contents of the propaganda of rival communication activities. For example, while this report yielded only a few tentative conclusions, it did provide many inferences for U.S. policy and actions.

* * * * *

Pilots in Pajamas . . . , filmed in a North Vietnamese prison by producers from the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and recently broadcasted over GDR television, ... is a sophisticated propaganda production that undoubtedly will be effective with many audiences. It follows the convincing format of a documentary film in which captured U.S. pilots are individually interviewed by an unseen but

*Excerpts from "U.S. Vulnerabilities As Portrayed in the East German Television Film, 'Pilots in Pajamas'," Preston and Associates, Inc., Washington, D.C.: A Technical Report to the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, 1968, AOSR 68-1623. Reprinted with the approval of the Air Force Office of Scientific Research.

obviously a European interrogator. The questions are carefully phrased to sound reasonable and the answers are generally relevant. To provide background and credibility, the interviews are interspersed with scenes of bomb damage, captures of downed pilots, and excerpts from U.S. news films of U.S. pilots at bases in South Vietnam. These scenes and those of the interviews are artfully edited and spliced together into logical sequences and episodes that should prove plausible and convincing to the unwary. Technically, the film is an excellent production.

* * * * *

The present report is limited to the identification of individual propaganda themes in the film that appear to be components of current and anticipated Communist political strategy and tactics not only for the Vietnam conflict but perhaps globally. This report is divided into three sections: Propaganda Themes—their objectives and development in the film; Evaluative Comments—rationale and estimates of impact; and Implications and Tentative Conclusions.

PROPAGANDA THEMES

Captured U.S. Pilots in Vietnam are not prisoners of war. They are war criminals within the meaning of the London Agreement, the basis for Control Council Law No. 10, which was the authority for the International Court at Nuremberg ("War Crimes Court"). The findings of this Court were unanimously adopted by the United Nations upon a motion by the United States.

Under the "norm of international law" at Nuremberg, the individual was not excused for committing crimes against humanity because he acted in accordance with orders from his superior. Both the individual and the Nazi government were guilty. This theme is repeated throughout the film with appropriate variations. The captured pilots are air pirates, mercenaries, and outlaws. They and other U.S. military personnel in Vietnam are committing acts of criminal aggression. Thus, they have no status as prisoners of war, as defined by the Geneva Convention of 1949 to which both the United States and the North Vietnamese governments presumably adhere.

Throughout the questioning and commentary by the East German producers of the film, there is a studied attempt to compare U.S. policy and actions in Vietnam with those of the Nazis in Europe during World War II. Each pilot was asked specifically if he knew of any declaration of war by his government against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. As Nazis were convicted of crimes against humanity and their convictions were supported by world opinion, so U.S. military personnel are also criminals and not deserving of the status of prisoners of war.

The criminal intent of the individual pilot is established by juxtaposing scenes from his sober interview with scenes of conviviality among U.S. pilots at their air bases and on Navy carriers and scenes of alleged "terror bombing" of civilians in North Vietnam. Complimentary mention is also made in the commentary to the "Russell Court" in Copenhagen as a judgment of world public opinion on the U.S. role in Vietnam.

U.S. pilots are poor officers because they are callous about human life, cowardly when their own lives are at stake, and violate their own Military Code of Conduct when captured.

This theme is closely related to the one alleging criminality and is developed similarly in the film. Again, scenes of bomb damage and wounded women and children are followed by scenes from U.S. television films showing pilots being interviewed after returning to their bases from successful missions over North Vietnam. The pilots in these U.S.-made interviews are posed against a background of highly technical equipment and speak with fitting modesty about their recent success over specific targets. These scenes contrast vividly with those of North Vietnamese women and farmers capturing downed pilots with only pitchforks.

In the prison interviews, the fact is established that these downed pilots had their service revolvers with them at the time of their captures but, contrary to the Military Code of Conduct, had not used them to resist capture. Though brave when dropping bombs and napalm on civilians and heroic when interviewed by the U.S. press, these same pilots are cowardly when face-to-face with their victims and behave contrary to their own regulations when facing capture.

Further elaboration of the theme about the poor quality of U.S. officers is given by the East German commentator who, at the end of each extended interview with a captured pilot, reminds the audience that the Code of Conduct specifies that captured U.S. military personnel are bound to give their captors only their names, ranks, serial numbers, and dates of birth.

U.S. officers are ideologically naive and politically they are dolts.

The role of the pilots in the development of this theme is relatively passive. Each, following the U.S. tradition of political neutrality of members of the Armed Forces, makes a statement disavowing any active interest in politics, domestic or international. From these simple disclaimers,the East German commentator then attempts to reinforce the popular notion among many Europeans, Communists or not, that Americans generally are politically immature. Americans are obviously technologically advanced, but equally obviously they are retarded in their understanding of the real social forces and class struggle throughout the world. To quote from the commentary:

> The clumsy and by this time immature impression which captiveAmericans made with regard to politics may in our opinion hardly be blamed on the individual. It is much more the faithful reflection of the inner political situation in the U.S. of which Professor Robert Paul Wolff says in his essay, "The gap between the ruling and the ruled is so deep that the active participation of the citizen in the affairs of the government disappears into it. Even the periodic election becomes a ritual where the voters choose a president whom they have not appointed so that he decides on facts which were never discussed, on the basis of facts that cannot be published."

This theme is probably the most undisguised propagandistic one of all in the film. It lacks any subtle development that involves U.S. activities in Vietnam. It is exhortative and suggests that the U.S. is unfit to cope

with the governments and peoples in countries that are the beneficiaries of "scientific socialism." The U.S. pilots' disavowals of partisan politics only provide the springboard for a monologue on the political unawareness of American world leadership.

The North Vietnamese exhibit Western (Christian) virtues that the United States only professed

This is an all-pervasive theme. The people of North Vietnam are long-suffering. Their tribulations are American-made and not of their own making. They bear these tribulations with great fortitude and unswerving loyalty to their goverment that is also blameless since it is not attacking civilians in the United States. Yet when these simple people confront their tormentors—downed U.S. pilots—they act with great restraint and kindness. They see to their enemies' physical needs, offer what medical aid they possess, and steadfastly refrain from taking any personal vengeance against the pilots. This portrayal of the North Vietnamese people as the forgiving victims of an impersonal "American Colossus" is supportive of the contention of the peace movement in the United States and elsewhere. As such, the pictorial elaboration of this theme will be taken as "proof" by groups in this peace movement.

The use of camera close-ups and their editing into what appears to be uninterrupted sequences of this "good guys versus bad guys" theme is quite convincing. The faces of the pilots seem to reflect some inner feelings of guilt, sadness and remorse when they are questioned about their treatment by civilians at the time of their captures. Whether these camera shots were taken at the time the pilots were actually being queried about their captures cannot be determined. Only one pilot voiced some personal remorse at his violation of his religious tenets against killing. But even his response could have been made to a different question than the one that was heard on the sound track of the film.

The United States has broken with its own traditions in fighting a war in Vietnam.

The objective of this theme is to convince the captured pilots and more significantly those in the wider television audience that the Vietnam war is "Johnson's war." Such a war is contrary to America's great traditions. The questions and comments on the response from pilots mention the great hstorical role of the United States and reverently quote excerpts from the U.S. Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. It is doubtful that this "Devil quoting Scripture" technique has any effect on the captured pilots, but this cannot be asserted with the same confidence about viewers who have taken a peace-at-any-price position and who might be expected to be receptive to appeals to restore "historical America."

The Soviet Union is providing the tangible means for the people of a small "fraternal socialist" country to defend itself against attack from a mighty imperialistic country.

The purpose of this theme seems to be twofold. First, to demonstrate

that the U.S.S.R., as a nation-state, can compete successfully with the U.S.A. not only politically and economically, but also militarily and technologically. Secondly, to show developing nations in Asia and particularly those with Communist-influenced regimes that the Soviet Union is ready, willing, and able to come to their aid with modern and effective weapons.

This theme, unlike the one on the political and ideological shortcomings of Americans, is promulgated by testimony from the U.S. pilots rather than by direct statements of the unseen commentator. Each is asked if he knows how his plane was brought down, and each showed his technical knowledge of weapons by naming a specific type of enemy aircraft or type of rocket that he believed was involved. This U.S. expertise was further exploited by other questions that emphasized that the pilots knew the equipment involved was Soviet-made. In the battle, it was Soviet equipment in the hands of simple Vietnamese that triumphs over U.S. equipment and personnel.

EVALUATIVE COMMENTS

The six major propaganda themes just discussed were abstracted from a film where they are intertwined and submerged under the realism of a documentary-type production. Knowledge and forewarning about these themes can tend to destroy the seeming objectivity of the "documentary approach" of *Pilots in Pajamas* and can alert viewers to see the contrived nature of this television presentation. Many of these viewers and others who may read about the film, however, will still be perplexed at the seeming cooperation of U.S. pilots in such a propaganda effort that not only defames them personally but also the country they are sworn to defend.

Because this perplexity may lead some individuals to form hasty and derogatory conclusions about these pilots and U.S. servicemen in general, certain evaluative observations by the analytic team are in order. Some of these observations are admittedly speculative and must remain so until more information is available about the making of *Pilots in Pajamas*. Yet such observations may serve to bring about a suspension of judgment on the part of otherwise well-intentioned individuals who will inadvertently become victims of the propaganda effort if they form conclusions solely on the basis of what seems to be true at this time.

No hint is given by the producers about the selection of the particular pilots who were interviewed. Although they appear to be voluntary cooperators whose consciences, sense of guilt, or repentence caused them to consent to be interviewed, there is ample experience from similar prisoner interrogation in the past to support the suspicion that none had much, if any, choice in the matter. The producers attempt to avoid any impression of "brainwashing." This, in itself, suggests that less crass forms of psychological pressure may have been involved. One such pressure would be to dangle in front of isolated men the opportunity to

communicate with their families via a television interview to be conducted by an obviously non-North Vietnamese, Western interviewer.

While the eyes and ears of a TV viewer may verify that U.S. pilots submitted to interviews, they can only attest to what was an edited film and sound track. They cannot attest to what may have been said or done in the actual interviews but deleted by expert editing. For example, it was observed that some of the phrases were not in the idiom normally spoken by Americans when responding to the types of questions asked. The technique of substituting answers to questions other than those ostensibly asked is frequently used in film-making for both artistic and humorous effects. To believe one's eyes and ears in the case of a film that was edited by competent technicians of suspect political credentials, is a degree of credulity that is unwarranted in any educated person.

Answers by the pilots to questions about military equipment sound much more important and revealing than they actually are. The admissions about the MIGs, rockets, or AA fire that downed their planes is all ordinary, ex post facto information which the enemy already knew. Whatever intelligence interrogation these pilots may have had took place previously and was separate from any questioning shown in the film. The information of seeming military intelligence that was elicited in the film was for propaganda purposes and not intelligence. No assumption on whether these pilots gave intelligence information to the enemy is justified on the basis of this film.

The pilots are in situations for which they have not been adequately trained except for physical survival. Except for some oral instruction on the Code of Conduct, their training and practice have been in electromechanical systems, not social systems. They have been schooled to be operators of highly complex machines and to be leaders of men who have cultural values and ideals similar to their own. They have had little or no training in coping with the stratagems of a skilled dialectician who uses logic based upon assumptions with which they are unfamiliar, and in stressful situations where they are relatively powerless, and leadership rests with someone of a different political orientation. No Air Surgeon would authorize these pilots in their present debilitated physical condition to operate aircraft on which they have been highly trained. This same condition makes them even more incapable to perform mental skills for which they have had neither practical experience nor training.

Lastly, these pilots are not in a "Stalag 17" situation. They are not being detained in any organized prisoner of war camp where they might be able to draw some psychological support from being with other Americans and being permitted occasionally to exercise and communicate with other prisoners. Contrary to the few scenes of several Americans being together while reading, relaxing, and celebrating Christmas together, these pilots and other captive Americans are individually incarcerated, physically dispersed and isolated from each other, and kept incommunicado. Judgments about their behavior, therefore, cannot be based

upon the behavior of other Americans who have been captured in other wars where POWs may have been treated as harshly but differently. In this respect, the actual situation corresponds to the propaganda theme--captured U.S. military personnel are treated as criminals not as prisoners of war.

IMPLICATIONS AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

The quick analysis that was possible of the film, *Pilots in Pajamas*, yields only a few tentative conclusions but many inferences for possible U.S. policy and actions.

Five conclusions were reached. All conclusions but the first one listed below should be regarded as tentative and subject to verification.

1. The film, as a vehicle of psychological warfare, is admirable. It is a carefully prepared and sophisticated propaganda production. It sets forth a pro-Soviet position without alienating viewers who may be generally sympathetic toward the United States.
2. The film's greatest propaganda impact probably will be upon groups affiliated with peace movements in the United States and Western countries and upon individuals who tend to believe that there is a "credibility gap" in the reporting of news about the war in Vietnam. Its impact probably will be somewhat less upon individuals in Eastern Europe because of their over-exposure and saturation by State- sponsored, political education through public communication media. How effective the film will be with viewers in non-Communist Asian and "neutral" countries, cannot be determined without additional analyses. There is some reason to believe that audiences in Asian countries would find some of the behavior of the Vietnamese "unbelievable."
3. U.S. military personnel in Vietnam, if they view the film, will be relatively unaffected except for anger at the treatment of their comrades and amusement at the portrayal of the North Vietnamese as humane and forgiving. The film probably will have an irritating effect on many present and former officers of the U.S. Armed Forces.
4. The weakest point in the film to Western audiences will be the emphasis placed on the fact that U.S. pilots violated their Code of Conduct by not using their revolvers against civilians to resist capture.
5. The strongest point to Western audiences probably will be the "documentation" that was edited into the film from U.S. news and television sources.

The film, its making and distribution by the German Democratic Republic, has a number of implications for the United States. Some of these implications are set forth below.

1. The film is evidence that "software" as well as "hardware" is being accepted by the Hanoi government from Soviet Bloc nations. The absence of any references to military assistance from Communist China should be noted.
2. None of the identified propaganda themes is entirely new. Their combination in the scenario for this major production, however, strongly suggests a formal coalescing of these themes into a "line" that may be expected to be repeated again and again by front-organizations and hence in the public communication media of both the United States and countries abroad.
3. Any negotiations for a political settlement in Vietnam, including the preliminary talks currently being held in Paris between representatives of the United States and the Hanoi governments, will involve the propaganda themes imbedded in *Pilots in Pajamas*. U.S. representatives should be prepared to cope with these themes.
4. It is possible that the film, in whole or in edited parts, will be offered to U.S. networks and individual television stations in what may appear to be as a straightforward commercial transaction. Similar offers may be expected to be made to TV outlets in Mexico and Cuba. The title of the film may be changed and the entrepreneurship may not be directly identified with East Germany.
5. The portrayal and inferred treatment of captured U.S. military personnel indicate that the Geneva Convention of 1949 is not considered germane by the Hanoi government which subscribed to this Convention in 1957. That there may be even a remote basis for this position, suggests that the United States should examine this Convention for ambiguities and, at the appropriate time, press for clarifying amendments.

6. The Code of Conduct is being used as a psychological weapon against the United States and its military personnel and is not the defensive weapon it was intended to be. Those provisions of this Code that define and limit the behavior of military personnel at times of capture and detention should be reexamined in light of the changing nature of warfare and recent medical and psychological research.

7. The legal justification for the treatment being given captured U.S. military personnel is attributed to actions by the United Nations. For purposes of the record, this attribution should be questioned appropriately by the United States in the United Nations and in other international organizations.

AUDIENCE ANALYSIS

Audience analysis also may be classified as quantitative or qualitative. Much of the output of standard intelligence analysis [1] can be used in the evaluation of audience attitudes, opinions, emotions, and behavior. For a thorough analysis of the audience of a PSYOP appeal, survey techniques may be highly appropriate. However, in dealing with international political communications, such techniques are frequently infeasible for political reasons.

The first two articles of this section describe the means utilized by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty to assess the attitudes and perceptions of their audiences. Quantitative and qualitative techniques are employed.

Both types of analysis require certain capabilities on the part of the analyst. In this connection, the results of a study delineating some of the factors influencing the ability to estimate foreign populations' attitudes are described in an article by Alexander R. Askenasy.

The final selection of this part of Chapter IX is an example of the methodology employed to test hypotheses regarding the audience in communication theories applied to foreign audiences.

NOTES

[1] See Chapter VII of this casebook.

AUDIENCE ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH—RADIO FREE EUROPE*

BY LORAND B. SZALAY

Effective international communication requires more than accurate translation. People and nations have their own langauage, interests, concerns, concepts, priorities, and values—their cultural frame of reference. This frame of reference is the critical factor in determining whether a communicator is listened to and accepted. RFE audience analysis attempts to derive information from large samples representing wide cross-sections of the population.

BACKGROUND

Radio Free Europe's audience research has developed as a direct

*Excerpts from "Annex to Audience Analysis and Public Opinion Research—Radio Free Europe," by Lorand B. Szalay, annex to "Radio Free Europe—A Survey and Analysis," by James R. Price, the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, March 22, 1972.

response to conditions and situational characteristics which are fairly exceptional in broadcasting. Three of these conditions appear to be especially significant.

a. The broadcasting is directed toward the people of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. These distant audiences are not readily accessible because of the strong social and political controls that block most of the common means of feedback: free reporting, public opinion surveys, free political elections. The people of these Central and Eastern European countries live under political systems which maintain a fairly close monopoly over all channels of mass and public communications operated on the basis of Communist ideology.

b. The people of these countries generally feel poorly informed; they express a deep interest in receiving information that is timely and unbiased. Thus, there are large, highly receptive audiences in Eastern Europe, and they are distinguished by certain characteristics which deserve interest.

c. In respect to their frames of reference, beliefs, and opinions, these audiences cannot simply be identified with the ideological blueprints of the governments or official media. Nor can they be treated as if the experiences of the last three decades did not have any influence. Although in many aspirations the people of Eastern Europe are similar to people in the free neighboring countries, they cannot simply be equated. For example, they cannot be compared with Austria, on which public opinion survey data and free election results are readily available.

Thus, Radio Free Europe has as its major audiences people that have specific information needs and whose audience reactions are not directly available to the radio station operating from abroad. This uncommon relationship between the station and its audience presents a situation which is delicate politically, complex and demanding from the angle of the communication task. This situation accounts for certain distinctive characteristics of Radio Free Europe in general and for the role assigned to the audience and public opinion research in particular.

Audience analysis at RFE passed through various stages during the past until recently it reached its present scope and orientation. In its present form the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department (APOR) produces extensive and timely information by interviews. These interviews are conducted on large samples of visitors ($N \geq 1{,}000$) representing Czech-Slovak, Hungarian, Polish, and Rumanian audiences and also on sizable samples ($N \geq 800$) of Bulgarian audiences. The survey data contain generally three major categories of information: Listenership data, program evaluation, and attitude studies.

Comparable information is generally available to Western broadcasting from a variety of different sources. However, the RFE audience research performs an important pioneering service as the scope of the audience and public opinion research in these five Eastern European countries is modest and the publication of opinion results is selective. In the social and

political field, the validity of the officially released data is frequently questionable.

This explains why the relevance of the RFE research is substantive not only in connection with the immediate use of these data in program planning and evaluation but also in the broader context of introducing and applying social science research to this area. RFE research traces and evaluates social and political trends in the five Communist-controlled Eastern European countries in which objective public opinion research efforts are seriously hampered by political conditions. The resulting information gap on Eastern Europe is accentuated by a similar but still wider information gap—a nearly complete lack of solid social science research data on the Soviet society, on the Soviet citizen--his attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and world outlook.[1]

Against this background RFE audience analysis attempts to derive solid, objective information from large audience samples, which represent wide cross-sections of the populations. Based on information and observations personally accumlated in Munich and in Vienna, a few general conclusions may be formulated. To keep the report short, the actual procedures, designs, the technical and professional details, situational problems, and limitations are elaborated in separate appendices.

THE INTERVIEW

In its present form audience analysis conducted by RFE's Audience and Public Opinion Research Division is a most significant undertaking. It represents a large-scale research effort to apply public opinion survey methods in real life situations, which requires a careful adjustment of technical-scientific criteria to given social, political, and psychological conditions. After decades of nearly complete information blackout of valid empirical survey data, at the present level of operation nearly 7,000 Eastern European nationals are interviewed every year. Each national sample (with the exception of Bulgaria) includes over 1,000 cases. The interviews are conducted in various large European cities—Vienna, London, Paris—where Eastern Europeans travel as tourists, visitors, businessmen, or sportsmen.

The fieldwork of interviewing is contracted out by Radio Free Europe to independent national public opinion and market research organizations, which employ interviewers who speak the respective languages. The rules and quotas, as well as the guidelines for the interviewers, are specified by RFE's Audience and Public Opinion Research Department. Radio Free Europe also provides the questionnaire used by the interviewer in the process of the interview. The use of independent local organizations is an especially sound decision on more than one account. First, it makes the outcome of interviews and the research results independent of RFE, which is especially desirable because the results tell a great deal about RFE, its popularity, its impact, and its effectiveness.

Assigning this task to local public opinion research organizations is also

important in that it makes it clear that the research involves open public opinion surveys of the type widely used in all democratic, open societies and therefore has nothing to do with clandestine intelligence work—an accusation frequently voiced by the Communist authorities.

Finally, working independently in different locations and using more than one interviewing organization give ample opportunities for internal control, for testing the internal consistency of the results.

The actual interviewing procedure is described in Appendix 1. This description elaborates on a few technical questions such as the procedure for contacting visitors, their cooperativeness, the frequency with which interviews are refused, and other details which were considered important from the viewpoint of effectiveness of the method and the quality of the results.

REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE SAMPLES

The quality and information value of public opinion surveys are inseparable from the question of how generalizable are the results and how representative are the samples interviewed. This question of generalizability and representativeness acquires special importance in a situation where the parent population—the audiences at home—cannot be directly surveyed and inferences must be based on subpopulations such as the samples of travelers.

As elaborated in Appendix 2 in more detail, RFE's use of large samples, numerous independent subsamples, and its attempts to reach visitors randomly to reduce the biases of selectivity are all sound measures which help to fight the odds of a complex research task.

The designers of the survey work are unquestionably correct in asserting that developments in Eastern Europe during the last decade have produced certain welcome changes, such as extensive travel to the West and reduced anxiety about expressing personal opinions. The RFE Audience and Public Opinion Research Department is prompt and effective in the use of these changes for better obtaining research of higher quality and generalizable results. Although the optimism and confidence in the representativeness of the samples may not be readily proven merely by the adapted design or research method and some of the statistical assumptions may be questioned, a considerable body of empirical evidence suggests that this confidence in the samples is not unfounded. The research findings show that the samples include not only people from all walks of life but also from a broad and varied spectrum of political opinions (Appendix 2).

SCOPE AND UTILIZATION OF AUDIENCE INFORMATION OBTAINED

The information obtained by the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department covers a wide variety of topics and may be conveniently subdivided into three major problem areas:

1. *Listenership data.* This covers such technical information as listening habits, preferred listening times, wave length, receptivity, and jamming. The data are collected with regard to the technical planning and scheduling of broadcastings.

2. *Program evaluation.* This portion of the survey aims to determine the popularity and use of existing programs. It involves assessing what is liked, what is not liked, why, and what people would like to have more of. These and similar questions produce feedback necessary for timely, audience-oriented programming, which is the aim of every broadcast.

3. *Attitude research and special studies.* These studies deal with diverse socially and politically relevant attitudes, opinions, and images. They constitute fairly extensive survey work focusing on important parameters of public opinions relevant to programming and broadcasting.

The main process of data collection involves the administration of the basic questionnaire which includes questions related to all three problem areas. Each year it is administered to new samples. The questionnaire is also updated yearly: some questions are kept to allow for comparability over time and others are replaced by new ones to reflect more timely concerns.

In addition to these basic questionnaires, some special questionnaires are used to cover unanticipated timely events such as Prague in the spring of 1968 and the Polish uprisings in 1970. Some additional "special studies" are occasionally conducted in order to provide timely audience information: for example, the Eastern European interpretation of some key concepts (socialism, capitalism) using new research techniques such as the Semantic Differential.

The use of audience analysis data within Radio Free Europe is institutionally organized. The various country desks show a general and fairly uniform appreciation of the value of the listenership data. The program evaluation results are received occasionally with mixed feelings. This can be explained by the fact that when evaluation indicates a decline in program popularity, the feedback, while useful and necessary, is not flattering. The attitude data and special studies information is of more recent origin and up to now has been used on a more sporadic basis. I feel this area deserves more special attention (Appendix 3).

Generally, the relationship of the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department and the Country Broadcasting Departments cannot be entirely free from the common problems which naturally arise in those instances when people with different professional frames of reference must work out common solutions. The quantitatively oriented social scientist and the talented country expert charged with heavy responsibilities of daily output of high quality are naturally predisposed to look at the same problem from different angles. In the case of Radio Free Europe, however,there are clear signs of mutual appreciation and recognition of the complementary nature and shared interests of these two roles (Appendix 3).

The scope and results of audience research with its nearly 400 publications are broad and varied, and their discussion would go beyond the scope of the present report. However, some data on the role and image of Radio Free Europe may be of interest at this time of conflicting opinions, when the reactions of Eastern Europeans deserve special attention.

AUDIENCE DATA ON THE ROLE AND IMAGE OF RADIO FREE EUROPE

There are numerous categories of audience data which are informative on the role of Radio Free Europe. Perhaps the most signficant are those data which estimate the size of its [listenership]. According to earlier (1967) and more recent findings (1971), about 50% of the populations listen to Radio Free Europe. The figures are somewhat higher for Poles and Rumanians and lower for Hungarians and more recently, for Czechs. In all the Eastern European countries Radio Free Europe was found to be the most listened-to foreign station, preceded only by the local national station. Although these local stations—Radio Budapest for Hungarians, Radio Prague for Czechs—generally show the highest number of listeners, the importance of Radio Free Europe is frequently rated higher than the domestic station in particular contexts, especially on foreign news (Poland, 1971; CSR, 1971).

A trend analysis (#221, #304)* has found a slowly but generally increasing listenership for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. This trend is occasionally interrupted, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, by strict measures of control and heavy jamming in the post-invasion period (#304), but in the long range they usually prevail. While the figures on listening are high, the additional percentage of those who receive RFE news indirectly by word of mouth is hard to estimate. The censorship of news media and the desire to receive reliable information produce a favorable climate for spreading information by word of mouth. The importance of these private channels in controlled societies has been emphasized by numerous accounts.[2]

Although Radio Free Europe is right below the domestic station on the level of listening, in respect to such characteristics as reliability, truth value, and timeliness of information, Radio Free Europe is consistently in first place (#292. #292a, #182, #168, #177).

In contrast to the image of domestic broadcasting, which is generally criticized for suppression and distortion of information and described as "biased," "cold," and "obscure," Radio Free Europe is described primarily as "interesting," "skillful," "pleasant," "wide," and "quick" (#283, #284, #287, #288).

This emphasis on reliability and information value is consistent with the main task or function that Eastern European audiences assign to Radio Free Europe. To the question, "What do you consider the most

*See Appendix 5, for listing of RFE publications used.

important tasks of Radio Free Europe?" the most frequently chosen functions were "to inform about events," "to explain. . .," and "to entertain." The ambiguous function of "encouragement," which could simply mean to have faith that the situation will improve, or with more forcefulness might be interpreted to mean encouragement to revolt, figures only as a low choice of 10%. The most frequently given reasons for liking Radio Free Europe by Czech, Hungarian, and Polish listeners were that the programs were "interesting" and "informative" and that it provided information otherwise not available.

* * * * *

APPENDIX 1. THE INTERVIEW

The experience of being questioned by an independent research organization as a part of a public opinion survey is generally an uncommon, novel experience for Eastern Europeans. Questioning about attitudes and opinions related to official, governmental interests, which might have undesirable personal consequences, may be a more commonly shared expectation. Furthermore, Communist authorities are heavily engaged in campaigns to discredit Western public opinion research in general and the polls conducted by Radio Free Europe in particular.

There are numerous indications that during recent years the adverse effects of this preconditioning have considerably decreased, that Eastern Europeans are less hampered by fear, and that they talk more freely. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to entirely dismiss the potential impact of unfamiliarity, anxiety, and various misconceptions of the interview, which could produce biased results.

In respect to the objectivity and information value of the results of RFE audience research interviews, the following steps appeared to be especially critical:

a. Selection of the interviewee
b. Contacting the interviewee; his cooperativeness
c. Interview procedure

To examine the procedure, I questioned about a dozen INTORA (Vienna) interviewers about their work and experiences. I also had the opportunity to observe interviews in progress and to talk with the people interviewed. Based on these various impressions, I have come to the following general conclusions:

a. Selection of the Interviewee

Ideally, the interviewer would interview every traveller he happens to meet on an entirely random basis. These people, by their characteristics as a subsample, would approximate the parent populations (nontravellers in the country). There is naturally a discrepancy between the composition of the samples and the parent populations. In actuality, we know that the samples are not entirely representative, that the more educated strata are over-represented, that peasants are generally underrepresented, and so on.

To help correct his discrepancy, quotas are calculated. The director of INTORA explained that two complementary measures have been developed. One is based on previous experiences with the interviewers, which give an idea about their characteristic preferences, what type of people they are predisposed to contact. Taking these predispositions into consideration, INTORA selects interviewers whose predispositions largely balance each other.

As a second measure INTORA issues guidelines on which category of traveller to focus on—young, less educated, etc. The combination of these two measures was described as generally effective in obtaining sizable, fairly proportionate representation for the expected quotas. As a means of reducing the discrepancy between the composition of the samples interviewed and the parent population, weighting scores are calculated, based on the relationship of the actual proportions of people interviewed and the desirable quota calculated on the basis of the national sample.

A second source of discrepancy may be the result of a more or less conscientious avoidance of the unpleasant experiences of rejection. Especially the more experienced interviewers may be suspected of having developed a certain sense for detecting those who may be cooperative and those who may not. For instance, they may have learned to avoid hardcore party members, secret police, and the like. There are no safe controls against this type of bias. Nonetheless, the breakdown of the samples by occupation and party affiliation suggest that the effects of this selectivity are probably not too serious or that they may be partially cancelled out by conflicting trends (for example, the above average participation of party favorites in foreign travel).

b. Contact and Rejection Rate

Contacting the prospective interviewee is naturally an important and delicate step since Eastern Europeans are not used to polls and have developed considerable suspicions. The adverse effects of these understandable reservations are apparently reduced by the fact that the interviewers are compatriots of the travellers who speak the same language. The interviewers also understand that they must first establish a rapport on the basis of neutral topics (finding places, articles, shopping). Next the interviewer explains his survey and asks for cooperation.

As was stated by both the interviewers and INTORA, the average rate of refusal is about 20%. This rate differs from nation to nation as well as over time. Presently, the rate of refusal is the highest from Czechs and Slovaks (about 35%) while Rumanians were characterized as the most readily communicative (15%). The 20–25% refusal rate is surprisingly low and requires repeated verification.

To maintain control over the work of the interviewers, the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department has set the condition that the interviewers are obliged to call in by phone in 80% of the time. They must state that they have an interview in progress and give the location and a

brief description of the interviewee. These calls are then used for local spot checks.

c. The Interview Procedure

Once he has received an affirmative answer in respect to the interviewee's readiness to cooperate, the interviewer takes the questionnaire and poses one question after another. The interviewer reads from the questionnaire and notes the answers or places the checkmarks in the case of multiple choice items. The interviewee is fully aware that his responses are being registered. Although this procedure could arouse some fears, the fear may be counteracted by certain other factors. Namely, the interviewee recognizes that the nature of this inquiry is schematic and mechanical, and the questions do not convey the idea of searching for personal or confidential information. Furthermore, he has been previously assured that his identity will not be retained and that the evaluation of the information will be group-oriented and statistical.

The questions belong to three major categories: (a) attitudes and opinions on timely social, and political topics, (b) information on listening and program preferences, and (c) data on the respondent's sociodemographic background. Part b, is administered only to respondents who have stated previously that they regularly listen to Radio Free Europe. The administration of the questionnaire requires on the average 40–60 minutes.

The interviewers have stated the interviewees generally have no problem in understanding or answering the questions. Occasionally, they ask for clarification on the use of certain terms such as "socialist party" and express the desire to offer more qualified answers than the forced choice alternatives provide for. There is a general tendency to tell more and elaborate on details beyond the scope of the questionnaire.

The interviewees are not paid for the interview but it is a common practice for the interviewer to offer coffee or beer to the interviewee if the questionnaire is administered in a coffeehouse or restaurant. The interviewers state that the interviewees generally desire to talk and like to have their opinions asked.

The interviewers I met were mostly men; there were only two women in a group of twelve. Both male and female interviewers appeared well qualified and interested in the work. They usually have other full-time occupations and do the interviewing only on part-time basis. They receive about a $5.00 equivalent in Austrian schillings (135) for each questionnaire.

Since a large portion of the questionnaire deals with RFE performance, the claim that neither the interviewers nor the interviewee know about the source of interest is somewhat doubtful. It is true only in the sense that they are not told this explicitly. The official explanation states that radio stations involved in broadcasting toward their country are being evaluated.

APPENDIX 2. THE SAMPLES

To derive up-to-date information on audience characteristics such as listening habits, program preferences, and attitudes of the people in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, travelers (visitors, tourists) arriving in Western European capitals are interviewed.

The institutes listed below are being used to conduct the field work. Not all of them will always work with all five national samples as there may be only a few travelers of a certain nationality in a certain area.

INTORA Opinion Research Institute	Vienna, Austria
A.I.M. Market Research Institute	Copenhagen, Denmark
A.I.M. Market Research Institute	Stockholm, Sweden
William Schlackman Psychological Research	London, England
Sales Research Services	London, England
SOFRES Opinion Research Institute	Paris, France
COFREMCA Opinion Research Institute	Paris, France
Vandoros	Athens, Greece

Since the native populations of these countries cannot be reached by Western surveys, the interviewing of visitors to the West from these otherwise inaccessible populations appears to be the best alternative for obtaining useful, generalizable information. Since the early 1960s travel restrictions have been considerably reduced and now several hundred thousand Eastern Europeans travel to the West every year. While the size of the travelling groups is unquestionably large enough to warrant sampling on a sufficiently broad foundation, the composition of the samples presents a more complex problem.

The ideal objective would be to use samples that precisely match the composition of home audiences in the respective Eastern European countries. However, a more realistic expectation is to approximate the composition of parent populations within acceptable limits, and there are indications that a fairly good approximation is reached. Before elaborating on these data, we should discuss the extent to which we can expect the samples of visitors to be representative of the parent population. Even if they closely approximate each other in the distribution of certain demographic variables (age, sex), this is not necessarily an indication that the visitor sample does not deviate from the parent population on some other parameters—political beliefs, level of politicization, conformity, extroversion. If it does deviate, then this deviation in turn may show significant correlation with attitudes and opinions expressed in the interview. To mention only a single example, let us take mobility. Mobility, the motivation and interest in travel, is not the same for those who travel and those who do not. To what extent mobility, on which travelers and non-travelers differ, actually interferes with the distribution of responses

is in no way clear. If we assume that this mobility correlates with the level of interest in the external world, in international affairs, then it could produce biased results as a factor of selectivity. If this selectivity is assumed to be more political in nature, then its effects on politically oriented questions are likely to be negligible.

Since we cannot clearly identify those factors which actually differentiate those who travel from those who do not, demographic quotas (educational, occupational) provided for sampling may not solve the problem.

Nor is this problem resolved by the method of "independent sampling." The rationale of interviewing independent samples of travelers in various European capitals is undoubtedly sound, and it provides a solid basis for testing the internal consistency of the results. Nonetheless, if there is a selectivity factor which differentiates travelers from non-travelers, the effects of this factor cannot be eliminated by this sampling procedure because in this sense the samples are not independent.

Nonetheless, there are research findings which suggest that the samples have a broad and varied composition which includes not only sizable groups of the main social and educational strata but also sizable percentages of people with diverse political orientations. Table 1 shows the composition of samples on the basis of occupation.

TABLE 1
THE COMPOSITION OF THE 1970 SAMPLE BY OCCUPATION

	Czechoslovakia		Hungary		Poland	
	RFE Sample %	Population %	RFE Sample %	Population %	RFE Sample %	Population %
White Collar Workers	23	29.8	23	27.8	26	27.0
Technocrats	16		12		10	
Professionals	6		6		6	
Artists, Writers	4		4		1	
Students	7		4		12	
Workers	31	59.7	27	46.1	26	42.0
Full-time Housewives	6		9		10	
Shopkeepers	–		4		3	
Others	2		2		2	
Farmers	5	10.5	9	26.1	4	31.0
	N=1499		N=1525		N=1316	

The disparity in categorization complicates direct comparisons. As an RFE publication on the "Occupational Background of the East European Populations" observes:

> The statistical yearbooks, published under strictest regime supervision, tend to cover this area in summary fashion and, often, even this summary information is incomplete, or contradictory. Furthermore, employment figures are frequently presented for entire sectors of production (e.g., "transport" or "wood processing

industry") but these figures include everybody from the enterprise managers and chief engineers to unskilled messengers inside the plant and cleaning personnel.

Another problem relates to the semantic ambiguity of certain categories, a confusion probably resulting from both practical and ideological differences. In a Socialist country everybody is a worker by definition. Nonetheless, as a second meaning, worker is frequently used in reference to "manual worker" as in the dichotomy of "workers" and "intelligentsia." In the summary statistics shown above, worker is used apparently is this second sense and the white collar category is largely coterminous with intelligentsia. Where the division line is drawn is impossible to tell.

The demarcation between workers and farmers is perhaps even more ambiguous. Argricultural workers—for example, peasants working on state farms—are frequently categorized as "workers" while peasants doing practically the same work on private or partially collectivized land are identified as farmers.

The "Population" columns of the above table rely on official statistics. The data on CSR came from the statistical yearbook (1970), which contained a table on "the Social Structure of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic." The Hungarian data are based on a publication of the Bureau of Statistics in a volume entitled "Employment and Income Ratios" (1969 data), which shows the breakdown of the "vocationally active population" (4.46 million).

On Poland RFE has used the information provided by the State Telegraphic Agency (PAP) dated September 29, 1969—as the Statistical Yearbook did not provide this information. Discounting the apparent disparities between the social-occupational categories, the white collar stratum is somewhat overrepresented and the agricultural population underrepresented in the RFE sample.

The comparison between the RFE sample and the parent population is easier in terms of such demographic variables as sex, age, and education, as shown in Table 2. Again, as a general trend, males, middle-aged people, and the more educated strata are somewhat overrepresented in the RFE sample.

TABLE 2

COMPOSITION OF THE 1970 SAMPLE BY SEX, AGE, AND EDUCATION

	Czechoslovakia		*Hungary*		*Poland*	
	RFE Sample %	*Population %*	*RFE Sample %*	*Population %*	*RFE Sample %*	*Population %*
Sex						
Male	59	49	50	48	57.5	50
Female	41	51	50	52	42.5	50
Age						
Up to 25 years	21	22	18	20	27.0	25
26–35 years	28	16	22	18	29.9	19
36–50 years	31	25	29	25	26.3	27
over 50 years	20	37	31	37	16.8	29

TABLE 2 (Cont'd)

	Czechoslovakia		Hungary		Poland	
	RFE Sample %	*Population %*	*RFE Sample %*	*Population %*	*RFE Sample %*	*Population %*
Education						
Elementary	37	66.5	42	70	31.7	70
Secondary	47	27.0	43	25	46.3	25
University	16	6.5	15	5	22.0	5

Finally, the following Table 3 shows the political orientation of the interviewed samples by expressed political party preference.

TABLE 3
PARTY PREFERENCES IN A HYPOTHETICAL ELECTION-PARTY ALLEGIANCE BY PERCENTAGES (1970)

	CSR	*Hungary*	*Poland*	*Rumania*
Communist Party	3	5	3	11
Democratic Socialist Party	41	40	35	37
Christian Democratic Party	26	27	36	23
Peasant Party	6	13	6	8
National Conservative Party	7	2	5	13
Other and no answer	17	13	15	8

APPENDIX 3. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT GEARED TO THE AUDIENCE'S FRAME OF REFERENCE

The modern discipline of intercultural communication is based on the realization that effective communication between various people and nations requires more than accurate translation. People and nations not only speak their own language but they have also their own characteristic concerns, priorities, concepts, and values—their cultural frames of reference. This frame of reference is really the critical factor determining whether a communication is listened to, whether it is accepted or rejected, much more so than the language that is the pronunciation of a name or the grammaticalness of a sentence.

As Edward Hall elaborated on this topic at a recent hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee,* effective communication requires more than learning the foreign language; it requires knowledge of the foreign culture. This observation has far-reaching implications for broadcasting to foreign nations. It is obviously not enough to translate programs originally designed for U.S. audiences into the language of a particular foreign audience. Such a translation may be understood word

*Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Psychological Aspects of Foreign Policy (U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 1969).

by word and sentence by sentence, but this does not mean that it will be grasped in its full meaning or that it will relate to the experiences and interests of the local audiences.

Adjusting programs to the interests of a particular foreign audience constitutes an especially demanding task for which Radio Free Europe, with its national desks, programs, and first class staff recruited from the literary and intellectual elites of the respective countries, has developed outstanding potential.

The institutional policy of Radio Free Europe not only allows for individual country-oriented, independent program development but actually demands it. This unique feature, which is supported by a corresponding organizational structure, differentiates Radio Free Europe from all other known broadcasting stations aiming at foreign audiences. It is probably the main factor responsible for the strong identification Eastern Europeans—Czechs, Hungarians, Poles—develop with the station and is also primarily responsible for its wide popularity.

The audience research has an important role in this performance, even if this role may presently be more potential than actual. In this role the following contributions require special recognition.

First of all, the audience research provides the only empirical evidence which is broadly based and convincing enough to demonstrate that Eastern European audiences do have highly specific audience characteristics—concerns, interests, concepts, images—which differentiate them from other audiences and thus require full recognition and selective communications. For any interested citizen these findings should speak clearly enough to show the necessity of differentiated treatment of selective, audience-adjusted broadcasting.

Secondly, the audience research of Radio Free Europe is an important instrument, which enables the members of the national broadcasting staffs to keep up to date, to preserve the impression of timeliness, and to keep apace with the changes. Whether the staff members are new or old emigrants, they are in danger of getting more and more detached and losing contact with recent changes in the home audiences. Concerns and priorities change, new slogans and concepts develop (e.g., new ecomonic mechanisms), and new social phenomena emerge (hippies). To keep apace with the changes and to update their approach, the broadcasters, script writers, and commentators can safely rely on the findings of audience analysis. To take full advantage of its potential, it is important that audience analysis be treated not as a threatening authority exerting criticism but as an important source of authentic information which can help to adjust to the latest changes and provide a basis for timely decisions not by speculations and arbitrariness but by empirical evidence.

Finally and most importantly, RFE audience analysis has the organizational, material, and personnel resources to provide up-to-date audience information and feedback on approximately 120 million Eastern Europeans—a knowledge presently not available from any other source.

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APPENDIX 5. RADIO FREE EUROPE PUBLICATIONS USED

318	The Major Information Sources of Polish Respondents on Important Foreign and Domestic Issues	October 1971
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314	An Audience Evaluation of RFE's Czechoslovak Programs	September 1971
313	An Audience Evaluation of RFE's Rumanian Program	September 1971
312	An Audience Evaluation of RFE's Polish Programs	August 1971
311	An Audience Evaluation of RFE's Hungarian Programs	August 1971
309	Party Preference Trends in Hypothetical Free Elections in East Europe	July 1971
305	Listening to Western Radio in Bulgaria Before and after the "Polish Events" (April 1970-March 1971)	May 1971
304	Audience Trends in Czechoslovakia (1967-1970)	May 1971
303	Rumanian Listening Patterns Before and After the "Polish Events" (April 1970-March 1971)	May 1971
301	Listening to Western Radio in *Hungary* Before and After the "Polish Events" (May 1970-March 1971)	April 1971
300	Listening to Western Radio in *Poland* Before and After the "December Events" (May 1970-March 1971)	April 1971
292	The Reliability of Radio Free Europe	December 1970
288	The Images of Radio Free Europe and Radio Bucharest Among Rumanian Respondents	November 1970
287	The Images of Radio Free Europe and Radio Budapest Among Hungarians	November 1970
284	The Image of Radio Free Europe and of the Domestic Station Among Poles	October 1970
283	The Image Among Czechs and Slovaks of Radio Free Europe and the Domestic Radio Stations	October 1970
280	Identifying with Radio Free Europe	August 1970
270	Rumanian Listening Patterns May 1969-March 1970	May 1970
269	Listening to Western Radio in Poland-1969	May 1970

263	Listening to Western Radio Stations in Hungary in 1969	February 1970
259	Listening to RFE in Czechoslovakia in 1969 (A Preliminary Report)	December 1969
256	Attitudes Toward Key Political Concepts in East Europe (An Exercise in the Measurement of Meaning) BOUND STUDY	December 1969
245	Listening to Western Radio in East Europe (Joint s.) BOUND STUDY	July 1969
239	Listening to RFE Programs in Czechoslovakia Before and After August 21st	April 1969
238	Listening to Western Radio in Hungary in 1968	April 1969
237	Listening to Western Radio in Poland-1968	April 1969
235	Audience Mail in 1968	March 1969
234	Rumanian Listening Patterns 1968/69	March 1969
230	Listening to Western Broadcasts in Czechoslovakia Before and After the Invasion	January 1969
223	The Program Preferences of RFE's Hungarian Listeners (A Technical Report)	December 1968
222	Listening to Western Radio in Hungary 1967/1968	November 1968
221	Radio Free Europe's Listenership Trends 1962–1968	Octiber 1968
219	Listening to Western Radio in Poland	October 1968
218	RFE's Audience in Czechslovakia After the Invasion (A Preliminary Report) (Strictly Confidential)	October 1968
206	RFE's Audience in Czechoslovakia (1963–1968)	April 1968
204	Rumanian Listening Patterns 1967	March 1968
186	Listening to Western Radio in Bulgaria	September 1967
185	The Image of RFE in Bulgaria	September 1967
181	The Image of RFE in Poland	August 1967
177	The Image of RFE in Hungary	July 1967
175	Listening to Western Radio in Hungary, 1966/1967	July 1967
174	Listening to Western Radio in Poland	July 1967
168	The Image of RFE in Czechoslovakia	February 1967
164	Listening to Western Radio Stations in Czechoslovakia	February 1967
157	Hungarian Listening Patterns, 1965/1966	August 1966
156	Bulgarian Listening Patterns, 1964/1966	August 1966
151	Listening to Western Stations in Czechoslovakia III	June 1966
133	Listening to Western Radio in Poland	December 1965

132	Rumanian Listening Patterns III	December 1965
122	Hungarian Listening Patterns 1964–1965	August 1965
118	The Audience of Western Broadcasters to Czechoslovakia-II	March 1965
116	Radio Listening Patterns and Program Preferences of Polish Listeners to RFE (With Special Reference to Certain Age and Occupation Factors)	January 1965
115	Hungarian Attitudes Toward Other Nations	December 1964
107	Radio Listening Patterns and Program Preferences of Polish Listeners to RFE	August 1964
104	Hungarian Listening Patterns Prior to the Cessation of Jamming	April 1964
92	Agitation or Information? East Europeans Mistrust Their Mass Media (An Illustrative Report)	August 1963

NOTES

1. Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961).
2. Inkeles and Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen*; Klaus Mehnert, *Der Sovietmensch* (Stuttgart: Deutscher Verlag, 1958), pp. 13–14.

AUDIENCE ANALYSIS AT RADIO LIBERTY*

BY LORAND B. SZALAY

Despite similarities between RL and RFE audiences, there are differences. The Soviet audiences pose special requirements which RL must meet to provide effective audience-adjusted broadcasting. Audience analysis, in such a situation, becomes a most elementary and vital requirement.

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SITUATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, INSTITUTIONAL PHILOSOPHIES

In its background and objectives, Radio Liberty shows some distinct similarities with Radio Free Europe. The similarities are especially important in respect to audience analysis.

First of all, there is no direct physical access to the audiences toward which the station is primarily oriented, and there is little public opinion and feedback information on these main audiences. Moreover, the stations operate in a highly sensitive psychological and political atmosphere. Although little is actually known about the opinions and attitudes[1] of these distant audiences, there are indications that during the last decades

*Excerpts from "Audience Analysis at Radio Liberty," *Congressional Record*—Senate, Vol. 118, No. 33, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office (March 6, 1972), pp. S 3426–S 3428.

they have developed some characteristics which distinguish them from comparable Western audiences.

Despite the similarities between RL and RFE audiences, there are also some characteristic differences. The differences may have emerged as a function of the longer history of the Soviet Communism and the inbred nature of the Soviet system as compared to the largely imported nature of Eastern European Communist systems. The differences may also have resulted from the greater isolation of the Soviet population compared to the physically, geographically, and psychologically more exposed populations of the Eastern European border states.

For the Soviet audiences there also appears to be a stronger association between nationalism and loyalty to the political system. There are indications that external criticism of the system may be more readily resented on primarily nationalistic grounds. There is a type of national pride in the Soviet world power status, space achievements, and sport successes which is effectively exploited by the political system for denouncing criticism and political opposition as "unpatriotic." The Eastern Europeans, however, do not take pride in Communism as a type of national achievement; rather it is generally viewed as a foreign imposition of Russian colonialism.

It is not only the combination of strong national feelings with ideological elements which complicates the situation; a combination of nationalism and white Russian centralism also produces a hard-to-predict attitudinal mixture, which challenges minority nationalisms that work toward independence and separatism.

All these factors and more contribute to making an especially complex communication task involving audiences with uncommon, occasionally highly ambivalent, feelings and philosophies. Thus, the Soviet audiences pose special requirements which Radio Liberty must meet in order to provide effective, audience-adjusted broadcasting. In such a situation audience analysis becomes a most elementary and vital requirement.

At the same time, as a competent RL representative has expressed, no one in the West seems to have a very clear idea about the actual attitudes and beliefs of the broad Soviet citizenry.[2] Under these conditions the proper selection and planning of broadcasting, which is large in volume and can rely on little first-hand audience feedback, becomes an immense task.

The situational factors hampering audience analysis are overwhelming. Compared to the Eastern European development, they show only slow and minor improvements. The Soviet attitude of hostility has not mellowed, jamming is in full effect, and the number of travelers (RFE's major information source) has not shown a dramatic increase. Moreover, the campaign of denouncing Radio Liberty and discouraging cooperation with Radio Liberty has recently been further intensified.

Listenership data are naturally very difficult to obtain in a closed society. In view of the Soviet system and the lack of surveys conducted on

samples which would allow broad generalizations, it is impossible to give an empirically founded estimate on the actual proportions of the listenership. Nor is it possible to plot trends in the level of listening over time as Radio Free Europe has been doing for the last decade. Only a few general statements can be made which suggest that Radio Liberty is widely known and listened to.

In a closed society where listening to a foreign station is an officially proscribed activity, statements on listening or nonlistening cannot be accepted without reservation. The impact of the station, however, goes beyond the direct listeners; it also involves those who receive the information by word of mouth. These percentages may run high but are especially hard to estimate. In an open society the proportions of listenership may directly express the popularity of particular stations. In a society of controlled public media, however, where there is an intensive awareness of news censorship, the numerical data on the direct listeners is not sufficient to give a realistic idea of the importance of a station.

Under these conditions Radio Liberty does not feel that the situation is "thawed" to the point that they can provide public opinion research comparable to Radio Free Europe's. At the present time it is considered impossible to conduct open interviews on large visitor samples which could approximate in composition the home audiences. Whether this position is a legitimate one or merely an attitude based on past experiences is a debatable question which will be discussed later.

Nonetheless, Radio Liberty now holds the position that audience analysis, at least for the time being, cannot be conducted on the principles of open public opinion research. It cannot use open, large-scale surveys, first of all, because by doing this Radio Liberty would expose its sources, who as Soviet citizens would be subject to political persecution. Furthermore, Radio Liberty feels that a detailed elaboration of the present procedures is undesirable at least in terms of specifics, which could be exploited and frustrate future efforts of data collection.

Discussed in more general terms, Radio Liberty's audience analysis consits of three types of activities:

a. Documentation of mail and press reactions.
b. Panel evaluation of programs.
c. Reports on interviews with Soviet travelers.

DOCUMENTATION OF MAIL AND PRESS REACTIONS

Especially in the past this category of audience reactions to RL broadcasts has represented a major information source. While the content of the audience mail reveals public sentiments, the flow of this information depends a great deal on the fluctuating level of censorship and suppression of private mail traffic.

The content of this mail is conveyed by RL excerpts. This method is simple and commonsensical but provides little basis for broader generalizations and is not very convincing to the more skeptical. The central

themes of therse letters are: complaints about the suppression and distortion of news by the Soviet media, manifestations of desires to be adequately informed about the world, and compliments to Radio Liberty for its interesting and informative broadcasting.

While this content shows little change over time, the flow of these letters has shown a decrease in volume during recent months. Although it might merely be taken as a sign of loss of interest, this simple interpretation would ignore certain facts. Recently the foreign mail has undergone stricter censorship and strong anti-Radio Liberty campaigns have been launched. That the Soviet government has taken an increased interest in Radio Liberty is shown by the . . . yearly breakdown of the volume of media used in attacking Radio Liberty.

PANEL EVALUATION OF RL PROGRAMS

As a partial substitute for first-hand audience feedback, Radio Liberty has developed a panel approach for program evaluation. A fairly sizable panel is formed of recent emigrants, travelers, and Soviet experts. The members of these panels receive samples of the new program items, and they are asked to evaluate them in terms of the effects they might have on Soviet audiences. To facilitate and systematize this evaluation, a variety of specific questions are asked: How interesting is its content? How effective will it be? How is the form of presentation, language, style? Is the program sufficiently supported by facts and data? Should the program be repeatedly used? Does the program appeal to the whole listenership? to the creative intelligentsia? to the scientific-technical intelligentsia? to journalists? to party and ideological leadership? to military, youth, workers, rural populations? The members of the panel evaluate each submitted program element in the above terms. Then the evaluations produced by individual members are summarized and the conclusions are formulated.

Considering the situational constraints, the above panel procedure appears to provide an economical solution. The panel's effectiveness, of course, depends a great deal on the authenticity of its members in their representation of the contemporary Soviet audiences—their concerns, attitudes, language, style, taste, etc.

REPORTS ON INTERVIEWS

To differentiate this method from the RFE's public opinion questions, which are contained in a questionnaire administered in a uniform, schematic procedure called an "interview," Radio Liberty refers to its approach as "conversations." These are also fundamentally interviews, but they differ from RFE's surveys in that they are not organized on the same lines as Western surveys. They try to adapt to each individual informant and tap his personal knowledge and opinions in the framework of one or more conversations. The interviewer is not bound by prepared questions but has a checklist of possible topics. These involve general

listening, foreign radio listening, general accounts of audience reactions, attitudes, opinions, etc. The conversation can be of any length, extend over numerous meetings, and can discuss audience characteristics at any depth. This procedure does not follow the rationale of Western opinion surveys, which attempt to work with representative samples by using a standard, pretested set of uniform questions. Accordingly, RL's evaluation is fundamentally descriptive.

The number of persons interviewed reaches several hundred yearly. Thus, the size of the group is large enough to warrant broader generalizations. The specific composition of these samples, however, represents the more thorny problem.

Radio Liberty's position, as it stands now, is that in order to protect informants, it would be "irresponsible" to place the interview in the public spotlight. As a "Note" by Radio Liberty on this subject states:

The difficulties encountered in conducting survey research work among Soviet citizens are all those obstacles which a totalitarian regime can systematically impose, the most important of which is the denial of free and ready access to interviewees, both within and without the territorial confines of the USSR. Internally, the Soviet Union is a closed society and systematic interviewing of a representative sample of the population is impossible for obvious reasons. This limits Audience Research essentially to interviewing Soviet travelers abroad. Here also free access is denied, however. Travelers abroad are generally briefed to be wary of foreigners or Soviet emigres who attempt to engage them in conversation on substantive issues. Surveillance of Soviet travelers, while not total, is also a common practice. Additionally, fear plays an important role. Radio Liberty and other foreign radios are regularly and systematically attacked by Soviet media in the most inflammatory terms. The virulent hostility of the Soviet regime to foreign radios in general and Radio Liberty in particular is consequently no secret to Soviet citizens and they are often hesitant to discuss listening (which can be interpreted as a political act) with a stranger until good rapport and some degree of confidence can be established, often a time-consuming process. In light of these impediments to normal social research, usual scientific sampling methods are precluded. An adjunct to the above is that the recruitment and training of qualified people to work as field interviewers is no easy task.

As an additional reason for keeping these interviews confidential, Radio Liberty refers to the need to protect the RL interviewer. This attitude of cautious secrecy prevails in the entire procedure from the moment of contact to the use of the results.

In respect to the contact, no claim is made for random choice. To the contrary, those travelers are interviewed who in a careful process of establishing rapport present themselves as cooperative. Areas of conversation or themes about which the interviewee appears hesitant to speak are avoided. The broadcasting divisions receive the report of the conversations in an anonymous form.

The main products that the broadcasting divisions receive are in the form of single listener reports. They describe the interviewee in terms of occupation, nationality, and language. The reports also include such details as place, listening times, language of broadcast, audibility, jamming, and specific programs listened to. In addition to these general, largely technical details, there is a summary of the conversation, which may include statements about public reactions, comments on recent events, and expectations about future developments. In the few reports I have read, there was a recurring complaint about the system's control of news and the general lack of reliable, objective information.

NOTES

1. Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961).

2. This opinion is generally supported by the literature. As Inkeles and Bauer point out in their Harvard study on Soviet refugees, "there are many excellent books describing the history of the Soviet Union and the formal structure and functioning of its institutions, but we know almost nothing about the attitudes, values, and experiences of its citizens." *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 3.

IDENTIFICATION WITH NORTH OR SOUTH VIETNAM IN EASTERN EUROPE*

BY RADIO FREE EUROPE

An example of the use of comparative and continual sampling techniques by RFE to assess east European dispositions toward North and South Vietnam.

Interviewing on which this report is based was completed in 1967. Six hundred and seven (607) Polish, 622 Hungarian and 279 Czech and Slovak respondents were polled. Urban residents and those in the higher occupational and educational brackets were overrepresented. The method of COMPARATIVE AND CONTINUAL SAMPLING was employed, and the final analysis was based on those findings which were to a large extent common to the independent samples obtained in seven interviewing areas over a period of 11 months. The interviews were carried out by local opinion research institutes whose interviewers were not identified with Radio Free Europe.

I. WHICH SIDE SHOULD BE SUPPORTED BY YOUR COUNTRY?

Table 1, shows the amount of support North Vietnam and South Vietnam received from the Polish, Hungarian and Czechoslovak samples. The question was formulated so as to neutralize, as much as possible, the fact that the citizens of none of the three countries have, at present, any choice about supporting North Vietnam:

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*Excerpts from "Identification With North or South Vietnam in Eastern Europe," Audience and Public Opinion Research Department, Radio Free Europe, April 1968.

Table 1

"Assuming that it had a free hand in the matter, should your country support North Vietnam, South Vietnam or neither?"

	Poles %	*Hungarians* %	*Czechs/Slovaks* %
North Vietnam	16	10	5
South Vietnam	18	12	14
Neither	64	74	77
Other answer, no answer	2	4	4
	100%	100%	100%

In spite of strenuous propaganda efforts, the Polish, Hungarian and Czechoslovak governments have not succeeded in evoking a groundswell of sympathy for the North Vietnamese "victims of imperialist aggression." Fully 82% of the Poles, 86% of the Hungarians and 91% of the Czechs/Slovaks polled did not want their country to support North Vietnam.

Support for South Vietnam was slightly stronger. The pro-South Vietnamese minorities in the Polish and Hungarian samples were only marginally larger than the pro-North Vietnamese minorities. However, among the Czechs and Slovaks, South Vietnam was clearly favored over the Communist North: even so, only one in seven respondents from Czechoslovakia wished to see his country become involved on the side of Saigon.

Not to take sides at all was the reaction of two out of three Poles and three out of four Hungarians and Czechs/Slovaks interviewed. To all indications, most Poles, Hungarians and Czechs/Slovaks interviewed are not ready to take sides in the Vietnamese war and desire that their countries should be equally uncommited in this distant conflict.

II. WHAT KIND OF HELP SHOULD BE GIVEN TO NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM?

Humanitarian and material aid were suggested most frequently, while military support was mentioned by only about a quarter of the pro-North Vietnamese minorities. Moral and diplomatic support, which calls for little sacrifice on the giver's part, was suggested mainly by Hungarians:

Table 2

"What kind of help should your country give to North Vietnam?"

	Poles %	*Hungarians* %	*Czechs/Slovaks* %
Medical aid	27	28	50
Food and clothing	19	29	21
Economic, industrial, technical aid	24	18	14
Moral and diplomatic support	11	43	14
Military aid	23	20	29
Other answers	25	17	–
Don't know, no answer	3	5	14
	132%*	160%*	142%*

*Multiple answers

* * * * *

Depite the vast deployment of American aid in South Vietnam, a very large proportion of Czechs and Slovaks, a majority of Poles and nearly half the Hungarians wanted their country to give humanitarian relief and economic aid to South Vietnam. In this respect, East European respondents appear to see both Vietnams in the same light: distant and non-white North and South seem to be associated with disease, poverty and backwardness. In the Hungarian and Polish subsamples, military support was specified by only one respondent in six; the Czechs and Slovaks not only identified more with South Vietnam than with North Vietnam (see Table 1), but they also wanted to help them militarily twice as often as did the Poles and Hungarians.

III. REASONS FOR NOT TAKING SIDES

In Table 1 it was shown that large majorities from Poland, Hungary and Czechosovakia wanted their country to stay clear of the Vietnam conflict; this desire for non-involvement was based on the following reasons:

Table 3

"Why should your country support neither North Vietnam nor South Vietnam?"

	Poles	*Hungarians*	*Czechs/Slovaks*
We are too poor, too small, have our own worries	38 } 55	46 } 73	34 } 49
They are too far away, none of our business	17 }	27 }	15 }
Nobody should interfere, they should solve their own problems	14	13	34
Would be dangerous, nobody should extend a war	20	3	13
Other answers	15	16	14
No answer	–	3	–
	104%*	108%*	110%*
Number of cases	388	458	215

*Multiple answers

As Table 3 shows, the plurality of Poles and Hungarians—and a large minority of the Czechs and Slovaks—felt that their country lacked the means to influence events in Vietnam. Conceptually related is the view that Vietnam is far away and (hence) of no concern to the respondent's country.

REFERENCE GROUPS, CONGRUITY THEORY AND CROSS/CULTURAL PERSUASION*

BY E.S. LORIMOR and S. WATSON DUNN

The findings of this study in the measurement of selected middle-class attitudes in France and Egypt suggest that persuasion messages (such as advertisements) can be transferred across cultures to a greater extent than is generally supposed. It also seems probable that the transferability of messages differs from nation to nation rather than conforming to an exact formula.

* * * * *

One of the many puzzling questions facing international communicators and marketers today is the extent to which they can transfer a successful domestic persuasive or promotional campaign to a different culture. Opinions on the subject range from those which support almost complete transferability [2] to those which maintain that every market is so distinct that marketers will face a host of problems if they attempt to use the same approach abroad as they have in their domestic advertisements [7, 12]. Yet there is little evidence reported to support either argument, nor have the factors which affect international communication ever been clearly identified.

The study that follows provided a test in the field of some hypotheses developed from reference group theory and a consistency model of attitude change.

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Among the many variables influencing the effectiveness of most persuasive communications is the source of the message. This point has been well documented by Hovland, Weiss and many others and need not be discussed here. One of the standards by which the audience appraises the source is the reference group to which that source belongs.

Implicit in the concept of reference group is the notion of an individual deriving values and goals as well as frame of reference from the perspective of the group [4, 17, 19]. Consequently, many kinds of units with great variations in size, composition, and structure may become reference groups [19]. A person's reference group may well contain persons whom he has never seen [18], but it is important that the individuals composing a group bear a psychological relationship to each other [3]. We may therefore think of a given nationality as constituting a group. Such phenomena as jingoism, chauvinism, and wartime solidarity suggest that the citizens of a nation have a psychological relationship to each other. We speak of a nation as sharing a common culture, a concept used by Redfield (cited in 19) to refer to a perspective shared by those in a particular group. On this basis it is proposed that one's nationality group serves as a

*Excerpts from "Reference Groups, Congruity Theory and Cross-Cultural Persuasion," *The Journal of Communication*, XVIII (December 1968), pp. 354–368. Reprinted with the permission of the *Journal of Communication*, copyright holder and the courtesy of the author.

reference group for both self-evaluation and attitude formation, other things being equal. The qualifying phrase recognizes such exceptions as the individual who has learned to loathe himself and his membership group so that it may become a negative reference group (cf. 11) and such facts as that the individual has many reference groups, one of which may have more effect than another in a given situation [17].

One popular approach to the study of attitude change is Congruity Theory [13] where two objects of judgment—*source* and *concept*—and an *assertion* are linked. The assertion (communication) originates with the source and concerns the concept. Both source and concept may be positive, negative, or neutral, and the assertion may be positive (associative) or negative (dissociative). The basic congruity principle holds that changes in evaluation always occur in the direction of increased congruity with the prevailing frame of reference. For example, if a negative source (an habitual Drunk) says something favorable about a positive concept (Fine Wines), the attitude toward fine wines would become less favorable while the drunk would rise in the individual's estimation.

HYPOTHESES

On the basis of reference group and congruity theory, and the findings of the case history research, certain hypotheses were formulated:

1. A persuasive message is more effective when its source is viewed as a member of the recipient's nationality group than when the source is seen as a non-member, other things being equal (nationality of source).

Since the foreign model in one country was the native model in the other, and vice versa, it was predicted that:

2. A persuasive message from a source in a country to which he is native has a reverse effectiveness from one in a country to which he is foreign (between country).

It is a well-known fact that the language of a group reflects its values and interests. Obviously an outsider will not be so aware of these as a member of the group who is thoroughly at home in the language. Therefore, a third predictive hypothesis was:

3. A message composed originally in the language in which it is read is more effective than a message translated idiomatically from another language (translation).

A weakness of Congruity Theory is the failure to allow for the consequence of the intensity of the bond between source and concept (originator and object of the message, respectively). It seems reasonable that the strength of the bond is partially determined by the distance between source and concept.

In the study under discussion, it was assumed that a message directly attributed to a source would be seen as more closely linked to that source than one which merely associated the source with the message without making an explicit attribution. For example, if Carl Sandburg is quoted

about a pen, the message is seen more as *his* than when his face simply appears without comment in a pen advertisement. Closer association of the source with the message should lead to closer association of the source with the object of the message. We would expect that Carl Sandburg would have a stronger association with the pen in the first instance. On the ground that a closer association between source and concept results in a stronger link, it was predicted that:

4. A message which is directly attributed to a *positive* source is more effective than one which is his merely by implication (attribution).

Various studies of communication effects have found that, in general, picture and verbal messages together are more effective than words alone in changing evaluative judgments (e.g., 8). A possible reason is that the pictured source reinforces or creates favorable feeling toward the source by appearing to be a member of the recipient's reference group. On the basis of an extension of congruity theory, combined with reference group theory, it was predicted that:

5. The effect of a persuasive communication is greater when a favorable source is actually portrayed with the message than when no source is portrayed regardless of whether or not the message is verbally attributed to the source (illustration).

To test the hypotheses, designs were formulated with two countries, France and Egypt; three levels of identified sources, one native and two foreign; two levels of attribution, attributed and not attributed; two levels of translation, idiomatic translation and a message composed originally in the language in which it was read; and five products.

SAMPLE

The subjects selected for study were middle- and upper-class, urban French and Egyptians. The two countries differ markedly in their degree of economic development, standard of living, and literacy level, and hence permit a test of the hypotheses under very different conditions. The sample in France was chosen by selecting one section at random from middle- and upper-class sections of Paris. After the blocks were numbered, 20 were selected randomly and 10 interviews done in each for a sample of 200. The interviewers were given no choice in the selection of respondents; however, the sample was stratified for sex and employment. In Egypt, a sample of 200 was selected randomly from a larger sample used in a refrigerator study. The original sample was obtained by listing all households in Cairo and its environs which had a special meter, indicating that they used electricty for purposes other than lighting. This original sample was judged by Egyptian authorities to contain almost all of the middle- and upper-class inhabitants of metropolitan Cairo. The respondents were approximately half male and half female. In both countries, subjects were limited to individuals 18 years of age or older. The income, education, occupation, and possessions of the sample were congruent with a middle- and upper-class population.

TEST MATERIALS

The persuasive messages used in this experiment were five print advertisements which had been run quite successfully in mass-circulated magazines in the United States. All had received high Starch recognition scores and most had produced evidence of high recall and/or sales response. All were full-page advertisements which would be effective in black-and-white, were of conventional advertising format, and depended for their impact on a combination of illustration, headline, and body text.

Headlines and copy were translated by bi-lingual nationals. The second version of each headline and copy was written by professional copywriters from each country who had a copy of the original copy platform (including advertising objective), certain background information on prospective consumers, copies of the illustrations to be used, and instructions to write appropriate heads and copy of a given length for the advertisement.

The original photographs were replicated, using French and Egyptian nationals. Great attention was devoted to making details correct, and each illustration carried as a caption a typically national name plus the nationality. Copy and headlines were attributed through the addition of quotation marks and the selected name plus a few words describing the pictured source. The finished persuasive messages consisted of 20 advertisements about each product for each country. The experimental ads were produced by an electrostatic process which provided a clear black-and-white reproduction.

Care was taken to select five products which were neither culture-bound nor too drastically different from products normally used in the selected countries. None of the products violated obvious taboos in any of the countries, and an attempt was made to avoid using a product which was associated with a particular country. For example, France is known for its perfume, on which grounds a French national might be expected to be a better perfume salesman than, say, a Turk, even to other Turks. Neutral fictitious brand names were assigned to the products in order to avoid ceiling effects and any pre-communication judgment. The judgments as to whether or not the products met the selection criteria were made by consulting communication and advertising experts in the nations to be studied.

Ten subjects in each of twenty conditions were shown one message promoting each brand for a total of 200 in each country. These conditions permitted a test of each of the hypotheses. Various measures of effectiveness were administered individually by trained native interviewers in each country. Special care was taken to avoid interviewer or order bias.

MEASURING INSTRUMENTS

Four measures of advertising effectiveness were used. As a measure of attitude toward the products, seven-step semantic differential scales [14]

were used. There is evidence for both reliability and validity of the evaluative scales used in this way [13], and variations of the method have received increasing use in testing advertising effectiveness (e.g., 10). Care was taken to select panculturally stable scales. Subjects rated each advertised product against 12 scales and against a *would buy-would not buy* continuum. In addition, each subject was asked to describe his corresponding ideal product on the same scales. The semantic differential scales were coded from 1 to 7 with 7 being the most favorable.

After factor analysis, four scales which loaded high and purely on the evaluative factor were selected. For both countries, the scales were good-bad, dirty-clean, effective-ineffective, and agreeable-disagreeable. The scores for these four scales were summed for each individual to give his evaluation factor score; this permitted a range of scores form 4 to 28.

Table 1
Product Means and F-ratios for French Study

Product	Evaluation		Eval-diff.	Comprehension	Willingness to Buy
Soft Drink	21.43_a		1.98_d	1.14_e	4.66_g
Toilet Soap	22.02_a		3.66_c	$.84_f$	4.52_g
Cigarettes	19.52_b		1.88_d	$.78_f$	3.80_h
Men's Toiletries	21.91_a		3.09_{cd}	$.80_f$	4.32_g
Washing Machine	21.93_a		3.35_{cd}	1.06_e	4.24_g
Source of Variance	df	F	F	F	F
A Nationality of Source	2			1.11	
B Attribution	1			2.17	
C Translation	1		5.18**		
AB	2				
AC	2			2.95	
BC	1				
ABC	2			2.01	
Error (between)	108				
D Product	4	8.06*	3.73*	7.40*	5.47*
AD	8	1.35		1.32	
HD	4	1.22			1.68
CD	4		1.55	5.05*	
ABD	8			1.03	
ACD	8			1.69	1.82
BCD	4			2.04	1.11
ABCD	8				1.45
Error (within)	432				

*$p<.005$
**$p<.05$
Note: Means with the same alphabetical subscript are not signifcantly different from each other at the .05 level by Newman-Keuls test.

As a second measure of attitude toward the products, evaluation factor scores of the advertised brands, were subtracted from the evaluation factor scores of the corresponding ideal products, theoretically permitting a range of individual scores from −24 to +24. These scores are

hereafter referred to as evaluation-difference scores. The rationale for this measure is that the most effective advertisements would tend to move the individual's product rating closer to his ideal product score than would the less effective messages. Thus, the smaller the score, the more favorable the evaluation.

Table 2
Product Means and F-ratios for Egyptian Data

Product	*Evaluation*		*Eval-diff.*	*Comprehension*	*Willingness to Buy*
Soft Drink	22.52_{b}		3.02_{d}	1.34_{f}	5.29_{hf}
Toilet Soap	23.62_{b}		2.94_{d}	1.20_{fg}	5.70_{h}
Cigarettes	18.85_{c}		1.92_{de}	1.29_{f}	3.45_{j}
Men's Toiletries	23.04_{b}		1.42_{e}	1.28_{f}	4.95_{i}
Washing Machines	25.05_{a}		1.75_{de}	1.06_{g}	5.40_{hi}
Source of Variance	df	F	F	F	F
A Nationality of Source	2			1.13	3.08
B Attribution	1	3.83	6.93**		
C Translation	1	1.53		5.81	
AB	2		5.15***		
AC	2		1.49		
BC	1				1.03
ABC	2	4.07**	2.13		4.31**
Error (Between subjects)	108				
D Product	4	47.44*	3.83***	3.66	32.28*
AD	8	1.04	1.93	1.30	1.21
BD	4			1.26	1.08
CD	4		2.14	3.51***	1.05
ABD	8	1.36	1.48		1.78
ACD	8		3.07		
BCD	4			1.02	1.02
ABCD	8	1.91		1.16	1.45
Error (within subjects)	432				

*p<.005
**p<.025
***p<.01
Note: Means with the same alphabetical subscript are not significantly different from each other at the .05 level by Newman-Keuls test.

The willingness-to-buy measure was simply the rating made by the individual on the single *would buy-would not by* scale. This again ranged from 1 to 7, with 7 being the extreme of *would buy*.

For the comprehension measure, the two most important ideas from each advertisement were selected, as rated by six judges. Each was presented in a multiple-choice situation with two other plausible statements about the product, again as suggested by the judges. Thus, there were ten multiple-choice questions with three parts to each. The subject was given zero for an incorrect choice, and one for a correct choice. The answers to the two questions for each product were combined, permitting a possible score of zero, one, or two for each individual for each product.

Table 3
Source-by-Attribution-by Translation Means of Egyptian Evaluation Scores

Model	Attribution Translation	Attributed		Not Attributed	
		Idiomatic	Original	Idiomatic	Original
American		22.30_{ab}	23.20_{a}	23.28_{a}	23.84_{a}
Arabic		19.52_{b}	22.98_{a}	24.50_{a}	21.84_{ab}
French		21.98_{ab}	21.74_{ab}	21.60_{ab}	24.60_{a}

RESULTS

The data were analyzed using analysis of variance and appropriate subsequent tests [20]. Generally little support was found for the nationality-of-source hypothesis. There were no significant source main effects on the basis of any measure. In the case of French data, there were no interaction effects involving the source.

In the collected data in Egypt, significant interactions of source with other variables occurred in the case of all measures except comprehension. (See Table 2.)

Although there was no easy explanation for the significant differences among means in the case of Egyptian data there seemed to be a tendency for the version featuring Americans in illustrations to be more effective (at least in absolute numbers).

Support for the translation hypothesis was found in the evaluation-difference data in the case of French subjects (Table 1). The mean for idiomatic translation was 3.46 and the mean for original composition 2.12. (The lower the mean, the closer the evaluation is to the "ideal product.") In the case of Egyptian data, there was a translation main effect for the comprehension measure (Table 2) with the original advertisement being more effective than the translated message.

Table 4
Source-by-Translation-by-Product Means of Egyptian Evaluation-Difference Scores

Model	Translation	Product				
		Soft Drink	Toilet Soap	Cigarette	Men's Toiletries	Washing Machine
American	Idiomatic	2.00	3.10	3.70	2.20	2.55
	Original	.95	2.85	1.15	1.85	.85
Arabic	Idiomatic	3.85	4.05	1.25	3.35	1.95
	Original	3.70	1.20	4.05	−.60	2.60
French	Idiomatic	5.05	3.55	−1.05	.10	.55
	Original	2.55	2.90	2.45	1.65	2.00

For the French subjects, a significant interaction of translation with products occurred when comprehension was used as a dependent variable. The original was more effective than translation (in absolute numbers) for four of the five advertisements. There were no other interactions involving the translation variable in the French data.

In the Egyptian data, there were translation interactions for all measures. (See Tables 2 and 6.) There was a tendency for the absolute numbers to suggest more effectiveness for the original composition than for the translated message in the corresponding condition, but the differences were not usually significant.

Hypothesis 4 (attribution) received no support from the French data. For the Egyptain data subjects; there was an attribution main effect only in the evaluation-difference data (Table 2).

Table 5
Translation-by-Product Means for French Comprehension Scores

	Soft Drink	Toilet Soap	Cigarette	Men's Toiletries	Washing Machine
Idiomatic	1.08_{ac}	$.78_{bcd}$	1.00_{acd}	$.67_{bd}$	1.00_{acd}
Original	1.20_{a}	$.90_{acd}$	$.57_{b}$	$.93_{acd}$	1.12_{a}

Note. Means with the same alphabetical subscript are not significantly different from each other at the .05 level by Newman-Keuls test.

Here, the attributed message was less effective than the nonattributed message (means of 2.81 and 1.61 respectively). Attribution interaction effects appeared in all Egyptian data except comprehension (Tables 2, 3, 4). In the evaluation-difference analysis, the attribution condition with the American model and the attribution condition with the Arabic model where each less effective than the corresponding non-attribution condition. However, for the willingness-to-buy and evaluation data, there seemed to be no meaningful pattern involving the two conditions.

For the illustration hypothesis, there were no significant effects in any of the French data nor in the Egyptian data.

The hypothesis regarding reverse effectiveness of native and foreign sources received no definitive support from either the intra-country or between country comparisions. The interaction effects in the between-country analyses again seemed to lack a meaningful pattern. However, the evaluation data appear to indicate that Egyptian subjects were more influenced by all persuasive messages than were the French, regardless of source.

DISCUSSION

The findings suggest that persuasive messages can be transferred across cultures to a greater extent than is generally supposed. With the middle-class audience tested, it seemed to make little difference in effectiveness whether the source was native or foreign, whether the message was attributed or not, or even whether it was illustrated. There may well be a cosmopolitan audience in many countries for whom the nationality of the source is relatively unimportant. Although the data provided some evidence in support of the hypothesis that composition of a message in the language of the expected audience is more effective than translation from a foreign language, tests involving levels of skill are needed to determine the limits of this variable.

A number of possibilities suggest themselves as explanations for the lack of difference among the versions tested. (That it was not due to general lack of response to the messages is apparent from examination of the ratings, most of which are well above neutral.) For example, the predictions from reference group theory would not be applicable if one's nationality group were not really a reference group. However, three different measures suggested that the nationality group did indeed serve as a reference group although not necessarily the most important one in buying.

Another possibility is that reference groups are more likely to influence consumers in choosing among *brands* than classes of products [21]. One study [16] indicates also that national reference groups have more effect in association with some products than with others.

Also, expertise may have influenced the application of reference groups to buying decisions and attitudes toward products. It seems probable that a disliked outsider might, in some cases, be more influential than a liked member of one's reference group in cases where the former was seen as an expert and the latter was not. A foreigner might at times be considered more knowledgeable regarding a foreign product than a native, and hence serve to change the subject's attitude.

Table 6
Product Means and F Scores of French and Egyptian Data

Product	Evaluation	Eval-Diff.
Soft Drink	21.97_{c}	2.50_{ef}
Toilet Soap	22.82_{ab}	3.30_{e}
Cigarettes	19.18_{d}	1.90_{f}
Men's Toiletries	22.54_{bc}	2.26_{f}
Washing Machines	23.49_{a}	2.55_{ef}

Source of Variance	df	F	F
A Country	1	6.63**	2.43
B Nationality of Source	2		
C Attribution	1	3.11	5.19***
D Translation	1	2.18	5.48***
AB	2	1.47	
AC	1	1.02	
AD	1		1.57
BC	2		1.20
BD	2		
CD	1		
ABC	2		2.88
ABD	2		1.62
ACD	1		
BCD	2	2.59	
ABCD	2	2.07	2.10
Error (between subjects)	216		
E Product	4	45.76*	3.36**
AE	4	7.58*	4.18**
BE	8		1.56

TABLE 6 Cont'd

Product Means and F Scores of French and Egyptian Data

Source of Variance	df	F	F
CE	4	2.10	
DE	4		1.98
ABE	8	1.41	1.14
ACE	4		
ADE	4		1.63
BCE	8		1.33
BDE	8		
CDE	4		
ABCE	8	1.28	
ABDE	8		3.01
ABCE	4		
BCDE	8	1.28	
ABCDE	8		
Error (within subjects)	864		

*p<.005

**p<.01

Note: Means with the same alphabetical subscript are not significantly different from each other at the .05 level by Newman-Keuls test.

Another factor which may have influenced the results is the multiplicity of sources involved in an advertisement—the manufacturer, or agency, and medium in which it appears as well as the pictured or named individual. However, the obviously foreign names of the products featured may have suggested a foreign source, an idea which may have outweighed any effect as a result of the combined effect of various sources. Such an effect could occur in the case of any advertisment, but might have been intensified by the fact that the products in this case were foreign.

Still another possible influence is the level of sophistication of the audience. Reigrotski and Anderson [15], in a study of several European countries, including France, found support for the notion that increasing foreign contact tends to increase favorable opinion about other people and cause one to be more critical of his own people. A study of the lower classes might reveal a different picture from that indicated by this sample.

In agreement with earlier studies [9], the finding that Egyptians were more influenced by persuasive messages than the French subjects supports the idea of national differences in reaction to persuasive messages. The study mentioned actually provided evidence for the independence of the French. This suggests that a knowledge of national characteristics would be of great value to an individual in deciding on message strategy. Further, it seems probable that transferability of messages differs from one nation to another rather than being subject to a hard-and-fast rule.

A possible reason for the general lack of difference between illustration and no-illustration conditions is that most illustrations are designed to attract attention to the message. In cases where the subject is forced to

read, as in this study, the message alone may be equally as effective as the combination.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Despite the obvious need for further research, this study suggests that advertisements may often be successfully adapted from one culture to another. It further suggests that the models used in successful advertisments need not always belong to the recipient's cultural group. Thus, one of the first research tasks that confronts the aspiring international researcher is to determine the positive and negative national reference groups for the countries that he plans to enter and their relevance to the produce service or idea he is promoting.

This study also suggests that general theories such as reference group and consistency theories, may need refinement and possible modification when applied to cultures other than the one in which they were developed.

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MEDIA ANALYSIS[1]

The basic question for the communications specialist in the process of media analysis is "why?" Why was this channel (medium) of communication used rather than another? Or, why should this channel be used instead of another, and why does one particular medium contribute to the effectiveness of the message more than others? In order to answer the question, "why," it is first necessary to determine what contribution to effect is made by each channel.

The use of quantitative techniques to arrive at conclusions of comparative media effectiveness is demonstrated in the first essay of the section. Survey research methods have also been employed by RFE to measure the effectiveness of radio in communications about Vietnam to East European audiences.[2] "Effectiveness" in the context of media analysis, however, is really a measure of the range of the medium rather than its inherent advantages in persuasion.

The other essays in the media analysis section are not quantitative in approach. Each evaluates use of a particular channel of communication to various audiences from a qualitative frame of reference.

NOTES

1. See also "Exploitation of Channels of Communications" in Chapter VIII of this casebook.
2. The viability of the technique as it is used by RFE may be assailed by some for using samples that are not "representative" of the audiences as a whole. Clearly, the difficulty of obtaining representativeness is the major impediment in any survey technique. Nevertheless, the methodology itself is particularly valuable in some circumstances. In this connection see the contributions by Lorand B. Szalay in this section and Joseph G. Whelan, "Radio Liberty's Audience Impact and Effectiveness" in the Effects Analysis section of this chapter.

EFFECTIVENESS OF PSYOP MESSAGES:

A FOUNDATION STUDY*

By Ernest F. and Edith M. Bairdain

The findings of a quantitative research effort to establish the comparative efficacy of various PSYOP media in Vietnam indicate that leaflets and airborne loudspeaker messages were found to be clearly effective. Under conditions prevailing at the time in Vietnam, however, radio was not an effective medium.

Psyop comes in many shapes and sizes—ranging from mini-scale person-to-person up to maxi-scale nation-to-nation. But ultimately, even the most grandly conceived psyop reduces to a communication reaching a target—no communication, no psyop. . . .

REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE PSYOP MESSAGES

. . .Leaflets and airborne loudspeaker broadcasts are the media that reach the largest number of enemy troops most often. Supplementary data shows that appeals to rally or surrender are the most frequently used themes in the messages carried by these media. Research under wartime conditions prohibits experimental manipulation and it is necessary to find and work with existing real situations rather than creating them for the researcher's purposes. Therefore, the effectiveness of psyop messages making rally and surrender appeals using leaflets and airborne loudspeakers will be the focus of concern in this section.

SELECTION OF CRITERIA

The first issue in consideration of effectiveness is "what is effectiveness?". A search for answers to this question requires selection of criteria appropriate to the subject being studied (i.e., the phenomenon selected for measurement). In evaluating the effectiveness of rally or surrender appeals, the most demanding criterion is that rally or surrender occurs immediately in response to such an appeal; a less restrictive criterion is that the desired response occurs ultimately rather than immediately. A still less strict criterion is consideration of rallying or surrendering whether or not the action takes place. If any of this family of criteria is met, the message has been effective in some degree.

Being overly strict in specification of criteria also would mean being somewhat unrealistic or impractical in evaluating psyop; there must be some acceptable relationship between effort expended to transmit the messages and the amount of return for the effort. The second issue to be considered in effectiveness, then, is the question of "yield" or productiv-

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*Excerpted and adapted with the cooperation of the authors from *Final Technical Report Psychological Operations Studies—Vietnam,* Human Sciences Research, Inc., May 25, 1971. Reprinted with the permission of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, project sponsor.

ity; the basis for selecting criteria for evaluation of this issue appears to be purely a matter of subjective opinion in most cases unless someone can be persuaded to make abritrary decisions that trade off danger to life against expense in dollars and effort.

For clarity of analysis, interpretation and discussion of the issues of "whether effective" and "how effective" cannot be treated simultaneously.

Unfortunately, separate treatment of the two issues results in tedious, lengthy, and monotonous restatements of the same issues. In what follows the question of "whether effective?" will be treated in detail; the issue of "how effective?" will be treated in more global fashion.

REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVENESS

In order to focus analysis tightly and sharply on the issue of effectiveness, a sequential set of requirements that must be met for psyop messages to be effective has been postulated and a question which tests whether psyop messages meet each requirement has been formulated. These "requirements," in relation to the section titled "Development of a Science" may be regarded as first attempts at formulating and providing support for "theoretical constructs." The requirements are based on the experience . . . gained from studies in Vietman during 1966–71 and consultation to psyop-related programs at Fort Bragg, logical analysis of the experiential history of military psyoperations embedded in the psyop manuals, and conclusions from interviews and discussions with more than sixty psyop officers. . . . These requirements for psyop effectiveness and the associated test questions, ordered here in logical sequence are:

Requirement 1. Means of transmission of a psyop message must exist within the span of perception of target audience members.

Question: What media enable communication to enemy personnel?

Requirement 2. The message carried by the proximate media must come to the attention of members of the target audience, voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or by relay.

Question: Are messages actually received by enemy personnel?

Requirement 3. The words and phrasing—the language of the message—must be understandable to the target audience.

Question: Are the words and phrasing of the psyop messages understandable with normal ease?

Requirement 4. The theme or content of the message (with some specific exceptions) must be judged by members of the target audience to be comprehensible.

Question: Is the content of the message—the theme—comprehensible to the enemy?

Requirement 5. The content must be sufficiently believable for the target audience to ascribe some degree of credibility to the message.

Question: Are the messages judged by the enemy to be credible?

Requirement 6. The persuasive power of the message in the context of the situation in which it is received by the target audience must not be disproportionate to the danger and potential consequences involved in taking the action recommended in the message. To be effective the recommended action or an equivalent action must be taken or receive some degree of consideration.

a. Were the psyop messages the dominant factor or a major contributing factor in evocation of the desired action (or an equivalent action)?*
b. Were the psyop messages a facilitating factor in the decision to take the recommended action (or an equivalent action)?
c. Did the psyop messages receive serious consideration (whether or not the action or an equivalent action is ever taken)?
d. Did the psyop messages receive brief consideration even though it may have been quickly rejected?

SOURCE OF RESEARCH DATA/PROCEDURE

The data treated in this section includes the responses of 100 VC PW's and 200 NVA PW's interviewed in all four military regions in Vietnam in 1970. Specially-designed questionnaires were developed for each type of prisoner.

Also included are the responses of 100 NVA ralliers and 100 VC ralliers who were interviewed at the National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon and other Chieu Hoi Centers in MR2 and MR3 between July and November 1970. . . . Interviews averaged approximately three and one-half hours for PW's and slightly over two and one-half hours for ralliers. . . .

TEST OF RESEARCH RESULTS AGAINST REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVENESS

The test question for each requirement for media effectiveness is applied in sequence to the research data obtained on VC and NVA ralliers and PW's.

Requirement 1: What Media Enable Communication to Enemy Personnel?

Even a perfectly conceived psyop could not possibly have any effect upon the members of a target audience unless the media is effective in terms of reaching the target audience.

Table 1 shows the extent to which the physical means of emitting a psyop message were within the span of perception of members of the target audience. The proximity of nine types of media—leaflets, airborne loudspeakers, radio sets, newspapers, magazines, ground loudspeakers, posters, television sets, and psyop novelty items was surveyed for four classes of enemy: NVA Hoi Chanh, VC Hoi Chanh, NVA PW's and VC PW's.

*A requirement that psyop be judged the "sole factor" would be extremely unrealistic and incorrect; a basic tenet of clinical psychology is "multiple causation": paraphrased, the rule says; "Every bit of behavior has many causes."

TABLE 1
ENEMY PROXIMITY TO MEANS FOR TRANSMITTING PSYOP MESSAGES

Media	Ralliers		Prisoners	
	VC (100)	NVA (100)	VC (100)	NVA (200)
Saw Leaflets	99%	96%	87%	89%
Heard Airborne Loudspeakers	100%	88%	81%	70%
Saw Radio Sets	98%	69%	98%	68%
Saw Newspapers	34%	16%	20%	11%
Saw Magazines	13%	06%	10%	05%
Heard Ground Loudspeakers	09%	05%	04%	01%
Read Posters	07%	02%	03%	—
Saw Television Sets	04%	02%	07%	02%
Saw Psyop Novelty Items	01%	02%	—	—

Comment. The results shown in Table 1 demonstrate conclusively that leaflets, airborne loudspeakers, and radio are the mechanical means for transmission of psyop messages which are seen or heard by a large majority of VC and NVA personnel. Accordingly, these three media will be the focus of further attention. Statistics for other media will be shown where available but without comment.

Three media are effective means for attempts to reach enemy personnel with psyop messages (under current practices in Vietnam).

Requirement 2: Are Messages Actually Received by Enemy Personnel?

Physical proximity—i.e., being within sight or hearing—of means of transmission of psyop messages does not necessarily mean that messages reach the enemy. Leaflets can be left untouched, the sound of airborne loudspeakers can be audible but unintelligible, and radios may not be in

TABLE 2
MESSAGES THAT REACH LARGE NUMBERS OF VC AND NVA PERSONNEL

Media	Ralliers		Prisoners	
	VC (100)	NVA (100)	VC (100)	NVA (200)
Leaflets				
% in Sample Saw Leaflets	99%	96%	87%	89%
% in Sample Read Leaflets	86%	93%	27%	39%
% of "Saw Leaflet" who "Read Leaflet"	86%	97%	31%	44%
Airborne Loudspeakers (ALS)				
% in Sample Heard Sound of ALS	100%	88%	81%	70%
% in Sample Heard Words Clearly	89%	86%	63%	57%
% of "Heard Sound" who "Heard Clearly"	89%	98%	78%	81%
Radio				
% in Sample Saw Radio Sets	98%	69%	98%	68%
% in Sample Heard Broadcasts	69%	43%	21%	17%
% of "Saw Radio" who "Heard Radio"	70%	62%	21%	25%

operation or may be tuned to non-psyop channels. To have the chance to be effective, it is necessary that the target audience attend, voluntarily or involuntarily, to the psyop message.

Table 2 shows the extent to which messages carried by the three effective media register upon the four categories of enemy being treated.

Comment. The results shown in Table 2 make it clear that a very large majority of ralliers—both VC and NVA—did read leaflets before they rallied.

Although all of the samples of NVA and VC ralliers and prisoners had similar exposure to leaflets, there is a large difference in the number of ralliers that read leaflets and the number of prisoners that did so. The number of VC ralliers who read leaflets (86%) is three times as large as the number of VC PW's who read them (27%); similarly, the number of NVA ralliers who had read leaflets (93%) is two and one-third times the number of NVA PW's who had read them (39%).

The differences in leaflet-reading behavior between ralliers and prisoners were investigated by analysis of narrative responses. Those in the PW samples mention their cadres' insistence that it is strictly forbidden to read leaflets and the existence of strict surveillance and controls as reasons for not picking up and reading leaflets. Other reasons mentioned consistently explain that such an act would be disloyal or unthinkable. In contrast, the ralliers do also mention surveillance but a much larger percentage indicate that it is possible to escape such controls if it is so desired; many have some type of grievance. The contrast in attitudes between the ralliers and PW's suggests the existence of personality, ideological, and motivational differences between the two groups. This notion is furthered by the fact that the pattern of the responses of both ralliers and PW's is much more alike than is the pattern of VC ralliers compared to VC PW's or NVA ralliers, compared to NVA PW's.

A large majority of ralliers and prisoners heard the sound of airborne loudspeakers. For the ralliers, to hear the sound was essentially equivalent to hearing the message clearly although not necessarily on all occasions. Among the prisoners, a somewhat smaller percentage heard and a smaller percentage heard clearly on fewer occasions. The option to ignore a leaflet is easily exercised but the same option does not exist in the case of airborne loudspeaker broadcasts; because there is little or no choice about hearing or not hearing such messages, the findings must be interpreted with caution.

About half of the rallier samples—somewhat more VC than NVA—heard radio broadcasts and slightly less than one-fifth of the PW samples heard radio broadcasts. The questions used as internal checks on the consistency of individual responses disclose that in each sample a large majority of those who do listen to radio broadcasts listen solely or mainly to music, opera, or "news", all of which apparently have little relevance to psyop appeals. The relationship of "news" to psyop could not be determined within the limits of this study.

In summary, of the three media that reach the enemy in sufficiently large numbers to enable execution of studies, leaflets were clearly effective in getting messages to virtually all enemy personnel who become ralliers but were read by only about one-third of the prisoner samples.

Airborne loudspeakers did not reach enemy personnel with the same completeness of coverage as did leaflets although they do reach a larger percentage than any other media.

Radio broadcasts could reach useful segments of the enemy audience but, because the content of what is heard is ambiguous, radio is not identified here as an effective medium for psyop under current conditions in Vietnam.

Requirement 3: Are the Words and Phrasing of the PSYOP Messages Understandable with Normal Ease?

Once the psyop message has reached its target, as a minimum requirement the words, phrases, and style of composition must be characterized by normal intelligibility for communication to occur. Table 3 shows the pattern of reactions to the language used in leaflet messages.

The issue of "hearing words clearly" is so intricately involved with the issue of "understanding words" in a verbal message that the distinction could not be maintained satisfactorily; in effect, the terms appear to be interchangeable. Therefore, airborne loudspeaker messages were not included in this series of questions because of their known brevity and simplistic construction in order to conserve time and expand coverage of indeterminate issues.

Comment. Table 3 shows clearly that the language element of the message is almost completely effective in that no problems are indicated in understanding the individual words.

Requirement 4: Is the Intent of the Message—The Theme—Comprehensible?

It is quite possible to understand all of the words that make up a message without gaining any understanding of the intended content or theme of a message.

For the psyop message to have the chance to be effective, the target audience must feel that they understand the message. Despite this fact, the psyoperator's actual intention, which may be quite different from the "intent" perceived by the target audience—and which is presumably

TABLE 3

INTELLIGIBILITY OF LANGUAGE USED IN LEAFLET MESSAGES

Media	Ralliers		Prisoners	
	VC (100)	NVA (100)	VC (100)	NVA (200)
Leaflets				
% in Sample Read Leaflets	86%	93%	27%	39%
% in Sample Understand Words	79%	93%	26%	35%
% who "Read Leaflets" who "Understand Words"	92%	100%	96%	90%

embedded in the content of the message—does not have to be recognized consciously or understood by the target audience for the message to have a chance to be effective. It can be said with confidence that conscious understanding is not necessary for effectiveness because what is known of dynamic psychology makes it clear that one does not necessarily know whether, when , how, or by what, one's thinking and emotions may be affected. Therefore, it is theoretically possible that artfully contrived messages with hidden meanings could influence the readers' attitudes and emotions in some significant way that the reader does not consciously recognize. However, the nature of current operating practices in the field that govern the composition of psyop messages does not encourage the notion that sophisticated messages with hidden intent and impact are the rule—or that they occur at all by deliberate intent.

Instances where the psyoperator's intent is to cause confusion or perplex others may seem to be an exception to the need for an assumption of understanding on the part of the target audience but it is not actually so. The psyoperator's intent is for the reader to become confused about the issue treated in the message; except in unusual circumstances, it is not intended that the reader be confused about the meaning of the message.

Table 4 shows the extent to which target audiences report they have understood the intent or themes of psyop messages.

Comment. The category "Understand Some" is interpretable in two ways: analysis of narrative elaboration of the respondent's initial answers disclosed that the "Understand Some" response may be interpreted correctly as, "understood some part or all of all messages received" or "understood some part of some of the messages received".

It is obvious by inspection of Table 4 that when messages were read or heard, the recipients felt they understood part or all of some or all of the messages received.

TABLE 4
UNDERSTANDING OF THEME—INTENT OF MESSAGES THAT REACH ENEMY PERSONNEL

Media	Ralliers		Prisoners	
	VC (100)	NVA (100)	VC (100)	NVA (200)
Leaflet				
% in Sample Understand Words	79%	93%	26%	35%
% in Sample Understand Some/All Content	79%	93%	26%	35%
% of "Understand Words" who "Understand Content"	100%	100%	100%	100%
Airborne Loudspeaker				
% in Sample Heard Words Clearly	89%	86%	63%	57%
% in Sample Understand Some/All Content	87%	84%	56%	52%
% of Heard Clearly" who "Understand Content"	98%	98%	89%	91%

In summary, leaflet messages and airborne loudspeaker broadcasts were effective in the sense that those who read or heard the messages judged that they understood the theme or content of the message.

Requirement 5: Are the Messages Judged by the Enemy to be Credible?

Having reached a target audience—to have an opportunity to be effective, i.e., evoke a desired reaction—the content or theme of the message must be judged to be believable. The credibility of a message does not have to bear any relationship to its "truth" or degree of "untruth" as judged by some set of arbitrary standards. "Believability," or the willingness to ascribe credibility, exists in the mind of each individual recipient of a message.

Table 5 shows the judgments of believability of messages made by the four types of enemy samples.

Comment. As is the case for the data shown in Table 4, the category "Believed Some" is interpretable in two ways: qualitative elaboration of the respondent's initial answers disclosed that the "Believed Some" response may be interpreted correctly as "believed some part or all of all messages received" or "believed some part of some of the messages received".

It can be seen by inspection of Table 5 that more than three-quarters of all the rallier samples ascribe some degree of credibility to some or all of the messages received through either media. When only those who read or heard and understood the messages are considered, about nine out of ten ralliers—whether VC or NVA—ascribed some degree of credibility to the messages. Remembering that the average number of leaflets read by the rallier samples is about twenty, it can be said that "the rallier who reads leaflets came to believe them." About one-fifth of the prisoner samples found some of the messages credible in some degree. Airborne loudspeaker messages were heard and believed in some degree by a large percentage of the ralliers sampled and by about one-fifth of the PW samples.

TABLE 5
CREDIBILITY ASCRIBED TO MESSAGES THAT REACH ENEMY PERSONNEL

	Ralliers		Prisoners	
Media	VC (100)	NVA (100)	VC (100)	NVA (200)
Leaflet				
% in Sample Understand Content	79%	93%	26%	35%
% in Sample Believed Some/All	79%	83%	14%	25%
% of "Understand Content" who "Believed Message"	100%	89%	54%	71%
Airborne Loudspeaker (ALS)				
% in Sample Understand Content	87%	84%	56%	52%
% in Sample Believed Some/All	86%	76%	22%	28%
% of "Understand Content" who "Believed Message"	99%	90%	39%	54%

In summary, leaflets were effective in the sense that almost all in the VC and NVA samples who did rally, and had read or heard and understood messages, believed some or all of what was said in some or all of the messages. About one-fifth of the PW samples ascribed some degree of credibility to messages read or heard.

Requirement 6a: Were the PSYOP Messages a Dominant Factor or a Major Contributing Factor in Evaluation of the Desired Action (or an Equivalent Action)?
Requirement 6b: Were the PSYOP Messages a Facilitating Factor in the Decision to Take the Recommended Action (or an Equivalent Action)?
Requirement 6c: Did the PSYOP Messages Receive Serious Consideration (whether or Not the Action or an Equivalent Action is Ever Taken)?
Requirement 6d: Did the PSYOP Messages Receive Brief Consideration Even Though it May Have Been Quickly Rejected?

Messages may be believed—may be ascribed any degree of credibility—without being "effective" in the sense that "belief" in the message results in any behavior that the message is intended to evoke. A recognized problem that has hindered attempts to "measure PSYOP effectiveness" in the past has been the pervasive tendency to either omit definition of objectives for messages or to cast objectives in terms of what the sender wants to do instead of specifying what the sender wants the recipient of the message to do. Although the distinction may not seem obvious, it is of extreme importance.

Effectiveness, in the context of this study, can be defined only in terms of the objective(s) that the message is intended to serve. A hierarchy of progressively more demanding objectives can be conjectured to exist for most rally messages whether or not they are defined by the originators; stated in terms of effectiveness, these objectives are:

— Cause no negative/counterproductive reaction
— Cause awareness of the possibility of rallying
— Cause consideration of whether or not to rally
— Cause a desire to rally (whether or not acted upon)
— Cause a rally

Whether or not a message can cause any of these behaviors is dependent upon the persuasive power of the message and the individual's total life history up to the point of reading the message and for some period of time afterward.

The total patterns of responses of the VC and NVA ralliers demonstrated that leaflets, far more than airborne loudspeaker messages, were effective in that they had contributed to the decisions and acts of ralliers. Unfortunately, the length of the interviews—which were designed to serve several different objectives and which were held to a maximum of four hours because of limitations imposed by POW Camp and Chieu Hoi Center regulations and schedules—did not permit intensive inquiry into the reasoning processes and emotional reactions associated with rallying.

The total patterns of responses of the VC and NVA prisoners indicated that a considerable number of prisoners, influenced to some extent by leaflet messages, may have surrendered or engineered their own capture deliberately as a way of surrendering that had less potential for future reprisal by their own side.

Once it was established that PSYOP messages were affecting decisions to rally or surrender, the reasoning processes and emotions that were experienced prior to rallying or to giving some degree of "cooperation" when becoming a prisoner—in other words, the "how" and "why" of deciding to rally or facilitate capture—increased greatly in importance. Despite the significance of this issue, contractual limitations on time and effort made it impossible to conduct a further study of both ralliers and prisoners; accordingly, NVA and VC ralliers were selected for a more intensive examination of motivation to rally.

An additional questionnaire and interviewing procedures were designed specifically for more penetrating investigation of the amount and nature of the influence actually exerted by the leaflet messages upon VC and NVA ralliers. One portion of the comprehensive interviewing procedure used with these samples was designed to identify the extent to which the PSYOP messages affected the enemy soldier's thinking and behavior, specifically in relation to defection. Another portion is designed to identify the ways in which the action of rallying first enters an individual's thoughts, the reasoning processes and emotional linkages involved in coming to accept rallying as a possible action, and the reasons for making and acting on a decision to rally. Narrative elaboration of responses was obtained to provide a check on the validity and reliability of initial brief answers. These responses provide useful descriptive detail and, if necessary, can be subjected to latent structure analysis to resolve inconsistencies.*

Arrangements were made for interviews to be conducted at the National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon, at the Chieu Hoi Center in Bien Hoa, and at several other province centers by a trained all-Vietnamese team of interviewers under the supervision of a Vietnamese Research Supervisor and an American Research Supervisor. Individuals were selected at random from administrative records and assigned to the appropriate category until samples of 100 VC and 100 NVA ralliers had been obtained with the combat:support ratio matched to that of the earlier groups of ralliers. Interviews required from one and one-quarter to one and one-half hours; each was conducted under adequate conditions for privacy and freedom of response.

Table 6 shows the percentages of the two samples of VC and NVA ralliers who had read leaflets, claimed to remember particular types of

*Latent structure analysis is a method used in the social sciences for scaling replies to questionnaires based on the assumption that contradictory or partially inconsistant replies can be explained in terms of the "latent class" or "latent distance" found in deeper underlying attitudes; the logic of the analysis resembles that of factor analysis (Lazarsfeld, 1954).

TABLE 6
ATTENTION TO PSYOP LEAFLETS

Question	First Sample *NVA*	First Sample *VC*	Second Sample *NVA*	Second Sample *VC*
Read leaflets before rallying	93%	86%	89%	87%
Remember particular types of messages	87%	85%	89%	87%
Describe message content	87%	85%	89%	87%

leaflets, and could validate this report to a considerable extent by accurate recollection of themes or wording.

Comment. It is obvious by inspection that the statistics approach being identical. [sic]

Table 7 shows four different attitudes toward rallying that existed prior to the reading of PSYOP messages and the effects associated with having read the leaflets. An average of approximately twenty leaflets had been read before rallying; a large majority of the leaflets concerned rallying.

TABLE 7
EFFECT OF PSYOP MESSAGES ON DECISIONS ABOUT RALLYING

Attitude toward defection before reading leaflets	NVA (100) Leaflets played part in decision to rally (Col. 1)*	NVA (100) Would not have rallied if had not read leaflets (Col. 2)*	VC (100) Leaflets played part in decision to rally (Col. 1)*	VC (100) Would not have rallied if had not read leaflets (Col. 2)*
"No Prior Consideration" Did not consider defection before reading leaflets	37%**	(32%)**	26%	(21%)
"Considering Other Method" Considering another means of defection before reading leaflets	06%	(03%)	19%	(03%)
"Undecided Re Method" Undecided about how to defect before reading leaflets	18%	(07%)	15%	(03%)
"Already Considering Rally Wanted to rally even before reading leaflets	11%	(05%)	20%	(03%)
All Others	28%		20%	
	100%	(47%)	100%	(30%)

*Col. 2 is included in Col. 1.

**For example: Among the 37 ralliers who did not consider defection before reading leaflets, 32% would not have rallied if they had not read the leaflets.

Comment. The results in Table 7 show that 37 individuals in the NVA sample had not considered defection before reading GVN leaflets: among these 37, 32 would not have rallied if they had not read the leaflets. For the VC, the equivalent figures are 26% and 21%.

Of 6 NVA who were already considering some other form of defection prior to reading GVN leaflets, 3 would not have rallied if they had not read the leaflets. For the VC, the equivalent figures are 19% and 3%.

Among the 18 NVA who were undecided about a way in which to defect before reading GVN leaflets, 7 would not have rallied if they had not read leaflets. For the VC, the corresponding figures are 15% and 3%.

For the 11 NVA who already wanted to rally before having read GVN rally leaflets, 5 would not actually have rallied if they had not read leaflets. For the VC, the corresponding figures are 20% and 3%.

In summary, 47% of the NVA and 30% of the VC ralliers would not have rallied if they had not read GVN rally leaflets.

Table 8 shows the four gross groups treated in Table 7 (defined by attitude towards rallying before they read rally leaflets), broken down further into seven sub-groups and rearranged to show their relationship to the graded criteria for effectiveness described in Requirements 6a, 6b, 6c, and 6d.

Comment. The results in Table 8 show that the "No Prior Consideration/Would Not Have Defected" group—32% of the NVA ralliers and 21% of the VC ralliers—had not considered any form of defection prior to receiving PSYOP messages and judged that they would not have rallied if the messages had not been received. This pattern of reaction to the PSYOP message indicates the leaflets to have been a dominant factor in the act of rallying. This group, then, meets the requirements for PSYOP message effectiveness described in 6a.

Fifteen percent of NVA soldiers and 9% of VC soldiers (the total of those in the "Considered Other Method/Would Not Have Defected", "Undecided About Method/Would Not Have Defected", and "Already Considering Rally/Would Not Have Defected" sub-groups) had already been considering either a specific method of defection (not rally) or several alternative methods of defection (one of which might be rallying) or were already considering rallying before they read rally leaflets; these individuals reported that they would not have rallied if they had not read rally leaflets. This pattern of reaction to PSYOP messages indicates the leaflets to have been a major contributing factor in the decision to defect by means of rallying. This group, then, also meets the requirements for effectiveness described in 6a.

Nineteen percent of the NVA and 33% of the VC (the total of those in the "Considering Other Method/Would Have Defected in Some Way", "Undecided About Method/Would Have Defected in Some Way", and "No Prior Thought/Would Have Defected in Some Way" sub-groups) would have defected in some manner but had not decided upon rallying. For the 5 NVA and 5 VC in the "No Prior Thought/Would Have De-

TABLE 8

EFFECTS OF HAVING READ RALLY LEAFLETS: EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA

Effectiveness Requirement	Before Reading Leaflets	Attitude toward Defection	After Reading Leaflets	NVA (100)	VC (100)
Dominant Factor (6a)	No prior thought of defection	Would not have defected	Rallied	32%	21%
Major Factor (6a)	Considering other method to defect	Would not have defected	Chose to Rally	03%	03%
Major Factor (6a)	Undecided about method to defect	Would not have defected	Chose to Rally	07%	03%
Major Factor (6a)	Already considering rally	Would not have rallied	Did Rally	05%	03%
Facilitating Factor (6b)	Considering other method to defect	Would have defected in some way	Chose to Rally	03%	16%
Facilitating Factor (6b)	Undecided about method to defect	Would have defected in some way	Chose to Rally	11%	12%
Facilitating Factor (6b)	No prior thought of defection	Would have defected in some way	Chose to Rally	05%	05%
6a, 6b	Total: Leaflets Contributed to Decision to Rally			66%	63%
6c, 6d	Total: Would Have Rallied Even if Had Not Read Leaflets			06%	17%
6d	Total: Rally Decision Not Affected by Leaflets			15%	09%
--	Total: Did Not Read Leaflets			13%	11%
				100%	100%

fected" sub-group, reading rally leaflets was a facilitating factor in their choice of rallying as a means of defection. For the 11 NVA and 12 VC in the "Undecided About Method/Would Have Defected" sub-group, reading rally leaflets tipped the scales toward rallying. This pattern of reaction to PSYOP messages indicates that the leaflets had a facilitating role in the final decisive act of rallying in that the leaflets caused rallying to be chosen rather than some other form of defection. These three sub-groups, then, meet the requirements for effectiveness described in 6b.

Below the double lines in Table 8 are shown the totals for the seven sub-groups of the NVA and VC samples that have been discussed so far; the totals are 66% and 63% respectively.

Immediately below the totals, the number appears of those in the "Already Considering Rally/Would Have Rallied Without Reading Leaflets" who would have rallied even if they had not read rally leaflets—6 NVA and 17 VC. Analysis of their narrative responses, which provides qualitative elaboration in the form of reasons for most answers, indicates that a majority of both groups had prior information about the Chieu Hoi Program from relatives, friends, or other sources; the sources may or may not have been motivated by PSYOP programs given such names as "Induce VC Kin to Rally". In overall context it appears certain that the leaflets, though not a determining factor, were read with some

TABLE 9
THEMES OF INFLUENTIAL LEAFLET MESSAGES

Leaflet Theme	VC (100)	NVA (100)
Family Sentiment	17%	10%
Death	15%	16%
GVN Welcome	08%	12%
Hardship	06%	---
Chance for New Life	04%	---
Useless Sacrifice in NLF	04%	---
Other	02%	12%
TOTAL	56%	50%

degree of serious attention. This group meets the requirements for effectiveness described in 6c and 6d.

A toal of 15 NVA and 9 VC read rally leaflets but do not consider that the leaflets contributed to their rallying. While the simple act of reading a leaflet can be ascribed with equal justification to curiosity or boredom, as well as interest in gaining information, these individuals had read the leaflets thoroughly enough and often enough to remember specific kinds of leaflets and to recall message content. The responses of this sub-group clearly meet the requirements for effectiveness described in Requirement 6d.

In summary, PSYOP leaflet messages are effective in that approximately two-thirds of large samples of NVA and VC ralliers believe that the leaflet messages played a part in their decision to rally.

Effective Themes in Influential Messages.

Although those who read leaflets had read an average of about twenty and could recall a variety of themes, 56% of the VC soldiers and 50% of the NVA soldiers, or 53% of the total sample, said that a specific leaflet message had contributed to their decision to rally. The themes most frequently cited as specifically influential are shown in Table 9.

Nearly one-third had a leaflet with them when they rallied, 19% of the VC and 37% of the NVA. The primary reason given for not rallying sooner was the constant surveillance; the next most frequently cited reason was the fact that they had not yet come to believe what the leaflets said.

The Rally Decision Process

The process of reaching and acting on a decision to rally was probed with a structured series of questions about attitudes that existed when the term "Chieu Hoi" was first heard, at the time of actual rally, and at various times after rally.

Knowledge of the Chieu Hoi Program and arrival at some degree of confidence that the GVN will act in accordance with the policies it proclaims emerge as the primary factors in the constellation of developing

attitudes that eventually lead to rally. Motivation is two-factored: there can be motivation to leave the NLF and there can be motivation to join the GVN; the two motivations are separate and do not necessarily appear together. The two factors work together to move the individual in one direction; while the factor impelling the individual away from the Front ranks is fear and distrust, the factor impelling him to rally is some measure of hope and trust. In 200 responses, 200 different situations may be described at a "total detail" level of analysis. But overall there is a clearly discernible consistent general pattern that starts with initial disbelief, perhaps even intense dislike for the term "Chieu Hoi". This is followed by growing recognition of evidence of the truth of the messages, and a slow transition to acceptance of the belief that the GVN descriptions of the Chieu Hoi Policy are made in good faith. Once arrived at this opinion, if some factors motivate the individual to leave the Front and at the same time others motivate him to move toward the GVN, the decision to rally and the actual rally becomes only a matter of finding or making an opportunity.

Almost all of the ralliers placed their first consideration of the possibility of rallying at a point in time between one and two years before actually rallying. The most frequently cited reason was the fact that they did not yet believe fully in what the leaflets said. Investigation of the time lag between consideration of rallying and actually doing so, in cases where there was a considerable time gap between having made a decision to rally and the actual rally, indicate the primary reason was constant surveillance—the validity and generality of this reason is supported by the results of several more lengthy related studies not reported here.

Thus knowing about the Chieu Hoi Program, knowing how it works, knowing how to rally, knowing what to expect, believing that good treatment will be received, and staying alive long enough for accretion of credibility is essential in inducing rally. Family urging of the prospective rallier is particularly effective for VC, and for NVA where relatives or friends exist; the family can explain the program, can cite the well-being of other ralliers, and assist by escorting him to the rally point or by making prior arrangement for a safe reception when rallying.

In summary, the thinking and feeling processes that lead to a decision to rally operate over a one to two year time period if unusual situations do not occur.

SUMMARY

As one part of a total systems approach to the complex manifold problems involved in attempting to measure the effectiveness of PSYOP as a military function in a field operational setting (Vietnam), the basic ingredient of all PSYOP—messages—was selected for a total-detail-level examination. For this task a total of 700 NVA and VC ralliers and prisoners was interviewed (200 NVA ralliers, 200 VC ralliers, 100 VC prisoners, and 200 NVA prisoners). The issue of effectiveness of PSYOP

messages was fractionated into six aspects or dimensions; proximity of media, clarity of reception, language appropriateness, thematic comprehensibility, credibility, and evocation of behavioral response. Questions applicable to each aspect were formulated and used to query the data resulting from the rallier and prisoner interviews.

Step-by-step analysis of the data in relation to the first five of the six criteria demonstrated the pre-eminence of leaflets and airborne loudspeakers as effective media in the sense that they do reach the enemy, are understood, and have some credibility. An even more searching test of the sixth question or criteria showed that leaflets, to a much greater extent than loudspeaker messages, were effective in that they contributed to the defection of two-thirds of the VC soldiers and two-thirds of the NVA soldiers sampled. Almost one-third of the VC and one-half of the NVA ralliers maintain they would not have defected if they had not read leaflet messages.

The authors advise that the results of this study and their implications be considered with caution. It is clear that the much-maligned leaflet has received unmerited disparagement from enthusiasts for other media but it must be remembered that leaflets represented about 95% of the planned PSYOP effort in Vietnam. It is not possible to say whether the same amount of expense and effort devoted to another media would produce equivalent returns and the problem cannot easily be subjected to cost; yield analysis.

EAST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TO THE VIETNAM CONFLICT*

BY RADIO FREE EUROPE

The results presented in this preliminary account of the effectiveness of Western international broadcasting efforts in the formation of East European opinions toward the U.S. involvement in Vietnam show RFE's audience covered a broad range of the attitudinal spectrum. The listeners were far from unanimous in approving U.S. policy.

INTRODUCTION: SAMPLE AND METHOD

This is a preliminary report, based on interviews with 583 Hungarians, 569 Poles, and 261 Czechs and Slovaks—1,413 respondents in all. Interviewed in four West European countries, they were in nine cases out of ten on temporary visits to the West and have since returned home; only 10% of the sample comprised defectors, refugees, and emigrants.

* * * * *

Among the 1,413 respondents, there was a predominance of males, urbanites, and the better-educated, with a disproportionate number fit-

*Excerpts from "East European Attitudes to the Vietnam Conflict: A Study in Radio Effectiveness," Radio Free Europe, Audience and Public Opinion Research Department, July 1967.

ting into the higher occupational categories. Overall, the general run of the interviewees consisted of "opinion leaders."

The interviews were done by independent research institutes in various West European countries, the interviewers being in no way identified with Radio Free Europe.

I. Attitudes To The United States Course in Vietnam

Respondents were asked whether they considered the U.S. course in Vietnam to be "right," "wrong," or "right in some respects and wrong in others." In Table 1, half the Hungarian and Polish samples and nearly half the Czechoslovak were critical of American policy in Vietnam.

II. The Most Important Factors in Attitude-Formation Toward The U.S. Course in Vietnam

Once his attitude toward the U.S. course in Vietnam had been ascertained, each respondent was asked to select from a list the influences he thought had contributed to his opinion. The list included the three major mass-communication media (press, radio, television) as well as informal channels ("discussion with friends and relatives"); he could also indicate that, mistrusting contradictory influences, he had used his own resources ("thinking the matter over by yourself"). Lastly, each respondent was encouraged to volunteer unlisted influences (few did volunteer any).

Table 2, shows the five items in the order in which they were submitted to the respondents. Radio, standing fifth in the order of submission, was the most frequently cited influence in two samples and the second most frequently cited one in the third, a result that argues against any link between responses and placement in the list.

Radio was the strongest influence among the Hungarians and the Poles, and the second strongest among the Czechs and Slovaks. The frequency of the "discussions" and "thinking it over" responses in all three samples is typical for the attitude formation process as seen by the respondents involved.

Television in all three samples turned out to be less important not only than radio and newspapers but than the two other options as well. Only in the Polish sample did television emerge as an important attitude-forming factor. As for newspapers, their showing was significant. Radio, it must

Table 1

"What do you think of the U.S. course in Vietnam?"

	Hungarians	*Poles*	*Czechoslovaks*
	%	%	%
Right	19	31	38
Right in some respects and wrong in others	26	20	17
Wrong	50	49	44
No answer	5	*	1
	100%	100%	100%

*Less than 0.5%

be remembered, refers to both regime-controlled broadcasts and the uncensored ones from abroad; newspapers on the other hand refer, in practical terms, to the communist press alone.

	Hungarians	*Poles*	*Czechs/Slovaks*
Listening to the radio	57%	71%	53%
Reading the newspapers	47%	60%	53%

The above figures suggest that radio listeners (including listeners to Western radio) may not be impervious to the tendentious "interpretation" of the U.S. course in Vietnam carried by the Hungarian, Polish, and Czechoslovak press.

III. Reference to RFE, VOA, BBC, And The Domestic Radios As "Important" in Forming Opinions About Vietnam

Those who regarded "listening to the Radio" as an important influence on their Vietnam opinions were asked to specify stations. For the purposes of this preliminary report, minor Western stations were disregarded. [The results are in Table 3.]

Of the three major Western stations, the only one with an impact approaching that of the domestic radios on attitudes to Vietnam was RFE. Among Poles, Radio Warsaw and RFE were specified about equally, another indication of RFE's authority in Poland.

The Hungarian interviewees cited Radio Budapest somewhat more often than the Poles cited Radio Warsaw, and they mentioned RFE somewhat less often than the Poles did. This result is hardly surprising: Table 4 shows that Hungarian respondents hostile to the U.S. course in Vietnam outnumber its supporters even among the regular RFE listeners.

In the Czechoslovak sample, references to radio—both the domestic broadcasts and RFE's—occurred less frequently than in the other two samples. The importance Czechs and Slovaks accorded to "thinking the

Table 2

"Which of the following were important to you in helping you to form this opinion [on the U.S. course in Vietnam]?"

	Hungarians %	*Poles* %	*Czechs/Slovaks* %
"Discussion with friends and relatives"	52	57	48
"Thinking the matter over by yourself"	49	69	75
"Reading the newspapers"	47	60	53
"Watching television"	20	53	22
"Listening to the radio"	57	71	53
Other answers	3	1	–
	228%*	311%*	251%*

*More than 100% because of multiple answers

Table 3

"Which stations were important to you in helping you to form this opinion [on the U.S. course in Vietnam]?"

	Hungarians	*Poles*	*Czechs/Slovaks*
Domestic radio	43	40	30
RFE	33	39	26
BBC	13	12	7
VOA	6	10	6

matter over by themselves" (see Table 2) suggested a measure of distrust for all communications media.

The differences among the Hungarian, Polish, and Czechoslovak results should not obscure the fact that a quarter of the Czechoslovak, a third of the Hungarian, and two-fifths of the Polish respondents ascribed to RFE a decisive influence on their Vietnam attitudes. Combining the three national samples produces the following results:

Domestic radio	40%
RFE	34%
BBC	11%
VOA	8%

For every respondent whose attitudes to Vietnam were influenced by BBC, nearly four were influenced by the regime station. The comparable ratio for VOA was 1:5. Of the three major Western stations, obviously only RFE is at present capable of effectively challenging the domestic radio on issues like Vietnam.

IV. Attitudes To The U.S. Course In Vietnam By Regular RFE Listeners

Table 4, below, compares the attitudes of regular RFE listeners (defined as people who tune in more than once a week) with those of the others in the three samples. Irregular listening (less than once a week) was reported by under 10% of the interviewees. The "others" therefore consist mainly of non-listeners.

Table 4

Attitudes of Regular RFE Listeners and "Others" to the U.S. Course in Vietnam

	HUNGARIANS		POLES		CZECHS/SLOVAKS	
	Regular RFE listeners %	Others %	Regular RFE listeners %	Others %	Regular RFE listeners %	Others %
U.S. course is						
right	26	11	43	20	46	32
partly right, partly wrong	36	17	25	16	18	15
wrong	37	63	30	64	35	52
No answer	1	9	2	–	1	1
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Interestingly, the degree of approval by regular RFE listeners was lowest among the Hungarians, higher among the Poles, and highest (although by a very narrow margin) among the Czechs and Slovaks, while the same ranking, at a considerably lower quantitative level, prevailed among the "others." It is equally significant that the only sample in which regular RFE listeners opposing the U.S. course in Vietnam (37%) outnumbered those favoring it (26%) was the Hungarian, in which the "others" rejected the U.S. course by a six to one ratio.

The Polish results deserve scrutiny. They indicate an especially close rapport between RFE and its Polish regular listeners, as shown by the very sharp split between the attitude patterns of the regular listeners and the others. Polish approval of the U.S. course in Vietnam was twice as frequent—and disapproval half as frequent—among regular RFE listeners as among the "others." In regard to regular RFE listeners, the proposition of unqualified opponents of the U.S. course in Vietnam was smaller for the Poles than for the Hungarians or even the Czechs and Slovaks.

A quantitative expression of the differences between the attitudes of RFE's regular listeners and the others can be given by a *new approval index* of both groups in the three national samples. The index is computed by subtracting negative attitudes ("U.S. course is wrong") from positive attitudes ("U.S. course is right")—disregarding indecisive answers and refusals.

	NET APPROVAL INDEX	
	Regular RFE listeners	Others
Poles	+18%	−52%
Czechs/Slovaks	+14%	−24%
Hungarians	−18%	−70%

The degree of attitudinal difference between the regular RFE listeners and the others is, for each of the three countries, expressed by the "distance" between the two figures. That distance is the largest in the case of the Polish sample—"70". The Hungarian sample ("52") follows, and then the Czechoslovak sample ("38"). Looked at in this way, the impact of RFE upon its Polish regular listeners appears extremely impressive. They provided the highest net approval index for the U.S. course in Vietnam in spite of a powerful hostility on this score among the remainder of the Polish sample. By the same token, RFE's impact on its regular listeners in Czechoslovakia seems to be less decisive—with regard to Vietnam—than in either Poland *or Hungary*, since Czechoslovak public opinion, as reflected by the preliminary findings under discussion, is generally less hostile to the U.S. course in Vietnam. It has already been shown (Section III) that Table 4's evidence of RFE's variant impact among regular listeners in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland has the support of other data.

V. Evidence Of Direct Effect Of RFE On Attitudes to Vietnam

The 476 Hungarian, Polish, and Czechoslovak interviewees who regarded RFE as an important influence on their attitude toward Vietnam were asked to specify *how* RFE broadcasts affected their opinions. [See Table 5.]

Nearly half of the Hungarians, nearly two-fifths of the Czechoslovaks, and nearly a third of the Poles who listed RFE as an important influence on their attitude to Vietnam (see Table 2) revealed that RFE was *the* decisive influence. It was RFE which "made them think the way they do" or which, less frequently, dissipated an earlier attitude and thus "changed their opinion."

Table 5

"Did listening to RFE. . .	*Hungarians* %	*Poles* %	*Czechs/Slovaks* %
. . . confirm the opinion you already had?"	34	41	52
. . . make you think the way you do?"	44 } 46	22 } 31	31 } 36
. . . change your opinion?"	2 }	9 }	5 }
. . . leave your opinion unchanged?"	26	26	6
No answer	2	2	6
	108%*	100%	100%

*More than 100% because of some multiple answers

Significantly, RFE's attitude-forming role was most pronounced in the case of the Hungarians, who represent a public opinion predominantly hostile to the U.S. course in Vietnam (see Table 1). In this generally critical climate, tendentious regime propaganda about the war itself, emphasizing its "David and Goliath" aspect, exerts a heavier impact. And, more important, "discussions with others" tend to reinforce negative rather than positive attitudes toward the U.S. line in Vietnam. Under such circumstances, positive attitudes to the U.S. course in Vietnam are more strongly in need of RFE's support in Hungary than, for instance, in Czechoslovakia.

GENERALLY, A MASS MEDIUM IS ALREADY CONSIDERED VERY EFFECTIVE WHEN IT SUCCEEDS IN REINFORCING EXISTING ATTITUDES. TABLE 5 CLEARLY SHOWS THAT, AS FAR AS THE VIETNAM ISSUE IS CONCERNED, RFE'S IMPACT WENT BEYOND REINFORCEMENT: IN A LARGE NUMBER OF CASES ATTITUDES WERE ACTUALLY FORMED AND CHANGED!

CONCLUSIONS

Attitudes to the U.S. course in Vietnam may be regarded as a sound test of RFE's impact and effectiveness as a communicator in East Central

Europe. The Vietnam issue is salient enough to provoke opinions (only 5% or less failed to answer the first question) but still stands apart from the respondents' most immediate personal concerns.

Two findings desire particular emphasis:

1) Many interviewees indicated that their attitudes to the U.S. course in Vietnam were formed under the direct influence of RFE. The implication is that any full or partial endorsement of American policy was due not to a general predisposition in favor of "U.S. courses" but to the specific content of RFE communications on the subject of Vietnam.

2) RFE listeners were far from unanimous in approving the U.S. policy in Vietnam.

This is an important finding. It indirectly reasserts that RFE listeners are an integral part of the active public opinion by which they are influenced and which they in turn can influence. Had the results shown the attitudinal patterns of RFE listeners on this issue to be the exact opposite of the remainders of the three samples, there would have been a question of whether or not RFE's Vietnam broadcasts "preach only to the converted." By extension, RFE could have been suspected of talking to the completely disaffected and them alone. Whatever the actual numbers of the disaffected, their role in any gradual and patient transformation of economic, political, and "power" relationships from within can be only limited. The results presented in this preliminary report show that RFE's audience covers a broad range of the attitudinal spectrum. There seems to be no danger that the station's message might fail to reach those people, both inside the "Communist Establishment" and outside it, through whom progressive changes in East Central Europe must come.

USING MOTION PICTURES TO AID INTER-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION*

By Neil P. Hurley, S. J.

The author, who has experimented with screen education, believes there are three types of film. He outlines six rules which explain why motion pictures are capable of creating intercultural bonds among peoples of the world. Twelve films are evaluated in terms of their contribution to intercultural communication.

From their very inception, motion pictures enjoyed a world-wide appeal. Without the barrier of language and all the accompanying cultural and psychological associations, films crossed political boundaries with the ease of the weather. Charlie Chaplin, of all the performers on the silent screen, became known rapidly by such endearing names as Charlot (France), Carlos (Spain), Carlito (Latin America), and Kärlchen (Germany, Austria and Switzerland). Vision became language as the silent

*From The *Journal of Communication*, XVIII (June 1968), pp. 97–108. Reprinted with the permission of the *Journal of Communication*, copyright holder, and the courtesy of the author.

film learned to touch that universal cord latent in mankind. True, there were still cultural factors which influenced popularity in varying degrees. For example, Griffith's "The Birth of a Nation" was a distinct product of American culture just as Eisenstein's "Potemkin" was unmistakably a Soviet statement. Nevertheless, in both instances, the audiences overlooked the conditioning factors of time and space as the magic of the camera depicted mutiny, slavery, rebellion, death, and sacrifice in an historical reconstruction hitherto unknown to mankind. In the pre-talkie era, motion pictures served as channels of inter-cultural communication.

Yes, motion pictures ushered twentieth-century man into the "imaging revolution" where psychology was as important as logic, where social context ranked with the traditional moral evaluation of the individual, where mood rivalled categorical statements, and emotion was as weighty as reason. Perhaps the end of "typographic man," to use Marshall McLuhan's phrase, came between the two great wars when a global audience made up of all classes, races, creeds, ages, and sexes could, for a modest admission fee, see the implications and consequences of human involvement in every conceivable circumstance of life. Women vibrated in empathy with Greta Garbo in her tragic portrayals of Anna Karenina, Queen Christina, and Mata Hari, and were attracted by Douglas Fairbanks and Ramon Novarro. Men learned about *femmes fatales* such as Pola Negri and Marlene Dietrich and identified with heroes such as William S. Hart, Clark Gable, and Leslie Howard. Children learned about the Wild West, gangsterism, war, and the adult world through a Tom Mix, a James Cagney, a Jean Gabin, a Humphrey Bogart, a Frederic March, or a Charles Laughton.

Unfortunately, because motion pictures have been seen largely as a profit-seeking venture; educators, parents, and the cultural guardians of society have been late in recognizing its potential as a formative and informative instrument for creating the bases of community: shared experiences at the affective and cognitive levels. One reason is that the image is so close to us that we take it for granted. Curiously children understand pictures more readily than adults as Antoine de Saint-Exupery indicated in *The Little Prince*. Whenever he drew a boa constrictor which has swallowed an elephant, adults thought it was a hat until he drew the elephant inside the swollen body of the boa constrictor. Something very similar takes place in the cinema. We see the thematic expression but not the non-thematic reality with which the film artists have to work. The hidden elephant in every media experience is the set of rules of the particular communications game. For instance, there are six such rules which explain why motion pictures are capable of creating intercultural bonds among peoples of the world.

1. A physical law—that a transparent plastic material sufficiently flexible to unwind from a reel could produce a number of swiftly moving still images.

2. A physiological law—that an image on the retina of the eye persists long enough to give the illusion of continuity when successive still pictures are passed rapidly before a spectator.

3. A psychological law—that through skillful editing and montage, induced associations from memory, mind, and imagination suggest the inner life of persons photographed in illusory motion.

4. A sociological law—that any group of individuals emerges more cohesive in sentiment and purpose after a common communications experience.

5. An anthropological law—that people have curiosity about other peoples and want to learn *how* they meet the four essential *whats* of life: (a) survival and development; (b) love and hate; (c) authority and disobedience; (d) belief systems—integration in the present social order or protest against it.

6. An ethico-religious principle—based on identification: (a) negatively with villainy; and (b) positively with self-sacrifice and vicarious suffering.

It is interesting that these six rules of cinematic experience seem to be bound up inextricably with certain constants of reality. In summary, we are saying that man has discovered a way of recording both visually and aurally experiences of nature, life, and human activity so that a mirror-image of reality permits man to discover himself and the world about him in greater depth. Let us now show more concretely how film can enable the human process of personal and social existence to be better understood, thus furthering inter-cultural understanding.

The author has experimented with screen education in both Chile and the United States for more than two years, at both the high school and university level in social science and religion courses. Films proved an especially valuable ally in such courses, especially for beginners. The author discovered that there are three types of film:

1. films peculiarly apt for members of a given society;

2. films which reveal important differences between cultures in a way which is fresh and non-polemic;

3. films which are transcendental and incorporate members of all cultures indiscriminately into a state of mind characterized by solidarity and allegiance to the human race.

The twelve films which the author has found particularly illuminating in teaching certain traditional disciplines are:

1. The Leopard
2. Zorba the Greek
3. Hombre
4. The Lilies of the Field
5. West Side Story
6. The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner
7. Children Adrift
8. Mint Tea
9. Phoebe
10. Le Boulevard de Saint Laurent
11. The World of Marshall McLuhan
12. The Parable

The first six films are full length commercial movies, while the last six are short subjects ranging from twenty minutes to an hour in length. The film, *The World of Marshall McLuhan,* was a television program now available from the National Broadcasting Company in color.

1. The Leopard, a film directed by Visconti from the novel by Giuseppe di Lampedusa, had an extraordinary impact on Chileans when it was shown in Santiago in 1964, because the presidential election later that year heralded radical changes in the social structure of Chile. A country with great concentration of wealth, especially land, Chile found itself facing the same social upheaval so dramatically described by di Lampedusa in his novel on the passing of the *ancien régime* in Sicily.

The graphic representation of drastic social reform by Garibaldi's "red shirts" on the island of Sicily in 1884 produced historical echoes in those fearing a Communist victory at the polls. The important points which emerged as focal issues for Chilean viewers of *The Leopard* were:

a. Economics—the importance of relating concrete commercial transactions and circumstances of economic power to a cultural framework.

b. Psychology—the difficulty of regressing from a higher standard of living to a lower standard of living and the opportunistic psychology of the *nouveaux riches* who emerge to fill the social vacuum left by the displacement of the feudal nobility.

c. Sociology—the implications of abrupt social change and the passing of one social code where honor and status predominate to one where wealth and influence matter.

d. Religion—the ties between religious conviction and social stability, showing that the environment is a conditioning factor in religious observance.

2. Zorba the Greek. A rendition by Jules Dassin of Nicolai Kazantzakis' novel by the same name, this film is an admirable example of the thesis of Marshall McLuhan that "the medium is the message" and that oral cultures produce "cool types" such as Zorba and print cultures "hot types" such as Zorba's English employer. According to McLuhan, a "cool type" is mysterious, uninhibited, with little sense of time, while a "hot type" reveals a clearly defined, time-conscious, orderly, and efficient personality structure.

It is interesting that Latin audiences see in Zorba a resourceful, fun-loving person with dignity and freedom, not a parasitic, amoral, indolent character such as an Anglo/Saxon audience sees. On the other hand, Latins tend to interpret pejoratively the narrator who is Zorba's boss. For them he is a slave of the clock, overly serious, and a captive of an arbitrary and unreal set of convictions about honesty, fidelity, and industriousness.

The film is far from being a great film, one of the chief weaknesses being the lack of psychological preparation the audience receives for the narrator's sudden conversion to the belief system of Zorba. Despite its defects, the film is admirable as a basis for intercultural understanding,

especially in terms of how characterology is intimately related to a specific communications matrix.

3. Hombre. A picture directed by Martin Ritt is excellent for giving expression to minority views. In one of Hollywood's rare exceptions to the classic cowboy film, the Mexican and Indian characters are shown in a favorable light with the "white man" portrayed in a villainous light. The long-standing paternalism of both the Anglo and the male is subtly examined in a suspense-ridden movie in which the dialogue moves even swifter than the action.

The heroism which the picture portrays rests on the notion of vicarious suffering. For this reason it has appeal to youth especially in an age of iconoclasm and skepticism. The film is saved from pathos by an excellent portrayal of the Indian hero by Paul Newman. It is never clear why he goes on the stage-coach trip with the others, but plot lapses such as these are forgivable when compensated for by sustained creative achievement elsewhere in the film. As an obvious intercultural bridge, *Hombre* shares with *Zorba* the advantage of immense appeal to peoples in the underdeveloped world where the ethos of thrift, hard work, and wealth have not taken hold. These same audiences invariably like films such as the *Apu* trilogy of Satyajit Ray, De Sica's *Shoeshine* and *Bicycle Thief*, and John Ford's *The Grapes of Wrath* and *How Green was my Valley*. It is interesting that some pictures find greater popularity abroad than at home (*The Blackboard Jungle, Rebel Without a Cause, David and Lisa*).

4. Lilies of the Field—Another excellent example of how film can portray national types. The plot centers on an urban Protestant Negro, self-sufficient but not self-conscious, and a strict German Catholic nun, domineering by instinct. The contrast between the two is well-drawn, especially in the scene when Sidney Poitier, as the Negro, defends his pluralistic belief system to the unyielding Mother Superior. This confrontation is the beginning of mutual respect and even fondness.

Other touches which many audiences miss and which only a second viewing can disclose is the mediating role which Sidney Poitier plays between the Mexican-Americans and the nuns. He is a blend of "hot" and "cool," to use McLuhan's categories. He stands up to the White Southern Protestant and his prejudices; he makes friends with the Mexican cafe owner, caught between the culture he came from and the one in which he finds himself; and he appeals to the Irish-American Catholic priest who serves the region with his mobile church van.

Curiously, Poitier is the stranger, the wanderer, the pilgrim. But this marginal man proves to be all things to all men. He wins the affections of all the different racial, religious and class groups; he is at home with the vortex of social change; he knows that to be is to be different; he needs no privileged cultural cocoon or environmental prop. He is the only character of the film who is living in the present; all the others are tilted toward the past.

5. *West Side Story*. This stunning film blends music, choreography, and color in a patent inter-cultural example. Borrowing from the feud of the Capulets and the Montagues in Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*, the picture transplants the scene from Verona to upper west side Manhattan. The white gang and the Puerto Rican "pandilla" provide the backdrop of racial tension for the poignant love affair between the Puerto Rican girl and the Anglo-Saxon youth.

Latin American audiences react fearfully, as a rule, to this film. For example, Chilean audiences saw the threat of American imperialism as an imminent one. They miss the references in the film which portray the Latin reaction to the shadowy side of life in America as well as the voluntary nature of the Puerto Rican migration to New York. Nevertheless, Latins sympathize with the film, finding in it a vehicle of authentic expression of some of their most basic values and enotional responses.

The film offers perhaps greater rewards to Anglo-Saxon audiences, particularly those people who are inadequately informed concerning Latin America. Some still believe that it is a giant seedbed of caudillos, revolutions and anti-Americanism, characterized mainly by the bossa nova, the rhumba, bootblacking, begging, and banana crops. A film such as *West Side Story*, if discussed in a mixed group of Anglos and Latins, can do much to bring into sharper focus the mutual image each group has of the other and the underlying value-system which supports it.

6. *The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner*. Directed by Tony Richardson, this film cuts across many boundaries of class, culture, and creed to touch a universal chord in man. The film has a peculiar appeal to adolescents because it sensitively portrays how the "establishment world" of authority and adults is seen subjectively by a youth from Nottingham who has been sentenced to Borstal Reform School for theft. *The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner* offers the adult world a reflection of themselves in the mirror of youth.

The inter-cultural value of this existential motion picture is that it unites the rebellious and the protesting elements against those who hold the reins of power and sanction. Highly credible, this picture appeals to all cultures where the adolescent revolt has taken root. Since the death of James Dean, the phenomenon of Colin Smith is world-wide: the *blousons noirs* of France, the *Teddy Boys* of Holland, *die Halbstarken* of Germany, and the *Stilyagi* of Russia. In the television scene, we see Colin and his friend turn off the sound and ridicule the adult world with its empty rhetoric and moralizing postures. The communication's "short-circuit" between generations has never been shown more forcefully.

SELECTED SHORT FEATURES

7. *Children Adrift*. This French filmette is ideal for inter-cultural exchanges. The author has found that this tender film about the life of children in a metropolitan banlieu gives a convincing portrayal of the joys and the sorrows of vagrant children. In the Inter-American conference

held at the University of Notre Dame last May, this film welded together the sentiments of both Latin Americans and North Americans. The culture of poverty is as real as the culture of youth and, we might add, for many just as unknown.

Children Adrift is a highly visual film, almost worthy to be called silent. As such, it does not jar any national sensibility or trigger any defensive mechanism. Since the world of slum-dwelling children is, essentially, a nonthreatening experience, a multi-national audience will usually let down the psychological barriers and become united in the deeper community of the family of man.

8. Mint Tea—Another French film which appealed to the Notre Dame Inter-American Conference, mainly because it portrayed loneliness within the soul of a homosexual. Centered on persons whom we meet in a Parisian sidewalk cafe, the picture shows the inability of a young, effeminate-looking man to relate to those around him. The close-ups (the sideward glances, the immobile face, the empty gaze) serve to heighten the young man's state of incommunicability.

Unfortunately we know deviant behavior only through statistics, sensational newspaper accounts, and documentaries, but rarely through the eyes of the artist. Not since Fritz Lang's *M* gave us a compassionate account of a child-murderer, have we seen such serious treatment of what society calls abnormal. One of the fine touches of *Mint Tea* is the final scene of an elderly gentleman seated alone with his tea.

9. Phoebe is a product of the Film Board of Canada. It is remarkable from several points of view. Its psychological power lies in the ability of the teen-age Phoebe, pregnant and unwed, to communicate with her boyfriend, her parents, and the school authorities. Furthermore, it shows the social context of her home, suggesting why she might have sought affection in the way she did. Artistically, Phoebe is a celluloid cameo with superb angle shots and mood scenes. Its handling of what Henri Bergson called "inner time" is splendid. By drawing out Phoebe's imagined confession to her mother, we are reminded of Eisenstein's classic bridge scene in the *Forty Days That Shook the World.* Another fine artistic touch is the baroque trio on the beach who imbue the film with a Fellini-like quality.

The intercultural contribution of *Phoebe* as cinema is its transcendental theme. Avoiding the moralist's temptation to portray as sordid an immature romance, Phoebe spells out delicately the ramifications of young love consummated. We do not know what Paul will do when Phoebe calls him to tell him about their future child. We have seen her previously imagine the worst (his running away) and the best (his taking her into his arms and promising to get a job). The workings of the adolescent female imagination is brilliantly achieved with rapid shuttle-like scenes between extreme optimism and extreme pessimism.

Again we have a subtle indictment of the adult world, but one so masterfully achieved that national and cultural considerations create no obstacle to appreciation. The author has found that in Chile teen-agers of

the middle and upper class accepted Phoebe's plight as an accurate representation.

10. Le Boulevard de Saint Laurent—Another film of the Film Board of Canada. The depressing scenes of the Bowery section of Montreal create a striking visual impact which surmounts the barrier of the difficult French soundtrack.

The film portrays several forms of asocial behavior but in suchwise that we see human beings and not merely agents of socially repugnant conduct. The viewer is more inclined to compassion than condemnation. Starting with a nightclub "strip-tease," we are taken on a camera tour of Le Boulevard de Saint Laurent. It is mostly "night people" who fill the screen with only occasional shots of dishevelled women and dirty men sitting on park benches or shuffling along in the daytime.

In showing the film to young college girls from the upper class of Santiago, the author insisted that we were not looking at a certain section of Montreal but that every large city has its equivalent of *Le Boulevard de Saint Laurent.* The students applauded and expressed their sincere thanks, demonstrating that social evil can be portrayed in a way which serves humanistic, supra-national purposes. The reaction of students from different nations is unvariably one which recalls Terence's dictum: *"Nil humanum puto a me alienum."*

11. *The World of Marshall McLuhan*—A film copy of a one-hour television show based on the book which McLuhan published with Quentin Fiore: *The Medium is the Message.* We earlier made reference to McLuhan's thesis that "the medium is the message" in commenting on *Zorba the Greek.* McLuhan's latest elaboration of this thesis in the form of a pun states that most people live not in the present but in the previous environment. Apart from the avant-garde artists and astute students of social change and cultural flux, the great majority look through a historical rear-view mirror (recall *The Lilies of the Field*). To borrow computer terminology, only a few live in "real time," where knowledge can be used to shape the present.

This film documents McLuhan's observations with brilliant sequences of overlapped images, out-of-sight voices, out-of-focus shots, and feverish intercutting of scenes *à la Eisenstein.* The younger generation find McLuhan refreshing and provocative. The film as a rule, irritates older people. How such films divide audiences is a significant cross-cultural phenomenon. The younger generation, products of the "electronic age," basically sympathize with McLuhan. This has been the author's experience in his teaching experiences in both North and Latin America. *The World of Marshall McLuhan,* captures viewers in diverse cultures, compelling them to co-create the experience. Disconnected, suggestive, a Joycean "stream-of-consciousness" experience, this film can help bring prepared viewers to understand the bias in media and, consequently, the perceptual prejudices which are unconsciously smuggled into every culture.

12. *The Parable*—A film made by the Protestant Council of New York for presentation at the 1964 New York World's Fair. It is a remarkable attempt to use the medium of cinema to convey to 20th century mankind the significance of Christ's life and message. In a sense, both can easily become historical relics, recalling the McLuhan insight that we live life backward and not forward. In order to bring freshness to the gospel story, the makers of *The Parable* resort to a circus background. It is ironic that the spirit of Christ must be clothed in the character of a clown. What he does, however, is ridiculous: exposing himself to the anger of the powerful by helping the underprivileged (the worker, the unemancipated woman, the victim of racial injustice). Finally comes the scene of the clown's voluntary death: an agonizing death scene in the harness of one of the live marionettes, aloft in the high rotunda of the circus tent.

The author led eight film discussions on *The Parable* in Chile with laity and clergy, atheists and Marxists, youth and adults. The diversity of interpretations clearly indicate that the film is a true parable. That is to say, just as in Christ's parables, so too in this film, there are many levels of meaning, some more overt than others. Three points in particular are interesting:

a. Marxists, atheists, and not a few Christians perceive a subtle criticism of organized religion. Thus the tent top in the parallel-crucifixion scene, some claim, looks like a church cupola; the youthful spectators wear cowl-like hoods; the harness-wires are jerked to the sounds of something close to church chimes. The impression is one of prophetic judgment on all institutions as accomplices in the death of the Christ-figure.

b. There is a strong insinuation that the followers of the Christ-figure have not caught His message. They seem to be aloof from the march of history, colorfully portrayed by a succession of decorative floats bearing the names of nations. Just as the picture ends, the man on the donkey seems to veer off onto a side path, no longer part of the parade. Although the evidence is scanty, it is not demonstrably clear that the master of the marionettes undergoes a conversion. Some viewers maintain that he puts on the clown's grease paint to dissimulate the Christ in order to sow discord. These would also hold that the figure on the donkey in the final scene is not the same as at the beginning, but rather the disguised master of the marionettes.

c. It is not certain that there is a resurrection of Christ for we only see a springtime scene of peace and harmony but no physical person resembling the clown. The last scene is reminiscent of the first and cannot be thought to be a clear sign of a physical resurrection.

The intercultural power of this film needs no special argument. The figure of Christ is of transcendental interest and the multiple interpretations carefully folded into the picture, either deliberately or inadvertently, give free play for the imaginations and minds of viewers with divergent backgrounds. The film succeeds in teaching many things ac-

cording to the capacity of those learning. As such it is well-named *The Parable* and revitalizes contemporary mankind's jaded perception of the Christ who taught in parables.

In a world growing smaller and smaller due to satellites, TV, computers, and lasers, it is imperative that attention be given to programming which transcends provincial interests. The author is convinced that underlying the undeniable differences of men and nations, there is a sameness, not a monochromatic sameness, but an inexhaustible wealth of sensibility, spirit, and emotional resonance. We are at an evolutionary juncture where we are seeing civilization in the singular. Our education must recognize that the "image" is the worldwide language which can unite men in the depths of their being across all known barriers of sex, race, class, nation, politics, and religion.

THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING* **

By Francis S. Ronalds, Jr.

International broadcasting is defined as broadcasts prepared in one country but intended for other countries. The discussion of its trends and implications suggests a growing importance.

The world may become a global village some day, and home receivers may be picking up audio and video signals via satellite from all over the world. But that "some day" will not be soon, certainly not in this decade and probably not in the next.

On the other hand, if we judge by the investments going into transmitters for use in external propaganda efforts via short- and medium-wave radio, and if we accept estimates that the number of short-wave radios will nearly double during the seventies, then there is no doubt that international broadcasting is alive and well, enjoying healthy middle age.

DEFINITIONS

Before examining the above claims, let us define terms. Just what *is* international broadcasting?

. . . I exclude domestic broadcasting in foreign countries and speak solely of broadcasts prepared in one country but intended for other countries. Such "external" broadcasts may be mounted by governments, either officially as external services or unofficially as clandestine stations, by "public/private corporations," by religious groups, and by commercial

*Special thanks for help in preparing this paper go to Mrs. Barbara Schiele, VOA's inexhaustible fount of facts and figures on the subject.

**Excerpts from "The Future of International Broadcasting," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 398 (November 1971), pp. 71–80. Reprinted with the permission of the American Academy of Political and Social Science and the courtesy of the author.

operations. Most of the major international broadcasters, including Moscow, Radio Peking, Radio Cairo, the Voice of America (VOA), and the Deutsche Welle (the external radio of the West German government) belong to the first category. At the moment of writing, there are seventeen Communist and fourteen non-Communist clandestine radio stations. The British Broadcasting Corporation and certain Commonwealth stations patterned after it, including the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, are granted appropriations by Parliament but are not directly controlled by the government currently in power. Radio Free Euope and Radio Liberty . . . [may] be converted into similar "public/private" corporations. . . . Radio Peace and Progress, although housed in the same building as Radio Moscow, purports to be supported by Soviet public organizations. . . .

Major religious broadcasters. . .may carry news but . . . concentrate on bringing the word of God to people who might otherwise be deprived of it.

* * * * *

One service of Radio Cairo beams out recitations from the Koran for 98 hours a week. Of the commercial broadcasters carrying international services, the largest are Radio Luxembourg and Europe Number One––the latter located in the Saar. Their audiences are estimated in the tens of millions. The Commercial Service of the Ceylonese Broadcasting Corporation, although not described as an external service, would not be so lucrative if it were not for its millions of listeners in India.

I am aware of only one television station with an "external" service: Tallin TV is beamed across the Baltic in Swedish and Finnish. There are, however, important "spillover" audiences for a few TV and many national radio stations. Of political significance is the considerable if unmeasurable viewership for Austrian TV across the borders in Hungary and Czechoslovakia; there is a lot of cross-watching between East and West Germany, particularly in the Berlin area; and Estonians can pick up and understand Finnish TV programs.

Listening to a foreign country's domestic radio broadcasts is traditional in Europe, where some powerful medium- and long-wave signals virtually blanket the continent. Accra is heard throughout Anglophone West Africa, Radio Conakry in the French-speaking countries, and Nairobi is popular throughout East Africa. Refugees from China report listening to Cantonese programs from Hong Kong. The U.S. Armed Forces Radio-Television System, broadcasting only in English for troops stationed abroad, is believed to have a very large audience, particularly in Germany, Japan, and Southeast Aisa. However, even though spillover listening to such programs may have international political consequences, they cannot rightly be labeled "international broadcasts." With the United Arab Republic, on the other hand, it is difficult to distinguish domestic from external broadcasts. Radio Cairo's three 500-kilowatt medium-wave transmitters can be heard though-out the Near East and North Africa, as

well as in the UAR itself. Its Arabic programing is generally aimed at Arabs everywhere.

In the case of certain international broadcasters, direct listening is supplemented by relays and by "placement." A great many Commonwealth nations continue to relay BBC newscasts and other programs on domestic facilities. Hundreds of stations south of the Rio Grande regularly relay portions of VOA programs in Spanish and Portuguese; two-thirds of Latin America's 3,600 medium-wave stations carried VOA coverage of the flight of Apollo 11. Communist stations do not fare so well. Somewhat to the surprise of experts, Havana so far has not seen fit to relay Radio Moscow, which receives such brotherly support only from Ulan Bator. Little Albania, one of the largest international broadcasters, has only recently begun to relay selected programs of Radio Peking. Largely as a by-product of direct broadcasts, BBC and VOA also ship out vast quantities of taped programs for replay by government and commercial stations all over the world. The Office de Co-operation Radiophonique (OCORA), now absorbed into the foreign service of the French Radio, supplies much of the programing carried over many French-speaking nations in Africa, the Caribbean, and elsewhere. Relay and placement is also common within the East European Communist bloc.

Since this whole range of activity is too broad for coverage in one short article, I will discuss only the politically significant broadcasts of official government and "public/private" stations.

SATELLITES

What about the future? Will satellites make it possible for Moscow, the Voice of America, and other broadcasters to dispense with short-wave and to beam TV as well as radio programs directly into the homes of people practically everywhere?

The United Nations Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites says no—not for a long time to come. In a report of February 26, 1969, it concluded:

> While it is considered that satellite technology has reached the stage at which it is possible to contemplate the future development of satellites capable of direct broadcasting to the public at large, direct broadcasting of television signals into existing, *unaugmented* home receivers on an operational basis is not foreseen for the period 1970–1985.

In a July, 1970, report to the White House, a panel of U.S. government experts under the chairmanship of W. E. Plummer of the Office of Telecommunications Management came to the conclusion that direct radio broadcasts by satellite, while technologically feasible, are economically out of sight:

> Such a satellite could provide a single voice channel to an area the size of Brazil, for up to twenty-four hours a day, with poor to good quality reception by typical FM receivers employing simple outdooor antennas. However, the estimated annual cost would be between $40 and $50 million. By comparison, the VOA is presently

reaching the entire Western Hemisphere with a consistently good signal many hours a day for approximately $1.5 million a year using terrestrial high frequency transmitters for as many as three different programs simultaneously.

The total annual budget of the VOA comes to slightly over $40 million a year—the price of that one satellite circuit.

The cost of satellite circuits will drop, but other obstacles will remain. Many countries fear a possible loss of control over their own mass media and wish to write into international law a provision preventing broadcasting via satellite into any area where the local government does not desire to have it. Copyright restrictions likewise present nightmarish complications. And last but by no means least, the broadcast spectrum is so crowded in the high and ultra-high frequency ranges that the world Administrative Radio Conference of the International Telecommunications Union held in Geneva in June/July of this year determined that a portion of the spectrum in the newly developed superhigh frequency range would be set aside for use in direct broadcasting by satellite, and for the first time allocated frequencies for direct broadcasting via satellites to home receivers. This means that when and if direct broadcasting by satellite becomes technologically, economically, legally, and politically feasible, new TV sets must be devised capable of receiving signals at frequencies up to 12 *gigaherz*, or 12 billion cycles per second.

So-called educational satellites, capable of relaying a signal into relatively low-cost "community" receiving stations, are a different matter. The United States is due to loft one such "Edsat" in 1974 over the Indian Ocean for use by India. Brazil hopes to get one a year or two later, and the Andean nations are talking about sharing one. However, due to the fears of "cultural imperialism" and the need to tailor educational programs to specific national conditions, as well as to the fact that Edsats will be controlled by the governments of the countries using them, these second-generation satellites are not expected to provide any significant outlets for international broadcasters.

Existing point-to-point satellite stations—expensive installations which send, receive, and amplify extremely faint signals from space —have so far been used sparingly by international broadcasters. The only organization of any kind to purchase dedicated 24-hour voice circuits for extended periods is the Voice of America, which has used them on an experimental basis to feed its relay stations in the Far East. The satellite circuits proved to be more reliable than short wave, but more expensive. As prices fall, satellite circuits may be ordered for regular feeding of far-off relay stations. In the meantime, they will be used occasionally as back-up for high frequency circuits during periods of poor propagation.

GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

With TV out of the picture, the term "international broadcasting" will remain synonymous with international radio for a long time to come. But is international radio becoming more, or less, important? Are the signals

fading away or getting more numerous and more powerful? Are more countries getting in on the act, or are they opting out? Is the number of languages that are broadcast going up, or down? the total time on the air increasing , or falling?

In 1966 there were 52 broadcasting transmitters of 200 kilowatt or greater strength. By 1969 there were 131, 180 in 1970, and in 1971, 185. In Europe, East Asia, the Near East, and Africa alone, there were 47 such transmitters in 1968; now there are 93.

Construction of short-wave superpower transmitters (200 kilowatts and above) moves ahead at a furious pace, increasing by 255 percent over the past five years. Leading the pack is the Deutsche Welle, which is building twelve 500-kilowatt transmitters inside Germany. All twelve are scheduled to go into operation before the Munich Olympics in 1972, and there are plans for new relay stations in Rwanda, Malta, and the Caribbean.

International broadcasts are not limited to short wave, as many people seem to think. Although extra-continental broadcasters reach Africa and the Americas only via short wave, medium wave is very important in Europe and Asia. In the Far East alone, the VOA has three megawatt (one-million watt) medium-wave transmitters—each with a strength twenty times as great as the most powerful United States domestic station. It has others in Europe, the Near East and, for Cuba, in Florida. The BBC pours 600 kilowatts into Europe and has a 1½ megawatt medium-wave transmitter outside the Persian Gulf. The USSR uses medium wave for Europe and the Near East, whereas China covers much of South and East Asia with several powerful medium-wave stations, one believed to have a power of two megawatts. Many of these boom louder than domestic stations in the intended target areas. And the trend is still up. In the period 1968 to 1971, the number of superpower medium-wave transmitters used in international broadcasting jumped by 97 percent and large numbers are reported under construction.[1]

Many smaller nations have come into the field. Saudi Arabia, for example, recently inaugurated a megawatt medium-wave station and Congo-Kinshasa [Zaire] has a 600-kilowatt medium-wave transmitter that reaches as far as Abidjan. The greater power does not, however, necessarily mean that the signals will be heard better than before. Spectra for both the short and medium wave-lengths are now so crowded that co-frequency interference limits the effective coverage area. You have to shout louder to be heard at all.

According to the last totting up by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (the U.S. government radio monitoring organization), in May of 1969 international broadcasts had reached the incredible total of sixteen thousand hours weekly, and were still on the way up. The USSR is way ahead with 1,921 hours. However, if Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and RIAS (Radio In the American Sector of Berlin) are added to the VOA, the U.S. total rises to 2,155. Outside Eastern Europe the United

States is again far behind Communist countries, which carry a whopping 6,478 hours weekly.

The number of professionals employed in the business of international broadcasting is considerable. Of the Western stations, the BBC External Services have the largest staff: thirty-six hundred people. A Royal Commission headed by Valentine Duncan in 1968/69 proposed drastic cuts in British government overseas operations but praised the BBC and even recommended a technological build-up. VOA has a staff of twenty-two hundred, more than half of them technical personnel. Staff sizes of Communist stations are not known, but in view of the number of languages broadcast out of Russia—eighty-two, compared with thirty-eighty for the BBC and thirty-five for the VOA—the USSR's External Services must be huge.

Over the past four years, the number of Communist clandestine stations has increased from fourteen to seventeen, the total broadcasting volume rising by 42 percent, from 450 to 639 hours weekly. The additional effort is aimed mainly at Southeast Asia, presumably in the hope of filling a vaccum left by the expected U.S. pullback from the area.

The expense of this vast effort has been estimated at a billion dollars yearly in construction and operation costs, exclusive of the several hundred million dollars doled out every year for jamming by the USSR, China, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia.[2]

THE IMPACT OF TELEVISION

So, more money and men are going into international broadcasting, and there is evidence that this will continue. But are more people listening? What has been or will be the effect of the development of domestic mass media, particularly television?

Wherever TV has taken hold, it has had a powerful effect on radio listening, and on virtually every other leisture-time activity, as well. The most comprehensive international study of the subject has been carried out under Dr. Alexander Szalai of UNITAR, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research.[3] It covers, on a twenty-four-hour basis, the leisure-time activities of comparable control groups in Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, East Germany, West German, Hungary, Peru, Poland, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. John P. Robinson of the University of Michigan was one of the sociologists involved. In the Summer, 1969, issue of the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, he discusses TV-watching in these twelve countries. He points to evidence that in all countries, apparently independently of the total amount of leisure time available and of the different types and quantity of programing offered, the average amount of time spent by the population in viewing television rises at approximately the same rate and in direct proportion to the increase in the number of sets in operation.

At the saturation point, as in the United States—and apparently in Britain and Japan, although they were not among the participating

countries—people sit in front of the "boob tube" for about two hours daily, which in the United States amounts to about 40 percent of their leisure time.[4] They generally watch, not because they have favorite programs, but because they have nothing better to do. There is little televiewing in the morning or during the daytime, even in those relatively few countries that have extensive daytime programing.

As for radio listening, in the twelve countries surveyed, this has become almost entirely a "secondary" occupation; people listen while driving their cars, doing the housework, eating, shaving, and so forth. In the countries covered, time spent listening to the radio in 1966 varied from thirty-six minutes a day in West Germany through one hour in the United States and up to an hour and forty-eight minutes in Czechoslovakia.

It is obvious that, at the very least, nighttime radio listening is bound to be affected—has probably already been seriously affected—by the growth of TV in the urban areas of East and West Europe and in Latin America, as well as in Japan, the United States, and Canada. People don't very often watch television and listen to the radio simultaneously. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the total number of people listening to radio is decreasing, or that the aggregate amount of time spend listening to radio is falling off. Nor does it mean, necessarily, that there is less listening to international radio, even in the urban areas affected.

WHO LISTENS TO INTERNATIONAL RADIO?

There were about 370 million radios in the world outside of the United States in 1970; of these, approximately one-third can tune short-wave. There were an additional 275 million sets in the United States, of which only two million could tune short-wave. By 1980, the world's population will have increased by 1.3 billion, while the number of radios—and the number of shortwave sets—is expected to double.[5] Per-capita radio listening in the United States and West Europe will probably remain steady.[6] As the transistor revolution continues, hundreds of millions of people who have seldom had access to the radio in the past will begin listening regularly—in the rural areas of Latin America, even in the outback of Siberia and Soviet Central Asia.[7]

As far as Asia and Africa are concerned, with the major exception of Japan, radio will remain communications king during the seventies and beyond. In China, "radio has become a crucial Maoist tool of mobilization."[8] The late Gamal Abdul Nasser, as he was launching the remarkable expansion of Radio Cario, wrote:

> It is true that most of our people are still illiterate. But politically that counts far less than it did 20 years ago. . . . Radio has changed everything. . . . Today, people in the most remote villages hear of what is happening everywhere and form their opinion. Leaders cannot govern as they once did. We live in a new world.[9]

Noting United Nations predictions that Asia and Africa have a long time to go before they have enough newspapers and cinemas, Wilbur Schramm writes that "the picture points to the importance of radio in the decade ahead."[10]

In considering the future audience of listeners specifically to international radio, it is important to keep a number of factors in mind. Already mentioned is the fact that many international broadcasters cover vast areas with strong medium-wave signals, as well as by short wave. Also important—and this often comes as a surprise to Americans—is the widespread use of short wave outside the United States. Many countries, particularly very large ones like the USSR, China, India, the Congo, and Brazil, make extensive use of short wave for domestic broadcasting, since it constitutes the cheapest means of covering widespread areas. Broadcasting in Indonesia, a land of thousands of islands stretched over three thousand miles of water, is almost exclusively via short-wave. Most would be inclined to think that the cost of 729 hours of English-language programs broadcast via short-wave to North America every week is money down the drain, but even here it is claimed that some one million Americans listen with some regularity and that they are, in fact, influenced by what they hear.[11]

WHY DO THEY LISTEN?

Signal strength and frequency aside, people listen to foreign radio to get something they don't get from their domestic media. This may be certain types of entertainment, such as Western jazz and pop music. They may listen out of sympathy for political views barred at home, or simply "to get the other fellow's point of view." Major Western broadcasters are convinced, however, that the primary motive is the desire—often the need—for timely, accurate, objective information, which the domestic media of most of their target countries fail to provide. After the 1968 imposition of censorship in Brazil, for example, Agence France Presse reported that the BBC and VOA had become the sole reliable sources of news on events in Brazil itself. "It is not rare in Brasilia," said the AFP dispatch of December 20, 1968, "to see officials desert receptions and return home to listen to the British and American radio." Although scientific surveys are scarce, evidence is sufficient that people in Communist countries will go to the trouble of listening to jammed broadcasts that are only fifteen minutes long in order to get information denied to them by their own media.[12] Other means of international communication can be controlled by government authorities but radio broadcasting, as the BBC's External Services Director, Oliver Whitley, has said, "cannot be confiscated, or refused a visa, or burnt in the public square."[13]

For Communist broadcasters, providing the current line to the party faithful may take precedence over building up a listening audience among those who thirst for objective information.[14] At any rate, available surveys almost always show Moscow, Peking, and other communist stations

trailing far behind Western stations. Of regular listeners to foreign radio in Hungary in 1967, Gallup has reported 64 percent listened to Radio Free Europe, 31 percent to the BBC, 30 percent to VOA, and 16 percent to Radio Moscow. In Poland in 1969, it was 36 percent for VOA, 32 percent for RFE, 31 percent for BBC, and just 1 percent for Radio Moscow. Among college graduates surveyed in East Africa in 1968, the Voice of Kenya had 70 percent, BBC 61 percent, Radio Uganda 45 percent, VOA 36 percent, Radio Tanzania 33 percent, Radio Brazzaville 19 percent, Voice of the Gospel 17 percent, Radio Moscow 7 percent, Deutsche Welle 7 percent, and Radio Peking 2 percent. A general population survey carried out by the German government in Argentina in 1968 shows the BBC on top among foreign broadcasters with 3.4 percent, VOA 3 percent, Moscow 1.1 percent, Deutsche Welle 1 percent, Spain 1 percent, France .6 percent and Havana, Peking, and CBC all .5 percent. Only in India does Moscow do relatively well. According to a 1969 survey of regular listeners to foreign broadcasts, Radio Ceylon had 83 percent, BBC 66 percent, VOA 58 percent, and Radio Moscow 55 percent.

Within government bureaucracies, the debate will doubtless continue as to what audiences their radio operations should try to reach. Some will advance the "elite" theory—called the "target group concept" within the U.S. Information Agency, and described informally by BBC programmers as "the pernicious doctrine of the influential few." Most professionals in the business of international radio will agree that they want most of all to reach the "opinion leaders." But they understand this term in the sense used by sociologists, beginning with Paul Lazarsfeld in the 1940's: that is, not as limited to representatives of the elite and of the media, but as made up of individuals in all walks of life who influence their peers. It is further argued that persons sufficiently motivated to listen to foreign broadcasts are likely to belong to such groups, which include potential leaders not otherwise identifiable. It is this large body of people—estimated at from 10 to 20 percent of the adult population of most countries—that forms "public opinion," a force that has been growing at a quickening pace over the past two centuries. Diplomats, writes Lloyd Free,

> do not include in their calculations the degree to which the public all over the world has, in fact, got into the act; nor the extent to which propaganda, popular persuasion, and information and cultural programs have become major instruments of the new diplomacy.[15]

HOW INFLUENTIAL IS INTERNATIONAL RADIO?

We have seen that a tremendous effort is going into international broadcasting, and that the audiences are large. But what effect does all this have?

Obviously, there is no pat answer. Don Smith notwithstanding (see footnote 11), it is hard to believe that short-wave broadcasts have had any appreciable effect on the thinking of Americans. But in much of the rest of

the world, international broadcasts may be as influential as local radio, occasionally even more so. In Africa, radio has been "an essential instrument of national development,"[16] and BBC, VOA, and ORTF have all seen it to be in their interest to help propagate this development. Radio is also seen as the "most powerful" and "crucial" weapon in the "war for men's minds" on the dark continent.[17]

In Nigeria, Brazil, and India, for example, Everett Rogers found the broadcast media particularly important in the diffusion of innovations. Of the world's largest country, Ithiel de Sola Pool has said:

> Most of the things of a positive character that are happening in the Soviet Union today are explainable only in terms of the influence of the West, for which the most important single channel is radio. There is now enough communication to keep us part of a single civilization, to keep us influencing each other, to assure that any Western idea circulates in the Soviet Union, too. The pessimistic expectation that totalitarianism could develop an accepted heinous civilization of its own by 1984 or any other year has been defeated primarily by the forces of communication, and above all by international radio.[18]

CONCLUSION

The public for international radio will continue to be a broad one, including a wide spectrum of the intellectually curious. Its influence will vary, depending upon signal penetration, competition of local media, area listening habits, the presence or absence of crisis situations, and other factors. Morning listening will become relatively more important where televiewing has become widespread. The purpose of international broadcasts may shift slightly in the direction of plugging the industries or products of the sponsor country, as has happened in recent years with the BBC and the Deutsche Welle. . . . [The] Director General of the BBC, describes the role of the External Services as "the cultivation of trade and good will."[19] Yet the prime aims will undoubtedly remain political; to win friends, explain policies, break down the other fellow's monopoly on information, and, particularly for "clandestine" operations, support rebel movements and subvert the governments of target countries.

The race to build bigger transmitters and mount more programing becomes increasingly expensive. Yet in the last analysis, the major international broadcasters cannot afford to fall behind. They fear to leave the field open to others, whose interests are less than identical at best and sharply inimical at worst. For the future of international radio it is safe to predict: more of the same.

NOTES

1. For Europe, North Africa, and Asia. Figures compiled by FBIS and VOA.

2. VOA is jammed in Havana, but rather ineffectually. Suspicious interference with Western broadcasts has also been reported in Cairo and Alexandria. The USSR jams Peking's broadcasts in Russian, but China leaves Moscow's Mandarin programs unmolested. China also leaves BBC alone, concentrating on the VOA and the Republic of China's 274 hours a week out of Taiwan in eight different Chinese dialects. In 1963, Khrushchev lifted Soviet jamming of VOA and BBC—not Radio Liberty—but it was resumed within hours of the

invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968. Jamming of Western broadcasts in Czech and Slovak was also resumed at that time.

[3] Alexander Szalai, "Multinational Comparative Social Research," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 10 (December, 1966). Two volumes of the results of this study are due for publication later in 1971.

[4] Some U.S. surveys have put the time spent in televiewing as high as three hours daily or even more, but Dr. Robinson has told me that he considers these figures inflated. Various studies by the R-TV Culture Research Institute of NHK, the Japanese national broadcasting system, put the Japanese average at about three hours daily.

[5] Edgar T. Martin and George Jacobs, "Shortwave Broadcasting in the 1970's," in J.M. Frost, ed., *How to Listen to the World* (Pontllanfraith, Wales; Pendragon Press, 1971), pp. 4–8.

[6] The *European Broadcasting Union Review* of July, 1970 reports "a general stabilization of the over-all audience with a slight increase in certain countries" and "an upward trend in the early morning."

[7] According to Radio Liberty, the number of sets in the Soviet Union, exclusive of wired speakers, stood at just 50 million in 1970, or about one to every five persons. Twenty-eight million sets tune to short wave. However, there was a great concentration of sets in European Russia.

[8] Alan P. Liu, "Mass Communication and Media in China's Cultural Revolution," *Journalism Quarterly*, 46 (Summer, 1969), p. 314.

[9] Gamal Abdul Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of a Revolution* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1955).

[10] Wilbur Schramm, "World Distribution of the Mass Media," in Heinz-Dietrich Fischer and John C. Merrill, eds., *International Communication* (New York: Hastings House, 1970), p. 157.

[11] See Don D. Smith, "America's Short-Wave Audience: Twenty-Five Years Later," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 33 (Winter, 1969/70), pp. 537–545; and "Some Effects of Radio Moscow's North American Broadcasts," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34 (Winter, 1970/71), pp. 539–551.

[12] Over one-half of the blocks of vernacular language broadcasts carried by the BBC External Services are no more than fifteen minutes long.

[13] *BBC Handbook* (London: Cox & Wyman, 1970), p. 16.

[14] An article in the May 27 issue of the Turkish newspaper *Son Havadis* charged that "there were identical passages in broadcasts of the Communist 'Our Radio' transmission from East German and Hungary, and articles by certain writers in Turkey."

[15] Lloyd A. Free, "Public Opinion Research," in Arthur S. Hoffman, ed., *International Communication and the New Diplomacy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), p. 52.

[16] Rosalynde Ainslie, *The Press in Africa* (New York: Walker and Co., 1966), pp. 153–176.

[17] Ibid., p. 166.

[18] Address in Workshop in Communications with the People of the USSR, sponsored by the Radio Liberty Committee and the Department of Communications in Education, New York University School of Education, November 19, 1965. Professor de Sola Pool reports that information amassed over the past six years has further confirmed this statement.

[19] *BBC Handbook*, 1970, p. 16.

PROPAGANDA THROUGH THE PRINTED MEDIA IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES*

BY Y. V. LAKSHMANA RAO

Developing countries fear the introduction of alien and undesirable influences in the form of printed media from the outside world. Unlike the developed countries, developing societies are almost exclusively consumers of international communications, not producers; audience, not communicator. The "flow of communications" is essentially unidirectional in such cases.

* * * * *

THE PRINT MEDIA

Insofar as the printed media in the developing countries are concerned, there are certain specific factors which one can discuss as leading to an international intercourse which is neither planned nor propagated deliberately. It is difficult, in the absence of any systematic study, to point out how much of this international intercourse is "propaganda" and how much is non-persuasive content affecting thought and behavior. To the extent that in many of these countries a relatively free press does exist and that outright censorship does not exist, there is scope for a considerable amount of international flow of information. But there are other factors within the structure of the printed media themselves which lead to a situation where a great deal of non-indigenous material comes in. These factors are worthy of consideration.

The post-colonial era left a number of newspapers in the hands of foreign investors and of expatriate editors and editorial staff who gained their experience during the colonial period. We are not now dealing with those newspapers which printed surreptitiously and perhaps provoked people into rebellion or some other manifestation of an anti-colonial nature leading thereby to independence. We are talking only about those newspapers which were economically viable and which have continued to publish after the countries gained independence. The editorial staffs of these papers have continued, generally speaking, as the "Westerners" did. They have continued to belong to an elite group which is invariably far removed from the mass of the people; they have continued, by and large, to talk a certain "language"—which is usually the language of *The Times* of London or the *Daily News* or the *Daily Express*. These have been the newspapers which the average journalist in the developing countries still tries to emulate, whether or not he has the benefit of the audience of, say, *The New York Times*. This has led to a certain professional conformity which is international. It has also limited their appeal, viewed in the context of communities where broad-based governments

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and political structures are now generally the rule. This has left the newspapers catering only to a small minority, however important that minority may be in the decision-making process.

Another factor leading to such conformity is both economic and professional in nature: the presence of the big international news agencies, and in many ways their stranglehold on the newspapers of the developing countries. It is professional because of the quality and the convenience which these agencies provide; it is economic because most of the newspapers cannot afford to have correspondents in the major news centers of the world. An additional reason is that many of the developing countries cannot afford to have national news agencies of any reasonable size; and even where these exist, such agencies in turn have to subscribe to one or more of the international agencies for their inflow of world news.

The pressure toward "objectivity" and accuracy to satisfy a mixed clientele—including governments, commerce, and industry, as well as news media of varying political beliefs—has already led to conformity among the newspapers in the industrially advanced countries, where it is increasingly common to have only one newspaper in each town. Although not quite to the same extent, a similar situation seems to be developing in other parts of the world. In the absence of human and material resources to support competing newspapers, news agencies, or feature services, the content of newspapers is becoming increasingly standarized.

SPECIALIZED AUDIENCES

In the case of magazines, however, the situation is perhaps slightly better, but only slightly. While these publishers do aim at more specialized audiences—youth, women, the educated elite, the business community, and so on—even they are finding it more convenient and cheaper either to subscribe to syndicated material from abroad or to buy regional rights to publication of new books in serialized form.

Even where book publishing is concerned, it is becoming increasingly common for publishing firms to establish similar relationships with publishers abroad. One need only to go into a book shop or a stationery shop in a developing country to find this uniformity of taste (innate or developed) extending to such things as posters and phonograph records.

Among the widely circulated magazines, *Time*, *Newsweek*, *Life* and the *Reader's Digest* come immediately to mind as those which have special editions for specific regions, with local advertising and well-organized distribution systems. Newspapers like the international edition of the *Herald Tribune*, the Sunday *New York Times*, or the weekly English edition of *Le Monde*, reach the far corners of the earth within a day or two of publication. And books, whether they be *The Death of a President*, *The Ugly American*, or *Candy*, are to be found on the bookshelves of the rest of the world at almost the same time as they reach the homes of Americans.

It is obvious, therefore,that, for good or bad, international intercourse made possible through the ever-expanding channels of communication has indeed led to a certain amount of commonness and uniformity through the printed media, even as it has led to the same result through the non-print media.

One must note, however, that insofar as the developing countries are concerned, this commonness and uniformity, internationally speaking, have so far been generally confined to small minorities—minorities which are well educated and relatively high up in the socio-economic scale. It is only a matter of time before these tastes, these values and beliefs, percolate downward and begin to affect the majorities. This will happen as intra-national communication networks begin to function as effectively as the international channels perform today. The tragedy in many of the developing countries is that it is easier, in both a practical and a psychological sense, for a person in a capital city to communicate with London or Paris or New York or Moscow than with someone in a smaller town or rural community in his own country.

The recognition of this phenomenon in the developing countries has been fairly recent. Fears are being expressed openly by the leaders in these countries that the process has already gone so far that it cannot be reversed. The question now is: should efforts be made in fact to reverse it, or is it the inevitable result of development and modernization? After all, these are, in most cases, the same leaders who only a few years ago not only recognized the need for international intercourse but also insisted upon it. The price, if indeed it is a price, had to be paid. If pressures are growing for a reversal of the process, these pressures are being exerted, by and large, by the senior citizens, to whom such change has perhaps been too rapid for adjustment and too intense for emotional comfort. Where such a feeling of going too far has been felt by the leaders themselves, it is very political in nature, and only social and cultural to a lesser degree. Foreign investment, welcomed in other fields, has been seen as a threat—a political threat—when it impinges upon the media. There has been a growing concern about expatriates owning and/or operating the media, for fear that public sentiment may be swayed in favor of political ideologies repugnant to the basic tenets of the present leaders.

One of the more cogent arguments of the leaders of developing countries today is that political stability is perhaps more important than political philosophy—and especially the freedoms that go with it—and that a country cannot afford the luxury of a clash of ideas or a clash of interests while it is dealing with the more fundamental problems of food and shelter.

As far as the printed media are concerned, the pressure is toward more conformity—not conformity with international standards or international symbols but with national aspirations, with national needs and national priorities, and therefore with national governments. The printed media

therefore are standing today amid a great deal of talk about international intercourse, and are on the brink of disaster, for the very reason that in their shortsighted quest for internationalism—admittedly propounded by their own national leadership at an earlier stage—they are paying the price for neglecting their own national roles.

It has been said repeatedly in the literature of communication that a country's media networks and media content are but a reflection of the country's own structure, its own values, beliefs, and aspirations, and its own stage of development. To the extent that the printed media are in the throes of intellectual ferment, they do reflect the mood of their countries. The media as producers have been found wanting; the media as importers have been shortsighted. By importing material to satisfy their own immediate needs and by not making efforts meanwhile to develop their own production capacities, they are in danger of neither producing nor being allowed to import further.

The implication of such a state of affairs, viewed from an international point of view, propagandistic or otherwise, is frightening. This discussion has dealt with the problem deliberately and almost exclusively from the point of view of the developing countries because the more developed countries have had such intercourse for a long time and have built their own safeguards and their own forms of attack. The United States and the Soviet Union, for example, have worked out a fairly convenient way of exchanging publications, such as *America Illustrated* and *Soviet Life*. The number of copies, the content, and the like, are all fairly well standardized. No overtly propagandistic material is permitted, but each knows what type of content may subtly influence the readers.

The developing countries are new at this game. But they are beginning to learn the rules and it would be a great shame if, because of their own lack of experience and lack of foresight, they were to stop playing the game altogether. Propaganda used in its broadest and healthiest connotation can add greatly to a society's education and experience. The political aspects of it can perhaps be controlled if all parties concerned can achieve some kind of understanding in a spirit of give and take. But to lose sight of the social and cultural advantages accruing from international exchange of information, and so to reject them, is tantamount to throwing out the baby with the bath water.

In his oft-quoted discussion on *Political Propaganda*, Barlett said as long ago as 1940 that

> today propaganda is in the air and on it. There is no escaping from its insistent voice. Even were it only half as effective as it is often claimed to be its power would be enormous. . . . It is at work to fashion the education of the child, the ambitions of youth, the activities of the prime of life, and it pursues the aged to the grave.[1]

It is this fear of propaganda, right or wrong, that the leadership in the developing countries shares.

NOTES

1. "The Aims of Political Propaganda," Daniel Katz, et al., editors, *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1954), p. 464.

EVALUATING FILMS FOR DEVELOPMENT*

BY TULSI BHATIA SARAL

A qualitiative evaluation of film effectiveness in communicating development principles.

In order to be able to criticize or evaluate . . . films [in the international development process] we must first be clear in our minds about the goals and purposes we want these films to serve in the process of development.

We must, for example, determine decisively whether we want the films to inform people about what is happening in their villages, or whether we want the films to be consciously used as instruments of change to facilitate acceptance of new ideas. Do we want the films to serve as tools for imparting new skills and techniques, or do we want them simply to provide recreation in the otherwise dull and monotonous life of the village? Are our films to serve the villagers, the elected village leaders, the paid government workers employed for development work at the village and block levels, or the rare elite, usually far-removed from the realities of village-life but unfortunately actively involved in the decision-making processes affecting the very future of the village-community? These, and a host of similar questions need to be posed, thoroughly studied, and satisfactorily answered before any systematic and serious attempt to formulate evaluation procedures for developmental films can be made.

THE EXPECTATIONS

Odd as it may appear, the exact role of films in development has never been clearly specified. All of us engaged in development work all over the world, in our sacred enthusiasm, assume that the communication process is basic to development, diffusion of innovations and modernization, and that if we are to succeed in sparking the expansion of the productivity of underdeveloped nations, we must somehow become more effective communicators. We also assume that of the mass media readily available or commissionable in developing countries, film is the most effective (it has moving pictures, combined sight and sound, has a novel appeal, etc.) and has the potential to cut across the language and cultural barriers.

Without ever caring to test any of these seemingly sound yet vague and rather general assumptions, production units all over the world have been spending vast sums of money turning out movies on development and related topics, and development agencies—governmental, non-governmental, national, international—have been helping finance their large-scale production and distribution in the remotest parts of the world, wishfully thinking that once the people come out of their shells and

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*Excerpts from "Evaluating Films for Development," *International Development Review*, VIII, No. 4 (December 1966), pp. 39–41. Reprinted with the permission of The Society for International Development, copyright holder.

expose themselves to these wonderful vehicles of opinion, attitude and behavior-change, they will feel inspired to change their outlook if not their living habits, and the task of development will be that much easier.

THE FAILURES

To our great disappointment, however, the miracle does not happen. After successive screening of hundreds of brilliantly produced works of art, which invariably draw large audiences whenever and wherever screened, the message of development does not seem to be getting across—people, somehow, do not seem to be changing their attitudes and behavior in the desired direction. What is more frustrating is that we do not know where our failure lies because we never knew what we wanted our films to achieve to begin with.

Is it because most of the available films, originally produced for a specified audience, are shown indiscriminately to any available audience? (This seems doubtful, because most of the films, unfortunately, are not produced with a specific audience in view.) Is it because the content of the films is too technical, too complex, too obviously propaganda-oriented that the audience turns off its receptivity at the very outset? (An Indian villager, for example, does think of efforts at propagating developmental activities as propaganda but nevertheless exposes himself to such media. Obviously, the villager expects from these media some entertainment value. In the case of a movie, it is a moving picture and he can see people and things in motion—very often people with whom he can identify and things which he can recognize.) Or is it that our basic assumption that movies cut across language and cultural barriers is invalid—maybe they don't; maybe every geographic region and every cultural region employs and understands a completely different visual language—a completely different film-language, if you please. It may be that certain meanings or messages in a particular region communicate an entirely different and irrelevant meaning or message in a different region or culture!

We know, by now, that the simple skeletal diagram of communication, SENDER—MESSAGE RECEIVER, is not a valid representation of how communication works. (If it were, the task of rural development would be vastly easier than it is!) There are, in addition, the questions of audience-predispositon, self-selection, and selective perception. We have been forced to realize that mass communications as such are not really powerful enough to bring about significant changes in deep-rooted attitudes or widespread adoption of new practices. Functioning simultaneously (sometimes reinforcing and sometimes retarding or counteracting) are a host of other important factors such as the audience's image of the source of communication, the group-orientation of the audience-members and the degree to which they value the group-membership, social aspects of the content of communication, and so on. As of now, we have no way of formulating any systematic description of what effects are effected how,

or of determining the role and weight of one or more of the many potential factors in such a process.

An important facet of the role of communication is its relation to the growth of popular aspiration toward betterment. Unless the desire for change and for appreciably higher living standards takes root in the peasant communities, new techniques from outside will not be accepted or exploited fully. Unfortunately, however, development in most countries is a government responsibility, and many of the developmental agencies—particularly the international organizations—largely base their development efforts on the govermental assessment of plans, priorities and people's aspirations. Often, such assessments are either far removed from the real aspirations of the people, or are unrealistically overenthusiastic. No wonder films made to fit such a framework fail to trigger the motivation of people to change.

SOME COMMUNICATION CLICHES

It is fashionable today to say that any communications program, to be successful, must carry information that is "local" in character, is acceptable and understandable to the village people and is relevant to the problems that villagers themselves sense as problems serious enough to warrant action toward their solution. It is more easily said than implemented that communication must consider local traditions, habits and beliefs that should not (or cannot?) be shaken. The real problem arises when an attempt is made to translate such seemingly simple and straightforward propositions into action, because we have no objective criterion by which to determine the "localism" of a particular piece of information or problem, nor do we know where to draw a line between the traditional beliefs that must be given up and those which may be blended with, or can perhaps co-exist with, the modern belief systems.

NEED FOR THOUGHTFUL ACTION

The need is to define more precisely the prevalent terms and describe more explicitly the relationships we assume to exist between various facets of communication and development. This relationship between communication and development in all its aspects is a field of study with relatively recent origins; and so far, conscientious and well organized use of media, based on behavioral patterns and on sociological and psychological factors relating to individuals and groups, has not been made in the field of development. The film section of this *Review* can make a vital contribution by pinpointing blind spots in this field and by specifying directions for immediate research attention. A beginning can perhaps be made by compiling a bibliography of available evaluation reports of mass communications in general, and films in particular, in the process of development, in order to facilitate the pooling of knowledge and speedy exchange of experience. A systematic effort may perhaps then be made to propose some exploratory studies, to probe, to test, and to stimulate

more rigorous research on relationships between variables that come into play in communications and development.

EFFECTS ANALYSIS

The effects of persuasive communications are particularly difficult to ascertain because in practice it is usually impossible to isolate the cause of observable results. To discover 100 enemy troops defected within a certain time after a direct appeal to do so does not prove the appeal had anything to do with the defection, and certainly not that the appeal was the defection's primary cause.

Clearly, then, the major need in effects analysis—and to a somewhat lesser extent in the SCAME categories—is the isolation of appropriate methodologies to measure effect or at least assist in its determination. The first essay, by Lieutenant Colonel R. P. Morris gives some idea of the diversity of approaches currently used by Army personnel to measure effect and effectiveness. His article is based upon survey research as well as an extensive literature search.

The second and third papers illustrate methodologies used or recommended by various researchers for the evaluation of effectiveness. Similarly, Joseph G. Whelan's essay demonstrates the techniques used to determine effect by a source involved in political communications with an audience to whom the communicator does not have unimpeded research access.

Donald D. Smith's essay on the effects of Moscow's short-wave transmissions to North America is interesting in terms of both methodology and findings. The article illustrates that audience predispositions may bring about the *success* of international communications even when other conditions presumed necessary for effectiveness are lacking.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM: INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS AT THE U.S. ARMY DIVISION LEVEL*

BY R. P. MORRIS

A review is made of the numerous indicators of effectiveness used by the U.S. Army in the Vietnam era.

This study reviews the types of PSYOP indicators employed by Army divisions in South Vietnam and suggested by Army personnel at the U.S. Command and General Staff College.

CASE STUDIES

*Excerpted and adapted from "Psychological Operations in Vietnam: Indicators of Effectiveness at the Division Level," student thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1969, pp. 34–93. Reprinted with the permission of the author.

I. 1st Infantry Division

In the 1st Infantry Division a total of seventeen PSYOP feedback indicators of effectiveness were identified. These indicators ranged from quantifiable direct indicators, such as the number of *Hoi Chanh* (returnees to Government of Vietnam control from VC/NVA ranks) per month in the division area of operations, to subjective indirect indicators, such as conversations with the division Vietnamese Army Liaison Officer and attached Vietnamese Army interpreters.

The indicator given the greatest significance during 1968 was the Chieu Hoi (Vietnamese Government Open Arms Program) rate.[1] The rate was figured on the number of ralliers per month in the division area of operations. This indicator was considered to be significant because the main thrust of the division PSYOP effort was directed toward causing members of the enemy forces to defect from their own units and to rally to the side of the free world forces. A related incidator utilized by the 1st Infantry Division was interrogation information obtained from among ralliers in the division area. Another indicator was the "mass rally rate," or the frequency in which multiple ralliers from the same enemy organization defected to the allied side together.

Two other statistical PSYOP indicators used by the division that are related to the Chieu Hoi Program are: (1) the rate of ralliers per month who turn themselves over to U.S. units rather than to Vietnamese officials,[2] and (2) the number of ralliers who volunteer to serve with the division in the "Kit Carson Scout Program." [3] The Kit Carson Scout data is considered significant from a PSYOP viewpoint because the participation in the program reflects not only defection from the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army ranks, but reflects complete reversal of loyalties to the point where the rallier takes up arms against his former comrades in an active and hazardous manner.

According to PSYOP doctrine, one of the functions of tactical PSYOP is to reduce interference by civilians with tactical operations. The extent to which PSYOP accomplishes this function is judged by the next indicator used by the division, which is "direct observation." The extent to which people in the target audience follow instructions (often simple administrative instructions) broadcast from an overhead PSYOP helicopter can usually be observed directly from the helicopter by the PSYOP crew aboard. A variation of the direct observation indicator by U.S. troops on the ground is used to check the technical effectiveness or the operational capability of the electronic broadcast equipment aboard PSYOP helicopters. On certain operations where U.S. troops are known to be on the ground in the close vicinity of the ethnic target audience, a control message is often broadcast in English so that the U.S. troops can provide rapid feedback as to the technical effectiveness of the electronic equipment.

Another important effectiveness indicator used by the division is feedback information from prisoners of war.

The division participates in a combination intelligence and PSYOP

program known as the Volunteer Informant Program. In return for voluntary services, the people may be compensated with money, rice, or other commodities. The resultant effectiveness of these efforts is indicated by the number of informant tips received, the number of weapons turned in, and the frequency of other positive services rendered to the friendly forces by the people in the target audience.

Captured enemy documents are used as indicators of PSYOP effectiveness because they sometimes contain specific information concerning enemy reaction to PSYOP broadcasts and leaflet drops.

Two additional indicators of effectiveness that originate outside the division, but relate to the division PSYOP effort, are: (1) the monthly reports of province senior advisors, and (2) periodic civilian attitude reports from the province advisory staff.[4]

The number of Medical Civic Action Project (MEDCAP) patients treated per month is considered to be a direct PSYOP indicator. A variation of this indicator is the number of dental civic action project (DENTCAP) patients treated per month; however, the figures are usually consolidated into a single MEDCAP figure that includes both the medical and the dental patients.

Another direct PSYOP indicator is the attendance rate at division-sponsored movies provided for the benefit of local audiences. These movies are publicized by PSYOP media and the attendance at the movies is considered to be "responsive action" on the part of the target audience; hence, this data qualifies as a direct PSYOP indicator under the criteria set forth in the official field manual on PSYOP doctrine.

Another PSYOP effectiveness indicator is the monthly "Hamlet Evaluation System" report which shows the percentages of hamlets that are considered to be pacified in degrees ranging from unsecured to secured.

The final PSYOP indicator revealed by the data on the 1st Infantry Division is an indirect indicator. This indicator concerns specific VC/NVA PSYOP actions directed against the division PSYOP efforts.

In summary, the 1st Division case study has produced a total of seventeen different PSYOP indicators of effectiveness that are or have been used by the division in evaluating the results of its PSYOP effort.

II. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

The data examined concerning the 1st Cavalry Division yielded eight major PSYOP indicators of effectiveness. Of these eight indicators, six were the same or were variations of indicators that were also identified in the 1st Infantry Division case study.

Of the two new indicators developed, the first one was "voluntary surrender broadcasts" or "quick reaction messages" broadcast by ralliers to their VC or NVA units.

The other new indicator developed from the 1st Cavalry Division study consisted of incidents in which the enemy fired upon PSYOP helicopters broadcasting messages.

III. 4th Infantry Division

Fifteen indicators of PSYOP effectiveness were identified in the 4th Infantry Division. Seven of the fifteen indicators were not mentioned in the studies of the 1st Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions.

Of the seven new indicators, one was "results per dollar cost," and the other was "results per manpower unit." An internal staff study found the average monthly cost of the 4th Infantry Division PSYOP program to be $19,420 and 11.5 or 12 manpower spaces. To complete the ratios, results were quantified in terms of *Hoi Chanhs* who had rallied in a given time period and the number of items of intelligence value reported to the division during a given time period.

Weather conditions were also cited in the 4th Infantry Division as a subjective indicator. The damp, soggy conditions brought about during the wet monsoon season work against PSYOP effectiveness by limiting loudspeaker ranges and by reducing the legibility of paper leaflets lying on the ground in the jungle. On the other hand, the rainy monsoon season works for PSYOP effectiveness by creating less desirable living conditions for the VC/NVA forces and thus possibly making the target audiences more susceptible to allied PSYOP efforts.[5]

Another subjective indicator of PSYOP effectiveness that was cited in the 4th Division was "status of enemy medical care."

Similar to the reports received concerning the status of enemy medical care, was another closely related subjective indicator. This indicator consisted of interrogations which directly reported upon the state of morale within the enemy ranks.[6]

The 4th Infantry Division disseminated a two-to-four page news leaflet by air drop to suspected enemy areas. The leaflet was named *Binh Minh,* a Vietnamese phrase which means "First Light." The PSYOP indicator in this situation was the number of *Binh Minh* clippings found on the bodies of enemy troops.

Another different indicator that was developed through the 4th Division study was "JUSPAO analyses of VC propaganda." [7] This indicator is subjective and is based upon a series of periodic field memorandums published by the Joint United States Public Affairs Office in Saigon. This indirect indicator of PSYOP effectiveness is unique in that it is based on material developed at the national level from which information can be extracted that pertains to the local division area of operations.

IV. 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)

The study of the 101st Airborne Division revealed seven PSYOP indicators of effectiveness, of which three had not been mentioned previously in this research project.

Probably the most unusual example of PSYOP effectiveness in the 101st Division was the incident in which PSYOP was used successfully to aid in the repatriation of forty Vietnamese Government troops who were being held captive by the Viet Cong in a prison compound. In the confusion following a raid on the prison compound, the prisoners scattered into

the surrounding jungle areas. It was only after the airborne PSYOP loudspeaker reassured the repatriated prisoners as to their safety that they were successfully brought back under friendly control.

The three indicators which had not been mentioned previously in this study were: (1) the repatriated prisoners' response to PSYOP, (2) the verbal surveys conducted by the armed propaganda teams, and (3) the monitoring of the tactical operations of target groups.

V. Americal Division

In the Americal Division a total of nine PSYOP indicators of effectiveness are utilized. These indicators were identified in a letter from the Division Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Lieutenant Colonel Norman L. Robinson, dated January 5, 1969. The nine indicators used by the Americal Division are common to the other divisions previously discussed.

VI. 9th Infantry Division

No letter response was received by this investigator from the 9th Infantry Division; however, some data was available from other sources, and six PSYOP indicators were identified. These indicators generally follow the pattern of those mentioned most frequently in the studies of the other U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam.

VII. 25th Infantry Division

The data available on the 25th Infantry Division revealed seven PSYOP indicators of effectiveness. All seven of these indicators have also been identified in the *modus operandi* of other divisions in Vietnam.

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE (CGSC) SURVEY

The approach to the problem in this research study was the consideration of two major batches of data—division case studies and a survey of Command and General Staff College (CGSC) students. There were eight PSYOP indicators of effectiveness mentioned by multiple respondents. The indicators most frequently cited by the respondents and the percentages of same are shown in Figure 1.

Of the eight indicators mentioned by multiple respondents, all but two indicators had been developed in the case studies of the divisions. The two new indicators were the following: (1) number of desertions in enemy ranks reported per period of time, and (2) the number of prisoners captured per period of time.

There were fourteen other PSYOP indicators mentioned by respondents only a single time. These additional indicators covered a relatively wide range and included six indicators that had not been mentioned previously in the study. The six new indicators were: (1) attitudes and behavior of Vietnamese civilian laborers employed on U.S. base camps, (2) frequency of enemy rocket/mortar attacks against division base camps, (3) number of "high impact" Vietnamese patients treated successfully by division surgeons (medical conditions remedied in a dramatic manner with resultant favorable psychological impact, such as correction of cleft palates, removal of cataracts, quick cures of advanced pneumonia with massive doses of antibiotics, correction of crossed-eye conditions,



Figure 1. PSYOP Feedback Indicators Identified by Multiple Respondents.

and treatment of remedial blindness), (4) number of Vietnamese patients voluntarily participating in the in-patient hospital care program at the division headquarters base camp, (5) frequency of enemey incidents directed against U.S. division medical personnel operating among the Vietnamese local populace in enemy-dominated or contested areas, and (6) data obtained through in-depth conversations by specially trained U.S. division personnel.

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

This report [has been] concerned with the examination of data available from the division case studies and the CGSC survey. From these two groupings of data [36] feedback indicators of PSYOP were identified.

I. Central Patterns

It was found that the indicators that were identified and developed in this study could be arranged into six general categories. These categories were: (1) Chieu Hoi statistics, (2) intelligence from interrogations, (3) intelligence from captured documents and intercepted messages, (4) observations, (5) enemy counter actions, and (6) miscellaneous. Of these general categories, there was sufficient data to justify further division of three of the general categories into specific subdivisions.

The "interrogations" group was further divided into interrogations of: (1) prisoners of war, (2) detainees, (3) members of the local populace on a voluntary basis—Volunteer Informant Program, (4) *Hoi Chanhs*, and (5) intelligence agents.

The "observations" group was subdivided into observations by: (1) U.S. PSYOP teams—in the air or on the ground, (2) U.S. troops on tactical operations, (3) province advisory team personnel, and (4) Vietnamese officials at the province and district level within the tactical division area of operations.

The "enemy counter actions" group was subdivided into: (1) enemy broadcasts—both by radio and by local ground mounted loudspeaker systems, (2) leaflets distributed in and around U.S. division areas, (3) enemy roadblocks and tactical operations in the U.S. division areas, and (4) enemy restrictions placed upon their own troops against reading or listening to U.S. propaganda messages and literature.

All of these indicators are shown, by major groupings, in Figure 2, in which the various indicators from the division case studies and the CGSC survey have been synthesized into a single figure. From an examination of this figure, it can be seen that these groupings do reflect the central tendencies. The "Chieu Hoi statistics" and the "interrogations" categories were the most frequently identified indicators, followed closely by the "enemy counter actions (leaflets)" and "miscellaneous" categories.

It was also noted that there was a definite mutual pattern of support between the general indicators developed within the division case studies and by the CGSC survey. This pattern of support existed within all six of the major categories of PSYOP indicators.

It was found that "Chieu Hoi statistics" were universally used by the U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam as an indicator of PSYOP effectiveness. This indicator lends itself to this purpose particularly well because the data involved can be readily presented in a quantitative form on a briefing chart or in a report to higher headquarters or to other interested agencies. A weakness of this indicator is that misleading statistics can be easily developed unless a careful, accurate, and honest reporting system is used. In situations where more than one U.S. division is operating within a given Vietnamese province, it is possible that each division could report the same province Chieu Hoi center returnees solely within its own totals for a particular month, rather than pro-rating the numbers or using some other system that would approximate the truth. Another weakness of the Chieu Hoi statistic is that in the enthusiasm for meeting quotas or exceeding the results of a previous reporting period, the staff officers concerned may simply accept each feeder report without question and simply add the new numbers to the old. This type of accounting can lead to duplication of data and inaccurate reporting of the totals, for a given *Hoi Chanh* might be reported by a subordinate unit as one rallier on a particular day to that unit; later this same rallier might be reported again as a new acquisition by the local province Chieu Hoi center. Therefore, it can be seen that a careful and valid accounting system is necessary if the Chieu Hoi data is to be meaningful, and great care must be taken to identify specific *Hoi Chanh* by name and by other specific identification means in order to preclude fallacious or ambiguous reporting.

The "interrogations" PSYOP feedback indicators provide quantitative and subjective information for the PSYOP analyst. The division case studies and the CGSC survey reflected wide use in Vietnam of interrogations, particularly interrogations of people under the "Volunteer Informant Program" and interrogations of *Hoi Chanh* personnel. The numbers of individuals interrogated successfully can be quantified. The amount of munitions, the number of weapons turned in, the number of mine and booby trap locations, and the number of intelligence tips of value received can be quantified and used as a numerical yardstick of effectiveness in a relative manner. But, as was pointed out by Colonel Bambery, former G5 of the 1st Cavalry Division, in his letter to this investigator, there is an inherent "desire to please" that characterizes people within the oriental races, and this desire to say what the questioner would like to hear is a factor that must be taken into account when making subjective evaluations of PSYOP feedback information obtained through interrogations.[8]

With respect to participants in the Volunteer Informant Program and individuals acting as regular intelligence agents, there is the element of "payment for services rendered" involved in the interrogations. The informants (the informants who are being paid for their information) have a product to sell and it would be natural to assume that such informers would be eager to please their benefactors in the hope of making even

more money. When the primary motivational factor becomes money, then it seems that the indicators of PSYOP effectiveness thus produced must not be accepted purely at face value. These indicators must be evaluated in a careful manner or there is the possibility that information provided may be somewhat less than accurate, less than objective, and less than completely reliable. Even if the intent of the informer is sincere, the information may be of doubtful veracity because of the qualities of the various sources along the reporting line.

Another disadvantage of interrogations as a source of indicators is that in many cases the information must be obtained through the use of either Vietnamese or U.S. interpreters. Therefore, the quality of the information obtained through interrogations must be tempered and assessed in terms of the qualifications and reliability of the person who interprets and translates the thoughts from one language to another. Colonel Wolfred K. White, in his article in *Military Review*, "Interpreter—or Filter?" has examined this problem and has cited the pitfalls inherent in the use of interpreters in the less developed countries of the world. Colonel White has explained the situation in the following terms:

> Nothing can replace the person-to-person exchange of ideas in a language common to both indivduals. At best, the interpreter is a substitute for no communication at all.
>
> The interpreter's lot is not a happy one. His task is demanding, his responsibilities are great, and too frequently his reward is scant. The interpreter's abilities are determined by a number of factors including:
>
> Detailed knowledge of the formal aspects of the languages in which he is working.
>
> Command of the idiomatic expressions in each language.
>
> Technical vocabularies applicable to the interpretive situation.
>
> Ability to convey accurately the tone, spirit, and nuance of each speaker.
>
> Native intelligence.
>
> It is infrequent that the military advisor is fortunate enough to acquire an interpreter possessing all of these qualities in adequate measure. In most instances, he is forced to settle for less—much less.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> One of the most frequently expressed complaints of the advisor concerning his interpreter is the real or imagined reluctance on the part of the interpreter to convey criticism, bad tidings, or censure.[9]

Although Colonel White's remarks are directed specifically at situations involving advisor-counterpart relationships, it seems that the thesis he presents would apply equally to interrogations of prisoners, detainees, volunteer informants, or any conversation or communication between U.S. personnel in tactical units and members of the indigenous cultures.

The obvious alternative to the problem of unreliable interpreters might be to dispense with native interpreters entirely and to conduct interrogations using only highly qualified U.S. personnel who are fluent to the highest degree in the local dialects. But, people with the requisite language skills are in short supply within our armed forces, in spite of efforts to train personnel in the service schools. Colonel White has summarized this paradox as follows:

INDICATORS	DIVISIONS					CGSC
	1st Inf	1st Cav	4th Inf	101st Abn	Amer-ical	CGSC
1. Chieu Hoi statistics	X	X	X	X	X	X
2. Intelligence from interrogations						
a. PWs	X	X	X		X	X
b. Detainees	X				X	
c. Populace (VIP)	X	X	X	X	X	X
d. Hoi Chanhs	X	X	X	X	X	X
e. Agents	X			X	X	
3. Intelligence from captured documents and intercepted messages	X	X	X			X
4. Observations by						
a. PSYOP teams	X	X		X		
b. U.S. troops	X		X			
c. Province advisors	X					
d. GVN officials	X				X	X
5. Enemy counter actions						
a. Broadcasts			X	X		
b. Leaflets	X	X	X	X		X
c. Roadblocks and enemy operations	X			X		
d. Restrictions on own forces	X	X				
6. Miscellaneous	X	X	X	X		X

Figure 2. Central Patterns—Division Case Studies and CGSC Survey.

> . . . At a time in our history when we have the greatest requirement for citizens capable of speaking a wide variety of foreign languages, we are discovering the difficulty of developing rapidly these required skills.
>
> .....
>
> Undoubtedly, the lack of U.S. advisors adequately trained in the language of the host country has frequently caused misunderstanding, impeded progress, and complicated the task of aiding emerging nations.[10]

Captured documents and intercepted messages are another indicator of PSYOP effectiveness that has been used by U.S. tactical divisions in Vietnam. This indicator has also been cited in the CGSC survey. The number of documents and messages processed that allude to PSYOP effectiveness can be quantified; however, it seems that the same disadvantages that have been mentioned concerning the evaluation of information through interpreters can be equally applied to the evaluation of

captured documents and messages. Whether the translator is a native of Vietnam or whether he is a U.S. native, there is the pitfall of "filtering" or of unintentional misrepresentation of the facts or data contained in the documents or messages processed. If a division has a highly developed intelligence capability, then it would seem that the problems encountered with interrogations and translations would be greatly ameliorated and the two indicators, "interrogations" and "captured documents and intercepted messages," would become significantly more valid.

The "enemy counter actions" indicator seems to have gained general acceptance in Vietnam. Enemy leaflets were mentioned most frequently as the medium of action. Since the leaflets directed against the U.S. troops are written or printed in the English language, the interpreter/translator problem is of no consequence. However, the value of this indicator would probably depend upon the availability of adequately trained personnel within the division resources who could properly evaluate the meaning and exact underlying significance of the messages and broadcasts, *vis-a-vis* judging the effectiveness of the corresponding U.S. PSYOP activity that may have had a direct or indirect bearing upon the enemy side producing a particular counter action.

The "observations" indicator of PSYOP effectiveness was the one mentioned less frequently than any of the other indicators. This situation may be due to the fact that PSYOP personnel and other U.S. and GVN personnel are so close to many activities that have PSYOP significance that the observations of the effects are missed in spite of the close proximity. Another way of expressing this thought is by reference to the saying that often one "can't see the forest for the trees."

Direct observation is a technique that avoids the pitfalls inherent in the use of interpreters, translators, and third-party persons involved in intelligence networks. It is believed that this indicator has merit in that results should be forthcoming with relatively little on-the-job training or experience. An enlisted specialist aboard a PSYOP helicopter should be able, it would seem, to observe directly whether or not the populace of a local village is moving to a designated assembly point as may have been directed in a previously broadcast message from the PSYOP helicopter loudspeaker system. It appears that U.S. troops, officers and enlisted personnel on the ground, should certainly provide feedback information concerning the quality of English language "test" messages broadcast to check whether the electronic communications equipment is functioning in an audible and intelligible manner or not. Certainly, it would seem, the local U.S. advisor teams at the province and district level, who are in daily contact with the local people, could provide observations concerning behavior of the local populace. The corresponding GVN officials could provide information concerning behavior and attitudes through channels and directly to U.S. division PSYOP or G2 personnel. It may be that because the PSYOP function is relatively new to many U.S. division staff officers that the possibilities of direct observation as an indicator of PSYOP effectiveness have not yet been fully explored.

The "miscellaneous" category of PSYOP effectiveness indicators seems to have merit because the indicators reflect the imagination and development of many different individuals and organizations. The apparent disadvantage of the indicators in this category is that most of them are not generally known to the operators in the field. The fact is that these miscellaneous indicators have been identified by individuals and organizations that have been professionally associated with U.S. divisions in Vietnam. Collectively these indicators reflect a relatively large amount of thought and experience.

As with any other indicators or yardsticks used by any sort of analyst, unless the indicators are employed with care and a certain degree of subjective judgment, their usefulness to a commander at the tactical level of operations can be lost. Judiciously utilized, these indicators have served as useful tools in the management of PSYOP and tactical resources in the Vietnam environment.

NOTES

[1] Robert P. Morris, G5 Workbook (Lai Khe, Vietnam, March 1–June 19, 1968), p. 93.
[2] Morris, R. P., *op. cit.*, p. 137.
[3] Ibid., p. 123.
[4] Morris, R. P., *op. cit.*, p. 111.
[5] Henry C. Evans, Jr., "Staff Study: PSYOPS Study" (Vietnam, July 5, 1968).
[6] Robert Apt, "Staff Study: The Effectiveness of Psychological Operations Conducted by the 4th Infantry Division" (Vietnam, February 25, 1968).
[7] Personal Correspondence of the Author, letter with inclosures from James E. Fiscus, January 12, 1969.
[8] Personal Correspondence of the Author, letter from James R. Bambery, January 20, 1969.
[9] Wolfred K. White, "Interpreter—or Filter?" *Military Review*, XLVIII (February, 1968), 80.
[10] Ibid., p. 79.

MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AN OVERSEAS INFORMATION CAMPAIGN: A CASE HISTORY*

By Leo Bogart

A survey demonstrates the proposition that a short-term information campaign is more likely to provide people with a rationale for reinforcing their existing beliefs and attitudes than for changing them.

* * * * *

The attempt to measure communications effects in the field has been most frequently made in the subject areas of politics and marketing, where the stakes are high and where substantial research budgets can be met. In their studies of the 1940 and 1948 election campaigns Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and their associates, relate changes in voting intention to mass media effects (among other things).[1] Large

*Excerpts from "Measuring the Effectiveness of an Overseas Information Campaign: A Case History," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXI, No. 4 (Winter 1957–1958), pp. 475–498. Reprinted with the permission of *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, copyright holder, and the courtesy of the author.

corporations have sometimes made similar studies of the effectiveness of advertising or marketing campaigns, but these remain unpublished.

Two notable community studies have utilized the familiar scheme of interviewing cross-sections of a population before and after large-scale public information efforts. In Cincinnati in 1949, Shirley Star and Helen Hughes found that the effects of an information campaign on behalf of the United Nations were untraceable in the light of the problems which the organization itself faced during the same period.[2] A study of a venereal disease information program in Columbus, Ohio, made by the Bureau of Applied Social Research, also showed disappointing results. Those who were most apt to expose themselves to VD were least apt to expose themselves to the media which carried information on the subject.[3]

The present study is presented as a case history in the same area of research. It was planned not with theoretical objectives in mind but with the immediate objective of evaluating a test campaign.

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The communications campaign in this case was conducted in Greece in the later part of 1952 as part of the U.S. information program in that country. The U.S. Information Agency has used a wide variety of communications techniques; the test campaign represented an experimental use of paid newspaper advertising as a means of conveying ideas to a wide overseas public. A series of 14 advertisements was prepared for insertion in Greek newspapers and a booklet, "The March of Freedom," was offered free to the readers of the ads. The appearance of the advertisements, both in their size and styling, was such as to make them stand out in the newspaper.

The research was organized and timed as an integral part of the campaign itself.[4] The objectives were to determine (1) whether or not these materials succeeded in attracting the attention of a wide popular audience; (2) what kinds of people they reached; (3) what the readers thought of them; (4) what kinds of information the ads and the booklet managed to convey to their readers; and (5) what political attitudes they modified, if any.

The newspaper advertisements aimed to create or reinforce the conviction that the U.S. and Greece are joined together in the cause of freedom and that their common ideals are those embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The advertisements used large photographs and brief texts to illustrate and discuss the rights enjoyed by citizens in a democracy.

These freedoms were visualized in terms of the "rights of children" which might be expected to gain warm acceptance virtually everywhere. The underlying point of view is expressed in the following quotation from one of the ads:

> We believe it is important to the U.S.A. that this child and every child in every land shall have these basic human freedoms.

> We believe this because we deeply love the freedoms we are building in our own life . . . and we know that our own freedoms are not fully safe until freedom is safe for anyone, born anywhere.
>
> This does not mean, of course, that we want Greece and other countries to try to be like the U.S.A. Each free people will always have its own way to build its own use of freedom.
>
> But the goals we seek are common.

Emphasis in the ads was not on the present *threat* to freedom; only the last ad in the series referred directly to the Soviet Union and the "cold war." They were, rather, focussed on the positive aspects of human liberty.

One ad mentioned the Declaration in its headline, and another focussed on the booklet offer. All the rest referred to individual rights, covered in nine of the Declaration's Thirty Articles. All the ads except one featured large photographic illustrations of children.

"The March of Freedom" was a 32-page booklet illustrated with two-color drawings which showed significant stages in the development of human rights from Hammurabi's Code to the United Nations. It contained no direct references to Communism. Its objective was rather to show the historical continuity of the democratic tradition.

Between November 16, 1952, and January 3, 1953, the 14 advertisements were run on a twice-a-week alternating schedule in all four Salonica newspapers.[5] (These papers claim a combined total daily circulation of about 50,000.) Every ad appeared once in each paper, but no ad ever appeared in more than one paper on the same day. Approximately 17,000 copies of "The March of Freedom" booklet were distributed by the U.S.I.S. Library in Salonica directly and by mail.

METHOD OF STUDY

The study was designed to permit comparison of the attitudes of a cross-section of adults in Salonica, who were interviewed shortly before and again immediately after the advertisements ran in the press. To overcome any possible "panel effect," the second wave of interviews (after the ad campaign) was conducted not only with the *same* people who had been in the original sample, but also with *another* parallel cross-section of the population, a sample whose members had not been interviewed previously.

Changes in opinion between the first and second survey periods might have occurred quite independently of the advertising campaign, through the impact of world events or of political developments in Greece.[6] For example, attitudes toward the United States might have become more favorable between the first and second wave of the study because of a general improvement in opinion throughout the country rather than as a result of the ad campaign. Or opinion might have remained about the same in Salonica, while it became less favorable elsewhere in Greece (that is, the ads might produce their effect not by *improving* attitudes but by preventing a decline which was evident elsewhere).

To take these possibilities into account, a simultaneous before-after survey had to be run in *another* Greek city in which no advertising or

information campaign was conducted. In the control city selected, Patras, two identical random samples (consisting of separate individuals) were interviewed in two waves corresponding with the two waves of the Salonica survey.[7] The survey was completed by the addition of a special sample of persons in Salonica who had sent or called for "The March of Freedom" booklet at the U.S.I.S. Library. The first wave of interviews took place between September and October, 1952. The second wave took place immediately after the ad campaign ended, during the week of January 4–11, 1953. A total of 2,238 interviews was conducted.

* * * * *

THE CLIMATE OF OPINION

To understand what the ad and booklet campaign accomplished we must first look at the *existing* pattern of public opinion and information which the campaign sought to influence. We must also note the points on which opinions in the test city and in the control city (Patras) were similar and different.

Economic problems were most on people's minds at the time of the survey. . . . With such a focus of attention, other subjects received relatively few mentions. Virtually no one discussed the threat of Communism. . . . It appears therefore that the U.S. information campaign, centering as it did on *political* rights and freedoms, faced a challenge in the form of a widespread public preoccupation with the immediate day-to-day problems of making a livelihood.

In answer to the question, "Does the attitude position of a little country such as Greece influence the future shaping of international events?," the great majority of those answering said that Greece's attitude mattered a great deal. Most of the answers stressed Greece's strategic geographic position, and its potential importance as a military base.[8]

* * * * *

In both cities, Communism's growth was attributed much more often to a national movement caused by economic conditions than to Russian stimulation. In Salonica this was the prevailing opinion by a larger margin (39 percent, as against 12 percent) than in Patras (42 percent against 28 percent) perhaps showing greater Communist influence in the larger city.

Although many Greeks thought Communism arose independently of Russian imperialism, this by no means placed them in the Communist camp. The survey findings showed the United States to be the most popular and respected nation in Greek eyes, while the Soviet Union was widely criticized and disliked.[9]

* * * * *

The preponderant hostility toward the Soviet Union took the form of a general belief that Soviet power was on the wane. To the query, "Ten years from now do you think Russia will have increased or decreased its following among other nations?," virtually all of those replying said that Russia would decrease her following, and almost everyone said this was a good thing. Conversely, the overwhelming majority said the United

States would increase its following in the next ten years and that this was good.

Over-all feelings toward the U.S.A. were described as being *very* favorable by most of the respondents (more so in Salonica than in Patras). . . . The generally favorable outlook toward America was reflected in an overwhelmingly affirmative response to the question, "Do you think the U.S. is doing all it can to help Greece?" and in a strong belief that the U.S. wants to help Greece remain free and independent rather than to dominate it.

Although the ultimate purpose of the U.S.I.S. campaign was to influence opinion, its immediate objective was to increase knowledge of democratic rights and freedoms. How much awareness existed to begin with?

When respondents in both cities were asked to name the rights and freedoms which citizens enjoy in a free country, their response was similar, with freedom of opinion and expression far in the forefront, and references to working men's rights strong in Patras. An average of 1.4 rights was mentioned in Patras, and 1.1 rights in Salonica; 18 percent and 27 percent were unable to name any rights at all.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was emphasized in the ads and booklet was unknown to all but a tiny minority. In the interviews made before the campaign began, 8 percent (P) and 26 percent (S) claimed to have heard of it, but only 2 percent (P) and 6 percent (S) were able to explain what it was. The democracies rather than the Communist countries were named as the ones who signed it. In other words, the campaign was designed to inform its audience on a subject with which they were not too familiar. There was considerable room for expanding knowledge of democratic freedoms in general, and of the Declaration of Human Rights, in particular.

THE INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AND ITS AUDIENCE

The campaign was based on the assumption that newspaper advertising is an effective means of reaching the public in Greece, as it has proven to be in the United States, though Greek newspapers do not have the mass circulation of the American press. In Salonica, for instance, the four daily papers, with a total city circulation of 21,000 must serve the needs of 300,000 residents (about 190,000 adults over 18) in the city, and additional thousands in the surrounding region.

However, . . . it may be estimated that in Salonica each copy of the newspaper reaches approximately five adult readers represented by pass-along readership, reading in coffee houses, and the practice of paying the news vendor a small sum for the privilege of looking at the paper. About one in five in the sample proved to be illiterate.

How many people were reached by the ads and the booklet? How did they react to what they read? Were people who had not been directly exposed to the campaign aware of it in any way? These questions were answered by the second wave cross-section of Salonica residents who were interviewed after the campaign. Their answers closely parallel

those given by members of the panel who were interviewed on both waves.[10]

The ads were seen by a large proportion of the reading public. . . . All but a handful of those who said they had seen the ads associated them with the United States. Four out of five of those who said they had seen the ads could answer a question on the main point.

Readership of the ads was estimated in two ways: (1) by asking the respondent directly how many ads he had seen, and (2) by actually taking him through the ads one by one, in each case asking whether he had previously seen it or read it.

* * * * *

There were notable differences in the degree to which various groups in the population came into contact with the campaign. Since literacy was higher among men . . . than among women, . . . men read more newspapers every day. . . . More of them, therefore, claimed to have seen at least one ad. . . . More men were also aware of the booklet (48 percent against 26 percent).

The expected differences may be found when we compare exposure for different socio-economic groups, as in Table 1.

Of those who were known to have called or written for the booklet, 84 percent were men, and 30 percent were under the age of 20. They were considerably better educated than the average; at least 34 percent of them (probably more) were students.

Of those who claimed to have seen the ads, 21 percent were unable to recall the main idea, 24 percent described the ads as being about human rights, and 17 percent mentioned freedom of the individual. An almost equally large number of responses were expressed not in terms of human rights in general, but of *children's* rights. One fourth said the ads were about the freedoms and rights of children. An additional five percent said the ads were supposed to teach people to give their children rights and privileges; six percent said that the ads were supposed to teach young children about freedom. Only one percent referred to "The March of Freedom" booklet.

Thus for a good many of those who saw the ads, *attention* was drawn from the *ultimate* point (U.S.—Greek unity in support of universal human rights) to the *immediate* appeal.The ads visualized human rights in terms of the rights of children in order to capture reader interest and to arouse a favorable sentiment for the *underlying* message. Apparently this is what happened, since the ads were (by American standards) extremely successful—not only in reaching an enormous part of their potential audience, but in impressing their central theme upon the memory of the people who saw them. Of all those who saw or heard of the ads, 80 percent commented favorably on them, while only 5 percent had critical reactions. Comments on production and format outnumbered those on the content of the ads, four to three. The ads were liked precisely because their readers accepted them at face value: they were

TABLE 1

*Exposure to the Campaign, by Socio-Economic Status**

	Salonica Booklet Sample	Salonica Cross-Section, Wave II		
	Got Booklet	Saw Booklet	Saw or Read Ads	Not Exposed
Well-to-do	12%	14%	8%	5%
Middle Class	66	68	56	29
Poor	22	18	36	66
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N(100%) =	(254)	(62)	(493)	(235)

*Percentages not weighted by sex.

not thought of as propaganda serving a selfish interest. Everyone who had seen or heard of the ads was asked what their purpose was. They answered with references to the ads' literal meaning rather than with any sophisticated inferences about their underlying political objectives; 22 percent said the purpose was to enable people to learn their rights and freedoms. . . .

Another eleven percent said the purpose was to educate and inform people on the subject of freedom . . . , and eight percent said it was to show the life of the free world. . . . Significantly, 22 percent of those answering said the purpose of the ads was to help youth. . . . While this is a favorable judgment, it suggested that the pictures of children, while they attracted interest, distracted some readers from the ads' main message and purpose.

Of those who knew of the ads, 88 percent thought it was a good thing for the U.S. to publish them.

* * * * *

Although, when asked directly, readers did not indicate that the *purpose* of the ads was to gain support for the United States, one in three thought the ads were good because they worked to this end!

* * * * *

The purpose of the ads was, of course, not merely to create a favorable impression, but to influence the thinking of the Greek people. A majority of those who saw the ads had the impression that they were influenced (whether or not they actually were). Fifty-four percent replied affirmatively to the question, "Would you say the ads contributed in any way to your knowledge or attitudes?" Thirty six percent said that they hadn't—a substantial minority which probably includes not only the critical and the apathetic, but a great many people who felt already as much convinced as they could possibly be.

Since attitudes were so predominantly favorable to begin with, the major potential for change was on the part of a small minority of critics. If

all those who said the ads affected their attitudes and knowledge had really been influenced, the campaign might be considered spectacularly successful.

A principal objective of the ads was to stimulate interest in "The March of Freedom" booklet. Of the public as a whole, 28 percent said they had noticed the statement about the booklet in the *ads*, and 9 percent had heard about the booklet in some other way; 63 percent had not heard about it. Eight percent of the public claimed to have read the booklet (21 percent of those who knew of it). Of these, a third had gone to get it at the U.S.I.S. Library, and 37 percent had sent for it. The remainder had read a copy obtained by another family member or by a friend.

Of all those who read the booklet, more than two out of five said it described the *historical* growth of freedom or liberty. Another two out of five said it was about human rights or freedom in general. As in the case of the ads, comments concentrated on production and format rather than on content. Like the ads, the booklet seems to have been accepted at face value, and not thought of as propaganda. Half said its purpose was to teach people about the idea and meaning of freedom. One in every five or six said its aim was to show the development and evolution of freedom in a historical sense. About as many believed it had a general educational mission. Only a small number said its purpose was to win friends for the United States.

Among those who had read the booklet, opinion was virtually unanimous that it was a good thing for the U.S. to publish. This was explained most often by the argument that it informed and educated people about their rights and freedoms. A sizable proportion explained that it was a good thing because it was beneficial to the United States. Thus in the case of the booklet as in the case of the ads, the information campaign won approval for doing the very job of propaganda which its audience did not *think* it was designed to do.

OPINION CHANGES IN THE TEST AND CONTROL CITIES

Thus far we have described the climate of opinion in Salonica and Patras before the U.S. information campaign began, and the audience which the campaign reached in Salonica, the test city. To determine what effect the campaign had on public opinion, we must make a series of comparisons between those who were and were not reached, before and after the campaign took place. The design of the study makes it possible to look for effects in three distinct ways: (1) by comparing results before and after, for the test and control cities; (2) by comparing results, before and after, for exposed and unexposed groups within the test city; and (3) by internal analysis of changes within the test city panel.

Let us first consider whether changes in opinion or knowledge took place in Salonica as a direct result of the campaign, but not in Patras. There was no significant shift of opinion in either city in the proportions who:

1. Felt very favorably toward the U.S.
2. Thought that the U.S. was interested in dominating Greece.[11]
3. Thought that Russia was the country most guilty of meddling in Greek affairs.
4. Thought the U.S. was doing all it could to help Greece.
5. Though that Communism was mainly caused by economic conditions.

On a number of points, opinions changed between the first and second waves of the study, but they generally changed the same way in *both* Salonica and Patras, apparently as the result of attitude trends throughout Greece.

* * * * *

In a number of respects, however, the campaign appeared to have had an effect in the test city. The number who claimed to have heard of the Declaration of Human Rights was greater on Wave II than on Wave I, in both cities.[12] In Patras, there was a small increase in the percentage who could demonstrate that they knew what the Declaration was. However, in Salonica the proportion familiar with the Declaration jumped from six percent of the public before the campaign to 27 percent afterwards.[13]

* * * * *

Knowledge of the countries that had signed the Declaration and knowledge of the rights and freedoms which citizens enjoy in a democracy increased in Salonica but not in Patras between Wave I and Wave II. There was a major drop in the percentage who could not answer the question, and *more* individual rights and freedoms were named. . . .

* * * * *

There was an increase in Salonica of those who mentioned the right to free choice of employment, the right to own property, and freedom of religion; while fewer persons mentioned these rights on the second wave in Patras. . . . Freedom of opinion and expression was mentioned more often on Wave II in both cities, but the increase was significantly greater in Salonica.

On one other major point there was a clear-cut change of attitude in Salonica only. Although there was no change in the proportion who said the U.S. was sincerely interested in keeping Greece free and independent, the proportion able to support this point of view with *reasons* increased enormously in Salonica. It remained the same in Patras.

* * * * *

EXPOSURE AND ATTITUDES

Thus far we have seen that *opinions* underwent only slight changes in

Salonica, the test city, compared with Patras; while knowledge of the subjects stressed in the ads underwent major increases. Were these changes due to the direct influence of the campaign, or did they occur independently? We can answer this question best by seeing how those who were *most* exposed compare in knowledge and attitudes with those who had *no* contact with either the ads or the booklet.

To do this, a comparison has been made of the special booklet sample (the people who actually *went* or *sent* for the *booklet*) with those members of the Salonica cross-section who *saw* the *booklet*, those who *saw or read* at least one *advertisement*, and those who were completely unexposed.[14] The evidence indicates that not only knowledge, but some important attitudes, were different among these different exposure groups.

Those who were least exposed were least able to answer the question as to whether Greece can influence international events. . . . Considering only those who express opinions, it is apparent that, the greater the exposure, the greater the feeling that Greece's opinion matters in world affairs. This is a political sentiment (that is, an expression of patriotism and of conviction that thinking about current events is important). It may also be a reflection of the respondent's personal pride and dignity, of the feeling that his views matter. It is probably a good index of political interest and activity. . . .

* * * * *

While there was no direct indication of anti-American feeling, and very little neutrality, one indication of real opinion about the United States is the distinction between "very favorable" and merely "favorable" views.[15] By this criterion, the people who read the booklet were most strongly pro-American,. . .and those who saw the ads more pro-American, . . . than the non-exposed. . . .

* * * * *

Of those who read the booklet, 87 percent said they were familiar with the Declaration of Human Rights, while 45 percent of those who saw the ads, and only nine percent of the unexposed, made this claim. The greater the exposure,the more familiarity was shown with the rights enjoyed by citizens of a democracy. . . .

* * * * *

Knowledge of democratic rights was greatest among the well-to-do, and least at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder.

* * * * *

Did the campaign tend to select for its audience people who were already predisposed to be favorable toward its objectives? By comparing the responses given before and afterwards by the same individuals in the Salonica panel, we can see to what extent people who started out with a particular opinion (on Wave I) became exposed to the campaign, and compare them with those who initially held other opinions.

* * * * *

There was . . . remarkable similarity in the degree of exposure found among people who were initially very favorable, regardless of their social characteristics. About half the people who were predisposed to be friendly to the U.S. read the ads or the booklet—and this was true regardless of what kind of people they were.

Of those who claimed to have heard of the Declaration of Human Rights on the first wave of interviews, only a minority were actually able to explain what it was. These few became a very highly exposed group. Whatever their personal characteristics, 18 of the 23 cases (79 percent) read the ads or the booklet.

THE EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE ON ATTITUDES IN THE SALONICA PANEL

We have seen (1) that attitudes and knowledge, as well as exposure, differed among different kinds of people, and (2) that though exposure was widespread, it was greatest among those who were the most friendly at the start. With these findings understood we can consider whether exposure *changed* information of attitudes. Table 2 shows the shifts which took place in the percent feeling "very favorable" toward the United States.

There are several points to be noted:

1. The less the exposure, the less favorable was the original attitude on Wave I.
2. Regardless of exposure, between a third and a half of the respondents shifted in their response on this important question. Among those who had read the ads or the booklet a smaller percentage (35 percent) shifted opinion than among those who were less exposed (47 percent).
3. In spite of the fairly large fluctuation of opinion within the panel, shifts in one direction cancelled out shifts in the other direction—

TABLE 2

Per Cent Very Favorable to U.S.
(By Exposure to the Campaign, Salonica Panel)

	Read Booklet	Read Ads	Saw Ads	Unexposed
Very Favorable				
Both waves	46%	50%	32%	24%
Before campaign only	17	17	23	29
After campaign only	17	18	26	13
Neither time	20	15	19	34
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N(100%) =	(24)	(116)	(90)	(55)
Net Change	0	+1	+3	−16

except in the case of those who were completely unexposed. This group was less favorable (by 16 percentage points) *after* the campaign, suggesting that exposure to the campaign offset a generally unfavorable trend.

Although this difference is not statistically significant, there appears to have been a very marked pattern in the shift of opinion. Regardless of exposure, the groups which on Wave I were most apt to give no answer to this question (women, older persons, and the low-income group) became more favorable on Wave II, or at least showed no change. Their move from "no answer" to "very favorable" may have been due to the effect of being interviewed twice, rather than to any real modification of attitudes attributable to the campaign.

By contrast with the considerable shift of opinion on this general attitude question, there was relatively little change of judgment as to whether or not the U.S. was helping Greece all it could, with about three-fourths of the respondents holding to the affirmative both times. There was also no real shift of opinion—either among the heavily exposed or the lightly exposed—as to whether Greece influenced international events a great deal.

Although the campaign did not modify opinions significantly, it appears to have been most successful increasing knowledge on the subject with which it dealt: the Declaration of Human Rights. On the first wave, eight percent of the total panel had heard of the Declaration and could describe it. By the second wave this proportion had increased to 32 percent of the total. This increase is entirely attributable to the campaign, as Table 3 demonstrates.

* * * * *

There was also increased familiarity with the individual democratic rights and freedoms. . . .

In the mention of individual rights and freedoms, there was considerable shifting between the two waves. The effect of the campaign was shown most dramatically on the subject of free speech or expression, stressed in the ads. Although in every exposure group there were more mentions on the second wave than on the first, the net increase was greatest among the most heavily exposed (50 percent for those who read the booklet and 33 percent for those who read the ads, compared with 20 percent for the unexposed).

* * * * *

The campaign was extremely successful in conveying information about human rights to the people who were exposed to it, in every sector of the population. At the same time our findings indicate that it did not *directly* affect fundamental attitudes. When we examine the shifts in public opin-

ion which took place between Wave I and Wave II, it is evident that those who read the ads and the booklet did not move in a favorable direction to any greater degree than the less exposed respondents. We found no evidence that this was true within any of the sub-groups of the population, when information was analyzed separately by sex, age and social status.

CONCLUSION

Any campaign which sets out to convey ideas may tend to select in its audience a large concentration of persons who are favorable to its objectives, and who expose themselves in order to reinforce their prior opinions. The Greek ad campaign appears to have gotten its *greatest* exposure among people who were somewhat more friendly to the United States to begin with and more articulate in their views. But these people were an important target, precisely because they were drawn from the more articulate and presumably more politically active sectors of the public.

The ads and the booklet won the approval of their readers; they were considered "a good thing" for the U.S. to publish; their execution and subject matter were liked and even admired. It seems likely that this approval was in part a reflection of the initial attitude of approval for America and things American, as well as an expression of the readers' specific reaction to the ads themselves.

What seems more significant is that readers accepted the ads and the booklet at face value. They were interpreted as a genuine attempt to inform people about rights and freedoms, rather than as an attempt to preach at them or to change their views. The fact that the ads and the booklet wre not directly perceived as "propaganda" is as important as the fact that the motives behind them were seen as worthwhile or disinterested. Those who said their thinking had been influenced by the booklet or the ads explained this by references to the subjects on which they had become better informed, rather than by references to changes in conviction or point of view.

TABLE 3

Per Cent Who Know of Declaration of Human Rights
(By Exposure to the Campaign,-Salonica Panel)

	Read Booklet	Read Ads	Saw Ads	Unexposed
Both waves	8%	10%	3%	—
Before campaign only	—	4	2	—
After campaign only	79	43	19	5
Neither time	13	43	76	95
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N(100%) =	(24)	(116)	(90)	(55)
Net Change	+79	+39	+17	+5

The comparative findings indicate that the campaign increased public knowledge of the subject on which it was focussed, the Declaration of Human Rights, and that it increased familiarity with the individual rights and freedoms enjoyed by citizens in a democracy.

This increase in knowledge took place in Salonica but not in the control city, Patras. The gain was greatest among those who were most highly exposed, and it took place among those exposed within every element of the population.

Increased familiarity with the individual rights and freedoms came about through a large number of small increases in the mentions of individual rights (including a number which were *not* stressed in the ads as well as those which were). Had the ads concentrated on a smaller number of rights, with each one being covered in several different ways and several different times, recollection might have been even higher than it was. However, the purpose of the campaign was not to stimulate recall of the individual rights as such, but to build recognition that they exist as an important bond between Greece and the United States. In this respect the campaign was successful, since it heightened awareness and knowledge of the subject.

Experimental studies have repeatedly shown that it is easier to convey information than to change attitudes, even where there is a large amount of room for improvement in attitude change. In the present case, because opinions were so favorable at the outset, there was slight opportunity for favorable change. Of the minority who, at the outset, were not very favorable in their attitude, a certain proportion were probably "hard-core" Communists, and an additional number were politically apathetic and largely beyond reach of the mass media. This left a comparatively small residue of individuals with a neutral, suspicious or critical view of the United States who might be considered primary targets for a campaign to change attitudes, but who tended to be people who were harder than average to reach through conventional channels.

Careful exploration has yielded no evidence to prove that any change due to the campaign took place in fundamental attitudes. It is important to note that a *simpler* study design might have suggested that major changes took place on a number of points. We have seen that in some cases opinions became more favorable in Salonica (but they also became more favorable in Patras). On the second wave in Salonica, the exposed were more favorable than the non-exposed (but the same individuals were also more favorable to begin with). The use of several methods of control in the design of the study made it possible to rule out such spurious indications of effect.

Only one facet of opinion appears to have been influenced as the direct result of the campaign: it seems to have made people better able to give

reasons in support of their existing conviction that the United States wants Greece to remain free and independent. Most particularly it seems to have made more people believe that America's general attitude (and not any selfish interest) favored such a desire—that America was in effect a country devoted to human rights and freedoms, including the rights of small nations. This interesting development demonstrates how the campaign's effects in conveying information may begin to be translated into attitudes. What happened was not so much an attitude change (attitude was favorable from the beginning on this point). Rather the campaign seems to have confirmed already favorable opinion by giving it a supporting argument.

Changes in public opinion come about slowly, and international propaganda always functions within the context of world events. This survey adds to the already considerable weight of evidence which shows that (apart from political acts) attempt to influence opinion must be carried on consistently and over a period of time before any major shifts are detectable. If, in the long run, what the Greek people *think* of the United States, or of democracy, is a product of what they *know*, then the Salonica test campaign contributed toward the larger purpose of the U.S. information program.

NOTES

1. Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, Hazel Gaudet, *People's Choice*, New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944. Also Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, William N. McPhee *Voting*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.

2. Shirley A. Star and Helen MacGill Hughes, "Report on an Educational Campaign: The Cincinnati Plan for the United Nations," *American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LV (January 1950), pp. 389–400.*

3. *VD Means Trouble*, Columbia University, Bureau of Applied Social Research, New York, 1950 (Unpublished).

4. The writer assumed responsibility for this project after the completion of the field work. The original research design was prepared by Herta Herzog and Donald B. Armstrong, Jr. The field work was under the direction of William Reynolds. Ben Gedalecia headed the Office of Research and Evaluation of the U.S. Information Agency at the time the study was made. The interpretations and statements made in this article are solely those of the writer and in no way reflect either the official position of the Information Agency or that of the writer's own organization.

5. *Macedonia, Fos, Ellinikos Vorras, Nea Alithia.*

6. During this period, elections were held both in Greece and in the United States, truce negotiations were bogged down in the Korean War, and the Soviet bloc continued to spar with the West in the U.N. General Assembly.

7. Both cities surveyed are major ports—though Salonica is a larger and more prosperous one than Patras. In Macedonia, only 50 or 60 miles from the Bulgarian and Yugoslav borders, Salonica became a part of modern Greece only in 1913. It is the country's second largest city, with 300,000 inhabitants (and another 150,000 in the surrounding area). More cosmopolitan, and because of its size, position and history, more internationally minded than Patras, Salonica was closer to the centers of Communist rebellion during the Greek civil war. Patras, with a population of 67,000, is a provincial city in the Northwestern Peloponnesus.

[8] More complete answers were received for this part of the question on the second wave of interviews, so that they could be coded in more detail. On this second wave, 47 percent (P) and 45 percent (S) specifically mentioned Greece's importance as a military base.
[9] While responses on this point may have been affected by the prevailing political atmosphere, the pro-Communists would be more apt to give *no* answer than to give a false one. Even if the percentage not answering these questions is considered to be (in part, at least) hostile to the United States, the over-all picture is still extremely favorable.
[10] To simplify the presentation, the statistics for the panel are not reported here. On some points the percentages are somewhat different for the two samples. In part this is due to sampling variations. In part it stems from a "panel effect" often noted in studies of this kind, which comes about because respondents have been asked the same or similar questions previously and are sensitized to the subject matter and the interview situation. The data for the panel group are examined in detail later.
[11] As opposed to those who said that the U.S wants Greece to remain free and independent.
[12] The rise in Patras may be due to independent mentions of the Declaration in the Athens and Patras papers, or simply to a difference in interviewing technique between the two waves of the study. Knowledge of the Declaration, rather than the claim to knowledge, is the major consideration here.
[13] Although the jump from two percent to ten percent in Patras is also statistically significant, it simply reflects the increase in the number who claim to have heard of the Declaration, whereas in Salonica there was a great rise in the proportion as well as the number who knew what it was.
[14] The actual, rather than the sex-weighted totals are used here, since the booklet sample is so predominantly male.
[15] Anti-American respondents who feared to express their views openly might be expected to give the weaker of the two responese.

RADIO LIBERTY'S AUDIENCE IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS*

By Joseph G. Whelan

This discussion of Radio Liberty's attempts to obtain some feedback from its audience indicates the political and societal limitations on audience analysis in closed societies.

* * * * *

I. POSITIVE MEANS FOR EVALUATING RADIO LIBERTY'S EFFECTIVENESS

A. Interviews with Soviet Citizens

1. Some Sources for Judging Audience Response

Despite known disadvantages, which by the nature of things cannot be easily corrected, Radio Liberty (RL) attempts, nonetheless, to establish some positive basis for judging audience impact, however imprecise it may seem compared with the reasonably accurate techniques in American public opinion research. It does this by collecting evidence on audience reaction, (1) in interviews with Soviet visitors to the West, legal Soviet expatriates, Soviet defectors, and with some Soviet listeners actually living in the Soviet Union itself; and (2) from letters received from Soviet listeners through the indirect method of a mail drop in the

*Excerpts from Chapter VI, "Radio Liberty—A Study of Its Origins, Structure, Policy, Programming and Effectiveness," The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., February 29, 1972.

West. The substitute audience panel and the special program auditions panel provide another imput, though limited, into assessing possible audience response.

Through these efforts [the Audience Research Division of Radio Liberty] (ARD) attempts to fill the gap between the speaker and the audience, to determine an accurate image of the listener and the listener's image of RL (both essentials for success in communications), and to build the foundations for a continuing dialogue with the audience. The Director of ARD files a quarterly report containing an analysis of and references to listener mail, reactions to RL emanating from the media of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, conversations with Soviet listeners at home and abroad, and related background material on attitudes and conditions in the Soviet Union.

2. Difficulties in Interviewing

Interviews, or "conversations" as RL prefers to term them, presumably since they lack the formal structure and statistically-workable ingredients of professional poll-taking known in the United States, are regarded as a prime indicator of audience response. During FY 1971 interviews were conducted with hundreds of Soviet citizens, of whom well over one-half were foreign radio listeners. But, interviews are very difficult to conduct. Polling by Soviet Government agencies has only begun in recent years in the Soviet Union, and the people do not regard them as scholarly efforts but rather as instruments of the KGB. The problem is especially acute in the Soviet Union where the climate of suspicion impedes a genuine exchange of views, especially with a foreigner. Even interviews conducted with Soviet visitors in the West are carried out with difficulty. It is estimated that only one out of eight contacts will yield a fruitful interview.[2]

The results of interviews are sent to RL headquarters in Munich by field correspondents where they are compiled in a final Target Area Listeners Report that is prepared by ARD and distributed throughout the organization. These reports describe the interviewee, his occupation, nationality, age, and language facility. They include such details as place, listening times, language of broadcast, audibility, jamming effectiveness, and specific programs of interest. In addition, the conversation is summarized, and this may include statements about public reactions, comments on recent events and expectations about future developments.

3. Analysis and Use of Interview Data

RL approaches analysis of audience research data conservatively. ARD does not claim to have enough data at its disposal from interviews to speak about a "sample"—that is, as interpreted in a statistical sense.[3] It does not go beyond the claim of having only "bits and pieces of samples that could be indicative of some certain groups." Yet, Mr. [Howland] Sargeant [President of the RL Committee] has written that such interviews have been collected and properly coded, transferred to cards and

can be processed by machines to show "an increasingly accurate picture of the listeners, and of potential listeners." [4]

Accordingly, ARD is able to give RL programmers some perception of their audience's image and scattered evidence of impact and effectiveness. In recent years this perception and measure of effectiveness have no doubt become more reliable because the percentage of ARD interviews has been progressively increasing from 17 percent in 1969, to 23 percent in 1970 and up to 41 percent during the first quarter of 1971.[5] The ages of RL's listeners were estimated in mid-1971 to be 35 percent in their 20s; 31 percent in their 30s; and 16 percent in their 40s.[6] The preferred listening time was cited at 2001–2400 for 57 percent of listeners, with the next highest percentage preference at 16 percent from midnight to 0400.[7] The distribution of audience occupation in 1970 was concentrated heavily among the intellectuals, including university students: 72 percent of the listeners were said to be from the intellectual professions.[8]

Clearly, audience research data of this nature confirms RL's judgment on audience structure, policy content, and program design. This is especially true of ARD studies on audience reaction to samizdat [the private publication and circulation of one's own works in the Soviet Union], presently the main staple of RL's programming. Again, RL's judgment was reaffirmed. During the first quarter of 1971, 87 percent of the interviewees mentioned samizdat favorably, 3 percent with mixed or neutral reaction, 10 percent hostile reaction. During the fourth quarter of 1970, 100 percent of the interviewees mentioned samizdat in a friendly manner; for the third quarter of 1970, there was 90 percent with 10 percent mixed or neutral. The total overall percentage for this mini-month timeframe from July 1, 1970 to March 31, 1971 was 85 percent friendly, 4 percent mixed or neutral, and 11 percent hostile. Moreover, RL's focus on the intelligentsia was reaffirmed. The majority of listeners mentioning samizdat (70 percent) belonged to various segments of the intelligentsia.[9]

Undoubtedly the most comprehensive assessment of empirical evidence of RL's effectiveness drawn from interviews is contained in ARD's quarterly reports. The report for the second quarter of 1971 generalized on the data collected in an effort to determine listener profile, effects of jamming, specific program interests, programming suggestions, RL's impact and image in the eyes of its listeners, attitudes on specific problems such as samizdat and Jewish emigration, criticism of RL, and responses from the nationality areas.

On the basis of empirical evidence the listener profile for the second quarter of 1971 looks like this: RL respondents came from all walks of life, although the number of those holding positions in the technological, scientific, and cultural fields outweighed those in other professions. Many listeners were under 40 and an "overwhelming majority" supported RL and its aims. Listening took place mainly in large industrial cities such as Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev and their surroundings, though a sizeable number in Siberia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in Central Asia, to

Georgia and Armenia in the South. [sic] Most listeners whose nationality was ascertainable were Russians, followed by Ukrainians, Belorussians, Karelians, Georgians, Kazakhs, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Tatars, Bashkirs, and others from Eastern Europe.[10]

Other categories within the report either directly or indirectly provide some indication of RL's effectiveness, but perhaps none so much as "Radio Liberty's Impact and Image in the Eyes of Its Listeners." Under this category numerous comments were made about reasons for listening to RL and what its impact was judged to be.

For a scientist, RL had become a "most important source of information and a link between our more free-thinking intelligentsia and the Soviet working people." A musician considered that "normalization" of Soviet life could only come through the creation of a public opinion which would exert pressures for change. Since there was no freedom of information at home, the initiative had to come from abroad—and RL, he said, was the only possible source. "Thanks to Radio Liberty's broadcasts," said a Moscow engineer, "I have learned to think and develop a 'free relationship' with the outside world." This theme was reiterated by a Soviet musician who said that "free voices from abroad, especially the voice of Radio Liberty, are the only forces which can wake people up and open their eyes."

Listeners were aware of regime attacks on RL and expressed concern for the radio's future. According to a Moscow engineer, rumors were being circulated to the effect that the station would soon cease broadcasting.

RL was of special interest ot a Leningrad scientist since, in his words, "It is what a Russian radio station would have been like if we had had freedom of speech in our country." A traveler from Sverdlovsk considered RL to be "a free and international" station, not government operated like the BBC or VOA, and this enabled it to devote so much time to Soviet problems. He appreciated this. A Kiev intellectual who previously thought RL was an "American propaganda station" had changed his opinion when he became more familiar with its broadcasts. He now felt that, although financially supported by the United States, it was working for the good of Russia. Whenever an official announcement was made in Soviet media, said one engineer, it was very common to hear people remark: "That's what 'ours' said. But we still have to know what 'they' will say." "They" was RL.[11]

Scattered evidence of impact and effectiveness like this and other evidence included in the quarterly report cannot constitute a "sample" according to the statistical requirements of public opinion research. RL is the first to acknowledge this limitation. Yet, it would seem to be a commonsense judgment that comments by opinion leaders such as scientists, engineers and others within the intelligentsia could be reflective of important preferences and predilections of others within the Soviet intelligentsia and perhaps even in broader segments of Soviet society.

* * * * *

B. Letters from Soviet Listeners

1. Techniques for Eliciting Listener Response

Interviews as a means of evaluating audience response are supplemented by letters from Soviet listeners. Such letters are regarded as documentary evidence upon which judgements can be made on Soviet listening behavior and on Soviet attitudes toward RL programming.

There are two ways in which letters are received from the Soviet Union. One is by establishing give-away accommodation addresses in the West. Under this system the listener is asked to write a particular box number in a designated West European city, and he will receive in return certain give-away material, such as books and records. A popular give-away book of particular interest to radio enthusiasts is the *World Radio TV Handbook*. This is merely a standard radio handbook available in any major reference library in the West.

The other system of eliciting listener correspondence is to urge the listener to communicate with the RL speaker at an address given in the West. In both cases, the mail is forwarded to RL where it is categorized according to favorable and unfavorable letters, location of sender, etc. Such letters-to-the-editor type of correspondence and give-away offers to listeners are common practice in a free society such as that in the United States.

2. Statistics on Listener Mail

According to RL, audience feedback through mail has increased considerably in the past decade.[12] Except for a momentary decline in early 1971, apparently, the general trend continues upward. Actual numbers of letters received are not available for publication; percentages are. This may not be entirely satisfactory, but it does serve the purpose of giving some indication of listener response through mail, and at the same time denying important information to the Soviet censor.

Increasingly, more listener mail has originated from the Soviet Union than from the countries of the Soviet bloc. In 1968, 31 percent came from the USSR; 69 percent from the bloc. In 1969, 56 percent from the Soviet Union; 44 percent from the bloc. In 1970, 62 percent from the Soviet Union; 38 percent from the bloc. And for the first three months of 1971, 87 percent from the Soviet Union; 13 percent from the bloc.[13]

In the second quarter of 1971, listener mail decreased in number. Aside from the seasonal factor (the second and third quarters of the year usually have less mail than the fall and winter quarters), the decrease in listener mail in the second quarter was ascribed to RL's discontinuance of give-away offers and to the hostile and systematic campaign which Soviet media have been waging against RL during the past three quarters. In fact, only one letter was a response to a former give-away offer, while most of the other mail items contained comments, both friendly and critical, to problems and questions raised in RL's programming. It was

during the first quarter of 1971 that 105 attacks against RL in Soviet and orbit media were recorded, a figure surpassed only during the previous quarter when 156 attacks were recorded.[14]

Audience mail does serve the useful purpose of giving RL some perception of its listenership. In the first quarter of 1971, 96 percent of the mail was regarded as substantive in content; 4 percent without substantive content. In the second quarter, the percentages were 95 and 5 percent respectively.[15]

Russian is the language in which most of the broadcasts were heard. In the first quarter of 1971, the percentages were 85 percent Russian, 13 percent Ukrainian, and 2 percent Georgian. In the second quarter, the percentages were 74 percent Russian, 16 percent Ukrainian, 5 percent each for Belorussian and Bashkir.[16]

As for geographical distribution of audience mail, in the first quarter of 1971, 56 percent came from the RSFSR, 30 percent from the Ukrainian SSR, 4 percent from the Georgian SSR, and 2 percent each from the Latvian, Estonian, and Moldavian SSRs. Those addresses that could not be ascertained were placed at 4 percent for the entire USSR. For the second quarter the percentages were 50 percent, RSFSR, 31 percent Ukrainian, 6 percent Belorussian, 6 percent each for the Latvian and Lithuanian SSRs. From the other Communist countries in Eastern Europe the percentages were as follows: 30 percent Rumania, 30 percent Poland, 20 percent Czechoslovakia, and 10 percent each from East Germany and Bulgaria.[17] In 1967, RL reported that "an extremely high proportion" of its mail comes from Moscow.[18]

RL also categorizes its mail according to "repeat writers" and "first-time writers." In the first quarter of 1971, the letters from repeat writers were 6 percent from the Soviet Union and 71 percent from the bloc countries. Letters from first-time writers were 94 percent from the USSR and 29 percent from the bloc countries. In the second quarter of 1971, the percentages were 6 percent repeat writers from the USSR, 67 percent from bloc countries; and 94 percent first-time letters from the USSR, and 33 percent from the bloc countries.[19]

Moreover, RL records the sex of its correspondents. In the first quarter of 1971, 81 percent of the correspondence was from males, 19 percent from females. In the second quarter, 68 percent was from males, and 16 percent from females, with 15 percent unascertainable.[20]

3. Content of Letters

RL also categorizes the content of its mail according to "friendly" letters and "hostile/critical" letters. The report for the second quarter of 1971 stated that the proportion of hostile to friendly letters was not as high as in the previous quarter, but was "still substantial." "Some of the hostile letters," the report said, "indicated that their authors were acquainted with the official reactions to Radio Liberty's activities."[21]

In general, friendly listeners praise RL's operations and citicize their own Soviet media. Judgments are made within the context of compari-

sons between Soviet "democracy" and genuine democracy in the West. RL is also praised for providing information to the Soviet listener in the tradition of a free press. One listener from the Ukraine commented favorably on RL for its "regular and accurate information." In turn, he criticized the Soviet leaders who "maintain a cowardly silence and wish to hide a pig in a poke from their very own people. . ." The writer continued:

> In so doing, of course, to our shame and regret we have to learn the truth not from the voice of the public, but from abroad. And all this only serves to undermine more and more their authority in the eyes of their own people . . . Let me express over and over to you my acknowledgment that you have been able to open my eyes and broaden my horizon.

Taking issue with RL's question on the 24th Congress of the CPSU, the writer continues:

> I only regret that I am a Russian and still live in this wretched Russia and have to write in shameful block letters like an illiterate at a time of freedom of the press and speech. And I am not sure whether my letter will reach you and whether I will find out about it in your broadcasts. If you receive it, may I ask you strongly to put over its message in several programs; for, because of the strong jamming, I may not hear my own voice. . . . [22]

Another writer from Stravropol Kray, The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), a woman listener, made the sweeping judgment that "everybody [in the USSR] listens to Radio Liberty." In the buses, she said, people exchange comments about its broadcasts. She praised RL's *Women's Show* series devoted to the Soviet working woman but added this critical comment: "Your in the West have no idea what . . . [the life of a Soviet Woman is like], but you are not to blame for that."[23]

RL also receives and records in its files letters that are hostile and critical. A worker at the Zaporozhstal factory, claiming to speak for his comrades, denied both the persecution of Jews and the restrictions on freedom for Soviet writers. Seemingly well informed about the activities and works of a number of Soviet dissidents, he compared the virtues and achievements of the Soviet constitution with the "freedom" in America where "in broad daylight" a President is murdered.[24]

A letter in a similar vein from a listener in Moscow Oblast dismissed the "slanders" whose "cast-iron throats will be silenced," and concluded: "The day will come when there will be no more West Germany, U.S. or any other capitalist country."[25]

Another letter from a group of Tatars and Bashkirs charged that RL presented their life "in a distorted way;" that they "have got enough of everything;" and expressed compassion for the lot of former Soviet citizens living in the West in these words: "We are sorry for you, brothers."[26]

RL categorizes responses from listeners according to "friendly" and "hostile/critical" reactions and attempts to measure the response in percentages. During the first quarter of 1971, the category "friendly" response recorded 43% for letters and 85% for interviews; the category "hostile/critical" recorded 57% for letters and 15% for interviews. For the second quarter, the percentages for the "friendly" category were 74% for letters, and 88% for interviews; and for the "hostile/critical" category, 26% for letters and 12% for interviews. The total percentages for both

quarters and for both letters and interviews were 81% for "friendly" and 19% for "hostile/critical."[27]

4. Significance of Listener Mail

Listener mail provides RL with another important input of data, despite acknowledged imperfections, to flesh out its perception of the Soviet audience and to measure its effectiveness in broadcasting. It provides further documentary evidence, though minimal, of audience reaction. What is important to bear in mind in measuring the value of listener mail was pointed out by George Perry, namely, that "people write when they are really motivated, either pro or con"—meaning that listener mail reflects a significant reaction to programming and thus takes on a special value of its own in determining audience reaction.

On the other hand, the value of this reaction may be somewhat diminished by the fact that, apparently, RL strongly encourages listener response by mail; in fact, the practice may be overdone. As one senior RL staffer said in a post-broadcast audition on the matter of soliciting listener mail: "Perhaps we are unwittingly giving it more emphasis than is advisable."[28]

Nevertheless, this does not devalue listener mail per se as an important input factor in measuring audience impact; for, listener mail, whether pro or con, is an affirmation of RL's purposes, namely to provoke the Soviet people to think critically and independently and to contemplate alternative solutions to problems on the basis of more complete information. Dr. Sosin inferred as much in a statement evaluating the evidence on RL's listenership. The evidence that RL is heard in the Soviet Union, he said, comes from hundreds of interviews with Soviet tourists, members of delegations in the West, conversations with Soviet citizens held by Western tourists, guides and students, and "perhaps most important," he said, "from letters which slip through the net of Soviet censorship and reach Radio Liberty's mail drops in the free world." "The great majority of this audience mail is favorable," he continued, "and encourages Radio Liberty in the conviction that its basic premise is sound, namely, that in all walks of Soviet life people are thirsty for information and ideas denied them by the official media; that in the current era of ferment after de-Stalinization they seek a deeper understanding of their own society." [29]

C. Other Bases for Evaluating Effectiveness

1. References to RL in Soviet Literature

For internal organizational purposes RL relies wholly on interviews and listener mail as positive means for evaluating its effectiveness. Still, the frame of reference for audience reaction could be broadened to include comments in Soviet literature (not regime attacks) on RL and other foreign broadcasters, and also to include general evaluations on RL's activities made by Western authorities, private scholars or officials in government.

With regard to the first point, that is, references in Soviet literature, there has been a steady growth of evidence to demonstrate the value of

RL in the eyes of many Soviet listeners. Frequent references have been made to Western broadcasts in Soviet literature, particularly in samizdat, and appeals have been voiced urging that such broadcasts be continued.[30] Yuri Galanskov, author of the samizdat, "Organizational Problems of the Movement for Full and Universal Disarmament," made this reference in an appeal on behalf of imprisoned dissenters:

> The Western press, and *especially Western radios in the Russian language*, give wide currency to facts of arbitrary judicial actions and administrative perversion, pinpoint their social nature, and force the state organs and officialdom to take urgent measures. This overcomes the natural inertia and conservatism of the bureaucracy . . . In functioning like this, Western press and radio perform the task of an organized opposition which is presently lacking in Russia, and thus stimulate our national development . . .[31]

A recent example of this sort of evaluation by indirection was the revelation in *The New York Times* in August 1971 of the existence of a publication in the Soviet Union called, "Political Diary." It was described as an exceptional example of political samizdat. Typical of the disquiet evident in this publication was a letter dated February 1966 and sent by an educator to Premier Kosygin. Of particular importance for this study is the writer's reference to Western radio broadcasts.The letter, printed in the Diary, said that people had "a great many questions to which they are not getting direct answers, either in the press or on the radio, or in the speeches of our party and Government leaders. It is not surprising that many of our people are beginning to find their answers in foreign radio broadcasts." [32]

Another form of evaluation by indirection is the frequency with which the upper echelons of the Soviet ruling elite draw upon foreign broadcasters like RL as sources of information. This statement cannot be documented with the precision of the above reference to the "Political Diary;" but it is known that the Soviet leadership draws heavily upon daily monitored news from abroad. As Dr. Pool observed: "For the Soviet elite there is, of course, as there always has been, substantial coverage of foreign news sources in the classified monitoring reports."[33] Even middle and upper class Russians have shortwave radios available, and, accordingly, as Dr. Pool noted, "BBC, Voice of America, and Radio Liberty broadcasts are normal information sources for high status Soviet professionals or bureaucrats." [34] By implication, therefore, the Soviet leadership itself places a high positive value on foreign broadcasters such as RL.

What effect such access to outside information sources has on the ruling elite cannot be determined. In a comment on the immediate prospects of samizdat developing into "any sort of important political force," Peter Reddaway made an observation that has relevance to this larger question. "I happen to think," he said, "that samizdat at its present stage and in the present state of the Soviet society has little or no direct impact on policy-making by the leader. I do not see it as part of a political struggle. On the other hand, I see it as potentially of the greatest significance . . ."[35]

2. *Views of Former Soviet Citizens and Western Authorities*

Other sources of evidence upon which to judge RL's general audience impact are the assessments of former Soviet citizens now living in Israel and the West who had been listeners while in the USSR, and also assessments by Western authorities who through their various academic and official connections have established credentials for passing judgment. All comments found tended to support the radio. This does not necessarily mean, however, that there has been no adverse criticism. The following are examples of favorable commentary.

Dr. Boris Tsukerman, Soviet physicist and human rights activist who left the Soviet Union in January 1971 and is now a citizen of Israel, declared that "Radio Liberty has its own audience in the USSR. This conclusion is the result of my conversations with many people."[36]

Mrs. Natalia Belnikov, wife of the deceased Soviet writer Arkady Belnikov, lecturer at Yale University, and former staff member of the Sociological Department of the Moscow Radio and Television Committee, described their listening habits and those of their friends while in the Soviet Union. What seems most significant about her comments is the high value that is placed on the work of foreign radio broadcasters and also the widespread influence these broadcasts have within the Soviet intelligentsia. Mrs Belniko said:

> I well remember the efforts made by my friends to hear, despite difficulty, the unfettered word filtering through jamming. My invalid husband would spend hours sitting tensely before the radio, operating the volume and tuning controls with both hands. We saved our money, and even went without necessities, in order to buy the most sensitive receiver; all of us had homemade schedules of broadcasts by the BBC, VOA, and Liberty. People brought (illegally, of course) special adapters for Soviet-made receivers in order to increase the range of frequencies. We would report to each other immediately on what we had heard, and set up a timetable to take turns listening. I happen to know that recently this timetable has been operating throughout the night time when the jammers are ineffective. The technique of listening has been perfected. Broadcasts are being recorded on tape recorders. The broadcasts that are most prized by listeners get transcribed on the typewriter and become part of *samizdat* . . . [37]

Western specialists on Soviet affairs have also made assessments on the effectiveness of RL as a broadcaster. Peter Reddaway, Soviet specialist at the London School of Economics, stated that from his "intensive study in recent years" on the democratic tendencies and movements in the Soviet Union he has accumulated "massive evidence of the importance which these tendencies and movements attach to Radio Liberty." [38] Another scholar, Jean Train, Professor of Russian at the Ecole Polytechnique, declared that according to many of his informants, RL "is listened to avidly by most of the intellectuals and leaders in the Soviet Union" with whom he has been in contact for many years. So important are RL's programs to these intellectuals that a number of groups have been formed, he said, "for the express purpose of listening to them and discussing them afterwards." [39]

Governmental authorities on both sides of the Atlantic have commented favorably on RL's effectiveness. Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of

State for European Affairs, acknowledged that estimates of the number of RL's listeners are "of necessity less precise" than those of RFE, still, "there is extensive corroborative evidence which shows that . . . it has a large and tenacious audience." Mr. Hillenbrand went on to say that further evidence of audience impact comes from foreigners living and working in the area "who confirm that these peoples depend on the radios and that a significant proportion of the broadcasts penetrate the jamming." "One of my colleagues, fluent in Russian, who recently spent a two-year tour in the Soviet Union," Mr. Hillenbrand continued, "has said that in all his wide travels in that country he seldom met an individual who did not admit to listening to Radio Liberty." [40]

A similarly favorable appraisal came from Asher Lee, a British specialist on Soviet affairs and BBC Director of External Audience Research from 1948 to 1970. "In their research work conducted by us at BBC," Mr. Lee said, "we received many indications that this unique service provided by Radio Liberty was widely heard and appreciated by a significant audience in the USSR who, to a great extent, rely on Radio Liberty for information and an analysis of events in their land and abroad." Many Soviet listeners regard RL as their own station, he said, adding that RL broadcasters are regarded by Soviet listeners not "as foreigners transmitting from abroad, but as friends who enlighten." [41]

Taken together, many of these statements, and others that are included in RL's formal presentation to Congress and appended to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, have the ring of a self-serving commercial so frequently seen on American television; but this is a matter of tone and style, and does not devalue the substance, for many of the scholars making these assessments are leading and respected specialists in Soviet affairs in the Western world; thus their judgments have validity; they carry the weight of authority. Negative appraisals by scholars could not be found in published literature.

II. REGIME ATTACKS AND JAMMING AS MEANS OF EVALUATION

A. Regime Attacks on RL

1. Soviet Tradition of Attacking RL

Documentary and empirical evidence are positive means which RL uses to determine impact and effectiveness. RL uses other means, essentially negative, that provide another measurement, however imprecise, namely, the number of regime attacks and the persistency of Soviet jamming.

Soviet attacks on RL are nothing new. What is new is the intensity and frequency of these attacks. The Soviet book, "U.S. Radio in Psychological Warfare," published a few years ago summarized the regime's inveterate opposition to RL in these words:

> It is well known that of all types of Western "freedoms" "Radio Liberty" makes intensive use of one—freedom of slander, or falsifying facts and of fabricating provocative rumors. Up to the present day, "Radio Liberty's" broadcasts [transmitted] in the languages of the peoples of the USSR consist of overt and malicious

subversive propaganda. All of this has been mentioned more than once in the Soviet press.[42]

* * * * *

B. Soviet Jamming of RL

1. Extent of Soviet Jamming

An equally important measurement of RL's impact and effectiveness, even though negative in character, is the persistency of Soviet efforts to jam its signal. Within 10 minutes after RL went on the air in March 1953, the Soviet Government began jamming operations; it has continued ever since, jamming RL around-the-clock 24 hours a day.

This has not been the case with other foreign broadcasters. As early as 1956, jamming operations ceased against the BBC on the occasion of Khrushchev's visit to Britain. VOA experienced a similar respite in 1959 when Khrushchev visited the United States. Between these years and 1963 both stations experienced periods of selective jamming during which many of their broadcasts got through without interference. In June 1963, the Soviet Government suspended its jamming of all major non-Communist world broadcasters, except RL.[43]

III. RL's AUDIENCE IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS

A. What Does It All Add Up To?

How is it possible to make any valid judgments on the extent of RL's impact and effectiveness? Hundreds of interviews a year from a narrowly selected audience provide one input for measurement. Listener mail, some 6,000 letters since 1956 (an average of some 33 letters a month), provide another.[44] Both represent positive means for judgment.

Assessment of regime media attacks and calculations of Soviet investment in time, resources and energy into jamming provide essentially negative inputs. Yet, they, at least, have the virtue of creating greater certainty in a very uncertain area of human judgment.

But, what does it all add up to?

* * * * *

B. Possible Modifying Factors

Commonsense seems to dictate that the positive inputs of interviews and listener mail can at best give RL only a hazy image of its audience and an uncertain estimate of its effectiveness. Still, this judgment might be modified somewhat by the knowledge that interviews, particularly those among the scientific intelligentsia, have an especially high value in weighing impact since they represent opinion leaders within Soviet society. Moreover, the number of interviews are, apparently, on the increase, especially with the expansion in the last few years of the Soviet Union's scientific and cultural exchange programs in the West.

This judgment might be modified still further by an awareness that while RL may have an opaque view of its audience, nevertheless, by the expertise of its staff, the quality of research, and particularly the emergence of the samizdat phenomenon, an unknown quantity in the early to mid-1960's which provides rich new insights into the workings of

Soviet society, RL itself can make assessments of its audience, programming needs, and probable effectiveness that may make this ordinarily opaque image appear somewhat clearer. Thus, it is possible, though not provable that RL may not be "flying blind" entirely, to use Mr. Sargeant's metaphor, and perhaps may even be in atmospheric conditions that are somewhat clearer than "a pea-soup fog."

NOTES

1. Analysis Report #6–71, Evidence of Radio Liberty Effectiveness (Second Quarter of 1971), July 26, 1971. (RL, v. XII, pt. 2).
2. Hopkins writes: "So far, Soviet mass communications researchers have done little to measure radio audiences and listenership. All that Soviet authorities know is that the radio broadcasting network is technically capable of reaching all but a fraction of the Soviet population." (op.cit., p. 249.)
3. According to one RL paper, "direct, though random, contact with the listener is established through listener mail, of which there has been a considerable flow since 1960, and through interviews with Soviet citizens visiting in the West. While these contacts are not quantitatively large enough to provide a representative sampling of the audience for statistical purposes, the substantive information contained in the *Listener Mail Reports* and *Target Area Listener Reports*, issued by the Audience Research Division, serves frequently to confirm or refine policy judgments, and on occasion listeners have made direct programming suggestions which were considered worthy of instituting in Radio Liberty programs." (RL Policy Formulation, June 1971, p. 19. *In*, RL, v. IV, pt. 7).
4. Sargeant, Communications to Open and Closed Societies, p. 176.
5. RL Visual Exhibits, Illustration 4. (RL, v. V, pt. 11).
6. Ibid., Illustration 5.
7. Ibid., Illustration 6.
8. RL Inter-Office Memorandum, Briefing Material, Chart VI, Audience Occupation Distribution, p. 6. (RL, v. V., pt. 12).
9. RL's Russian Service Programming samizdat programming, April 1971, section V., pp. 20–21. (RL, v. II, pt. D2).
10. RL, Analysis Report #6–71, Evidence of Radio Liberty Effectiveness (Second Quarter of 1971), July 26, 1971, p. 7. (RL, v. XII, pt. 2).
11. Ibid., pp. 10–11.
12. RL Policy formulation, June 1971, p. 19. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7).
13. RL, Inter-Office Memorandum, Briefing material, August 26, 1971, p. 3. (RL, v. V, pt. 12).
14. RL Analysis Report #6–71, Evidence of Radio Liberty Effectiveness (Second Quarter of 1971), July 26, 1971, p. 1. (RL, v. XII, pt. 2).
15. Ibid., p. 16
16. Ibid., p. 16
17. Ibid., p. 17.
18. NYU-RL Conference, Communicating with Soviet Youth, 1967, p. 4 ff.
19. RL, Analysis Report #6–71, Evidence of Radio Liberty Effectiveness (Second Quarter of 1971), p. 18. (RL, v. XII, pt. 2).
20. Ibid., p. 18.
21. Ibid., p. 1.
22. Ibid., pp. 1–2.
23. Ibid., pp. 2–3.
24. Ibid., pp. 3–4.
25. Ibid., p. 4.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 19.
28. RL, Post-Broadcast Audition Report, Audition of RL Russian Program for Wednesday/

Thursday, Oct. 14/15, 1970, November 13, 1950, p. 11. (RL, Post-Broadcast Auditioning File).

29. Sosin, Role of Radio Liberty, pp. 95–96.

30. RL Formal Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 8. (RL, v. I).

31. Ibid., p. 8. Italics added.

32. Gwertzman, Bernard. Notes from the Russian Underground. *The New York Times*, August 22, 1971, p. 32.

33. Pool, Ithiel de Sola. "The Changing Soviet Union: The Mass Media As Catalyst," *Current*, (No. 67, January 1966:15).

34. Pool, Final report, p. 11.

35. RL, Future of Samizdat, p. 16. (RL, v. II, D1).

36. RL Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 46. (RL, v. I).

37. Ibid., pp. 43–44

38. Ibid., p. 27.

39. Ibid., p. 35. Prof. Hugh Seton-Watson, a leading British specialist on Soviet affairs, declared that despite the elaborate and expensive measures the Soviet Government has taken to prevent RL's broadcasts from reaching the Soviet audience, "there is much evidence that the present audiences can be counted in millions." (Ibid, p. 29).

40. SFRC, Report, pp. 20–21.

41. RL Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 34. (RL, v. I).

42. U.S. Radio in Psychological Warfare, pp. 33–34.

43. RL, Soviet Counter-measures against Radio Liberty, pp. 1–2. (RL, v. III, pt. M).

44. RL, The Soviet shortwave audience, p. 2. (RL, v. III, pt. J.)

SOME EFFECTS OF RADIO MOSCOW'S NORTH AMERICAN BROADCASTS*

By Don D. Smith

Opinion change may result from an "unexpectedly better" audience impression of communications.

* * * * *

Although international political communication is now a very prominent part of international political activity, actual empirical research in this field is quite scanty.[1] This study continues to report some research in one area of international political communication—short-wave radio broadcasts from an official source in one nation to an audience in some other nation.

Some research reported recently in *Public Opinion Quarterly* found that there is a sizable audience in the United States to political programs broadcast directly to this country from other nations by short-wave radio.[2] What effect do such broadcasts have? The last controlled research on the effects of short-wave radio broadcasts to American audiences was conducted in 1942. In that study of German and Italian broadcasts, Allport and Simpson found that the broadcasts were generally ineffective, although some positive effect was noted on a few issues under certain conditions.[3] In the 27 years since that research was conducted, international political broadcasting has intensified to the point where it now represents a major part of the international political communication

*Excerpts from "Some Effects of Radio Moscow's North American Broadcasts," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXXIV (Winter 1970–1971), pp. 539–551. Reprinted with the permission of *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, copyright holder, and the courtesy of the author.

expenditure of many nations.[4] Moreover, when compared to the efforts of a generation ago, considerable skill has been developed in communications designed to persuade. What are the effects, then, if any, of short-wave radio broadcasts on the current audiences?

Replies from the current American audience certainly suggest that such broadcasts do affect their political opinions and beliefs. These "real-life" listeners say that the broadcasts "help them see the other side of the story," and "provide a broader perspective of international events."[5] Another response from this actual audience which is of particular relevance for the study reported here is that one of the stations to which they listen most frequently is Radio Moscow.[6] This paper reports the results of an experimental study which examines some effects of Radio Moscow's English language North American broadcasts. To gain experimental control, the subjects are not a "real-life" audience, but the results will be compared to those reported by actual listeners.

THEORY

A very small but intensive pilot study provided the theoretical leads utilized in this research.[7] In that early research it was found that (1) by our standards of effective communication, the content (and the manner in which that content was presented) of Radio Moscow's North American programing was very poor, and would probably not be considered effective no matter what the goals of the communicator might be;[8] (2) the program content was biased and anti-United States, and the listeners perceived it to be such; (3) but the listeners were quite surprised that the content was not even more biased and more anti-United States. (4) Despite these negative characteristics, the respondents felt themselves to be influenced by what they had heard. The study reported here began with a search for a theoretical orientation which would provide a meaningful frame-work for the interpretation of these preliminary observations.

Social psychological research has noted that the response of an individual to a message is a function of the perceived relationship of that message to some internalized standard. Individuals evaluate incoming stimuli against some standard which they bring to the situation, and the direction and extent of their response is a consequence of that comparison. Within this framework, cognitive congruity or consistency formulations have emphasized the logical "fit" of the stimulus with some pre-existing cognitive structure, that structure usually being viewed as consisting of those attitudes and beliefs held by the individual which he relates to the incoming stimuli.[9] More recent assimilation-contrast and social judgment formulations have emphasized the evaluation of a stimulus against a range of internal reference points.[10] In both approaches, there has been increasing recognition that an individual's *expectations* about the stimulus are a prominent part of the baseline or standard against which he compares incoming stimuli.

The conclusions of such research have been that small deviations from

what is expected produce positive affect and positive construal of the stimulus, while gross deviations from what is expected produce negative affect and negative construal of the stimulus (with confirmation of expectancies resulting in some negative affect also). These results have been obtained regardless of the direction of the deviation from expectancy. In this view, gross discomfirmation of expectancy, no matter whether the stimulus is perceived as better or worse than expected, should result in negative response to that stimulus.[11]

In real-life contexts, such experimental results have rather startling implications. According to this thinking, we should respond negatively if something turned out to be much better than we expected it would, or respond positively if something turned out a little worse than we expected it would; a student would respond negatively on learning he had passed a test he expected to fail, and respond positively on learning he had barely flunked a test on which he expected to get by; or a traveler in a foreign land would respond even more negatively on finding his original negative stereotype about the host country clearly disconfirmed. There are enough readily observable everyday situations which do not fit such a pattern to indicate that something is missing from these theoretical formulations.

Harvey and Clapp have added an important point by recognizing that the baseline or standard with which a stimulus is compared has evaluative dimension.[12] They note that human beings have hopes and desired goals as well as expectancies, and evaluate stimuli against these hopes as well as comparing them with their expectations. Harvey and Clapp found support for the hypothesis that deviations from expectancy in a direction supporting one's hopes would result in positive affect and positive construal of the stimulus, while deviations from expectancy in a direction negating one's hopes would result in negative affect and negative construal of the stimulus.[13]

An important addition should be made to these statements by Harvey and Clapp. The perceived deviation of the stimulus from expectancy is a judgment *relative* to what is expected; it is not a categorical, "all or none" judgment. It follows that an individual may be positively affected by a negative stimulus (negative in terms of his hopes) if he perceives the stimulus to be less negative than he had expected. Thus our student, although hoping to pass the test, might respond positively to flunking it because he did not flunk it as badly as he expected he would; and a student who easily passed a test he expected to pass easily might not be affected as positively as the student who barely passed a test he expected to fail.[14]

Several characteristics of the subjects in this study are pertinent at this point. (1) All of them assessed international cooperation, understanding, and peace as "very desirable" goals (the hope condition), and (2) all of them expected the stimulus to be incompatible with these hopes; that is, they had very negative expectations about Radio Moscow and its programing. They expected it to be very slanted and very anti-United States

in content, consisting of blatant propaganda and "fanatical" attempts to change their minds (the expectancy condition). Also pertinent here for a full understanding of the hypotheses of this study is the point, to be documented later, that the broadcasts to which the subjects listened were indeed biased and noticeably negative to the United States, and were perceived as such by these American subjects. With these characteristics in mind, the following hypotheses may be derived from the foregoing discussion: (1) Listeners perceiving these negative broadcasts to be relatively better than their negative expectations will respond positively to the broadcasts. (2) Listeners perceiving these negative broadcasts as confirming their negative expectations will respond negatively to the broadcasts. (3) Listeners perceiving these negative broadcasts to be relatively worse than their negative expectations will respond most negatively to the broadcasts.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design consists of an experimental panel of 122 university students and two control panels of 43 and 54 university students respectively. This excludes, from an original experimental panel of 151 students, those individuals who had ever listened to Radio Moscow's broadcasts before. It is perhaps indicative of the success of our own country's political socialization that, in the original panel of 151 subjects, only 11 had favorable expectations of Radio Moscow's broadcasts; these individual's are also excluded from this report. The experimental panel listened to Radio Moscow's North American broadcasts one and one-half hours each week for two and one-half months—a total of 15 hours exposure. The broadcasts were monitored, taped, and replayed to the students usually within one to three days of their actual transmission.[15] The subjects, all volunteers, submitted to a before-after questionnaire consisting of semantic differentials, opinion scales, and both structured and open-ended questions. The subjects were assigned a number at the beginning of the study, so that the before-after responses of each individual could be matched while protecting his anonymity.

As a control for any sensitizing effect to international news from other sources that might be created by participation in the study, control group I (CI) was fully informed about the research, and we attempted to instill a full sense of participation in these individuals. Subjects in control group II (CII) were unaware that they were a part of any larger study, and unaware that they would be queried again some two months later on the same issues.[16]

Utilizing Radio Moscow's practice of three one-half hour program blocks, which are rebroadcast in rotating order throughout the same evening, and some of which are repeated on still another evening of the same week, the experimental panel was presented with tapes which exposed them to each type of program in the same proportion in which it appeared on live programing. This included the usual news and political

commentary, scheduled programs such as "Science and Engineering," "Viet Nam Fights Back," "What is Communism," "Moscow Mailbag" (with its inimitable slogan, "You couldn't do better than write us that letter"), and short serials such as "The Pechala Family."

Several characteristics of the programing are particularly important. First, content analysis indicated that most of the programing did not deal with international political affairs per se.[17] Aside from short news items, some political commentaries, and a few regularly scheduled programs on political issues, the broadcasts dealt mainly with such topics as urban planning in Moscow, descriptions of the educational system in the USSR, grain production, the rebuilding of the city of Frunze, the booming concrete and cement industry, and the excelling of work norms in tractor production—all quite descriptive and factual in character. Second, by both content analysis and a panel of 15 judges, the programs were evaluated as "moderately biased."[18] These judges also rated the manner of presentation as "dull, boring, and unimaginative."

One striking exception to both of these observations, and one of particular significance in the analysis of results, was the issue of Viet Nam. The subject of news shorts, political commentaries, and a weekly feature of its own entitled, "Viet Nam Fights Back," this issue was frequently presented in a blatantly one-sided manner, characterized by highly charged negative statements likely to be viewed as incredible by an American listening audience, such as reports of U.S. troops ramming flaming bamboo splinters underneath the fingernails of captured prisoners, or U.S. troops pushing captured Viet Cong out of high-flying helicopters without parachutes.[19]

Several separate indices were used as indicators of the subjects' perception of the broadcasts in comparison with their expectations. The results reported here are based on the subjects' replies to questions in the after questionnaire which asked whether or not the content of the broadcasts, and the manner of their presentation, were what they thought they were going to be before they listened and, if different, how and in what way they were different. These items provide the basis for categorization of the subjects into those individuals who perceived what they expected (referred to hereafter as the expected group), those individuals who perceived the broadcasts to be worse than they expected (the unexpectedly worse group), and those individuals who perceived the broadcasts to be better than they expected (the unexpectedly better group).

RESULTS

Data are given here on the following items: the Soviet government (evaluated by semantic differential), separate measures of the subjects' views of the Soviet government's sincerity, the legitimacy of that government's actions in world affairs, and that government's actual desire for world peace (each item evaluated on a nine-point opinion scale), the Russian people, and American military participation in Vietnam (the

latter two each measured by semantic differential).[20] Since the subjects were continually exposed to the many reinforcement patterns of their own society while being exposed to Radio Moscow's broadcasts, we could hardly expect actual conversion of their opinions; consequently, the measurement here is of the *direction* of opinion change rather than conversion of opinion.

The initial results are given in Table 1. Even without any breakdown within the experimental group, it is clear that the broadcasts did have some impact.[21] In Table 1 there is no significant difference between the opinion change occurring in CI and that change occurring in CII, an indication that participation in the experiment was not a significant factor influencing the opinions of the participants. On the other hand, there is a significant difference between the experimental group and CI (in the case of the desire item, CII) on all issues but Vietnam, an indication that the broadcasts did indeed result in considerable opinion change.

Table 2 shows the data bearing on the specific hypotheses of this report. Hypothesis 1 stated that those listeners who perceived the broadcasts to

Table 1

Percentage of Subjects Modifying Opinions Toward the USSR

Issues	Experimental Group (N = 122)		CI (N = 43)	CII (N = 54)
Desire				
Changed favorably	39			25
Changed unfavorably	36	($p < .05$) [b]	[a]	29
No change	25			46
Legitimacy				
Changed favorably	39		24	23
Changed unfavorably	38	($p < .05$)	32	24
No Change	23		44	53
Sincerity				
Changed favorably	51		28	26
Changed unfavorably	22	($p < .05$)	33	28
No change	27		39	46
Soviet government				
Changed favorably	49		28	31
Changed unfavorably	13	($p < .02$)	19	19
No change	38		53	50
Russian people				
Changed favorably	46		25	
Changed unfavorably	20	($p < .05$)	19	[a]
No change	34		56	
U.S. in Vietnam [c]				
Changed favorably	27		23	
Changed unfavorably	34	n.s.	30	[a]
No change	39		47	

[a] Data on this issue were not collected from this group.

[b] All statistical tests in this table are X^2, two-tailed.

[c] For purposes of this table it is assumed that opposition to the U.S. military participation in Vietnam would be favorable to the USSR.

be relatively better than their negative expectations would respond positively to their exposure. In Table 2 it may be seen that this unexpectedly better group consistently changed in a direction more favorable to the Soviet Union on all issues except Vietnam, an issue which, as we have noted, possesses considerably different characteristics. The change is particularly striking on such issues as sincerity (70 percent of the subjects became more favorable, while only 8 percent became more unfavorable), and on the semantic differential of the Soviet government, on which 63 percent of the subjects moved in a favorable direction and 7 percent became more unfavorable.

In contrast, on Vietnam, the one issue which was clearly dealt with in the "hard line" fashion the groups had expected, the unexpectedly better group did not move particularly toward the Soviet Union. Although we have no separate measure of their perception of this specific issue, subjects in the unexpectedly better group frequently indicated that on this one issue, they perceived the broadcasts to be as negative as they had expected.

Hypothesis 2 stated that those listeners who perceived their negative expectations to be relatively confirmed would be negatively affected by their exposure. In Table 2 the data are mixed for this hypothesis. On the issues of desire and legitimacy, individuals in this expected group did move in a direction more unfavorable to the Soviet government.[22] However, they split evenly on the issue of the government's sincerity, and, on the measures of the Soviet government and the Russian people (both obtained by semantic differentials), they actually became more favorable (although certainly not as much so as the unexpectedly better group). These results suggest that under some conditions subjects who generally perceived the broadcasts negatively can be positively affected. It may well be that, just as the unexpectedly better group perceived the Vietnam issue differently from other issues, the negative expectations of the expected group were not confirmed on these specific issues. In future research separate measures of expectation should be obtained for each specific issue.

Hypothesis 3 stated that those individuals who perceived the broadcasts to be relatively worse than their negative expectations would respond most negatively. Although the N in this group is so small as almost to preclude the results from reaching a .05 level of statistical significance, opinion change in a direction more unfavorable to the Soviet Union is, as hypothesized, clearly the most pronounced among subjects in this group (see Table 2). Individuals in this unexpectedly worse group consistently moved in a direction negative to the Soviet Union on all issues except sincerity (on which they split in the direction of their opinion shift).[23] On the issue of desire, for example, 46 percent of the group moved in a direction unfavorable to the Soviet Union while 15 percent became more favorable. Even on the item of the Russian people, about whom all categories in the experimental group originally had rather favorable

Table 2

Percentage of Subjects Modifying Opinions Toward the USSR, by Prior Expectations

Prior Expectations	Issues						
	Desire	Legitimacy	Sincerity	Soviet Government	Russian People	U.S. in [a] Vietnam	N
Unexpectedly better [b]							
Changed favorably	55 [e]	48 [i]	70 [d]	63 [d]	53 [d]	34	
Changed unfavorably	26	35	8	7	15	30	59
No change	19	17	22	30	32	36	
Expected [b]							
Changed favorably	25 [g]	30	34	40 [f]	44 [f]	22 [g]	
Changed unfavorably	46	38	34	16	18	38	50
No change	29	32	32	44	38	40	
Unexpectedly worse [c]							
Changed favorably	15 [h]	33 [i]	33	23	23 [i]	15 i	
Changed unfavorably	46	58	33	31	46	39	13
No change	39	9	34	46	31	46	

[a] For purposes of this table, it is assumed that opposition to the U.S. military participation in Vietnam would be favorable to the USSR.

[b] All statistical tests for this group are the McNemar test for the significance of change, corrected for continuity, one-tailed.

[c] Due to the limited number of cases, the statistical test used for this group is the binomial test, one-tailed.

[d] $p < .001$ [e] $p < .01$ [f] $p < .025$ [g] $p < .10$ [h] $p < .15$ [i] $p < .25$

opinions, the unexpectedly worse group responded quite negatively, with 46 percent becoming more negative, and 23 percent more favorable.

The subjects' open-ended replies on the after questionnaire flesh out the results of these before-after measures. Some excerpts from the unexpectedly better group illustrate the subjects' reactions:

[1] A very silly effect, perhaps, but all of a sudden I realized that Russia's citizens are ordinary people.
[2] You know, here we are always cast in the good guy role. It (the broadcasts) helps you to step back and get a possible view others might take of us and their reasons.
[3] You begin to see that the Soviet Union is not a monster with atomic bombs in each hand; instead they're human, as concerned with human affairs as we are.
[4] Through the dark and heavy mist, every once in a while I felt they really did seem to want world peace, at least those in control of the broadcasts, and as I look over the world situation as a whole, I can begin to see where this could be true.

Such replies are very similar to those we consistently get in interviews with actual American listeners to Radio Moscow's North American broadcasts. Frequent comments from the "real-life" audience are: "It makes you realize they are people just like us"; "You see that there are two sides to most of these international problems"; "You begin to see their side of the story too." [24]

The open-ended responses also provide additional support for the theory entertained in this research—that the process involves a comparison of what the respondent heard with what he expected to hear:

[1] I expected it to be one mass of making the U.S. look black and completely positive for the Russians. I thought I would hear more bad points than I did. I was surprised, they seemed so much like us. From the general idea we get in America we are told the Soviet Union is bad, so I assumed they would try to make us look bad too. They were fairly reasonable about it and it made me think maybe they really were trying to help us understand each other better.
[2] You can't believe all they say, but they didn't hit us hard on the things I thought they would, like race riots, as if they really were trying not to make trouble.
[3] I thought they would try to persuade me. Instead they played music and frankly answered those questions from Americans. They seemed so sensible about it all—makes you realize they're honest people trying to help international affairs.

There are undoubtedly many sociological and psychological factors at work to account for why some subjects perceived what they had expected in the broadcasts and some did not.[25] In our research so far, we have examined only one of these factors—dogmatism, with the more dogmatic individuals purportedly more resistant to opinion change and more prone to distort information to fit pre-existing opinions and beliefs.[26] There is some indication in these data that those individuals scoring high on the dogmatism scale perceived the broadcasts as they had expected them to be, while the low dogmatics found the broadcasts to be something different from what they had expected ($t = 1.37$, $p < .15$).[27]

DISCUSSION

This study obtained a measure not only of the specific point on an opinion measure which a subject indicated most exactly characterized his

own position, but also the range of his acceptance and rejection of other positions on the opinion measure. The results of this study are accentuated when this additional dimension is taken into account.

This rather exploratory experiment leaves many important variables uncontrolled, and the results are legitimately subject to diverse interpretations. Nevertheless, they suggest some fruitful directions for additional research. For one thing, disconfirmation of expectancy in the direction of hope or goals seems to suggest why some opinions change—a welcome contrast to the abundant evidence we have on why opinions do *not* change. The results also highlight the fact that political opinion change is a sociological as well as a psychological phenomenon. In this study, the entire social system of the audience must be considered for a full understanding of the impact of Radio Moscow's broadcasts. The broadcasts seem to have had an effect, not because of any particular skill in communication, but because conditions in our own society had led the audience to hold unrealistic negative images which, upon actual exposure, were clearly refuted for many of the listeners. According to the replies of the subjects in this study, the domestic mass media were among those aspects of our society which played an important role in determining their response to these foreign broadcasts. The domestic media came in for specific censure from individuals in the unexpectedly better group as a prime source of their unrealistic expectations.[28]

Some implications for traditional issues in international political communication may also be found in these results. To cite but a few, there is the issue of the comparative effectiveness of political communications that deliberately attempt to persuade and "propagandize," in comparison with a relatively candid and straightforward presentation.[29] The results of this study suggest that national groups which expect biased political persuasion from a source in another nation, and get (or perceive) the communication in that form, tend to respond negatively; national groups which expect biased political persuasion from a source in another nation, and do not get (or perceive) the communication in that form, tend to respond positively. Since most people are taught to expect political "propaganda" from their nation's adversaries, this fact has obvious implications for developing effective political communications to the people of other nations.

Related to this point is the political import of overtly nonpolitical content in international political communications. Having expected overt political persuasion attempts, but confronted rather with concerts, accounts of everyday life in the Soviet union, and descriptions of Soviet social institutions, the subjects frequently cited this overtly nonpolitical content as prominent in the refutation of their expectations. Many other areas of relevance could be cited, such as the relation of expectancy confirmation to the frequently noted "boomerang" phenomenon, and the value of side effects in political communication.

In sum, these results strongly suggest the value of continuing to

examine the factor of confirmation/disconfirmation of expectations in assessing the effectiveness of international political communications.

NOTES

[1] International political communication is considered here as the deliberate attempt by a communicator in one nation to further the political interests of that nation through the dissemination of messages to audiences in other nations by means of the mass media.

[2] Don D. Smith, "America's Short-Wave Audience: Twenty-five Years Later," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 33, 1969, pp. 537–545.

[3] Floyd H. Allport and Mary M. Simpson, "Broadcasting to an Enemy Country: What Appeals Are Effective and Why," *Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 23, 1946, pp. 217–224.

[4] See W. Phillips Davison, *International Political Communication*, New York, Praeger, 1965; Eron M. Kirkpatrick, ed. *Target: The world*, New York, Macmillan, 1956; *Internationales Handbuch für Rundfunk and Fernsehen*, Hamburg, Hans-Bredow-Institut, 1960.

[5] Smith, *op. cit.*

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Don D. Smith, "Radio Moscow's North American Broadcasts: An exploratory Study," *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. 42, 1965, pp. 643–645.

[8] It is an assumption, of course, that at least one of the goals of the broadcasts is the creation of favorable opinions about the communicating nation.

[9] See Robert P. Abelson *et al.*, eds., *Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1968.

[10] See Muzafer Sherif and Carl I. Hovland, *Social Judgment*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961.

[11] Cf. J. Merrill Carlsmith and Elliot Aronson, "Some Hedonic Consequences of the Confirmation and Disconfirmation of Expectancies," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 66, 1963, pp. 151–156; Edward E. Sampson and Linda B. Sibley, "A Further Examination of the Confirmation or Nonconfirmation of Expectancies and Desires," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol, 2, 1965, pp. 133–137; Salvatore R. Maddi, "Affective Tone during Environmental Regularity and Change," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 62, 1961, pp. 338–345. Also see Harry Helson, *Adaptation-Level Theory*, New York, Harper, 1964. A recent study by Keisner indicates that negative affect as a consequence of strong expectancy disconfirmation is limited to public conditions; see Robert H. Keisner, "Affective Reactions to Expectancy Disconfirmations under Public and Private Conditions," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 11, 1969, pp. 17–24.

[12] O. J. Harvey and William F. Clapp, "Hope, Expectancy, and Reactions to the Unexpected," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 2, 1965, pp. 45–52.

[13] Harvey and Clapp, op. cit.; also see J. Scott Verinis, Jeffrey M. Brandsma, and Charles N. Cofer, "Discrepancy from Expectation in Relation to Affect and Motivation," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 9, 1968, pp. 47–58, and David C. McClelland, *et al.*, *The Achievement Motive*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953.

[14] For other treatments of the confirmation and disconfirmation of expectancies in real life situations see Robert T. Bower and Laure M. Sharp. "The Use of Art in International Communication: A Case Study," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 20, 1956, pp. 221–228, and Kurt Lang and Gladys Lang, *Politics and Television*, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1968, pp. 43–48.

[15] This taping took place between October 7, 1966 and December 15, 1966.

[16] The before-after responses of this group were matched by social background data.

[17] Generally, no more than 25 percent of a given evening's broadcast content dealt overtly with international political affairs.

[18] All of the judges were students who had previously listened to Radio Moscow's North American broadcasts and who were familiar with the literature on opinion-attitude forma-

tion and propaganda. They listened to a one-hour sample of the same tapes presented to the experimental group and responded on a semantic differential.

[19] Replies from the subjects (and the panel of judges) indicate that they did indeed view this material incredulously.

[20] The subjects' opinions on all items were measured on the evaluative continuum of favorableness-unfavorableness.

[21] There were no significant differences in the initial opinions held on these issues by either the experimental group or the control groups.

[22] Although the results do not reach the .05 level of statistical significance.

[23] The broadcasts appear to be particularly effective on the issue of sincerity. Again, the need is clear in future research to obtain measurements of prior expectations on each specific issue.

[24] Smith, "America's Short-Wave Audience."

[25] In this study 41 percent of the subjects perceived what they had expected in the broadcasts, 48 percent saw the broadcasts as better than they had expected them to be, and 11 percent found them to be worse than expected.

[26] Milton Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind*, New York, Basic Books, 1960.

[27] In interpreting these results, it should be mentioned that a highly shortened version of the dogmatism scale was used. See Rolf H. K. Schulze, "A Shortened Version of the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale," *Journal of Psychological Studies*, Vol. 13, 1962, pp. 93–97.

[28] Indeed, some of the respondents, finding the stance taken in the broadcasts to be so different from what they had expected, felt "betrayed" by American media coverage.

[29] Ralph K. White, "The New Resistance to International Propaganda," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 16, 1952, pp. 539–551.

THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM POSES THREAT OF SPECIAL DIMENSIONS*

BY HAMMOND ROLPH

This article illustrates the use of captured documents as a measure of the effectiveness of psychological operations programs. The selection is an assessment of the impact of the Chieu Hoi Program through textual and documentary material.

Ever since the Viet Cong insurgency reached serious proportions in the early 1960's, the Saigon government has had some kind of program for inducing defectors from the revolutionary movement. These were not highly organized or very effective, however, until the present *chieu hoi* or "open arms" plan was instituted about three years ago. Furthermore, the military situation in the earlier period did not favor Viet Cong defection. . . . The basic program was designed to persuade NLF soldiers and lower-level personnel to lay down arms and rejoin the national community, with assurances of full constitutional rights, a fraternal welcome, and material assistance. It was supplemented in April, 1967 by a National Reconciliation Policy specially aimed at inducing defection by higher-level Viet Cong military officers and political cadre leaders.

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*Excerpts from "Viet Cong Documents on the War (III)," *Communist Affairs*, VI, no. 1 (January-February 1968), pp.21–25. Reprinted with the permission of *Studies in Comparative Communism* (successor to *Communist Affairs*) and the author, copyright holders.

Defections to date have been largely from the hamlet and village level and from the ranks of the local guerrillas and functional associations, but there have been some "ralliers" of distinctly greater importance, and recognition of the threat to the cadre structure is explicit in the NLF documents on the subject. A report . . . taken from a cache in the Iron Triangle area north of Saigon in Binh Duong Province during Operation "Lam Son 67" by the U.S. 1st Division, blamed the success of *chieu hoi* on poor security policies, loose personnel procedures, lack of vigilance, and weak ideology. It also recognized the key operative element in the defections: appeals from the families of Viet Cong members.

> The Current Affairs Committee has published directives concerning internal protection against the enemy "Open Arms" activity. All echelons, organizations, and branches complied with this, but the results were limited. Secrecy preservation classes have been conducted for all cadre and personnel of all committee echelons, organizations, and societies. Some organizations have reestablished the personal history statement, controlled to some extent the internal political situation, set up protection teams, and constructed defense works to protect the organizations. This was successful in avoiding regrettable casualties to some extent. However, from time to time and in some areas, particularly at district and village levels, the preservation of secrecy was not strictly carried out. This was evidenced by the lack of secrecy in conversation. Moreover, the loss of documents was noted in some areas. The recruitment of soldiers and personnel was done without caution; defense against psywar and "Open Arms" was not rigorously undertaken. . . . As a result many soldiers and workers have lost spirit and become demoralized. There were also cases of dereliction of duty. This was common everywhere. . . .Some of our soldiers and cadres are misled by the enemy, have surrendered to the enemy, carrying important documents and weapons with them. As compared with 1965, the rate of deserters is higher. In some areas, the number of soldiers and cadre workers who deserted or defected to the enemy as a result of the appeals of their family amounted to 80 percent, and the number of village guerrillas, hamlet guerrillas and cadres and civilians was 70 percent. The rest were district-level cadres and higher (including workers, District and Province Concentrated Forces). Some defectors . . . have shown the enemy our base areas and installations, thus causing some damge to us, much political effect on the people, and reducing the people's absolute confidence in our cadres and soldiers. Worse still some people began to doubt our cadres' and soldiers' loyalty.
>
> The above situation was caused by many things, primarily because of the failure to heighten the vigilance by the committee echelons and organization Party Headquarters. It was also due to: Failure to fully understand the principle of building up and defending the Party's revolutionary forces; failure to thoroughly understand the cunning scheme of the enemy; too little emphasis on ideological and political instruction which was designed to heighten the cadres' and soldiers' revolutionary spirit and awareness. . . .
>
> In the near future, psychological warfare on a greater scale will be initiated by the enemy. Intelligence, "Open Arms" activities, and military activities will be increased in support of his resettlement and pacification activities. Other activities will include demagogy and bribery. Indications are that television sets will be brought to rural areas to support psychological warfare and "Open Arms" activities.
>
> To frustrate the enemy psywar and "Open Arms" plan, all committee echelons, Party and group agencies, and the commanding officers of the other organizations should understand that the building up of our forces and the security protection for our revolutionary forces are a common task. The protection of forces is as necessary as the development of forces. Without due protection, our forces will not last long before the cunning scheme of the enemy. . . .
>
> * * * * *
>
> Therefore, the security protection of the unit, defense of our revolutionary force against the enemy's psywar, *chieu hoi* and "appeal to surrender" attempts, at present, and in the future, constitute the most important and urgent mission. . . .

* * * * *

Continue to watch after the unit's political situation. We should grasp fast the people who have doubtful political tendencies or those who are still wavering. Cases of unclarity, signs of corruption, bribery, and demoralization should be halted in time, and each problem should be carefully judged, then solved logically and legally. Avoid mechanical settlements which may create antagonism in the internal organization. Concerning the suspected elements, the Party officials and security authorities concerned should submit proposals to the Party committee on the action to take against these elements and request that the committee echelon take drastic measures against them. The people who still have doubtful political tendencies but are not directly against us or considered dangerous should be continually educated, if they really want to progress, so they can adopt a decisive attitude and discern friends from foes. The core elements which assume key missions should be truly pure and clean.

The people in charge of recruitment should be careful and determined to put an end to easy and careless admission.

Special emphasis should be placed on the education of the servicemen's and soldiers' families in weak areas . . . the organizations should have a plan to contact the cadres' and soldiers' families and fight the enemy's dangerous attempts to lure them through their families.

A secret report from a district unit commander to his district committee . . . spoke bluntly of the difficulties the *chieu hoi* program is causing in his area.

An overall review of the Vietnam battlefield at the start of the winter and spring campaign shows that we have suffered both military and political failures. The enemy . . . intensified military action, and uninterrupted raids have eroded the will to fight of our army and people. Coupled with his military effort, the enemy has stepped up his perfidious *chieu hoi* campaign in his attempt at undermining our fighting spirit.

The impact of increased enemy military operations and *chieu hoi* programs has, on the whole, resulted in lowering the morale of some ideologically backward men, who often listen to enemy radio broadcasts, keep in their pockets enemy leaflets, and wait to be issued their weapons in order to go over to the enemy side.

* * * * *

They might betray the revolution by having their parents, wives, children, relatives and friends establish contact with the enemy to make arrangements for their eventual defection. They will steal documents, weapons and other equipment and cause us losses prior to going over to the enemy to betray the Revolution.

* * * * *

Addressees, upon receipt of this memorandum, will confer with their respective [Party] chapter committee authorities to work out plans for finding out these "bad elements," reeducating them as individuals and their units, as a whole.

On Nov. 20, 1966, the political department of the South Vietnam Liberation Army (the Viet Cong armed forces) issued a directive for action against the *chieu hoi* and other GVN-U.S. psychological warfare programs. The document was captured by a unit of the U.S. 25th Division in February, 1967.

The *chieu hoi* program, one of the most important activities of the enemy psychological warfare, is a national policy of the neocolonialist war. True to the nature of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, their psywar reflects aggression, reaction, and injustice. It is carried out under many aspects but its main purpose is to deceive, flatter or oppress us and impair our morale and ideology.

In an attempt to weaken our combat spirit and sow doubt and fear, the enemy uses the label of false independence, seduces our men with money, women and sympathy, or resorts to bombs. These factors are used to make our troops surrender.

Such a scheme is very dangerous. Therefore we must counter their psywar activities permanently in order to maintain the morale of the troops, their combat spirit and their firm viewpoint.

* * * * *

Our cadres still underestimate the value of the enemy's propaganda. Our men still listen to the enemy broadcasts and read enemy magazines and newspapers.

The political views of our troops are still insufficient and loose due to the ignorance of the enemy's cruelty. The enemy tries to increase the fear of sacrifice and encourages pacifism. As a result, a number of our soldiers have been influenced by the enemy's deceitful propaganda. . . .

Security maintenance is not properly observed by cadres and soldiers.

* * * * *

Defection occurs frequently in various armed forces. Many cases have resulted in diastrous consequences. Some have killed our cadres and soldiers, destroyed weapons and stolen secret documents before surrendering to the enemy.

* * * * *

Point out the danger of this scheme. Its influence is so bad that it weakens our ideology, impairs our combat spirit, and finally induces our cadres to side with the enemy and to become traitors.

The struggle against the psywar and *Chieu hoi* program is a class struggle. It is a long-range and complicated struggle during which we must increase indoctrination for class consciousness, lay bare the enemy's deceitful propaganda, and control our ideology and our organization closely.

* * * * *

To stop enemy influence, the first basic thing to do is to strengthen the personality of each of our cadres and fighters. . . . When one has a deep hatred of the enemy and a noble revolutionary ideal, one is immune to the threat of arms, the appeal of money and beautiful women, and the lure of deceitful tricks. Our cadres and soldiers must be taught how to make a distinction between right and wrong so that they will be able to help one another with the force of collectivity. This is the most revolutionary and effective way according to the Party line. When enemy propaganda reaches our units, we must on the one hand organize the collection of these documents, and on the other, proceed with the analysis of enemy materials with a view to unmasking his deceitful arguments in the eyes of the people. Do not underestimate enemy propaganda. Actually it does not affect anybody specifically. Its influence penetrates our minds day after day and will cause disastrous consequences. Therefore, we should heighten vigilance in order to expel it from our mind.

* * * * *

Provisions of the internal regulations must be strictly observed by cadres at committee levels. Listening to enemy broadcasts and reading enemy newspapers, magazines, and leaflets are forbidden. Provisions concerning the political administration in the unit and assignment of personnel to important units must be strictly observed.

* * * * *

Investigate the attitude of those influenced by enemy psywar operations and straighten it out in time.

* * * * *

Help and motivate families whose children joined the Revolution. We must make them believe in the revolutionary movement, take part in the resistance, and encourage their children to fulfill their duties. Point out the enemy's plot to bribe their children, induce them to side with them. This shows confusion and weakens our combat determination.

In a directive . . . from the Party Committee of Military Region I, entitled "Counter *Chieu Hoi* in the Armed Forces," the campaign to neutralize this dangerous GVN program is elaborated upon. There is no

attempt to minimize the impact of the political arm of the enemy's "two-pronged attack," and severe countermeasures are directed.

In the psywar and "Open Arms" programs, due to our failing to pay attention to cope with the situation and provide correct guidance, the enemy has been positively active and has achieved certain definite results among the people and among our armed forces, especially the guerrilla forces and regional troops. In recent years, they have attached much importance to that attempt and have organized the psywar branch from highest to lowest level and placed that branch under military command. They have also organized the "Open Arms" branch from central to district level, formed and sent many "Open Arms" cadres to work in close coordination with pacification cadres, intelligence agents, spies, U.S. advisers and their vassels, namely the Formosans, South Koreans, Malayans, etc. . . . They have devoted to this task a great deal of money and reserved all available means for this task. . . .

* * * * *

Thus, it is obvious that the enemies have for a long time considered their attempts to induce our cadres and fighters to surrender and rally as a well-organized strategic plot, properly guided from top to bottom and involving the use of a great deal of money and means. All their attempts are directed toward the masses and especially toward our armed forces. At present, within the framework of their attempting to launch a two-pronged attack, the enemies are actively carrying out their effort to induce our people to rally in a well-organized manner and with more cruel and furtive plots. Concurrently, they also step up their fierce military activities. . . . a great majority of our cadres and fighters have proved themselves to be confident and have fought bravely to achieve greater and greater merits and feats of arms in really hard fighting situations which require them to surmount countless difficulties.

However, we must recognize that recently our enemies have achieved, through their "Open Arms" activities, certain definite results. This is because, on the one hand, they have been working actively and have resorted to many tricks and, on the other hand, because we really still have many shortcomings in our task of fighting against enemy attempts to induce us to surrender or rally through their "Open Arms" activities. . . .

Generally speaking, our cadres and fighters still underestimate enemy tricks and "Open Arms" activities and have failed to follow closely their tricks and activities to educate and guide their units to fight against and defeat these enemy plots. . . .

Cadres and fighters tune to various enemy radio stations, U.S. and British stations and the Saigon radio station, without regard to regulations prescribed by higher levels; listen to all kinds of news and "Open Arms" broadcasts through enemy programs of music and artisitic performances. People also read enemy reactionary newspapers and magazines.

People are allowed to read enemy leaflets freely. . . . Some people even bring these leaflets to their offices to serve as wrapping paper or envelopes. . . .

Cadres and fighters who get in touch with their families often return with pictures of their family members. Among them are such people as puppet officers, GVN officials, security agents and policemen. They consider such pictures as free from all bad influence and keep them in their pockets. . . . Leading cadres are aware of this but have failed to take determined, constructive and adequate measures against such occurrences.

* * * * *

Leaders have not succeeded in controlling the state of mind and thoughts of each of the men in their units. . . .They have failed to follow closely and thoroughly understand the difficulties that must be overcome, so as to be able to prevent their men from being upset and pessimistic, thus vulnerable to enemy psywar.

* * * * *

Certain units have admitted many people into their ranks in a reckless manner and without regard to prescribed procedures and principles. They have freely accepted relatives and friends, whose "curriculum vitae" they do not thoroughly know about, into their ranks.

* * * * *

In certain units, cadres usually do not pay attention to the physical and spiritual life of their fighters. This is because they are inclined to think that it is taken for granted that their men will have to endure hardships, however great these hardships may be. Thus, they never pay attention to improving their fighters' way of living with means that are within their reach and capacity. Moreover, conditions in which cadres fail to share the sweet and the bitter with their fighters still exist at certain places.

* * * * *

... Party commissars and leading cadres in units and organizations are to reinforce and increase education in current matters in a continuous manner, with a view to showing people clearly our advantageous position and the weak position of our enemy.

These cadres must also educate their men to closely and constantly follow enemy plots and "Open Arms" activities, so as to design proper measures to cope with such situations in time.

Properly carry out regulations prescribed by the army concerning the question of listening to enemy radio broadcasts and reading enemy newspapers and magazines. Severely judge and exert disciplinarian measures against cadres and fighters who transgress such regulations. . . .

* * * * *

Concerning the dissension between China and Russia, leaders must explain to cadres and fighters that these are only certain differences of concepts that can be smoothly settled. Leaders are to emphasize the fact that, at present, China and Russia are actively supporting our people in all fields to defeat the U.S. aggressors. Leaders must also tell those who listen to Chinese and Russian radio broadcasts not to discuss any sensitive news before receiving official explanations emanating from the Party.

* * * * *

Party chapters, organization and unit commanders are to maintain firmly all activities of such organizations as the three-men cells in their units, pay attention to isolated elements operating in weak areas, assign hard-core cadres to keep well in hand the daily routine and thoughts of each person so as to discover any mistake and help correct it immediately.

Party chapters and organization commanders are to keep well in hand the family situation of each of their men, their strong points and weak points regarding their way of thinking, behavior, and psychology as well as their aspirations so as to constantly help them. And, especially with people who have committed certain mistakes, Party chapters and organization commanders are to analyze such mistakes, judge them, and create for them favorable conditions to progress and achieve merits instead of overcriticizing them and having prejudices against them.

* * * * *

... The question of getting in touch with family members must be thoroughly studied and correctly organized and carried out. However, in this critical situation, such contacts ought to be limited. Commanders must educate their men prior to their departure and motivate them to reeducate their family members. . . . For people whose standpoint and thought are still shaky, commanders must not allow them to contact their families at once. In emergency cases and when facing righteous aspirations of these people, commanders are to assign some other people to go with them to strive to educate their families if this is possible. (Avoid causing people to think that we are doubting them when having them accompanied by some other people.)

* * * * *

... We must not, even when short of personnel, admit into our ranks doubtful elements whose "curriculum vitae" we do not know about, so as to avoid all possible infiltration.

* * * * *

Actively control and implement regulations guaranteeing the realization of democracy in organizations and units; raise to a higher degree the people's attitude toward Party chapters cadres and commanders; promote unity among the cadres and fighters; absolutely fight against despotic, bureaucratic, imperious, nepotistic, and militaristic thought and gesture among the ranks of the army, especially among the ranks of the cadres. . . .

Actively realize the . . . task of supplying our troops and taking care of the material needs of cadres and fighters within the reach of our capacity. . . Absolutely fight against the thought of refusing to share the sweet and the bitter with everybody and striving to improve personal benefits.

* * * * *

In case we discover a cadre or fighter who induces some other people to desert our ranks, we are to thoroughly study the case to see whether that cadre is someone sent by the enemy or just a person who could no longer endure hardships and has resorted to such a wrong means.

If the man happens to be a real enemy, then we must deal with him in a proper manner. If he happens to belong to the second case, then we must reeducate and reform him right at the unit.

In case some cadres and fighters receive appeals from their families to return and inform us about such moves, we are to promote their revolutionary spirit and comfort them. We must also make public such a revolutionary spirit and have it studied by other people. Concurrently, we are to consolidate their thought and strive to prevent them from being shaken by other appeals that will be launched by their families at other times. Finally, we are to motivate people to write letters to build revolutionary concepts for their families or inform regional authorities to take care of that work.

It is evident from the above directive that restoration of discipline is a mixture of persuasion and coercion, with the former preferred whenever possible. The NLF leaders apparently realize that Draconian measures would tend to erode the psycho-political underpinnings of the revolution. References to the requirement that cadres share "the bitter and the sweet" with their subordinates are frequently seen in Viet Cong operational and training documents dealing with criticism and self-criticism. There is no evidence, however, that such directives are ever put into full effect. In fact, gross inequality between cadres and rank and file (particularly in food rations and access to sexual pleasures) is built into the system [1] Furthermore, some Communist POW's have expressed surprise at the degree to which combat dangers shared by American officers with their men exceed those to which NLF cadres expose themselves.

NOTES

[1] I. de Sola Pool, *op. cit.* , p. 56.

ON ANALYZING PSYOP CAMPAIGNS BEFORE USING THEM*

By Richard H. Orth

CONSIDERING POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS

In attempting a persuasion campaign, it is best to use a step-by-step procedure. First, the PSYOP planner decides which attitudes or behaviors are to be changed. Next he determines the desired direction of the change, and then he writes the message. If the message is to go to an audience that does not speak the writer's language, it is translated into the language of the audience. (If there is time, the message may be translated back into the original again to check the adequacy of the translation.) Then the message is disseminated via the available media and one hopes for the best.

The PSYOP planner must then assess the effect this campaign had on the target audience. This he can do in several ways. He could make surveys or he could analyze the media of the target, or he could note the effects of the audience. If the campaign appeared to work, there is a feeling of satisfaction over a job well done. If it did not work, a plethora of rationalizations are available either from the technical literature or from the contingencies of the situation. For example, if leaflet drops were used as the distribution method, one can easily blame the lack of success on bad luck (that is, high winds, skirmishes, and the like).

If, however, the PSYOP evaluator dwells only on the determination of success or failure, he does not gain any insight into the factors that caused the success or failure. When operating in the field, clearly the psyoperator does not have the luxury of addressing himself to all, or even a portion, of the factors that may enter into the persuasion process. The question then becomes, what can and should he do to anticipate the potential effectiveness of a campaign. An answer may be found in W. J. McGuire's analysis of the persuasion process.[1] Although this analysis is specifically meant to deal with some aspects of personality and persuasibility, it can reasonably be extended to other areas of the persuasion process.[2]

THE THREE-FACTOR THEORY

The model proposed by McGuire has been labeled the "three-factor theory." The name of the theory is derived from the three factors examined: (1) receiving, (2) yielding, and (3) opinion change. Essentially, it says that the likehihood of opinion change derives from the answers to two questions. Although the two questions may seem oversimplified, they really go to the heart of the issue as will be shown later. The

*Original essay by Richard H. Orth.

questions are: (1) what is the probability that an individual will receive* the message and (2) what is the probability that he will yield** to the message. The combination of these probabilities gives the probability of opinion change taking place. An example could be the effects of intelligence (mental acuteness) on the probability of receiving the message and of yielding to it. It seems reasonable to expect that the more intelligent the individual is, the more likely he would be to understand the message. Moreover, one would also expect that the more intelligent he is, the less likely he would be to yield to the message. This expectation comes from the notion that the more intelligent person would be more likely to have considered the arguments being presented and to have dismissed them as not being sufficient to support their side of the question.[3] It is suggested that the probability of opinion change is the product of the probability of perceiving and the probability of yielding. Thus, we have the equation:

$$Pr\ (O) = Pr(R) \times Pr(Y)$$

where P(O) is the probability of opinion change, Pr(R) is the probability of receiving, and Pr(Y) is the probability of yielding. This equation can be plotted graphically as shown in Figure 1.



*Note: Since probabilities range between zero and one, they are really fractions. Multiplying by a fraction serves to reduce the absolute value rather than to increase it as would be the case with whole numbers.

FIGURE 1

Examination of Figure 1 shows that opinion change is least likely to occur at the extremes of intelligence and most likely to occur in the middle ranges of intelligence as discussed in the text above.

*The term "receive" is used here to indicate understanding or attending, it is a general term to indicate whether or not the message gets through to the target.

**The term "yield" is used here to indicate an acceptance of the content of the message.

THE THREE FACTOR THEORY AND THE COMMUNICATION MODEL

Obviously, the intelligence of the target audience is not always the crucial factor in the PSYOP situation; it is even less often known. However, the three factor theory may still be of utility to the psyoperator once its elements are related to the general model of the communication process. The most frequently cited model of the communication process is diagrammed in Figure 2



FIGURE 2

As originally conceived, the three factor theory concerns itself only with the receiver, with some concern for the decoding process. The model, as will be shown in the following text, can easily be expanded to cover all the elements of the communication system. The probability that a message will be received is not only affected by the characteristics of the receiver, but also by the channel and by the encoding process. The probability of yielding, again, need not be dependent only on the receiver but also on the sender and the channel. For example, a message encoded into Spanish will have a low probability of being received (that is, little impact) in Vietnam; a message delivered by a woman to a male Cua tribesman would have a low probability of yielding, since women have much lower status than do men among this tribal group.[4] In summary, various aspects of the communication (persuasion) process can be considered in light of the three factor theory. More detailed information on this process will be presented in the following portions of this essay.

THE SENDER

The nature or qualities of the source of a message have received attention for many years. Usually the investigators subsume all the source qualities under the rubric of "credibility," and the caveat for persuasion attempts is to use a credible source. This oversimplification is of little assistance in most PSYOP applications. First of all, often no source is cited. Secondly, when it is evident, the source of a message is usually an impersonal one (that is, a nation, an army, and the like), for which some aspects of credibility are difficult to determine.

The following set of questions should be of concern to the psyoperator in attempting to deal with source problems in a campaign:

1. Who will be thought of as the source of the message?
2. To what degree will the source be seen as being similar to the receiver?
3. Is the source likely to benefit from the proposed opinion?
4. What is the record of the source on past campaigns?

5. Is the source knowledgeable about the problem discussed in the message?

It has been shown that the receiver is more likely to be swayed by a source that resembles himself than by someone else. Using the three factor theory this consideration is diagrammed in Figure 3.



Figure 3. Similarity Between Source and Receiver

Keeping this basic idea in mind, we can diagram a specific situation likely to arise in a conflict situation. Many campaigns are organized around the idea that a defector from the enemy should be used as the source. Thus, an officer who has defected is asked to write a message suggesting that more of his former comrades join him. The principle, as can be seen from Figure 3, seems sound on the surface. This source is much more like the target than anyone from the psyoperator's side. Yet if the psyoperator asks question number three ("Is the source likely to achieve some gain?"), his conclusions might be different. An individual defector has much to gain (easier treatment, money, and the like) from taking the side of the former enemy. As a consequence, an appeal focused on one such source may well be doomed to failure. Figure 4 shows such a situation graphically.



Figure 4.

The probability of yielding is derived from the combination of two different probability curves as shown in Figure 5.



*Figure 5**.

*Pr' (Y) is the probability curve for the similarity and PR" (Y) is the probability curve for the potential gains: Pr(Y) = Pr' (Y) × Pr" (Y).

This discussion should serve to illustrate the need to criticize the accuracy of our perception of the credibility of the source as well as the perceptions of the targets before the campaign is initiated.

ENCODING AND DECODING

The encoding process involves putting a thought or idea into a form which can be communicated. In contrast, the decoding process takes the form in which the idea was transmitted and puts it back into a thought or idea. For example, a person has a mental image of a joke. He translates that into spoken language to "tell" the joke to a friend. The friend then translates the telling (words) back into a mental image. Although this seems like a relatively simple process, its difficulty is illustrated in that not all people will laugh at the joke. The process can break down in a number of respects, that is, the mental images created in the receiver were not the same as the ones held by the source.

In analyzing a proposed campaign, the psyoperator should ask several questions including:

1. Is the language used by the encoder the same as the language of the decoder?
2. Is there a similarity in the past experiences of the two elements? Do they have like frames of reference that can be drawn upon?

Whereas the analysis of the source most often involves the probability of yielding, for the present elements (encoder and decoder), the probability of receiving is also usually involved, but the yielding factor becomes more important. The following example should serve to illustrate the process for analyzing the elements of encoding and decoding. Once again, let us assume that the sender is a defector from the enemy forces and the campaign is aimed at the soldiers in the forces he came from. Furthermore, let us assume that he was an officer in his former position.

Consider now simply the encoder and the decoder. (Note: again, we are using the terms encoder and decoder to imply a processing agent within

the individual that transforms thoughts into language and language into thoughts, respectively. They are mechanisms possessed by the individual, but are not the individual himself.) The analysis is quite straightforward. For example, ask the question: "How similar are the frames of reference of the two elements?" The graph representing the probabilities for this consideration is shown in Figure 6.



Thus, the more alike the frames of reference, the more likely that opinion change will occur. A specific example would be whether the officer concentrates on the strategic and political factors behind the value of surrender rather than on the tactical and corporeal factors. The decoder, if he is an ordinary soldier, will most likely use the latter as a frame of reference, and the message will have little effect on him if the encoder uses the former as his frame of reference.

THE CHANNEL

At one level, the analysis of the channel is extremely simple. One need only ask: Is the channel one that is available to the target? The probability of yielding does not enter into this question. If the answer is no, the probability of receiving the message is zero, and, consequently, the probability of opinion change is also zero. If the channel is available to the audience, then additional questions can be asked involving yielding as well as receiving.

1. Is the channel one that is trusted by the target?
2. To what extent does the channel reach the audience?
3. What characteristics in the channel can create interference in the transmission?
4. To what extent are the interferring characteristics present?

Again, following through with the example of the defector suggesting surrender to his former comrades, what would be the effect of utilizing leaflets? Assuming that the means of distributing them is available, how much trust does the target have in them? It is reasonable to expect that if the audience had been exposed to leaflets before and the promises contained on them had not been kept (or not perceived as having been kept), it will assume that the contents of the leaflets are worthless. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 7.



*Note: The conditions are such that reception (Pr(O)) has virtually been guaranteed.

Figure 7

In summary, it is obvious that consideration of the channel is important. However, often the data one needs are not available, nor does one always have the luxury of deciding what channel should be used. Under the latter circumstance, if one has analyzed the previous effects of using the channel, one will still be able to estimate what to expect from the campaign, and will not be at a loss to explain why the campaign had little or no effect.

THE RECEIVER

The importance of the receiver in determining the effectiveness of a planned campaign cannot be overemphasized. What characteristics should be examined? The following list is intended only to be illustrative, not exhaustive. (Each question can either refer to one individual or a group of persons.)

1. How strongly held are the receiver's views?
2. What are his group memberships?
3. What are the commonalities in basic personality variables among a group of individuals?
4. What data are available about the intelligence level of the receiver?
5. What is the receiver's previous experience with propaganda efforts?
6. What are the cultural variables that can affect the receiver's predisposition toward mass communications?

Continuing with the same illustration, let us ask the question of how committed the target is to his current opinions? First, examine the probability of receiving. There is some indication that as commitment becomes stronger the individual will be more likely to give his attention to messages related to the opinion he holds, but this is true only up to the

point where his commitment is so strong that he will simply not attend to any alternatives. On the other hand, the probability that he will yield should decrease steadily as he becomes more committed* to his opinion.



Figure 8

Figure 8 shows how this looks graphically. This suggests the following hypothesis: if an individual is at the extremes of commitment, he will be less likely to change his opinion. Thus, it would be more efficient to launch a campaign directed at another, related area when this is found to be the case. It is reasonable to expect that if a number of related opinions can be changed, the target will be likely to move along the continuum of commitment to an area where he will be more susceptible to efforts to change that opinion.

SUMMARY

In this essay the three factor theory has been used to analyze the potential effects of various states of elements in the communication process on the likelihood of completing a successful PSYOP campaign. Although the elements were discussed separately, they are closely related. If one follows through the example used in this essay, it will become obvious (from the fact that the same situation was used throughout) that all the elements should be examined and that they are related. For instance, while the decoding process and the receiver were discussed separately, the former is clearly a part of the latter. The receiver's intelligence level will determine some of the constraints of the decoder.

From the above paragraph, it should not be asumed that separating the elements is not beneficial to an analysis of effectiveness. Indeed, it is often necessary for the following reasons. First, if all the elements are lumped together before the final analysis, it is easy to forget one that will turn out to be critical. Second, data (or impressions) about certain elements are often scarce or unavailable and there may be a temptation to skip the entire analysis if this is true. Last, it is better to have knowledge about a portion of the process than none at all.

*Commitment increases, for example, as more people are aware of his opinion concerning a particular issue.

It should also be reiterated that no actual numbers need be used in the analysis and the actual shape of the graph (whether it is a straight line or a curve) is not important. The important factor is how the rough shapes, if they had actual numbers, would determine the outcome. We are dealing with fractions, and if one fraction is extremely low, it will decrease the other drastically.

NOTES

1. W. J. McGuire, "Personality and Susceptibility to Social Influence," *Handbook of Personality Theory and Research*, E. S. Borgotta and W. W. Lambert, eds. (Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally, 1968).
2. Richard H. Orth, "The Acquisition of Attitudes as an Instrumental, Conditioned Response with Consideration of the Developmental Aspect of the Effects of Delayed Reinforcement" (Ph. D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1969).
3. Adapted from W. J. McGuire, "Personality and Susceptibility to Social Influence," *Handbook of Personality Theory and Research*, E. S. Borgatta and W. W. Lambert, eds (Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally, 1968).
4. U.S. Department of the Army, Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam, Ethnographic Studies Series. Pamphlet 550–105 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 100.

CONCLUSION (CHAPTER IX)

EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA*

By L. John Martin

Most propaganda is facilitative communication, not persuasive communication. Confusion of the two has impeded the search for effective measures of communications effectiveness.

It is impossible even to estimate the amount of money that is being spent on international propaganda. Knowing the budgets of the propaganda agencies of individual countries would be inadequate, since their sum is only a fraction of the total amount involved. The major effort appears in the guise of numerous official activities that do not go by the name of propaganda or by one of its euphemisms. It is safe to assume that the international outlay on propaganda is in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Hardly any country is too small or too poor to invest in it. One can say this quite authoritatively without extensive investigation for one simple reason: there is no consensus either among the practitioners or among the theoreticians as to what constitutes propaganda. Definitions range from very specific types of messages transmitted through very specific types of media for every specific end—to deeds that often in

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*Excerpts from "Effectiveness of International Propaganda," *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 398 (November 1971), pp. 61–70. Reprinted with the permission of the American Academy of Political and Social Science and the courtesy of the author. Copyright is retained by the original copyright holder.

retrospect, result, or are intended to result, in particular behavior on the part of the target. With this latitude in interpretations one can fearlessly make statements such as the above.

By any definition, the amount of money and effort that goes into what people take to be international propaganda—including the people who pay for it—is impressive. For purposes of this article, I will define *Propaganda* as a persuasive communicative act of a government directed at a foreign audience. I would have liked to exclude the activities of the diplomatic corps when they are dealing with their counterparts in an official exchange; but nowadays that is difficult. In the old days, such activity was called diplomacy. Today, the target of international propaganda quite frequently is made up of government officials, and the channel or medium often is the interpersonal relationship of a cocktail party. Yes, one might say, but the message is different. A diplomatic exchange is legally, or at least diplomatically, binding. Propaganda is not. This is cold comfort. Often nowadays, diplomatic moves are publicized through the mass media, while diplomatic exchanges are repudiated without qualms.[1]

The expenditures on international propaganda are especially remarkable in view of the fact that there is very little assurance that the activity will have the desired effect; frequently there is very little indication that the propagandist knows what effect he desires, nor does he have any theory as to why his propaganda activity is likely to produce a particular effect. Such a theory is necessary if he is to satisfy economy-minded guardians and disbursers of the public funds, who normally insist on evidence of effectiveness. As Edward A. Suchman has pointed out, "A test of 'Does it work?' presupposes some theory as to why one might expect it to work." [2]

What will come as the greatest surprise to most people, however—not least to the propagandist himself—is that by far the largest chunk of the propaganda budget is not spent on propaganda at all. It is spent on what I shall call *facilitative communication*. This is an activity that is designed to keep lines open and to maintain contacts against the day when they will be needed for propaganda purposes. It is a ploy that is familiar to the newspaper correspondent faced with a press conference and a limited number of telephones on the premises to phone back a hot scoop. He puts an assistant on a phone to his home office and thus keeps the line open until he is ready with his story.

Facilitative communication by international propaganda agencies most frequently takes the form of radio newscasts, press releases, books, pamphlets and periodicals of a general or technical nature, artistic and other cultural programs, exhibits, films, seminars, language classes, reference services, and personal social contacts. None of this, naturally, is engaged in or performed with any conscious, limited objective other than the generally conceded hope of creating a friendly atmosphere, or, as a psychologist might put it, a favorable *affect*.

I have made no systematic study of the content of the world's so-called international propaganda as opposed to its facilitative communication, but my educated guess is that in peacetime, between 95 and 99 percent of the communication activity that is paid for by governments—because they think that engaging in international propaganda is the "in thing" to do—is really not propaganda at all. Ironically, few governments will publicly admit that they are engaged in propaganda because of the pejorative meaning the term has acquired. They prefer such euphemisms as *information program* or *cultural activity*. But for budgetary purposes it is justified as propaganda and serious efforts are made to measure its effectiveness in terms of its persuasiveness.

TYPES OF COMMUNICATION

I have defined propaganda as a persuasive communicative act. All communication is purposive by definition,[3] but not all communication is necessarily persuasive in intent. Besides propaganda, there are other forms of persuasive communication, such as advertising, education, and political campaigning. These differ from propaganda in source, purpose (or content), and target. What they have in common is the process. They are all forms of communication. The question is, how effective are they?

There is no doubt that one human being can affect and even persuade another through communication under certain circumstances. All communication, no matter how insignificant (even a brief "Hi!") leaves a mark on the receiver. Communication specialist Wilbur Schramm likens the effect to calcareous water dripping on a stalagmite. Occasionally a drop leaves an especially large deposit, but generally it merely contributes to the imperceptible growth of the spur. There is some empirical evidence of this lasting effect. Psychologist Harold E. Burtt, for example, occasionally read passages from Sophocles to his two-year-old son in the original Greek. He did this daily for three months, then put the experiment aside until the child was eight years old, when he had the boy memorize a number of selections. He now found that it took a significantly larger number of repetitions for the child to learn passages he had never heard than it took him to learn the ones he had heard six years earlier—a clear indication of a residual effect.[4]

The question, however, is not whether communication leaves a mark—that is, whether it is purposive—but whether it is effective. Effectiveness by definition assumes a *predetermined* outcome. One cannot speak of effectiveness—that is, attaining an intended or expected objective—unless one has a prior objective in mind. This, in essence, is the connotative meaning of persuasion. Purposiveness does not have that connotation. It does not necessarily imply movement or change. Persuasiveness does.

Is persuasive communication effective, then? Generally, the answer is, "No, it is less than effective." Raymond A. Bauer of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration has pointed out, for in-

stance, that an advertiser seldom expects more than 2 to 5 percent of his target audience to be influenced by his message. Is this effective? Is is .02 to .05 effective, but it could represent new sales of 150,000 to 400,000 if his medium is a magazine with a circulation of seven to eight million. A politician would probably be happy with a persuasive communication that was 10 to 15 percent effective, while a teacher would expect at least 70 to 80 percent effectiveness, realizing that 100 percent effectiveness is a pipe dream. There is an interesting difference between the advertiser and politician on the one hand and the educator on the other. The first two often (though perhaps not always) have very specific objectives when they engage in persuasive communication. Generally, these center in the cash register or the ballot box. The educator, on the other hand, frequently has only a vague notion of his objectives. The tests and exams used in measuring the effectiveness of his "persuasive communication" are, therefore, often attacked by those taking them as "subjective" and "unfair"—meaning that the tests do not adequately measure the effectiveness of the persuasive communication.

The propagandist has much in common with the educator. As I pointed out above, most of the time he is engaged in facilitative rather than in persuasive communication and, ironically, most of the time he does not realize it. As a result, he searches feverishly but, naturally in vain for evidence of his effectiveness, so that he can justify his continued existence to the controllers of his budget. What he ends up with—and this is true of propagandists the world over—are some figures that attest to the effectiveness of his facilitative communication.[5] But not realizing that this differs from persuasive communication, he feels guilty and frustrated about having to present clearly inadequate data.

Yet there is a fundamental difference between the measure of the effectiveness of persuasive communication and that of facilitative communication. The former is measured from the top down. The objective is to persuade a given target, and effectiveness is approached though seldom attained. In fact, by the time it is attained the objective has changed, since objectives in international propaganda are defined and circumscribed in terms of time, space, and publics. The effectiveness of facilitative communication, on the other hand, is measured cumulatively from the bottom up. Since its objective is to open or to maintain channels of communication with a given individual, group, or public as potential future targets, effectiveness is measured incrementally, rather than decrementally as is the case with persuasive communication. One can only be more effective, not less than effective. Everyone is potentially a target and must be counted, until a specific objective involving persuasive communication specifies and delimits the target. Obviously, propagandists would just as soon their open channels were never put to the test, since that would involve decremental measurement, in which they almost invariably come out relatively poorly.

HIERARCHICAL IMPACT MODELS

Facilitative communication requires no more than exposure as evidence of effectiveness. If we think in terms of a hierarchy of impact measurement, beginning with the input of the propagandist and ending with a change in the behavior of the target, we can conceive of several intermediate points at which measurement is feasible. Besides measuring input in terms of the number of hours of broadcasting, pages, pamphlets, pictures, periodicals, projections, or what-have-you emitted by the propagandist, one might measure the number of people exposed to the input. Many communication specialists [6] say that the next step in the hierarchy of the effectiveness process is awareness, which involves a conscious knowledge of the subject. Nothing will happen unless the communication can carry the individual on to the interest stage and, possibly, an evaluation stage, which requires an understanding and a "reception" of the message. This is followed by an acceptance, trial, or yielding stage, often thought of as a stage in which attitudes are changed. I refer to this as "collimation of the receiver's cognitive world," since what happens is a realignment or reorientation of a person's attitudes, values, opinion, and behavior within his "reality world." This may be likened to a magnet passing over a piece of iron and changing the orientation of its molecular magnets; only, here the change is in the salience (that is, the psychological closeness of an object to a person) and pertinence (that is, the relative importance of objects) of the situations, objects, and people in his cognitive world.[7] A final adoption or behavioral change step is suggested by some communication specialists, which involves overt action on the part of the target. This, in my opinion, is tautological, since behavior follows from the readiness to act when the opportunity presents itself, and this is inherent in a person's attitudinal orientation.

This hierarchical model encompasses two distinct processes rather than one. The first is the process of facilitative communication that begins with input and ends with exposure. With exposure, the process has been completed. The line of communication is open and that is its sole purpose. The question of efficiency may be raised: What is the cost-per-exposure of opening and maintaining this channel of communication? But effectiveness is achieved once a single contact is made. The second process involves persuasive communication, and begins with awareness. Awareness is clearly unnecessary for facilitative communication; it is crucial for persuasive communication. The step from exposure to awareness is a quantum jump because it moves communication from the physical plane to the intellectual. It is a step that some people can never take because of intellectual or educational deficiencies. John R. Mathiason, studying the urban poor in Venezuela, found that exposing them to more mass media was futile since they had not been trained to process the information transmitted to them. "The poor of Ciudad Guayana have difficulty defining their situations," he concluded.[8]

VALUE OF FACILITATIVE COMMUNICATION

Does facilitative communication have any propaganda value? Yes, it has been shown that familiarity itself tends to create a positive feeling toward an object or subject. Numerous experiments using Chinese characters, nonsense syllables, and human photographs support the theory that repeated exposure—that is, familiarity—creates a favorable attitude toward an object. True, people will tune to a novel stimulus or situation in preference to a familiar one when they have a choice. But exploration or search for novelty correlates negatively with liking.[9] In this sense, therefore, as Marshall McLuhan would say, the medium is the message.

There are two caveats, however, in a propaganda situation as opposed to a laboratory experiment. The favorable *affect* (that is, feeling or emotion) toward the channel—say, the Voice of America—engendered by mere familiarity may be tempered or even reversed if the original attitude of the target either toward the communicator or toward his message was negative. This will be discussed in more detail. Secondly, the positive feeling is limited to those who voluntarily expose themselves to the channel, and this, in turn, raises two questions: Were these people friendly to the channel in the first place, or did they become friendly as the result of exposure? And, more importantly, when at some future date it is necessary to transmit a persuasive communication—that is, propaganda—through the channel, will those who have been linked to it by facilitative communication also be the target of the prescribed persuasive communication?

PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION

And now, finally, we come to the pay dirt in the propaganda mine. How effective is propaganda, which by all definitions is *persuasive* communication? This question has plagued and intrigued communicators the world over, although it was not studied systematically until the twentieth century, which happens to coincide with the period of the development of social science.

Both inductive and deductive approaches have been tried.

INDUCTIVE APPROACHES

The inductive approaches are exemplified by the applied research begun by the Army's Information and Educational Division during World War II and contained by Carl I. Hovland and his colleagues in the Yale Communication and Attitude Change Program. These researchers and others who proceeded along the same lines of enquiry examined the effects of communication through controlled experiments in which they carefully subjected one variable after another to the test. Their findings have included the following:

1. The Communicator

A credible persuasive communicator—and, in most instances, a likeable one—has a great initial advantage over a non-credible communicator. A credible source is one that is seen to be "trustworthy" and "expert," although researchers have found it hard to disentangle the two attributes. It helps if the communicator also appears to have views in common with his audience. The initial advantage of credibility disappears a few weeks after the message is heard, the tendency being to forget who the communicator was. This is called the *sleeper effect*. Other factors, such as age and appearance, have been found to enhance a communicator's effectiveness under certain conditions. Unfortunately for the propagandist, credibility, attractiveness, and similar positive attributes are not characteristics of the communicator but are judgments of the audience.[10] In other words, the propagandist has little control over them.

2. The Message

The effectiveness of propaganda is increased if its message fulfills a need or an aspiration of its target and if it agrees with existing values, attitudes, opinions, beliefs, norms—or whatever one would like to call them—of the audience. It was also found that presenting only one side of an issue is more effective than presenting two sides when the audience is not well educated, already convinced, and unlikely to hear the other side; that presenting both sides of a case is more effective with those who are well educated or initially opposed, and that in general, two-sided presentations tend to inoculate against future counterpropaganda. Effectiveness of a communication is influenced by the order in which the pro and con arguments are presented, but the differential effect depends on the number of sources, how the message is introduced, what happens before or after each side is presented, and the type of audience. Fear-arousing and threatening communications have in some cases been found to be directly related, and in other cases inversely related, to effectiveness. The same is true of emotional as against national presentations. A liked message has a better chance of being remembered than a disliked one, a selected message better than one that the audience chanced onto. One fact pervades all these studies: every variable appears to interact with audience factors over which the communicator has no control.

3. The Medium

Because of the great difference in the cost of communicating through the various mass media, much emphasis has been placed by all "persuasive communicators" on determining the differential effects of the media. The findings have been very disappointing. While a cross section of the public is reached by each medium, with a small decline in magazine readership and a large one in book readership at lower educational levels, each channel—by which I mean the specific radio or TV program, newspaper, newspaper column or page, magazine, and so on—has a very

distinctive audience with little overlap.[11] Given the same audience segment, researchers have found no consistent pattern of advantage in one mass medium over another. Joseph T. Klapper, in his often quoted study of the effects of the mass media, concludes that

> *All other conditions being equal, as they are in the laboratory*, face-to-face contact is more efficiently persuasive than radio, which in turn is more efficient than print. TV and films probably rank between face-to-face contact and radio, but this latter point has not been empirically demonstrated.[12]

He goes on to say that all other conditions are rarely equal in real life. This is an understatement. They can rarely be made equal even in the laboratory, as numerous studies, especially in the field of education, attest. Much depends on the communicator, and this carries over into intimate, face-to-face communication. Not only does interpersonal communication of necessity reach smaller numbers than communication through the mass media, but the impact of the communicator is more vivid and is likely to have a negative effect if he is attempting to persuade individuals on a matter involving personal values.[13]

4. The Audience

More than anything else, effectiveness of persuasive communication depends on the past history of the receiver of a message—the ground in which the seed is sown. This includes the cognitive system—the values, attitudes, beliefs, opinions—and the habitual behavior patterns of the individual, which in turn, also depend on such idiocratic factors as age, sex, education, socioeconomic status, geographic region, and race. Equally relevant are such personality factors as need for social approval, aggressiveness, authoritarianism, high versus low need for clarity or simplicity, self-esteem, and whether the target is particularly topic-bound, appeal-bound, communicator-bound, media-bound, style-bound, or situation-bound. People, it has been found, expose themselves selectively to messages, although it is no longer believed, as it once was, that they will tend to expose themselves only to supportive communications. They will tend to perceive selectively, or, more correctly, their retention is selective, since they must have perceived a message before deciding to reject it. Finally, the pressure of group norms tends to inhibit attitude change except insofar as the group itself is changing in its values.[14]

DEDUCTIVE APPROACHES

The deductive approaches to the study of communication effects have started out with either a behavioristic or a cognitive theory of attitude formation.

Behaviorists

The behaviorists such as Leonard Doob, Burrhus F. Skinner, Caryl Bem, and Arthur and Carolyn Staats base their theories of attitude change on learning theory. Theirs is essentially a hypodermic model of attitude formation and modification, in which a communication stimulus

leads to an observable opinion or behavioral response mediated by an attitude. This, in turn, is a tendency, learned through conditioning, to respond in a given way.

Cognitive Theorists

The cognitive theorists such as Leon Festinger, Fritz Heider, Charles Osgood, and Theodore Newcomb have developed consistency models that explain attitude modifications in terms of a strain toward balance in the beliefs and emotions of the individual. It is a homeostatic model in the sense that a person tries to maintain a logical consistency in the things he knows and likes. Thus, if *A* likes President Nixon but doesn't like his China policy, he will attempt to restore cognitive balance either by changing his attitude toward Nixon or by modifying his attitude toward China. Festinger would add that he is liable to reduce his dissonance by refusing to believe that Nixon holds those views, or by misperceiving the news, or by minimizing the importance of China, or by forgetting what the President said.

These theorists not only explain why and how attitudes are formed and modified but also try to predict the outcome of a communication effort in terms of their theories. The models occasionally lead to incongruous conclusions. As Festinger once pointed out, regardless of how much a child likes Popeye, he can't be made to like spinach. Yet balance theories tend to suggest that he can. Festinger's dissonance theory has some useful applications to the analysis of persuasive communication if one can first measure the attitudes of the target on relevant factors. Sometimes the predicted behavior fails to materialize, which has led to the suggestion that "dissonance theory is almost Freudian in its ability to explain data, no matter how they come out." [15]

There are other deductive approaches that attempt to explain why people are influenced by persuasive communication, but they tend to be extensions of the two described above. One is based on the perceptual theory of Solomon Asch and on Muzafer Sherif's assimilation-and-contrast theory, suggesting that attitude change is due to a change in pertinence, or the relative importance of objects, rather than to a change in a person's feelings about the object. Another theory is based on the functional approach of Daniel Katz, who says that a person's attitudes are tied to his need system or ego-defensiveness. Any changes in his attitude would be due to a change in his psychological need.[16]

EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA

In both theory and practice, persuasive communication has been shown to have an effect. But this is a far cry from evidence of effectiveness. Nor is effective persuasion necessarily the same thing as effective propaganda. If we could select our audience on the basis of certain idiocratic factors—objective physical and personal characteristics peculiar to an individual, such as age, sex, race, education—we might increase by a

statistically significant fraction the proportion of those influenced by a message. But we would have no control over such factors as personality and susceptibility to persuasion, existing values, beliefs and opinions or attitudes toward the objects, subjects and situations involved in the persuasive message. We can choose our communicator but not determine his image. We can select the vehicle of transmission but not the channel of reception of the target of our communication. We could maximize the effect of all these factors for a single individual, especially if we were able to subject him to intensive precommunication analysis. But there is no way that this can be done for the diverse assortment of individuals who normally make up the audience of the mass media, the vehicles most commonly used in international propaganda.

What all this boils down to is that if our persuasive communication ends up with a net positive effect, we must attribute it to luck, not science. The propagandist cannot control the direction or the intensity of impact of his message, if, indeed, he reaches his target at all.

So much for the effectiveness of persuasive communication. Propaganda, as I said earlier, differs from other forms of persuasive communication in its source, its purpose, and its target. The purpose of propaganda may be to influence a government, but it is quite conceivable that the most effective and efficient way to accomplish this is to persuade a particular segment of the population whose composition is totally different from that of the individuals who make up the government. It is further possible that the propagandist is highly effective in his persuasive communication with this segment but that his effectiveness does not carry over to the ultimate objective of his propaganda—influencing the government. The effectiveness of propaganda may, therefore, be even less predictable and controllable than the effectiveness of mere persuasive communication.

Now, prediction and control are two key elements of effectiveness. Another element is an articulable objective. Measurement of effectiveness is, of course, impossible without a specifically stated objective,since we cannot say how well a person has succeeded unless we know what he is trying to do. Put another way, if you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there. Having an objective, the only way a person can successfully attain it is to have control of the vehicle that will take him to it. Finally, the only way he can control the vehicle is by being able to predict what will happen if he moves various knobs and levers in it.

* * * * *

NOTES

1. A recent example was the feeler by the senior United States diplomat in the United Arab Republic, Donald C. Bergus, whose suggestions to President Sadat regarding a Suez Canal solution were termed his personal views by the State Department when they backfired. *The New York Times*, June 30, 1971

2. Edward A. Suchman, *Evaluative Research: Principles and Practice in Public Service and Social Action Programs* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967), p. 86.

3. Some have spoken of non-purposive communication—for instance, the reflexive "communi-

cation" of bees described by von Frisch—but admit that this is not true communication. See D. O. Hebb and W. R. Thompson, "The Social Significance of Animal Studies," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aaronson, eds., *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, vol. 2, 2d ed. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968), pp. 738–740.

[4] Harold E. Burtt, "An Experimental Study of Early Childhood Memory: Final Report," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 58 (1941), pp. 435–439.

[5] I have discussed this problem with British, German, Egyptian, Indian, Polish, Czech, and French propaganda analysts, to name just a few, and found that they all faced the same dilemma we did in the United States. At the time, my analysis of the problem had not as yet crystallized in its present form.

[6] Cf. Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations* (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 76–120; William J. McGuire, "Personality and Susceptibility to Social Influence," in E. F. Borgatta and W. W. Lambert, eds., *Handbook of Personality Theory and Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), pp. 1130–1187.

[7] Cf. Steven H. Chaffee, "Salience and Homeostasis in Communication Processes," *Journalism Quarterly*, 44 (Autumn, 1967), pp. 439–444, 453. Leon Festinger has suggested that "when opinions or attitudes are changed through the momentary impact of a persuasive communication, this change, all by itself, is inherently unstable and will disappear or remain isolated unless an environmental or behavioral change can be brought about to support and maintain it" ("Behavioral Support for Opinion Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 28 [Fall, 1964], p. 514). I disagree. Festinger's own dissonance theory, when viewed in conjunction with Fritz Heider's balance theory, points to the probability of collimation, which requires no change in the environment, only a reorientation toward it.

[8] John R. Mathiason, "Communication Patterns and Powerlessness Among Urban Poor: Toward the Use of Mass Communication for Rapid Social Change," in *Studies in Comparative International Development* (St. Louis, Mo.: Washington University Social Studies Institute; forthcoming.)

[9] See Robert B. Zajonc, "Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology—Monograph Supplement*, vol. 9, no. 2, part 2 (June, 1968).

[10] C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, *Attitude and Attitude Change* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1965), pp. 201–202.

[11] Alfred O. Hero, *Mass Media and World Affairs* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1959), p. 50.

[12] Joseph T. Klapper, *The Effects of Mass Communication* (New York: Free Press, 1960), pp. 108–109.

[13] This finding emerged from a study that was done by USIA in India under my supervision. Intellectuals in India having close personal contacts with Americans were less favorably influenced toward Americans than was a matched sample of Indians without such contacts. On the other hand, they were more favorably influenced toward America as a country. *Opinions of USIS Target Groups and Other Literates in Delhi, India*, unpublished report (Washington: USIA, Research and Reference Service, September, 1966).

[14] A good general review of the literature in this field is provided in Ralph L. Rosnow and Edward J. Robinson, *Experiments in Persuasion* (New York: Academic Press, 1967).

[15] Charles A. Kiesler, Barry E. Collins, and Norman Miller, *Attitude Change* (New York: John Wiley, 1969), p. 236. This book also provides a good general review of the literature on deductive approaches to persuasive communication effects.

[16] See McGuire, op. cit., pp. 1136–1139.

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CHAPTER X

FOREIGN IDEOLOGY AND PROPAGANDA

What role does the ideology of a government play in its propaganda in international communications? What is the role of the form of government? Opinion is divided on these questions now, as in the past, although the trend of thinking of an increasing number of scientists since the late 1940s has been to emphasize national rather than ideological interests, to stress the similarities in the behavior of states over time rather than the differences.

Nevertheless, the form of government is an important consideration in some respects. For example, as an audience, a largely closed society presents major problems for the communicator. Penetration of the barriers can be made difficult, and the uniformity of ideas allowed open circulation by the government often limits the ambitiousness of the effort as well. However, the government often develops a credibility problem as a result of its communications control.

Neither is ideology's effect one-sided. Although an ideology may increase the personal commitment of its adherents and those whose conversion it seeks to complete, its economic, racial, religious, or other social ramifications may induce great fear in the majority, whose members usually cling to important cultural traditions in most societies, and may in the process alienate many leaders.

The essays in this chapter indicate, then, that the principles of communication are valid for all states, and that it is the audience and the objective that determine the theme and media used in a message, not the nature of the communicator's regime.

At the same time, a state identified with an all-embracing ideology may well choose to place many of its psychological initiatives in the framework of this ideology. Similarly, revolutionary regimes, which must present universalistic values as a *raison d'être*, often espouse equally intransigent positions in their propaganda. In neither case is the ideology determinative of the appeal: rather it is the interests of the communicator as he perceives them that take precedence.

It is stressed that the content of the illustrative material in this chapter should not be considered as having official Department of Defense approval, express or implied.

ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT SYSTEM

Whether and to what extent political communications are effective may be influenced by the degree of control over the flow of the communications to and within the audience. It is clear that totalitarian regimes can exert a much greater control over communications channels, and hence over the information to which their citizens are exposed, than freer societies. On the other hand, individuals in closed societies tend to develop filters for regime communications and increasingly rely upon other means of receiv-

ing information. Moreover, technological development and growth in the volume of communications recently have circumvented many of the controls that were formerly at the disposal of totalitarian regimes.

Democratic theory assumes public access to most information so that the public may reach decisions on matters of public concern after informed deliberation. Totalitarian government rests on almost complete control of information. From these antithetical positions it should not be assumed, however, that persuasive appeals should be eschewed by democratic governments domestically or internationally. Both models rely on domestic popular support—or at least tolerance—and both seek to justify their actions in communications to external audiences in order to obtain an international environment conducive to the realization of national objectives. Moreover, the two extreme points on the political spectrum serve to illustrate principles, not to portray governments actually in power which, inevitably, fall somewhere between the complete democratic model, on the one hand, and the totalitarian paradigm, on the other.

A survey of international communications shows that without exception each government explains its policies and practices to world audiences. Different techniques may be employed, different audiences appealed to, and different messages conveyed, but each regime, in its own style, attempts to sway attitudes in terms which may or may not employ ideology or other symbols to persuade.

PROPAGANDA AND THE MONOPOLY OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS*

BY CARL J. FRIEDRICH
and
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Central to the effective organization and operation of totalitarian government is the control of mass communication processes and output. Propaganda is woven into almost all aspects of life in totalitarian systems; it is not treated as merely one tool in isolation from others.

* * * * *

The nearly complete monopoly of mass communication is generally agreed to be one of the most striking characteristics of totalitarian dictatorship. It is also one of the features which clearly differentiates it from earlier forms of autocratic rule, as we have noted. Modern mass-communication media, the press, radio and television, and the film, have been developing gradually and have, under competitive conditions, been looked upon as an essential condition of large-scale democracy. For,

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without the possibility of communicating a great deal of information that is beyond the reach of the immediate community, even the casual participation in policy determination which the citizen of the modern state is called upon to perform would be impossible.

In totalitarian dictatorships, all these means of communication are centrally controlled by the government, regardless of whether they are also actually owned by the government, as in the Soviet Union, or continue under "private" ownership, as in fascist countries. Hence they are not available for the expression of criticism or even adverse comment. This monopoly of the channels of mass communication is reinforced by the control of the means of private communication, the postal services and more especially the telephone and telegraph. Wire tapping is a common practice, and there is of course no such thing as "privacy" of the mails. In the interest of combatting counterrevolutionary plots, the government claims the right to open all mail. What this means is that only word-of mouth communication remains for those who wish to carry opposition beyond the point permitted by the government—surely a rather inefficient method under the conditions of modern mass society. All effective control over the content of communications is vested in the state, which in fact means the top party functionaries who usually possess, as a result of previous revolutionary agitation, considerable know-how in the field of propaganda.

Propaganda as such is not a peculiarity of totalitarian dictatorship. It has become increasingly recognized as an integral part of all organizational activity in a highly literate society.[1] Propaganda has been defined in different ways, depending in part upon what it was to be distinguished from. It should be pointed out here that the Soviets make a clear distinction between propaganda and agitation. Some of what we mean here by propaganda would, in Soviet terminology, more accurately be called agitation. To the Soviets, propaganda is restricted to a more refined, rational, documented appeal, designed to convince rather than to induce. Agitation tends to be more vehement, striking, and generally aimed at the masses.

It has been said that "propaganda is the other fellow's opinion." In line with such a superficial notion, many people think of propaganda as essentially untruth. But no propagandist worth his mettle will prefer an untruth to a truth, if the truth will do the job. This is the vital test of all propaganda activity: does it do the job? and what is the job? The needs, interests, and requirements of the organization for which the propagandist works determine the answer to this question. If it is the Red Cross, the "job" may be to secure contributions; if the *Ladies' Home Journal*, it may be subscriptions. The latter example shows that propaganda, under competitive conditions, resembles advertising; both are often soft-pedaled as "public relations." In short, propaganda is essentially action-related; it aims to get people to do or not to do certain things. That action focus may be either very visible or hidden away. But it always is there

and needs to be inquired into, if propaganda is to be understood. And since propaganda is carried on in behalf of an organization, it is equally important to inquire into who finances it. Many propagandists are reluctant, therefore, to reveal the source of their funds.[2]

In totalitarian dictatorships, virtually all propaganda is directed ultimately to the maintenenace in power of the party controlling it. This does not mean, however, that there are not many sharp conflicts between rival propagandists. As will be shown later, the maintenance of totalitarian dictatorship does not preclude the occurrence of many internecine struggles; on the contrary, it lends to these struggles a fierceness and violence which is rarely seen in freer societies. This issue of the rival component elements in the totalitarian society poses very difficult problems for the over-all direction of propaganda. The chief propagandist often has to opt between such rival groups. (In the National Socialist Ministry of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, these rival claims to some extent found expression in the organization of the "desk," that is to say, of different bureaus which would report on different sections of the society and would thus mirror the conflicts.)[3]

The documentary evidence that has become available since the war tends to support earlier views regarding the inner workings of Goebbels' propaganda organization.[4] There is no need here to go into details of the organization, but some outstanding features deserve brief comment. Perhaps the most important aspect of this "monopoly" control was the dualism of government and party. Each had its elaborate propaganda setup, both headed by Goebbels, who succeeded in maintaining a measure of effective coordination. But on the whole it would seem that the Ministry of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment and the party office of propaganda were in a coordinate position. However, key officials of the ministry who stood in sharpest antagonism to Goebells, like Otto Dietrich, the press chief of the Hitler government, also occupied pre-eminent posts in the party's propaganda machine. This "personal union" extended fairly far down the line. The relationship has been described as follows: "The task of the Propaganda Ministry in the whole machine for controlling and creating public opinion might be compared with a Ministry of War. It coordinates, plans, and is responsible for the smooth carrying out of the whole propaganda effort of the German government. The Party Propaganda Department, on the other hand, is comparable to the General Staff of an army which actually directs operations and musters and organizes the forces and their supplies and ammunition." [5] It is seen from this and other evidence that the two organizations had different functions within the regime, comparable to the difference between party and government. The aggressive boldness of a leader of the National Socialist movement was as much a quality required of Goebbels as was the forceful caution of a leading government official. It is generally agreed that the most important instrument of Goebbels in planning and coordinating all the far-flung activities of his two organizations was the Coordination

Division of the ministry. Here was centered the conflict between the rival requirements of the two organizations; here, if possible, such difficulties were solved by the key officials of the division or, if necessary, by Goebbels himself. But it was never an easy task to draw together the various divergent strands of the propaganda apparatus, and the difficulties experienced by the Ministry of Propaganda reflected the tensions of the moment. It is an ever present problem when total monopoly control exists.

The same problem, often in aggravated form, confronts the totalitarian propagandist in the field of foreign relations. While he gains the advantage of controlling all channels of information to other countries, he suffers under the distinct disadvantage of having little chance to secure the confidence of people abroad, including the foreign governments themselves about any information reaching them. Hitler showed considerable awareness of these difficulties. At one time, talking among intimates, he noted that a sharp distinction must be made between handling the domestic and the foreign press. Radio messages for foreign countries must similarly be differentiated. Such messages, if intended for Britain, should contain musical offerings, since they would appeal to English taste and accustom the British public to tune in to German Broadcasts: "As regards news-bulletins to Britain, we should confine ourselves to plain statements of facts, without comment on their value or importance . . . As the old saying has it, little drops of water will gradually wear the stone away."[6] Goebbels added that the opinion of people who have confidence in their leadership can be effectively swayed by pointed and unequivocal value judgments. He therefore recommended that, in messages to the German people, reference should be made again and again to "the drunkard Churchill" and to the "criminal Roosevelt."

This attempt to create stereotype images of the enemy has been developed to a fine point in Soviet propaganda. All discussions and pictorial representations of the enemy stress some specific feature suggesting the enemy's alleged criminal nature and evil intent. Operating on a huge scale and addressing its appeal to the great masses of the Soviet people, Soviet propaganda strives to present a simple, unrefined, and strikingly negative portrayal, so as to create the politically desirable conditioned reflex in those to whom it is directed. . . . It is to some extent in terms of these negative symbols that the "consensus" develops. As a matter of common observation, shared hostilities are an effective source of political association. Indeed, some political analysts have gone so far as to assert that political parties essentially rest on these shared animosities. The totalitarian dictatorships have built upon such negativist positions a good part of the popular loyalty to the regime.

During the war, Soviet anti-Nazi propaganda usually associated "Hitlerite" with such terms as "vermin" or "beast," frequently with corresponding illustrations. The anti-American campaign has similarly employed certain words over and over, such as war-mongering and im-

perialist, in speaking of American leadership. *Krokodil*, the humor magazine, has become a real rogues' gallery of various criminal types, with beast-like faces, dressed either in U.S. Army uniforms or in top hats and morning coats, their fingers dripping with blood and threateningly grasping an atomic bomb. In external propaganda, the Soviet Union never fails to draw a distinction between the people as such and the leaders, who are the ones who fit the stereotype.

The nearly complete control of all means of mass communication gives the totalitarian dictatorship the very great advantage of being able to shift its general line of propaganda rather radically over short periods of time. This is especially helpful in the field of foreign affairs. After the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939, Communist and Nazi propagandists were stressing all of a sudden the common features of these "popular" regimes and their contrast with the "Pluto-democracies" of the West. Various points were brought forward in this connection—such as that the Russians and Germans were both young and vigorous as contrasted with the decadence of the West. Even more striking is Russia's recent turn in regard to Communist China, as indeed has been the change in China itself. Such reversals in official propaganda lines are inconceivable under competitive conditions.

But while these shifts may work in the Soviet Union, they certainly tend to bring on a crisis in the Communist movement in other countries. Many Communist followers, including important men, have changed sides in the past and may do so again. After the Hitler-Stalin Pact, twenty-one French Communist deputies out of a total of seventy-two abandoned the party.[7] Similarly, Nazi sympathizers in a number of countries, especially the United States, were deeply disturbed, and anti-Nazi activities were assisted by this change. Even deeper were the fissures caused by Khrushchev's denunication of Stalin. In fact, the repercussions of that move are still audible in the way Communist parties have been affected by the conflict between the USSR and China.

But even internally the alteration in an official line may have subcutaneous reactions, which the leadership fails to appreciate. When Hitler suddenly decided to invade the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, he was much pleased with his success in accomplishing this *salto mortale*. "I am proud that it was possible with these few men [himself, Goebbels, and a few aides] to shift course by 180 degrees. No other country could do the same."[8] In this instance, we know from postwar documents that the effect on German public opinion was quite mixed. For, while some men who had previously stood aloof decided that in a life-and-death struggle with communism they must support Hitler, others concluded that, the game was up and joined what became a dangerous and large-scale opposition movement. Detached analysis suggests that it was not so much the propaganda as the very facts themselves which had the greatest effect.[9]

This instance serves to illustrate what is probably a very important aspect of all totalitarian propaganda. The fact of monopolistic control

gradually causes in the general public a profound distrust of all news and other kinds of information. Since people do not have any other sources of information, there develops a vast amount of rumor mongering as well as general disillusionment. And since a man cannot think without having valid information upon which to focus his thought, the general public tends to become indifferent. This in turn leads to a phenomenon we may call the "vacuum," which increasingly surrounds the leadership. Comparable problems have beset autocracies in the past. Well known is the tale of Harun al-Rashid, who stalked Baghdad at night disguised as a commoner to find out what was going on. Harun al-Rashid, so the tale goes, was wise enough to realize that his subordinates were prone to abuse their great power and, instead of employing it for the good of the community and the commonwealth, would oppress and exploit the people. He had no reliable way of ascertaining the common man's views through regular channels, since all of these were controlled by the very subordinates he wished to check up on, so the great Caliph disguised himself from time to time and mingled, in the dark of night, with the people in taverns and streets to listen to their tales of woe. On the basis of what he had heard, he would bring those to trial who had been talked about as vicious and corrupt. This problem of checking up occurs, of course, in all human organizations, but under orderly constitutional government (and the corresponding patterns of responsibility in private organizations), such checking occurs readily and continuously as a result of the open criticism that is voiced by members not only in formal meetings, but informally through press, radio, and all the other channels. Under the conditions of totalitarian dictatorship, the check-up becomes exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.

This failure to communicate effectively, both within the hierarchy and with the rest of the people and the world, we have called the "vacuum." There develops within the totalitarian regime a kind of empty space around the rulers, which becomes more and more difficult to penetrate. A slow disintegration affecting all human relations causes mutual distrust so that ordinary people are alienated from one another; all the bonds of confidence in social relationships are corroded by the terror and propaganda, the spying, and the denouncing and betraying, until the social fabric threatens to fall apart. The confidence which ordinarily binds the manager of a plant to his subordinates, the members of a university faculty to one another and to their students, lawyer to client, doctor to patient, and even parents to children as well as brothers to sisters is disrupted. The core of this process of disintegration is, it seems, the breakdown of the possibility of communication—the spread, that is, of the vacuum. Isolation and anxiety are the universal result. And the only answer the totalitarian dictatorship has for coping with this disintegration of human relationships is more organized coercion, more propaganda, more terror.

We know today that the SS of Himmler made extensive checkups on

the attitude of the German population during the war. Many of these reports show a remarkable candor about the faltering and eventually vanishing support for the regime.[10] But there is every reason to believe that these reports never reached Hilter, even in abbreviated form. It is not even clear how many of them became available to Himmler. The terror that permeates the party and secret-police cadres, no less than the general population, operates as an inhibition to truthful reporting. Block wardens falsify their reports, in the hope of currying favor with their superiors. We shall see later how this tendency to pretend that results are better and more favorable to the regime than the facts warrant and to make adjustments, not only in reports about attitudes, but also in those about production and maintenance of industrial plant, interferes with industrial planning. . . .

A similar situation arose in Italy. We learn from Leto's *Memoirs* that only Rocchini among Mussolini's lieutenants had the courage to tell him that the Italian people were bitterly opposed to entering World War II; Starace even claimed that almost all Italians would unite behind the Duce. The Duce was similarly misinformed about the state of Italy's military preparedness; his subordinates preferred to flatter their chief by presenting rosy estimates, suggesting the prowess of his regime.[11]

In the Soviet Union, the vacuum became most pronounced at the height of the Stalin terror. It has now become greatly reduced as a consequence of the policies of "popular totalitarianism." But even under the current regime, there is a good deal of it—as shown by the recurrent efforts of stimulating "letters to the editor." It also is operative in the world Communist movement and thereby affects the USSR's intelligence work in its foreign relations. It appears that Soviet intelligence is also handicapped by the fact that, in some respects at least, it must work with and through local Communist parties. If it tried to do without them, it would soon find itself in difficulties, particularly with reference to the problem of recruiting agents and contacts, as well as penetrating the government institutions of foreign powers.[12] But when the intelligence service employs the local party organization, it is exposed to the effect of this process of falsification, rooted both in fear of the Moscow center and in ideological blindness. Local Communist leaders, fearful of Moscow disfavor and subsequent purges, easily develop a tendency toward overestimating their strength and the degree of inner disintegration in the capitalist order. Soviet miscalculations in France and Italy are among many examples, dating back to the days of the Comintern and the unsuccessful Soviet venture in China. Also at the time of the blockade of Berlin, undertaken by the USSR in June 1948 to counteract the currency reform that the Allies had instituted after lengthy Soviet obstruction,[13] it became clear that the Soviet Union, on the basis of East German information, had confidently counted upon the Germans in Berlin to abandon the Allied cause and submit to the Soviet position; even elementary intelligence work could have informed them to the contrary. In fact, there is reason to

believe that the entire Soviet policy in Germany was, to some extent, the result of such a failure of intelligence, because of excessive reliance upon German Communist information.

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the Soviet Intelligence agency, both at home and abroad, operates like a man wearing red-colored blinders. Soviet leadership makes special efforts to develop alternate channels of information and control in order to eliminate precisely this element of coloring and distortion. Soviet espionage, apart from collaborating with the local Communist parties, also operates independent networks, which report directly to Moscow. Espionage revelations show that there are normally at least five such networks in a country subjected to intensive Soviet espionage: one working through the local Communist party, another run by the MVD, a military intelligence network, a commercial espionage network, and finally the foreign-service intelligence network. Excessive discrepancies can thus be more easily detected when all such reports are processed in Moscow and submitted to the policymakers. Similarly, in their domestic surveillance, the Soviet rulers are careful not to make themselves dependent on only one source of information. Apart from the secret police and the ordinary channels of the party, there exist the party Control Commissions, which investigate party activities in all walks of life; the Ministry of State Control, which is specially concerned with keeping in touch with administrative functions and making independent reports on their operations; and the prosecutor general and his subordinates, who have . . . been given additional investigating powers. There is also the technique of *samokritika*, or self-critique, according to which Soviet officials and functionaries as well as the people in general are encouraged, besides examining themselves, to criticize the operations, but *not the policy*, of the party, the state administration, or the economic enterprises.* This not only serves as a vent to pent-up aggression, but is also useful to the rulers in detecting current weaknesses, abuses, and public attitudes. As a result of this, the Soviet regime can, when it wants to, judge the responsiveness of its population to its propaganda with a surprising degree of accuracy. Also, besides these sources, there are the press and the letters to the press and party headquarters, which have, at least for Smolensk, been analyzed thoroughly.[14] . . . There is one major problem, however: as the totalitarian regime maintains its internal coercion and indoctrination, the degree of apparent consensus will in time increase, and the secret police will find it much more difficult to do its work. There is no doubt that the Soviet population is today much less divided in its opinions and reactions than it was a generation ago. This naturally makes information gathering less reliable. But it also makes it less urgent, since such consensus means that

*"Self-critique" is preferable to the more frequent translation of "self-criticism." There is a Russian word *krititsizm* which means criticism. *Kritika* means critique, and the Soviet regime is interested in promoting the technique of critique, but not in encouraging a critical attitude through criticism.

the regime's ideology has been "internalized". . . . And propaganda is thereby greatly facilitated.

Such consensus, such internalizing of the ideology, did not occur to any extent in Germany under Hitler (except within the party). Goebbels was by no means unaware of the difficulties he was confronting. In his diaries[15] . . . the problem is a recurrent theme. They also show how well he knew how to exploit the clumsy views which were being aired by the Allies regarding the German people as a whole, particularly the demand for unconditional surrender. As the plain facts of the Allies' successful air war against Germany mounted, the unconditional-surrender formula remained as one of the few propaganda weapons to fall back upon. Another one was provided by the Morgenthau Plan put forward at Quebec in September 1943. But not only did the Allies provide desperately needed propaganda weapons; the Soviet Union, by repeatedly demanding that ten million Germans be furnished for reconstruction purposes in the Soviet Union, allowed Goebbels to note: "Demands like that are wonderful for our propaganda. They stir German public opinion deeply. The idea that our soldiers might not return home at all but might have to remain in the Soviet Union as forced labor is a terrible thought for every woman and every mother. The German people would prefer to fight to their last breath."[16] Incidentally, this is an illustration of the fact noted above that a propagandist prefers a good fact to the best lie. But in spite of such aids, the task of propaganda became ever more desperate as the war continued. What evidently kept Goebbels going was that he himself believed, at least until the end of 1943, in the Fuhrer's ability to avert disaster.

That critical views printed in the press need not have any significant effect in a totalitarian regime, unless the leadership sees fit to take them into account, is demonstrated by Hitler. Great difficulties resulted from his hostility to the German press. This contrasted curiously with his avid interest in reading press reports from abroad.[17] But although they were brought to him almost hourly, they failed to influence his modes of expression and his basic propaganda lines. Nor did he receive sound information about the probable course of British and American policy, nor about the trend of opinion in both countries. When he arrived at his decision to go to war with Poland, he did not seem to have expected the British to do much more than make a gesture of protest, and he hoped until the last to be able to keep the United States out of the war. The efforts of certain qualified persons, especially in the Foreign Office, to furnish Hitler with more adequate data were thwarted by the predominant party cadres.[18] This circumstance shows the catastrophic effect of the factor we are here analyzing: an unintended consequence of totalitarian terror is an almost complete isolation of the leader. At the time Hitler decided to go to war, in the fateful August days of 1939, he isolated himself, and no advisers, not even Goering, let alone foreign diplomats—according to Sir Neville Henderson's pitiful account—could secure access to Hitler.[19]

Not the vacuum specifically, but the effect of it on the totalitarian ruler has caused one leading student of these problems to make the following comment:

> Where the instruments of public enlightenment are wholly under the domination of the active elite of power, the controllers of the media develop a fantasy world in which the images communicated to the people have little relationship to reality. The stream of public communication becomes dogmatic and ceremonial to such a degree that it is inappropriate to think of communication management as a propaganda problem. It is more accurate to think of ritualization than propaganda.[20]

Undoubtedly this kind of ritualization exists to some extent. On the other hand, repeated shifts in the actual lines of communication, involving the leadership in serious self-contradictions, suggest that large amounts of propaganda as such continue to be issued. The "fantasy world" in which the dictator lives, and which is a product of the vacuum that the terror has created around him, plays its role in competition with the real world that he seeks to master.

The lieutenants of a dictator are often more clearly aware of the complexity of the issues and the risks involved in a particular course of policy. It is interesting that a key German official believed that Hitler's unrealistic propaganda lines were decidedly detrimental to the regime. His comments indicate a typical clash of views between the professional propagandist and the ideologue, whether educator or party fanatic, who is preoccupied not with the survival but with the advance of the totalitarian movement. This man's comments are so revealing that they deserve quoting in full:

> I was of the firm conviction at that time that a national socialist Germany could live in peace with the world, if Hitler had been restrained in his actions, had bribed the radicalism internally, and had externally an objective which took account of the interests of other nations. The provocative demonstrations, unnecessary in their extent. . . the anti-semitic excesses, the inciting and tolerating of violence, and the world propaganda of Goebbels as embodied in the tone and content of his Sportpalast demonstrations, were psychologically unsuited to gain support abroad for national socialist Germany and to cause other nations to recognize the good side of national socialism. These tactless and offensive outbursts decisively influenced world public opinion against Germany immediately after 1933.[21]

That the propaganda was unwise probably is right, but it overlooks the fact that Hitler was not primarily interested in the German people and was basically motivated by his totalitarian mission, as he conceived it; for this the German people were merely the tool.

As in nature, so in society, the vacuum is relative. And since totalitarian dictators, as already mentioned, to some extent at least realize their isolation, various efforts are made to reduce the "thin air" around them. We have shown some of the techniques employed for increasing the intake of popular reactions; totalitarian regimes have also developed techniques for increasing the outgo. Apart from the party members' continuing function as spreaders of propaganda lines, there has been developed the technique of whispering campaigns. A high party official will call in some of his friends a little further on down the line in the party and, in strict confidence, tell them something highly startling or secret.

He knows perfectly well that they will go and tell somebody else, in similarly strict confidence, and so on. This technique was and is employed also for the purpose of reaching and misleading foreign correspondents. The technique is, of course, not unknown in other societies; but in them it serves a purpose radically different from that in a totalitarian dictatorship. It is the means of penetrating a fog rather than reducing a vacuum.

The vacuum has another curious effect, as far as outgo is concerned. As already mentioned, people under totalitarian dictatorships become so suspicious of all communication, suspecting every news item of being propaganda, that even paramount facts are disbelieved. Thus it appears that, as late as September 12, 1938, the Germans professed not to know, or rather not to believe, that Britain and France had declared war upon Germany. To the blatant headlines of Goebbels' propaganda press, their reaction evidently was: "Another of Goebbels' propaganda stories." At the time of the Franco rebellion, when the papers reported, quite truthfully, that the British navy was demonstrating in the western Mediterranean, a widespread public reaction in Germany created a genuine war scare, because people were convinced that the British navy was threatening instead the North Sea coast of Germany.[22] Goebbels in his diaries reports a number of other instances of this kind, and the entire collection provides a striking illustration for the vacuum theory; as the war went on, the problem of reaching the German populace became more and more perplexing.*

In the Soviet Union, the war also gave rise to many rumors, which swept the population by means of the OWS news agency—a translation of the popular and symptomatic abbreviation for the Russian phrase, "one woman said. . ." During the period of initial Soviet reverses, many exaggerated accounts of Soviet defeats, flights of leaders, and so forth were passed from mouth to mouth, contradicting the official radio broadcasts and newspaper communiques. Later on, by 1943 and 1944, as a corollary to the many promises of a happy future made during the war by the Soviet leaders, rumors circulated that the Soviet government had decided to end collectivization of agriculture and to release all political prisoners. Possibly such rumors were even originated purposely by the regime itself in order to gain public support for the war effort. In any case, some interviews with former Soviet citizens suggest that these rumors were widely believed, and the population was quite disappointed by the postwar harshness of the Stalinist policies. A similar instance is the extensive misrepresentation of figures on the grain harvest in the late fifties, which so gravely affected Khrushchev's agricultural efforts.

It would seem from all the evidence at our disposal that the vacuum

*Actually, this problem also plagued the people in charge of wartime propaganda in the Western democracies, for during the war "constitutional dictatorships" were instituted, and the controls over news resulting from this temporary concentration of power caused the public to become increasingly suspicious.

works like a cancer in the totalitarian systems. This means that its growth endangers the continued existence of the totalitarian scheme of things. It may even catapult such a dictatorship into a calamitous foreign adventure, such as Hitler's wars. Stalin's ignorance of the agricultural situation similarly made the food problem in the USSR very much more acute, according to Khrushchev's revelations. Reality is hard to perceive in a vacuum created by fear and lies, buttressed by force—hence the Khrushchevian policy of reducing the vacuum by greater popular participation.

An important feature of totalitarian propaganda is its all-pervasiveness, the direct result, of course, of the propaganda monopoly. Not only the members of the party and the more or less indifferent masses, but even the more or less determined enemies of the regime fall prey to its insistent clamor, to the endless repetition of the same phrases and the same allegations. A general pattern of thought, almost a style of thinking, proves increasingly irrestible as the regime continues in power. This is the basis of the consensus formation in the USSR. "It is clear," we read in one thorough study of these problems, "that there are people in all ranks of life who believe implicitly what they read and hear." Arguing from a presumably hostile sample, these analysts say that despite this "it is striking how the more implicit aspects of Soviet official communications, the mode of thought and the categories in which events are grouped, are reflected in the thought patterns and expression of our informants."[23]

It has been, as a matter of fact, the frequent experience of interviewers of former Soviet citizens to find that even those who profess the most violent hostility to the Soviet system tend to think in patterns instilled into them by that regime. Their attitudes on such matters as freedom of the press or the party system are often inclined to mirror, even by contradiction or negation, official Soviet propaganda. Similarly, in such matters as word usage, words laden with propaganda-derived value judgments are used as part of their daily vocabulary. They thus serve unconsciously as unwitting propagandists for the regime they abhor.

This singular success of totalitarian propaganda is the result of constant repetition. Soviet press, radio, oral agitation, and propaganda operate ceaselessly, supplementing the party and Komsomol activities and the ideologically oriented training system.[24] Soviet newspapers, controlled centrally, repeat day after day the political themes set by *Pravda*, the organ of the party Central Committee, and *Izvestiya*, the central-government organ. *Pravda* itself, with a circulation of well over three million, is read and studied throughout the Soviet Union, particularly in the party cells, where it is compulsory reading. Local newspapers, many with circulations of several hundred thousand, such as *Pravda Ukrainy* and *Leningradskaya pravda*, re-echo the essential points of the Moscow daily, often reprinting its editorials and commentaries. The local press is also sometimes given special instructions about the handling of the news

and the sequence in which the various statements of the leaders are to be presented. For instance, after Malenkov's "resignation" in February 1955, Radio Moscow issued such special instructions to all the provincial papers. In addition to *Izvestiya* and *Pravda*, there are a large number of specialized papers for youth, the trade unions, the military, and others, published centrally and distributed throughout the USSR. All these newspapers, with a combined circulation of over forty-seven million in the 1950s, play an important role in the Soviet process of indoctrination.[25]

This process is backed by the other two basic media of propaganda and indoctrination: the radio and personal agitation. The radio, with an estimated listening audience of about forty million, quite naturally devotes a great deal of its time to political matters.[26] A reliable estimate places the amount of time devoted to political and scientific broadcasts at 28 percent of the central program time. One of the most important Moscow radio broadcasts is the morning reading (7:00 a.m.) of the *Pravda* editorial, which is relayed simultaneously by all other Soviet stations.[27] Soviet radio publications openly admit the political importance of radio broadcasting, as seen in the following statement: "Radio helps considerably in the Communist education of the workers. It is one of the most important means of disseminating political information, of spreading the all-triumphant ideas of Marxism-Leninism, popularizing the most advanced industrial and agricultural techniques and the achievements of socialist culture, science, and art." [28] News and editorial programs particularly are designed to complement the press propaganda coverage and highlight the important points in the current propaganda themes. Foreign news is rarely given prompt treatment, and it is usually presented as a commentary. Furthermore, the use of radio-diffusion speakers, which work on the basis of wire transmission and are therefore useless for listening to non-Soviet stations, is promoted. This, of course, insures complete monopoly for Soviet broadcasting, and about 70 percent of all sets in the USSR are of this type.[29] Similar sets are now being introduced in the satellite regimes of Central Europe.

The third and, in some ways, the most important device is that of direct, personal agitation. This involves literally millions of agitators, some full-time, some part-time during special campaigns, who organize mass meetings, give lectures, visit families in their homes, distribute literature, set up study and discussion groups, and, in general, attempt to draw everyone into active participation in the indoctrination process. The estimated number of regular agitators is around two million, thus providing one agitator for every hundred Soviet citizens (including children).[30] In a sense, this mass indoctrination constitutes an effort to conduct a nationwide process of brainwashing, which only a very few succeed in completely avoiding. It is on these propaganda processes, as well as on the educational training system, that the regime depends for the achievement of total ideological integration of its people. It is these instruments of mental molding that are used by the administration to

produce a generation of convinced followers, thinking and acting in disciplined unison.

The technique of personal agitation has been elaborated by the leaders of Communist China. Based upon their experience during the long period of incubation when they were struggling to survive—a time they speak of as the "low ebb"—they have evolved, systematized, and tested what they call the democratic "mass line." As early as 1934 Mao charged the party cadres with mobilizing the broad masses to take part in the revolutionary war.[31] Although the situation has radically changed, since Mao and his party took over the government of all mainland China and established a totalitarian dictatorship, they have retained, adapted, and elaborated these techniques. "The mass line is the basic working method by which Communist cadres seek to initiate and promote a unified relationship between themselves and the Chinese population and thus to bring about the support and active participation of the people." There is nothing particularly novel about the mass line; it is the propagation of the party line, applied under primitive technical and intellectual conditions, to millions of illiterate followers. To vulgarize and in the process distort and corrupt Marxist economic and social analysis was and remains no mean task. The detailed methods are in each case molded naturally by the folkways of the particular people. "This method includes the two techniques of 'from the masses, to the masses,' and 'the linking of the general with the specific,' the basic formulization [sic] given by Mao Tse-tung in 'On Methods of Leadership' (June 1, 1943)," writes the most penetrating student of Communist Chinese leadership methods.[32]

Fascist propaganda techniques placed a similar emphasis upon the spoken word. Both Mussolini and Hitler were powerful orators who served as examples to many of their subleaders. Both also explicitly favored the technique; Hitler had supported this method emphatically in *Mein Kampf*, and it became a key policy of the Goebbels operation. One whole section of the party's propaganda apparatus was dedicated to the training of speakers, and there was a deliberate effort made to cultivate oratory rather than written communications. Thousands of men were thus trained to emulate Hitler in developing the technique of rousing the mass assembly, with its emotional outbursts and its vague longings, to violent action against the Jew, the Marxist, and the November criminal.

All in all, the system of propaganda and mass communication developed in the totalitarian systems is of crucial importance for the maintenance of the regime. It may be doubted whether it could function so well without the terror, but it cannot be doubted that as it actually functions it is highly effective. If manipulative controls are carried beyond a certain point, the system becomes self-defeating. Hence the loosening up after Stalin's death was intended to make the anti-Stalin propaganda effective. Now that there has developed a distinguishable "Soviet style of thinking," there can be some easing of the controls. But "it would be unduly optimistic to assume that the Soviet leadership is to any major degree

moving toward the establishment of free discussion." [33] The principles of thought control, as maintained by Lenin and other Communist leaders, are merely more flexibly applied. In a sense, such thought control dehumanizes the subjects of the regime by depriving them of a chance for independent thought and judgment.

NOTES

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3. Carl J. Friedrich, *The New Image of the Common Man* (Boston: 1951), Chapter 3. All attempts to define propaganda in terms of the content of the communications or the psychological effect tend to obscure these crucial political features.
4. Otto Dietrich, *Zwolf Jahre mit Hitler* (Munich: 1955).
5. Derrick Sington and Arthur Wiedenfeld, *The Goebbels Experiment—A Study of the Nazi Propaganda Machine* (London: 1942), esp. Chapters 2, 3.
6. Ibid., p. 17. It may, however, be argued that the real dualism was that between Goebbels and Dietrich. In the party, Dietrich's position was equivalent to Goebbels'; he was Reichsleiter as press chief of the Reich, and although he was Goebbels' subordinate as secretary of state in the Ministry of Propaganda, he wore another hat as press chief of the government, which gave him direct access to Hitler.
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26. M. Strepukhov, "Powerful Instruments for Mobilizing the Masses to Carry Our Party and Governmental Decisions," *Kommunist,* vol. 6 (April 1955), pp. 91–102.
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[30] Inkeles, *Public Opinion*, p. 248.
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[32] Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (5 vols., 1954–1961) (London and New York).
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THE CHANGING SOVIET UNION*

By Ithiel de Sola Pool

Monopoly of mass communications has been made more difficult as technological progress has improved and increased the channels of communication the sender and receiver may use.

"When Stalin ruled the Soviet Union only 2 percent of the Soviet people had the physical possibility of hearing foreign radio broadcasts. Today over a third of the people have that chance. That is a difference of monumental significance. . . .

"There never was a time when the Bolshevik attempt totally to control the information that reached Soviet citizens succeeded in full. There were always heroes who kept alive in the privacy of their heads, or within their families, political or national or religious faiths that the regime proscribed. There were also always islands of freedom in prison. Men to whom arrest and imprisonment had already happened, who had already written off rewards in this life, who knew that their neighbors also were enemies of the regime could sometimes talk more freely to each other than could people still trying to make their way up the treadmill. . . .

"There was also always in Stalin's Russia a rumor net that covered the country. Typically, each person in a totalitarian society, for sanity's sake, has to have one or two trusted friends in whom he can confide. Without that his thoughts will change; brainwashing will work. A completely unexpressed view does not survive. In Stalin's Russia . . . the net of personal confidence covered the country even though each person usually could talk freely to only one or two close friends. That is enough to permit very high saliency messages to diffuse rapidly thoughout the country. . . .

"That kind of rumor net is, however, an inefficient kind of information channel. It carries only the dramatic item. It provides little richness of detail and little interpretive background. The best feature of rumor is that it may be accurate, contrary to common impressions. The evidence from various rumor studies suggests that rumors change little in the

*From "The Changing Soviet Union," *Current*, no. 67 (January 1966), pp. 12–17. Reprinted with the permission of *Current*, copyright holder, and the courtesy of the author.

course of transmission in the real world, and that what change takes place is in the direction of plausibility. If the truth is indeed implausible, that will result in message distortion; but since the truth is more often plausible, change in the message is often correction. Rumor . . . was and still is an important source, and on many topics the most reliable one, in Soviet society, but it is a grossly inadequate and thin source. In the absence of other and more detailed media, even persons very hostile to the regime and people who grossly distrust the official sources nonetheless become the captives of the totalitarian worldview because they do not have enough information to construct a valid picture of reality. . . .

"Recognition of this phenomenon by which total control of information captures the mind and shapes the worldview of even those who oppose the regime, was what led many free world writers in the latter years of the Stalin regime to fearfully anticipate a 1984 of brainwashed automated men. Orwell, Koestler, Milosz and many other writers expected the younger generations, wholly educated under totalitarian control, to yield to a value system and world view utterly at odds with Western civilization.

"Now in retrospect we see that they were too pessimistic. Soviet youth is unquiet. But too often we attribute the rebellious and liberal spirit sometimes found among Soviet youth simply to the psychology of adolescence and the inevitable conflict of generations. That is too simple. Such conflict can take many forms. It was not foreordained that Soviet youth would like beat jazz or that Soviet artists would paint abstractions. These are not the only forms that protest can take. The style of rebellion of the flappers and their companions in the 1920's was not the same as the style of today's adolescents. Rebellion against tradition in the intellectual milieu of the *philosophes* was not the same as that in Greenwich Village and Leningrad today.

"Why are the forms of rebellious individuality so similar in Russia and in the West today? Clearly not by coincidence, nor, I would argue, by any inevitable law of industrial society, but because of communication. There is now enough communication to keep us part of a single civilization, to keep us influencing each other, to assure that any Western idea circulates in the Soviet Union too. The pessimistic expectation that totalitarianism could develop an accepted heinous civilization of its own by 1984 or any other year has been defeated primarily by the forces of communication and above all, by international radio. . . .

THE IMPACT OF RADIO

"In 1940 there were about 1 million wave radio sets in the Soviet Union. By 1952 there were about 5.8 million. By now there are perhaps 35 million. If we simply assume that two-thirds of the sets could receive foreign short-wave broadcasts and that a set is available to all members of a family, then as a very rough approximation we can say that about one person in 57 could listen to a foreign broadcast if he dared to in 1940,

perhaps one in 13 in 1952, and one in 2.5 today. This is a highly significant change, for it changes drastically 1) the richness of foreign information available and, therefore, also changes 2) the role of rumor and 3) the role and reactions of the domestic media. . . .

"We have said that the accessability of foreign broadcasts to something like one Russian in 2.5 (and that means to a large majority of urban, educated, white-collar Russians) increases the richness of foreign information available. Mere availability, however, would be of no interest if the available broadcasts were not used. After all, how many Americans listen to foreign broadcasts? *All the evidence, however, is that the Russian listener eagerly uses his short-wave bands.*"

Rumor is still important as a source of information about world affairs, "but in a very different way from what it was in Stalin's Russia. When one person in 57 had access to direct foreign news and maybe one in a couple of hundred heard any one item, its dissemination was largely conditioned by the filtering and sometimes distorting character of the oral net. In the present situation where one person in two or three has access to direct foreign news, in any small circle of friends or co-workers there will typically be several who have heard any major item [and] can diffuse, discuss, or correct it.

"Lest I be misunderstood let me emphasize that even a wide access situation does not overcome distortion and misunderstanding in the flow of information between countries or cultures. After all, the understanding by the American citizen of life in Russia is poor indeed, even though no censorship bars knowledge from him. But. . .he misunderstands because he has little motivation to learn about Soviet affairs, and to the extent that he does see Soviet affairs as relevant to him, it is in the narrow context of a threatening foe. Soviet facts are functional to him, therefore, insofar either as they fit the stereotype of evil or are reassuring about the intentions of limited capabilities of the potential foe. The American media reinforce these limitations on knowledge. . . .

"On the Soviet side, the development of worldwide media has in one respect made the situation similar to that in the West, though in other respects it is entirely different. The growth of access to foreign news sources with their rich picture of reality means that, as in the West, the only absolute barrier to full and accurate information is the psychological one. No longer do the devices of a police state successfully keep the Soviet citizen in the dark. What he learns or fails to learn is now primarily determined by the filters of what is functional to him.

"The lifting of jamming on almost all foreign broadcasts was the last step in making the major filter the citizen's interest. News was receivable with enough effort to evade the jamming before, so it was not a decisive barrier. But now it takes no significant effort by any radio owner who wants the world news to get it. For the Soviet citizen who craves information about the outside world international radio is but one, though the most important one, among a number of media that have been re-opening

the channels of contact with Western civilization. There are exhibits and dramatic performances and TV kinescopes . . . that are part of cultural exchange programs. Personal contact with visitors from abroad has also been increasing as well as travel abroad by Soviet citizens. The number of the latter to get abroad is in the hundreds of thousands (although an overwhelming majority travel to non-capitalist countries.) Travelers to the Soviet Union now run at about the same rate including a significant number of cultural, educational, scientific and marine personnel. . . .

Getting the News Sooner

"The printed word from abroad is also increasingly, but still sparsely, available. . . . [Yet] the motivated Soviet citizen can receive an increasing amount of international information from the Soviet media. These have had to respond to an increasingly competitive environment. In the Stalin era an unfavorable development abroad might be smothered in silence, and generally the Soviet media system waited a day or two until *Pravda* could first be told how to treat an unfortunate event, and then tell other media how to treat it. That is no longer possible. As officially stated in 1960, and reiterated in 1963: 'The central radio stations in Moscow must first of all assure timely broadcasts of important political information, effective commentary on domestic and foreign events, and the organization of various artistic programs. . . . Because radio should give the population the important news before the newspapers do, *Tass* has been instructed to transmit news immediately to central and local radio stations. Radio should communicate to the population all important news earlier than do the newspapers.'

"The Soviet radio has had to change drastically in response to its new foreign competition. It now has to report the world news as it occurs and not wait for a day. If it waits, it will be scooped by an interpretation other than the Soviet one. Silence encourages listening to foreign radio.

"For the same sort of reason the Soviets have started publishing magazines of reprints of foreign materials. There is *Inostrannaya Literatura* (*Foreign Literature*) and *Za Rubezhom* (*Abroad*). [The latter] is the great success story of the Soviet magazine world. This weekly, started in 1960, had reached a circulation of 400,000 by last September. In earlier years of paper shortages, rationed magazine subscriptions, and absence of foreign or domestic competition such a press for alien material would have been forbidden. But the Soviet Union today proudly claims that it can meet the demand for all magazines and that it now sells subscriptions to general magazines to all comers. *Za Rubezhom* has been allowed to meet the spontaneous and phenomenal demand. The interested Soviet common man can now read Walter Lippmann or the editorials from *Le Monde* in a legitimate and extensive, even if highly selected, Soviet source.

News for Elite Eyes Only

"For the Soviet elite there is, of course, as there always has been, substantial coverage of foreign news sources in the classified monitoring reports. These are of differing degrees of completeness according to the receiver's rank. Every day *Tass* sends virtually the entire nonlocal, political contents of *The New York Times* to the Soviet Union. Translations of whole Western books get produced in editions not for sale to the general public. Daily monitor reports can be read by authorized persons (besides those who get them personally) in numerous government offices and research institutes. The classified foreign news reports issued daily by *Tass* run to about 200 pages a day. . . .

"The change in access to foreign information that we have been describing is taking place in the context of a still wider though not deeper change in the Soviet communication system, namely, the growth of domestic mass media. Just as in a still broader economic context the Soviet Union is changing from an underdeveloped into an industrialized nation, so too its communication system is changing from a word of mouth system into a mass media system. . . .

Promoting Middle-Class Values

"We know too little about the psychological difference between living in a mass media system of communication and a pre-mass media system, but there are differences. Daniel Lerner has written about the role of the mass media in widening empathic capacity, i.e., enabling people to understand ways of life and roles that they have not experienced at first hand. Others have written of the role of the mass media in homogenizing society or in creating a mass society or in debasing culture. Actually, little of this speculation has much solid basis in research, but it does suggest some of the kinds of changes in the character of life that mass media bring in. They bring easy, passive, but obviously enjoyable, entertainment. They change patterns of social visiting, of friendships and of family life. They tend to encourage a value system and social structure that is more personal or familial, more pleasure oriented perhaps, certainly less group focused. They promote uniform middle-class values. In these respects a mass media system unifies society and dissolves some of the hold of special ethnic or class groups that make it up.

"Some of these changes can be seen in the Soviet Union. Russification, decay of folk culture, amalgamation of rural and urban ways of life, adoption of middle-class ways and modern values, increased orientation may have other causes too besides media growth, but the development of modern mass media reinforce such tendencies.

"The Soviet press writes about some of these and related trends in ways that sometimes sound much like the parallel discussions in this country. There are Soviet pedagogues, for example, who worry that TV watching is impinging on reading. One recalls the frequent post-Sputnik observation that the Russians are a nation of book readers. The taxi

driver with a classic in hand is a favorite idol of visiting journalists. It must be recognized that in part this book-reading habit simply reflected the aridity and also, to some degree, unavailability of mass media entertainment. Magazines, newspapers, radio and TV were scarce and what was available was ponderous, political and dull. They were dull to the point of driving the audience away. . . .

"Rejection of the dull Soviet mass media is still a characteristic citizen reaction but less so than ten years ago. Dullness and repetition in programming, is also a prime subject for Soviet discussions on radio and television. . . . The mass media revolution that is in process in Soviet society consists not only of the increased availability of magazine subscriptions, tape recorders, transistor sets, and TV, but also in a major effort to ligthen their contents. . . .

THE MASS MEDIA AS PARTY RIVAL

"As such material becomes available and as effective mass media become a major means of coordinating social action and organizing life, one very subtle but important consequence has been the decline of the agitprop system. When Alex Inkeles wrote his classic book on *Public Opinion in the Soviet Union*, the most characteristic feature of the Soviet communication system was the use of oral agitators. Two million agitators, getting their guidelines from *Bloknot Agitatora*, bored the rest of their fellow countrymen at regular, sometimes daily, meetings at all sorts of places of work. None of that has now changed in any dramatic way, but a distinct erosion has set in. . . .

"The organizational network can, of course, still be mobilized at important moments. The last total mobilization was after Khrushchev's Twentieth Congress speech which was diffused not by publication but at meetings of party members all over the country. . . . It is true that the party machine with its secretary in every organization is the ruling machine. . . . But, just as in the West, political machines which still exist have been eroded in favor of direct use of the mass media by the top leaders to reach the public. . . .

"It is easy to oversimplify the picture of that trend. Let us not do so. Let us digress for a minute from the Soviet Union onto the general problem of the relation between mass media and face to face organization at various stages of development. Mass media and face to face communication are not completely substitutable commodities. Communications research in recent years has demonstrated that there are some things best done by the mass media and some things best done by word of mouth. They complement each other. The mass media are the cheapest way to diffuse knowledge rapidly, but personal influence is essential to get people to act. Any effective program of persuasion or leadership has to mesh mass media propaganda with some sort of organization. Effective marketing requires not only advertising but also a distribution network through stores and salesmen. . . .

"In general, modernization substitutes mass media influence for certain forms of traditional control and indoctrination within the family and other primary groups. While it loosens the grip of these primary institutions, however, it does not destroy them, and it also impels the growth, not the decline, of various forms of civic, commercial and social organizations.

"It is this complex, double-barrelled process that is taking place in the Soviet Union too. On the one hand, as the Soviet Union becomes a more complex industrial society the number and variety of organizations that it needs to create to carry out its myriad economic, social and scientific programs grow and grow. On the other hand, as the mass media become an increasingly important mobilizing, homogenizing and value-setting institution, many of the functions performed previously by the most primary and most personally controlling organizations, particularly the family and the local party organizations, are taken over by the media.

Competition at Home

"In a non-Communist society the most natural outcome of the mixed relationship in the process of development between the mass media and organization, is pluralism. A complex society which mobilizes itself partly by the essentially noncoercive but unindividualized means of mass media persuasion on the one hand, and partly by a myriad of specialized organizations on the other, tends most naturally to a pluralistic pattern of partial and overlapping loyalties and affiliations. This pattern is in sharp contrast to the kind of pre-modern society that socializes and controls each person within a single all-embracing primary group, be it a family, caste or clan, or be it a guild or party organization.

"In short, the Soviet conception or organization of society, via an encompassing structure of activities arranged at the place of work under the full direction of the local party organization was appropriate for mobilizing an underdeveloped country without an effective mass media system. It is an incubus in the complex society of today and is inevitably eroded to the degree that there are effective mass media. . . .

"No issue in Soviet life will be more important over the coming years than the struggle over the role of the party. The conservatives will continue to insist on effective control via party organization even at the inevitable cost of inefficiency and backwardness. The struggle will center to some degree on the role and character of the mass media, for, to the extent that the mass media are allowed to become lively and appealing, they must escape party control and indeed will tend to undermine party control. To the extent that the mass media are, on the contrary, held to the limited role of loudspeakers for party policies and resolutions, their potential for effectively mobilizing society are partially sacrificed. Without the debaters being fully aware of it, the debate over the mass media is also a debate over the party.

"It is in the light of these issues about the domestic Soviet media that the importance of international media must be evaluated. Foreign radio and other foreign media have a profound influence on the course of Soviet development over and above their influence as direct sources of ideas. As competitors for the audience they force the Soviet media to become more candid, more lively, more varied. (In that respect, incidentally, foreign media succeed precisely as they lose their audience.) To the extent that these things happen the role of the party is changed and diminished."

What will happen to Soviet society as a result of the new influence of the mass media it is difficult to say. "Change is not necessarily gradual and continuous. All sorts of things may happen. Nonetheless, it does seem possible to predict that in the long run Russia will achieve a more modern type of society with a more normal form of social coordination that relies more heavily on freer mass media instead of party control and is generally more pluralistic."

PROPAGANDA AND DEMOCRACY*

BY JACQUES ELLUL

The success of psychological appeals is as important to democratic government as it is to other forms of government.

DEMOCRACY'S NEED OF PROPAGANDA

On one fact there can be no debate: the need of democracy, in its present situation, to "make propaganda."[1] We must understand, besides, that private propaganda, even more than governmental propaganda, is importantly linked to democracy. Historically, from the moment a democratic regime establishes itself, propaganda establishes itself alongside it under various forms. This is inevitable, as democracy depends on public opinion and competition between political parties. In order to come to power, parties make propaganda to gain voters.

Let us remember that the advent of the masses through the development of the democracies has provoked the use of propaganda, and that this is precisely one of the arguments of defense of the democratic State—that it appeals to the people, who are mobilized by propaganda; that it defends itself against private interests or anti-democratic parties. It is a remarkable fact worthy of attention that modern propaganda should have begun in the democratic States. During World War I we saw

*Excerpts from "The Socio-political Effects," Chapter V in *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, translated from the French by Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1965, pp. 232–242. From PROPAGANDA: THE FORMATION OF MEN'S ATTITUDES, by Jacques Ellul. Copyright © 1968 by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

the combined use of the mass media for the first time; the application of publicity and advertising methods to political affairs, the search for the most effective psychological methods. But in those days German propaganda was mediocre: the French, English, and American democracies launched big propaganda. Similarly, the Leninist movement, undeniably democratic at the start, developed and perfected all propaganda methods. Contrary to some belief, the authoritarian regimes were not the first to resort to this type of action, though they eventually employed it beyond all limits. This statement should make us think about the relationship between democracy and propaganda.

For it is evident that a conflict exists between the principles of democracy—particularly its concept of the individual—and the processes of propaganda. The notion of rational man, capable of thinking and living according to reason, of controlling his passions and living according to scientific patterns, of choosing freely between good and evil—all this seems opposed to the secret influences the mobilizations of myths, the swift appeals to the irrational, so characteristic of propaganda.

But this development within the democratic framework can be understood clearly if we look at it not from the level of principles but from that of actual situations. If, so far, we have concluded that inside a democracy propaganda is normal and indispensable, even intrinsic in the regime, that there are one or more propagandas at work, nothing seems to make propaganda obligatory in *external* relations. There the situation is entirely different. There the democratic State will want to present itself as the carrier of its entire public opinion, and the democratic nation will want to present itself as a coherent whole. But that creates some difficulty because such desire does not correspond to a true and exact picture of democracy. Moreover, this implies an endemic, permanent state of war. But, whereas it is easy to show that permanent wars establish themselves at the same time as democratic regimes, it is even easier to demonstrate that these regimes express a strong desire for peace and do not systematically prepare for war. By this I mean that the economic and sociological conditions of the democracies possibly provoke general conflicts, but that the regime, such as it is, is not organically tied to war. It is led there, *volens nolens*. And it adjusts poorly to the situation of the Cold War, which is essentially psychological.

Another circumstance imprisons democracy in the ways of propaganda: the persistence of some traits of the democratic ideology. The conviction of the invincible force of truth is tied to the notion of progress and is a part of this ideology. Democracies have been fed on the notion that truth may be hidden for a while but will triumph in the end, that truth in itself carries an explosive force, a power of fermentation that will necessarily lead to the end of lies and the shining apparition of the true. This truth was the implicit core of the democratic doctrine.

One must stress, furthermore, that this was in itself a truth of an ideological kind that ended by making history because it imposed itself on

history. This attitude contained the seeds of, but was at the same time (and still is) the exact opposite of, the current Marxist attitude that history is truth. Proof through history is nowadays regarded as *the* proof. He in whose favor history decides, was right. But what is "to be right" when one speaks of history? It is to win, to survive, *i.e.*, to be the strongest. This would mean that the strongest and most efficient, nowadays, is the possessor of the truth. Truth thus has no content of its own, but exists only as history produces it; truth receives reality through history.

One can easily see the relationship between the two attitudes and how one can pass easily from one to the other: for if truth possesses an invincible power that makes it triumph through itself alone, it becomes logical—by a simple but dangerous step—that triumph is truth. But—and this is frightening—the consequences of the two attitudes are radically different.

To think that democracy must triumph because it is the truth leads man to be democratic and to believe that when the democratic regime is opposed to regimes of oppression, its superiority will be clear at first sight to the infallible judgment of man and history. The choice is thus certain. What amazement is displayed again and again by democrats, particularly Anglo-Saxon democrats, when they see that a man selects something else, and that history is indecisive. In such cases they decide to use information. "Because democratic reality was not known, people have made a bad choice," they say, and even there we find the same conviction of the power of truth. But it is not borne out by facts. We will not establish a general law here, to be sure, but we will say that it is not a general law that truth triumphs automatically, though it may in certain periods of history or with respect to certain verities. We cannot generalize here at all. History shows that plain truth can be so thoroughly snuffed out that it disappears, and that in certain periods the lie is all-powerful.

Even when truth triumphs, does it triumph through itself (because it is truth)? After all, the eternal verities defended by Antigone would, in the eyes of history, have yielded to Creon even if Sophocles had not exited.

But in our time, the conviction of democracy and its claim to inform people collide with the fact that propaganda follows an entirely different mechanism, performs a function entirely different from that of information, and that nowadays facts do not assume reality in the people's eyes unless they are established by propaganda. Propaganda, in fact, creates truth in the sense that it creates in men subject to propaganda all the signs and indications of true believers.

For modern man, propaganda is really creating truth. This means that truth is powerless without propaganda. And in view of the challenge the democracies face, it is of supreme importance that they abandon their confidence in truth as such and assimilate themselves to the methods of propaganda. Unless they do so, considering the present tendencies of

civilization, the democratic nations will lose the war conducted in this area.

DEMOCRATIC PROPAGANDA

Convinced of the necessity for using the means of propaganda, students of that question have found themselves facing the following problem. Totalitarian States have used propaganda to the limit, domestically in order to create conformity, manipulate public opinion, and adjust it to the decisions of the government; externally to conduct the Cold War, undermine the public opinion of nations considered enemies, and turn them into willing victims. But if these instruments were used principally by authoritarian States, and if democracies, whose structure seemed made for their use, did not use them, can they now be used by democracies? By that I mean that the propaganda of the authoritarian State has certain special traits, which seem inseparable from that State. Must democratic propaganda have other traits? Is it possible to make democratic propaganda?

Let us quickly dismiss the idea that a simple difference of content would mean a difference in character. "From the moment that propaganda is used to promulgate democratic ideas, it is good; if it is bad it is only because of its authoritarian content." Such a position is terribly idealistic and neglects the principal condition of the modern world: the primacy of means over ends. But one may say—and this is a matter worthy of reflection—that democracy itself is not a good "propaganda object." Practically all propaganda efforts to promulgate democracy have failed. In fact, one would have to modify the entire concept of democracy considerably to make it a good propaganda object, which at present it is not.

Also, in passing, I will mention the following thought: "From the moment that democracy uses this instrument (propaganda), propaganda becomes democratic." This thought is not often expressed quite so simply and aggressively, but it is an implicit notion found in most American writers. Nothing can touch democracy: on the contrary, it impresses its character on everything it touches. This prejudice is important for understanding the American democratic mythology and the tentative adoption of this principle by other popular democracies.

Such positions are so superficial and so remote from the actual situation that they do not need to be discussed. Besides, they usually come from journalists or commentators, and not from men who have seriously studied the problem of propaganda and its effects. Even the majority of the latter, however, retain the conviction that one *can* set up a propaganda system that expresses the democratic character and does *not* alter the working of democracy. That is the double demand that one must make of propaganda in a democratic regime.

It is argued that the first condition would be met by the absence of a monopoly (in a democracy) of the means of propaganda, and by the free

interplay of various propagandas. True, compared with the State monopoly and the unity of propaganda in totalitarian States, one finds a great diversity of press and radio in democratic countries. But this fact must not be stressed too much: although there is no State or legal monopoly, there is, nevertheless, indeed a private monopoly. Even where there are many newspaper publishers, concentration as a result of "newspaper chains" is well established, and the monopolization of news agencies of distribution and so on, is well known. In the field of radio or motion pictures the same situation prevails: obviously not everybody can own propaganda media. In the United States, most radio and motion picture corporations are very large. The others are secondary and unable to compete, and centralization still goes on. The trend everywhere is in the direction of avery few, very powerful companies controlling all the propaganda media. Are they still private? In any event, as we have already seen, the State must make *its* propaganda, if only under the aspect of disseminating news.

Assuming that information is an indispensable element of democracy, it is necessary that the information promulgated by the State be credible. Without credibility, it will fail. But what happens when a powerful private propaganda organization denies facts and falsifies information? Who can tell where truth lies? On whom can the citizen rely to judge the debate? It is on this level that the dialogue really takes place. The problem then is whether the State will support a private competitor who controls media equal or superior to its own but makes different propaganda. It may even be entirely legitimate for the State to suppress or annex such a competitor.

Some will say: "Freedom of expression is democracy; to prevent propaganda is to violate democracy." Certainly, but it must be remembered that the freedom of expression of one or two powerful companies that do not express the thoughts of the individual or small groups, but of capitalist interests or an entire public, does not exactly correspond to what was called freedom of expression a century ago. One must remember, further, that the freedom of expression of one who makes a speech to a limited audience is not the same as that of the speaker who has all the radio sets in the country at his disposal, all the more as the science of propaganda gives to these instruments a shock effect that the non-initiated cannot equal.

I refer in this connection to the excellent study by Rivero,[2] who demonstrates the immense difference between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in this respect:

> In the nineteenth century, the problem of opinion formation through the expression of thought was essentially a problem of contacts between the State and the *individual*, and a problem of *acquisition of a freedom*. But today, thanks to the mass media, the individual finds himself outside the battle . . . the debate is between the State and powerful groups. . . . Freedom to express ideas is no longer at stake in this debate. . . . What we have is mastery and domination by the State or by some powerful groups over the whole of the technical media of opinion formation . . . the individual has no access to them . . . he is no longer a particip-

ant in this battle for the free expression of ideas: he is the stake. What matters for him is which voice he will be permitted to hear and which words will have the power to obsess him. . . .

It is in the light of this perfect analysis that one must ask oneself what freedom of expression still means in a democracy.

But even if the State held all the instruments of propaganda (and this becomes increasingly probable for political, economic, and financial reasons—particularly so far as TV[3] is concerned), what characterizes democracy is that it permits the expression of different propagandas. This is true. But it is impossible to permit the expression of all opinion. Immoral and aberrant opinions are justifiably subject to censorship. Purely personal opinions and, even more, certain political tendencies are necessarily excluded. "No freedom for the enemies of freedom" is the watchword then. Thus the democracies create for themselves a problem of limitation and degree. Who then will exclude certain propaganda instruments? For the Fascist, the Communists are the enemies of truth. For the Communists, the enemies of freedom are the bourgeois, the Fascists, the cosmopolitans. And for the democrats? Obviously all enemies of democracy.

Matters are even more serious. In time of war, everybody agrees that news must be limited and controlled, and that all propaganda not in the national interest must be prohibited. From that fact grows a unified propaganda. The problem that now arises is this: We have talked of the Cold War. But it seems that the democracies have not yet learned that the Cold War is no longer an exceptional state, a state analogous to hot war (which is transitory), but is becoming a permanent and endemic state.

There are many reasons for that. I will name only one: propaganda itself.

Propaganda directed to territories outside one's borders is a weapon of war. This does not depend on the will of those who use it or on a doctrine, but is a result of the medium itself. Propaganda has such an ability to effect psychological transformations and such an impact on the very core of man that it inevitably has military force when used by a government and directed to the outside. There is no "simple" use of propaganda; a propaganda conflict is hardly less serious than an armed conflict. It is inevitable, therefore, that in cold war the same attitude exists as in the case of hot war: one feels the need to unify propaganda. Here democracies are caught in a vicious circle from which they seem unable to escape.

The other principal aspect of democratic propaganda is that it is subject to certain values. It is not unfettered but fettered;[4] it is an instrument not of passion but of reason.[5] Therefore, democratic propaganda must be essentially truthful. It must speak only the truth and base itself only on facts. This can be observed in American propaganda: it is undeniable that American information and propaganda are truthful. But that does not seem to me characteristic of democracy. The formula with which Ameri-

cans explain their attitude is: "The truth pays." That is, propaganda based on truth is more effective than any other. Besides, Hitler's famous statement on the lie is not a typical trait of propaganda. There is an unmistakable evolution here: lies and falsifications are used less and less. We have already said that. The use of precise facts is becoming increasingly common.

Conversely, the use of nuances and a certain suppleness reveals an attitude peculiar to democracy. At bottom there is a certain respect for the human being, unconscious perhaps, and becoming steadily weaker, but nevertheless still there; even the most Machiavellian of democrats respects the conscience of his listener and does not treat him with haste or contempt. The tradition of respecting the individual has not yet been eliminated, and this leads to all sorts of consequences. First, it limits propaganda. The democratic State uses propaganda only if driven by circumstances—for example, traditionally, after wars. But whereas private and domestic propaganda is persistent in its effects, governmental and external propaganda evaporate easily. Besides, such propaganda is not total, does not seek to envelop all of human life, to control every form of behavior, to attach itself ultimately to one's person. A third trait of democratic propaganda is that it looks at both sides of the coin. The democratic attitude is frequently close to that of a university: there is no absolute truth, and it is acknowledged that the opponent has some good faith, some justice, some reason on his side. It is a question of nuances. There is no strict rule—except in time of war—about Good on one side and Bad on the other.

Finally, the democratic propagandist or democratic State will often have a bad conscience about using propaganda. The old democratic conscience still gets in the way and burdens him; he has the vague feeling that he is engaged in something illegitimate. Thus, for the propagandist in a democracy to throw himself fully into his task it is necessary that he believe—*i.e.*, that he formulate his own convictions when he makes propaganda.

Lasswell has named still another difference between democratic and totalitarian propaganda, pertaining to the technique of propaganda itself, and distinguishing between "contrasted incitement" and "positive incitement." The first consists of a stimulus unleashed by the experimenter or the authorities in order to produce in the masses an effect in which those in power do not participate. This, according to Lasswell, is the customary method of despotism. Conversely, the positive incitement, symbolizing the extended brotherly hand, is a stimulus that springs from what the powers that be really feel, in which they want to make the masses participate. It is a communal action. This analysis is roughly accurate.

All this represents the situation in which democracies find themselves in the face of propaganda, and indicates the differences between democratic and authoritarian propaganda methods. But I must now render a very serious judgment on such activity (democratic propaganda): all that

I have described adds up to ineffectual propaganda. Precisely to the extent that the propagandist retains his respect for the individual, he denies himself the very penetration that is the ultimate aim of all propaganda: that of provoking action without prior thought. By respecting nuances, he neglects the major law of propaganda: every assertion must be trenchant and total. To the extent that he remains partial, he fails to use the mystique. But that mystique is indispensable for well-made propaganda. To the extent that a democratic propagandist has a bad conscience, he cannot do good work; nor can he when he believes in his own propaganda. As concerns Lasswell's distinction, the technique of propaganda demands one form or the other, depending on circumstances. In any event, propaganda always creates a schism between the government and the mass, that same schism I have described in the book *The Technological Society*, and that is provoked by all the techniques, whose practitioners constitute a sort of aristocracy of technicians and who modify the structures of the State.

According to Lasswell's analysis, propaganda based on contrasted incitation expresses a despotism. I would rather say that it expresses an aristocracy. But the famous "massive democracy" corresponds to that, *is* that. Ultimately, even if one tries to maintain confidence and communion between the government and the governed, all propaganda ends up as a means by which the prevailing powers manipulate the masses.

The true propagandist must be as cold, lucid, and rigorous as a surgeon. There are subjects and objects. A propagandist who believes in what he says and lets himself become a victim of his own game will have the same weakness as a surgeon who operates on a loved one or a judge who presides at a trial of a member of his own family. To use the instrument of propaganda nowadays, one must have a scientific approach—the lack of which was the weakness that became apparent in Nazi propaganda in its last few years: clearly, after 1943, one could see from its content that Goebbels had begun to believe it himself.

Thus, some of democracy's fundamental aspects paralyze the conduct of propaganda. There is, therefore, no "democratic" propaganda. Propaganda made by the democracies is ineffective, paralyzed, mediocre. We can say the same when there is a diversity of propagandas: when various propagandas are permitted to express themselves they become ineffective with respect to their immediate objective. This ineffectiveness with regard to the citizens of a democracy needs more analysis. Let us merely emphasize here that our propaganda is outclassed by that of totalitarian States. This means that ours does not do its job. But in view of the challenge we face, it is imperative that ours be effective. One must therefore abandon the traits that are characteristic of democracy but paralyzing for propaganda: the combination of effective propaganda and respect for the individual seems impossible.

There is a last element, which I shall mention briefly. Jacques Driencourt has demonstrated that propaganda is totalitarian in its essence, not

because it is the handmaiden of the totalitarian State, but because it has a tendency to absorb everything. This finding is the best part of his work.[6] It means that when one takes that route, one cannot stop halfway: one must use all instruments and all methods that make propaganda effective. One must expect—and developments over the past dozen years show it—that the democracies will abandon their precautions and their nuances and throw themselves wholeheartedly into effective propaganda action. But such action will no longer have a special democratic character.

. . .[To measure the effects that the making of propaganda has on democracy], we must distinguish between external and domestic propaganda. We must not retain the illusion that propaganda is merely a neutral instrument that one can use without being affected. It is comparable to radium, and what happens to the radiologists is well known.

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NOTES

1. Perceptive authors agree that without propaganda a democratic State is disarmed at home (vis-à-vis the parties) and abroad, the latter as a result of the famous "challenge" that sets the democracies and the totalitarian States against each other. But one must not overlook the many setbacks that democracy has suffered for lack of propaganda. Maurice Megret shows (in *L'Action psychologique* [Paris: A. Fayard; 1959]) that the crisis in which the French Army found itself from 1950 on was in large part caused by an absence of psychological action on the part of the government, and he demonstrates that the famous Plan was less than a great success for the same reasons. Finally, we must remember that if the democratic State is denied the right to make propaganda, such propaganda appears in the form of Public Relations at the expense of the State, and is all the more dangerous because camouflaged.

2. "Technique de formation de l'opinion publique," in *L'Opinion Publique* (1957).

3. In France. (Trans.)

4. Propaganda as such is limited in the democracies by law, by the separation of powers, and so on.

5. See, for example, "Trends in Twentieth-Century Propaganda," by Ernst Kris and Nathan Leites, who contrast the appeal to the super-ego and to the irrational by authoritarian propaganda with democratic propaganda, which is directed at the ego.

6. *La Propagande, nouvelle force politique* (Paris: A. Colin; 1950).

IDEOLOGY

In a real sense, all international persuasive communication implies an ideology. Within this general concept, however, differences in ideological content are vast and highly significant. The inherent applicability of any specific ideology to psychological operations is often lessened as the meaning of the ideology is explicated in detail. This is because such specification forces an ideology to define itself in terms of concrete choices, choices which will alienate some even as they will attract others. The individual aspects of a broad philosophy can appeal however to different audiences, and the prudent, ideologically motivated communicator will be aware of the aspects he must emphasize and de-emphasize to appeal to different audiences.

A second major weakness of ideologically based appeals is, as Bernard

Yoh points out, that another government or group may choose to emphasize the contradictions between the communicator's ideology and the traditions and values of the audience.

Against such weaknesses must be weighed the ability of universalistic ideologies to produce "true believers." An all-encompassing ideology is an entire value system with its own justification and ethical code which some converts may find appealing , and in support of which they may become jealous or even fanatical.

COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY AND REVOLUTION*

BY JOHN H. NORTON

Selected elements of Marxian theory lend themselves unusually well to either totalitarian regimes' justification or stimuli for revolution.

* * * * *

An ideology is a philosophical construction which explains everything about the historical process by logical deduction from a single basic idea. Unlike other philosophies an ideology usually claims a monopoly of truth and is intolerant of other outlooks. In these aspects it bears a resemblance to religion, with which it is often compared. Unlike revealed religions, however, ideologies claim to be based upon scientific truth, since they deal with natural and not supernatural processes and since they are internally consistent. In this assertion, however, they err by ignoring the basis of scientific truth, which is composed of tentative (heuristic) propositions to be tested independently by many individuals against observable reality and discarded if they do not meet that empirical test. Despite the fact that they demand acceptance in the name of science, ideologies are dogmas which display very little curiosity about the real world. But in this respect they are less secure and more subject to change than religions. They purport to explain natural events, and they are therefore open to challenge when they fail to predict them.

Ideologies play an important role in social change. They seem to arise from the psychological stresses produced when a social system is not in equilibrium, and they serve the individual who accepts them as a means for relieving these tensions. In this respect they offer a consistent picture of the universe which gives meaning to the life of the individual and offers an explanation of the events he witnesses. Often they serve as replacements for old value systems which have broken down under social change, and they serve as a rallying point for those individuals who are dissatisfied with the social system.[1]

Because of their religious and pseudoscientific nature, ideologies can be used to influence and organize people. Those who use them for this

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purpose are not necessarily cynical or sinister manipulators; it is more likely that they have accepted the ideology too.[2] Particularly for those at the center of a revolutionary movement, the psychological satisfaction of directing that movement toward a meaningful ideological goal can be tremendous.[3] So, aside from the intrinsic appeal of the ideology itself, there are powerful psychological and social rewards for those who subscribe to it.

Marxism and its offshoots are just such ideologies.

Marx proposed a theory of history and economics which, with modification, is still widely accepted. He saw history as a process in which people's thoughts, attitudes, and actions are largely determined by economic factors. These factors were held responsible for the division of people into classes and for the struggle between those classes which would—after passing through periods of feudalism and capitalism—finally and inevitably result in a revolution of those who produced wealth (the workers), which in turn would bring about a utopian classless society.

Marx's view of this society was optimistic and idealistic. He foresaw it as a society in which . . .

> men would exercise a much greater, and equal, control over their individual destinies; would be liberated from the tyranny of their own creations such as the State and bureaucracy, capital and technology; would be productive rather than acquisitive; would find pleasure and support in their social cooperation with other men, rather than antagonism and bitterness in the competition with them.[4]

This utopian vision still has much appeal today. It represents enough universal human longing to attract the radical students in the industrialized countries as well as the peasant societies of the Third World.

Four points in Marx's theories are particularly important. First is his argument that misery and want are not *natural* conditions, but *political* ones—the results of social institutions and not of scarcity. In this, his philosophy continues in a direct line from that of the French Revolution, whose leaders saw human happiness and the alleviation of poverty as the ends of revolution. (Note the significant contrast of this idea to that of the American Revolution, which was fought to free individuals to seek their own happiness within a political order based on their own consent. This is an important practical and philosophical difference.[5])

Second is Marx's emphasis on historical determinism. Despite his concern with human happiness, human beings are seen not as individuals with individual needs and capabilities, but as agents of an historical process over which they can have little control.The corollary of this notion is purely ideological—that humans can best find happiness now by joining, not resisting, the inevitable movement toward socialism and the victory of the working class.

Third, we have Marx's conception of the dialectic of the historical process, which meant that out of the conflict of thesis (the old society) and antithesis (reaction to its injustices) would emerge a new synthesis (the

new order). A corollary of this idea was that reforms of the old order only slowed the historical process and the ultimate revolution and were therefore undesirable. In short, "real" change could only be brought about by revolution.

Finally, we come to Marx's idea of the alienation (estrangement, dehumanization) of man in industrial (capitalist) society, by which he meant that the division of labor and the necessity for bureaucratic administration created by the advance of technology had resulted in a condition wherein man received no self-fulfillment from his work and life. It is this concept, seized upon by Marcuse and other contemporary social critics, which has crystallized opposition to unthinking commercialism and bureaucratic government by the student left in the industrialized countries.

The problems with Marx's original theories are well known. The labor theory of value, upon which he based much of his argument, was later shown to be deficient. His touching confidence that human nature would change from acquisitiveness to cooperation with the imposition of different social institutions was ill founded. He failed to see that his scheme provided no safeguards against the conversion of the dictatorship of the proletariat into the tyranny of a party; his classless society allows for no other institutions which could compete with the state or offer that society some defense against the totalitarianism of the new elite.

Nevertheless, the elements of Marx's theory mentioned above make it unusually susceptible to perversion into dogma for ideological purposes, either as the charismatic justification of a totalitarian system or as a stimulus to revolution. The theory tells men that they can achieve happiness by changing certain political institutions held to be responsible for their misery. It tells them that they will be acting against history if they do not change these institutions in a certain way (revolution). It explains their present discontent, and it gives them a sense of participation in history if they adhere to the theory. In short, it claims a monopoly of truth, supports all those who believe in it, and provides a justification for ignoring or eliminating those who disagree. Marx was clever enough to have been able to recognize these problems, had he lived into the 20th century. An enemy of classes and bureaucracy, he would very likely be appalled by the Communist states today. Even at the end of his life he wrote to his son, "I am not myself a Marxist."

It was left for Lenin to covert these theories into ideology. . . . He made two important contributions. He extended the theory of revolution to include not only the proletariat, but the large mass of peasants as well. And he forged the priesthood of the Communist Party as the conspiratorial vehicle for revolution and the guardian of the dogmatic faith of Marxism.

Mao Tse-Tung's addition to Marxist ideology arose out of his well-known experiences in mobilizing a peasant base to struggle against the Nationalist Government and the Japanese. In the course of this struggle

he continued to move away from reliance on the proletariat and toward reliance on the peasants as the backbone of communism. He thus incorporated into the body of Marxist doctrine the peasant who had been despised by Marx and his European followers and who had been utilized but largely overlooked by Lenin.

The success of Mao's organizational efforts and guerrilla tactics in China moved him to elevate the new emphasis into dogma and extend it to international politics, where he now postulates a worldwide "guerrilla war" of the underdeveloped, rural Third World against the metropolitan powers of Europe and North America.[6] This element in Mao's ideology has been both the instrument and the motivation for China's mischief making in the Third World and, of course, contributed also to the break with Russia.

What then is the role of contemporary Marxist ideology in the unstable social and political situation existing in the developing countries? How much is it responsible for the unrest there? What appeal does it have to individuals in those societies and why? To what degree is it merely a tool of Soviet and Chinese interests?

. . .The Soviets and China have promoted revolution and the spread of Marxist ideology in the underdeveloped countries for their own political purposes. But to believe that the influence of communism in these areas is solely, or even chiefly, the result of conspiratioral, outside Communist "takeover" tactics is to ignore the inherent relevance of this ideology to the Third World and to render ourselves incapable of dealing with the complex situation in the Third World except in the emotional and somewhat simplistic manner in which we have reacted in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.

Do we really think that modern Communist ideology could have taken such deep root in Asia and Latin America if it did not have some meaning to the people there? The Third World is not Eastern Europe, where communism was imposed on an unwilling population by Stalin's armies. It stretches the imagination to believe that the hundreds of thousands of highly motivated Vietcong can be but dupes of clever organizers and propagandists.

Marxist ideology and Communist organization are, and will continue to be, successful in the underdeveloped countries for at least five reasons:

(1) Marxist utopianism fits right in with the natural utopianism which exists in all peasant societies.

(2) Communist organization offers a quick, practical means for native intellectuals to gain a pervasive control of their societies.

(3) Communist governments are effective in creating political controls capable of holding a society together in today's world.

(4) The hostility of Communist doctrime to Western Europe and the United States provides a rationale for developing countries to cast off odious colonial influence and inappropriate Western-style political systems.

(5) Both the ideology and the hierarchical social organization of modern communism offer the individual a satisfying substitute for the vanishing social institutions of extended family, tribe, and local community.

Utopianism is a common phenomenon among those whom Morris Watnick calls the "history-less" peoples of the world—those whose actions are governed by custom, and whose imagination spans only one generation.[7,8] There it acts as a psychological safety valve for the trials of a difficult existence. When social institutions begin to break down or to change rapidly, this utopianism bursts forth frequently in desperate, futile peasant rebellions (e.g., the 16th century Bauernkrieg in Europe on the eve of the Reformation).[9] Such rapid social change is occurring today in the Third World under the impact of new ideas.

This native drive for millennial rectification of perceived wrongs is usually directed against whomever is in authority as the society disintegrates. But it is doomed to achieve nothing unless it can be effectively organized. It can be organized by means of appropriate ideology and methods of control. Communism in its present form offers both. The elements of Marx's theory accord perfectly with the millennial dream of the peasant in time of stress "Alienation" and "class exploitation" explain his unhappiness, the "classless society" provides his goal, the "need for revolution" shows him how to act, and "historical determinism" gives him the sense of participation in an historical process.

Who then are attempting to use this ideology to control and manipulate the dissatisfied majority? Foreign agents? Local Communists trained in Moscow and Peking?

Most revolutionary leaders in the Third World are indigenous intellectuals who are otherwise excluded from positions of power in their societies, who find communism relevant to them personally, and who see it as the best tool to modernize their countries.[10,11] In Marxist ideology they, too, find self-justification; in Communist organization they find the means to put themselves in power and to guide their societies toward the more sophisticated political systems necessary to survive in the last third of the 20th century. The backgrounds of Communist leaders have been found to be surprisingly similar to those of their local nationalist opponents.[12] Except in rare cases they are not workers or peasants, but men educated in modern ideas.

Here we find many similarities with prerevolutionary Russia and China (similarities which are not lost on Third World leaders). Communism was not imposed upon Russia from without. It was eagerly adopted by native Russian intellectuals who used it as a tool to overthrow Kerensky's provisional government, install themselves in power, and work for modernization. In China, after the nearly disastrous manipulations of Russian agents, it was a homegrown intellectual, Mao, who guided the country to a successful Communist revolution. A look at the biographies of current Vietcong leaders reveals few peasants and workers, but a high proportion of schoolteachers, architects, and engineers, whose "foreign training"

was usually acquired in Paris.[13] It is especially with regard to these indigenous revolutionary leaders that we usually underestimate communism as a compelling, relevant force in the developing world by labeling such people "dupes," "foreign agents," or "Power-hungry cynics."

Does communism deliver what it promises to these modernizing nationalists? Although many of the promises are not kept, it does satisfy what is perhaps the greatest immediate *need* of their societies—not economic development, but political cohesion. The Communists offer effective government based on widespread mobilization of the community in political and economic programs. To label these governments totalitarian dictatorships may be true, but it does not tell the whole story—perhaps not even the most important part of it. The significant difference between the dictatorships of Ho and Diem was that Ho constructed the institutions necessary for a modern political system, while Diem did not. The United States' great failure in dealing with insurgency in the Third World has been that we have never offered these peoples an effective alternative to totalitarian control as a *rapid* means to political modernization. I believe we must try, for I believe that democracy and effecitve government are not mutually exclusive.[14]

Points 4 and 5 above probably need less discussion. It seems obvious that the old colonial powers appear as more of a threat to the new leaders than do Russia or China, partly because many of their economies are tied to the West (a fact which is seen as "nonpolitical" in the United States; after all, it's just business). These economic relations with the powerful, industrialized countries are often perceived in the developing countries as exploitation and, therefore, "neocolonialism." Witness our current problems in Latin America. Similar Soviet economic relations, such as the natural gas sales to Western Europe, are only just beginning and are therefore not so clearly perceived.

Furthermore, the Western Powers, in an unsophisticated, idealistic, and parochial manner have attempted to push the forms, if not the substance, of Western Constitutional democracy upon developing countries for whom these institutions are not very relevant—less relevant, in fact, that homegrown communism. These systems have in many cases been properly rejected or modified out of existence, and the new nations are now experimenting with their own institutions—sometimes with disastrous results. If we hope to encourage other peoples toward systems of government we believe best, we had better study carefully the elements in other ststems which are perceived by them as more appropriate for their own needs

The psychological rewards of modern communism as a substitute for decaying traditional social institutions have already been mentioned and explored. They are a powerful motivating force for which men will give their lives.

Hopefully, the above discussion will have demonstrated that the popularity of Communist ideas and the penetration of Soviet and Chinese

influence in the Third World have not been simply the result of tactics used by Communist insurgents to organize and control a population, but rather the result of the relevance of certain elements of Marxist ideology and Leninist political organization to conditions in developing societies. For our own national interest we simply cannot afford any longer to ignore these elements because of our hostility to "communism."

NOTES

1. Chalmers A. Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 80–87.
2. Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York: Harper, 1951), p. 104.
3. E. Victor Wolfenstein, *The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), *passim.*
4. Thomas B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 132.
5. Hannah Arendt's discussion of the question of human wants and political institutions is brilliant on this point and may indicate why some of our domestic institutions are failing us now. See her *On Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), pp. 53–110.
6. U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Lin Piao Article Commemorating V-J Day Anniversary "Long Live the Victory of the People's War"* ([Washington]: 3 September 1965), p. 22.
7. Morris Watnick, "The Appeal of Communism to the Underdeveloped Peoples," John H. Kautsky, ed., *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries* (New York: Wiley, 1962), p. 317.
8. Margaret Mead, *Culture and Commitment* (Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1970), pp. 32–97.
9. Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 453–483, discusses the social conditions aside from peasant utopianism, which provoke peasant revolts.
10. Harry J. Benda, "Reflections on Asian Commumism," *Yale Review*, October 1966, pp. 1–2.
11. Kautsky, ed., *Political Change*, p. 77.
12. Harold Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, *World Revolutionary Elites* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1965), pp. 97–178.
13. Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 421–436.
14. For a detailed discussion of the institutions of modern political systems and for an analysis of how Leninism can also help provide them, I urge the reader to consider Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 334–343.

PROPAGANDA AND IDEOLOGY*

By Jacques Ellul

Ideology limits propaganda; propaganda alters and destroys ideology.

THE TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIP

A relationship between propaganda and ideology has always existed.

*Excerpts from "The Socio-political Effects," Chapter V in *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*, translated from the French by Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1965, pp. 194–202. From PROPAGANDA: THE FORMATION OF MEN'S ATTITUDES, by Jacques Ellul. Copyright © 1968 by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

The pattern of that relationship became more or less established toward the end of the nineteenth century. I will not give here an original or specific definition of ideology, but will merely say that society rests on certain beliefs and no social group can exist without such beliefs. To the extent that members of a group attribute intellectual validity to these beliefs, one may speak of an ideology. One might also consider a different process by which ideology is formed: ideologies emerge where doctrines are degraded and vulgarized and when an element of belief enters into them. However that may be, it has long been known that some ideologies are compatible with passive behavior, but most of them are active—*i.e.*, they push men into action.

Moreover, to the extent that members of a group believe their ideology to represent the truth, they almost always assume an aggressive posture and try to impose that ideology elsewhere. In such cases ideology becomes bent on conquest.

The drive toward conquest may arise within a society as a conflict between groups (for example, the proletarian ideology vs. others within a nation), or it can aim at targets outside, as a nationalist ideology will. The expansion of an ideology can take various forms: it can accompany the expansion of a group and impose itself on collectivities being embraced by the group, as with the republican ideology of 1793 or the Communist ideology of 1945, which accompanied the armies.

Or an ideology such as that of Labor in a bourgeois society may expand by its own momentum on a purely psychological plane. In this case, the ideology assumes a non-imperialist attitude; meanwhile it penetrates the group that represents such an attitude. In this fashion the ideology of Labor helped bring about the bourgeois orientation of all Western society in the nineteenth century.

Finally, an ideology can expand by certain other means, without force and without setting an entire group in motion: at that point we find propaganda. Propaganda appears—spontaneously or in organized fashion—as a means of spreading an ideology beyond the borders of a group or of fortifying it within a group. Evidently, in such cases propaganda is directly inspired by ideology in both form and content. It is equally evident that what counts here is to spread the content of that ideology. Propaganda does not lead a life of its own; it emerges only sporadically—when an ideology tries to expand.

Propaganda organizes itself in conformity with that ideology, so that in the course of history we find very different forms of propaganda, depending on what ideological content was to be promulgated. Also, propaganda is strictly limited to its objective, and its working processes are relatively simple in that it does not try to take possession of the individual or dominate him by devious means, but simply to transmit certain beliefs and ideas. That is the current relationship between ideology and propaganda. The classic pattern, still in existence in the nineteenth

century—and considered valid today by many observers—no longer prevails; the situation has undergone profound changes.

Lenin and Hitler found a world in which the process of ideological expansion was more or less set. But their intervention in this domain would be the same as their intervention in all others. What actually was Lenin's and thereafter Hitler's great innovation? It was to understand that the modern world is essentially a world of "means"; that what is most important is to utilize all the means at man's disposal; and that ends and aims have been completely transformed by the profusion of means. The fact that man in the nineteenth century was still searching for ends led him to neglect most of the available means. Lenin's stroke of genius was to see that, in reality, *in our twentieth century,* the ends had come to be secondary to the means or, in many cases, of no importance at all. What mattered was primarily to set all available instruments in motion and to push them to their limits.

Moreover, Lenin was carried along by the conviction that such extreme utilization of all means would, a priori, lead to the establishment of Socialist society. The end thus became a postulate that was easily forgotten. That attitude agreed exactly with the aspirations of the average man and with his firm belief in progress. That is why Lenin designed a strategy and a tactic on the political plane. There as elsewhere he permitted the means to assume first place; but that led him, on one hand, to modify Marx's doctrine, and on the other, to give the doctrine itself a level of importance secondary to action. Tactics and the development of means then became the principal objects even of political science.

With Hitler one finds precisely the same tendency, but with two differences: first of all, a total lack of restraint. Lenin envisaged the application of progressive, limited, adjusted means. Hitler wanted to apply them all, and without delay. Second, the end, the aim, the doctrine, which Lenin merely had demoted to second place, disappeared altogether in Hitler's case—the vague millennium that he promised cannot be regarded as an aim, nor can his anti-Semitism be considered a doctrine. Instead, we pass here to the stage of pure action, action for action's sake.

This completely transformed the relations between ideology and propaganda: ideology was of interest to Lenin and Hitler only where it could serve an action or some plan or tactic. Where it could not be used, it did not exist. Or it was used for propaganda. Propaganda then became the major fact; with respect to it, ideologies became mere epiphenomena. On the other hand, ideological content came to be of much less importance than had been thought possible. In most cases, propaganda can change or modify this content as long as it respects such formal and customary aspects of the ideology as its images and vocabulary.

Hitler modified the National Socialist ideology several times according to the requirements of propaganda. Thus Hitler and Lenin established an entirely new relationship between ideology and propaganda. But one must not think that Hitler's defeat put an end to that; actually, it has

become more widespread. There is no question that the demonstration was compelling from the point of view of effectiveness. Moreover, the trend launched by Lenin and Hitler touched on all prevailing ideologies, all of which now exist "in connection" with propaganda (*i.e.*, live by propaganda) whether one likes it or not. It is no longer possible to turn back; only adjustments can be made.

THE NEW RELATIONSHIP

These new propaganda methods have completely changed the relationship between propaganda and ideology, and as a result the role and value of ideologies in the present world have changed. Propaganda's task is less and less to propagate ideologies; it now obeys its own laws and becomes autonomous.

Propaganda no longer obeys an ideology.[1] The propagandist is not, and cannot be, a "believer." Moreover, he cannot believe in the ideology he must use in his propaganda. He is merely a man at the service of a party, a State, or some other organization, and his task is to insure the efficiency of that organization. He no more needs to share the official ideology than the prefect of a French department needs to share the political doctrines of the national government. If the propagandist has any political conviction, he must put it aside in order to be able to use some popular mass ideology. He cannot even share that ideology for he must use it as an object and manipulate it without the respect that he would have for it if he believed in it. He quickly acquires contempt for these popular images and beliefs; in his work, he must change the propaganda themes so frequently that he cannot possibly attach himself to any formal, sentimental, political, or other aspect of the ideology. More and more, the propagandist is a technician using a keyboard of material media and psychological techniques; and in the midst of all that, ideology is only one of the incidental and interchangeable cogs. It has often been stated that the propagandist eventually comes to despise doctrines and men. This must be put into context with the fact, analyzed above, that the organization served by propaganda is not basically interested in disseminating a doctrine, spreading an ideology, or creating an orthodoxy. It seeks, instead, to unite within itself as many individuals as possible, to mobilize them, and to transform them into active militants in the service of an orthodoxy.

Some will object that the great movements that have used propaganda, such as Communism or Nazism, did have a doctrine and did create an ideology. I reply that that was not their principal object: ideology and doctrine were merely accessories used by propaganda to mobilize individuals. The aim was the power of the party or State, supported by the masses. Proceeding from there, the problem is no longer whether or not a political ideology is valid. The propagandist cannot ask himself that question. For him, it is senseless to debate whether the Marxist view of

history has more validity than any other, or whether the racist doctrine is true. That is of no importance in the framework of propaganda.

The only problem is that of effectiveness, of utility. The point is not to ask oneself whether some economic or intellectual doctrine is valid, but only whether it can furnish effective catchwords capable of mobilizing the masses *here and now*. Therefore, when faced with an ideology that exists among the masses and commands a certain amount of belief, the propagandist must ask himself two questions: First, is this existing ideology an obstacle to the action to be taken, does it lead the masses to disobey the State, does it make them passive? (This last question is essential, for example, for propagandists who operate in milieux influenced by Buddhism.) In many cases such an ideology will indeed be an obstacle to blind action, if only to the extent that it sparks some intellectual activity, no matter how feeble, or provides criteria, no matter how insecure, for judgment or action. In this case the propagandist must be careful not to run head-on into a prevailing ideology; all he can do is integrate it into this system, use some parts of it, deflect it, and so on.[2] Second, he must ask himself whether the ideology, such as it is, can be used for his propaganda; whether it has psychologically predisposed an individual to submit to propaganda's impulsions.

In an Arab country colonized by whites, in view of the Islamic ideology that has developed hatred for Christians, a perfect predisposition to nationalist Arab and anti-colonialist propaganda will eixist. The propagandist will use that ideology directly, regardless of its content. He can become an ardent protagonist of Islam without believing in the least in its religious doctrine. Similarly, a Communist propagandist can disseminate a nationalist or a democratic ideology because it is useful, effective, and profitable, and because he finds it already formed and part of public opinion, even if he himself is anti-nationalist and anti-democratic. The fact that he reinforces a democratic belief in the public is of not importance: one now knows that such beliefs are no obstacle to the establishment of a dictatorship. By utlilizing the democratic ideology that Communism supports, the Communist party obtains the consent of the masses to its action, which then puts the Communist organization in control. Propaganda thus brings about the transition from democratic beliefs to a new form of democracy.

Public opinion is so uncertain and unclear as to the *content* of its ideologies that it follows the one that says the magic words, not realizing the contradictions between the proclamation of a catchword and the action that follows it. Once the "Machine" is in control, there can be no objection to it by those who adhered to the previously prevailing ideology, which is always officially adopted and proclaimed by the new organization in power. People live therefore in the mental confusion that propaganda purposely seeks to create.

In the face of existing, usable ideologies, the propagandist can take one of two paths: he can either stimulate them, or mythologize them. In fact,

ideologies lend themselves well to both methods. On the one hand, an ideology can be expressed in a catchword, a slogan. It can be reduced to a simple idea, deeply anchored in the popular consciousness. And public opinion is used to reacting automatically to the expressions of a former, accepted ideology: words such as *Democracy, Country,* and *Social Justice* can now set off the desired reflexes. They have been reduced to stimuli capable of obtaining reflexes in public opinion, which can turn from adoration to hatred without transition. They evoke past actions and aspirations. To be sure, if a formula is to be able to stimulate, it must correspond to existing conditioned reflexes that were forged gradually in the course of history by adherence to an ideology. The propagandist limits himself to what is already present. From there on he can use any ideological content at all, no matter where or when. Differences in application will be determined according to psychological, historical, and economic criteria, to insure the best utilization of ideology in the realm of action. I have said that ideology is a complex system capable of evoking one aspect while leaving out another; the propagandist's ability will consist precisely in making these choices.

On the other hand, the propagandist can proceed by transforming ideology into myth. Some ideologies can indeed serve as a springboard for the creation of myths by the propagandist. Such transformation rarely takes place spontaneously. Generally, ideology is quite vague, has little power to move men to action, and cannot control the individual's entire consciousness. But it furnishes the elements of content and belief. It weds itself to myth by the complicated mixture of ideas and sentiments, by grafting the irrational onto political and economic elements. Ideology differs radically from myth in that it has no basic roots, no relation to humanity's great, primitive myths. I have already said that it would be impossible to create a complete new myth through propaganda. However, the existence of an ideology within a group is the best possible foundation for the elaboration of a myth. In many cases, a precise operation and a more pressing and incisive formation will suffice. That the message must be formulated for use by the mass media automatically contributes to this: the fact that the widespread belief is now expressed in one-third the number of words and shouted through millions of loudspeakers, gives it new force and urgency.

The coloration supplied by psychological techniques, the power of efficiency demonstrated by the integration in an action, the over-all nature attributed to the construction of an intellectual universe in which ideology is the keystone—all that can be accomplished by the propagandist. In such fashion Socialist ideology was transformed into myth by Leninist propaganda, patriotic ideology became national myth, and the ideology of happiness was transformed into myth at the end of the nineteenth century. In this fashion, too, the myth of Progress was constructed from a group of propagandas based on bourgeois ideology.

Finally, the propagandist can use ideology for purposes of justification.

I have shown on several occasions that justification is an essential function of propaganda. The existence of a generally accepted ideology is a remarkable instrument for providing a good conscience. When the propagandist refers to collective beliefs, the man whom he induces to act in accord with those beliefs will experience a feeling of almost unshakable self-justification. To act in conformity with collective beliefs provides security and a guarantee that one acts properly. Propaganda reveals this consonance to the individual, renders the collective belief perceptible, conscious, and personal for him. It gives him a good conscience by making him aware of the collectivity of beliefs. Propaganda rationalizes the justification that man discovers in the prevailing ideology, and gives him the power to express himself. This holds true, for example, for the ideology of peace utilized by the Communist party: as soon as this ideology is used, everything, even hatred, is justified by it.

For a long time, man's actions, just as certain of his reactions, have been partially inspired by ideology. The masses may act because of a spontaneous belief, a succinct idea accepted by all, or in pursuit of an objective more or less vaguely outlined by an ideology; democratic ideology sparked such behavior. But the relationship of ideology to propaganda has completely changed this.

In a group in which modern propaganda is being made, man no longer acts in accord with a spontaneous ideology, but only through impulses that come to him from such propaganda. Only the ignorant can still believe that ideas, doctrines, beliefs can make man act without the utilization of psycho-sociological methods. Ideology not used by propaganda is ineffective and not taken seriously. The humanist ideology no longer provokes a response: in the face of modern propaganda, intellectuals have been completely disarmed and can no longer evoke the values of humanism. Torture (of political enemies) is implicitly accepted by public opinion, which expresses its dismay only in words, but not in action. With regard to the war in Algeria, it is well known that the most ardent defenders of P. H. Simon (a young lieutenant who exposed the practice of torture during that war) defended him only verbally and when they could afford to: once they were in combat, plunged into action, such "ideas" were relegated to a secondary level, and the F.L.N. and military propaganda—which, on both sides, accused the enemy of torture and thus legitimized its own actions—took over again. The same is true for Christian ideology, which no longer inspires action: Christians are caught in a psycho-sociological mechanism that conditions them to certain practices, despite their attachment to other ideas. Those ideas remain pure ideology because they are not being taken over by propaganda; and they are not taken over because they are not usable. In this fashion, such an ideology loses its reality and becomes an abstraction. It loses all effectiveness in relation to other ideologies being used by propaganda.

Moreover, in this relationship between ideology and action, we emphasize that nowadays action creates ideology, not vice versa, as the

idealists who relate to past situations still would like to believe. Through action one learns to believe in "some truth," and even to formulate it. Today, ideology progressively builds itself around actions sanctioned by propaganda. (For example, in order to justify certain actions in Algeria, an entire, complex ideology was created.) Thus, in various ways—all the result of propaganda—ideology is increasingly losing its importance in the modern world. It is devalued whether propaganda uses it or not; in the latter case because it reveals its ineffectiveness and cannot prevail against the competition; in the former, because when used, it is broken up: some aspects of it are used and others pushed aside.

The same holds true for ideology as for doctrine; when propaganda uses it, it destroys it. The transformation of the Marxist doctrine by propaganda, first Lenin's and then Stalin's is well known. Works such as those by P. Chambre, de Lefèvre, and Lukacs explain this "evisceration" of doctrine by propaganda very well. All that is believed, known, and accepted is what propaganda has promulgated. It is the same for ideology, which is merely a popular and sentimental derivation of doctrine. One can no longer establish anything at all on genuine ideologies in social groups; one can no longer hope to find in such ideologies a solid point of support for redressing man or society. Ideology has become part of the system of propaganda and depends on it.[3]

* * * * *

NOTES

1. Ideology plays a certain role in propaganda. It can prevent propaganda from developing when the governmental centers themselves are the seat of an ideology. . . . On the other hand, it has been shown how the belief in certain utopias (goodwill of the people, harmonization of international interests, and so on) is also a negative factor here, just as the ideology of democratic elites is less suitable than that of an aristocracy as the basis for a propaganda plan. Conversely, when the belief of the elites is progressive, it will lead to a powerful propaganda. Thus ideology partly determines whether a climate is favorable or unfavorable to the creation and use of propaganda, but it no longer is the decisive factor.

2. This is why one ideology cannot serve as a weapon against another ideology. Propaganda will never proclaim the superiority of an ideology over that of the enemy, for in doing so it would immediately fail. Against an opposing ideology one can only counter with a waiting attitude, an attitude of hope, and with questions as to what the future will bring. By thus asking an ideological adversary concrete questions pertaining to the future, the propagandist follows Marx's method of "progressing from language to life."

3. This can have decisive consequences, for one must not forget that this is the road by which a change in "culture" (in the American sense of the word) can take place, that is, a true change of civilization, which was so far maintained by the stability of ideologies and "chain-thinking."

PSYCHOLOGICAL TOTAL WAR*

By Bernard Yoh

Social contradictions may be used by or against revolutionary ideology.

Psychological warfare has been used throughout military history as one

*Original essay by Bernard Yoh.

among many tactics to attain military goals. The use of psychological initiatives—for example, ruse, showing the flag, war cries, threat—in conflict has often brought about the turning point of a battle or war. Yet, even more often, these techniques have been learned and used haphazardly without having been systematically studied and taught.

Historically, the people who have used psychological warfare most extensively are the Chinese. (The Chinese historical novel, *The Three Kingdoms*, describes numerous battles in which psychological tactics played an important part.) And in the words of Sun Tzu, the best known strategist in China (200 B.C.), "The first choice is to conquer a nation without fighting a war."

TRADITIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE VERSUS PSYCHOLOGICAL TOTAL WAR

In the Western world, medieval concepts of chivalry evolved into the unwritten rules of "conventional" warfare, which characterized both world wars and numerous smaller conflicts. The "Marquis of Queensbury" approach discouraged the use of psychological techniques, which were considered underhanded and unethical.

Even today, psychological warfare is limited by inadequate study, incomplete understanding, and suboptimum use. In the military forces of most Western countries there is little dedication to the use of psychological operations and relatively slight stress upon its developmnet as a weapon.

Communist doctrine, however, puts a high priority upon psychological warfare. Indeed, military action is viewed by Communist armed forces as a tool for the achievement of a psychological condition which will in turn bring about the realization of political objectives. This reversal of priorities has created a new dimension in warfare.

One indication of this change is in the structure of Communist armed forces. Every unit from a platoon to an army has one or more "political cadre member" or "political commissar" to oversee the psychological implementation at every level. They are usually of equal rank to the commanding officer. But regardless of rank, the political officer always has the last word on all policy decisions. Furthermore, the political officer has his own chain of command and communication—outside the regular military organization—directly to a member of the politburo.

This emphasis on thorough indoctrination and consistent predominance of political objectives even at the lowest levels is designed to guarantee the psychological contribution to the campaign, to insure that each member of each military unit is a "true believer," is devoted to his cause, is prepared to make the sacrifices requisite for furthering that cause, remembers to place all military circumstances in their "proper" political contexts, and is awake to the psychological potential inherent in every situation.

GUERRILLA WARFARE: THE BAIT—SOCIAL DISORDER: THE TRAP

Since the end of World War II, numerous revolutionary groups have challenged the legitimacy of governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Having recognized their conventional military inferiority in personnel and equipment, many have relied upon guerrilla techniques to overthrow the incumbent regimes. However, it has rarely been the strategy of revolutionaries to rely on guerrilla military successes alone. Instead, aware of the Communist conception of psychological total war, they have concentrated much of their resource base and many of their hopes on psychological victories—the creation of dissension, dissatisfaction, and disorder in society.

As the government focuses on the "war effort" and asks greater sacrifices of the nation, severe strains are placed on the loyalty, patience, and understnading of the populace. It is this increased cost that the government demands of its citizenry that the guerrilla hopes to exploit.

CONTRADICTION AND IDEOLOGY: A PAIR OF TWO-EDGED SWORDS

The philosophy of the revolutionary is to "utilize contradiction, control contradiction, and promote contradiction." These "contradictions" are therefore the seeds of destruction of government, powerful psychological tools the incumbent regime provides the insurgent. The objective of the government that wishes to preserve its dominion in the face of such a challenge is clear, then: it must eradicate contradiction between the government and the people. Corruption, electoral fraud, power abuse, ineffectual and arrogant bureaucrats may be fatal to a government under revolutionary siege.

On the part of the revolutionary force, ideology is often a powerful weapon because its sweeping generalizations allow many charges to be levelled at government in the name of ideology. But ideology also constitutes a potentially severe handicap to the revolutionary forces. If the generalizations can be used to castigate specific programs of the government, they can also be employed by the government to point out contradictions between revolutionary beliefs and the underlying attitudes and traditions of the population.

Too often, however, governments, concentrating on control of the economic, political, and military environments in which the revolution has developed, have neglected the potential for a psychological offensive, have neglected to use ideology to defeat insurgents through their own contradictions. The primary objective of psychological total war must be to marshal all available societal resources to secure the allegiance of the communications media, the intellectual and academic community, the organized and professional political elements, the rural community, the

workers, and the business community. The support of each is necessary to government success. And the allegiance of all can only be secured by imaginative use of psychological stimuli. When these six basic components of society are definitely won over to the government cause, the revolutionary forces are destined to fail in their own goals. They will have lost to the technique mastered by their forebearers: psychological total war.

PROPAGANDA

The purpose of this section is to illustrate many of the principles discussed earlier in the context of diverse propaganda appeals from governments and insurgent groups around the world.

The geographical grouping used here is arbitrary. Different criteria could be employed to group such appeals. For example, propaganda is often dichotomized: revolutionary versus status quo; developed versus underdeveloped; democratic versus totalitarian; Communist versus non-Communist; government versus insurgent; and the like.

None of these dichotomies is satisfactory for the broader purposes of this casebook. Eventually, most governments will either abjure the use of ideology or force it to conform to the state's needs. Propaganda is used to support the interests of the communicating entity, interests that, in terms of the study of communications, need not usually be considered in country-specific terms.

Therefore, to conform to the purposes of this casebook, what follows here are grouped essays dealing with political matters almost exclusively (while in fact governmental propaganda addresses a wide range of subjects). However, these articles, though primarily political in emphasis, focus on objectives, methods, media, policy planning, and organization. They are arranged on the basis of origin of the propaganda.

Western Europe

THE PROJECTION OF BRITAIN ABROAD*

By Max Beloff

Cultivating the desired image of a country in foreign audiences is an extraordinarily complex undertaking. The high costs support the thesis that reevaluation and analysis of techniques and effects should be a continuing function of government. A positive image can be created that is still not the desired image.

* * * * *

Efforts directed towards creating a favourable image of one's own country are nothing new in the history of inter-state relations. The monarchs of the *ancien régime* who spent so much money on palaces and spectacle, who patronised the arts and men of letters, were clearly not

*Excerpts from "The Projection of Britain Abroad," *International Affairs* (London), XLI, no. 3 (July 1965), pp. 478–489. Reprinted with the permission of Oxford University Press and the author.

insensible to the political dividends to be drawn from such investments. It would be surprising if Britain were not concerned in this form of peaceful competition for:

> If it is true to say as we believe, that of all the great Powers none is so dependent, for reasons of security and trade, on maintaining friendly relations with other countries as is the United Kingdom, then logically this country should spend more, in relation to population and resources, than other countries in order to maintain efficient Information Services overseas.[1]

Nor is . . . [one] correct in assuming that information work can be limited to promoting particular ends of British policy as distinct from a more generalised projection of Britain's image. On the contrary, unless people have a high regard both for the country which is endeavouring to persuade them of the advantages of a certain course of action, and for the credibility and reliability of the institutions through which it purveys information in support of its views, the machinery available will not be able successfully to perform its required function when a specific case arises. Successful work in the information field demands a high degree of continuity both as to the regional area of concentration and as to the substantive content of what is offered. It cannot simply be turned on and off at will.

Finally, . . . the image that is used to attract tourists to this country, the beefeaters and thatched cottages—and that is for this specific sphere extremely successful, does in fact handicap the country's efforts to project quite other facets of Britain which are important for our commercial and even our political objectives. Tourists want to visit museums and antiquities; but a country whose image is limited to this aspect will hardly be looked to as a source of industrial equipment or new ideas in the fields of science, education, social institutions and so forth. We surely have no wish to see Britain regarded in the 20th century as was Italy in the 18th.

* * * * *

It is a perfectly valid point that it is much harder to individualise the appeal of a country which wishes to present itself as being in the vanguard of scientific or industrial advance; there is a common style pervading much of modern industrial civilisation, and national differences may be thought of as marginal, or as only perceptible to the expert in a particular field. But the fact that something is difficult does not mean that it is not worth doing. It is also true that rewards of investment in this field are very difficult to measure, though some would argue that modern market research is not without its application here; and the BBC has by now a relatively long experience of gauging the size of its foreign audiences, and the impact of its programmes upon them.

Furthermore, there are aspects of the effort itself which lend themselves to direct assessment. It is possible, for instance, to evaluate our exports of books, and reckon up the number of British books that secure translation into other languages. It is possible to work out the proportion of students from other parts of the world who come to our institutions of higher education to acquire specialised skills and more general prepara-

tion for positions of leadership in their own societies. It is harder, but it should not be impossible, to get some idea of their quality, and to know whether we are getting the best representatives of their generation or only those who cannot go elsewhere. We should be able to derive some information from the coverage of British affairs in the foreign Press and discover whether we need to do more to assist both resident correspondents, and the larger number of foreign journalists who come for shorter periods under official auspices.

In addition to such possibilities of concrete evidence as to Britain's standing there are other and more personal impressions to be evaluated—the feelings, for instance, that scientific, academic and other professional men derive from their travels and their contacts with foreign colleagues, a rather underworked vein in some people's view. And there is, above all, the large mass of information at the disposal of the world of business. Such impressions can at least be checked with advantage against the changes in the regional distribution of expenditure by the Foreign Office, the [Commonwealth Relations Office] CRO, the British Council and the BBC.

* * * * *

Naturally this does not mean that there is a direct relationship between the efforts of information or cultural agencies and the popularity of the country concerned. Other and more powerful motives may come into play. For instance, there is some reason, one would imagine, to believe that there is more latent goodwill towards Britain in that Cinderella-continent, Latin America, despite its relative neglect in these respects, than in the Arab Middle East which has absorbed a very high proportion of the total British effort. Indeed, the question of whether one should row with or against the tide is one of the hardest to answer; but the responsibility clearly lies with the policy-making departments rather than with the information agencies, and need not be much further explored here.

But one comment is perhaps in order. There is in Britain's case a peculiar political complication (not faced by the French or Germans) that arises out of our doubly complicated relationship with the United States. In the first place we are allied as the principal competitors with the Communist Powers for access to the hearts and minds of the "uncommitted" nations. In the second place, there is the fact that both we and the Americans are protagonists of the use of English as a "second language," and that individuals who have acquired the use of English can freely choose between British or American books, broadcasts and so forth, and are equally able to pursue higher studies or training in the United States or in the English-speaking countries of the Commonwealth, including Britain herself.

From these facts some people would draw the conclusion that it should be a matter of indifference to us whether it is the British or the American effort in the information field that prospers in any particular part of the world. Provided that the students we lose go to America and not to China or Russia, or provided the foreign literature in circulation is American

and not Communist, we have nothing to worry about and might indeed welcome on financial grounds the substitution for our own efforts of American ones.

Against this there is the alternative argument that the general similarity of our ultimate political objectives presupposes neither universal coincidence of opinions nor the absence of competition between ourselves and the United States. It is clearly not a matter of indifference to us whether British or American aircraft, automobiles or other industrial goods are bought by particular customers; nor, as we have all too good reason to know, is this matter of indifference to Americans.

Such commercial preoccupations have their counterpart in the informational and even cultural undertakings of the two countries. If students of technical subjects use British texts or go for training to Britain, the odds are that the apparatus they will want their countries to acquire will be British also. If the links they establish are with the United States, so too will the United States become the country to which they continue to look after their professional or industrial careers are established. It is true that the demands of the "underdeveloped" world are so enormous that Britain and the United States together cannot hope to meet them all; perhaps all the resources of all the developed countries are likely to fall short of what is needed. But we want to be in a position to choose how to direct our own limited resources, and in the matter, for instance, of bringing students to our universities to make certain that we get a fair proportion of the best ones.

If one accepts this view, certain practical consequences follow. For it is also certainly the view taken by the Government of the United States. It is perhaps most obvious in the field of book exports, which is of direct commercial interest to us quite apart from the impact it may have upon the "projection of Britain" at large. The American Government has gone much further in a variety of ways in facilitating the export of books to the "underdeveloped" countries and in subsidising or guaranteeing publishers in a variety of ways than our own Government has hitherto shown itself prepared to contemplate. And there are no signs that the United States would be prepared to regard the promotion of literacy in English, or the supply of educational material, as a co-operative rather than a national effort. In the circumstances the adaptability and performance of the British publishing industry is one of the most creditable parts of the record; but it may find itself outgunned if it is left to fight its own battles.

Where a more short-term appreciation of British attitudes is concerned, newspapers and magazines matter more than books. Here again, there is an element of competition though not in so direct a fashion. On the one hand there are the airmail editions of the English "quality" newspapers, whose growth is limited by their unprofitability—duties on newsprint are the obvious handicap imposed by the Government on their development. There is also the international role of "Reuters" as a supplier of news and trainer of journalists for overseas countries.

On the other hand there is the blanketing of the world market for news by *Time* magazine and to a much lesser extent by other similar American publications. It is not clear that there is any way in which this situation might be remedied to our advantage; there may well be economic reasons that rule out an operation of this kind from a British base. But that does not mean that the effects are not serious. It is worth reminding oneself, when people talk of British influence "east of Suez" or of reviving our links with Latin America, that for a large proportion of the people whose interest or support we wish to attract, what they know about Britain is what *Time* magazine can find room for, and that any voice that Britain may have independent of America's in world affairs must be a muffled one.

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In these circumstances our position depends very much on what advantages we can take of media that depend less on language, or where indigenous languages can be used with greater freedom, namely radio and television. One is, of course, familiar with the fact that the wartime effort of the BBC provides a remarkable example—perhaps the most remarkable of all—of the rapid exploitation to the utmost of what was still a relatively new technique. But wartime provides a stimulus of its own. Furthermore, from the technical point of view, one was trying to reach an audience much of which was located conveniently near at hand. World-wide coverage is another matter, and if this is to be successfully achieved at high quality, much capital expenditure will be required for new relay stations and their equipment, as well as an increase in current expenditure. The direct return in the shape of sales of receiving equipment may be less important, since radio receivers of the cheaper kind are suitable for production in many countries. But in sound radio—whether it be direct broadcasts or transcription services—we start with some considerable advantages, which should not lightly be thrown aside.

The coming of television presents a more difficult problem. In the present preparatory phase where television is still for the minority (outside the advanced industrial countries) and where access to it is to be had by other countries mainly through the provision of films or other "canned" material, international competition takes the form of bids for supplying transmitters and studio equipment, and of offers to assist in the training of technicians and producers, which is a more complicated affair than it is for sound radio. Success in this important, though little publicised, form of competition (which involves private firms as well—in view of the dual structure of British television) may have direct economic consequences on the sale of receiving equipment, but it will also influence the choice of programmes by such stations, and therefore have a direct impact upon the image of Britain that is presented.

But as has been suggested, all this may only be a preliminary stage before we come to the television era proper. What at present distinguishes television from radio is its short initial range. We cannot even watch European programmes unless channelled to us through Eurovi-

sion. There seems a consensus of opinion that the development of earth-satellites will one day make this limitation obsolete. "Early Bird" shows what a relay through national networks can do: what will come is direct transmission which any individual can pick up as he can foreign radio broadcasts on short wave. The only question in dispute is how soon. Once this happens we may be in for a very fierce competition of a new kind, of which the lineaments are only dimly visible. We do not fully know what the immediacy of visual images can do in creating attitudes and responses; though we know something from Hollywood's effect upon the foreign image of America. It is certainly a case where considerable advance thought should be given to what is to be done, not forgetting the rather terrifying financial implications of entering this new epoch in the history of the international use of mass-media.

Even if we make the decision that to some extent Britain must project herself through all the means available to her, the problems do not end here. Britain has both advantages and disadvantages when it comes to competing in this field. The advantages consist in a high degree of professionalism, particularly but by no means exclusively, in radio, and the proved ability to communicate a national message without either the exaggeration that defeats its ends, or the vulgarity that goes with too pronounced an infusion of commercialism. We have managed with some skill to give the BBC a reputation for objectivity not subjected to the transient policies of individual British governments. The printed output of the Central Office of Information—the service organisation for all the field operations of the information services—shows a fairly consistently high quality of content and design within certain limits of expenditure which may be more tightly drawn than those of the Americans.

But it is more important to be conscious of what our weaknesses are, and to have some idea as to how to set about correcting them. One difficulty here is to fasten responsibility for the whole range of information and cultural services and the media through which they operate. Since some of the weaknesses can only be corrected through actual additional expenditure it would seem desirable that there should be a single Minister to decide upon priorities and to press the demands of these services upon the Treasury and the Cabinet. . . . On the other hand, not every Prime Minister has some actual or potential Cabinet colleague equally suited to the task.

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There is in Britain a not altogether suppressed nostalgia for an imperial past. It is perhaps this underlying wish to strike paternalist attitudes quite as much as deep political calculation, that makes such activities as teaching elementary English, or now-a-days rather training teachers, or teaching teacher-trainers the kind of thing most readily acceptable, as obviously desirable in itself, as compared with, for instance, the projection of Britain to more sophisticated audiences.

We have already noted this fact in connection with the post-Drogheda shift away from Europe in the weight of the British Council's activities.

. . . Whatever may be said about the advantage of a variety of experience in the case of diplomats, the case in respect of some aspects of the British Council's work remains unproven. And this is particularly so where it is a matter of projecting Britain at the rather sophisticated level of contacts with national academies, universities and other cultural institutions, where a rather deep acquaintance with a particular country's language and civilisation are essential to success.

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A similar preference for paternalist enterprises is shown in the decision to make the Ministry of Overseas Development responsible for relations with UNESCO. While it is true that the inculcating of mass-literacy has recently overshadowed the original scientific and cultural purposes of the organisation, it hardly seems a reason for abandoning the latter altogether, or for manifesting Britain's lack of interest in them.

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But there is, of course, another reason for the shift towards this exclusive preoccupation with the educational needs of developing countries, and that is the general failure of the British Government (and public) to appreciate the extent to which a country's scientific and cultural achievements are an important aspect of its prestige abroad. This failure is shown in many ways. No attempt has been made to get any of the international bodies through which contacts in the natural sciences, social sciences or humanities are maintained to set up their headquarters in London, or to hold their conferences and seminars in Britain. When they meet in foreign capitals, the British Embassies rarely pay the same social attentions to the delegates as do the Embassies of other major countries. No attempt has been made to exploit the fact that in both the natural and the social sciences many of the officers of such bodies have so far been nationals of this country. No doubt the fault is not all on one side; academics in Britain tend to fight shy of officialdom in the way their continental colleagues (who are, after all, themselves officials) do not. But the gap is patent.

The fact that the teaching profession in Britain is not part of the service of the central government has other consequences as well. It is not easy to obtain from hard-pressed local authorities a massive secondment of teachers such as the French have made in order to secure the perpetuation of the French language in their former imperial possessions; nor can those who go overseas receive such ready assurance that their career-prospects will remain undamaged. Similarly the British Council cannot call (as can the *Relations Culturelles* of the Quai d'Orsay) upon British university teachers to spend part of their career directing Institutes abroad.

But this is a parenthesis. The third major weakness on the British side arises from a certain suspicious puritanism. We mistrust the showy; yet in modern conditions a direct visual appeal may be essential. It is no good sending abroad highly talented cultural representatives of well-selected

libraries and hiding them away up flights of stairs in dingy and uglily-furnished buildings. It is natural that when pressed for funds, the British Council should rather spend them on men than on "plant." But where the projection of Britain is concerned, "plant" tells as well, and the choice is not one that should have to be made.

Less importance should be attached to what might be called *"Daily Express* puritanism"—the view that no public money should ever be spent on disseminating the products of Britain's artistic genius. In fact, the fine arts take up only a very small proportion of the British Council's outlay while reaching elements in foreign élites that can be appealed to in no other way. The main problem is that theatrical and ballet companies and orchestras are extremely expensive to send abroad while in the particular case of the theatre there is a very easy descent from the best we have to offer, for which the demand is insatiable, to the merely mediocre which may easily do much more harm than good.

There is the further difficulty of the conflict between the ancients and the moderns. Shakespeare is our best-selling line, but in what sense is even the best production of Shakespeare a projection of modern Britain? And to have to choose amid the pitfalls of the modern drama is asking too much of a semi-official body. Luckily, in the visual arts, particularly sculpture, this difficulty does not arise. We have there an open door. But in general the idea that a British government might indulge in frivolously extravagant expenditure upon the fine arts has only to be stated to be seen for the nonsense it is.

The fine arts have, of course, the further advantage that they can be regarded as less politically-oriented than some other aspects of our cultural offering. It is therefore easier to include cultural exchanges, in this sense, in conventions with countries where access to all external stimuli is government-controlled. On the other hand we should not be content with this. Such exchanges may prove that both we and the country concerned are capable of reaching high levels of excellence in the theatre, the ballet or whatever the particular field of activity may be; but not much more follows from this than from similar demonstrations in the field of sport. We are proving in an agreeable way what no one ever doubted. What we are concerned to do is to increase our knowledge of these countries in a much deeper sense, and to project an image of our society which can correct the distortions to which it is subjected by foreign official propaganda, and thus serve direct political purposes.

We are, then, trying to do something which the other participants in such negotiations wish to avoid. We are already an open society which they can study if they wish but do not on the whole wish to, unless for very specific and material reasons. They are closed societies which want to drive the hardest bargain they can, in return for any chink in the curtain they are willing to open to us. One feels that those who are unacquainted with the difficulties of such negotiations, with the very tiny allotment of student places that we can secure, with the almost insuperable barriers still erected against access to our books, magazines and films,

are very often completely at sea in assessing either the cultural and political developments within such countries, or the role that cultural contacts abroad play in their scheme of things. Such countries think in terms of "delegations" and "manifestations"; we in terms of individuals and their direct interests. Possibly recent relaxations in the jamming of broadcasts should be taken as heralding an easier era in this respect, but one has the feeling that of all aspects of the task of "projecting Britain," this is by far the most difficult.

There is indeed one important additional reason for saying so. When we come to presenting our social and political institutions and ideas—and these parts of our culture are by no means insignificant—the most acceptable method is through free discussion. We want to show what we do and also discuss with others how they do things and where our ideas differ or coincide. Such a combination of the projection of Britain with free discussion is by far the most effective way of making the desired impression and arousing a permanent interest. Participation is always more effective than passivity. For this reason the institution known as Wilton Park, which has done this first on an Anglo-German, then on a European and now on an Atlantic basis, has some claims to be the most successful venture in this field that the British Government has ever undertaken. It would seem in many, though not of course all respects, both more effective and more economical than the sponsored tours of Britain by foreign journalists or politicians, which are its main competitors. On the other hand, the formula is almost impossible to apply to exchanges with countries where a high degree of totalitarian uniformity and dogmatism prevails. The one comparable Anglo-Soviet venture can hardly have been termed a success; nor have the Russians been willing to repeat it. Anglo-Polish exchanges understandably have shown much more promise. But the essence of the formula is free discussion between individuals in which a national uniformity of view is specifically excluded.

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But one comes back in the end from questions of organisation and media to questions of content and purpose. Our purpose can be stated clearly. We wish to present Britain as a country which, despite its loss of relative power in the world, can still offer much of interest in both the material and intellectual sphere. We know that there are difficulties in our internal arrangements for making our most recent and exciting achievements readily available for projection overseas. The fact that Britain's not inconsiderable output in important branches of the social sciences is so little known outside the Commonwealth may be due to the fact that there is as yet no organisation to do for the social sciences what the Royal Society has so long done for the natural sciences, and what that odd and secretive body the British Academy is now attempting to do for the humanities. But the difficulties are partly due to our ignorance of ourselves. How can we expect to explain to foreigners what British universities have to offer when we read such ill-informed nonsense about them in the British press itself, and find it believed by those who should

know better? We have only recently become a fully self-conscious society, and some of the self-consciousness takes such morbid forms that the less it produces in the way of export, the better. We would not like to be judged on the basis of BBC "satire" any more than by the "beefeater, thatched cottage" image.

The content of our self-projection can thus be negatively defined. It is further limited by the country's own achievements. The best advertising is no use if the product is no good. All one can ask is that those responsible for informational and cultural work are fully acquainted with those aspects of the nation's achievements in which we may genuinely take pride. They should therefore have a sensitivity to developments in society and thought which, even if they have no direct mass-appeal, may still impress the élites of other countries. They must not allow enthusiasm for a new post-colonial role (with an expiation complex lurking in the background) to overshadow the importance of our dealings with highly advanced countries, whether or not these are friendily disposed towards us.

It would be absurd to compare the importance for Britain's international standing of her informational and cultural activities with the skill of her statesmen, the productivity of her industries or the courage and efficiency of her fighting men; but they remain an important part of our national armoury; their cost if not enormous is not negligible, and is almost certain to rise for the technical reasons already stated. It is one of those occasions when one must conclude by saying: if the thing is worth doing at all, it is worth doing as well as it can be done.

NOTES

[1] *Summary of the Report of the Independent Committee of Enquiry into the Overseas Information Service* (Drogheda Report). Cmd. 9138, 1954, par.12.

INTERNATIONAL FILM AND TELEVISION PROPAGANDA: CAMPAIGNS OF ASSISTANCE*

BY BERNARD RUBIN

All countries engage in propaganda, the more highly developed states more heavily than developing societies. As each government emphasizes the themes it considers to be most important to its national interests, different audiences attend to communications at levels based upon their perceived interests.

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WESTERN EUROPEAN FILM AND TELEVISION PROPAGANDA

Western European countries have developed sizable film and television programs for international persuasion purposes, emphasizing trade, cultural, and political objectives. France and Britain exchange information

*Excerpts from "International Film and Television Propaganda: Campaigns of Assistance," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. 398 (November 1971), pp. 81–92. Reprinted with the permission of the American Academy of Political and Social Science and the courtesy of the author.

with the independent countries formerly in their colonial empires. Both nations look to the maintenance and enhancement of important trading areas within the cultural regions they helped to shape in the past. The Federal Republic of Germany is anxious to win understanding for its political point of view and customers for its commercial and industrial offerings. All three nations are representative of the highly developed democracies whose main propaganda is geared to peaceful exchanges of information and technology.

Great Britain

Great Britain's overseas film and television program is largely directed by the Central Office of Information (COI), which works in close cooperation with other government departments and with relevant private organizations. On the film side, the *Overseas Film Library Catalogue 1970–71*, published by the COI for the benefit of potential clients, offers hundreds of productions dealing with British culture and history, Commonwealth developments, governmental planning and services, science and technology, sports and recreation, the arts, agriculture, commerce, industry, and labor.

An essential aspect of the enterprise is the determination of all concerned to "put Britain across" in its export program. A senior British official writes: "The promotion films we acquire—mainly for non-theatrical showings—are most important . . . and the trade theme features prominently in our television programs."[1]

The over-all effort is impressive. In 1968/69 the COI distributed a weekly cinema newsreel to seventy-nine countries, two monthly and one bimonthly cinemagazine programs going to fifty-one countries, and eleven weekly television programs going to ninety-two countries. In that same period, COI completed twenty-six films requested by government departments concerned with home affairs and four on behalf of the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices. Two hundred and ten other films were acquired from commercial sources—mostly industrial—and of those, ninety-seven were distributed overseas.

Approximately 150 Commonwealth, colonial, and foreign lands receive COI films each year. . . .

The Films and Television Division of the COI cooperates closely with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Independent Television Authority (ITV). Reuters, the BBC, and the Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand broadcasting authorities form the partnership known as VISNEWS LTD., the news film agency which provides a daily international news service on film to television subscribers in sixty-eight countries.[2] The BBC and the ITV each distribute about sixteen thousand television programs a year to more than eighty countries.

By and large, the COI is reticent about the successes and failures of the film and television productions sent abroad. It states:

No attempt is made to evaluate the total film and television programmes. Comprehensive usage reports are called for each year from overseas posts on a sample range of films. In the television field, user stations are asked to report times and frequency of use.

The Federal Republic of Germany

The Federal Press and Information Office in the Federal Republic of Germany cooperates closely with several quasi-official and private organizations. Inter-Nationes, the German association for the promotion of international relations, is a non-profit institution primarily responsible for cultural programs. Official government missions abroad maintain inventories of films listed in the Inter-Nationes catalogue. Those missions thus act as clearing houses for a wide range of German organizations. They include: *Institut für Film und Bild in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, Institut für den Wissenschaftlichen Film,* and *Deutsches Industrie-Institut.* The only limitations imposed by the missions before they will pass requests along to Inter-Nationes are that the clients order no more than four films from any one organization at a time, and that the order be placed a month ahead of the screening date.

Following other leading Western powers, the West German government maintains film archives in key cities abroad and film depots to serve regional interests. "Kultur" institutes in seven less developed countries also serve as presentation centers for television and film works.

Trans-Tel, the only non-government TV organization partly sponsored by the federal government, is headquartered in Cologne. Its statutes forbid Trans-Tel to distribute in Europe, the United States of America, Canada, Australia, and Japan. Television companies, acting directly through their commercial agents, deal with those markets.

Trans-Tel does not produce anything itself but, from the two German networks, merely selects, edits, and dubs TV programs that promise to be of cultural, instructional, or public relations value in the developing countries. The fees are relatively low.

Because there is no governmental television agency in the Federal Republic, this joint undertaking of the two major and rival West German television services, *ARD* and *ZDF* (Arbeits-gemeinschaft der Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen), is of prime importance in the success of foreign relations.

For the international market, Trans-Tel "employs international teams of experienced film editors and commentators whose job it is to adapt and tailor the films, synchronizing them in English, French, Arabic, Portuguese and Spanish." By and large, adaptations of TV programs are handled by the staff of *Deutsche Welle.*[3]

France

The French government's film and television overseas enterprise in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs works closely with other government organizations such as the *Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision Francaise*

(ORTF) and the *Office Francais de Techniques Modernes d'Education*, and private companies.

In scope, the program ranges as widely as the American, British, and German, emphasizing distribution of film magazines, cultural films, television program series, theatrical films (several subtitled in English, Arabic, and Spanish), newsreels (Great Britain is the other main supplier of newsreels), educational films, and courses of instruction in the French language.

During 1970, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the help of private firms sent out the magazines *France: Panorama, Chroniques de France*, and *Aux Frontières de l'Avenir* (on scientific subjects), while ORTF produced *Pour Vous, Madame* and a magazine devoted to literature. Most of these productions were also prepared for audiences speaking English, Spanish, Portuguese, and Arabic. *France: Panorama* was prepared in a Russian language version in addition to the other languages.

ORTF productions form the mainstay of the general program. Variety, documentary, dramatic, and musical programs are sent to French-speaking countries in the same versions as seen at home, while other countries receive dubbed or subtitled versions. A strong effort is made in the area of education. The *Service de la Radio-Télévision Scolaire* emphasizes the sciences.

The volume of programming is impressive: approximately 8,500 hours of film and television magazines a year; 5,783 of ORTF domestic productions in 1969; and, in terms of copies sent out, approximately 1,600 copies of educational programs sent to 69 countries in 1969.[4]

Estimating or speculating about the effectiveness of French television and film work is difficult. In the past few years governmental sensitivity seems to have increased in proportion to the increasingly important role France tries to play as a mediator between and manipulator of powerful opponents. In short, French reticence on the subject of program evaluation is at this time a fact of life.

THE DEVELOPING NATIONS

Films and television programs have been instruments for useful propaganda exchanges between the "have" and the "have-not" peoples. Cutural news has been the main ingredient in those exchanges, and this will continue. Unfortunately, cultural news is primarily one-sided, the "have" nations not learning much, if anything, about the people they communicate with.

However, some small insight as to foreign effectiveness with films is obtained from a limited recent survey (those interviewed were mainly young people considered to be potential technological change-agents), conducted in South America and Middle America. The results which follow (see Table) are in response to the question, "From what country or countries are the films which you see most?"[5]

TABLE—Foreign Film Reception in Middle and South America

Source	Middle Americans (n = 119)	South Americans (n = 190)
United States	96	82
France	41	57
Italy	35	51
West Germany	26	12
Mexico	25	4
Great Britain	17	15
Eastern Europe	3	6
Spain	5	3
Argentina	4	3
Sweden	0	5
Japan	0.8	3
India	0	0.5

NOTE: The respondents in many cases named more than one country, which accounts for total of answers being larger than number of persons interviewed.

At the very least, provisions must be made for film and television propaganda to be mutual, if the general interest is to be served.

In a significant way, film and television propaganda constitutes schooling in development. Will it be effective? Perceptive students are skeptical. Here are a few reasons:

1. For a developing world torn by political difficulties, there is precious little use of films and television to warn emergent nations about the perils of repeating dreadful twentieth-century experiences of the advanced countries. The newsreels available from abroad have too little relevance to the local needs for news; much so-called news is documentary gloss and is lacking in truly educational information. It is a fact that "underlying causes of recurring crises are rarely explored ... no account is given of what might be done to avoid or alleviate these crises."[6] For both the developing and developed nations, there is a lack of adequate reporting about really serious problems like starvation and brutality. Coverage of the Biafran revolt or its aftermath in Nigeria, or about South African apartheid, are cases in point.[7] . . . [One of the] savants produced by the American television industry, says "As journalists, we are not keeping pace with the realities; we report them but we do not truly understand them, so we do not really explain."[8]

2. Not enough study has been devoted to why development films fail to "contribute vitally to organic progress." We need more films of the type produced in the last decade by the National Film Board of Canada, such as *The Head Men* (which compares village chiefs in Brazil, Nigeria, and Canada), *You Don't Back Down* (a report of a two-year study by a young Canadian doctor in a village of Eastern Nigeria), and *The Stage to Three* (which contrasts leading theatrical personages of Greece, Thailand, and Canada).[9]

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The developing nations are so caught up in rhetoric about communications technology that key Western leaders translate all wordly needs in terms of their own ambitions, and those ambitions by-pass objectives so necessary to progress in less developed countries. Propaganda becomes a mirror image of the developed West. Robert W. Sarnoff, chairman and president of the Radio Corporation of America, worries about the "social grasp" of communications and about communications satellites in particular. He warns that

> If this new device is to realize its full potential, the nations of the world must come together to agree on matters of frequency, rates, copyrights, avoidance of interference, and freedom of access to the system's facilities.[10]

Such contemplation reveals all too dramatically the basic propaganda chasm of our times! The man in love with the idea of the machine is distinct from the man who desperately needs the ideas that are themselves the machines of progress.

NOTES

1. Letter to Bernard Rubin from D. Willcocks, Deputy Director, Policy and Reference Division, British Information Services, New York, N.Y., dated November 24, 1970.

2. Letter, Willcocks, op. cit.

3. The following sources were utilized in the discussion of West German activities: Letters to the author from Dr. Johannsen, *Press—Und Informationsamt Der Bundesregierung*, Bonn, Federal Republic, dated October 16, 1970, and December 8, 1970; letter from Wilhelm Hondrich, *Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen*, Mainz, Federal Republic, dated January 26, 1971; letter from Dr. Krause-Brewer, *Trans-Tel*, Cologne, Federal Republic; letter from Christian v. Chmielewski, Direktor des Kulturellen Programms, *Deutsche Welle*, Cologne, Federal Republic, dated November 16, 1970.

4. Letter to author from Alain Chaillous, Director, Press and Information Service, Embassy of France, New York City, dated January 26, 1971. Also, from same source, specially prepared document, 2 pp., "La Production des Films et des Programmes de Télévision Réalisés par le Gouvernement Francais à l'Intention des Pays Etrangers." Also, see "UNESCO: Global Overview of Film Situation," in Heinz-Dietrich Fischer and John C. Merrill, eds., *International Communication* (New York: Hastings House, 1970), p. 402.

5. See Paul J. Deutschmann, Huber Ellingsworth, and John T. McNelly, *Communication and Social Change in Latin America* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 79.

6. Max F. Millikan and Stephen White, "TV and Emerging Nations," *Television Quarterly* 7, 2 (Spring, 1968), p. 31.

7. Robin Day, "Troubled Reflections of a TV Journalist," *Encounter* 34, 5 (May, 1970).

8. Eric Sevareid, "Address to the Massachusetts House of Representatives" (January 24, 1967), House No. 4408, Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Also see, "How Influential Is TV News?" *Columbia Journalism Review* 9, 2 (Summer, 1970), pp. 19–28; Sir William Haley, "Where TV News Fails," *Columbia Journalism Review* 9, 1 (Spring, 1970), pp. 7–11.

9. Jean Marie Ackermann, "Small Actions and Big Words," *International Development Review* 8, 4 (December, 1966), pp. 33–39.

10. Robert W. Sarnoff, "Proposal for a Global Common Market of Communications," *Communications News* 7, 4 (April, 1970), p. 8.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA LINE*

BY FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN

Soviet propaganda is not prevented by Communist ideology from adapting to changing international needs.

* * * * *

Since the [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] CPSU's "general line," formulated and reiterated with appropriate modifications in certain key statements, sets the ideological and semantic framework to which Soviet propaganda must conform, a survey of a series of these propaganda directives may furnish a background useful for understanding the major propaganda themes.

The communications examined have policy as well as propaganda aspects. It whould be noted here that in Soviet political communication it is unusually difficult, and sometimes nearly impossible, to distinguish clearly between the elements of policy and propaganda. One can, of course, seek to infer policy from action. In reading Soviet mass media, however, it is difficult to separate analysis and directive, on the one hand, from demagogy and even deception, on the other. A heavy component of propaganda is built into most published Soviet statements, especially those intended for distribution outside of a relatively narrow circle of heavily indoctrinated, experienced communist party insiders. The party leaders tend to view even most communists as objects of propaganda manipulation. Moreover, difficulties arise because they are impelled to resort to guarded, esoteric communication patterns that reflect both the influence of the elitist, conspiratorial political structure in which they operate and probably also the inadequacy of Marxist-Leninist terminology as a political language.[1]

Of course, the student of Soviet political prose learns to distinguish between statements intended primarily as policy directives for party executives and propaganda specialists, for example, and agitational statement designed to play upon the emotions of rank and file communists and of non-communists. Thus, an analysis in a CPSU theoretical journal such as *Kommunist*, most of the readers of which belong to the Soviet political elite, of the "political essence" of the "national bourgeoisie" can be classified as primarily a policy document. Still, such an article may be permeated with propaganda connotations of a more or less covert nature. It may be intended, in part, to convey to Soviet and foreign communist functionaries instructions regarding tactics to be applied in dealing with, for example, Indian, Indonesian, or Brazilian "bourgeois" statesmen. By contrast, when Khrushchev openly and insist-

*Selections from "Development of the Propaganda Line" in Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Foreign Propaganda* (copyright © 1964 by Princeton University Press). Renumbering of footnotes. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press.

ently advocates "universal and complete disarmament" but dodges the issues of control and inspection, he is dispensing propaganda, but of course within the framework of the policy line controlling Soviet behavior in the given period.

Many Soviet statements, perhaps particularly those concerned with professed values and long-range goals, offer a rather confusing mixture of propaganda and policy content. Such a characterization would appear to be applicable to the statement taken from the 1961 CPSU program, and quoted by *Pravda*, for December 3, 1961 that "Communism fulfills the historic mission of rescuing all people from social inequality, from all forms of oppression and exploitation, from the horrors of war and establishes in the world peace, labor, freedom, equality, fraternity and the happiness of all peoples." Such a statement embodies both long-range policy and short-run agitational content. It also contains an element of myth and the reader's evaluation of it depends upon his fundamental political philosophy and his level of intellectual sophistication.

Understanding of Soviet propaganda strategy is facilitated by familiarity with certain kinds of statements, or indicators, such as the slogans issued by the party central committee in connection with the May Day and November 6 revolutionary holidays, or the documents emanating from congresses and other important meetings of the CPSU and the international communist movement. As a rule, the instructions, demands, and perspectives contained in slogans and other influence-seeking messages remain valid indicators of the Kremlin's outlook until they are altered or superseded by new communications that reflect new analyses and new decisions. Of course, these indicators have their imperfections. Even the leaders of various national communist parties often have difficulty in deciphering their full meaning for their particular situations. Nevertheless, acquaintance with those sequences of statements in which the semantically flexible but attitudinally rigid international policy line of Soviet Communism have been embodied over time is essential to an understanding of Soviet foreign propaganda. Let us begin with a survey of the international implications of Soviet slogans.

A systematic analysis by Lasswell and Yakobson of trends in Soviet May Day slogans for the period 1918–1943 yielded significant results.[2] The central finding of the study, which covered a period, it should be noted, when Moscow was usually on the defensive, was a pronounced diminution in "universal-revolutionary" symbols.[3] This was attributed to "changed expectations regarding the imminence of world revolution, and the resulting change in the relationship of the ruling elite to the world balance of power."[4] During the dangerous year 1940 even the term "international proletariat" disappeared from the May Day slogans. It was in that year that the threat of "imperialist encirclement" seemed to the Soviet leaders to become more acute than ever before. In 1940 and again in the early months of 1941, the slogans reflected a desire "not to affect

adversely, by any hasty or unfriendly word, the established understanding with Berlin." [5]

In 1942, during the first year of the Soviet-Nazi war, the slogans called upon the "proletarians" of all countries to fight against German-fascist aggression. The Nazis were referred to as "Hitlerite imperialist bandits," an expression calculated to mobilize both traditional Russian patriotic hatred of an invading enemy and the newer "Soviet patriotism" based upon devotion to Marxist-Leninist ideology and upon identification with Soviet institutions and achievements. The 1942 slogans significantly failed even to mention the Communist International. Its name was thus dropped well in advance of its official liquidation in 1943—"either by reason of obsolescence or in an effort to appease the new democratic allies." [6] Beginning in 1943, such words as "proletariat" and "proletarian" were no longer used in the slogans. From that year on, the slogans themselves began to be referred to as "appeals." The 1942 and 1943 slogans contained cautiously friendly references to Great Britain and the United States.

In the late 1920's and in the 1930's, a theme gradually emerged which is vital in Khrushchevian propaganda, and which like so many of Khrushchev's propaganda lines owed its inception to initiatives taken by Stalin. This theme was the superiority of the Soviet model for industrialization of a previously backward society, and it took on increasing significance during the period of the great depression in the west, in the early 1930's. By 1939, the slogans declared that the "immediate task" facing the Soviet people was that of "overtaking and surpassing" the economically progressive capitalist countries.[7] Even at this early stage, "the Soviet economy was ambitious to lead the world." [8] Of course, the introduction of the industrialization motif did not distract attention from urgent concerns connected with the difficulty of surviving in what Moscow correctly appraised as an exceedingly threatening world situation. The slogans, reflecting the bitter struggle of the Soviet leadership against external enemies and their real or fancied internal supporters, were dominated by warnings of impending dangers.

From the perspective of our times, however, it is significant that these slogans contained so many expressions of confidence about the future world role of the Soviet Union and of the communist movement in general. Despite the lesser prominence in the slogans and other contemporary communications of the general theme of "world revolution," this objective was, of course, not repudiated. For example, the famous "Short Course" on the history of the CPSU, published in 1938, stated in its introduction that the study of the history of the CPSU inspired confidence in the final victory of communism in the whole world.

World War II, while setting the stage for the second great period of expansion of world communism, also temporarily weakened the Soviet Union. In this complex and contradictory situation the Kremlin seized and, in the aftermath of the war, consolidated its control of as much

territory as it could in eastern Europe and in Asia. Reflecting alarm at Western resistance to Soviet expansion, the slogans, beginning in 1947, denounced the "warmongers" of the west. The May Day slogans, 1947–1952 inclusive, placed toward the beginning of the list such exhortations as "Workers of all countries: Struggle for a firm peace against the warmongers!" [9]

These slogans reflected Kremlin strategy in the period of military-political consolidation of the gains resulting from World War II.

May Day and November 6 slogans from 1953 on suggested only the broad outlines of the new world-wide propaganda strategy. Nevertheless, they furnished clues both to Soviet estimates of developing susceptibilities in various audiences and to the capability of the USSR to take advantage of them. In particular, they reflected Khrushchev's decision, from 1955 on, to exploit anti-western sentiments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The most striking over-all difference between the post-Stalin slogans and those of the late Stalin period was the reappearance and growing frequency of "internationalist" symbols. This trend was signaled by the May Day slogans in 1953 which were issued about six weeks after the death of Stalin. The very first slogan contained the exhortation, "Raise higher the banner of proletarian internationalism!" [10] In every subsequent year following the death of Stalin this exhortation was repeated. Until 1962 it was contained either in the first slogan or in one of the first three, sometimes as part of one of the slogans and sometimes as a separate slogan. However, in 1962, it dropped to seventh place in the listing, perhaps reflecting a certain disillusionment in Moscow with the results of cultivating the foreign "Internationalist" audience—though the clue may be too minor a one to serve as a basis for interpretation.

It is possible to distinguish between two kinds of "internationalism" in Soviet propaganda since Stalin. There is the traditional kind of communist internationalism, which is directed toward some group assumed to be favorable to the USSR—such as "peace partisans" or "workers"—or which revives such symbols of international communism as "proletarian internationalism." There is also a "great power" internationalism, in which the Soviet Union or other great powers appeal to world audiences without regard to class or ideological considerations. The relative weight of both of these kinds of international or "foreign" appeals increased in Soviet slogans and in the total Soviet propaganda output after the death of Stalin. The increase in slogans with "ideological internationalist" connotations was particularly pronounced after 1957. This type of appeal was, however, played down in 1955, the year of the "Geneva spirit" and the high point of the post-Stalin campaign for "relaxation of international tensions."

An analysis of Soviet slogans since Stalin's death revealed trends of interest for the study of Soviet foreign propaganda.[11] There was a substantial rise in the percentage of attention devoted to "foreign" as against

"domestic" problems. The total number of slogans and especially the number devoted to foreign countries increased. The slogans reflected the fact that Soviet concern with and attention to the external world increasingly flowed outward from the Soviet-Chinese heartland into areas to which previously little attention had been given. The area of Soviet attention broadened to include more and more countries in the "neutralist" world.

* * * * *

The slogans issued to the world by the CPSU following Stalin's death indicated a revival of confidence that the forces of world social revolution were once again on the move, especially in the underdeveloped countries. At the same time, they also reflected acute awareness in the Kremlin of the enormous dangers involved in the confrontation of Soviet bloc and western military power. Finally, unlike those issued during the first few years of the bolshevik regime, the post-Stalin slogans suggested that the leaders of world communism regarded Soviet state power rather than the international proletariat as the chief instrument for remaking the world.

It will now be useful to briefly survey and compare the vitally significant and revealing communiques issued by the two world communist summit meetings of 1957 and 1960. The 1957 document was endorsed by the CPSU and eleven other ruling "communist and workers' parties." The 1960 document was subscribed to by eighty-one communist parties.[12] In essence, both of the communiques heralded a revival of the international communist movement particularly with reference to the underdeveloped countries. With the internal situation in the Soviet bloc once again under tight control late in 1957, the Soviet and other communist leaders apparently felt that the time was ripe for the resumption of the international propaganda and psychological warfare offensive. The very beginning of the 1957 communique asserted that the "fundamental content of our epoch" was the "transition from capitalism to socialism, begun by the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia." It went on to assert that the most important consequence of the increase in the influence of the "forces of socialism" was that it had "stimulated the rapid extension of the anti-imperialist national liberation movement in the post-war period." It listed various countries that had "shaken off the colonial yoke and established national independent states." It hailed the struggle of the peoples of "the colonial and dependent countries" for "national liberation."

Both communiques depicted the capitalist countries as fighting to preserve a deteriorating position of world power. The 1960 communique, officially entitled Statement of the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties, referred to the contemporary historical period as a time of "socialist revolutions . . . nationalist revolutions . . . a time of the breakdown of imperialism . . . the abolition of colonialism . . . of transition of more peoples to socialism and communism on a world-wide scale." Both communiques described the world socialist

movement and the "national liberation movement" as natural allies in a bitter struggle to destroy capitalism. Both presented the "socialist camp" as the only possible model for economic and social development. Both also branded the United States as the leading exponent of reactionary policies and portrayed that country as the leader of a monopolistic, capitalist-imperialist bloc.

The two communiques both set forth similar strategical concepts. One was that of the non-inevitability of war between the capitalist and socialist blocs and the other was the doctrine of the "anti-imperialist" coalition. Both communiques expressed the conviction that the victory of socialism could be achieved without an all-out war. Such a war would be unprofitable for socialism. It was, however, necessary to keep socialist military strength stronger than that of the adversary in order to discourage a resort to war by the capitalist bloc. Perhaps because of the Chinese challenge to the thesis of the non-evitability of all-out war, the 1960 communique dealt at much greater length than that of 1957 with the problem of peaceful coexistence. The 1960 communique held that peaceful coexistence was "the only correct and reasonable principle of international relations" and that this policy was "an ally of socialism." It certainly did not, however, imply a cessation of the class struggle or any reconciliation of socialist and bourgeois ideologies. On the contrary, it demanded an intensification of "the struggle for the triumph of socialist ideas."

With regard to the "anti-imperialist coalition," the 1960 communique defined it as "the world socialist movement, the international working class, the national liberation movement, and the countries opposing war, and all peace-loving forces."

The language of the two communiques indicated that the leaders of the international communist movement were confident that the socialist bloc could win the adherence of all the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to their general line of policy and leadership. In addition, they counted on gaining the support of neutral countries and of all factions in the western world that were opposed to war and to the use of nuclear weapons. Finally, they could rely on foreign communist parties to facilitate their efforts. By marshaling these political and social forces they expected to bring about, systematically and rapidly, the progressive isolation of the western democracies from any influence outside the North American continent and western Europe.

In keeping with this strategic analysis, the two communiques contained directives for propaganda tactics. They urged the defense of "peace." The 1960 communique demanded "an end to nuclear testing in the arms race, of foreign bases, foreign occupation, the disbanding of all military blocs, a peace treaty with Germany, the demilitarization of Berlin, and the prevention of the revival of militarism in Germany and Japan.

Secondly, the communist parties were urged to fight in defense of the "national and democratic interests" of the peoples of all countries. The 1960 communique was more radical, however, than the 1957 communique

with respect to the "national liberation struggle." It foresaw as the immediate objective of this struggle the establishment of the "independent national-democratic state," or "national democracy."

The 1960 communique defined an independent national-democratic state as: "A state that consistently defends its political and economic independence, struggles against imperialism and its military blocs, against military bases on its territory; a state that struggles against new forms of colonialism and the penetration of imperialist capital; a state in which the people are assured broad democratic rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, press, assembly, demonstrations, and establishment of political parties and political organizations) and the opportunity to work for agrarian reform and the satisfaction of other demands in the sphere of democratic and social transformations and for participation in the determination of state policy.[13]

It would seem, then, that a central criterion for the establishment of "national democracy" is the elimination of "imperialist," or in other words western economic, political and cultural influence. Further characteristics of the national-democratic state also appear from the above definition to include nationalization of the major sectors of the economy, a radical program of agrarian reforms, and freedom of action for the local communist party. It is expected that the national-democratic state will be established through the unification of all "progressive" forces "vitally interested in abolishing the domination of the monopolies," these forces being the working class, peasantry, intelligentsia, and urban, petty, and middle bourgeoisie.[14] It seems clear from the 1960 communique and from the resolutions of the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU that the stage of "national democracy" is regarded as one of preparation for the transition to socialism. This is evident from the 1960 communique, which stated that: "The participation in the struggle for democratic transformations by the broad strata of the population convinces them of the necessity of unity of action with the working class and helps to increase their political activeness . . . In the process of this struggle they continually strengthen their ties with the masses, raise the level of the masses' political consciousness and bring them to understand the tasks of socialist revolution and the necessity of achieving it. . . . Marxists-Leninists are firmly convinced that the peoples of the capitalist countries will in the course of their day to day struggle come to understand that socialism alone is the real way out for them." [15]

Soviet foreign policy and foreign propaganda efforts continue to be linked to the objective of fostering and accelerating world-wide social revolution. And, as we pointed out in the preceding chapter, Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders continue to urge adherence to another Leninist policy, namely, that of making maximum possible use for communist purposes of temporary class allies such as the "national bourgeoisie" or various other non-proletarian strata and groups. The communists, of course, reserve to themselves the right of defining these groups and of

deciding when they cease to be useful and should be attacked or destroyed. However, while recommending cooperation with non-proletarian and non-Marxist groups and organizations whenever it is expedient, the 1960 communique and other current Soviet documents make it clear that the communists are prepared to resort to violence, or at least to threaten its use, to prevent the loss of any gains that may have accrued to them as a result of their exploitation of the national liberation movement and other contemporary social forces. In this connection it is significant that the 1960 communique also declared that it was the duty of all communists to oppose the "export of counter-revolution." This doctrine has assumed a particularly ominous significance since 1961 in connection with the Cuban problem and Khrushchev's ambiguous but nevertheless threatening statements that United States military action against the Castro government would mean war.

The main lines of the 1960 communiqué were reiterated in Khrushchev's speech of January 5, 1961, to a gathering of Soviet communists in Moscow, entitled, significantly, "For New Victories of the World Communist Movement," as well as the 1961 program of the CPSU. For example, the program indicated that although there could be differences in the "forms and tempo" of social revolution, revolution remained the only means and the dictatorship of the proletariat (declared by the program to be superseded inside the Soviet Union by the "state of the entire people") the inevitable outcome of the struggle still underway in the non-communist world.[16]

The above doctrines, reflected in Soviet strategy *vis-à-vis* such countries as Guinea, Laos, and Cuba, indicated Khrushchev's determination to achieve Leninist aspirations for world revolution even in the conditions of the nuclear age. Among many ominous manifestations of the post-Stalin rededication to the export of violent revolution, certain little-noticed Korean developments are worth mentioning. The Fourth Congress of the North Korean Workers (Communist) Party, in September 1961, called for establishment in South Korea of a "revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party," to fight against U.S. "imperialist occupation," and carry out an "anti-imperialist" program.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk in an address on July 10, 1961 noted that in Soviet policy, "the very language of international intercourse became distorted and contrived." "Peace" had, he observed, become a word to describe whatever condition would promote the communist world revolution. "Aggression" was whatever stood in the way of this revolution. He thus reminded the world of a communist practice, first applied on a global scale in the mid-1930's, of employing traditional symbols of democracy and liberalism for communist purposes. Of course, such terms as peace, negotiation, freedom, democracy, progress, etc., mean different things to communists than to western democrats, liberals, and non-communist socialists. The importance of what Lindley Fraser in his excellent study *Propaganda* called "double-talk" is that very often the

non-communist targets of the use of these terms by communists are not fully aware or perhaps not aware at all that, for example as Fraser puts it, "world peace will be for the first time achieved when the world as a whole is converted to communism." [17]

The doctrines, directives, and messages which we have surveyed reflect the dominant and persisting influence exercised in Soviet propaganda strategy by what Brzezinski calls the "dichotomic" Soviet vision of the nature of international politics. The data examined would appear to support Brzezinski's contention that the Soviet international outlook has been shaped by "the notion that social developments throughout the world operate on the basis of a sharply definable dichotomy—a dichotomy that is proof per se of an unbridgeable hosility between the emerging socialist state (later a system of socialist states) and the rest of the world."[18]

But, as we have also observed, the dichotomic orientation permits and indeed requires the exercise of strategic and tactical flexibility. It is probably true, as Robert C. Tucker impressively but perhaps a little too forcefully argued in 1957 in his article "The Psychology of Soviet Foreign Policy," that Stalin in the last few years of his life was so obsessed with physical control over territory and people that he was, in contrast to his successors, unable to employ propaganda effectively as an instrument of foreign policy.[19] While there is much truth in such an interpretation of Soviet policy during the late Stalin era, it tends to exaggerate the differences between the policies of Stalin and those of his successors. During the last three years of Stalin's lifetime some essential elements of the strategy which has paid considerable political dividends to Khrushchev were worked out at least in preliminary form. The truth may be that Stalin, or some of his lieutenants, perceived the need for more flexiblity in Soviet foreign policy and for a more persuasive manner of presenting it. But it is possible that the dictator was temperamentally incapable of adjusting fully to the challenges and opportunities which the emerging international constellation offered for the extension of Soviet influence.

Nevertheless, as Marshall D. Shulman has convincingly argued, Stalin adopted, in 1949–1952, a policy designed to disintegrate the unity and mobilization achieved by the western powers in their efforts to counter the Berlin blockade, communist aggression in Korea and other communist actions. Stalin turned to "the use of nationalism, the peace issue, neutralism, trade, and other forms of collaboration with elements of the bourgeoisie."[20] Among the major propaganda operations in which the Soviet policy shift after 1949 were reflected, the Moscow International Economic Conference of April 1952, and a stepped-up "peace" campaign were perhaps the most conspicuous. Although with less enthusiasm and skill than Khrushchev was later to display, Stalin nevertheless attempted to convince foreign businessmen that it was profitable to trade with communist Russia. Shulman compares the late Stalin "right-wing policy" with other temporary Soviet retreats, succeeded, as was that of 1949–

1952, by renewed advances. He arrives at an interpretation which may seem reassuring because it differs from theories that emphasize neurotic compulsions in the personality of leaders as driving forces in Soviet policy, but should also serve as a warning against underestimating the effectiveness of that policy. Shulman sees in Soviet policy—and this writer agrees with his finding—a "largely rational responsiveness to changes in the world environment, particularly to changes in world power relationships." What may be an irrationally intense urge for power is associated with sensitivity to many dimensions of social and political reality, including some often neglected by non-communists, and with a formidable, coordinated program to shape the future of mankind in conformity with the Marxist-Leninist vision. If to these strengths one adds the energy displayed by Soviet communicators, and the resourcefulness they so clearly possess, it becomes possible to better understand the magnitude of the challenge posed by their urgent and persistent appeals to world audiences.

NOTES

1. Aspects of the "exoteric-esoteric" dichotomy in Soviet political communication have been perceptively analyzed by Almond, *op. cit.*, especially in chap. 3, and by Nathan Leites, in *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, Ill., 1953); see also Myron Rush, *The Rise of Khrushchev* (Washington, D.C., 1958) and Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.* (New York, 1961). Rush and Conquest are concerned primarily with Soviet domestic politics but their techniques of analysis have relevance also for the study of Soviet foreign policy statements.

2. Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites, and associates, *Language of Politics* (New York, 1949). The article on slogans, by Lasswell and Sergius Yakobson, entitled "Trend: May Day Slogans in Soviet Russia, 1918–1943," is on pp. 233–298.

3. Ibid., p. 242.

4. Ibid., p. 245.

5. Ibid., p. 279.

6. Ibid., p. 281.

7. Ibid., p. 277.

8. Lasswell and Yakobson, *loc. cit.*

9. *Pravda*, April 26, 1947. The above was slogan No. 2. Slogan No. 3 urged the "workers of all countries" to "expose the aggressive plans of the imperialists! Tear the mask from the inciters of a new war!"

10. *Pravda*, April 22, 1953, p. 1.

11. These observations are based largely on two quantitative studies, respectively, of May Day and November 6 slogans for the period May 1950–November 1958, by Mr. Arend Lijphart, and of November 6 slogans for the period 1954–1960, inclusive, by Mr. George J. Vojta.

12. For the text of the 1957 document, see *Programmnye dokumenty borby za mir, demokratiyu i sotsializm* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 4–21. The text of the 1960 communique was published in *Pravda* and other central Soviet newspapers for December 7, 1960, and is available in English in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, for January 4, 1961.

13. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, January 4, 1961, p. 4.

14. Ibid., p. 5.

15. Ibid., p. 5.

16. *Pravda*, November 2, 1961, p. 3. See also Triska, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–34.

17. Lindley Fraser, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

18. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (New York, 1962), chap. iv. Quoted material on p. 101.

[19] Robert C. Tucker, "The Psychology of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Alexander Dallin, ed., *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs* (New York, 1960), pp. 228–243. In this brilliant article Tucker argues that Stalin's neurotic concern for physical control made it impossible for him to seek to exercise mere influence, for which the logical means would have been persuasion, and that Soviet foreign propaganda came to be devoted mainly to preserving an "official illusion about Russia and the world" required by Stalin personally for psychological reasons.

[20] Marshall D. Shulman, "Some Implications of Changes in Soviet Policy Toward the West: 1949–1952," the *Slavic Review*, vol. xx, No. 4 (December, 1961), pp. 630–640. See especially pp. 631–632.

PROPAGANDA FOR THE PLA
SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO SUBVERT THE RED CHINESE ARMY*

By Richard H. Giza

An account of a two-year propaganda campaign using radio broadcasts to exploit tensions within the military forces of another country. In a conflict between ideological kinship and national interests the latter will win.

The withdrawal of Soviet military advisors and aid from Communist China in 1960 halted the modernization of the Chinese armed forces—the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Already in the late fifties, a debate was underway in China's military circles between professionals favoring an independent role for the military and the Maoists who advocated stronger party controls over the army. [1]

The Soviet Union, seeking to exacerbate tensions between the opposing military lines in China, began a sophisticated propaganda campaign in early 1967 using radio broadcasts, especially designed and beamed to PLA listeners, to play upon the discontent within the armed forces. The tenor of these broadcasts makes it quite clear that the Soviets are attempting to subvert the PLA.

PLA WEAKNESSES

While the PLA with its approximately two and one-half million men is the only nationally effective, comparatively unified body in China, it has weaknesses. It is divided by regional alliances, personal loyalties, and political, as well as professional, aspirations. It is, however, the only organ with sufficient power to challenge the Maoist regime. Now that the PLA is playing a role in practically all aspects of Chinese society, its loyalty is a vital factor in the Great Proleterian Cultural Revolution and the future of China.

The Chinese *Liberation Army Daily* admitted that a struggle existed between the "proletarian revolutionary line" represented by Mao Tse-tung and the "bourgeois reactionary line" in the PLA. It urged that troops be loyal to Mao and that they eliminate his opponents "who have wormed their way into the PLA." [2]

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*From *Military Review*, XLIX, no. 9 (September 1969), pp. 89–95.

The Soviet Union probably decided sometime in 1966 to take advantage of the growing opposition to Mao in military circles and openly intervene in the cultural revolution. Moscow no doubt felt that the area was fertile for exploitation and that there was not too much risk involved on her part. The beginning of the Soviet attempt to subvert the Maoist leadership and provoke discontent within the PLA was signaled by an editorial in the 29 December 1966 issue of *Red Star*, the Soviet daily military newspaper, entitled "Events in the Chinese People's Republic and the People's Liberation Army of China."[3]

ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN

The article begins with a commentary on the anti-Soviet campaign currently being waged in China and praises the PLA as representatives of the working class and true revolutionaries. It further states that the Maoist leadership is attempting to make the army a blind weapon for implementing its anti-Marxist-Leninist, anti-Soviet course. On purges, it stresses that those purged:

> . . . were experienced military leaders and Communists who tried to base and strengthen the combat capability of the PLA with a consideration for national peculiarities and revolutionary traditions.[4]

Having purged the army of all those disagreeing with Mao's politico-military theoretical concepts, the article accuses the Maoists of attempting to strengthen the army's role in the nation's political life and make it a bastion for Mao's ambitions. The article closes recalling the history of friendship between the PLA and the Soviet Army and expressing the hope that they will march together again united.

The Radio Moscow phase of the campaign to turn members of the PLA against Mao's military thought began slowly in 1967 and picked up momentum toward the end of the year. In February 1968, the Soviets sharply escalated the attack by increasing their half-hour programs to PLA listeners from three broadcasts a week to daily programing with each broadcast repeated four times per day.[5]

The general format of a "Program for the PLA" usually consists of a commentary by a military officer. He holds the rank of colonel or above and in many instances is identified as a former Soviet advisor to the PLA. Frequently, the previous warm ties of friendship between the PLA and the Soviet Army are recalled before the commentator attacks various Maoist policies said to be harming the armed forces. The program usually closes with a summary of the main theme and the hope that the PLA will overcome the grave obstacles put before it and become united once again with the Socialist camp.

The propaganda effort by Radio Moscow toward the PLA is based on six basic themes: a general attack on Maoist military doctrine, combat weakness and training, the cultural revolution and the army, the purge, the use of the PLA for nonmilitary purposes, and the recall of historical ties between the PLA and the Soviet Union. It is evident that the aim of

these programs is to cause a breakdown in the morale of the PLA which could lead to an open revolt against the Maoists.

The following is a typical Soviet attack on Maoist military doctrine:

> Mao's theory is basically erroneous, negative and defensive and points to defeatism. Mao proposes retreat and defensive maneuvers; giving the soil to the enemy. What was thought to be correct during the period of guerrilla war cannot be made the basis of present day combat maneuvers.

The broadcast closes with the following appeal:

> We know the PLA is an army which has spirit, patriotism and love for the fatherland. It will not be a silent and pliable tool in the hands of Mao.

On guerrilla warfare, Radio Moscow exhorts:

> Mao's guerrilla war thesis is not only a mistake of a man who has no knowledge of military affairs but an ideological attack aimed at shattering the Chinese people's belief in the Soviet Union's advanced military science.

COMBAT DEFECTS

The broadcasts which probably have the greatest impact on professional soldiers are those which attack combat weakness in the PLA. This weakness is attributed to the lack of modern weapons and realistic training.

In a program for the PLA entitled "Fatal Effects of Mao Tse-tung's Military Thought on the Development of the Chinese PLA" on 14 July 1968, the Soviets played on their favorite theme with this quote from V. I. Lenin.

> The ones who win the upper hand in war are those equipped with the best technological weapons, good discipline and behavior. . . . war tactics depend on the level of military technological equipment. . . . the finest army will be instantly mopped up by the enemy if it does not have the necessary arms, supplies and training.

The program concluded: "There are no planes or tanks in the PLA and the lack of spare parts makes useless those given by the Soviet Union."

Radio Moscow often quotes official Chinese Communist sources and then attacks the statement. In January 1968, it quoted a *People's Daily* statement that "the best weapon is Mao's thought as far as the Revolutionary Army in the contemporary era is concerned." The broadcast then charged that no PLA fighter can seriously accept this view and that planes and weapons are necessary for victory—not Mao's thought.

RHETORICAL QUESTION

The Soviets often use the rhetorical question to make their point. The query "Why does Mao's propaganda deny the importance of modern weapons in warfare?" is answered: "To have weapons you must first have a strong economy. The cultural revolution has dislocated the economy so that new equipment for the PLA is out of the question."

Individuals such as Lo Jui-ch'ing, former Chief of Staff of the PLA, are used as propaganda vehicles. One program stressed that Lo's purge was

due to his suggestion that weapons play an important role in modern warfare and his insistence on the modernization of the army instead of following the thought of Mao.

The Soviets boast of their assistance to other countries. One program detailed the modern equipment and training the Soviet Union was providing to the North Vietnamese Army. The idea apparently is to make the PLA jealous of the North Vietnamese Army and indignant at Chinese leaders for the poor relations with the Soviets.

Ridicule is sometimes injected into the campaign. The New China News Agency is quoted in one program as announcing that a U-2 spy aircraft was shot down while the Chinese air commander used Mao's quotes. The Soviets say this is laughable and that all Chinese people know that the victory was achieved not through quotes, but through the use of Soviet MiG aircraft.

No doubt the ultimate insult was a broadcast statement that the PLA was even inferior to Chiang Kai-shek's troops in technology and equipment.[6]

Maoist policy on military training stresses learning through actual combat. Moscow criticizes this policy as leading to great bloodshed at the hands of green leaders and points out that poorly trained troops cannot compete against modern armies. Mao is accused of betraying resolutions adopted at the 8th Party Congress which called for modern training for PLA cadres, for the PLA to master the skills possessed by Soviet troops, and for the PLA to guard the Socialist camp with the Soviet Union.

The Soviets set up the military school system in China, and many Chinese officers were trained in the Soviet Union. In the late fifties, the Maoists launched a campaign to deemphasize Soviet methods and doctrine. Today, Moscow broadcasts use ridicule to promote distrust of the present school system as a means for military preparedness. Commenting on a Chinese article announcing the establishment of an academy for training navy minesweeper personnel, a Soviet program had this to say:

> The major subjects in the curriculum are class struggle and the struggle between the two roads. . . . Mao claims there was not a single qualified military academy prior to the Cultural Revolution. Training of two to three years is too long involving too much book work . . . only one month is needed to train a good pilot. . . . An army which loudly recites Mao's slogans does indeed only need a couple of months of training.

The Soviets devote the largest percentage of programming to the cultural revolution and its effect on the PLA. They charge that opposition exists within the army and that Mao needs the army for the cultural revolution to succeed. In discussing an editorial in a PLA organ, which advises the army to keep away from factional conflicts, a Soviet broadcast concludes that this testifies to disturbances and disorder within the army and the factional conflict between supporters and opponents of Mao.[7]

In two programs in 1968 dealing with the opposition problem, Moscow claimed that 12 military corps do not support Mao, that Mao's policy in splitting this once closely knit group (the PLA) is contrary to China's

national interest, and that Mao is afraid of the PLA. The only answer for Mao is to split the army and sow discord.

PURGE STATISTICS

When a nation is in turmoil, the purge is no doubt the most feared consequence for those in power. Six programs for PLA listeners in 1968 were directly concerned with purges, and many other broadcasts alluded to them.

Statistics are frequently employed in exploiting this theme as indicated in an October 1968 broadcast:

> Ninety percent of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] military affairs committee in the last two years were expelled. . .as well as sixty top level PLA commanders.

Probably the best ploy used by Radio Moscow is the threat that the purge will be extended to the lower levels of the PLA. For example:

> Mao Tse-tung does not limit his purge to high-ranking commanders, but has decided to expand the purge to reach the middle and low ranking commanders, such as commanders of regiments, battalions, and companies.

SECRET POLICE

The Soviets also promote suspicion in the ranks of the PLA by referring to a secret police organization set up within it by Mao. The claim is stressed that any one can be arrested and units can be discarded at any time by the secret police.

The opposing military line in China has frequently complained that government use of the armed forces for nonmilitary purposes was detrimental to morale and combat preparedness. This theme is exploited by broadcasts which claim that the use of the PLA in propaganda efforts to spread Mao's thoughts and in military police work to put down clashes by the Red Guards detracts from its combat readiness and mastery of weapons. Radio Moscow calls on the PLA to refuse these tasks and not be manipulated.

For consumption by the Chinese civil populace, the Soviets claim "the army is everywhere having assumed the roles of police, judges, workers, executioners, peasants, and schoolteachers." To further opposition to the PLA and promote discontent among minority groups in China, broadcasts are directed to these people in their dialect. The aim is to unite the minority groups against the army and possibly provoke open opposition.

Stress is also placed on the deterioration of the PLA since the break with the Soviet Union. Weakness in the PLA is said to be due to the absence of cooperation with the Soviet Union, and this is Mao's fault. In contrast, the Warsaw Pact is held up as a symbol of unity and strength.

The PLA is asked in another broadcast why Mao attempts to incite hatred within the army for the Soviet Union. Moscow answers the question by stating that it does not matter what Mao attempts since Soviet and Chinese troops know the real value of combat friendship.

These programs stress the "good old days" and contrast them with the turmoil of the present day. There always appears to be the hint lurking in the background that conditions would improve if Soviet aid were provided.

This two-year propaganda campaign by the Soviet Union to subvert the PLA began to taper off in late 1968, and, by the end of the year, it had virtually stopped. The Soviets may have felt that they had exhausted the subject or that the campaign was not accomplishing the results desired and quite possibly that it was becoming counterproductive.

NOTES

1. The best known of these doctrines are concerned with the defense of mainland China and the Chinese Communist theory on revolutionary war. See Ralph L. Powell, "Maoist Military Doctrines," *Asian Survey*, No. 4, April 1968, pp. 239–256.
2. Samuel B. Griffith II, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army*, McGraw-Hill Book Co., N.Y., 1967, p. 302.
3. *Red Star*, 29 December 1966.
4. Ibid.
5. Radio Moscow in mandarin to China, 1 February 1968. Future reference to broadcasts will be Radio Moscow programs in mandarin to China during the period 1 January 1967 to 31 December 1968 unless otherwise footnoted.
6. Radio Moscow in mandarin to Southeast Asia, 4 September 1967.
7. Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 29 June 1967.

East Asia

POLITICAL WARFARE—QUALIFIED APPLICATION* **

By Monte R. Bullard

The political warfare concept has been used as a system to promote governmental legitimacy and to develop supportive political attitudes within the military forces, as well as to close the gap between the military services and the civilian populace. A political warfare doctrine to be transferable must recognize and be able to adapt to the underlying traditions of the society to which the transfer is attempted.

The importance of political warfare in countering wars of "national liberation" is evident in the increasing discussion of the political side of warfare. Asians, as well as Americans, are conscious of the need to place more emphasis on the political. As a result, Asians have begun to review Asian sociopolitical experience in the hope of finding a model which fits Asian problems more precisely than the Western approach which stresses military technology.

One model which is considered quite successsful by Asians is that of the Republic of China (ROC). It is considered successful because it seems to have reached an appropriate compromise between sociopolitical and technological considerations. The Republic of Vietnam was the first to adopt the Chinese system.

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SUPPLEMENT OR SUBVERT?

When certain conditions exist in a developing nation, the ROC political warfare model can be a valuable institution. Even when the conditions are appropriate, however, the ROC model must be modified before it is applicable to other nations.

* * * * *

The ROC model, in the eyes of the Vietnamese, seemed to fit the cultural patterns, history, and character of the people more closely than the U.S. military solutions for insurgency. It seemed to counter the threat of covert rather than overt aggression better than U.S. doctrine and tactics.

The principal political consideration concerns the length of time an incumbent government has been in power. A good government which has been in power for a long period may have proved itself by satisfying the demands of the people, thereby gaining their support. In other words, legitimacy has been established.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES

New governments, however, have not yet established legitimacy. They cannot assume that the people will grant automatically their wholehearted support. The government which has just gained power must rely on a political socialization process to teach the people their new role in society. It must create political attitudes which will support it until it has shown that it can satisfy the demands of the people better than the insurgents. It must devise some active means of creating supportive attitudes without the use of coercion since, in the long run, coercion would weaken the government.

The political warfare concept was the tool selected by the Chinese to accomplish this task in the aftermath of the 1911 Chinese Revolution. The Chinese abandoned the political warfare concept during World War II, however, because Western advisors believed it counterproductive.

When the Republic of China withdrew to Taiwan in 1949, it began an intensive review of the causes of its defeat. Many well-trained and well-equipped military units would have proved proficient, but there was a key weakness—loyalty. Outstanding units, trained by Western advisors, following Western military doctrine, were useless, or even dangerous, when they decided to change sides in the middle of the civil war. The Chinese recognized that internal strife generated unique military problems which did not exist in wars between nations. Thus, they concluded that a political warfare system was mandatory to promote governmental legitimacy and develop supportive political attitudes within the military forces.

LOYALTY CONCEPT

Beyond the idea of creating support for the government, the concept of loyalty in Asia should also be considered. There is little tradition in Asia of loyalty to a nation or ideology. More important has been loyalty to an

individual or family. The leaders of China had the monumental task of transferring this loyalty from an individual or family to a nation or ideology. The political warfare system was a vehicle for this transfer.

China had no tradition of democracy with its emphasis on individual rights and dignity. Even under the political system as outlined by Sun Yat-sen in the "Three Peoples Principles," the individual was to be subordinated to the needs of the state. It was true that the people, the masses, came first in everything, political or economic, but the term people always referred to the people as a whole, a collective term, and not people as individuals. When this concept is combined with the authoritarian tradition, the concept of standing up for one's individual rights is lost. As a result, a type of passive submission to authority existed among the people, especially in the army.

If a company commander took advantage of his position to maltreat one of his soldiers or even the civilians in his area of jurisdiction, traditionally there was no recourse for the mistreated individual. The power of the commander was too great.

One possible influence on the commannder was his education. If he were well read and understood the humanitarian principles of Confucius, he might be a benevolent leader, and there would be fewer problems. The majority of commanders, however, were not so well educated.

Often, economic temptations were great. The pay of officers, as well as that of soldiers in China, has always been low in comparison with other elements of society. Fringe benefits found in Western armies were lacking. There was no one to look after the moral or economic welfare of the troops.

ECONOMIC GAIN

Consequently, the unit commander, who received only a nominal pay, certainly not enough to support a family, began to take advantage of his position for economic gain. If he were given money to buy food for his troops, he embezzled a portion of it. If he had the opportunity, he confiscated some of the produce of local civilians in the name of the army and the revolution. But the soldiers sent to confiscate the local rice saw an opportunity for themsleves. They confiscated more than the commander asked for and kept the difference for themselves. Corruption was even worse at the higher levels.

There was traditionally a deep-rooted enmity between civilians and soldiers in China. For centuries, the armies of China have maltreated, robbed, and abused the peasant. This is reflected in the old Chinese saying, "One does not use good steel to make nails nor does one use good men to make soldiers."

The political warfare concept was designed by Chinese leaders to close the gap between commanders and soldiers and between the military services and the civilian populace.

FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS

One important reason for the quick acceptance of the political warfare concept into China concerns basic family relationships. Traditionally, family authority and responsibility are vested in the eldest member. He is responsible for the livelihood and protection of the family members. In order to make this system function, strict rules govern individual behavior and discipline, and all members of the family are expected to comply with the wishes of the group leader, the oldest living relative.

As a result of this relationship, the individual derives a strong sense of security. He knows he can depend on his family to help him solve his personal problems, especially those with people outside the family group.

When an Asian youth is taken from the relative security of his family group, he experiences much more of a traumatic shock than his Western counterpart. He is completely lost when he finds that he must accept the full responsiblility for his own actions and has no one to provide him guidance and support. The political warfare concept provided a solution for this problem. When the concept is carried out as it is intended, the military unit replaces the family, the political warfare officer provides assistance in solving personal problems, and the commander represents parental and supreme authority.

The concept of the military commander and the political warfare cadre acting *in loco parentis* is communicated to soldiers by means of military magazines, radio, and television, usually in the form of fictional stories which dramatize the role of the unit political warfare officer.

The role of the unit political warfare officer goes beyond serving *in loco parentis*. He is responsible for personalizing relationships within a unit. His goal is to make the unit into the soldiers' new primary group—that is, a surrogate family. The assumption is that, if the military unit becomes a *de facto* primary group, favorable patterns of behavior can be stimulated more easily, and new values can be formulated. The Chinese recognized the political warfare system as a possible solution for remolding attitudes and forming new values which could transfer the loyalty of soldiers from their real family to their new military family and beyond that to the nation.

A second sociological reason for the ready acceptance of the political warfare concept is directly related to the first. Personal relationships at the lowest level are virtually codified. Custom dictates how one individual deals with another. There are acceptable and unacceptable actions which can be taken. When a conflict between two persons arises, the means of resolving it is especially limited by the "code" of conduct. Conflict cannot be solved by direct confrontation. The traditional Asian way to resolve conflict between two individuals has been to use a go-between.

The problem of direct confrontation is especially difficult in the military hierarchy where the commander of a unit must maintain a special image. As a result, if a soldier has a grievance which might reflect adversely on

the capabilities of the unit commander, he must not seek redress because the commander cannot recognize the fact that something is wrong in his own unit. Consequently, the provision had to be made to resolve problems which were caused by the commander's actions.

MEDIATOR ROLE

It was necessary that no culpability be attributed to the commander who must be made to appear the champion of his troops, striving to protect them from grievances brought about by "the faults of the time." The only means to achieve this, yet bring bona fide problems to the attention of the commander, was through a mediator. Political warfare officers serve this purpose—grievances can be aired before the commander without attacking his dignity.

These were some of the considerations which caused China and Vietnam to accept the political warfare concept. Even if we allow, however, that the political warfare concept is a useful tool for situations like Vietnam, there are still some qualifications which must be introduced if an undesired concentration of power is to be avoided. Political warfare doctrine should:

- Be taught as a model only where political and social conditions are appropriate.
- Come from the majority voice of a representative national congress.
- Include political, sociological, economic, psychological, and military principles which reflect national goals.
- Be transmitted through command channels and be a command responsiblity..
- Prohibit direct connection between political warfare cadres and political parties or special government organs. Political warfare cadres should have no special channels of communication to the outside (party or higher level political warfare cadres).
- Include the fact that the political warfare cadre's role is to support the commander and not to watch over his activities.
- State that political warfare cadres are subordinate to unit commanders. Unit commanders must have courts-martial jurisdiction, influence on promotions and assignments, and generally unsubverted command authority over the political warfare cadre.
- Provide that the political warfare cadre should rotate in and out of political warfare jobs. Political warfare should not become a career specialty.
- Emphasize the welfare, educational and recreational aspects of political warfare.

Organizationally, counterintelligence should not be included as a political warfare function.

The Republic of Vietnam has studied the ROC model in detail,

and has integrated some of the points mentioned. The South Vietnamese have taken from the Chinese model that which they believe is consistent with conditions in the Republic of Vietnam. They have rejected portions of the Chinese model which are not suited to Vietnamese national goals.

The Republic of China's political warfare model has much to offer nations struggling to achieve stability and independence. It is worthy of continued study to seek solutions to problems which are peculiar to emerging nations. Most important is to recognize the ROC model, not as a panacea, but as a partial solution to insurgency problems when those problems are caused by conditions similar to the Chinese experience.

CHINA IN AFRICA*

By G. T. Yu

The effect of persuasive communications is greater when the source is perceived by the audience to be similar or in similar circumstances.

CHINESE-AFRICAN INTERACTION

Chinese-African interaction represents an excellent example of China's international participatory role. Over a decade has elapsed since China first appeared on the African scene. During this period, Africa increasingly assumed an important place in Chinese foreign policy. An intensive drive to win friends and gain influence ensued. Although the campaign has suffered serious reversals, China's presence continues to be evident in Africa. In 1969 thirteen African States continued to recognize China, while Chinese influence among the African liberation movements was also dominant.

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To date, the major thrust of China's interaction with Africa occurred during the years 1960 to 1965. Two dominant factors explain the wide level of Chinese activities. First, between January 1, 1960, and December 31, 1965, no fewer than twenty-nine African colonies won independence; consequently, these years represent also the peak of China's diplomatic offensive and other activities in Africa.

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Secondly, with the increased level of the Sino-Soviet conflict beginning in the 1960s, China sought to openly challenge Soviet diplomatic influence and subvert Soviet revolutionary credibility internationally. Africa,

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*Excerpts from "China in Africa," *The Yearbook of World Affairs*, 1970, Stevens and Sons, London, 1970. Reprinted with the permission of Stevens and Sons, publishers, copyright holder.

therefore, assumed the role of a battlefield in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Chinese activities in Africa directed toward the subversion of Soviet influence and credibility took many forms, including the campaign to identify the Soviet Union as a "European" State and the attempt to link Soviet policies with "United States imperialism."

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1965 dates the beginning of the . . . present period of Chinese-African interaction. This period has been characterised by a reduction in the overt formal presence of China on the African continent and the initiation of a "selective" Chinese foreign policy toward Africa. Within China, this period coincided with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; and except for Angola, Mozambique and a few other colonies this has been the post-independence era in Africa. Without question, this had been a period of Chinese retreat. . . . Really meaningful interaction with China involved less than six States, including the Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Tanzania and Zambia. Thus toward the end of 1969, China's policy toward Africa had changed from one of indiscriminately seeking to win recognition from and establish diplomatic relations with most of the African States in the early and mid-1960s to a policy of selective interaction with a limited number of African States.

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CHINA'S AFRICAN POLICY: OBJECTIVES

Since the late 1950s with the passing of the colonial empires and the emergence of the independent African States, Africa has served an important function in the foreign policy of China. While for reasons of security, and other immediate factors, Asia represents the area of primary national interest, China has perceived Africa as second only in importance. Three primary objectives can be suggested for the importance of Africa to China. Anti-imperialism has constituted a major theme in the foreign policy of China. . . . The 1965 statement by Lin Piao calling upon the "world countryside" of Asia, Africa and Latin America to surround and capture the "world cities" of North America and Western Europe can be accepted as a Chinese variation of the classical Marxist-Leninist thesis.[1]

* * * * *

If anti-imperialism constitutes a primary policy objective, the campaign to challenge and subvert the international status of the Soviet Union has become equally important to China. . . . A Chinese objective, therefore, has been to identify the Soviet Union with "United States imperialism" and to discredit the Soviet Union as a revolutionary force. . . .

A final Chinese objective has been the constantly reiterated theme: African-Asian-Latin American solidarity.

INSTRUMENTS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

China has conducted an aggressive campaign in Africa to achieve its

policy objectives, utilising a vast variety of foreign policy instruments, formal and informal. In the formal category, China has put great emphasis upon inter-State relations and has sought to win recognititon by, and exchange diplomatic missions with, most of the African States.

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To give substance to the relationship with the African States, China has been quick to employ additional formal foreign policy instruments. These have been expressed chiefly in the form of a variety of agreements. Generally speaking, they fall within four categories. First, there have been the more traditional alliance type of agreements, expressed in the form of friendship treaties. These treaties have always been based upon the Five Principles of Bandung, intended to promote solidarity between the two parties, and contained the provision "to develop economic and cultural relations in the spirit of equality, mutual benefit and friendly cooperation.". . .Cultural pacts represent a second type of agreement utilised by the Chinese. Such agreements usually call for the exchange of students, educators, newspaper reports, theatrical groups, and other activities in the cultural domain. . . .

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Finally, there are the economic aid and technical assistance agreements. As an instrument of foreign policy designed to give substance to Chinese-African interaction, this formal instrument has been most important. The hunger and need for funds, the lack of technical know-how and human resources, and the great desire to engage in developmental work to attain political and, moreover, economic independence, have made the African States highly receptive to foreign assistance.

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Concurrent with the utilisation of formal foreign policy instruments, China has made extensive use also of informal instruments. A study of statecraft has pointed to the importance of informal foreign policy instruments.[2] Basically, such instruments seek to bring into direct contact a State's representatives and opinions with the people and/or processes of another country, in an effort to achieve specific policy objectives. The emphasis here is upon face-to-face interaction as opposed to the formal State-to-State relationship. A major assumption is that by utilising informal instruments a State may better solidify friendship (or increase the level of conflict) with other States. Within the context of Chinese-African interaction, a degree of face-to-face contact has evolved through China's use of informal foreign policy instruments.

China's use of informal instruments includes a wide variety of techniques, overt and covert, violent and non-violent. (It is important to note that many of the informal techniques are made possible through prior formal access; *e.g.*, film agreements concluded between states make possible the showing of motion pictures to the general public.) Among the overt, non-violent techniques of informal access has been the exchange programme. This has brought Africans from various social levels and

professions to China and has sent delegations of one sort or another from China to Africa. Until the advent of the Great Proletarian Cultrual Revolution, an increasing number of Africans and Chinese had visited each other's country. During the month of September 1964, *e.g.*, no less than twenty-five separate reports on Africans in China were announced, ranging from an art delegation from Mali, a youth league from Zanzibar, to a music scholar from Morocco; in the same month, a Chinese youth delegation was visiting several central African states while a trade union mission was in Algeria. Whatever the type of delegation and whoever the individuals, the exchange programme has without doubt done much to introduce China to the Africans.

China has made extensive use of the communication media to reach the African population. Since 1956, radio broadcasts have been utilised with increasing frequency. Beginning with only seven hours per week in English, China in 1969 was broadcasting to Africa over 100 hours per week in English, French, Hausa, Portuguese, Swahili, and Cantonese and Mandarin Chinese. Radio Peking's programmes have consisted of combinations of news and commentary, strongly ideological in nature, with intervals of recorded music. Another important media has been motion pictures. China has exported to Africa full-length films, short films and newsreels; Chinese film weeks have been held in several African cities. Modern Chinese theatre groups have also toured Africa.

China has relied also upon the printed word to reach the African populace. There are now English, French and Spanish editions of the weekly *Peking Review* for Africa. Where sale and distribution have been permitted, the *China Pictorial, Quotation from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, Mao's selected military writings, and other Chinese offerings, have been readily obtainable.Other communication media include the New China News Agency, which freely distributes news of China to the Africans. In discussing the communication media, one must be intellectually aware that the measurement of flows is not necessarily a measure of their impact. Nevertheless, China's intensive use of the communication media, whatever the impact, cannot be denied.

Direct, face-to-face interaction between the representatives of one State and the populace of another constitutes another type of informal foreign policy instrument. Such personal contacts, it has been maintained, allow the representatives of one State to enjoy the maximum level of interaction with and impact on the populace of another State.

Within this context, the dispatching of Chinese experts to assist African individuals and groups in specific fields of knowledge (together with the training of select Africans in China) must also be considered. No doubt through such personal interaction, China has sought to influence a segment of the African population. Chinese technical assistance to Africa has included experts on tea planting and soil analysis in Morocco, rice growing and military training in Tanzania and Uganda, and building construction in Guinea. To date, the impact of the face-to-face interaction

via the presence of Chinese experts in Africa has been less as a consequence of personal interaction than through perceived exemplary Chinese behaviour patterns. Chinese experts in Africa, have largely refrained from establishing close social contact either with their African counterparts at work or with Africans generally. Personal interaction, therefore, has been minimal. Where the Chinese experts have made an impact has been in their collective and individual hard work and frugality, which has been cited by the indigenous leadership as behavioural patterns to be followed. In Tanzania, where over a thousand Chinese experts were residing in 1969, the face-to-face interaction between the Chinese experts and the indigenous population has followed this pattern.[3]

Participation in regional and functional international organisations constitutes yet another level of Chinese-African interaction. As an informal instrument of foreign policy, membership and participation in various international organisations have permitted China to gain access to both the representatives and processes of the African States. China's past and present role in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation, the Afro-Asian Conferences, the Afro-Asian Journalists Association and other organisations represent examples of the great use of this informal instrument.[4]

China has been equally active in the use of covert informal foreign policy instruments. Unlike overt instruments which can readily be observed, covert operations are hidden and therefore difficult to measure. The great secrecy surrounding such activities have [sic] sometimes led to a majority of the covert operations being attributed to Chinese influence, thereby giving the Chinese a far greater role in Africa than they in fact enjoy. This is not to deny the use of covert instruments by China. Chinese "illegal" arms and money, and methods in unconventional warfare have been uncovered in a sufficient number of instances to lend support to certain charges. For example, Chinese assistance to the Angolan, Mozambique and other African liberation movements has not been without total foundation. In short, we can correctly assume that China has made free use of covert informal foreign policy instruments. The question, however, is not the utilisation of covert instruments. Rather it is the extent of Chinese covert instruments, and China's perceptions pertaining to the use of covert instruments in relation to its use of overt instruments of foreign policy.

Fundamentally, China perceives no conflict between its concurrent use of overt and covert informal instruments of foreign policy. The two instruments have been seen as complementary. Thus, China has not hesitated to employ—or threaten to employ—revolution as an instrument of foreign policy, while utilising overt instruments in its relations with the African States and territories.

Taking into account all foreign policy instruments, formal and informal, overt and covert–and positing that the extent of one State's interest in another's can be measured in terms of the degree and depth of utilisation

of such instruments—the African States have occupied an important role in China's foreign policy. Similarly, the concentrated employment of a vast variety of foreign policy instruments toward Africa constitutes a measure of China's international participatory role.

NOTES

1. For the full text of Lin's comments, see "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking). September 3, 1965. For an English translation, see *Peking Review*, September 3, 1965, pp. 9–30.
2. A. M. Scott, *The Revolution in Statecraft* (1965).
3. G. T. Yu, "Dragon in the Bush: Peking's Presence in Africa," 8 *Asian Survey*, 12 (December 1968), pp. 1018–1026.
4. For an account of China's role in one such organisation, see C. Neuhauser, *Third World Politics, China and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization 1957–1967* (1968).

Southeast Asia

BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF NEWSREELS AND DOCUMENTARIES IN THE NEW SITUATION*

By Phan Trong Quang

In the face of aerial bombardment of their territory, the North Veitnamese concerned themselves with elementary and psychological impulses rather than with abstract ideological arguments. The effects of the air strikes were clearly depicted in order to reinforce domestic resolve and evoke international sympathy.

For nearly two years now, in the face of the situation of the American imperialists intensifying their war of aggression in South Vietnam and launching a war of destruction against North Vietnam, the Vietnamese documentary and newsreel films branch, rather than declining, has developed vigorously. In addition to the Vietnamese newsreel and documentary shops, we have additional Vietnamese People's Army film shops. Newreels, documentaries and science films have all increased over 1964. The process of making a film and getting it to the masses has been shortened. The number of films issued at home and sent abroad has tripled.

By way of instruction, the science films have made great efforts in guiding intensive cultivation to increased productivity of plants, in introducing production experiences from areas where there is continuous fighting, in actively contributing to stepping up the technological revolution in argiculture, and in teaching military, air-defense and first aid common sense.

By way of mirroring real people, real things and real scenery, the newsreel and documentary films have positively contributed to convicting the American imperialists and to singing the praises of our army and people. Although there have not yet been many films of the type that

*Excerpts from a translation of an article by Phan Trong Quang in the Vietnamese-language periodical *Hoc Tap* (Studies), No. 1, Hanoi, January 1967, pages 72–79. JPRS, listed in the monthly *Catalog of U.S. Government Publications*.

denounce enemy crimes, these films have become tombstones of hate and resentment through the pictures recording the barbarous crimes of the American invading army in its deliberate destruction of market places, schools, temples and churches and especially of our hospitals. The film of the Quynh Lap Leprosy Camp, destroyed by the American pirates, is, before international opinion, a fitting slap in the mouth of Johnson, the robber who both kills people and recites his prayer of "humane peace." The cruel character of the American imperialists was unmasked through their insane act of bombing the sick people receiving treatment there. The American bombs and bullets only brought to the surface the great and humane efforts of the public health workers of our country on the road to conquering Hansen's germ and to defeating the U.S. imperialists. The realism of the film is a reflection of the ardent revolutionary sentiment of the people who made the film. Only by really hating and resenting the enemy and only by really loving our system and our people could the film makers show these real pictures and be able to have such an effect. Teaching and creating hatred, resentment and despising of the enemy and building up the determination of our people to annihilate the enemy is a science and it is one of the important tasks of our culture and art.

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We have recorded beautiful pictures which easily reflect the incomparable bravery and the will of the army and people of North Vietnam to defeat the enemy's war of destruction. In the rain of enemy bombs and storm of enemy bullets our patrol boats still fiercely strike back at the enemy planes; the air defense fighters still aim directly at the enemy and fire; the militia women still bravely fight and help down U.S. jet planes; the workers still climb up tall electrical poles to join a wire; the Suot women still bravely row the ferryboat to serve the troops. . . . By bringing to the movie screen these very "real" and very "alive" scenes, the newsreels and documentaries have tried to prove in a concrete and active way the great revolutionary heroism of our army and people. One type of news reportage films about the front line provinces of the old Region Four has been welcomed by the people because of the new pictures in the first period of combat. A number of films after that learned how to penetrate an individual, a thing and a scene and condition in combat. Through the scenes of our soldiers placing their guns on the corpses of the French tanks at Dien Bien Phu and of our army and people joining together to pull artillery up high hills in order to fire on U.S. airplanes, the film *Tay Bac Attacks The Americans* showed the people the relationship between the previous resistance against France and the present resistance against the United States and, in so doing, consolidated their trust in the anti-American national salvation task. The film *Fighting To Protect The Native Island,* is like a picture poem singing the praises of the spirit of combat unity of the army and people of Bach Long Vi. From the first arrival of troops on the island to the time when the troops help the militia in military training and coordinate in rhythmic combat against

the American aircraft one sees a process of development, not only of incidents, but also of people. The film *Brave Con Co* showed moving shots of the life of combat on a small and brave island of the fatherland through the eyes and feelings of a soldier guarding the island. It can be said that the film is a diary splashed with feeling. Alongside the hours and minutes of fierce fighting against enemy planes and warships, our soldiers still occasionally relax and lie with their legs crossed, whistling; still sometimes mischievously splash water on one another while bathing; or right in the middle of the fighting trench enjoy the boiled crab of the cook. Their bravery is as great as their spontaneity, initiative and optimism; it is an unusually simple kind of bravery, combining in a lively way the essence of the new revolution and the traditional national traits of the Vietnamese people.

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Together with the precious films of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, the newsreels and documentaries in North Vietnam have effectively contributed to teaching the line and policy of the Party and Government, to stimulating the revolutionary heroism and will to win, to stimulating the people to stretch up into the front ranks, both producing and fighting and mastering science and technology. The newsreels and documentaries have been received by the masses with no less enthusiasm than for a feature film. Not only is the percentage of showings distinctly higher than before but the average number of viewers per showing is higher for newsreels and documentaries than for features. The tendency to treat newsreels and documentaries lightly and purely business thinking in the showing of films have begun to be overcome. It can be said that we have begun to carry out the instructions of late 1964 of Prime Minister Dong defining the present requirements for film production as "principally not feature films but newsreels and documentaries."

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The aforementioned record in producing and issuing newsreels and documentaries is a noteworthy victory on the ideological and cultural front. It has contributed to the defeat of the schemes of the Americans in using bombs, bullets and psychological warfare in the hope of shaking the determination to liberate South Vietnam and of blocking every anti-American-national salvation action of our people. It proves that in the war against the United States newsreels and documentaries have increasingly become powerful ideological weapons and more and more are the indispensable spiritual food of our people. From this we can affirm that the more the anti-American-national salvation work progresses and the fiercer the struggle becomes, the more abundant and the more powerful the newsreels and documentaries will become; and, regardless of the situation, the production, issuing and elevation in quality of the documentaries and newsreels will still continue to develop.

* * * * *

Among our ideological tools, newsreels and documentaries are able to

reflect these real people, real things and real scenes in the most faithful, lively and timely way. The film *Anh Nguyen Van Troi Song Mai* (Nguyen Van Troi Lives Tommorrow) has greatly contributed to the work of mobilizing among our our people a seething movement to imitate hero Nguyen Van Troi. It has been warmly received by foreign opinion chiefly because it has been able to introduce a hero who is proud and indomitable before the enemy troops during the last minutes and seconds of his life. When we saw Troi's picture in the newspapers we were able to concretely perceive a part of the truth. When we saw his image on a screen it was like seeing the entire truth about the historic nine minutes of his life. Real people and really brave things which have a political significance and effect, once selected for filming into documentaries or newsreels, take on more and more of a political character and are increasingly effective in directly serving politics. Lenin clearly pointed that the nature of newsreels and documentaries is reason and politics visualized, that the spirit of the film must comport with the proletarian press line and that the people who make the films and documentaries must become Bolshevick reporters with movie cameras in hand.

In reflecting real people, real things and real scense in the anti-American-national salvation task in order to stimulate, teach and organize our people to defeat the American aggressors, newsreels and documentaries perform the duty of a Party newspaper using images. As Party newspapers using images, the newsreels and documentaries must really correctly and really promptly reflect the line, policy and viewpoint of the Party through the reality of the masses who are striving to properly execute every directive and resolution of the Party in a self-aware manner. And, like a Party newspaper, newsreels and documentaries must assure timeliness, a mass quality, a combat quality, a liveliness and, most of all, truthfulness.

The principal value of newsreels and documentaries is the value of truth in life. Our people need to see newsreels and documentaries chiefly because they want to see the images of their native villages and their people and activities at the present time in order to take pride, be encouraged and be determined to vanquish the American invaders. Our people trust in the newsreels and documentaries and, consequently, we cannot allow one detail of the film to be able to sow suspicion in the viewer. In addition to the films which have unnatural smiles and smiles in the wrong places, there are a number of films which have a great many images of one hand on the plough and one hand on a gun, one hand on a hammer and one hand on a gun, and one hand on the fishing net and one hand on a gun; these have a forced quality. Tendencies to rearrange everything according to the subjective desires of the person making the film are also pretty prevalent. Even in some of the good combat films we still see details lacking in genuineness. No embellishment, no matter how "artistic" has any place in newsreels and documentaries, because newsreels and documentaries are only to reflect real people and real things.

Even in cases where we must reluctantly film a re-creation of the truth, the newsreels and documentaries still must assure the truthfulness and trustworthiness of the images represented and not permit the viewer to see the "hand" of the producer in it.

Every genuine image has truth; but every truthful image does not have genuineness. The image of mother Suot rowing the ferryboat to serve combat has been praised by viewers as genuine not just because it contains truth but, chiefly, because it has revealed the heroic but normal quality of a mother, in particular, and of our people in general. The genuineness discussed here is the genuineness representing the essence and law of matter in the process of its development, meaning genuineness in accordance with the point of view of Marxism-Leninism.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN LAOS*

BY THE 7TH PSYOP GROUP

A summary overview of the psychological operations program of the contending sides in Laos, the Royal Lao Government and the Pathet Lao.

Both the [Royal Laotian Government] RLG and the [Pathet Lao] PL have a variety of psychological operations (PSYOP(programs designed to rach various target groups within Lao society. PL themes are directed at the youth, ethnic minorities, religious leaders, and RLG troops. PL themes claim corruption and graft in the established government and are aimed at the youth and various ethnic groups. The PL direct the "warmonger" theme to all sections of the society. Along with this is an anti-U.S. propaganda program, designed for RLG troops. It stresses the righteousness of PL programs and calls for the RLG troops to defect to the "rightful" side.

To carry out their objectives the PL use radio, propaganda teams, motion pictures and printed media, including leaflets and a newspaper called the *Lao Hak Sat*. Four radio stations broadcast in support of the PL: *Radio Peking, Radio Pathet Lao, Radio of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces*, and *Liberation Radio* (Vietnam). Most of these programs are in Lao to Laos but the Pathet Lao send reports in English for international audiences via teletype.

In an effort to persuade rather than to force, the RLG carries out its own PSYOP programs. RLG themes are addressed to the entire country as well as to special audiences of Government officials, Lao-Thai, merchants and commercial circles, military forces, the PL, farmers, other ethnic groups, monks and the youth.

The PSYOP objectives of the RLG are to reduce the combat efficiency of the enemy to mold favorable attitudes toward the war effort, to stress the goodwill of the U.S. to confuse the enemy concerning ideology and the

*From "PSYOP Intelligence Special Report," Issue SR 1–72, 7 February 1972, pp. 1–15—1–16.

aims of leaders, to convince enemy troops to defect, and to carry out plans for economic and other development while educating the people.

To carry out these goals the Government uses posters, leaflets, motion pictures, still pictures, cartoons, traveling theater groups, FAR PSYOP teams, loudspeaker programs, radio broadcasts, and printed media.

The RLG has radio stations at Savannakhet, Pakse, Luang Prabang, Chimaimo, and Vientiane which transmit to an estimated 70,000 radio receivers in the country.

Since most of the people are illiterate, radio and loudspeaker programs are the most effective from the standpoint of reaching numbers of people. The cartoons, plays, and to lesser extent, leaflets are well received. Probably the most effective program is that of FAR country teams who travel throughout the country informally talking to villagers.

The Lao publish *Khao Phap Pacham Sapda*, a weekly news and photo sheet that has a circulation of approximately 20,000 and reaches the largest number of literate people in the country; this pictorial newspaper is valuable because its format is very effective in appealing to the uneducated villagers.

Since PSYOP effectiveness is always difficult to assess, the Ministry of Information, Propaganda, and Tourism is responsible along with military units for assessment. Recently, the value of leaflets was shown when large numbers of PL defectors stated that leaflets and loudspeaker programs were influential in their decision to desert. During the conflict in Indochina, PSYOP will be important.

Most Lao leaders are quick to recognize the importance of PSYOP to them even if the situation does not always allow necessary materials and support for thorough programs.

Pacific

INFORMATION AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS*

BY THE NEW ZEALAND DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Government information must be clear, well written, and adapted to the audience. Official information activity must be carried out with reference to policy objectives and national interest.

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In the past five years, following the somewhat belated recognition of the support which information activity must give to foreign policy, several important steps have been taken to shape and extend New Zealand's information efforts overseas. A Cabinet Committee has been established to provide co-ordination and guidance. An information unit has been set up within the Tourist and Publicity Department to produce material specifically designed for distribution overseas. Procedures have been worked out for regular co-operation and consultation in Wellington among the five most interested Departments—Treasury, the State Services Commis-

*Excerpts from *Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs* (New Zealand), 1 April 1966 to 31 March 1967, pp. 67–69.

sion, the Departments of External Affairs, Industries and Commerce, and Tourist and Publicity. A special annual appropriation for overseas information work has been provided. And deliberate efforts have been made in a number of ways to expand and improve overseas information activities within the broad policy objectives which have been set.

Particular attention was paid during [1966–1967] to projects for the adaptation and translation of information publications and film soundtracks for different regions; and priority was accorded material in vernacular languages for the new posts which were opened in Bonn and Rome. The basic booklet *Facts and Figures* is now printed in French, Italian, German, and Japanese, with Malay, Mandarin, and Thai versions soon to be available. The publication *New Zealand* has been completed in French, Japanese, and Thai, with Malay and Mandarin editions also planned. Selected articles in the New Zealand *Fact Sheets* series have been printed in all these languages, and also in Samoan and Indonesian. A set of the *Fact Sheets* in Dutch is in preparation. Finally, a number of background articles and a tourist brochure are also being translated and printed in most of these languages.

As the overseas information service has enlarged its scope, it has become apparent that continuing expansion in the range of publications and other resources, coupled with the growing experience of those concerned, make possible new and valuable opportunities to give factual details about New Zealand and to supplement its policies. At the same time, the increasing complexity of conducting sustained and successful information programmes has brought new problems.

For programmes to be effective, and equal to new opportunities as they arise, certain requirements are essential. The information service must be equipped with a comprehensive range of materials to enable it to present a true picture of New Zealand in all its aspects; there must also be close co-operation and co-ordination of efforts among the various Departments concerned in Wellington, and between the Department of External Affairs and overseas posts. At this early stage there are, obviously, some areas in which improvements in liaison are required. There is a need also for continual vigilance against differences of interpretation on basic policy features of the overseas information programme and for constant reference, in every publicity venture, to the accepted basic principles which govern information activities abroad.

If the increased production of basic information material in foreign languages is the year's most important advance, there have been several other useful achievements. Particular efforts have been made to take advantage of occassions which, of themselves, have directed attention of New Zealand. The distribution by posts to local newspaper editors and broadcasting stations of the New Zealand Day Press Kits, comprising feature articles and photographs on aspects of New Zealand, is an obvious example of the opportunities for valuable publicity which exist from time to time concerning New Zealand in overseas capitals. The visits to New Zealand during the year of President Johnson and Vice-President Hum-

phrey of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Australia and South Vietnam, aroused considerable interest abroad and led to heavy demands on our posts in many countries for information on New Zealand and its national and international policies. Kits of background material were provided to the groups of journalists accompanying the visiting parties. From all these differing operations one lesson has emerged clearly, namely, that the greater the number of audiences which New Zealand seeks to interest in itself, the more varied and sensitive must be the information which it provides.

The overseas programme exchange service of the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation, which was established in 1965, has rapidly expanded its distribution of transcribed radio programmes to stations in the Pacific and throughout Asia. It has thus provided a valuable supplement to the Department's own efforts in the day-to-day activity of overseas posts. The Department has also given encouragement to New Zealand participation in international cultural exhibitions. Particularly pleasing results were achieved through the exhibition of Katherine Mansfield manuscripts, photographs, publications, and personal articles in Paris, London, New York, Baltimore, and Ottawa. This exhibition involved the posts concerned in a considerable amount of administrative effort, but the reward in the audiences gained and the consequent appreciation of New Zealand cultural achievements, has fully justified a sustained and complicated operation. Planning is now proceeding for the tour in the Pacific and Asia of an exhibition of paintings of contemporary Maori artists and Maori artifacts.

An active programme of visits by influential persons from countries of importance to New Zealand, was fulfilled under the Overseas Visitors Fund.

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The Department will continue . . . to work in close association with the Overseas Information Section of the Tourist and Publicity Department to maintain and improve the effectiveness of New Zealand's information activities abroad. It will continue to emphasize the futility of information activity that lacks purpose and is pursued without regard to policy objectives and the national interest. It will stress, too, the need for information material that is clear, well written, and both in content and language, fully adapted to the audience.

Africa

SOUTH AFRICAN PROPAGANDA: METHODS AND MEDIA*

BY VERNON MCKAY

No country perceives itself as an international pariah, even if other states so treat it. The political communications of such a state tend to focus on the few highly specific audiences where the messages may have some impact.

. . . . For two decades, South Africa has been the target of worldwide

*Excerpts from "South African Propaganda: Methods and Media," *Africa Report*, February 1966, pp. 41–46. Reprinted with the permission of *Africa Report*, copyright holder.

criticism, some of it fair and some unfair. To respond to its critics, the Republic has mobilized a many-sided counterattack through the films, periodicals, and booklets of its Information Service, through employment of American public relations firms, and through publicizing the views of certain Americans who express strong sympathy for white South Africa and eulogize it as a fine field for American investors.

. . . . The Cabinet Ministers who portray South Africa as a stable, prosperous Western ally in contrast to a chaotic and savage black Africa infected with Communism are striking a responsive chord. . . . The ultimate objective is to change U.S. Government policy toward Africa.

NEW CONFIDENCE IN PRETORIA

To understand the current expansion of South Africa's information program, one must relate it to the political factors that account for the aura of confidence now emanating from Pretoria. . . . South Africans are encouraged both by their success in repressing African nationalist movements, sabotage, and terrorism, and by the hope that the threat of economic sanctions against them is receding.

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The government's view that diversionary turbulence elsewhere will ease pressure on South Africa had repeatedly been confirmed, however, by the crises over Berlin, Cuba, the Congo, Malaysia, the Dominican Republic, the Middle East, and India's conflicts with China and Pakistan. These crises bolstered the view that Europe, Latin America, and Asia were higher than Africa in United States foreign policy priorities, and that the American armed forces, heavily committed in Vietnam and elsewhere, would regard the idea of a naval blockade of South Africa with great disfavor.

"OPEN SEASON ON UNCLE SAM"

Pretoria's new confidence was reflected during the next few months by the introduction of further stringent security legislation in April and June and by Dr. Verwoerd's declaration of "open season on Uncle Sam," as a South African newspaper termed it (*Daily Dispatch,* July 21, 1975). In May [1965], when the American aircraft carrier *Independence* wanted to refuel in Cape Town enroute to the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific, the South African Government took the position that only white flight crews from the carrier could land at the Republic's airports. The United States responded on May 13 by cancelling the carrier's visit to Cape Town.

This was followed, on June 25, by Prime Minister Verwoerd's statement at a Nationalist Party meeting at De Aar that the United States would not be allowed to post Negroes at its two space tracking stations in South Africa. Since the United States had not sent any American Negroes to the stations, Verwoerd's statement was gratuitous and provocative. NASA responded three days later by stating that the United States planned to continue operating its tracking stations, using personnel assigned without regard to race and color. The issue also got to the White

House, where Press Secretary Bill D. Moyers reaffirmed on July 16 that the United States would assign personnel abroad regardless of color. In response to questions from the press, however, Moyers refused to say whether the United States would close the South African stations in case of a showdown.

At the De Aar politicaly rally on June 25, according to *The New York Times*, Dr. Verwoerd also bitterly attacked the multiracial guest list of invitees to the American Ambassador's annual Fourth of July party, and declared that South African officials would continue to boycott mixed receptions. Since this was the third year in which the Ambassador had invited people of all races, Dr. Verwoerd's statement again seemed deliberately provocative.

On August 30, the *Rand Daily Mail* carried a story saying that the Government of South Africa had demanded three cuts in the USIA film entitled *John F. Kennedy, Years of Lightning, Days of Drums*, because of scenes of U.S. Peace Corps volunteers working with Africans in Tanganyika, Negroes and whites working together in the United States, and scenes of the civil rights program. USIA refused to show a cut version of the film.

This was followed on September 21 by the Prime Minister's statement at the Orange Free State Nationalist Party Congress in Bloemfontein regarding his tangle with the United States Government over the activities of four American diplomats. It was true, he said, that these United States representatives had conducted themselves in a manner which his government did not regard as being in the interest of friendly relations between the two countries. He denied, however, the reports in the American press that South Africa had asked the United States to withdraw these diplomats. To repudiate reports that he had been rebuffed by the United States, the Prime Minister stressed that there was no question of a rebuff because he had only informed the United States of the behavior of its representatives, leaving it to the State Department to deal with the matter.

Two days later the American Embassy in Pretoria announced that the United States had decided not to withdraw the four "senior and experienced" diplomats. The statement reaffirmed full confidence in the officers, and the "conviction that they had performed their duties in accordance with normal and accepted practice for the conduct of diplomatic representatives." The Afrikaans newspaper, *Die Vaderland*, stated that the four Americans were "active in leftist politics," and it hinted that the government was displeased at reports that they were associated with the South African Institute of Race Relations. The paper also contended that the US Embassy had distributed films praising people who opposed the South African Government's policy and had issued "frankly propagandistic" materials on the civil rights issue in the United States.

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Whatever Dr. Verwoerd's motives, it should not be overlooked that his attacks on American policy unintentionally helped the United States, at

least temporarily, by improving its image in the minds of Africans and other critics of apartheid.

THE INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

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When the Nationalist government came to power in 1948, it decided to reorganize the Office and concentrate on an expanded information program abroad. Overseas information officers formerly under the Department of External Affairs were transferred to the State Information Office under the Department of the Interior. A Cabinet decision gave the Office director and his staff access to all Ministers and department heads, and the Office worked out a system of cooperation with other departments and with such government organizations as the South African Tourist Corporation, which advertises the Union's scenic attractions.

While the Office also serves South Africans at home, "by far" its "most important function," according to its first annual report in 1949, "is to serve as a channel for the distribution of information on South Africa abroad." When Dr. D. F. Malan became Prime Minister in 1948, there were only three information branches overseas—one in London since 1939, a second in New York since 1942, and a third in Nairobi since 1943. The Nationalist government increased the number of information attaches and assistants to 16 in 1949. Officers were assigned to Paris, The Hague, Rome, Bonn, Lisbon, Ottawa, Buenos Aires, and Leopoldville, and plans were made to send one to Salisbury. The Office announced the optimistic intention to have an information attache in every country with which the Union had diplomatic relations.

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The major program of the Office soon developed in the United States. According to its 1951 annual report ". . . the South African Government Information Office in the U.S. is in fact serving two States, the U.S. and the vast organization of the United Nations with its exceptional potentialities for spreading news and influencing world opinion." In 1951 the Union decided to set up an office in Washington in addition to the office operating in New York since 1942.

The 1952 annual report also suggested that the "West Coast offers an important and approachable field for South African publicity," although it was December 1963 before an office was finally opened in San Francisco. Above all, the 1952 report stressed the significance of New York which, "apart from being the biggest center of news dissemination in America, if not in the world, also has in its midst the elaborate press organization attached to the United Nations," with representatives of about 400 world newspapers, news agencies, and radio services accredited to the UN all the year around, and more than 1,000 accredited pressmen there during the General Assembly. The Office concentrates on lobbying of these newsmen in order to maintain the best possible relations with them: "This is undoubtedly the most important aspect of public relations activities in the UN."

By 1955, after J. G. Strijdom had replaced Dr. Malan as Prime Minis-

ter, the stage was set for still further expansion of information activities. The State Information Office was transferred back from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of External Affairs, then headed by Eric Louw. At this time, Louw also held the key post of Minister of Finance and was willing and able to provide more money for overseas propaganda. Partly because of its policy decision to refuse to cooperate in United Nations discussions of South Africa's racial problems, the government was convinced of the necessity for greater publicity overseas through its own channels.

A change in tone in South Africa's attitude toward world opinion is clear in the first of 107 "Fact Papers" which began to appear in 1955 as supplements to the Information Office's weekly *Digest of South African Affairs*. Written by P. J. Meiring, Director of State Information, it appeared in December 1955 under the title "World Opinion—does it matter?" Meiring warned his countrymen that those who are indifferent to world opinion "have arrived at a dangerous state of mind" because "the possibility of isolation and ostracism is more than South Africa would like to endure or care to afford." He concluded his four page plea with these words:

> Modern techniques have turned selling into a highly specialized science. South Africa could profitably employ these new-fangled methods in her difficult task of "selling" herself to the outside market. The real commodity that wants selling, however, is good will and the real story that wants telling is the unofficial, domestic and social story of what individual White South Africans are doing for the Bantu. Let that be a story of real understanding and willingness to uplift and it will be a story to impress and convince the outside world.

In addition to the problem of persuading the South African public, Meiring was having difficulty at this time in convincing Cabinet Ministers that they should be more careful in their speeches to constituents at local political rallies in order to avoid unnecessarily adverse reactions overseas. *The Star* (Johannesburg), in several critical articles during this period, called on the Information Office to publicize "facts" rather than political speeches. Meiring evidently had some success with Prime Minister Strijdom, partly by trying to convince him that the growth of President Eisenhower's popularity in the United States was the result of good press relations.

Another tactic of South Africa's propagandists is the use of American public relations firms. In 1955, when Meiring was considering offers from four American public relations organizations, he concluded that this was an effective way of selling Belgian policy in the Congo to American audiences, but doubted that American firms would have "enough sympathy and understanding for South African problems" to be good press agents for the Union. Five years later, however, the South African Government decided to employ . . . a New York firm, to help sell South Africa to the American public, mainly through films.

THE FULBRIGHT INVESTIGATION.

The activities of . . . [the firm] were investigated on March 25, 1963 by

the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during its study of the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States. The Committee Chairman, Senator J. William Fulbright, made it clear on several occasions that the Committee was not challenging the right of public relations firms to do business with foreign governments. The only issue was whether the public knew that it was getting foreign propaganda as required by the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Senator Fulbright pressed the point with painstaking care. When the . . . [spokesman for the firm] said that he did not engage in hardcore political lobbying, Chairman Fulbright took considerable time to establish the fact that the . . . Organization did engage in "political" propaganda. The Senator produced a letter dated November 22, 1961 . . . to Meiring which described the firm's propaganda work for the South African Government during the preceding seven months. . . .

> What much of this work proves—beyond doubt—is the value of positive nonpolitical propaganda to create an effect essentially political. Political propaganda as such would have been largely ineffective. But institutional publicity—touching on South Africa's general life, economic, social, and cultural accomplishments, tourist attractions, sports, festivals, etc.—can tend to soften hard political attitudes, make for good feeling, and tend to correct misinformation about the country. (U.S. Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States*. Part 7, Hearing on March 25, 1963, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, 1963, p. 708.)

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Two years later, the government [employed] another American public relations firm. . . . to undertake "a professional survey and public opinion poll" to determine South Africa's image in this country. In a letter dated December 23, 1964, the South African Director of Information asked . . . [the firm] to "propose a program to counteract the harmful effects of current misconceptions of the true thrust and intention of South African policies. . . . " . . . [The firm] replied on January 4, 1965, that

> South Africa has been the target of special interest and pressure groups internationally in recent years to an extent almost unbelievable in the history of militant propaganda. I am certain that no responsible person or group, in or out of the American government, desires misunderstanding with the Republic of South Africa, whose history so nearly parallels our own.

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In addition to the above expenditures, the South African Government paid over $141,000 during the first six months of 1965 for the tourist publicity of the New York office of the South African Tourist Corporation. Three American law firms were also in the employ of South Africa, one of them being a lobbyist for South African sugar.

THE NEW OFFENSIVE

By fiscal 1965/66, after a decade of continuous expansion, the information budget had risen to $4,459,000 under a separate Department of Information created in 1962 with its own Minister in the Cabinet. The total personnel complement of the Department and its external service had risen to 378.

South Africa's accelerated drive for American support was launched in March 1965 by three full-page South African advertisements appearing in

The New York Times, The Washington Post, and four other major American newspapers. The first ad, on March 21, stressed South Africa's role as a rich, anti-Communist ally which has attracted 100,000 immigrants in the past three years. The second, five days later, eulogized the "miracle" of a "real Eldorado" where American corporations in 1963 reported "a 26 percent return on their outlays." And the third, on March 31, portrayed the Transkei as South Africa's "Pattern for Self-Determination" in the form of a "Community of politically independent, economically interdependent states." The response to the newspaper advertisements reportedly brought as many as 100 letters a day to the Embassy from Americans, some of whom were interested in emigrating to South Africa. *The Washington Post* reported that a "flock of other newspapers," seeking advertising income, had also contacted the Embassy.

South African officials are also exhibiting a new alertness in the treatment of the Republic's critics. One good example is their response to diplomatic correspondent William R. Frye, who is making a study of American policy toward South Africa for The Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. After a visit to South Africa in March and April 1964, Frye published a series of articles in his syndicated column, "The World in Focus," in 78 newspapers, and in his syndicated news service, "The UN Today," in 16 newspapers. South African officials wrote letters of protest to the editors of many of these newspapers. Some of the editors subsequently canceled Frye's column.

Finally, South Africans are paying the expenses of a growing number of sympathetic American businessmen, journalists, professors and others, including wives, for tours of South Africa. The latest beneficiaries are a group of 14 American editors, publishers, and reporters who were given a tour of South Africa early in 1966. Four Americans were also brought to The Hague in 1965 by the South African Government to testify on its behalf in the South West Africa case before the International Court of Justice. While some of these trips are paid for by the government, others are financed by the South Africa Foundation, a private organization financed mainly by South African businessmen. Although the South Africa Foundation . . . contends that it does not engage in "political propaganda," the fact is that it buttresses the government by emphasizing only one side of the South African story—the boom in the White sector of the economy.

In the hope of improving the results of these propaganda efforts, the government is simultaneously attempting to stifle criticism at home and curtail it abroad. Visas have been denied to such American observers as Professor Gwendolen M. Carter, Director of Northwestern University's Program of African Studies, and Waldemar A. Nielsen, President of the African-American Institute. Visa application forms now contain a question asking if material will be written for publication. If the answer is affirmative, the application is sent to Pretoria for detailed screening. Few

graduate students now receive visas for research in South Africa. The whole system has tightened up, especially within the last three years.

Inside South Africa, the government is clamping down on the press and the English-speaking universitites which in the past enjoyed an atmosphere of free speech. The press has been forced to undertake voluntary censorship in order to stave off repressive legislation. The opposition *Rand Daily Mail* has succumbed to the extent of booting "upstairs" to the post of editor-in-chief its talented and outspoken editor Laurence Gandar. In the universities, many faculty critics have left the country, some are confined by "banning" regulations, and most of those remaining find it expedient to curtail their expression of political views. Students, under the influence of parents, professors, and the government, are also becoming noticeably more conservative. Several organizations that seek to improve African conditions, such as the Institute of Race Relations, the Christian Institute, and the Defense and Aid Fund, are becoming the object of more and more overt attacks in this conformist political climate.

PROLIFIC AND ATTRACTIVE OUTPUT

The Information Service produces numerous informative periodicals, hundreds of attractive pamphlets and booklets, occasional press releases, and films for cinema and television. Its officers also make many speeches.

Six Information Service periodicals reach American readers, three of them produced in South Africa and the other three by the New York office. *South African Panorama* is an attractive illustrated monthly, including handsome color photography and many readable and informative article about the Republic. *South African Digest* (formerly *Digest of South African Affairs*) is a valuable and convenient weekly featuring the latest statements by government officials and useful data on recent developments. *Bantu* is an illustrated monthly dealing mostly with Bantu developments and produced largely for South African readers although a limited number of copies are sent overseas.

The New York office produces *South African Summary*, a weekly news release which summarizes for American readers material cabled daily from Pretoria to the New York office. *Business Report* is a second weekly news release, somewhat longer than the *South African Summary*, which emphasizes economic data and other news of special interest to American business. The Third New York periodical, *Scope*, is a more elaborate illustrated monthly on items of contemporary relevance. By December 1965, according to information filed with the Department of Justice, the monthly circulation of *Scope* had risen to 14,000, *South African Summary* to 4,800, and *South African Business Report* to 3,100. The monthly *Panorama*, which is produced in South Africa, went to 1,200 American recipients in May 1965.

The hundreds of pamphlets and booklets include the complete texts of many speeches by Cabinet Ministers, reprints of articles by Americans and others favorable to South African policy, and a great many publications, both long and short, written especially for the Information Service covering many aspects of South African life. The effective Audio-Visual

section of the Department of Information produces a number of films each year, mostly in color, and has won more than two dozen cups, medals and diplomas at international film festivals. It produces films in English, Afrikaans, French, German, Dutch, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese. The most recent award came in October 1965 at the Ninth International Film Festival in San Francisco, where its film on "White South Africans" won first place among 225 films submitted by governments in the category "The film as communication—government film for general information."

The television section of the Department of Information has also produced several hundred films for television, but in the words of the Department's 1963–64 report: "Television gives a preference to sensational material; consequently it is difficult to get constructive material on South Africa into television screens." Successful efforts were continued, however, to get one-minute television recordings of interesting events in South Africa incorporated in U.S. television news services. Moreover, during 1963–64, officials of the Information Office in New York participated in about 60 U.S. television and 50 radio interviews, as well as giving about one hundred lectures to American audiences.

Finally, at the end of October 1965, Dr. Verwoerd officially opened the new Bloemendal international shortwave radio center near Meyerton which is to beam "The Voice of South Africa" in nine languages for a total of 30.25 hours a day. When complete, the station's powerful transmitters will be able to reach "about every corner of the earth."

By 1964, the Department of Information was able to report that while many Americans remained "cynical" about South Africa's racial experiment, "there was an appreciable decline in the eagerness of journalists to forecast nothing but darkness for South Africa. . . . "

CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE IN INTERNAL CONFLICT: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN PORTUGESE GUINEA (1959 until 1965)*

By I. William Zartman

While the propaganda by both sides in the Portuguese-Guinea conflict for internal and external consumption tried to convey a sense of victory, certain themes run so contrary to prevailing international sentiments in specific situation as to be unacceptable. As a result, the insurgents garnered much international support while the Portuguese were almost completely isolated on this issue.

BACKGROUND

Like other African colonial territories, Portuguese Guinea was caught up with the fervor for independence sweeping across Africa in the mid-twentieth century. If independence had not been achieved by Guinea in 1958 and Senegal in 1960, there would most likely have been no in-

*Excerpts from *Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Volume III The Experience in Africa and Latin America*, The American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, Washington , D.C., Arpil 1968, pp. 353–370 (written in early 1965).

surgency in Portuguese Guinea. This was less the result of any direct aid from these two states than simply the psychological influence of neighboring areas' having transformed the slogan of "independence" into reality. In a larger context, the situation also resulted from a world opinion that put "colonialism" in the company of bad words and "independence" among the good.[1]

Slightly larger than Massachusetts and Connecticut combined, this small wedge of Portuguese territory on the coast of West Africa, between the former French colonies of Senegal and Guinea, is a tropical lowland region of mangrove swamps and marshes along the Atlantic, with low foothills in the interior. It is roughly comparable in size and terrain to the coastal region of South Carolina. Fifteen to thirty miles off the coast, which is broken by numerous inlets and estuaries, lies the Bijagos archipelago of about 25 small islands. The country's largest city is Bissau, the chief seaport and capital, with a population of 30,000.

* * * * *

African Dissidence Is Largely Unstructured

From the urban and "civilized" population, feelings of dissatisfaction and nationalism have spread to the 500,000 Africans living mainly in the interior. In the face of this growing alienation, some support for Portugal has come from tribal chiefs who owe their importance and power to Portuguese backing, and from other tribal elements. Particularly in the Fula regions of the eastern interior, traditional elders have sought and found support from the Portuguese against their younger nationalist rivals.* Traditional animosity between the intermingled Diola and Manjak peoples in the north has also been reflected in conflicting reactions to Portuguese rule.[2] Intertribal disputes are thus translated into nationalist-colonialist terms, and sometimes they result in African support for the colonial power. In other instances, tribes which agree in opposing the Portuguese have joined rival nationalist organizations because of tribal differences.

Some tribes have a long tradition of resistance to European penetration. The Portuguese had to conduct military campaigns against coastal groups such as the Bijagos and Balantes as late as the World War I period. These tribes are located in the heavily populated areas of the earliest and deepest Portuguese penetration. Farther east in the interior, where there are fewer Europeans, there tends to be proportionatley less antagonism to colonial rule.

During the 1950s, opposition to Portuguese rule grew among the *mestiços* and urban African populations, specifically among laborers and those who had received some education. In 1952 an unsuccessful effort was made to organize an African political club. In 1954, an African sports and recreation association was formed, but it was repressed by the

*A similar situation, also involving the Fulas, occurred in neighboring French Guinea under French rule.

government because it opened its membership to *indígenas* as well as to *assimilados*. In 1955 an attempt was made to create a frankly political Movement for the National Independence of [Portuguese] Guinea (MING), but it failed for lack of support among civil servants and commercial employees in the face of Portuguese opposition. Between 1956 and 1958, urban workers were organized informally to the extent that they carried out strikes for specific labor benefits, but no African labor union was permitted.

Political activity during the 1952–59 period was limited to reform groups who concentrated on demands for better wages and political rights as well as for ending "contract" or forced labor, and the Portuguese system of dividing the African population into *indígenas* and *assimilados*.[3] As attempts to organize and strike were put down by the Portuguese, these specific grievances became the basis for the nationalist movement.

INSURGENCY

The Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), which despite its lack of legal status was to become the major insurgent organization, was founded in September 1956. It concentrated its efforts among urban workers and artisans, organizing strikes for specific demands. An important change in tactics followed the "massacre of Pigiguiti quay" of August 3, 1959, when a port strike in Bissau was ended bloodily with some 50 deaths. After this event, which marked the beginning of active insurgency, the PAIGC organization turned away from the city and toward the bush, where the Portuguese presence was weaker.[4]

Insurgent Phases and Areas of Operation

The insurgency involved a preparation stage, a phase of open guerrilla warfare, including some area control from the very beginning, and, from 1964, what may be considered a regular military phase. Actual fighting broke out during the middle of 1962 and has taken place in most of the heavily populated western half of the country. As of this writing in early 1965, the insurgency is still ongoing.

During the first year, the insurgency was largely contained in a southern area between Bissau and Bafatá on the Geba River and the border with Guinea. During the second year of the insurgency, flighting spread to the Senegal border region between the Cacheu River and the frontier around São Domingos, and in the Oio forest between Mansôa, Farim, and the Cacheu River, while intensifying in the original southern zone around Cacine and Catió.

Insurgent Aims, Strategy, and Tactics

The insurgents' purpose was to obtain total independence from Portugal. Their strategy has been to destroy the military and economic founda-

tion of the Portuguese presence and to wipe out installations that the PAIGC regarded as the symbols and bases of exploitation and socioeconomic disruption. Attacks were also launched to capture materiel, especially arms and small craft; and PAIGC claimed to have solved its arms problem with captured Portuguese weapons.

Guerrilla attacks during 1963 and 1964 followed several general patterns. Lines of communication—roads, bridges, and river transportation—were primary targets after the first sabotage attempts in 1962. Portuguese barracks and troop stations were other military objectives. Barracks and towns—such as São João and Fulacunda—were raided and burned, but never permanently occupied. Economic objectives were Portuguese trading posts and *cercos* (peanut storage bins), and installations of the large trading companies have been frequently hit. Guerrilla activity has thus been directed mainly against Portuguese military forces and commercial installations, although native supporters of the Portuguese have been killed along with Portuguese troops.

Attacks occurred most frequently at night, following classic guerrilla tactics of sudden ambush, after which the attacking force melted away into the forest. Before 1964, few operations ever reached a "military" phase, in the sense of pitched battles rather than guerrilla engagements. Occasionally, the size of forces involved in an ambush led to prolonged fighting rather than simply a hit-and-run raid, but this was usually by accident rather than by design.

Rebel Intelligence and Propaganda Efforts

To prevent counterattack, warning systems were set up around insurgent villages, so that the rebels' own local population could be notified in time to flee into the bush before Portuguese troops arrived. This system was not always effective, however, since Portuguese sympathizers were also found in some villages.[5] According to Portuguese sources, insurgent intelligence made extensive use of the women attached to guerrilla groups: On trips into town to make purchases, they were supposed to observe and report on Portuguese military movements.[6]

Intensive propaganda efforts by the insurgents to encourage desertion by Portuguese soldiers and officers have allegedly achieved some success.[7] Word-of-mouth propaganda and written tracts have been used to win over the native population and to spread the idea that PAIGC is the wave of the future, while Portugal is on the way out. Any talk of discouragement among the small Portuguese population is inevitably overheard in the towns, and this supports the insurgents' propaganda effort. Continuing attempts are also made to organize the native population—politically, into the PAIGC's territorial units, and functionally, to give food, shelter, and information to the guerrillas.

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PAIGC's Internal Support Base

The PAIGC's operations and membership gave it the best claim for

being the most significant nationalist movement in Portuguese Guinea. Relations with other nationalist groups tended to be hostile, as each group claimed to be the exclusive representative of the nationalist movement or, alternatively, an indispensable segment of the movement that must be taken into account in any unification effort. Within this contradictory atmosphere of hostility and unity, some attempts at political coordination were made.

A stillborn attempt to unify the PAIGC and the Union des Populations de la Guinée Dite Portugaise (UPG), led by Henri Labery, a Capeverdean in Dakar, took place in that city in July 1961 under the name of the Front Uni de Libération de Guinée et du Cap Vert (FUL). More successful was a later organization, the Front pour la Libération et l'Indépendance Nationale de la Guinée Dite Portugaise (FLING), which brought together the UPG, the Mouvement de Libération de la Guinée Dite Portugaise (MLG), led by Henri and Francois Mendy of Senegal, and the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain de Guinée (RDAG), led by Doudou Seydi and Cheik Mane of Senegal. In November 1963 FLING was reported to have been reconstituted, bringing into membership the moderate Union des Ressortissants de la Guinée Portugaise (URGP), or Union of Nationals of Portuguese Guinea, led by Benjamin Pinto-Bull, a Capeverdean in Dakar.

* * * * *

Importance of External Aid to the Insurgents

External aid has had the effect of keeping the insurgency alive, primarily by means of supplies of small arms and secondarily through the military sanctuary and haven for PAIGC leadership provided by the neighboring states, Guinea and Senegal. In the case of the splinter movements, including the MLG, sanctuary was everything, for the groups had little support and carried out little activity inside Portuguese Guinea. In the case of PAIGC, sanctuary and haven meant arms, offices for organization, and bases from which to carry out diplomatic operations to influence world opinion.

There is no way to measure the value of diplomatic support as against such material assets as arms or financial aid, but it is safe to say that the African states' propaganda campaign carried on by diplomatic means against Portugal has been of great advantage to the insurgents. Without it the insurgency would have been subject to demoralization, condemnation by world public opinion, and a more vigorous riposte from Portugal; furthermore, it kept hope and faith alive among the insurgents. Thus the diplomatic aspect of external aid, although intangible, may have been more effective than its few concrete victories might suggest.

Collective African Diplomatic Support

African aid to the insurgents of Portuguese Guinea has been given individually by single nations and collectively. It was, for example, at the second All African Peoples Conference, held in January 1960 at Tunis,

that the PAIGC joined the Movimento Popular de Liberação de Angola (MPLA), led by Mario de Andrade, to form the Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independência Nacional (FRAIN). In Casablanca in April 1961, this organization was enlarged to include nationalist movements from other Portuguese territories and became the Conferência de Organizações Nacionalistas das Colônias Portuguêsas (CONCP), with coordinating headquarters in Rabat.[8]

Three African interstate groups—the Casablanca Group, the African and Malagasy Union, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)—have given diplomatic support to the PAIGC, and their members in the United Nations (U.N.) have sponsored measures, such as boycotts of Portuguese goods, in order to exert pressure for the rebel cause. In 1963, the OAU voted $700,000 to assist the various insurgent movements in Portugal's African colonies.

Support From the African States of Guinea and Senegal

Aid from Guinea to the insurgents began in 1959, soon after that country gained independence from France. The external seat of the PAIGC was set up in the Guinean capital of Conakry following the already mentioned "massacre of Pigiguiti quay."[9] Guinea's aid in the form of sanctuary led the insurgents to concentrate their efforts in the southern portion of Portuguese Guinea near the Guinean border during the early stages. Arms supply routes run from Conakry across the border into the Portuguese Guinea interior. A rest and indoctrination center was known to exist outside Conakry. Guerrillas have received training in Guinea, ranging from political and military instruction to political and labor courses in the Guinean "workers' university" in Conakry. Guinea has given financial aid and has beamed radio propaganda across the border to Portuguese Guinea since 1959 in support of PAIGC.

Guinea has given active diplomatic support to the PAIGC through the OAU, United Nations, and Casablanca Group. In an investigation of the Portuguese Guinean problem held by the U.N. in 1962 and by the OAU in 1963,[10] the Guinean chairman of the subcommission in each case facilitated the PAIGC's presentation of its case. Guinea is also a member of the OAU liberation coordination committee of nine.

Senegal's position has been equivocal. Senegalese contacts with Portuguese Guineans and Capeverdeans antedated World War II, but Senegal could not proffer aid until it achieved independence in 1960. Both the PAIGC and MLG had bureaus in Dakar, but the MLG took greater advantge of this opportunity than did the PAIGC. At the OAU foreign ministers' conference in Dakar in August 1963, Senegal threw heavy diplomatic support behind FLING, of which the MLG was a part, effectively blocking OAU approval of the PAIGC as the sole representative of the nationalist movement in Portuguese Guinea.[11] Senegal is also a member of the OAU's liberation committee and special investigatory committee. Portuguese Guineans and Capeverdeans living in Dakar re-

ceived scholarships and education in Senegalese schools and at the University of Dakar. Some medical care was given to wounded insurgents in Senegalese hospitals. The insurgents also received press support through the Senegalese government's newspaper, *L'Unité Africaine*, and through Radio Senegal. The leaders of many Portuguese Guinea nationalist splinter groups were Senegalese citizens who had jobs in Senegal.

Support From Morocco, Algeria, and Ghana

Moroccan aid probably began about 1961. Significant events were the founding of the Casablanca Group in Januray 1961; the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of Portuguese Colonies (CONCP) in Casablanca in April 1961; and the establishment in June 1961 of a Moroccan ministry for African affairs, through which aid to the insurgency is coordinated. The Moroccan army has given training to guerrillas, and Morocco has given both financial aid and important quantities of arms. Office space has been provided in Rabat for the PAIGC bureau and CONCP offices, and diplomatic support for PAIGC has also come from Morocco in the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Casablanca Group.

Algeria became an important source of arms after the end of the Algerian war, principally through the shipment of war surplus; it has also been a source of financial aid. Radio Algiers propagandized the insurgent's cause, and support was given through the Algerian press, particularly *Révolution Africaine,* which was read throughout much of the continent. In the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Casablanca Group, Algeria has given diplomatic support to PAIGC against rival groups; it was a member of the OAU special investigating committee and liberation coordination committee. Algerian aid is coordinated through the offices of the president and the foreign ministry.

Ghana also gave diplomatic support to PAIGC through the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Casablanca Group, and has granted arms and financial aid in small quantities. A PAIGC bureau was located in Accra; money, aid, and accommodations are being handled by the Ghanian African affairs bureau. Ghana's press and radio have given heavy propaganda support to the insurgents.

External aid from African sources has aroused little international reaction. Guinea and Senegal have been very careful to keep their aid limited and to avoid condoning direct guerrilla incursions from their soil, lest the Portuguese use the doctrine of "hot pursuit" to ravage such territory—the Tunisian experience in the Algerian was was a vivid lesson. As a result of this policy, Senegal was even able to have Portugal condemned by the United Nations Security Council on one occasion when it bombed the Senegalese village of Bouniak on April 8, 1963, following an MLG raid. The solidarity between newly independent African governments and aspiring independence movements in Africa has been more or less accepted throughout the world.

Aid From Communist Countries

There was more international concern, especially in the West, over Communist aid. The U.S.S.R. Czechoslovakia, and possibly China have contributed important quantities of arms and given training, including education in Soviet schools, as well as guerrilla and political instruction. In Guinea's "labor university," Communist-bloc instructors also appear to have taught insurgents. There are no reliable reports of any foreign personnel operating with the guerrillas in Portuguese Guinea.

As far as can be determined, Communist influence has been ancillary to nationalism and did not, in any case, initiate the insurgency. *Mestiços* and modernized Africans, especially the assimilados, have had occasion to contact members of the illegal, clandestine Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) when in Portugal for schooling, training, or work. Insurgency leaders have also been in contact with nationalist leaders from Angola and Mozambique who are themselves influenced by Communists, whether Portuguese or other nationalities. Thus, although indirect contacts exist and have grown since the outbreak of the insurgency, the insurgency is a product of local conditions.

Portugal has emphasized the Communist aspect of the fight in the United Nations, but since the extent of Communist infiltration into the movement is not known, Western governments have limited their reaction to careful watching. It is by no means proved that arms aid has won for the bloc countries any permanent advantage among the insurgents.

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COUNTERINSURGENCY

Portugal's counterinsurgent strategy in this small West African colony evolved in reaction to the escalation of insurgent activity. As the nationalist movement gained momentum, the Portuguese turned from police measures to military operations. Later, the Salazar government instituted political reforms which appeared to have been taken in response to the growth of African nationalism throughout Portugal's African possessions, especially in Angola, which was in open revolt after 1961. Since Portugal's energies were so fully engaged in Angola, its military effort in Guinea was essentially defensive, although there were several military offensives against guerrilla-held areas.[12]

Portugal's initial response to the nationalist insurgency was to use police repression. After a number of strikes had taken place, a branch of the Portuguese political police, the Polícia Internacional de Defensa de Estado (PIDE), was set up in Portuguese Guinea in 1957. The Bissau port strike was ended by police action in August 1959, and the first large wave of arrests began in April 1960. Demonstrations in the cities were promptly broken up through the use of police and security forces. After 1959, there were no successful strikes. A 9 o'clock curfew was imposed in the principal towns, but this has been lifted from time to time.[13]

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Psychological Operations and Civic Action

Portuguese efforts at psychological warfare have met with varying degrees of success. African support for the Portuguese has come from various groups and tribes, notably the Fula, an eastern tribal group that has cooperated quite consistently with the Portuguese.[14] Effective use of the printed word has been limited by high illiteracy rates and general lack of public confidence in the government's official statements and commentaries. Government information media have in some cases succeeded in encouraging insurgents to defect, by carrying offers of pardon to guerrillas in the interior.[15] Penitent prisoners have been rewarded with high-paying jobs as civilian construction workers, but most efforts at prisoner rehabilitation have occurred in jail. There has been no known offer of general amnesty during the insurgency.

Because of their budgetary inability to carry out a broad program of social welfare, the Portuguese have concentrated their civic action efforts in operational areas; army doctors, for instance, devote much of their own time to helping local people. There has been no native resettlement program, and there have not been enough insurgents captured to warrant a general rehabilitation program. The PAIGC has repeatedly charged Portugal with the use of torture and brutal killings, and also with the maintenance of a concentration and forced labor camp on Galinhas Island.[16]

Programs of Social and Political Reform

Positive social and political reforms have also been undertaken by the Portuguese in an attempt to restore harmony in their realm. The *assimilado* system was abolished by the reforms of 1961–62; thus all inhabitants of Portuguese Guinea were presumably placed on an equal footing under Portuguese law. The legal status of *indígena* and its accompanying head tax were also abolished, along with forced labor laws. However, the effect of these changes has not appeared to be very great. Some "public labor" or even "private labor" still persisted, although it is less widespread than before; other personal taxes replaced the head tax.

Critics of Portuguese policies claimed that the proclamation of equality on paper had little meaning in the absence of greater economic and educational opportunities and that the reform measures, as much as any other measures, were imposed by a foreign authority.[17] In this view, the extension of Portuguese citizenship to all inhabitants of Portuguese Guinea would have meaning only if effective legislative bodies were created, to be elected by the entire population, and if a vigorous political, social and economic educational campaign were carried out prior to the vote.

Political reforms have also been instituted. New colonial statues were drawn up in 1961–62 and promulgated in June 1963 to liberalize the political regime of all the overseas territories, including Portuguese Guinea.[18] Pursuant to the Organic Law of 1963, a partially elected legisla-

tive council was authorized. On the local level, municipal committees and parish and local boards were established. The new organic law, which was indefinite on the powers of these bodies, provided for transitional conditions which left effective power in the hands of appointed officials. Laws passed by the council were subject to approval of the Portuguese overseas minister in Lisbon. Elections for the legislative council were held in March 1964, and the first council session opened in April. Voter registration requirements were so rigorous, however, that only a small percentage of the population could vote.[19] In any case, there was little or no indication that these reforms achieved appreciable positive effects.

By mid-1962, Portugal had also permitted the creation of the moderate nationalist party, the URGP or Union of Nationals of Portuguese Guinea, under the leadership of Benjamin Pinto-Bull, brother of the secretary general of the province. The Portuguese encouraged the URGP and allowed it to present its case for reforms, following which it was immediately criticized by other nationalist groups as "neo-colonialist." According to African reports, the URGP was eventually frustrated by Portuguese intransigence and, tired of impotent moderation, merged with FLING by the end of the year.[20]

Reactions in Portugal

Public opinion in metropolitan Portugal generally supported the government's suppression of the insurgency, for the territory of Portuguese Guinea has been considered an integral part of Portugal, and the insurgents as tools or agents of communism. Portuguese declarations and propaganda, however, have paid much less attention to Portuguese Guinea than to Angola and Mozambique, and many Portuguese were probably largely ignorant of the situation, possibly even of the existence of Portuguese Guinea. Relatively few Portuguese troops were involved, and the economic damage suffered by private investors in Portugal was fairly small and affected few people; thus there were few ways in which the insurgency touched the daily lives of the Portugese people.

Still, the problem must also be seen in the context of the Salazar regime's general political position.[21] Instead of retiring in 1958, as had been predicted, Salazar strengthened his hand in order to counter growing opposition. He consolidated his own political position at home, directed popular dissatisfaction against foreign scapegoats, and hardened his counterinsurgency policies in Africa. In June 1964, for example, the post of governor of Portuguese Guinea was combined with that of the military commander in chief. At the same time, Salazar encouraged ostensibly liberal reforms in the colonies, and there were persistent semiofficial rumors of greater liberalization.

International Reactions to Portuguese Policies

Portugal's colonial policies have aroused a variety of international reactions.[22] Communist-bloc countries loudly condemned Portugal's at-

tempt to maintain its colonial rule in Portuguese Guinea. Spain has given consistent support to Portugal in the United Nations; France, Belgium, and Great Britain have given partial support. The United States, Britain, and France have at times expressed concern for the violence in the Portuguese colonies, and in April 1963 the U.N. Security Council unanimously voted to condemn Portugal in the Bouniak incident. At the same time, however, Western states have been reluctant to support what they sometimes view as empty and self-righteous resolutions presented by the African states in the United Nations. Western votes for these resolutions have more often reflected an intention to appease the Africans than to condemn the Portuguese.[23]

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Attitudes in Latin American countries have varied. PAIGC officials have cited Brazil and Venezuela as areas where there has been some unofficial support for the nationalist movement, revolving around Salazar opponents in exile there. Through 1963, however, Brazil and the Dominican Republic supported Portugal in the United Nations on matters concerning Portuguese Africa, whereas all other Latin American states have rather consistently voted against her.

Although African countries have generally condemned Portuguese colonial policy, only Portuguese Guinea's immediate neighbors and radical African nationalists have shown much interest in this particular Portuguese colony. African reactions have been based on both moral and political grounds; they have protested the limitation on indigenous African rights and sought to promote solidarity among all African nationalist and independence movements. Portuguese attempts to suppress insurgency in Portuguese Guinea have been supported in Africa only by the white governments of Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa, two countries also under diplomatic attack for similar policies.

NOTES

1. Much of the information for this article was gathered in interviews with three men associated with the insurgents—Amilcar Cabral, in Conakry in October-November 1962; Arraujo, in Dakar in May 1963; Portuguese Embassy Secretary Luis Navega, in December 1963; and Portuguese Military Attaché Col. Pinto-Bessa, in December 1963. Some of this interview material was previously published in the author's article, "Africa's Quiet War: Portuguese Guinea," *Africa Report*, IX (February 1964), 8–12. In the present study, specific source reference will be made to the interviews or to the previous article only when necessary.

2. Interview with Professor L. V. Thomas, Universityof Dakar, May 1963.

3. *Le Peuple de la Guinée "Portuguesa" devant l'ONU* (PAIGC, mimeographed, n.d. [circa 1961]), pp. 54–64. See also the series of mimeographed reports submitted by the PAIGC before the Afro-Asian Jurists Conference, Conakry, October 15–22, 1962: "L'Emigration et le travail forcé," "La Situation politique," "Partis politiques et syndicats," "La Lutte de liberation nationale," "Situation judiciaire," and "Notre peuple, le gouvernement portugais, et l'ONU."

4. Information on the details of the insurgency is drawn largely from the periodic mineographed communiqués of the PAIGC. Brief news items, based on this material, can also be found regularly in *Le Monde* (Paris).

5. Interview with Amilcar Cabral.

[6] Translation from the Portuguese Press, January 29, 1964, subject: "Terrorism in Portuguese Guinea," Attachment No. 1 to IR 287.9002464. Unclassified.
[7] See the PAIGC "Message" of February 22, 1963, appealing for desertions and citing previous cases.
[8] See *Conférence des organisations nationalistes des colonies portugaises* (Rabat: CONCP, 1961).
[9] The following information has been gained largely through interviews. See Zartman, "Africa's Quiet War."
[10] See *African Revolution* (Algiers), vol. I, no. 4, 63–69.
[11] See *Le Monde*, July 31, August 3, 1963.
[12] Much of the material in the "Counterinsurgency" section is simply factual and can be gleaned from public as well as insurgent sources without any problem of political interpretation. It is regretted, however, that beyond the interviews granted by the Portuguese Consulate in Dakar and the Portuguese Embassy in Washington, there has been little assistance from Portuguese officials in providing information.
[13] *Le Monde*, June 15, 1961; Cabral, Speech to the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly December 12, 1962, p. 6; David Hapgood, Bulletin "DH–7" of March 30, 1962 (New York: Institute of Current World Affairs, 1962); *The New York Times*, March 22, 1962.
[14] "Comments . . . [on this study]," enclosure with letter from U.S. Department of State to Special Operations Research Office, August 4, 1964 (hereafter referred to as "Comments").
[15] *The New York Times*, September 2, 1963; PAIGC Communique, February 13, 1963; Portuguese Press Agency (ANTI), February 8, 1963.
[16] See *Le Peuple de la Guinée;* Cabral, Memorandum to the Union Africaine et Malgache, March 10, 1963; Cabral, Speech.
[17] See also *Le Peuple de la Guinée* pp. 25–30.
[18] See *Organic Law of the Portuguese Overseas Provinces* (Lisbon: Agencia Geral do Ultramar, 1963), chapters I, II, IV (secs. I, III); James Duffy, *Portugal's African Territories: Present Realities* (Occasional Paper No. 1; New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962); James Duffy, *Portugal in Africa* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1962); Patricia Wohlgemuth, "The Portuguese Territories and the United Nations," *International Conciliation*, 545 (November 1963).
[19] "Comments."
[20] Radio Yaoundé, November 27, 1963.
[21] See Duffy, *Portugal's African Territories*, pp. 24–27.
[22] See ibid., pp. 27–32; Wohlgemuth, "The Portuguese Territories and the United Nations."
[23] U.N. votes are given in ibid., pp. 60–66.

INSURGENT APPEALS AND METHODS

Political communications emanate from intergovernmental organizations, national governments, semigovernmental organizations, and private institutions. A growing number of domestic and international propaganda appeals derive from insurgent groups.

Domestically, insurgent propaganda may serve one or more objectives. It often seeks to reinforce the revolutionary spirit of the insurgents and their supporters. It may attempt to attract others to the cause of the rebels or to demoralize those loyal to the incumbent regime. On the other hand, it may simply take advantage of an event or development in such a way as to add to the state of unrest in the country.

Internationally, insurgent appeals may attempt to win foreign support (including the support of international organizations) to undermine the

international legitimacy of an existing administration, or to create the appearance of a viable opposition movement.

The means that the insurgents utilize to communicate with the population of the area in which they operate, or to which they aspire, depend upon the circumstances of the specific insurgency. In general, however, groups that are illegal can rely very little upon the mass media such as the newspapers. Instead, rebel groups tend to look to informal channels of communication and social movements for their primary channels in most cases.

The four articles that follow illustrate and discuss the appeals and methods of various revolutionary groups. The content should not be considered to have official Department of Defense approval, express or implied.

OLAS: GENERAL DECLARATION*

Supranational or international revolutionary organizations must rely on ideological and highly political statements of doctrine.

This Conference [of the Latin American Solidarity Organization], after a deep and exhaustive analysis of the conditions existing on the continent and after having ideologically clarified the essential problems of the revolutionary movements, has arrived at the following conclusions:

Latin America exists in conditions of convulsion, characterized by the presence of a weak bourgeoisie which, in indissoluble union with the landholders, constitutes the controlling oligarchy of our countries. Increased submission and almost absolute dependence of this oligarchy on imperialism has caused the intense polarization of forces on the continent consisting of the oligarchic imperialist alliance on one side and the peoples on the other. The peoples have a tremendous revolutionary power which is only waiting to be channeled by a correct leadership, by a revolutionary vanguard, in order to develop or to initiate the fight.

That power is the power of the proletarian masses, of city and rural workers, of a poor and highly exploited peasantry, of the young intellectuals, of students with a great tradition of struggle, and of the middle strata, all joined together by the common denominator of the exploitation to which they are subjected.

In the face of the crisis of the whole structure of the economic, social and political system throughout the continent, and the growing rebelliousness of the peoples, imperialism has designed and developed a continental strategy of repression which proposes vainly to detain the course of history. The survival of the colonial and neo-colonial systems of exploitation and domination are the aims of U.S. imperialism.

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*The General Declaration of the Latin American Solidarity Organization Conference, Havana, July-August 1967.

This situation determines and demands that revolutionary violence be unleashed and developed in response to reactionary violence.

Revolutionary violence as the highest expression of the peoples' struggle is not only the path, but it is the most concrete and the most direct potential for the defeat of imperialism.

The peoples as well as the revolutionaries have confirmed this reality and consequently realize the need to initiate, develop and bring armed struggle to its culmination in order to destroy the bureaucratic-military apparatus of the oligarchies and the power of imperialism.

In many countries the special conditions prevailing in the countryside, the favorable topography and a potentially revolutionary social base, in addition to the special adaptation of technical methods and professional armies to repress the people in the cities (which, moreover, are ill-adapted to an irregular war), mean that guerrilla warfare is the fundamental expression of armed struggle, the best school for revolutionaries and their indisputable vanguard.

The revolution, already underway in some countries, an imperative necessity in others and a future prospect in the rest, has a well defined anti-imperialist character within its anti-oligarchic aims.

The principal objective of the people's revolution on the continent is the seizure of power by means of the destruction of the bureaucratic-military apparatus of the state and its replacement by the people in arms in order to change the existing economic and social regime. This objective can be achieved only through armed struggle.

The development and the organization of the struggle depend on choosing the right site on which to carry it out and the most adequate methods of organization.

The lesson of the Cuban Revolution, the experiences accumulated by the revolutionary movement in recent years throughout the world, and the presence in Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia and Guatemala of an ever-growing armed revolutionary movement show that guerrilla warfare as a genuine expression of the people's armed struggle is the most effective method and the most adequate form for waging and developing revolutionary warfare in most of our countries and, consequently, on a continental scale.

In this particular situation the unity of the peoples, the identity of their aims, the unity of their views and their disposition to unite in carrying out the struggle are the elements characterizing the common strategy that must be opposed to that which imperialism is developing on a continental scale.

This strategy requires a precise and clear expression of solidarity, whose most effective characteristic is the revolutionary struggle itself, which extends across the continent and whose vanguard detachments are the guerrillas and liberation armies.

We, the representatives of the peoples of our America, conscious of the conditions which prevail on the continent, aware of the existence

of a common counter-revolutionary strategy directed by U.S. imperialism.

PROCLAIM:

1. That making the Revolution is a right and a duty of the peoples of Latin America:

2. That the Revolution in Latin America has its deepest historical roots in the liberation movement against European colonialism of the 19th century and against imperialism of this century. The epic struggle of the peoples of America and the great class battles that our people have carried out against imperialism in earlier decades, constitute the source of historical inspiration for the Latin American revolutionary movement;

3. That the essential content of the Revolution in Latin America is to be found in its confrontation with imperialism and the bourgeois and landowning oligarchies. Consequently, the character of the Revolution is the struggle for national independence, for emancipation from the oligarchies, and for taking the socialist road to complete economic and social development;

4. That the principles of Marxism-Leninism guide the revolutionary movement of Latin America;

5. That armed revolutionary struggle constitutes the fundamental course of the Revolution in Latin America;

6. That all other forms of struggle must serve to advance and not to retard the development of this fundamental course, which is armed struggle;

7. That, for the majority of the countries of the continent, the problems of organizing, initiating, developing and completing the armed struggle now constitute the immediate and fundamental task of the revolutionary movement;

8. That those countries where this task is not included in immediate planning must nevertheless inevitably consider this as a future probability in the development of their revolutionary struggle;

9. That the historic responsibility of furthering revolution in each country belongs to the people and their revolutionary vanguards;

10. That in most of our countries the guerrillas are the embryo of liberation armies and constitute the most efficient way of initiating and carrying out revolutionary struggle;

11. That the leadership of the revolution requires, as an organizing principle, the existence of a unified political and military command in order to guarantee success;

12. That the most effective type of solidarity that the revolutionary movements can offer each other lies precisely in the development and culmination of their own struggle within their own countries;

13. That solidarity with Cuba and cooperation and collaboration with the armed revolutionary movement are imperative duties of an interna-

tional nature, the duties of all the anti-imperialist organizations of this continent;

14. That the Cuban Revolution, as a symbol of the triumph of the armed revolutionary movement, constitutes the vanguard in the anti-imperialist movement of Latin America. Those peoples that carry out armed struggle will also place themselves in the vanguard as they advance along the road of armed struggle;

15. That the peoples directly colonized by European powers—or subjected to the direct colonial domination of the United States—who are now on the road to liberation must maintain, as their immediate and fundamental objective, their struggle for independence and their close ties with the general struggle on this continent, since this is the only way of preventing their being absorbed into the neocolonial system of the United States;

16. That the Second Declaration of Havana, a résumé of the great and glorious revolutionary tradition of the past 150 years of Latin American history, serves as a guiding document for the Latin American Revolution, and has been upheld, widened, enriched and made even more radical by the peoples of this continent during the past five years;

17. That the peoples of Latin America harbor no antagonisms toward any peoples of the world and extend their hand of brotherly friendship to the people of the United States itself, encouraging them to fight on against the oppressive policy of imperialist monopolies;

18. That the struggle in Latin America is strengthening its bonds of solidarity with the peoples of Asia and Africa and the socialist countries, especially with the Negroes of the United States, who suffer from class exploitation, poverty, unemployment, racial discrimination and the denial of the most basic human rights, and who constitute a force of considerable importance within the revolutionary struggle;

19. That the heroic struggle of the people of Vietnam aids all revolutionary peoples fighting against imperialism to an inestimable degree and constitutes an inspiring example for the people of Latin America;

20. That we have approved the Statutes and created a Permanent Committee with its seat in Havana for the Latin American Organization of Solidarity, which constitutes the true representation of the peoples of Latin America.

We, the revolutionaries of our America, the America lying south of the Rio Bravo, successors of those men who won our first independence, armed with an irrevocable will to struggle and a revolutionary scientific orientation and with nothing to lose but the chains which bind us.

ASSERT:

That our struggle constitutes a decisive contribution to the historic struggle of humanity to liberate itself from slavery and exploitation.

The Duty of Every Revolutionary is to Make the Revolution!

THE ALGERIAN PROBLEM*

BY THE ALGERIAN DELEGATION IN CAIRO

In colonial wars, a major insurgent goal is the establishment of a national personality—even if artificial—which may be claimed to have a prima facie right to self-determination.

Algeria is the case of a country annexed by a colonial power after a military conquest characterised by all aspects of classical imperialism. These aspects can be summed up as a policy of social depersonalization, exploitation and oppression of the Algerian masses for the sole benefit of the colonizing power and European settlers.

Colonialism has attracted the cultural and religious heritage of the Algerian nation, intent on depersonalizing the masses so as to exploit them further and to implement the policy of "assimilation."

The national language of the Algerian people is Arabic. Colonialism has sought to stamp out the Arabic language. The results of this policy are characterised until now by the refusal to allow the teaching of Arabic in Government schools and by the many hindrances to free education. Only in the Higher Institute of Islamic studies, and three Medersas (secondary schools), attended by less than 500 students, are Arabic studies pursued. In the French secondary schools, Arabic is taught as a foreign language. The opening of free primary-schools is openly hampered by the authorities who frequently close them down and arrest their teachers. One teacher (Cheikh Zerrouki) has been condemned to four years imprisonment for teaching Algerian history.

Even education in French is very limited. The percentage of illiteracy is 90 percent and today two million school-age children are deprived of any education. Two Algerian children out of 100 inhabitants go to school, while the proportion for the Europeans in Algeria is 16 students for 100 inhabitants. . . .

The Algerian problem is essentially a colonial one, and so long as the colonial regime continues to exist there can be no permanent solution and no permanent peace in Algeria, for it is in the nature of colonialism that it contains within itself the germs of continual conflicts and constitutes the greatest threat to peace. The Algerian people are deeply peace-loving. If there is any bloodshed in Algeria it is because the French Government have flatly rejected any peaceful solution of the problem.

The movement towards the independence of colonial peoples is gathering momentum and is becoming irresistible. Nevertheless, despite the changes which have occurred in Asia and in parts of Africa, in North Africa and particularly in Algeria, the French have persistently resisted any alteration in the status quo. In November, 1954, Mr. Mitterand, French Minister of the Interior, not only reaffirmed both inside the French Parliament and elsewhere that Algeria is a part of France and

*From "What Is Algeria," (Cairo: Algerian Delegation), 1955.

that "no interference by other countries in the Algerian question will be tolerated," but he also stated *"for Algeria the only negotiation is war."*

The fact remains, however, that the Algerian problem exists and can no longer be ignored. The military operations are continuing and the French now talk of an "impasse" and of the necessity of sending more and more reinforcements. French manoeuvres to suppress this problem, to hide it from the outside world are—as in the case of Tunisia and Morocco—doomed to failure. *From the legal point of view Tunisia and Morocco are "protectorates" while Algeria is considered "a part of France." In reality the problems of the three countries are the same and the fictions invented by France to confuse the issue have been rudely destroyed by the latest events in Algeria. The political aims of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria are the same; and their peoples look towards the establishment of independent states; their destiny is linked to each other in the future as it was in the past.*

Therefore, the basic solution for the North African problem lies firstly in the recognition of the fundamental fact that there is a single problem and that attempts to appease one part of North Africa in order to be able to crush another more effectively are destined to failure.

The French have to realise that the use of military repression against the force of nationalism cannot succeed. Sooner or later the French will have to recognise Algerian aspirations and to come to terms with the nationalists' demands. The continuance of forceful repression in Algeria will only cause increased bloodshed and bitterness between the Algerian and French peoples.

1. *Algerian Demands:* The political demands of the Algerians today, as since the end of the last World War, remain the establishment of a Sovereign Constituent Algerian Assembly elected by universal direct suffrage without distinction of race or religion. Such an assembly will enable the Algerian people to give expression to their aspirations through a genuinely representative body which will then undertake negotiations with France to define future Franco-Algerian relations. The prior conditions for such elections would be the abolition of the present police state government, the release of all political prisoners, the ending of police and military repression and the restoration of all civil liberties.

The Algerian Nationalists are for the establishment of a Social and Democratic Republic in Algeria.

2. *An International Problem:* Today the Algerian problem is not the concern of France alone but of the whole world—and particularly of those peoples who stand for abolition of Colonialism everywhere.

The 29 countries meeting at Bandung from April 18th to April 24th [1955] specifically considered the situation in Algeria.

The Conference declared its unanimous support of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination in the following terms:

> In view of the unsettled situation in North Africa and of the persisting denial to the peoples of North Africa of the rights to self-determination, the Asian-African

> Conference declared its support for the rights of the peoples of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence and urged the French government to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issues without delay. (Chapter D, Paragraph 2)

In addition, the Conference recognized that the basic right of the Algerian people to study their own language and culture had been suppressed, and condemned this denial of fundamental rights as an impediment to cultural advancement and to cultural co-operation on the wider international plane.

In a letter dated July 26th, 1955 addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the representatives of the Asian-African countries requested the "Question of Algeria" to be included in the Agenda of the tenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. They declared . . .

> The right of self-determination occupies a position of decisive importance in the structure of the United Nations. In the first Article of the Charter itself, it is specifically enumerated among the Purposes and Principles of the Organization; it is cited again in Article 55 as the basis of international economic and social co-operation; and it is affirmed in resolution 637 (VII), adopted by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly, as a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all other fundamental human rights. The emergence into independence of the peoples of many nations previously dependent is among the most encouraging features of the first decade of the United Nations history. On the other hand; the denial of the right of self-determination to other dependent peoples or undue delay in its implementation is a potential source of international friction and of concern to the international community.
>
> It is against this background that the United Nations should consider the deteriorating situation in Algeria, which has become a cause for growing concern. The position in Algeria is the direct result of colonial conquest, and the people of Algeria cannot be said to have exercised their right to self-determination as envisaged in the United Nations Charter. Delay in the exercise of this vital right can only frustrate the legitimate aspirations of the Algerian people, embitter relations between them and the French authorities and lead, as it is in fact doing, to the suppression of other fundamental rights, the retardation of cultural development and the imposition of order by force alone.

The French Government, for its part, has been quick to appeal to the Atlantic Pact Powers to support its attitudes towards Algeria and has already succeeded in obtaining permission from NATO High Command to withdraw French forces from Western Germany for use in Algeria. France is making every effort to put pressure on her friends and allies in case of the "internationalisation" of the problem.

The Algerian people are today being hard pressed by the forces of repression ranged against them. They know that their struggle for independence has entered a new and critical phase and that the sacrifices demanded of them are very great. They have accepted this and they have pledged themselves to stand united until final victory is achieved throughout North Africa. They know that in this struggle they are not alone, that millions throughout the world are watching their efforts with sympathy.

The Algerian people call upon the democratic forces in the world to take up the cause of Algerian freedom. The Algerians firmly believe that those who have so valiantly championed the cause of freedom in Morocco,

Tunisia and other parts of the world will not fail in their response to the people of Algeria. For Algeria is a part of the great struggle of peoples against the curse of colonialism, still powerful but yielding step by step to the irresistible forces of freedom.

WE ARE AT WAR*

BY THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

Where insurrectionary groups enjoy not military successes the emphasis on the survival and continued activism of the revolutionary group is primordial.

On 16th December, 1961, Unkhonto We Sizwe, military wing of the ANC, made it known that we, the oppressed people of South Africa, would fight for our rights. We made this known not only with words. Dynamite blasts announced it.

From 13th August, 1967, our men of Umkhonto We Sizwe, together with our brothers of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) have been fighting the oppressors in Matabeleland, Wankie and further south.

The Vorster government, through the radio and newspapers, continues to lie about this fighting.

The truth is very different from what these newspapers have reported. Our men are armed and trained freedom-fighters, not "terrorists." They are fighting with courage, discipline and skill. The forces of the Rhodesian racialists suffered heavy losses. So also did the white soldiers sent to Rhodesia by Vorster to save the Smith regime from collapse.

The freedom-fighters have inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. Apart from those who have been ambushed and killed, hospitals at Bulawayo and Wankie are crowded with wounded Smith and Vorster forces. Several South African helicopters and military transport planes have been brought down over the past three months.

The fighting will go on in Rhodesia and South Africa. We will fight until we have won, however long it takes and however much it will cost.

WHY WE FIGHT

To you, the sons and daughters of the soil, our case is clear.

The white oppressors have stolen our land. They have destroyed our families. They have taken for themselves the best that there is in our rich country and have left us the worst. They have the fruits and the riches. We have the backbreaking toil and the poverty.

We burrow into the belly of the earth to dig our gold, diamonds, coal, uranium. The white oppressors and foreign investors grab all this wealth. It is used for their enrichment and to buy arms to suppress and kill us.

In the factories, on the farms, on the railways, wherever you go, the hard, dirty, dangerous, badly paid jobs are ours. The best jobs are for whites only.

*Leaflet distributed by the African National Congress.

In our own land we have to carry passes; we are restricted and banished while the white oppressors move about freely.

Our homes are hovels; those of the whites are luxury mansions, flats and farmsteads.

There are not enough schools for our children; the standard of education is low, and we have to pay for it. But the government uses our taxes and the wealth we create to provide free education for white children.

We have suffered long enough.

Over 300 years ago the white invaders began a ceaseless war of aggression against us, murdered our forefathers, stole land and enslaved our people.

Today they still rule by force. They murder our people. They still enslave us.

ONLY BY MEETING FORCE WITH FORCE CAN WE WIN BACK OUR MOTHERLAND

We have tried every way to reason with the white supremacists. For many years our leaders and organizations sent petitions and deputations to Cape Town and Pretoria, even overseas, to London and the United Nations in New York. We organised mass demonstrations, pass-burnings, peaceful stay-at-homes.

What answer was given by the govenment?

Strikers and demonstrators were shot in cold blood. New acts of oppression and injustice were heaped upon us. Our leaders and spokesmen were banned, gagged, jailed, banished—even murdered. Our organisation, the African National Congress, was outlawed. Our meetings, journals and leaflets were prohibited.

The Nazi Vorster, who was interned for helping Hitler, is now the Prime Minister of South Africa. This man is the murderer of Mini, Mkaba, Khayingo, Bongco, Saloojee and other brave sons of Africa. He has condemned Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki, Mhlaba, Motsoaledi, Mlangeni, Kathrada, Fischer and many others to rot away in jails for life.

They have declared war on us. We have to fight back!

Our *Indian* brothers know full well the hardships and bitterness of white baaskaap rule. Since the time of Mahatma Ghandi and before, they have had to face persecution—attempts to deport them to India, Ghetto Acts, Group Areas and other forms of oppression.

The South African Indian Congress fought back. Led by men like Yusuf Dadoo, Monty Naicker and Nana Sita, the Indian community marched hand in hand with the ANC for liberty, for the rights of all South Africans.

Our *Coloured* brothers know how even the few privileges they were allowed—crumbs from the master's table—have been taken away from them. Votes, skilled jobs, trade union rights—one by one they are being taken away. Now apartheid madness is conscripting the Coloured youth into labour camps and jails for pass offenders. The ghetto walls grow

higher. Theat is why the Coloured People's Congress (CPC) pledged its support to the Freedom Charter and why its leaders are driven into jail or exile.

And what of the *white* minority? For years they have been misled by racialist politicians, dominees and fascists who told them they were the superior race. They have followed the Vorsters and the de Villiers Graffs, and now they are being called upon to fight and die in defence of apartheid. Let them ask themselves: is it worth it? Has it brought anything but uncertainty and fear, isolation and contempt at home and abroad. Is this a future to fight and die for—a life in an armed camp, surrounded by the hate and anger of the oppressed non-white people?

The African National Congress, remembering also the Bram Fischers and the Dennis Goldbergs, calls on white South Africans to take their place on the side of liberty and democracy, the side of our freedom fighters—now *before it is too late.*

WHAT WE FIGHT FOR

We are fighting for democracy—majority rule—the right of the Africans to rule Africa. We are fighting for a South Africa in which there will be peace and harmony and equal rights for all people.

We are not racists, as the white oppressors are. The African National Congress has a message of freedom for all who live in our country.

WHAT YOU SHOULD DO

The battle has begun.

In Rhodesia, we have met the oppressors with guns in our hands! That was the start. Soon there will be battles in South Africa.

We will speak to them with guns, again and again, now here, now there, until their day is done and apartheid destroyed for ever.

We call on you to be prepared.

Stand up and speak out against Vorster and his Nazis. Don't collaborate with them! Take courage from our immortal freedom-fighters who died in the name of freedom for all.

Our country will be free. We fight for all South Africans, for you and your children and your children's children.

PREPARE TO SUPPORT OUR FIGHTING MEN!

Pass this message to your friends and relatives, throughout Southern Africa—in Botswana, Lesotho, South-West Africa, or Swaziland; in Rhodesia, Mozambique or Angola, and in every corner of South Africa itself.

HELP THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS!

MAKE THEIR PATH EASY! Make the enemy's path hard!

WE ARE ANSWERING THE WHITE OPPRESSORS IN THE LANGUAGE THEY HAVE CHOSEN! THIS IS A WAR TO

DESTROY APARTHEID, TO WIN BACK OUR COUNTRY FOR ALL OUR PEOPLE!

WE SHALL WIN! FORWARD TO VICTORY OR DEATH!
AFRIKA! MAYIBUYE! AMANDLA NGAWETHU!
MATLA KE ARONA! POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS*

BY DOUGLAS PIKE

Successful insurgent movements are usually characterized by effective communications with the indigenous population. The Viet Cong employed a broad, highly sophisticated concept of social communication.

The three basic means by which ideas are more or less systematically communicated are mass media, such as radio, television, newspapers, magazines, books;[1] the so-called informal channels of communication —word of mouth, rumor, gossip, itinerant peddlers; and social movements or social organizations, in which the organization itself—for example, a church or the Boy Scouts—acts as the channel, communicating not only ideas but also facts, data, and value judgments. The NLF used all three but relied on the third, the social movement, as its chief medium of communication. It is with this phenomenon, together with one other Communist communication device—the agit-prop cadre—that we are chiefly concerned here.

In a sense it is false and misleading to treat the NLF's communication effort as a separate entity. In truth, almost every act of the NLF was conceived as an act of communication. Its use of the communication matrix went beyond the normal social role as understood elsewhere. Its communication system not only communicated information, explained it in meaningful terms, and provided it with a value judgment based on individual relevancy—the more or less traditional communication function—but it also shaped a communication weapon and used it to strike at the vitals of the GVN. Its victories and defeats were essentially the result of successful or unsuccessful communication efforts.

THEORY OF COMMUNICATION

The general characteristics of the NLF communication process were these:

1. The specially created social movements, such as the various liberation associations, became the primary vehicles for communication. Their activities were managed directly or indirectly by the agit-prop cadres and workers using both traditional channels, such as word-of-mouth and

*Excerpts from "Communication of Ideas," Chapter 7, in *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam,* M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1966. Reprinted with the permission of M.I.T. Press, copyright holder.

face-to-face communication, and mass media, the latter chiefly designed as a reinforcement.

2. Using this *apparat*, a theoretical formula was employed that first established a claim to truth in terms of basically rational appeals. This was not a full-blown ideology, Marxism or any other, so much as it was the conversion of specific ideas into actions and the transformation of abstract concepts such as nationalism into social levers. Second, using nonrational appeals, the emotions of the villagers were tapped, and passions, chiefly hatred, were generated. Third, a commitment to action was demanded, even if only a token act or gesture.

3. The Communist concept of communication predominated, with the Chinese rather than the Soviet experience serving as the model. As in China, great premium was placed on mass psychological techniques such as rallies, demonstrations, parades, movements (similar to China's "Back to the Countryside" movement), group criticism and individual denunciation campaigns, neighborhood and work meetings, and other forms of organizational communication, often with the mass social organizations acting as media.

4. The communication of ideas was viewed not as a separate act but as an integral part of the Revolution; communication was a seamless web. It was based on the orthodox Communist distinction between agitation and propaganda, derived from the famous Plekhanov (and Lenin) distinction between an agitator as one who presents only one or a few ideas to a mass of people and a propagandist as one who presents many ideas to one or a few persons; this approach was necessary, it was held, because the masses could not be expected to understand Marxism-Leninism but nevertheless must be imbued with the proper spirit so that they would work and sacrifice for the cause. Propaganda thus consisted of theoretical indoctrination through which Party members were armed with scientific knowledge of the laws that govern society, or almost the exact opposite meaning of the word as used in non-Communist countries. In functional terms, agit-prop[2] activities were conceived as a servo-mechanism by means of which the rural Vietnamese were indoctrinated with a certain set of values and beliefs as the necessary first step, the formation of the masses into an organizational weapon. It was often reiterated in internal documents, as in the following PRP statement:

> Agit-prop work is directed at the masses, for the benefit of the masses, and must involve the masses doing propaganda work under Party guidance. Thus the propaganda target is the masses, and the propaganda force is also the masses, but in the second case the masses are organized and educated by the Party, in associations, groups, organizations, etc. . . .

5. Although communication efforts were conducted simultaneously on various levels and with differing and often contradictory themes, the key communicator at all levels was the agit-prop cadre. He was no mere technician but one who sat at the highest policy determining levels and who at the lower echelons tended to dominate all activities, not just

agit-prop work. He was regarded as an instructor who explained NLF policies and programs in terms the ordinary rural Vietnamese could understand, using whatever arguments seemed most likely to be effective. Mass media, where they did exist, were never regarded as strong enough in themselves to convince the unconvinced.

6. Although the successes of the communication program were not due to its Marxist content so much as to its pragmatic arguments, the appeals were rooted in fundamental Communist doctrine: the united-front concept, class consciousness, and the historically determined inevitable triumph of the cause. Contamination of the communication system was reduced by requiring cadres to use Radio Liberation and Radio Hanoi as basic sources of material and by postcommunication audits at higher levels.

7. The NLF communication system suffered from standard Communist communication weaknesses: obtuseness, formalism, irrelevancy, and ultraconformity.

This summary and the following sections on social movements as communication devices and on agit-prop work were taken from two key documents that fell into GVN hands in mid-1962. The first was an NLF document entitled *Directive on Information, Propaganda, Agitation, and Cultural Activities for 1961.* It was written at the Central Committee level for use at the provincial level and contained an analysis of GVN rural communications efforts, an assessment of the rural climate of opinion, a critique of NLF communication efforts during 1961, and a master plan for its communication work during 1962. The second, a PRP document entitled *Training of Propaganda, Cultural and Educational Workers at the District and Village Levels,* was prepared for lower-echelon agit-prop cadres and dealt with specific agit-prop techniques and organization, the staffing of agit-prop and armed propaganda teams, and the use of culture and education (or indoctrination).

The first document was highly theoretical, the second concrete and practical. Taken together, they portrayed the full range of the NLF-PRP communication process; dozens of other documents, as well as more than 4,000 NLF propaganda leaflets subsequently collected, illustrated in detail the basic concepts outlined in the two major directives. Both documents stressed the importance of agit-prop work. The PRP cadre directive outlined it in specific terms:

> Daily the masses are oppressed and exploited by the imperialists and feudalists and therefore are disposed to hate them and their crimes. But their hatred is not focused; it is diffuse. The masses think their lot is determined by fate. They do not see that they have been deprived of their rights. They do not understand the purpose and method of the Revolution. They do not have confidence in us. They swallow their hatred and resentment or resign themselves to enduring oppression and terror, or, if they do struggle, they do so in a weak and sporadic manner. For all these reasons agit-prop work is necessary to stir up the masses, to make them hate the enemy to a high degree, to make them understand their rights and the purpose and method of the Revolution, and to develop confidence in our capability. It is necessary to change the attitude of the masses from a passive one to a desire to struggle strongly, to take part more and more violently to win their rights for survival. Good or bad results in our Revolution depend on whether agit-prop action

to educate and change the thinking of the masses [3] is good or bad. Every person in the Revolution therefore must know how to conduct propaganda. It follows that the [agit-prop] task is a very important one. During the Resistance, this task made the armed struggle possible. At the present time, with our struggle movement approaching, it is the unique weapon the Party and the masses use to strike at the enemy. Therefore a Party member must, in all circumstances—even when he has fallen into enemy hands—continue by all means to make propaganda for the Party under the slogan "Each Party member is a propagandist."

Explaining the difference in approach between efforts during the Viet Minh war and the later period, the document declared:

During the Resistance our struggle approach was to arm all the people and have them engage in guerrilla warfare. At that time we had a slogan, "Propaganda action is half the resistance work." At the present time we pursue a political struggle combined with the armed struggle, which present to the world three faces: political struggle, armed struggle, and struggle among the enemy. . . . It is the present policy of the Party that after completing the indoctrination work in the Party, Youth League, and other mass-based revolutionary organizations, we begin to reach the masses by propaganda in depth, by meetings in hamlets and villages, word-of-mouth communication. In this, the first action is agit-prop work, . . . which serves two purposes: a means of persuading the masses to participate in the political struggle movement against the enemy and, second, it is a [propaganda] weapon we place in the hands of the masses in their political attack on the enemy. The masses themselves therefore must be trained in the use of propaganda arguments. What we must do is to influence public opinion so as to get the masses to stop the enemy and win over officials of the enemy administration and enemy troops.

The NLF Central Committee directive took a somewhat longer view:

In all phases of the Revolution, the Party's agit-prop effort is vital and must not be neglected. . . . Our programs and policies and our effort to develop Party leadership of the Revolution require that the Party make every effort to develop agit-prop potential and in this way develop and widen Party influence among the masses.

The end result of agit-prop acitvity, both documents clearly stated, was not to be passive belief or acceptance by the people but actions by them against the GVN in the form of propaganda activities, one of the several forms that the struggle movement could take. Said the NLF Central Committee directive:

If the masses take part in propaganda action it is because it will serve their interests. Because they want to keep their land, peasants persuade each other to take up the struggle. Because they want to protect their homes and property and fight against regrouping [i.e., relocating], the masses take up the *binh van* movement.

Again the PRP cadre directive was more specific:

Agit-prop cadres must get the masses to invent propaganda arguments to use during struggle movements. . . . The masses already have developed many slogans such as "Struggle against shelling and bombing," . . . "Struggle against the strategic hamlet and agroville," . . . "Struggle against conscription," . . . "Struggle against looting," . . . and "Americans get out." During struggles, the masses themselves have invented many other arguments to deal with the enemy and stop terroism.

The importance of agit-prop work was outlined succinctly in a document issued a year later by the Long An province central committee:

It helps the masses understand the Party's programs and policies. . . , assists in unmasking the U.S.-Diem plot to keep the masses poor and miserable, and helps them realize their condition is not due to their bad luck or ignorance, and thus causes the masses to hate the enemy and to sacrifice for the Revolution. . . . It promotes unity and helps organize the people in the struggle. . . .

THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT AS COMMUNICATION CHANNEL

With the social organization as a communication device we reach the heart and the power of the NLF. Here lay the solution to the mystery that for so long puzzled knowledgeable and thinking Americans: How could the NLF achieve success in the face of overwhelming GVN military superiority and massive inputs of American material resources for civic action programs to alleviate economic grievances? Not superior ideology, not more dedicated personnel, not because voluntary support of the villager had been won, but the social movement shaped into a self-contained, self-supporting channel of communication—that was the NLF's secret weapon.

Working from the fundamental assumption that if an idea could be rooted in the group it would become strong, durable, and infinitely more difficult to counter, the NLF created a communication structure far beyond any simple propaganda organization and plunged to depths far below mere surface acceptance of a message by an individual. In the hands of the agit-prop cadres the social movement as a communicational device made these contributions to the NLF cause:

1. It generated a sense of community, first, by developing a pattern of political thought and behavior appropriate to the social problems of the rural Vietnamese village in the midst of sharp social change and, second, by providing a basis for group action that allowed the individual villager to see that his own efforts could have meaning and effect.

2. As an organizational armature, it mobilized the people, generating discontent where it did not exist, exacerbating and harnessing it where it did, and increasing especially at the village level the saliency of all the NLF appeals.

3. It altered to at least some degree the villager's information input, perception of the world, attitude toward government, and daily actions in and out of the village. It changed underlying beliefs and even caused villagers to do things to their own disadvantage.

4. In a self-reinforcing manner it fostered integration of the NLF belief system, turning heterogeneous attitudes into homogeneous ones; the social facilitation or interstimulation that resulted canalized and intensified village feelings, reactions, and aims. Thus even when the NLF organization turned coercive as it finally did, members continued to hold imported and alien values and norms.

5. It greatly facilitated the NLF's efforts to polarize beliefs, stereotype anti-NLF forces, and generally shift villagers' attention in the directions chosen by the NLF leadership. As does any social organization, it caused the villager to rationalize more easily, being influenced by those around him. Since resistance to suggestion, that is, critical judgment, is lower within a group, it caused him to accept spurious arguments more easily and to succumb more quickly to emotional or personal appeals by the cadres and the village NLF leaders. Once critical judgment was impaired, the villager soon came to confuse desire with conviction.

6. Once momentum in the group was developed, the group itself tended to restrict freedom of expression to the sentiments acceptable, to the NLF-created group norms. The individual became submerged, the group became the unit, and great social pressure was brought to bear against the deviant, thus achieving the ultimate NFL objective—a self-regulating, self-perpetuating revolutionary force.

7. Finally, because it helped cut social interaction and communication with the social system represented by the GVN, it isolated the villagers and heightened the sense of conflict between the two systems.

The significance of the social movement as a communicational device and the contribution it made to the NLF effort cannot be stated too strongly. Its essential importance was clearly grasped by the NLF from the earliest days, the result of lessons learned in the Viet Minh war. A 1961 document declared:

> An enlightened people if unorganized cannot be a force to deal with the enemy. . . . Therefore organization of the masses is essential, it facilitates our cause in all ways. . . . The [social movement] provides a strong force to oppose the enemy, it makes the Party's task much easier, [and] it both provides an audience for the agit-prop cadre and facilitates further agit-prop work. The [social movement] is a measure of our physical and moral strength, it is a practical way of both serving the people's interests and guaranteeing Party leadership among the people, it is the decisive element in the Revolution.

What the NLF leadership realized—and was all too poorly understood in the United States—was that social organizations are especially potent communication devices in underdeveloped countries. Yet the process is in no way alien to Americans, with their proclivity for the voluntary organization. The Boy Scout movement, for example, transmits and inculcates a whole complex of beliefs, the scope of which is indicated by the twelve Scout laws. A college fraternity can heavily indoctrinate an impressionable youth, shape his political beliefs and economic values, even dictate what sort of a wife to choose. This is done not as a premeditated brainwashing scheme but simply as a by-product function of the organizational essence or nature of its being. What the NLF did was deliberately to create such an organizational structure specifically to transmit information, data, ideals, beliefs, and values.

THE AGIT-PROP TEAM

The Communist institution of the agit-prop cadre is generally well known but little understood by Americans. Its utility to the NLF was so great that it has been singled out from other communication methods for special consideration here. Let us begin by inspecting the visit of a hypothetical NLF agit-prop team to a Vietnamese village.

The team approaches in late afternoon and has a rendezevous outside the hamlet with a Party member or sympathizer who carefully briefs it on developments in the village or hamlet since the team's last visit; he lists the local grievances, local animosities, the most disliked persons in the village.

At dusk the team enters the hamlet with a great deal of fanfare,

shaking hands, greeting people, carrying with it an aura of excitement, a break in the village monotony. Villagers are asked to assemble voluntarily at some central location. One old man, known to be irascible and intractable, announces loudly he'll be damned if he'll listen to a bunch of agitators. The team chief ostentatiously excuses him. However, should a sizable number of villagers indicate reluctance to attend,the team chief grows stern and indicates by gesture and manner that it would be well to give the memebers of the Revolution at least an opportunity to present their message. So the villagers gather.

The session begins with a short talk by the team chief in which he mixes flattery of the villagers' spirit, sympathy for their plight, and the hint that he will present later a message of great importance.

An interlude of singing and quasi-entertainment follows. The team chief or one of the members leads the villagers in a traditional folk song known and loved by all South Vietnamese. When it ends, the song leader announces that he has written new words to the old melody that he would like to teach the villagers. He receites the verse, which carries a class consciousness and revolutionary message, and after the villagers learn the words, he leads them through it several times.

Then comes the main speech, lasting up to an hour. The team chief has previously received from the interzone agit-prop section a directive outlining current themes to be stressed; they are biological warfare and cholera in an anti-American context. These are carefully fixed to local grievances. He tells the villagers: "Your harvest this year was not so large as in years past. The reason for this is that the Americans are conducting in South Vietnam something called defoliation. Strange chemicals are sprayed from airplanes, killing crops and foliage instantly. It is true that no planes have been seen, for none has sprayed within fifty kilometers of the village. But these chemicals can be carried vast distances, even halfway around the world, by the wind. What has happened is that some of the noxious chemicals have drifted over the village and fallen on the crops, stunting their growth and causing a lower yield." It is also believed by the villagers that there is cholera in the village. "This isn't really cholera but a germ disease for which there is no cure, also spread by the Americans." He continues to recite local fears, grievances, and problems, ascribing them all to some action by the Americans or officials in Saigon. He recounts atrocities committed in nearby areas. As a closer, he tells the villagers that the only way they can fight this injustice,the only way they can survive, in fact, is to join with the NLF and work for a General Uprising, after which there will be peace, economic abundance, and freedom for all.

The general meeting breaks up and the submeetings begin. The farmers gather to be addressed by the team's Farmers' Liberation Association representative, women by the Women's Liberation Association representative, and the youth by the Youth Liberation Association representative. In these meetings appeals are further refined and pin-

pointed, and a theme employed in one group is often inconsistent with one employed in another. For example, farmers are told that all the NLF asks from them is a small financial donation; the women are told the NLF army will protect their village and provide complete security; the youths may be urged to enlist in the NLF army and may be told that they must be prepared to sacrifice even their lives for the Revolution.

The villagers then reassemble in a large meeting that becomes participational. Questions are solicited, including those critical of the NLF. The team chief, a master at handling the barbed comment or loaded question, handles these with ease. Some questions may be fed him by covert Party members living in the village.

In the midst of this question period the team chief, in a demonstration of omniscience, casually remarks that he knows there are enemy agents in the group. He points to Mr. Ba and says "I know he is an enemy agent and will report to the village chief tomorrow about this meeting." The villagers know this is true. But the team chief takes no action against Mr. Ba and simply goes on with the meeting.

Then comes the *pièce de résistance*, a dramatic skit presented by the team. It is a highly entertaining little drama set in Saigon, involving a taxi driver played by the team chief, a Vietnamese girl played by the woman team member, and an American played by another team member. The American accosts the young girl and makes an indecent proposal that is overheard by the taxi driver, who comes to her rescue. There is a lengthy dialogue between the taxi driver and the American—full of double entendres and ribald remarks at the expense of the American, which delights the villagers. The drama becomes a verbal contest between the Vietnamese and the American, and the American is thoroughly confused, deflated, shattered, and defeated. The taxi driver and the girl go off together.

Then the team departs, scattering leaflets in its wake or pasting them to trees and walls, and it hoists and NLF flag.

THE AGIT-PROP CADRE

Agit-prop activity rested on the fundamental NLF assumption that the personal intermediary was the most potent form of communication. On the agit-prop, he was constantly told, rested the burden of the Revolution. A steady flow of messages from higher headquarters constantly reminded him of the complexity of his task and the high degree of skill that he must employ daily, for the NLF knew what all professional communicators know: that the simple communication of facts is often ineffectual in changing men's opinions, majority opinion reinforced by social pressure counts for much more than expert opinion or leadership assertions, and people tend to misinterpret what they hear or read to suit their own preconceptions. And the NLF knew that, working within such complexities, technique counted for all.

Next to technique, the personality of the individual agit-prop cadre was

of chief importance. The ideal cadre was a model of dedication, sobriety, skillfulness.[4] Agit-prop cadres were chosen, a directive noted, "from among those who have a clean past, who are virtuous in behavior, and who known how to arouse the masses".[5]

The previously cited Central Committee directive listed the duties of the agit-prop cadres in a general way:

> To direct the masses toward political struggle, armed struggle, or action among troops [by] directing the thinking of the masses toward the Revolution; to arouse hatred for the enemy in the masses and at the same time to enlighten them about their interests; to consolidate their faith and generate revolutionary enthusiasm.

The cadre directive listed his duties specifically as to:

> (1) promote hatred of the enemy; (2) show the people it is in their interest to support the Revolution, for it serves them; (3) teach the people the meaning and techniques of the political struggle ...; (4) develop the people's faith and self-confidence in achieving revolutionary successes and maintain their enthusiasm.

As GVN battlefield interdiction began to take a heavy toll among agit-prop cadres and as the NLF grew in size, increased numbers of cadres were required, and infiltration by Northern-trained agit-prop cadres increased. Several of those who were captured gave interrogators a word picture of the training they had received in the North. It consisted of two parts: a session in political indoctrination and one in agit-prop techniques. The first, usually lasting two weeks, involved indoctrination in these major subjects: the world-wide advance of communism; socioeconomic progress being made in the DRV; the role of youth, a chief target in the task of building socialism and of liberating the South; the sociopolitical situation in the South; and the NLF and its successes. At the end of this period the inept were weeded out and final selection of infiltrators made. The remaining group then received about ten days of further training in the specific techniques of agit-prop work.

The outer limits of accomplishment of the agit-prop cadres, in objective terms, appeared to be these: At best they hoped to shape villager opinion to such a degree that the villager would support the cause of his own volition; the least they tried to do, when greater achievement was not possible, was to confuse the opinions and emotions of the villager so that he became indecisive and thus ineffectual in providing support to the GVN. Within this range the agit-prop cadres sought to instigate strife along class lines. They dealt in misinformation, exaggeration, and distortion. They concealed or misstated Communist intentions. They drew attention to and inflated real or trumped-up village grievances.

Wooly-mindedness and lack of specificity were the major short-comings of the cadres, who were instructed to allow their work to grow naturally out of the exigencies of the moment. Cadres were instructed to

> study and understand both technique and policy. . . . Good technique does not consist of collecting materials about our policies and programs and then giving a "certified copy" to the masses. Neither does it mean picking up a megaphone and explaining general policies in a general way. It means ceaseless effort and taking detailed care to persuade the masses, to clarify their thinking. . . . Many cadres simply distribute slogans, and the result is that the masses know the slogans but do not know what actions to take.

Specificity of theme directed toward specific social elements was also stressed:

> Among poor peasants it is necessary to stress the class-conflict viewpoint . . . Among middle-class peasants, stress our agrarian policies, that peasants will be owners of land and rice fields. . . . Among religious groups, show how the Revolution will bring them concrete benefits in the form of religious freedom, and at the same time create class consciousness and strengthen the revolutionary struggle. . . Among the intermediate classes, those between the worker-peasant class and the petite bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie, according to individual and group understanding about the NLF and the Party, conduct clever agitation to widen the Front and Party influence; for instance, stress and emphasize the just and correct policies of the Front and the Party. . . . Among the masses, popularize the Front and Party plans and programs, the successes scored in socialist and Communist countries. . . . When the enemy talks about famine in North Vietnam do not deny there is famine but talk about the unending increases in food production in the North. The enemy will say the Communists are bloodthirsty dictators. We should point to their crimes. . . . Maintain the upper hand in counterpropaganda. Meet the enemy's anticommunism charges by promoting class consciousness through the *dan van* movement.

An agit-prop cadre could operate in a team or alone. In the latter case he was told to

> take every opportunity for agitation. . . . On a busy train, in a bar, at a private party, make the subject lively and raise the level of the class consciousness of the individuals present according to the circumstances. . . . But be careful not to reveal yourself and avoid talking too much. . . . Here is a good example: Take a newspaper that carries a story about a certain man named A who committed suicide because he was unable to find a job. Bring up the subject of the newspaper story and then lead the conversation to the general subject of jobs, unemployment, the difficulties of earning a living, etc. In this way people are invited to complain about the hardships they face. From this seek an opportunity to incriminate American aid as a source of this state of unemployment and starvation.

Also commonly employed in the earlier days was the "root-and link" device. A Party member looked for a prospective "root" whom he would meet, talk with, and win over, after which he would educate him. This root then became a "link" who looked for other roots, and thus a "chain" was formed. This did not necessarily involve Party membership or any form of formal organization. It was a transmission belt for propaganda, highly directed, specifically oriented, and very personal. The root-and-link device was an effort to make use of traditional channels of communication. NLF output referred to it and similar devices as word-of-mouth propaganda, which it described as:

> the principal medium of both covert and overt propaganda. It is direct. It enables us to present our views clearly and to understand immediately the response of the individual. We can by this means offer on the spot a solution to his problems and at the same time mobilize thinking. . . . .

Agit-prop teams also employed a vast number of psychological tricks, of which the following is an example. After the important NLF victory at Ap Bac in 1963, guerrilla units moving away from the battlefield passed through villages carrying, on a stretcher-like affair, a bulky item covered by a huge blue cloth. The band would stop for water in a village and the four bearers of the cloth-covered apparatus would set it down without comment. Villagers would gather around and exhibit curiosity about what was under the cloth. The guerrilla leader warned them not to get

near it. Then, as their curiosity reached the bursting point, the leader would say: "Under this blue cloth is a new secret weapon. By means of it we shot down dozens and dozens of the enemy's helicopters at Ap Bac." The band would then finish its marching break, the four bearers would pick up the device, still covered by the blue cloth, and depart. Other techniques employed by agit-props included those that piqued the Vietnamese sense of humor:

> It is possible to use riddles during such events [the incident that the agit-prop cadre is captitalizing on], such as this one we used in the [1960] presidential elections: "The head is fascist. The rear is colonialist. The hands and feet are feudalist. The mouth is republican. What is it? (Answer: Diem)." Once these have been devised it is necessary to spread them to the towns and cities. . . . Ask [loaded] questions of the administration authorities or of soldiers and officers. One can pretend to be an ignorant farmer and ask an army officer in the market place: "What exactly have the people of Binh Ninh done to cause the killing of so many of them?" This technique can also be used in the *binh van* movement.

The individual behavior of the agit-prop cadres received close supervisory attention by the leadership, for the cadre was the NLF representative most often seen by the villagers, and their opinion of him to a great degree determined their attitude toward the more abstract aspects of the NLF.

* * * * *

NOTES

[1] See the author's monograph *Viet Cong Communication Techniques* (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, 1966; No. C/66–11), which treats in some detail the methods employed by the NLF in communicating its ideas. For a much shorter version of this monograph see the author's *Vietnam: Communication Factors of Revolutionary Guerrilla War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, 1965; No. C/65–16).

[2] Originally the standard term for agit-prop in Vietnamese was *tuyen huan*, a contraction of *tuyen truyen*, meaning propaganda, and *huan luyen*, literally, training, but more precisely agitation in the Communist sense. Beginning in mid-1962 the NLF started using the term *tuyen van giao*, usually abbreviated as TVG, a contraction of *tuyen truyen* (propaganda), *van nghe* (meaning culture or letters and arts or literature and the fine arts, similar to the French *beaux arts et belles lettres* or *la literature et les beaux arts*, but with a Confucian literary overtone), and *giao duc* (meaning education or, in the Marxist sense, indoctrination). After mid-1962 the NLF generally employed the TVG term, and the GVN continued to refer to these activities as *tuyen huan*, or agit-prop; at the same time the NLF continued to use the term *chinh tri* (political) *tuyen truyen* or, roughly, political propaganda. The significant difference is that TVG referred to communication activities within the NLF system, the liberated area, and among the masses, and *chinh tri tuyen truyen* connoted activities directed against the GVN. In order to maintain this distinction, the only important one to the reader, and to simplify reference as much as possible, the term agit-prop is used here to mean cadre TVG activities and the word propaganda by itself to mean those mass activities that are part of the struggle movement and designed to influence the enemy. Since at the lower echelons virtually all communication activity was in the hands of a single individual, the agit-prop (or TVG) cadre, this oversimplification of usage cannot be regarded as particularly serious. What must be borne in mind, however, is the distinction between the *agit-prop* (or TVG) work by the cadres seeking to motivate the masses and the *propaganda* work by the masses themselves as part of their struggle movement.

[3] In Vietnamese, *chuan bi nhan tam*, literally, "preparing man's heart": to prepare the people for the coming drive, that is, to shape public opinion or win people's support.

[4] A cadre directive noted that "the purpose [of agit-prop work] is to mobilize the people's thinking. This is an ideological struggle that is complex and hard to carry out. It requires

time and painstaking efforts. A cadre should be patient, should follow up on each individual, and should repeat the same theme over and over. He should endeavor ceaselessly. He should build durable support and should not become discouraged. He should set an example for the masses, for unless we do how can we expect the masses to follow us?. . . . He should behave modestly, listen to the people talk. . . . He should be humble. . . ."

5. The best cadres, it added, are those who "ceaselessly study [Party] directives and policies, consolidate their thinking, and improve their virtuous revolutionary behavior. At the same time they remain humble and listen to the judgment of the masses. . . . Cadres not only must know programs and policies but also must feel hatred when they witness killings and oppression of the masses. They must know the secret thoughts and interests of the masses, must share their joys and sadness, must be determined to work for the good of the masses, and must make every effort to influence the masses. They must suffer the hardships of the masses, for only in this way can they feel the suffering and sorrows of the masses. If cadres lack feeling, their propaganda will be emotionless and will not arouse the masses. Above all, . . . cadres must accept responsibility for the words they speak."

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACPW	Assistant Chief of Psychological Warfare
AC of S	Assistant Chief of Staff
ACSI	Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
ACTIV	Army Concept Team in Vietnam (U.S.)
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
AFN	American Forces Network
Agitprop	agitation and propaganda
AIC	(Cambodian Information Agency)
AID	Agency for International Development
AMLANFOR	American Land Forces (Lebanon crisis)
APT	armed propaganda team
AR 360–55	U.S. Army Regulation on "Public Information—Community Relations." (1957)
ARD	Audience Research Division (of Radio Liberty)
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD/ISA	Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BCT(s)	battalion combat team (in the Philippines)
CA	Civil Affairs (U.S. Army)
CAO	Civil Affairs Office (in the Philippines)
CCP	Chinese Communist Party (People's Republic of China)
CEA	Council of Economic Advisors
Chicom	Chinese Communists
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIC	Counterintelligence Corps
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group (in Vietnam)
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
COI	Central Office of Information (Great Britain)
COMUSMACV	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam
CONCP	Conferência de Organizacioes Nacionalistas das Colônias Portuguêsas (Conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies) (Portugal)
CONUS	continental United States

CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (South Vietnamese organization)
COSVIN	Central Office for South Vietnam (in North Vietnam)
CPOC	combined PSYOP center (in South Vietnam)
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CRAC(s)	Community Relations Advisory Council(s)
CRO	Commonwealth Relations Office (United Kingdom)
CTO	Communist Terrorist Organization (Malaya)
CSR	Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
CTZ	corps tactical zone
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission (diplomatic)
DDRE	Director of Defense Research and Engineering
DENTCAP	Dental Civic Action Project
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DMZ	demilitarized zone
DOCSA	Deputy Director for Operations (Counterinsurgency and Special Activities) (in the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
DOD	U.S. Department of Defense
DPRC	Defense Program Review Committee (of the National Security Council)
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
EEI	essential elements of information
EUSAK	Eighth U.S. Army, Korea
ExCOM	Executive Committee of the National Security Council (of the United States)
FAR	Forces Armées Royales (Royal Armed Forces) (Laos)
FEC	Far East Command
FLING	Front pour la Libération et L'Indépendance Nationale de la Guinée Dite Portugaise (Front for the Liberation and National Independence of So-Called Portuguese Guinea)
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front) (Algeria)
FM27–10	U.S. Army Field Manual. *The Law of Land Warfare*, 18 July 1966
FM30–5	U.S. Army Field Manual. *Combat Intelligence*, 12 February 1971
FM41–10	U.S. Army Field Manual. *Civil Affairs Operations*, May 1962; August 1967; October 1969

FM31–22	U.S. Army Field Manual. *U.S. Counterinsurgency Forces*, November 1963
FM33–1	U.S. Army Field Manual. *Psychological Operations, U.S. Army Doctrine.* May 1965; June 1968; February 1971
FM33–5	U.S. Army Field Manual. *Psychological Operations, Techniques and Procedures.* October 1966
FRAIN	Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independéncia Nacional (African Revolutionary Front for National Independence)
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
FUL	Front Uni de Libération de Guinée et du Cap Vert (United Liberation Front of Guinea and Cape Verde)
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces (in Vietnam)
G1	Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, Personnel
G2	Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Intelligence
G3	Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Operations
G4	Assistant Chief of Staff, G–4, Logistics
G5 (G5/S5)	Assistant Chief of Staff, G–5, Civil Affairs
GPW	Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949
GPW 1929	Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 27 July 1929
GPWD	General Political Warfare Department (Republic of Vietnam)
Green Berets	nickname for the Special Forces of the U.S. Army
GVN	Government of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
ICA	International Cooperation Administration (a predecesor of the Agency for International Development, AID)
ICC	International Control Commission for Indochina
IG(s)	Interdepartmental Group(s) (of the National Security Council Systems)
IMG	International Media Code
IMV	The Motion Picture and Television Service (of the U.S. Information Agency)
IOP	Office of Policy and Plans (in the U.S. Information Agency)
IOR	Office of Research and Assessment (in the U.S. Information Agency)
IPW	prisoner of war interrogation

IRBM	intermediate-range ballistic missile
ISA	International Security Affairs
ITV	Independent Television Authority (Great Britain)
J1	Personnel Directorate (in the Joint Staff)
J3	Operations Directorate (in the Joint Staff)
J4	Logistics Directorate (in the Joint Staff)
J5	Plans and Policy Directorate (in the Joint Staff)
J6	Communications-Electronics Directorate (in the Joint Staff)
JCS	U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCS Publ	*Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage* (Joint Chiefs of Staff publication)
JUWTFA	Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Atlantic
JUSPAO	Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office
KCS	Kit Carson Scout (in Republic of Vietnam Chieu Hoi Program)
KGB	Commettee Gossudarstvennoe Bezapostnosty (Committee of State Security)
KLP	Korean Labor Party (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)
KPA	Korean People's Army (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)
LOC	lines of communication (logistic routes)
MAAG(s)	Military Assistance Advisory Group(s)
MACJ3–11	The PSYOP Division of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Project (in Vietnam)
MI	military intelligence
MING	Movement for the National Independence of [Portuguese] Guinea
MLG	Mouvement de Libération de la Guinée Dite Portugaise (Liberation Movement of So-Called Portuguese Guinea)
MMT	mobile motivation team, or mobile medical team
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Liberação de Angola (Angolan Popular Liberation Movement)
MRBM	medium-range ballistic missile
MTT	mobile training team

NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFORV	U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam
NCNA	New China News Agency
NHK	Nihon Broadcasting Corporation (Japan)
NLF	National Liberation Front (of South Vietnam)
NK	Sometimes used for North Korea
NSC	National Security Council
NSDM	National Security Decision Memorandum (of the National Security Council)
NSSM	National Security Study Memorandum (of the National Security Council)
NVA	army of North Vietnam
OASD	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCPW	Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare
OCSW	Office of the Chief of Special Warfare
ODCSOPS	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
OEP	Office of Emergency Preparedness
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
ORO	Operations Research Office
ORTF	Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision Française (Office of the French National Radio and Television System)
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OWI	Office of War Information
OWS	a translation of the popular abbreviation for the Russian phrase "one woman said"
PAIGC	Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (African Party of the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)
PAO	Public Affairs Officer (U.S. Information Agency)
PIDE	Policia Internacional de Defensa de Estado (International Police for the Defense of the State) (Portugal)
PIO	Public Information Officer (in World War II)
PL	Pathet Lao (Laos)
PL	public law (usually followed by a number)
PLA	People's Liberation Army (People's Republic of China)
POW	prisoner of war

PRO	Communist Provincial Committee Headquarters (in South Vietnam)
PRP	People's Revolutionary Part (North Vietnamese-controlled party in South Vietnam)
PSYOP	psychological operations
PSYOP Annex	an annex to a tactical operations order
PSYWAR	psychological warfare
PW(s)	prisoners of war
RAR (4, 1 etc.)	Royal Australian Regiment
RDAG	Rassemblement Démocratique Africain de Guinée (African Democratic Assembly of Guinea)
RFE	Radio Free Europe
RF/PF	Rural Forces/Popular Forces (Vietnam)
RL	Radio Liberty
RLG	Royal Laotian Government
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan)
ROK	Republic of Korea (South Korea)
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
S5	Civil Affairs Officer (U.S. Army)
SAC	Strategic Air Command
samizdat	the private publication and circulation of one's own works (in the Soviet Union)
SCAME	a formula for analyzing propaganda that takes into account: Source, Content, Audience, Media, and Effects
SCAP	Supreme Commander Allied Powers
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
SOP(s)	standard operating procedure(s)
SVN	South Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam)
TAOR	tactical area of responsibility
TDY	temporary duty (U.S. military)
TOE	table of organization and equipment (U.S. Army)
THVN	Government of South Vietnam Television
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (a specialized agency of the United Nations)
UPC	Union des Populations du Cameroun (Union of the Peoples of Cameroun)
UPG	Union des Populations de la Guinée Dite Portugaise (Union of the Peoples of So-Called Portuguese Guinea)
URGP	Union of Nationals of Portuguese Guinea

USAID(s)	U.S. AID missions
USARV	U.S. Army Vietnam
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIS	United States Information Service (includes most overseas operations of U.S. Information Agency—USIA)
USOM	United States Operations Mission
VC	Viet Cong
VIS	Vietnamese Information Service (Republic of Vietnam)
VOA	Voice of America
VPB	Voice of the People of Burma
WSAG	Washington Special Actions Group
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe Africa People's Union

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FRED C. WEYAND
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

PAUL T. SMITH
Major General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

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TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

December 19, 1951

THE DEVELOPMENT

OF

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1945 - 1951

by

Edward P. Lilly, Ph.D.

JCS and OSD review(s)

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PREFACE

This report covers in summary fashion the major developments during the past six years on that broad politico-military area of national policy which has been variously identified as propaganda, psychological warfare, or psychological operations. The subject matter has never been officially defined and there are almost as many diverse definitions as there are specialists and agencies in the field. The present study intentionally avoids any attempt at definition and uses these words in interchangeable fashion without any subtle distinctions or nuances.

The time factor necessitated serious restrictions on this study. Greater attention might have been given to the psychological elements influencing economic decisions. There was not time, however, to pursue this virgin research. Because the research could not be extensive and penetrating, many statements in the text have been so generalized as to be somewhat platitudinous. The treatment of attitudinal developments in State Department particularly suffers from these generalizations which must be made from lack of detailed evidence.

No conclusions are drawn in this study. The research is not sufficiently complete to substantiate worthwhile judgments. Conclusions also have an undue tendency to persuade and influence the rapid reader or the operator who seeks the short road to a knowledge of psychological activities. There is no such easy road to understand psychological operations and the more one reads on this subject, the sooner its complexities and intangibles will be appreciated. Perhaps then, progress in the field will be expected.

Even this rapid survey would have been impossible had it not been for the gracious and wholehearted assistance provided by the many who contributed to this study. The author is deeply grateful to the Staff of the

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Psychological Strategy Board for the many courtesies extended to him and for the invaluable help and assistance received by him daily. Gratitude is also expressed to those listed in the footnotes who contributed so willingly of their time and memories. To all, the author is most grateful and indebted to them for information, viewpoints, encouragement and assistance. This report is not their responsibility, however, and whatever weaknesses exist in this study are solely the culpability of the author.

Edward P. Lilly

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GLOSSARY

AFRS	-	Armed Forces Radio Service
CIA	-	Central Intelligence Agency
CIAA	-	Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations Among The Latin American Republics (after 1941, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs)
COI	-	Coordinator of Information
DCI	-	Director of Central Intelligence
ECA	-	Economic Cooperation Administration
ERP	-	European Recovery Program
ICS	-	Interdepartmental Coordination Staff
IFIO	-	Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization
IFIS	-	Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff
JCS	-	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSPG	-	Joint Strategic Plans Group
NME	-	National Military Establishment
NSRB	-	National Security Resources Board
NSC	-	National Security Council
OPC	-	Office of Policy Coordination in CIA
OSR	-	Office of Special Representative in Paris (ECA)
OSS	-	Office of Strategic Services
OWI	-	Office of War Information
OP-16W	-	Special Warfare-Section
PSB	-	Psychological Strategy Board
SANACC	-	State, Army, Navy, Air Coordinating Committee
SWNCC	-	State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee
SWPA	-	Southwest Pacific Area
SHAEF	-	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
UN	-	United Nations
USIS	-	United States Information Service
USSR	-	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VOA	-	Voice of America

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PART I. WAR EXPERIENCES AND LIQUIDATIONS

The Psychological Strategy Board did not, like Minerva, spring unheralded into full-blown existence. The Psychological Strategy Board (hereinafter identified as PSB), established by the Presidential directive of 4 April 1951, was one action in a long series of psychological activities and it takes on perspective only with a knowledge of the previous efforts. The PSB may in one sense be a new development in American policy and yet this newness may be more apparent than real. Nations have always waged war, and they have also tried peaceful means to gain their national objectives. Even as they fought, the belligerents undertook non-military activity to influence and weaken the enemy's will so that victory could be more rapidly attained. Whether it was the Romans, the Saracens, Ghengis Khan, the American Continental Congress of 1776, or the Allies of 1917-1918, threats, rumors, enticing statements, bribery and political strategems were intentially used to confuse and hamper the enemy's purposes, to weaken and lessen their resistance and to persuade the enemy population that they should stop fighting. Appeals to entice and keep one's allies were a pleasanter aspect of such psychological activity. A classical example during World War I of such a psychological maneuver was President Wilson's announcement of his "Fourteen Points" (January, 1918). This declaration, momentarily united and idealized the war effort of the American and Allied governments and peoples, offered the enemy a hopeful and desirable future as the alternative to the horrors of war and appealed to neutral opinion on a high moral tone. During 1918, American propagandists, in George Creel's Committee on Public Information, in the War Department's Psychologic Branch and in General Pershing's Intelligence Division, exploited Wilson's themes to enemy, ally and neutral

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through wireless bulletins, news and feature stories, leaflets, maps, posters and pictures. Allied agencies, if not American, employed covert methods to get those ideas circulated within Germany. In World War I, such psychological activity contributed in major fashion to the disintegration of the Hapsburg Empire and accelerated, if it did not cause, the weakening of the German government which made the armistice necessary.

America gained quite an extensive propaganda experience in World War I. After the Armistice, however, America preferred to slough off its responsibilities. The wartime propaganda agencies were rapidly liquidated. Official reports enumerated accomplishments but did not attempt to evaluate effectiveness or difficulties. Then all was forgotten until 1941.[1/] America desired to be left alone to amass wealth in the Twenties and to concentrate on its domestic depression and recovery programs during the Thirties. While domestic information facilities increased, especially radio broadcasting, and Americans became the most news-conscious people, they remained basically indifferent to world developments. The widespread acceptance of the economic interpretation of history and of life, together with the revisionist histories of World War I, caused the average American to view wars as profit and persuasion: bankers and munition makers reaped the profit and plied their fellow citizens and world opinion with appealing propaganda to increase their gains. Unaware that they were thereby being propagandized, Americans became isolationist and concomitantly developed a phobia against the very word "propaganda", as a horrid, sinister word, a really un-American word and activity.

These attitudes solidified in the Thirties, but some few Americans

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1/ George Creel, How We Advertised America (N.Y. 1919); Committee on Public Information, Official Report of... (Washington, 1919). It was not until 1939 that the first and still inadequate historical study on the Creel Committee was made. James B. Mock & Cedric Larson, Words That Won the War (Princeton, 1939). E.P.Lilly interviews with Elmer Davis, Robert Sherwood, et alii.

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become perturbed at Nazi Germany's use of psychological factors to control the German people and to threaten European security. By 1939, the Austrian, Czech and Polish incidents made clear that Hitler's regime was consciously using cajolery, bribery, threats both physical and moral, publicized use of force, diplomatic and economic measures, and a powerfully remilitarized Wehrmacht in accordance with a Nazi grand strategy. It was employing the psychological factor, overtly through its press service, its world covering shortwave broadcasting, and other controlled informational media, covertly through "fifth columnists", pan-Germanic groups, tourists and student groups and secret agents. When World War II started and especially with the fall of France (June 1940) and the aerial blitz and peace offensive against England, psychological warfare techniques became evident even to Americans. Some felt that only fire could fight fire; only American psychological warfare could counter and destroy Nazi psychological warfare. Such was the national hostility towards propaganda that official American action was long delayed.

America was engaged in a psychological war with the Nazis long before the nation became militarily involved. As early as 1939, Germany was waging psychological warfare in the United States, alternately cajoling or indirectly threatening, to prevent American aid to the Allies. Nazi economic and propaganda penetration of Latin America was a serious threat to our national security. Nazi conquest of France heightened the possibility that Latin America might fall into the Nazi power orbit. The United States had to act. Propaganda was still a horrid word, and the national administration in 1940 could not hope to establish an admitted propaganda agency. American psychological operations or opinion-influencing activities had to be cloaked in the subterfuge of agency titles. Unfortunately, the situation was never clarified and throughout the war, American propaganda was not officially admitted. America carried on informational activities. These semantics contributed to the endless discussions defining the agencies' functions and areas of activity, to their numerous inter-agency jurisdictional conflicts,

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and to a suspiciously delimited and begrudged participation in the war effort. The very term "psychological warfare" was intentionally dreamed-up to conceal, and, although it has now been used in government circles for a decade, no agreed definition of the phrase as yet exists. Forgetting that America had used propaganda in every national emergency we confused ourselves, and weakened our psychological efforts to avoid arousing the national aversion to propaganda.

Because all Americans, Republicans and Democrats, agreed on hemispheric defense and Pan-Americanism, the Roosevelt administration could establish an agency to coordinate our defense activities in Latin America and to foster Latin American attitudes favorable to our objectives. There would not be partisan clamor if its propaganda aspects were properly concealed. In August 1940, Nelson A. Rockefeller was appointed as "Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations Among the Latin American Republics" (hereinafter identified as CIAA). While the Rockefeller agency had economic, financial and commercial responsibilities in Latin America, its primary function was to employ all these instruments in conjunction with an extensive American information program so that the Latin Americans would recognize Axis success as a serious threat to their freedom. With such information Latin Americans would naturally join the United States in aiding the Western Allies against the Axis aggressors. This prime purpose of Rockefeller's CIAA had to be concealed in verbiage, lest the American people and the world suspect that the United States was engaging in that horrid activity - propaganda. 2/

Similarly, in mid-1941, with Lend-Lease, American Aid to Russia and American occupation of Iceland, it became necessary to establish another organization which would make clear to the people of Europe, that

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2/ Rowland, History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (Washington, 1949).

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is, to England and its Commonwealth, to the peoples in occupied areas, to the neutral nations, and even to the Axis powers, that the American policy favored the Allies and was opposed to the Axis. Because of the delicate domestic situation, the administration still could not openly speak of a propaganda agency to influence the opinions and actions of Europeans, although national policy required that all Europeans should clearly understand the basic American preference for an Allied victory. Hence, a Coordinator of Information, William Donovan, was appointed in July 1941, ostensibly to centralize the government's foreign intelligence. It was understood, however, by the President, the Bureau of the Budget and Donovan that COI would not only collect and evaluate intelligence, but that it would also operate an extensive foreign information service so that Europeans would interpret American views and policies most favorably to the Allied cause. Like Rockefeller's CIAA in Latin America, COI's developing informational activities throughout the Eastern Hemisphere (Europe and Asia) had to be cloaked in indefiniteness, if not actual secrecy.

Prior to our entrance into World War II, these two agencies increased the existing American information media in overseas areas. Being adequately serviced with American news, world opinion could not fail to cooperate with the United States in aiding the Allies and opposing the Axis. The agencies operated on the principle that American information programs were based on truth. Lies, deceit, and misinterpretations should not be a part of the American effort. This philosophy of truth continued throughout the war. In one sense, all propaganda is based on the truth since false propaganda is rapidly discovered and destroys the whole effort. The important but undetermined element, however, is the proportion of truth and the proportion of interpretation to be included in the information program. The information operators in COI and CIAA had to learn the distinction between straight news and an opinion-influencing program which would support

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American war aims, increase Allied morale, and yet weaken the enemies's fighting spirit. Even after Pearl Harbor, American agencies refused to use the term "propaganda". Similarly, the term "political warfare" was unacceptable to American agencies because it was a traditionally British instrument and hence suspected by many Americans. Therefore, American participants in overseas informational activities became habituated to the phrase "psychological warfare", as a cover term which was only vaguely understood or appreciated.

Although it remained undefined American psychological warfare did develop into an extensive wartime operation. Rockefeller's CIAA fed increased American information into Latin America, by shortwave radio and especially by increased use of the local Latin American information media. Local radio stations were persuaded or subsidized to carry unidentified American programs. Local newspapers, through CIAA's judicious supplying of limited newsprint and American advertising, used additional American materials. American residents and native Latin Americans were organized into local national committees to issue publications, news photos and magazines, to make speeches favorable to the United States and to provide a local group to answer all queries about the United States and its policy. COI increased its informational activities in the Eastern Hemisphere until, in June 1942, its functions were divided between the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services.

This division did not indicate any increasing appreciation of psychological warfare; it was the confused domestic information program and the jurisdictional rivalries among the psychological warfare agencies which motivated the change. The Office of War Information (hereinafter OWI) (Executive Order No. 9286, 13 June 1942) would be responsible for keeping Americans as well as the people of the Eastern Hemisphere adequately informed about the American war effort. This combination of domestic and overseas activities in OWI made its operations more difficult. The military and the diplomats, fearing the OWI was only another publicity agency,

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hesitated to give it classified items about future military operations or national policy. Newspapers and some Congressmen viewed all OWI activities as Administration publicity. Yet OWI was responsible for the development and execution of the overt, or the officially admitted, side of American psychological warfare. The Office of Strategic Services (hereinafter OSS), established by the President's military order of 13 June 1942, as an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was responsible for covert operations, i.e., those activities not attributable to the American Government. These three agencies, CIAA, OWI, and OSS, were the major organizations involved in American psychological warfare but the whole organizational picture was confused by the fact that the War Department had a Psychological Warfare Branch and the Navy had a Special Warfare Section (OP-16W). During 1942, there also was a Joint Psychological Warfare Committee in the JCS. Other agencies performing activities directly related to psychological warfare were: The Board of Economic Warfare, the Office of Censorship, the War Production Board and the Federal Communications Commission. Uncertainties about each agency's responsibilities in psychological warfare developed the innumerable jurisdictional conflicts among all these agencies and delayed effective planning and cooperation in this field.

Although coordinated planning was lacking, extensive psychological warfare operations developed. Shortwave radio broadcasts covered the world on a 24-hour a day basis employing some 40 languages. Transmitter coverage was increased from an original 11 to 36 powerful transmitters which were available in 1945. News photos, pictures, brochures and other publications, as well as specially spliced news reels, film documentaries and even full length feature movies were distributed to influence world opinion. Psychological warfare Divisions or Branches were gradually established in all the major combined and American theaters of operation to develop these activities in unison with military operations. At AFHQ and

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SHAEF, these military psychological warfare units consisted of military and civilian personnel, both British and American. In strictly American theatres (i.e.,SWPA, China, Cincpac-Cincpoa) only American civilian and military personnel composed the psychological warfare units.

These military units employed every technique developed by the civilian agencies and supplemented them with psychological warfare aimed directly at the enemy soldier. They initiated their own radio broadcasting facilities and programs. They used newspapers and other published media to influence populations in areas which had been occupied by the advancing Allies or to prepare enemy occupied areas for the Allied advance. These theatre units particularly emphasized airborne leaflets as the major instrument for weakening the enemy soldiers' will to fight. SHAEF, for example, saturated German occupied areas of Western Europe with over 5 billion leaflets. In the process, it developed a weekly newspaper especially prepared for German soldiers which was weekly distributed, by air. These papers became a feature which German soldiers expectantly awaited. By 1945 psychological warfare had become an accepted, if not well understood, instrument of the American war effort. Over 30,000 people were directly involved in its operations at home and in the theatres. Congress was appropriating funds for this activity at the rate of $150,000,000 a year.

While extensive psychological warfare operations were developed by the civilian and military agencies, American psychological warfare planning was continuously characterized by improvisation. The journalistic concept that people be fed truthful news dominated American psychological warfare planning and this concept was never completely abandoned. Gradually, but never admittedly, its planners did interpret and slant details to obtain the most extensive overseas acceptance of the American view. Such planning was seriously hindered and limited by America's wartime policy of short-range propaganda goals: Unconditional surrender, the United

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Nations and lasting world peace.

Planning was also hampered by the reluctance of the military and the diplomats to give the psychological planners any foreknowledge of future plans. This failure was partially justified on security considerations but the main reason was that the military and political policy makers felt that psychological warfare did not need positive knowledge of future policy. If current news or developing international tensions might endanger national policy, the military and political agencies would guide psychological warfare activities with negatives or vetoes. The State Department and JCS always maintained that they could veto any propaganda lines without offering any justification.

In overt activities, OWI's weekly directives supposedly set the tone and the policy lines for all American propaganda, although they were primarily attuned to radio and news operations. The theatre units, since these directives were not sent through military channels, looked upon these OWI directives merely as guidances. Rapid military communications were not available to OWI and its directives were so delayed that they were no longer operationally effective. It was only in mid-August 1945, as the Japanese were surrendering and then only because occupational problems worried the military, that JCS gave OWI directives an official status. This action provided OWI with a military channel of communication. JCS also directed theatre commanders to accept these directives as JCS approved policy. While much was accomplished operationally in psychological warfare and while military commanders, from Theatre to Divisional levels, acknowledged its value, the following quotation fairly and accurately summarizes America's psychological warfare effort in World War II:

> The United States psychological warfare has a history of improvisation without central leadership, control or integration

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with the other methods of obtaining national objectives 3/

As V-E day passed and the final attack on Japan was in the making, psychological warfare appeared to be an accepted activity. Newspapers gave almost daily attention to leaflet and loudspeaker activities in combat. Congressmen and editors discussed its use to quicken Japanese surrender. The JCS considered the reestablishment of a psychological warfare committee. The Air Force, particularly the 20th, had gone all-out for it. Even the staid old departments, State and War, petitioned Congress not to cut OWI's funds for psychological warfare:

> "This Department regards this work as an important and, indeed, at the present time, indispensable to the most effective conduct of American foreign affairs. Its liquidation would silence the Voice of America abroad at the very time when it is most necessary to get the American story told and the American policies understood among foreign peoples." 4/

By June 1945, all top government officials were aware of psychological warfare and, if questioned, would have conceded that it had contributed to the more rapid termination of the war. However, herein lay one of its weaknesses and the seeds of its subsequent decline. Nobody could say precisely what psychological warfare had actually contributed. Broadcasts could be totalled, leaflets counted and the amount of pictures and printed verbiage amassed. No one, however, not even the psychological warriors, could say with any precision, much less prove, how it all had affected ally or enemy or what it contributed to the

3/ A detailed history of American psychological Warfare has been prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by E.P. Lilly. (C) JCS 224/2, "Status of Office of War Information Propaganda Directives" 6 Aug 45. (C) Cable, War Dept., CM OUT46488 (11 Aug 45) JCS to American Theatre Commanders. (S) SWNCC 304/1, "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee..." 10 Dec 46, Appendix B, p. 16 /approved by SWNCC 30 Apr 1947/.

4/ (U) Memo, Joseph Grew, Under Secretary of State to President, "Restoration of OWI Funds in Senate", 11 Jun 1945; (R) Ltr., Gen. G. C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, to Senator McKellar, 14 Jun 45; (R) Ltr., Sec/War Stimson to President, 19 Jun 45. OPD 334.8 OWI, Sect. 9, Case 43, in AG Records.

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winning of a particular battle or to the war. Psychological warfare was an intangible concept whose value and effectiveness was practically a matter of faith. Since it was considered "un-American", its inability to prove its worth was embarrassing.

America's psychological warfare effort in World War II, large and influential as it might have been, was permitted to fall off into practical non-existence when the Japanese war ended. A repetition of World War I dissolution and subsequent forgetfulness seemed to be in the making. In the summer of 1944, when the European war seemed to be rapidly ending, each agency did some thinking about its post-war status. OWI and CIAA discussed the post-war information needs of the United States with the newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Public And Cultural Relations. These discussions occurred mainly because of the personality (Archibald MacLeish) who was Assistant Secretary, rather than any wide-spread State Department acceptance of the importance of any government information program overseas. Expecting a long Japanese war and then a six-months liquidation period, State, OWI and CIAA felt that they had time to work out long-range transferral programs. Expectation was that State's Foreign Service would take over the information activities at the many outposts. The agencies would develop their long-range plans so that an eventual take-over by State would be easier. About the same time, OSS developed a proposal for a continuing central intelligence service, incorporating most OSS functions into a peacetime agency. Government agencies had asked for comments and the proposal merited attention and discussion even in the newspapers. Continued German resistance, and particularly the Ardennes offensive, postponed additional action. The information agencies so concentrated on the final defeat of Germany, and then of Japan, that post-war planning was practically ignored. The relatively surprising Japanese surrender

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in mid-August, therefore, ended the fighting war before serious attention had been given to balanced planning on the post-war information needs of the American government.

In the subsequent liquidation of the American psychological warfare agencies, several factors must be mentioned as contributing to its apparent haste. The majority of the psychological warfare personnel were free-lance, creative and self-assertive individuals who might work in a government agency during wartime but who sought their individualistic professions when war ended. Feeling that they had done their bit, they rushed to get out of routine government operations. Secondly, during wartime it might be overlooked, but the traditional American hostility towards propaganda remained. When there is added the American post-war optimism that international relations would be an open exchange among the democratic nations, it is understandable that the psychological warfare agencies hesitated to invite possible Congressional and public hostility by suggesting the retention of government propaganda. Finally, the Administration desired to re-establish the government's peacetime basis as expeditiously as possible. The policy of the Budget Bureau might be summed up in the statement that the Administration did not want to eliminate clearly useful functions developed during the war. It was best, however, to liquidate rapidly those wartime activities which were not clearly demonstrable as necessary to the government's peacetime policy. These three factors--the personnel element, the fear of Congressional or public hostility, and the Administration's attitude on the government's peacetime structure--contributed to the hectic liquidation of the psychological warfare agencies.5/

5/ E. P. Lilly interview with Samuel Rossenman, December, 1945; with Mr. Schwartzwalder and Sydney Souers, November 1951.

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While CIAA and OWI visualized that their broadcasting and news functions would be incorporated into the State Department, few definite plans for the orderly incorporation of these functions had been developed by any of the agencies. When the Japanese announced their surrender, the war agencies were told to get their liquidation plans to the White House. Only by continuous conferences, the final one lasting 12 hours, was OWI able to get its liquidation plan into the White House withinthe three-day deadline. The Bureau of the Budget apparently had no definite plans regarding the psychological warfare agencies, and recommended that the President appoint a Committee of Three: John Snyder, Director of War Mobilization, Samuel Rossenman, Special Counsel, and Harold Smith, Director of the Budget, to study the problem and prepare the Executive Orders. Because there was uncertainty as to what information activities America really needed, an interim intelligence agency was proposed to continue the necessary intelligence functions and to commence the orderly liquidation of activities deemed unnecessary for a peaceful America. CIAA's and OWI's overseas activities were likewise to be combined in an independent Interim Information Office under the policy direction of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. State and the information agencies were given four months to determine what functions and personnel should be retained or could be eliminated. On 31 August 1945, President Truman issued an Executive Order providing that OWI's domestic activities should cease on 15 October 1945 and that its overseas information activities, together with CIAA's, should be integrated into the Department of State by 31 December, or liquidated[6/]

6/ Executive Order 9608: "Providing for the Termination of the Office of War Information, and for the Disposition of its functions", 31 August 1945 [10 Fed. Reg. (1 Sep 45) pages 1123-1125] .

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A similar directive was developed by the President's Committee of Three for terminating OSS. Except for secret intelligence, OSS's intelligence activities were to be integrated into the reorganized intelligence functions of the State Department. State Department did not want to handle the necessarily gradual liquidation of OSS's secret and covert operations. Other intelligence agencies had wanted secret intelligence files, if not its functions, to substantiate hostile criticism of civilian intelligence. To minimize conflict, a Strategic Services Unit was established under the Secretary of War to liquidate the unnecessary activities of OSS,[7] to maintain OSS's existent secret intelligence channels, and to keep the trained secret intelligence operators and analysts until adequate arrangements for secret intelligence could be determined.

The interim agencies established under the control of the State and War Departments tried to analyze the utility of their functions. The philosophy of keeping only the proven useful and desired budget reductions caused the elimination of activities which agency people thought, but could not prove, would be valuable in the post-war world. OSS's Morale Operation was considered too dangerous for peacetime American policy. Similarly, other secret operations necessary to wartime policy but not within the spirit of American peacetime international relations had to be liquidated. However, a few top personnel foresaw that even in peacetime, America might need some secret operations and so a cadre of the best secret operations people were slotted in secret intelligence positions with the assumption that they revive secret operations if necessary. [8]

7/ Executive Order 9621: "Termination of the.../OSS/" 20 Sep 1945, /10 Fed. Reg. (22 Sep 1945) page 1203/ E.P. Lilly interview with Admiral Souers, Schwartzwalder and Brig. Gen. John Magruder (Ret.) who was head of the Strategic Services Unit.
8/ E. P. Lilly interview with Sydney Souers and John Magruder.

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Other pressures were undercutting America's overt psychological operations. The American press associations, publishers, and motion picture distributors had permitted government agency operation in their overseas outlets during the war because as private enterprises they could not operate during wartime. With peace, the private informational media wanted to resume their own operations without competition or interference from a government agency. For example, the Associated Press and the United Press had been willing to provide their news files to OWI and CIAA and permit its uncontrolled transmission overseas as government news. At the end of 1945, however, they informed State's Interim Information Service (hereinafter IIS) that since peace was again established in the world, they could no longer contribute their service to a government unit which dangerously competed with their overseas commercial outlets. IIS was thereby cut off from a major news source, and it could only provide a textual service and editorial commentary from those newspapers which would permit such use. Similarly, elements in State Department sought the elimination of the all secret intelligence lest it threaten its position in the intelligence field. Much manipulation went on behind the scenes. Existing departments desired to do away with competing wartime activities. Simultaneously, a few far-seeing individuals in government and in private enterprise urged the retention of some activities as necessary adjuncts to a government which had become the world power.

The rapid liquidation of America's psychological warfare operation, which was practically completed by the end of 1945, was based on two uncertain factors: potential utility and adaptability to prospective national policy. The utility of psychological activities is an intangible on which many have opinions but no one has authority. Even in 1952, there are no certain means of determining its precise value and

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in 1945, there was even a lack of interest in such evaluation. Hence the judgments in the liquidation process as to what activities would be retained were made on a rule of thumb or a personal basis. During the war, the information agencies had attempted to make operational evaluation of the audience appeal and technical receptivity of their programs. In theaters of operations, military psychological warfare units unsuccessfully attempted the public opinion poll technique to arrive at some estimate of the activity's worth. Similar efforts were sporadically made during the early occupation of enemy areas. People were asked if they had seen leaflets or had heard radio broadcasts. More importantly, but with less satisfactory results, the interviewee was asked what influence the item had on his attitude and actions. No formal reports of these evaluating efforts were ever made.

By unofficial pressures, two questions bearing on the effects of psychological warfare "snuck" into the Morale questionnaire, which was a small feature of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey of aerial war damage in Japan. No such questions were asked in the European survey. The report on Japanese Morale mentioned leaflets as a factor contributing to the weakening of enemy morale, but it made no serious evaluation of their contribution. The Propaganda Branch of the War Department made three distinct efforts in 1945-1946 to get authorization for a survey of the effectiveness of military psychological warfare. While such proposals were recommended on the highest General Staff levels, they were never approved on the Secretary's level. Interestingly, neither CWI nor OSS was willing to assign any liquidation funds to the completion of detailed histories which had been started. It was only by unofficial and personel pressures that the JCS authorized and supported a "War Report" on OSS and a History of

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Psychological Warfare.[9/]

The uncertainties of utility as a criterion for estimating what psychological activities should be continued into peacetime were matched by the indecisiveness of national policy as the world shifted from war and started the United Nations as the hope for world peace. The fighting was ended; the aggressive totalitarian nations had been vanquished. For Americans, the dawn of world-wide democratic, peaceful and cooperative international co-existence was in the making. The major problems were: reconstruction and rehabilitation of war-torn areas and the economic and political development of the backward or colonial areas so that eventually they would be self-governing participants in the international paradise.

In addition to support of the United Nations, America's major goal was to get along with the USSR which was viewed as a democracy, at least in potency. Concessions were made to the Russians to prove that the Western Powers would live up to their wartime agreements and did not favor a cordaine sanitairre. In this atmosphere, American policy makers considered that psychological warfare or the direct influencing of world opinion was inappropriate. World opinion was recognized as a major support of the United Nations but that opinion should be based on enlightenment through factual information.

The American position although probably never reduced to paper ran along these lines. If the world were given straight facts about American objectives and desires, men would necessarily recognize the cooperative position of the United States. If the United States adopted

9/ PWD-SHAEF and PWB-AFHQ records in AG Record Center, Dept. of Army, contain the initial reports of the public opinion surveys. The author was connected with the Propaganda Branch's proposals for a survey, and with the OWI and OSS historical projects. Report on Japanese Morale (Government Printing Office, 1948) is a publication of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey.

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varying techniques to influence world opinion in accordance with American objectives, other nations would be justified in using the same techniques to obtain their desired ends. The United States would set the good example, which the other nations would adopt voluntarily or through the force of world opinion. The unadulterated facts speak for themselves and are more acceptable to the common man than government opinion influencing efforts. America had no selfish post-war policies, and therefore we needed only channels to insure that all peoples knew the American policy. World opinion could not avoid favoring our position in most matters. The information program of the Department of State needed only sufficient machinery from OWI and CIAA to insure that the American viewpoint would be objectively and impartially presented throughout the world. American policy makers undoubtedly were aware that Russia and Britain were not limiting themselves to factual information but were continuing to issue propaganda supporting their national positions. American policy makers, at least in early 1946, seemed to feel that the United States should be above such measures. The great hope was that world opinion, like the American public, would develop an aversion to governmental propaganda.

With this attitude, the United States had practically liquidated its psychological activities by early 1946. The better qualified personnel had returned to their normal occupations. All covert operations had been abandoned and only overt information activity was uncertainly available. These overt psychological aspects existed without any clear delineation of their status or high level acceptance and support for their continued existence. The Office of International Information and Education of the Department of State retained its indefinite jurisdiction over thirty-six international shortwave transmitters in the United States, together with contractual relay arrangements with the British

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Broadcasting Company and the group of relay transmitters in Algiers and in Manila. State also maintained a limited news service at each embassy where local United States Information Service tried to insure the distribution of American texts, editorial round-ups, occasional feature articles, newsphotos and news letters to the local molders of opinion.

State's information activity was seriously hampered, however, by two factors: the hostile Congressional attitude toward government information efforts and the indifference, if not hostility, of the career Foreign Service Officers to this unusual addition to their duties and responsibilities. Both factors were inherited from OWI and the State Department felt embarrassed by the continuance of an information service. Because it was an activity relatively new to Foreign Service personnel, it was not strongly supported or defined in the Department itself. The information program was administratively in State but it was not in State's policy side. State policy people thought of the information staff as journalists. They would be told what the State Department was doing or planning only after the action had taken place. Such publicity-minded people need not and should not be taken into the political planning process or the background discussions leading to decision. Information people did not have the political intelligence or experience to advise Foreign Service Officers in the Department or in the diplomatic missions.

These attitudes naturally frustrated the information people. They did not claim the right of participation in policy making. However, aware that the words and the manner by which the policy was presented often had as great a foreign impact as the substance of the policy itself, information people wanted to be consulted before the decision was finalized. Without altering the policy such discussions might lead to

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a presentation of the policy in a way which would have the most favorable impact upon all foreign audiences. This difference of attitude between the information and political policy people in the Department of State long hampered effective action. Policy makers considered that they had evaluated the psychological factors and the information people merely had to grind the mill and publicize it. Information specialists, while they disseminated the policy given them, saw how an improved presentation would have obtained a more favorable reaction. It was several years before the career Foreign Service Officers modified their views. In the interim, a full and fair picture of America was the only admitted objective of State's information program.

Intra-departmental coldness towards information activity was a limitation upon the program's effectiveness. An even greater deterrent to psychological activities was the hostility of large segments of Congress toward such activities. Part of the hostility was a hangover from Congress' attitude toward OWI; part was due to the privately owned information media seeing State's program as competition, and part was due to the unpopularity of the State Department, probably arising out of the frustrations of the postwar crisis which could not openly be directed at the political and policy sections but could safely and openly be vented against the information program. Hence rancorous partisans and even Democrats with grievances could attack, belittle and cut the funds for the information program and still claim that they were not interfering with foreign policy. The information program therefore became one of Congress' perennial whipping boys. This attitude was evidenced in appropriations for the information program between 1946-1948 which were reduced by more than half. These actions required that the personnel be reduced in proportion. The publicized abuse and criticism and Congressional uncertainty about the information program increased these personnel losses, not merely in quantity but more

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importantly, in quality. The better trained and the more capable people decided that their status in State was too precarious. They pulled out of the information program and moved into more certain and more effective work. In this process, State lost the most capable specialists with whom an expanded operation might have been developed. When the demands increased after 1949, the Department had to start practically from scratch.

Another example of inappropriate pressure on the information program was the Congressional insistence in 1947 that America's international news programs should be prepared and programmed by the private broadcasting companies with funds provided by the Department. Within a year private enterprise came back to Washington begging the Department and Congress to return to the old system whereby the companies rented the facilities to the Department of State and the Department had to recruit inexperienced people to fulfill its responsibility of programming the entire output. No matter how interested or aggressive State's information people might be, they were hampered by the Department's disinterest and the acknowledged hostility of the Congress and of private enterprise towards government information activities.

Indefinite and ineffective as State's information program might be in comparison with Russian propaganda, the overt psychological activity did maintain its existence. Covert psychological warfare disappeared. National policy of 1945 and 1946 viewed covert operations as un-American and undesirable. Little high level support could be developed for continuing the experience of such operations even within a small planning cadre. When powerful groups condemned the maintenance of any American secret intelligence, it is understandable that covert operations would receive even less favorable attention. Yet an ad hoc decision to maintain secret intelligence activities

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provided the strand on which postwar covert operations were attached. Without detailing the inter-governmental differences about central intelligence, the residue of OSS' secret intelligence activity was finally formed into a Central Intelligence Group under a Director of Central Intelligence who would be responsible for an interdepartmental committee. This was accomplished by the Presidential directive, 26 January 1946, "Coordination of Federal Foreign Intelligence Activities".

The significant phrases about covert activities in this directive, which the President issued on the personal recommendations of his staff advisors rather than upon the recommendations of the Departments concerned, were two vaguely stated duties assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Covert operations were eventually to be developed from them. In addition to correlating and evaluating all intelligence and recommending over-all policies and objectives, DCI would perform such services as the three Secretaries determined could be more effectively accomplished centrally and "perform such other functions and duties relating to intelligence affecting national security as the President or the National Intelligence Authority may direct".[10/]

It is not clear whether this directive in these phrases visualized that covert operations might become necessary and thereby provided for them. Such interpretations were current in the military intelligence agencies. Whether these phrases were so conceived on the White House level cannot be documented, but Congress in establishing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the National Security Act of 1947 used the same wording as this directive. These clauses were also explicitly

10/ Presidential directive to Secretaries of State, War and Navy, "Coordination of Federal Foreign Intelligence Activities", 26 January 1946, 11 Fed Reg (5 February 1946) p. 1337.

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mentioned in subsequent National Security Council (NSC) papers as the basis for including covert activities within CIA. 11/

During the postwar years 1946 and 1947, psychological operations were in abeyance or of insignificant calibre. American policy continued to hope for ideal international relations and an Assistant Secretary of State returned from the first general conference of UNESCO glorifying the conference's theme: "peace on earth and good will to men". In this climate of opinion the State Department's information program could only be a specialized press service. State did not distribute its news where the American press wire services already operated. It did send complete texts of American statements which the wire services rarely transmitted. In areas not covered by American news services the State Department attempted to maintain a brief but inclusive American news service but in a reduced number of languages. As a news service, planning aspects became unimportant. The highly developed planning procedures with directives, considered and approved by military and diplomatic policy people, fell into abeyance.

At the same time the armed forces maintained their special information programs, particularly Armed Forces Radio Service (AFRS), for American soldiers in areas of occupation. Policy and operational contact between the AFRS and State's information was non-existent. State's information programs were prepared to satisfy foreign sensibilities and possible foreign interpretation. The AFRS with its GI audience tailored its news to their American needs. It was gradually recognized that foreigners listened to AFRS to learn the real American

11/ Material on the above was secured in discussions with G.F. Schwartzwalder (Bureau of the Budget), with Rear Admiral Sydney Souers, USN (Ret.) (Executive Office of the President) and Brigadier General John Magruder, USA (Ret.) (Office of the Secretary of Defense).

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views. They considered that AFRS' programs were not propaganda, whereas State's Voice of America (VOA) being the official American output was tainted with propaganda.

Until 1947 it does not appear there was any serious effort to coordinate the output of these separate outlets even though differences in presentation might seem to foreigners to be contradictions or variations in American policy. Meanwhile State's program continued to be hampered by domestic minorities insisting that a false impression of the United States was being given to Europeans. Unfavorable publicity reduced the imaginative possibilities and State's operators felt themselves bound to a presentation of "a fair and balanced picture of the United States". As Russian propaganda became aggressively anti-American, the State Department hesitated to counter it with American propaganda lest Congress eliminate the entire information program.

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PART II. THE BEGINNING OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT

While the United States Government, by choice and under private and Congressional pressure, limited its information activities to factual news about American policy, the international scene was clearly changing. Hopes for a mutually peaceful understanding with the USSR became dimmer as Communist pressures increased in the satellite areas of Eastern Europe. Russian attitudes in the United Nations and at the four Foreign Ministers' meetings were not lessening the tension. A contributing factor was the Russian intransigence on the regulation and control of atomic energy by the United Nations. Similarly, Russian pressure on Iran, her demands upon Turkey for pre-eminence on the Straits question, and more particularly the evident but unofficial Communist intervention in the Greek Civil War, forced American policy to reconsider its hopefully idealistic approach of 1945.

On the Greek problem, America had joined in the UN Security Council proposal to send an investigating committee which Russia opposed to study the border incidents. At the end of 1946, an American Economic Mission was appointed to assist Greece in rehabilitating its economy and maintaining its national independence. Similarly in early January 1947, the United States sent basically identical notes to Britain, Russia and to Poland protesting in diplomatic language against the undemocratic procedures of the existing Polish provisional government. The note claimed that such official conduct would prevent the coming Polish elections from being truly democratic and free. 12/

12/ W. Millis, Editor, The Forrestal Diaries (NY 1951) gives innumerable instances of American official concern, p. 129 ff: State Department Bulletin XVI, No. 392 (5 Jan 47), p. 20; No. 493 (19 Jan 47) P.134.

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This paper need not detail the development of the two fundamental American policy decisions of 1947 which altered the whole trend of national policy and revitalized psychological operations. Undoubtedly State and the Military Departments had done much thinking as the Russian domination in Eastern Europe became clearer during 1946. In any policy change the influence of domestic considerations had to be kept in mind. Americans wanted peace and believed that continued cooperation with the Russians, together with the United Nations, would bring peace if our leaders took the correct steps. American dominance in atomic developments gave us a feeling of superiority if an undesired war developed and yet it also hampered our freedom of considering alternatives because of the horrendous implication that in war the atomic bomb might be used against American cities.

Whether its domestic and foreign psychological implications were appreciated or not is unknown, but America had taken the position that it would use the atomic bomb on any aggressor against international peace. American public opinion accepted this policy in expectation that it would compel an effective control over atomic energy. There was the unquenchable fear, however, that we would use the atomic bomb in case of aggression, and there would be an atomic retaliation against the United States. As Russian aggressive intentions became clearer, American policy planners, aware of domestic opinion and hoping for the idealized international peace under the United Nations, had to develop a position which could check Russian intentions and still avoid the catastrophe of war.

The solution was the Truman Doctrine, enunciated by the President to Congress on 12 March 1947. Greece and Turkey had been under severe Communist pressure to establish governments more friendly to Communism. In Greece, guerrilla warfare between Communist groups and

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the government had continued for a year. Russian threats had forced Turkey into a rearmament program which jeopardized its economic existence. Britain had aided these countries with both political advice, economic and military assistance. By 1947 Britain's domestic economy was so precarious that England warned that if the United States could not replace British military and economic aid, the Eastern Mediterranean would fall into the Communist orbit by Allied default. This British action was publicized and the American public became excited. Opinion favored checking Communist intentions but insisted upon the avoidance of war. The answer was the Truman Doctrine, the Doctrine of Containment, developed mainly by the Department of State with the approval of the military services.

The Truman Doctrine expressed in the President's speech to a joint session of Congress declared it to be desirable American policy to provide arms, economic aid, and military advice to Greece and Turkey so that those governments could maintain their freedom against an engulfing Communism. While he explicitly requested aid for Greece and Turkey, the President declared that future American policy would continue to contain Communism within its then existing area. Wherever Communist pressure threatened to push beyond the existent Communist-controlled areas America would provide aid to the nation so threatened which wanted to maintain its freedom 13/

13/ State Department Bulletin XVI, No. 403 (23 Mar 47) p. 534 ff; Forrestal Diaries, p. 247, ff. The policy of containment was most explicitly developed in an unsigned article, "Sources of Soviet Conduct", Foreign Affairs, XXV (July 1947) p. 566-582, which currently and thereafter was attributed to the State Department's major Russian planner, George Kennan. The gist of of the Truman Doctrine is in the words "the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm, and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies....The possibilities of American policy are
(contd. next page)

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During the Congressional debates on Greek and Turkish aid, and in authorizing legislation, it was evident that this American aid was considered as a limited counter to an immediate Russian threat rather than a fundamental change of policy toward Russia and our desired postwar world. It was expected that when they realized that America would oppose unlimited Communist expansion the Russian leaders would drop their aggressive demeanor and cooperate in the organization of a peaceful world. While Congress debated aid to Greece and Turkey, and the departments initiated the necessary military and economic aid programs, Western Europe's economy was rapidly deteriorating.

France and Italy were undergoing severe economic strain as a normal consequence of long German occupation and the postwar inflation. Economic dislocation and Communist-inspired labor unrest threatened France with a political crisis during which the Communist minority might gain control. Economic crises in France and Italy threatened England's stability and a depression throughout Europe. Americans were aware of these foreign economic issues and their relationship to our own economic welfare. However the main American concern was that Europe's collapse increased the possibility of Communist domination of Western Europe. In this crisis the State Department proposed large-scale American economic aid to Western Europe to improve financial and manufacturing conditions, to alleviate the threatened unemployment and labor discontent and thereby counter Communist-inspired unrest. The formal promulgation of the proposed economic aid was made by Secretary of State Marshall in his commencement

13/(contd)
by no means limited to holding the line and hoping for the best. It is entirely possible for the United States to influence by its actions the internal development, both within Russia and throughout the international communist movement". Facts and news and the resultant pressure of world public opinion were then conceived as the major instruments of influencing Russian and world opinion.

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address at Harvard, 5 June 1947.

In one paragraph Marshall suggested that America would provide economic recovery funds to these European states who were willing to cooperatively plan and implement a continental economic program. Marshall's Plan for European recovery was heralded in the American and European press. The original Marshall Plan was not limited to non-Communist countries but included all European countries who would pool their economic potentials for the common good of all Europe. Russia and its Satellites attended the Paris meeting to develop the Committees for European Economic Cooperation (CEEC). Subsequently the Russians withdrew from the CEEC and their Satellites followed. It was Russian opposition which gave the Marshall Plan the character of another positive American step to counter Russian expansion, this time through economic aid. Marshall's policy declaration initiated extended negotiations in Washington and in Europe to prepare the plans so that Congress would approve and authorize the European Recovery Program (ERP). The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) was established by Congress in April 1948 to direct American participation in ERP. Russian policy towards America meanwhile crystallized into an officially peaceful but actually hostile attitude. Communist policy militantly opposed the Marshall Plan as American imperialistic domination of European economy. To destroy ERP the Russians in 1947 organized the Communist parties in its satellite areas, and even those in the Western countries, into the Cominform. 14/

14/ Communist Information Bureau (Sep 47) Pravda (5 Oct 47). Studies of the Russian motives for the establishment of the Cominform suggest that its purpose was to accomplish the acceptance of a single communist party line by all the independent Communist parties in Europe without irritatingly and openly identifying it with the Krenlin policy. The cominform would be a front by which Kremlin policy was given the appearance of being freely adopted by the representatives of all Communist parties acting on a free and equal basis. CIA Studies on the Cominform.

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The Cominform's militant agitation against the Marshall Plan rapidly passed beyond strict information activities into actions. The Communist apparatus, particularly in France and Italy, flexed its muscles, preparatory to a full-fledged test of strength in the elections in 1948. The Communist-dominated trade unions in France and Italy increased agitation and strikes to dislocate economic life and prevent these unstable governments from joining ERP agreements. Communist opposition to the Marshall Plan worried American policy makers and great efforts were made to present the Marshall Plan as a cooperative European-American enterprise. The critical situation, while Congress debated and legislated, awakened American officials to the necessity of our overseas information program presenting a uniform viewpoint. Whether it was issued by the Voice of America, by local USIS, by the Armed Forces Radio Service, or by American private and commercial outlets, America's story had to be uniform or Communist propaganda would exploit the differences. This background explains two important developments in American psychological operations which occurred at the end of 1947.

A paper requesting that the government's foreign information measures be strengthened and coordinated was presented at the first substantive meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) in early December. State Department presented a SANACC proposal which emphasized that government information could influence foreign attitudes directly by explaining American objectives and countering anti-American propaganda. To strengthen the information program, NSC approved, and the President directed, that the Secretary of State be charged with formulating the information policies and that he implement them through his department and that he would coordinate all other government overseas information so that it was in conformity with

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that developed policy. The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs would be assigned these responsibilities under the Secretary. He would be assisted by an informal group of representatives from the government agencies having foreign information activities. The Assistant Secretary would determine the most effective utilization of all information facilities, and develop interdepartmental plans and programs, so that foreign opinion would be influenced in a direction favorable to United States interests. This decision, NSC-4, was the first direct action to improve postwar foreign information service.15/

This early NSC paper on overt psychological operations represented a year and a half's study by an interdepartmental committee on psychological warfare. This special planning committee had been established in the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC/later SANACC) after the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in June 1946 had suggested its need. SWNCC appointed an ad hoc committee representing State, War and Navy Departments. This group was directed to review World War II psychological warfare, to recommend a peacetime organization to keep it in a "ready for mobilization" status, and to prepare proposals for its wartime organization. This ad hoc group prepared a long report recommending the establishment of a permanent SWNCC subcommittee on psychological warfare to develop policies, plans and studies for its use "in time of war or threat of war as determined by the President". It suggested that this subcommittee would be chaired by State's representative and consist of a representative from Central Intelligence Group, two War Department officers (representing the Army and the Air Force) and a Navy representative. This proposed subcommittee

15/ (C) NSC-4, Memo, NSC Exec Sec to NSC, "Coordination of Foreign Information Measures", 19 December 1947.

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would study and prepare effective psychological warfare plans containing organizational patterns and basic policy assumptions and decisions as well as the personnel, the man-hour and logistic requirements for a national psychological warfare effort during wartime. These plans prepared by SWNCC would be sent to JCS and the National Intelligence Authority for concurrence. The SWNCC Subcommittee was authorized to plan, guide, coordinate, and execute the American psychological wartime effort until a national organization was established. With relatively minor changes the proposal for a permanent psychological warfare subcommittee under SWNCC was approved on 30 April 1947. Although it changed its name to SWNCC Special Studies and Evaluations Committee, which was merely a cover name, this body presented the first postwar document on psychological warfare 16/

This SWNCC Subcommittee provides one line of continuity for the postwar revival of interest in psychological warfare. It was the activity of this Subcommittee that eventually came to the attention of the National Security Council and which led to the series of NSC papers on psychological warfare planning. This first SWNCC paper on psychological warfare established several definite patterns which became unalterable departmental traditions. In attempting to delimit the concern of the different departments, this paper invented the unfortunate three-fold time blocks for psychological warfare: during peacetime, in time of war, "or threat of war as determined by the President". These three time divisions were subsequently repeated

16/ (S) SWNCC 304/1, "Psychological Warfare", 10 December 1946; (S) SANACC 304/15, "History of the Activities of the Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations", June 1948. With the establishment of the Air Force as an independent service and department in the National Military Establishment under the National Security Act of 1947, SWNCC's title changed to SANACC (State, Army, Navy, Air Coordinating Committee).

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in every major paper on psychological warfare organization and raised unnecessary organizational conflicts because they involved the pre-eminence of the different Departments' responsibility for each period. The Subcommittee assumed that in peacetime, psychological warfare or more properly, the information program, was pre-eminently a State Department responsibility for planning, execution and coordination. During the threat of war or national emergency, the State Department still had primary concern for planning but had to coordinate its policy and operations with the armed services. In wartime State retained primary policy interest, but the responsibilities of the armed services increased as psychological warfare more closely supported and contributed to military policy.

In another area this original paper set an important precedent. It provided that psychological warfare in actual or projected military theatres of operations was the responsibility of the theatre commanders. Directives, guidances and communications to the theatre commanders regarding psychological warfare could only be forwarded through JCS channels. The SWNCC Subcommittee also undertook the study of an organization for psychological warfare during wartime. It proposed

an independent agency directed by a Presidential appointee with fulltime representation from State Department, the armed forces, CIA, and if desired, from the Office of Censorship and the office responsible for domestic information. In these SWNCC studies the coordination of overt and covert psychological operations was for the first time seriously considered. In 1948, SWNCC was assuming that on the level of the national organization, plans for overt and covert activities would be coordinated in accordance with over-all psychological warfare plans.

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Very little of the SWNCC Subcommittee's proposals on psychological warfare proved to be effective if one uses the criterion of acceptance as national or interdepartmental policy. While many of its papers were approved by SWNCC, some approved by the JCS and several forwarded to the NSC, these SWNCC papers were always overtaken by an agency paper or an NSC paper. Nevertheless the SWNCC Subcommittee on psychological warfare performed a valuable educational service. The departmental representatives on the Subcommittee had to present psychological problems to their departments for policy decisions. SWNCC papers had to be circulated among the departments, and even to the JCS for concurrence. In this way psychological warfare and its problems were forced on the attention of political and military planners who might have preferred to ignore the entire subject as outside their area of responsibility. Those papers which were accepted by SWNCC and forwarded to NSC, brought a reconsideration on a national level of psychological warfare. One example will suffice. The SWNCC Subcommittee proposed that a national organization for psychological warfare be established in the future. The JCS reaction urged its immediate establishment. This development led to an NSC decision that an interdepartmental group be set up in State Department to do such planning. 17/

Before the SWNCC Subcommittee did more than recommend a national psychological warfare organization for wartime, the European crisis of 1947 forced American policy makers to reconsider the idealistic American approach towards international informational work. Mention

17/ (S) SANACC 304/15, SWNCC 304/6 (January 1948); JCS 1735/4 "Report by a Joint Strategic Plans Committee on Report on Psychological Warfare from SANACC", 16 March 1948; (TS) NSC 43, "Planning for Wartime Conduct of Overt Psychological Warfare", 9 March 1949.

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has already been made of the open and avowed ideological attacks against the Marshall Plan by the Communists. Communist press and radio efforts were only one part of their European campaign. They realized that mere words were not enough, and the field of labor activities was chosen for additional Communist pressure. Controlling the major French labor unions, the Communists called throttling strikes in the coal and transportation fields to prevent government cooperation in the European Recovery Program (ERP). While these strikes might have wrecked French economic life and the ERP, the Kremlin would gain power and yet avoid any appearance of USSR meddling in French internal problems. The strikes were internal domestic concerns with which neither Russia nor the United States should interfere. If the strikes succeeded in eliminating France from ERP, however, American objectives would be defeated. Russian prestige and influence would proportionately increase in Western Europe.

American policy makers were enormously concerned about these Communist tactics. America could not formally and openly interfere in the French labor question. Pressure might be put on the French Government but the United States could not formally influence the labor leaders of France. American officials, however, could not allow

25X1



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France was not the only area of Communist instigated crises in 1947-1948. Italy provided an equally fruitful field for Communist subversion. Communist success in Italy would increase Communist power in the vital Mediterranean area. The wartime Allies had just ratified the Treaty of Peace with Italy and a new Italian Government was to be elected in April, 1948, the first freely elected government of the new democratic Italy. Italy's economy was weakened by widespread unemployment and severe scarcities. The ravages of war and the lack of machinery had reduced its farming population to the 1910 level. Widespread Italian dissatisfaction, if exploited, might enable Italian Communists through threats, bribery, cajolery, and "pie in the sky" promises, to gain the election of sufficient Communist representation in the legislature to keep Italy out of the Marshall Plan and bring it within the Iron Curtain.

State Department planners were agreed that action had to be taken so that the Communist efforts would not swing the Italian election to the Communists. A second NSC paper was developed out of the SANACC 25X1 paper presented by the State Department in December 1947, advising the

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NSC that the USSR and the Communists were using covert operations to discredit and defeat American objectives. The United States, to insure world peace and national security, would now have to supplement its overt information activities with covert operations. This significant policy paper, NSC-4-A, was officially approved by the NSC, and it directed the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to undertake covert activity. This paper, at the first substantive meeting of NSC, is the first authorization for American covert activities. 19/

25X1



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In March, 1948, State Department's Voice of America beamed an extensive information program to Italy. As the official instrument of the Government, VOA attempted to make clear the "intensity of the American interests in Italians' welfare...without providing grounds for the charge that the United States is interfering unduly". It was recommended to the VOA operators that news and commentaries should clearly present the American point of view to the Italians and to all Europeans. Free elections would show whether the Italians desired a free government or wanted to be subject to the Moscow dictatorship. America would have to determine its action after the Italians had made their choice. Without implying that America would shut off aid to a Communist Italy, the VOA should emphasize that Moscow had not permitted any of its Satellites to participate in ERP or to receive its benefits. The Italians would be reminded of "the unequivocal assurances of the effective United States support for the free nations of Western Europe". President Truman had promised aid to all democratic people, and Congress had implemented the promise in the Greek and Turkish aid program. While the VOA would stick to news reporting, it would emphasize to the Italians that all previous working agreements or political compromises with Communists had always resulted in disaster and eventual Communist domination. The Balkan countries and the recent coup in Czechoslovakia were to be

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constantly repeated as warning examples of appeasement's danger. 20/

These antagonistic relations between the Communists and the West, under American leadership, intensified the existent Cold War, until now an unadmitted reality. Communist seizure of control in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and the pressures on Berlin, emphasized to American leaders that traditional American diplomacy was insufficient to check the Russians. Communist successes in propaganda, political blackmail and secret operations increased the cynical despair engulfing Western Europe and endangered the purposes of the Marshall Plan. Western Europe might easily fall prey to the Kremlin unless America could reverse the trend. The United States could not officially and openly match Russian action. Hence covert activity, which could not be attributed to the United States, did offer the means to match the Russians. The revived interest in covert operations in early 1948 developed concurrently among the planners in both State and Defense. However, completely divergent and irreconcilable views on the American position towards the USSR complicated their discussions of covert operations within American policy.

The State Department was committed to the "policy of containment", maintaining that war was neither desirable nor inevitable. State planners visualized covert operations as actions short of war, to weaken the Communist position of power and to strengthen the prestige of the Western Powers. Defense accepted the existing policy that America desired peace, but it also had to consider war with the USSR as the major assumption of the military planners. Covert operations were, therefore, seen by the military as mere preliminaries to, and

20/ (C) Office of Information and Education Exchange, Dept. of State, "Special Guidance; Elections in Italy," 19 March 1948. Dr. Laurence Langer, "The Magic Curtain," and telephone interview, 12 Nov 51. Discussions with Mr. Lovett, 24 April 52.

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preparations for, an eventual war. State was interested in covert operations such as rumor-spreading, bribery, the organization of non-Communist fronts, and other non-war related activities. Covert operations to Defense mainly meant evacuation, evasion or escape of leaders important to an Allied war effort, the organization of guerrilla movements convertible into underground armies as the war started, and the preparation of sabotage and assassination for wartime implementation. These ideas and divergencies about covert activities in peacetime were not written into the papers and frequently were not understood by the participants in their discussions. State and Defense could agree, however, that covert operations should be started immediately. They also could agree on the organizational pattern to get such operations under way. Hence it was that the necessary NSC staff studies and decisions could be prepared and taken without mention of these important department divergencies.21/

After the Italian elections had provided a clear victory for the West and a temporary setback for Communism, the State Department prepared the basic paper which proposed a permanent organization to perform covert activities. At the end of April, 1948, the State Department,acknowledging the importance of covert activity to supplement overt American policy, proposed that a Director of Special Studies, nominated by the Secretary of State, and appointed by the NSC, together with a planning staff, should be established under the NSC. This Director, under the NSC, would develop plans for covert operations, provide for their execution by existing government agencies,and review

21/ Telephone conversation with George Kennan (formerly Chief of State's Policy Planning Staff) 23 November 1951. Mr. James Lay, Exec. Secy. of NSC, disagrees with the view that the NSC Senior Staff did not understand the different viewpoints.

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the entire program as it was in process of execution. He would also develop a personnel training program and a catalog of the special supplies and logistic support required for such covert activities.[22/] The NSC paper was circulated to the interested Departments and to the JCS. In JCS there were differing points of view which delayed JCS action. One group in JCS felt that the proposed organization was satisfactory so long as the NSC action did not prejudice a review of covert operations during a national emergency. The other view within the JCS emphasized that certain features of the NSC proposal infringed on JCS prerogatives related to training programs and plans for wartime covert activity. This view also emphasized that covert operations should not be limited to CIA since the military services could perform many such activities.

While the JCS was making up its mind, the Director of CIA forwarded a proposal to the NSC which attempted to reconcile the State and JCS views. He emphasized the difference in the responsible control of covert operations in time of peace and in time of war. DCI proposed that the paper be amended so that covert operations during peace would be placed under CIA with high level policy guidance from the State Department. In wartime, covert planning would be developed by a combined committee of JCS and CIA and covert operations would be transferred to JCS' control. Meanwhile the JCS resolved its differences; covert planning and operations in wartime should be under the JCS since the planning and personnel training for wartime activities was a military responsibility. Receiving the JCS comments and DCI's suggestions, the NSC staff in June developed a revised draft which was approved with a few amendments by the NSC and adopted as

22/ (TS) NSC 10, "Director of Special Studies", 12 May 1948.

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the directive and charter for American covert operations. Since CIA was responsible under the NSC for espionage, the staff paper proposed that covert activities in peacetime should also be placed within CIA. A separate Office of Special Projects would be established under the Director of CIA, headed by an individual nominated by the Secretary of State, approved by DCI and appointed by the NSC itself. The staff draft provided for an operational advisory committee consisting of representatives of the Secretaries of State and of Defense. These liaison representatives would supply full policy guidance on covert projects and would assist in preparing all plans. Any disagreement between the DCI and the departmental liaison officers should be referred to NSC. This organization would study and develop plans for NSC consideration regarding the necessary collaboration with the JCS for covert operations in wartime. 23/

The staff paper on the Office of Special Projects was accepted by the NSC at its 13th meeting (17 June 1948). However, two major amendments were made by the NSC. The policy advisory committee representing the Secretaries of State and Defense would have been practically an independent policy-making body controlling the activities of the Office of Special Projects. The NSC eliminated this paragraph and made it a duty of the Director of CIA to insure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with American foreign and military policy. In this process DCI was to use the above-mentioned representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense. The NSC change had the effect of making the State and Defense liaison with the Office of Special Projects subordinate to the position of the Director of CIA. The other major change

23/(TS) NSC 10/1, "Office of Special Projects," 15 June 1948.

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resulted in the adoption of the JCS' position on covert operations in wartime. The NSC staff proposal had provided that the Office of Special Projects would conduct wartime covert planning and operations in collaboration with the JCS. The NSC amended this paragraph, the famous paragraph 4, so that plans for wartime covert operations had to be coordinated with the JCS. Wartime covert operations would be conducted under the control of American theatre commanders who would receive their directives on covert operations through the JCS "unless otherwise directed by the President". Here the NSC again changed the emphasis by providing that all plans for covert operations in times of war had to be coordinated by the JCS. This paper, NSC 10/2, has been the charter for American covert operations which fundamentally altered postwar thinking regarding psychological operations. NSC-4-A was cancelled when NSC approved 10/2 . NSC-4-A had never become sufficiently well-known or influential. Hence, the tradition that American policy first accepted covert operations as a major instrument in June 1948 is basically correct, although not completely accurate. 24/

The NSC decided that American policy would be implemented by covert operations. The actual development of covert operations, however, was a time-consuming activity. A director of the Office of Special Projects had to be satisfactory to State, CIA and Defense, if an NSC appointment was to be assured. It would seem that Secretary of Defense Forrestal and Mr. Lovett, Under Secretary of State, considered the Office of Special Projects as their personal concern. They obtained a director on the understanding that he would be given sufficient time to study the complications of covert operations, to secure and train the technically skilled personnel required, and to organize methods of operation,

24/ (TS) NSC 10/2, "Office of Special Projects", 18 June 1948

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or to use the technical jargon, develop his apparatus. There were several significant features in the development of the Office of Special Projects which influenced its early operations. 1948 was a critical year and the Director of the Office of Special Projects had no time for contemplative study. He had hardly secured his major assistants and the departmental policy advisers when he was asked to undertake urgent operational duties.

The Office of Special Projects (which became the Office of Policy Coordination, will hereinafter be identified as OPC) started in a difficult administrative position. OPC was in CIA administratively and with a strict reading of NSC 10/2, the Director of CIA would have control over its policy and operations. When it commenced to operate, however, because of the personalities involved, because OPC received instructions and guidanced directly from the Secretaries of State and Defense, and because of the special sensitivity of its operations, there was a general agreement among the officials involved that OPC should be a separate and independent entity within CIA. Independence even went so far that OPC's intelligence requests were handled by CIA as requests of a separate agency. OPC, on its part, was reluctant to tell the intelligence side of CIA about its operations even though the DCI had been given the responsibility of policy coordination and of appealing to NSC if policy disagreements arose. The practice developed, however, that the departmental policy representatives only consulted with OPC, and the DCI was initially left out of covert planning. This procedure initially gave OPC a relatively greater freedom of action, but removed the single responsible authority who could decide if a particular covert operation was in accord with American policy. When Lieut. Gen. W. B. Smith became DCI, he brought OPC directly under his authority.

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As the international situation increased the opportunities for covert operations, and after its original godparents, Forrestal and Lovett, left the government, OPCfound itself in the questionable position of judging whether its own operations even when desired or approved by the departmental liaison officers actually were in accord with any planned national strategy. American objectives with respect to the USSR had been formulated by the NSC in NSC 20/4 (November 1948) but these objectives were general and vague objectives. Such national aims afforded covert activities many opportunities, but their vagueness left many uncertainties on which the operational planner wanted official answers. OPC's position became more unsatisfactory when the departmental policy representatives presented projects on a piecemeal basis and OPC had no time for long-range planning and preparation of its needs. OPC continued to develop and to operate, but it was restrained by personnel training and technical uncertainties until the Korean war revitalized other agencies' interests in covert activities.25/

While the NSC was establishing covert operations as an integral instrument of the national policy, State Department was acting to develop greater coordination of the current foreign information program under NSC-4. A fulltime interdepartmental staff had been provided the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs by NSC-4 to develop the adequate coordination of the government's foreign information program. It was three months after NSC-4's approval that State Department appointed its chairman of the Interdepartmental Coordination Staff (ICS). The Air Force and CIA sent their members in April; the Army arrived in early May, but the ICS did not become complete until June 1st when the Navy representative reported. 26/

25/ E. P. Lilly interview with appropriate CIA representative; with John Magruder (Defense), Robert Joyce (State) and Sydney Souers (then NSC).
26/ (C) NSC-4, "Coordination Foreign Information Measures", 9 Dec 47; (S) ICS to Asst. Sec/State, "Annual Rpt of Interdepartmental Coordinating Staff",31 Dec 48.

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In addition to a half year's lateness, the ICS was temporarily hampered by the uncertainty of its responsibilities. Like the SWNCC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare, ICS commenced as an exploratory and investigative group. An interdepartmental directive was developed by the Staff, subsequently approved by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and issued to the three service Secretaries in the National Military Establishment and to the Director of CIA. The directive was not of shattering significance. It officially reminded all military and political departments that the President had authorized the Secretary of State to insure the coordination of the many foreign information outlets so that a unified and consistent American program would be presented for foreign consumption. This directive went through the department channels to the theatre commanders and diplomatic missions overseas so that all American representatives were officially made aware that informational activities were a part of national policy. Whether it was State's information outlet, or the military's AFRS or their Information and Educational Program, the same over-all picture should be presented.

The ICS provided a continuous mechanism to keep State aware of the military's information policy and to notify the military of major changes in State's presentation. When the State Department desired special assistance from the armed forces information outlets, ICS could arrange the timing. ICS had no control over policy matters. Its potential position as a policy coordinator was weakened by the fact that the information program of State did not have any adequate planning staff, and it was not consulted by the political policy planners prior to the policy decisions. The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs was presented with a fiat accompli

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and expected to make the best possible presentation. This was doing the information work in a vacuum. Nevertheless the ICS did improve American operations in the foreign information field, particularly in developing necessary rapid liaison between State and the three military services. The ICS prepared and supervised the execution of interdepartmental plans to insure that the American story of the Berlin blockade and Airlift was adequately presented by all government-controlled media. Similarly, the Yugoslav crisis and the Finnish elections were items on which the ICS successfully manipulated interdepartmental interests so that American government outlets presented a coordinated, even if not identical, series of reports and bulletins.27/

During 1948, important developments on the national level increased the emphasis on psychological operations. The European Recovery Program (ERP) was legislatively authorized by Congress and an independent agency, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), was established to carry out American economic policy under State Department guidance. Congress explicitly authorized ECA to maintain a European information program to insure that Europeans would be aware of America's interest in, and contribution to, their recovery. This Congressional decision on information work was a direct result of the numerous Congressional junkets to Europe in late 1947. The Congressmen had been intentionally made aware of the extent of European ignorance regarding America, its purpose and objectives. The important role played by Communist propaganda in perpetuating these misconceptions was made clear. The limitations on the American

27/ (TS) Memo, Lt. Col. Wm. H. Kinard to Chief of Information D.A., "Psychological Strategy", 3 September 1948; (S) ICS to Asst. Sec/State, " Annual Report of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Staff", 31 December 1948.

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information program in combatting these errors became evident to the Congressmen. Hence in 1948, Congress gave verbal and legislative support to the psychological effort. Most importantly Congress increased the appropriations for information work and promised more in succeeding years. It enacted the Smith-Mundt Act which for the first time gave a statutory basis for State's information program. 28/ This Act gave the State Department a legal basis for its previously traditional claim that information policy determination was the prerogative of the Secretary of State. Other agencies had never denied this position for peacetime activities but had attempted by interpretation to restrict State's prerogatives in time of emergency or during war. Now Congress had validated State's position and subsequent interdepartmental discussions on information and psychological warfare programs were prejudiced by State's interpretation of the Smith-Mundt Act. The specific informational objectives mentioned in the ECA Act was another recognition by Congress that the influencing of foreign opinion and attitudes was important to American policy.

The formulation of an informational policy in ECA's overseas activities is most difficult to trace because of that agency's double decentralization. ECA's Washington office was mainly a central point to service its independent counterpart, the Office of Special Representative (OSR) in Paris. The ECA offices in the ERP countries were basically autonomous, with only vague relationships to OSR and ECA-Washington for centralized bookkeeping. At each local ECA office there was an information officer, responsible to the local ECA Chief of Mission under general guidances from the Information Section of OSR in Paris. Each local

28/ "United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948" (approved 27 Jan 1948) (Public Law 402, 80th Cong., 2nd Session)

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information officer was expected to exploit the locally available media. American information or locally produced pro-American news was to be spread locally to insure that proper recognition was given to local recovery projects as a part of America's over-all effort to help Europe and to keep it free. Certain individuals in ECA's C&R in Paris had discussed covert information to supplement ECA's overt presentation of the American position, but in its first year ECA's information program was based on the old journalistic principle that only straight news was needed to keep the Europeans informed. ECA emphasized news releases, fostered local publicity for ECA-sponsored projects, and whipped up local interest for the American objectives on ERP.

ECA and the State Department developed unwritten understandings whereby ECA's material was incorporated into State's VOA programs and overseas news files. In each ERP country, the local ECA information man and the USIS Chief at the Embassy informally discussed and agreed on their respective fields and how each would supplement the other's activities. The relations between ECA and State Information people were in the main, satisfactory and cooperative. Since ECA paid higher salaries, it often secured uninhibited and energetic operators who might "free wheel" informationally and irritate State's local representatives. The USIS Chiefs were limited in their information work to materials approvable by the Ambassador. ECA operators, relatively independent of the Ambassador, unaware of the need or the desirability of clearing with Foreign Service Officers, and, desiring rapid and tangible results, carried out information programs at times which were unapproved and thereby caused bad feelings.

ECA and its information campaign was, however, only one aspect of the Cold War. The Berlin Airlift to supply West Berlin and so checkmate the Russian blockade was a psychological effort as well as

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an economic and political one. During this period, NSC re-studied the international positions and objectives of Russia and the United States. The Russians were using all possible methods and tricks to weaken American prestige in Europe. American security was thereby threatened. The danger of the power struggle turning into a fighting war was recognized. To counter this Russian threat, NSC had to develop American objectives toward the USSR, which would over the years lessen the danger of war while reducing Russian power so that it could not threaten world and American security. NSC determined that this national policy would be pursued by all means short of war. The Satellites would be encouraged to emerge as independent countries. The attitudes of the Russian peoples and the spirit of nationalism within the USSR would be main targets for American action and influence. America should inform the world of the true nature of the USSR and convince it that the USSR threatened world peace. To accomplish these aims, America would develop a position of military readiness, increase its economic reserves, and help all non-Soviet peoples to improve their conditions, while it kept the world and the American people thoroughly informed of the developing situations. 29/ These American objectives mark a fundamental change in American policy. Unlike policy decisions of 1947, NSC 20/4 recognized the long-term Russian threat which had to be countered by long-term American policies. Peace and international good will were no longer "just around the corner". NSC 20/4 was equally important because of the emphasis and importance which it put on psychological operations as a means

29/ (TS) NSC 20/4, "Report to the President. United States objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to United States Security", 23 November 1948. The President approved these objectives 24 November 1948.

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of implementing national policy in peacetime. Political, military and economic actions to foster national policy were well recognized. NSC 20/4 recognized the contribution of all these and then emphasized the information and the opinion-influencing activities additionally required to accomplish America's objectives. This paper did not use the words: overt, covert, or psychological operations. It is evident, however, that such activity was visualized even if vaguely. State and OPC were not empire building when they recognized this policy as calling for great increases in their respective overt and covert activities. It took time, however, to transform NSC's lofty and generalized statements into operational plans, coordinated with the military, economic and political planning under NSC 20/4.

An early evidence of this firmer policy towards the USSR was the American initiation of the North Atlantic Treaty whereby the United States and Western Europe agreed to cooperatively plan and develop mutual defenses against aggression. America's formal participation in a Grand Alliance required that American and European attitudes and reactions be carefully nurtured to support this new policy trend. Psychological considerations were significantly important in the development, the announcement, and the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, it was the increasingly tense international situation which focused greater attention on the need for a psychological warfare organization to plan its wartime usage.

As early as January 1948 the old SWNCC but now SANACC Subcommittee on psychological warfare had proposed a small organization for wartime planning be set up under the NSC. The Subcommittee suggested that the actual agency, while it should be approved in principle, need not be organized immediately. The JCS recommended that the proposed organization be established immediately as a planning nucleus without any

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operational responsibilities. The whole discussion was temporarily delayed while the NSC was making its decision on covert operations. In this period State and Defense began their long disagreement on whether the proposed nucleus for wartime psychological planning should be under the NSC, or under State Department control with military coordination. These discussions were fruitlessly protracted for months until in early 1949, an NSC staff paper was developed with the cooperation of all the interested Departments.

The NSC staff proposed that there be immediately established a small organization in the State Department

> to plan and make preparations for the coordinated conduct of foreign and domestic information programs and overt psychological operations abroad in the event of war or threat of war as determined by the President.

The Director of the organization would be appointed by the Secretary of State. The director would be assisted by a group of "policy consultants" representing the Secretaries of State, Defense, JCS and the National Security Resources Board (NSRB). A full time staff of representatives from the Department of State and the National Military Establishment would do the preliminary drafting. The paper directed that plans for information activities and "overt psychological operations" in the initial stages of war should be given highest priority. The paper explicitly directed that the SANACC Subcommittee on psychological warfare be discontinued. This recommendation was approved by the National Security Council and the President with the recommendations that the desired preliminary plan be produced within

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90 days 30/

This new organization did not come up with a proposal in the suggested 90 days. It took time to organize the consultants into the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization (IFIO) and the departmental representatives into the staff (IFIS). Even a longer time was required to reconcile the divergent views of the departments and develop a modus operandi which permitted discussion. In early August, however, the Secretary of State sent a report to the NSC which had been prepared, but not approved, by IFIS on the "General Principles Covering Overt Psychological Warfare in the Initial Stages of War". Primarily a State Department paper, this proposal assumed that the President during an emergency would quickly take control of psychological warfare and that policy determination would be the responsibility of the Secretary of State who would insure the coordination of overt psychological planning with the National Military Establishment. This report proposed that overt and covert psychological warfare, censorship and domestic information should all be coordinated at the national policy level. Finally State requested that the planning of domestic information should not be combined with wartime psychological planning. Defense, in the name of the Secretary, but actually representing the views of JCS, disagreed with certain basic premises of the State Department. They suggested terminological changes and a specific requirement for the coordination of psychological plans with joint war plans. The necessity of JCS approval for such plans was explicitly

30/ (S) SWNCC 304/6, "Report on Psychological Warfare," 9 Jan 48;
(S) JCS 1735/4, "Report on Psychological Warfare," 5 Apr 48;
(S) SAMACC 304/12, "Psychological Warfare Organization," 7 Apr 48;
(TS) NSC 43, "Planning for Wartime Conduct Overt Psychological Warfare," 9 Mar 49. This seems to be the first mention of "psychological operations" in an NSC paper but there is no evidence that it had any special significance.

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mentioned in the Defense Department's revision. Defense also suggested that the Coordinating Staff under NSC-4 and the Planning Staff under NSC-43 should be combined into one group which should both plan and coordinate. 31/ Defense's recommendations were accepted by the NSC and the planning organization under the Secretary of State was directed to continue its planning activities for a psychological organization in time of peace.

While the reconstituted IFIS under the aegis and influence of State Department was fulfilling its responsibilities for the improved coordination of the foreign information program and the development of psychological plans, the military planners in the Joint Staff became bothered by the relationship of the JCS with the whole problem of psychological warfare. Before mid-1948 there was no single individual in the JCS responsible for the psychological aspect of national or military policy. Several individuals in the Joint Strategic Plans Group (JSPG), because of their wartime familiarity with psychological warfare, had called attention to the psychological factors in developing war plans. When the SWNCC and SANACC papers on psychological warfare came to the JCS for their view, differing ad hoc groups in JSPG were organized. This procedure, like JCS's wartime practice, provided no continuity of JCS attitude, and expert knowledge within JCS on psychological warfare could only be ephemeral and temporary. With the NSC-10 series, and the increased SANACC papers, the Joint Staff found its machinery ineffective.

In April 1948, as NSC-10 was considered, JSPG proposed that a psychological warfare subcommittee be established

> to protect JCS interests in the multifarious aspects of psychological warfare, to coordinate the planning by

31/ (S) Memo, Sec./Def. to Exec. Sec., NSC, "General Principles... NSC-43/1," 7 September 1949.

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the three military services for the use of psychological warfare in wartime and to develop psychological warfare plans in consonance with progressive strategic plans.

It was also emphasized that JCS's interests in psychological warfare had not been protected under the NSC-4 and 4-A series. The Secretary of Defense should request the NSC to amend its existing procedures so that the military planning responsibilities of JCS would be protected. Judging from results, the Joint Staff's sympathetic interests in psychological warfare was not extensive. In mid-July, when NSC-10/2 required it, the original proposal was partially accepted. A "Special Section" in JSPG was established to serve the policy and logistic demands which would arise under Defense's policy liaison with OPC in CIA. JSPG's Special Section would also do the staff work on all psychological papers requiring JSPG recommendation but it actually was not a responsible subcommittee of JSPG.32/

The Special Section did not consider its position and capability within the Joint Staff sufficient to fulfill the psychological demands or responsibilities of the Department of Defense. It developed the proposal that a special psychological warfare section be established under the JCS, independent of the JSPG, to fulfill the JCS's responsibility not only for psychological policy formulation but more importantly for the coordination of inter-service readiness for psychological operations. Personnel selection and training, tables of organization, and research and development for psychological warfare could only be coordinated among the services on the JCS level. There was also a need for a central clearing house to insure that the services were properly and adequately providing for the necessary logistic support of psychological

32/ (TS) Draft Paper, "JCS Relationship to Psychological Warfare," 25 Apr 48; (TS) JSPG 806/6, "Psychological Warfare," 14 Jul 48

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warfare in wartime. On the departmental working levels there was general acceptance of this proposed Armed Forces Psychological Warfare Organization under the JCS to plan, coordinate and implement the three services' psychological responsibilities. However, when the proposal was officially presented to the JSPG, each service filed numerous exceptions so that the original paper was never adopted. Only after a year of wrangling was an equivalent substitute recommended by the Joint Strategic Planners and approved by the JCS.

Back of these inter-service disagreements was the fact that only the Air Force by 1949 had developed a special staff section for psychological warfare which could develop considered service views regarding future organization, possible plans and policies, and detailed logistic requirements. Official circulars in the War and Navy Departments in January and June 1947 had declared each service's responsibility, and had assigned this responsibility to Plans and Operations in the Army, and to Deputy CNO for Readiness in the Navy. Neither service had taken additional steps to fulfill their wartime responsibilities. Neither service had completely ignored the subject since both the Army and Navy included brief treatment of psychological warfare in the curriculum of their intelligence schools and in training manuals. Within the Army Ground Forces a small psychological warfare unit had been established to develop doctrine, plans and logistic requirements for this activity within the Ground Forces. Each service apparently felt that psychological warfare, as a peacetime concern, was not sufficiently important to require continuous and detailed staff consideration. Each service maintained representatives on the SWNCC and SAHACC Subcommittee on psychological warfare and subsequently on the Interdepartmental Coordinating Staff under NSC-4. While the background of

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the new American objectives were under discussion during the latter part of 1948, the services had implicit warning that they would have to provide additional personnel to participate with State in informational and psychological planning. The services had not thought out or planned their respective psychological requirements. Hence they all agreed on postponing any inter-service agreement which might in the uncertainty give one service pre-eminence in this field or inadvertently freeze another out entirely. It was better not to act at all, as JCS did, on the proposal for an Armed Forces Psychological Warfare Organization. Hence in the military establishment, as in State and in CIA, the uncertainties about psychological warfare loomed large.

Uncertainties were the order of the day, but the increased stridency of Russian propaganda against the United States and the Marshall Plan, in particular, and increasing Communist subversion in Asia forced a total American reappraisal in NSC-20/4 of Russian threats to American security and American aims to end these threats. In the main, the psychological element was not directly emphasized in this reappraisal which took place on the higher levels of the departments and in NSC. In July 1948, however, the Secretary of Defense mentioned the need of coordinating internal and foreign policies of the government. He recommended that in the Executive Branch domestic issues and foreign policy should be closely coordinated with the international situation. He noted the possible foreign impact of the stories issued by government agencies and built up by the press, as for example, the great publicity given to the indictments and arrests of the Communist leaders as General Clay returned to discuss the Berlin situation, and as the nation announced its initial draft quotas. He emphasized that while Americans might not see any interrelation,

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Communists would build these three items into convincing propaganda that America was preparing for war. The Secretary recommended

> that we develop as rapidly as possible some means whereby domestic events of this kind are, whenever possible, weighed in light of the international situation at a given time. It is also important that in examining this problem weight be given to the need for synchronizing these actions with our foreign information program so that our policies will be purposefully supported in all possible ways.

He recommended that the NSC investigate this problem to prevent our domestic and foreign policies from working at cross-purposes. Although it was election year and the proposal had implications which the press might have characterized as censorship, NSC approved the principle. NSC recommended that the President advise his Cabinet that important domestic matters should be closely coordinated with international affairs. The President should also request that members of the Cabinet, when in any doubt of foreign repercussions to specific domestic events, should consult with the Secretary of State prior to taking any action. 33/

The major policy change of 1948, however, resulted from the approval of NSC 20/4 (3 November 1948) which explicitly recognized Soviet threats to American security and proposed American objectives to counter those threats. The major policy change eventually accelerated America's interest in psychological warfare, but it was more immediately evidenced in the more traditional fields of political, military and economic activity. Undoubtedly people in information work in State Department and in OPC of CIA were germinating ideas, projects and programs. For example, OPC had been requested to plan

[redacted] 25X1

33/ (C) NSC-23, "Domestic Activities and Foreign Relations", 27 July 1948; (C) NSC-23/1, "Domestic Activities...", 5 August 1948

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During 1949 it would seem that America's major instruments of publicizing official opinion, namely the VOA and the USIS, continued programs presenting a full and fair picture of American aid to the world. Guidance regarding the Berlin Blockade and Airlift, and the break between Tito's Yugoslavia and the Cominform, undoubtedly required special treatment emphasizing the aspects favorable to the West and distasteful to the USSR. On the whole, however, VOA's program seems to have been posited on a peacetime basis until 1949. Then VOA underwent a slow change. A Russian specialist became its director. Programs in Russian were increased to a "round-the-clock" basis. The tone of the broadcasts was becoming more aggressive. While not answering the Russians, Russian lines were countered and efforts made to put the USSR on the defensive.

Simultaneously there was a reorientation of ECA's information program under OSR, Paris. The utility of covert activities to supplement the ECA's overt information programs had long been recognized but had not been developed until mid-1949. ECA's information program had been executed as a straight reporting job. It was premised on the supposition that if ECA handouts were sufficiently newsworthy and rapidly made available, the European media would give them

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extensive play, and thereby develop European interest in ERP, in a European economic unification as well as the American contribution to these goals. ECA's information program prepared publications for special audiences such as labor, educational, religious and professional groups. While ECA ground out news and swamped European media with Marshall Plan information, the Cominform apparatus enjoyed greater success besmirching America's purposes. Gratitude is never a characteristic national virtue, and the European is not naive enough to believe that America would spend billions without ulterior motives. Hence the Communist publications, and particularly rumor influences on labor and progressive groups, succeeded in raising European doubts and suspicions about the ERP.

Since the Communists so effectively used covert information and other activities, it was only natural that the ECA people would seek to counter these Russian purposes by similar covert activities. It would seem that ECA initially employed covert measures not in the informational field but in the labor field. So long as labor unions in France and Italy were dominated by the Communists, economic security could not be permanent. If ECA could foster independent labor unions and attract the majority of French and Italian labor into non-Communist controlled unions, ERP might be successful. ECA had the counterpart funds to support independent labor unions, but ECA could not openly perform such action, however, since signs of any American connection would immediately injure nationalistic sensitivities and destroy the movement before it really started. ECA had to act cautiously so that a labor movement could not be attributed to the American Government. ECA had no such machinery, but the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)

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25X1 [redacted] of the State Department-OPC "treaty" of early 1950. OPC had requested State's Information people to define their respective responsibilities for covert propaganda operations. Covert activity was such that duplication could jeopardize all participants. A clearer delineation of areas in which OPC would operate and wherein State might operate was necessary. The State-OPC agreement required careful and time-consuming discussions. When approved, it provided that State would be responsible for all acknowledged American government activities in overseas areas. CIA alone would handle admittedly covert operations. For that middle area which has been traditionally classified as "grey" activities which were not officially acknowledged nor were they specifically covert, three criteria were established to determine State's or OPC's responsibility. If a negative answer could be given to all three criteria, then State and its Public Affairs people might engage in such undertakings. If the normal answer to any of three criteria was in the affirmative then State should abstain and assign its execution to CIA. The determining criteria in the "grey" field were:

1. If the particular operation or activity were actually disclosed as American initiated or supported, would it seriously embarrass the Government of the United States?
2. If the operation or activity were disclosed as American, would it seriously impair the value of the operation itself and make it ineffective in the future?

34/ Interview with Col. John L. Tappin (ECA) and Frank Wisner (CIA).

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3. If the activity or operation were disclosed as American, would it seriously impair a valuable operational mechanism? State and CIA would consult on all projects in the middle area. This same agreement was developed between ECA and OPC to handle covert activities bearing on ERP, with the additional provision that in case of doubt, CIA's decision would be determining. 35/

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35/ Conference with Col. John L. Tappin (ECA) and an appropriate CIA representative; (S) Foreign Service Information and Educational Exchange Circular No. 4 (1 Nov 51), "USIE and Indigenous Operations".

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

While ECA was energetically attempting to foster greater understanding and appreciation of America's interest in Europe's economy, the State Department's Informational Exchange program apparently continued on its peacetime basis. ECA information people sought State Department assistance in supplementing their programs on both the Washington and foreign mission levels. In Washington, the VOA maintained a newshound in the ECA newsroom. A daily summary of the

36/ (TS) Memo, Col. John L. Tappin to Acting Administrator, ECA, "Report on Visit to Europe, 19 September-4 October 1951", 17 October 1951; also conferences with Col. John L. Tappin, Andrew Berding and Roscoe Drummond (former ECA information chiefs in Europe).

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major ECA materials was prepared by ECA for VOA programs. In addition, ECA prepared its own daily program which the VOA translated into its various languages as an over-all summary on ERP. At the diplomatic missions, mutually agreeable relations gradually developed between the ECA Information officer and the local USIS. Administrative difficulties in defining ECA's field of information when USIS was also responsible for all American information might cause minor irritation but the knowledge of Washington cooperation, together with the big information jobs which both USIS and ECA had to accomplish, caused each to accept local working agreements so that only an occasional unsolveable project had to be referred to high levels for settlement. A major difference between ECA and the USIS in 1949 was the emphasis and tempo of their informational activities. ECA viewed its information work as part of the aggressive attack against Communist influence in Western Europe. The USIS was still dominated by the slogan: "the full and fair picture of America". ECA wanted to inform so that the recipients would react in support of the American position and against Communist aims. USIS was still working on the principle that it was a straight news service which informed without expectancy of, or direct relationship to, favorable attitudes by the recipient.

This philosophy of the USIS merely represented basic concepts of the information program in the Department of State, which disliked to classify its activities as propaganda. They were doing information work. When Russian programs were increased in 1949 and the Russians reacted with a complete jamming of American Russian programs, the VOA was more concerned with the technicalities of getting the "Voice" heard in Russia, than it was in the content of the programs. This attitude resulted partially from the fact that the entire information program was still on the defensive within the Department. State's policy

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makers kept the information people informed on policy, only when the planners considered it useful to their own purpose. The information people restrained themselves to prove that they were not trouble makers. Congress' suspicious attitude towards the entire information program also made the information people conservative and strictly legalistic about what they should be doing. 37/

A similar attitude characterized State's leadership of the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff (IFIS) set up under the NSC-43 series. NSC-43/1 had directed that basic studies be prepared under the Secretary of State for a psychological warfare plan during a national emergency and the initial stages of war. After some nine months of study and interagency difficulties, IFIS had not progressed further than a proposal for an organizational pattern which should do the planning and initial implementation of psychological warfare in an emergency or the initial stages of war. A major reason for the failure of NSC-4 and NSC-43 to produce interdepartmental agreement on psychological activities was the fundamental difference of concept between State's planners and the military planners in Defense. They agreed that foreign information programs and psychological warfare programs in periods of national emergency were instruments of national policy and had to be directed towards the achievement of national aims. There was a vague agreement that there had to be continuity between peacetime and wartime plans and programs. Then divergencies commenced. State viewed psychological warfare as an aspect of over-all policy planning. The Department of State, traditionally and under legislative authority, was responsible for foreign policy planning. Therefore, State maintained that, whether in peace or war, policy planning was the responsibility of

37/ From 1947 until 1949, the Secretary of State had explicitly said that his Department was not to do propaganda work.

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the Secretary of State. The military planners did not disagree fundamentally with State's responsibility. They maintained, however, that during a national emergency, and especially during wartime, policy planning must be closely coordinated with, and made partially responsible to, military planning.

There was yet another significant difference between State and Defense. Defense planners, trained in the system of staff planning, developed long range, or strategic plans, to fit the most probable future contingencies. This was one aspect of the military which was at complete variance with attitudes of the civilian planners in State. State Department for generations had operated on the basis that political contingencies were so variable and intangible that long-range political plans were impracticable, if not impossible. State planners had to wait and observe how situations developed and then improvise a policy and plan to fit that particular situation. This difference was a major factor in the frustrations of IFIS. The military wanted IFIS to develop long-range psychological warfare plans. Without a long-range political plan, State could not let IFIS develop a long-range psychological warfare plan. The military could not determine their respective responsibilities or requirements without such a plan. Hence round and round the argument went without resolution or reference to the basic differences involved. The failure of the two major participators in national policy planning to reconcile their differences resulted in the failure of the NSC-43 effort and of subsequent efforts.

IFIS, under NSC-43 and 43/1, attempted to develop a national policy statement on psychological warfare which would set forth the national position during an emergency or the initial stages of war. During 1949, many staff papers were written, and departmental comments and criticisms elicited, in the preparation of a basic policy which

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might be acceptable to the State and Defense Departments. The State members of IFIS were apparently hampered because the policy people, as distinct from the Public Affairs people, were still suspicious that IFIS was really trespassing on State's policy prerogative. The military on IFIS, although outnumbering State's representatives, felt themselves frustrated by that Department's limiting of IFIS to operational coordinating activities and organizational proposals, which the Department felt was the primary responsibility of the Secretary of State. With that view, military suggestions for plans and for necessary policy statements from the political side of State were tabled by the chairman of IFIS. State people were unhappy because their inquiries about the detailed implementation of information programs by the Armed Services information units ran into a stone wall of military compartmentalization. The result was that while IFIS had extended discussions and worked up many drafts of informational and psychological plans, its only real contribution was the development of another proposed psychological warfare organization for NSC consideration. 38/

IFIS's inadequate results came before the NSC in December 1949 as NSC-59. This paper reaffirmed the principle that in peacetime, during a national emergency and in the initial stages of war the Secretary of State would determine policy matters and handle operational coordination. In an emergency, IFIS, which the proposal urged be kept in existence, and State's Public Affairs would provide the nucleus for an ad hoc psychological warfare organization. The IFIS group should continue to develop a plan for an interim psychological warfare organization in time of national emergency and the initial

38/ Conferences with Col. Paul Davis, Col. William Kinnard and Mr. Walter Schwinn.

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stages of a war, together with an outline for a wartime psychological warfare organization. NSC-59, as presented to the National Security Council, was primarily the point of view of the State Department, and it did not provide for sufficient coordination with the Department of Defense, and particularly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Hence, the Defense Department proposed that NSC-59 be amended to assure that psychological warfare would be considered as an integral part of the national policy. Defense stated that psychological warfare plans had to be in consonance with military plans and required the guidance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 39/

This proposed alteration was accepted by NSC and approved by the President as NSC-59/1 and became the basis for continued frustrating interdepartmental meetings between Defense, State and CIA. The major advance of 59/1 over NSC-43/1 was the acceptance of the position that until further decision was made in the event of the actual outbreak of warfare, psychological warfare was primarily the responsibility of the State Department. More significantly NSC-43 had provided for planning limited to overt psychological warfare, whereas NSC-59/1 conceived of, and attempted to provide for, the inter-relationship and liaison of overt and covert activities in one organization. This decision also rescinded NSC-4 and 43 although it retained IFIS.

While NSC-59 was in the process of consideration, several developments in the departments must be taken into account. On the military side, greater attention was being given to psychological warfare matters since increasing tensions between the USSR and America made complete war planning more desirable and necessary. On the Joint Chiefs level, closer attention by the Joint Strategic Plans Group (JSPG) was given

39/ (S) NSC-59, "Foreign Information Program...", 25 December 1949;
(S) NSC-59/1, "Foreign Information Program...", 9 March 1950.

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to overt and covert psychological annexes to various war plans. More importantly, the serious inadequacies of psychological warfare in the theatres of operation during an emergency compelled JSPG, and even the JCS, to take a position on the long envisaged Armed Forces Psychological Warfare Organization which had been "kicking around" the departments for more than a year. The eventual solution was a compromise establishing the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division (JSPD) which was formally approved by JCS in December 1949. JSPD was established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but was still responsible in part to the Director of the Joint Staff. It was considered, however, to be independent of the Joint Strategic Plans Group and its subcommittee on psychological warfare. JSPD was explicitly authorized to handle intradepartmental coordination of psychological warfare for the JCS, to insure that there was departmental agreement on psychological warfare policy and operations, and that all plans had been coordinated with JSPG. The head of JSPD would represent the JCS for the policy liaison with OPC and with IFIS even though these were extra-official developments. In its liaison capacities, JSPD was authorized to represent the views of the JCS and, with proper intra-agency coordination, give JCS approval to interdepartmental plans and proposals for psychological warfare. A major JSPD function was supervising, even if not controlling, the military services' logistic planning for psychological warfare and their logistic support of current OPC operations. In fact, OPC pressure to have one central office to which OPC personnel and logistic demands could be channeled to the military with the expectation that they would be fulfilled, had been a contributing factor in JSPD's establishment. 40/

40/ (TS) JCS 203/73, "Joint Subsidiary Plans Division", 6 Dec 1949. Interviews with "appropriate CIA representatives".

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OPC had been hindered in its covert operations by lack of military support. Equally important to OPC was the increasing danger to its operational security arising from the necessity of frequent, detailed explanations of its covert operations to the lower military supply levels to justify OPC requests for military aid. It was expected that JSPD participation in OPC pplicy and planning would give it the background on and justification for OPC's personnel and logistic requirements. JSPD might forward these requirements to logistic divisions with the official statement that they were in accordance with JCS plans and policy and hence they should be fulfilled. This procedure stopped unnecessary talk about covert activity, and it enabled JSPD to tabulate the requirements which OPC actually secured. JSPD could, therefore, not only insure that the military fulfilled their responsibilities, but it also could evaluate OPC operations in the light of the policies expressed and the materials provided. One limitation on JSPD's coordinating effectiveness was the fact that only in the person of the Chief of JSPD did overt and covert psychological warfare come together. On JSPD working level there were separate and fundamentally unrelated groups specifically limited to overt or covert operations. Another limiting factor on JSPD effectiveness was the confused status of JSPD in relation to the Psychological Warfare Subcommittee of JSPG. This issue did not arise in the first year because of the personality of the first Chief of JSPD, and because of JCS' interest in psychological warfare. However, JSPD's establishment vastly improved the handling of psychological warfare planning and coordination on the military levels. 41/

41/ (TS) JCS 203/73, "Joint Subsidiary Plans Division," 6 December 1949. Interview with appropriate CIA personnel and Rear Admiral Leslie Stevens, USN, (Ret.)

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While JCS increased its psychological warfare personnel a single officer continued to handle the Navy's interest in psychological warfare planning and operations. Studies on psychological warfare and anti-submarine warfare were initiated in 1950 by the Navy. Extensive funds were provided by the Office of Naval Research for outside studies and evaluations of psychological warfare's possible contribution to this major interest of the Navy. The Air Force, with a Psychological Warfare Section of its Planning Division, continued to develop increasing emphasis on the logistic requirements and training programs for psychological warfare. In the Department of the Army, there was extensive recognition of the need for a psychological warfare organization but little seems to have resulted before the Korean incident. In early 1949, Wallace Carroll, who had had long OWI experience in World War II, prepared a study with recommendations on the Army's participation in psychological warfare. Immediate results were not forthcoming even though a complete reorganization of the Army's General Staff was being considered. The General Staff apparently continued to accept a former Secretary's viewpoint that psychological warfare was not a regular military activity and it should not concern the military until the shooting war started. The psychological warfare responsibilities of the Army, therefore, continued to be handled by two officers in the General Plans Branch of P & O, and subsequently G-3 of the General Staff. 42/

42/ (TS) Tyler Port "Army Organization for Psychological Warfare and Special Operations", 12 April 1950. It is interesting to note his conclusion regarding the Army's interest in psychological warfare up until early Spring of 1950. He mentioned that the study "gave him the distinct impression that a feeling of hopeless frustration surrounds the entire history of postwar development...psychological warfare".

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While the JCS action on JSPD had improved the position of the military on psychological warfare the State Department went through one of its perennial reorganizations which greatly improved its information program. The information program had been in State Department, but the information people felt that it was not of State Department. This situation underwent gradual improvement after a high-ranking Foreign Service Officer was brought back to the Department as the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. All developments in State's information program need not be considered but two are worthy of mention. A representative of the Public Affairs Sections (P Area) was assigned as a regular attendant at the State Department's policy staff discussions. Thereafter, planners of the information program were informed of, and could present their views on, policy as policy was in the process of formulation. This representation on the policy planning staff tended to give information people the feeling that they were a part of State's team. It also widened the horizons of State's planners so that they more readily considered the psychological reactions which might be expected. The policy planners had claimed that they always gave consideration to the psychological elements of policy. It can hardly be questioned, however, that the presence of an individual trained and responsible only for the psychological elements could not help but highlight these aspects to an extent which the policy planners concerned with all the other factors of policy formulation might not realize. What might appear as an insignificant development in intradepartmental organization tended to become a major factor in improving the position and the importance of the P Area and the Information Program within the Department. A second step, accelerating the appreciation of psychological activities, was the assignment of a Public Affairs Specialist to the geographic sections of State. Thereby each area secured a person

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trained and knowledgeable in information activities who was also an integral and responsible part of the areas' operations.

The over-all effect of this partial decentralization of State's informational planning was beneficial. The geographic desks gave more attention to the information problems as a part of their regular activities. These specialists provided a sympathetic contact point in the major geographical areas for keeping the P area cognizant of major developments and general trends. Subsequently, it would seem that the decentralization temporarily weakened the planning staff of the P Area at a most unfortunate time. The Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs had selected his best people and assigned them to the geographical areas in order to make the best impression. This left the P areas without its better planners. This weakness was balanced by the fact that having assigned the responsibility of these informational planners to geographical areas, the transplanted information specialists, when adopted by the geographic areas, recommended approaches proposed by the P Area. The serious psychological problems arising at the outbreak of the Korean war were resolved by these information specialists on the geographic desks bringing into harmony the major objectives of the geographical areas with those of the P Area. These specialists performed capable information operations by getting the propaganda objectives in early and thoroughly discussed in each geographical area. The isolation of the P Area from policy formulation was, thereby, minimized.

Despite these intradepartmental developments, the status of IFIS had not fundamentally changed even under NSC-59/1 which had been approved by the President in early March 1950. IFIS continued to be plagued by interagency rivalries with the result that no constructive action

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was taken prior to the start of the Korean action. Meanwhile, international developments had moved at an unprecedented rapid rate. The cold war was officially recognized as a non-military struggle for power by the Kremlin imperialists against the Western powers. The North Atlantic Treaty had been signed in a blaze of publicity directed at increasing the domestic and foreign appreciation of its significance. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a milepost in fulfillment of NSC-20/4, unifying the military potential of the West in case of Soviet aggression. NATO's Council of Ministers could expand the military and political alliance into an economic unification.

American success in Western Europe was not matched in the Far East. The weakening of the Chinese Nationalist Government had become obvious and by the end of 1949, its continued existence in exile on Formosa was a matter of doubt. Since Marshall's failure in China in early 1947, American policy wrote off China as an area where we could do nothing. The White Book on China publically characterized the Chinese Nationalist Government as a useless encumberance to our Far Eastern policy. Meanwhile, the long-disputed pretense of the Chinese Communists to be agrarian reformers wore thin as their power increased. Their anti-foreign, and virulently anti-American, policy and propaganda became more clearly evident. There were even indications that their anti-Americanism was proportionate to their pro-Sovietism. The increasing tensions in Europe and the Far East, and the emotional repercussions to Soviet's first atomic bomb caused American leaders, in early 1950, to reconsider national objectives and aims adopted in November 1948.

Acting on the Presidential directive, the Secretaries of State and Defense prepared a special report analyzing the existing crisis. This new study reiterated the basic NSC-20/4 position that the Kremlin's

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policy was a threat to American security. NSC 20/4 had visualized a four or five year period of critical tensions during which the United States and the Western powers could prepare their political, military and economic strength for a possible showdown with the USSR, if that nation insisted on war. Now, however, Soviet possession of the atomic bomb, their close alliance with Communist China, their stricter control over their satellites, all these indicated that the Kremlin was preparing for a more immediate showdown. The Secretaries of State and Defense, therefore, recommended that the programs, visualized in NSC-20/4, be immediately rushed to completion and that the United States and its Western Allies most rapidly improve their military position. This report initiated extensive NSC planning to develop budgetary estimates demanded by the expanded and accelerated defense program. While this planning was still in process, the Korean crisis of 25-27 June 1950 startled the nation.

What psychological considerations entered into the American decision to provide air and Navy cover for South Korean forces under the United Nations auspices, and subsequently to engage in police action, is not clear. The President's statements and subsequent public addresses indicate that the psychological factor was a major element in the decision to accept the Korean issue as Communist-inspired ruse which the West could only ignore with serious loss of prestige and influence. The Korean incident clarified American policy toward Russia and also raised psychological activities to a higher policy level.

While the Korean crisis gave increased emphasis to psychological operations, aggressive psychological warfare against Russian Communism had been developed and implemented prior to the Korean war. The entire

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ECA Information Program, both its overt and covert activities, were the aggressive implementation of psychological warfare techniques and methods to counter Russian efforts to weaken America's position and to strengthen popular support for that position throughout the West. In State's Information Program, an increasingly aggressive attitude towards the Russians had developed sometime before the Korean incident. In 1948, State's guidance on the Italian elections had aggressively set forth the American position on expanding Communist power without mentioning Russia, or the Kremlin. In 1949, however, its directives were aggressively directed at Russian statements and Russian actions. In July 1949, State informed its information people that they were openly and explicitly to point out Russian lies and to point the accusing finger at the Russians. In the summer of 1949, the information people at the overseas mission were told to circulate American information even if it made routine diplomatic negotiations more difficult. Voice of America programs discrediting the Russians were developed and the number of Russian language programs increased. These signs indicated that the State Department was getting away from the old theory of the "fair and full" picture of America. 43/

The pressure of international developments compelled the State Department to take a more aggressive attitude in its information program. Its proposal to counter Russian jamming of its VOA programs to Russia and Russian-dominated areas by increasing transmitters under "the ring plan" was indicative. 44/

43/ Interview with Walter P. Schwinn and E. H. Kloman, Jr. The summary index of Public Affairs guidances and directives also indicates the trend toward "a tough attitude" toward Russia.

44/ NSC-66, "Support for the Voice of America...," 4 April 1950. Also JCS 2043/6, 5 April 1950, and subsequent papers in that series.

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The "Campaign of Truth" was additional evidence of State's stiffening attitude toward Russia. It is not clear when and where the concept of the "Campaign of Truth" originated. The closer integration of the information program with State's policy planning must have made the P Area planners conscious of the background papers to the NSC-68 series. This reappraisal of American objectives toward the USSR explicitly listed an intensified information program as a policy instrument which would check possible Russian aggression. The P Area people had to prepare the detailed plans to implement this great effort. The public announcement of the "Campaign of Truth" was made by the President on April 20, 1950, but the basic principles underlying this campaign were visualized in the draft of NSC-68.45/

In the political and psychological estimate of NSC-68 frequent mention was given to the psychological elements: to the power of American public opinion, to our own confidence and sense of moral direction, and to the necessity of stimulating similar feelings among our Allies. If Americans increased their own confidence and moral sense, they would evoke similar strength in our Allies and other free peoples. NSC-68, in providing for the acceleration of America's defense against Russia, explicitly urged

> the development of programs designed to build and maintain confidence among other peoples in our strength and resolution, and to wage overt psychological warfare calculated to encourage mass defections from Soviet allegiance and to frustrate the Kremlin's design in other ways. 46/

45/ President Truman's Address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 20 April 1950. State Dept. Bulletin, XXII (1 May 1950) pp. 669-672.

46/ (TS) NSC-68, "U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security", 14 April 1950, pp. 21-24, 56-57.

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The Campaign of Truth was prepared by the Public Affairs Section of State Department as part of the over-all political program to strengthen the international position of the Western powers, and yet to maintain the possibility of continued negotiations with Russia. Russian propaganda with its emphasis on Western war-mongering in contrast to Soviet peaceful intentions was putting the United States in an unfavorable psychological position. America could not refuse to negotiate with Russia, and America could not give the Russians a propaganda victory by requesting the Russians to negotiate. The Campaign of Truth, while it took a firmer attitude, would prove the basic falsity of Russian propaganda and emphasize that America's unchanging aims had always favored peace and adequate negotiation of all difficulties. The Campaign of Truth has been considered by many to be the real start of revived psychological planning within the Department of State.

Previous planning in this field had been on the basis of expediency and improvisations. When a crisis developed it was then decided how it might best be handled. The Campaign of Truth was, however, premised on fundamental goals and policies. The trend of developing situations would not change these goals and policies although the operational emphasis might be varied as it appeared to be most appropriate for the success of American policy. The planning of the Campaign of Truth was in a sense a revolutionary process within the P Area of the State Department. It appears to have been State's first effort to do detailed long-range planning. To determine areas of most immediate importance and within these areas the most effective targets for psychological activities, the world was divided into four major categories. Russia itself comprised the first category. While it was the most important target it was recognized as the area least

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capable of being influenced by overt activity. In the second category were the satellite areas which provided possible targets for eventual successful psychological attack, but which in the immediate future had to be considered as areas wherein only the ground work for future attitudes might be prepared. Most importantly there were the peripheral areas around the Communist countries, i.e., that group of strategically important but neutrally inclined nations on whom the Communists might bring immediate and future pressures. This peripheral area was first subdivided into the immediately dangerous areas such as Western Germany, Iran, and Southeast Asia where existent Communist pressures could be recognized. Then there were the areas presenting longer term problems such as India, France and Italy, where danger of Communist pressure existed but where the general trend was in support of the Free World. Finally, there were peripheral areas, the Scandinavian countries and the Arab world, where the influential opinion had to be so prepared that these areas which were attempting to maintain neutrality in the cold war, would be sympathetic towards the Western world if a shooting war started. A system of priorities was developed for the handling of programs to these various areas together with detailed guidances on the strong and weak points of the American position in each separate area. In this way the Campaign of Truth was prepared in early 1951 as an integral part of national policy.

Concurrently with policy planning, the P Area was doing extensive technical planning. After preliminary private studies, it had proposed the "Ring" plan to counterbalance Russian jamming of VOA and BBC. New powerful transmitters would be established along the Iron Curtain to transmit and to relay American broadcastswith such volume and in such a pattern that peoples within the Communist sphere could hear the American message despite the most extensive Russian efforts to jam and

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distort it. This program was detailed in the Annex to NSC-68/1 on the Information Program. It provided for a series of five-year appropriations averaging $120,000,000 a year for the information program. The assumptions on which this information program was based were stated in the same document:

(a) "USSR is waging psychological warfare against the Free World and its propaganda is a major threat to American Foreign Policy."

(b) "The Free World's effort to counter USSR policy by political, economic and military means 'can obtain maximum results only if the psychological effect of these programs is beneficial to, and in support of, their objectives'".

(c) "The psychological offensive based on truth is essential if the United States is to succeed in its foreign policy objectives."

The Annex then emphasized that the American information program must increase the Free World's psychological resistance to increased Soviet aggression, that it must create doubt among the peoples in the Soviet-dominated areas and develop "a community of interest" among the governments and peoples of the Free World so that they would act in a determined manner against Communist aggression.47/

While State Department was reacting to the intensifying situation by developing its Campaign of Truth, inter-departmental coordination and planning under NSC-59/1 was not progressing. While State's P Area had been issuing weekly guidances from March 1950, it was not until July that inter-departmental coordination

47/ (TS) Annex 5 to NSC-68/1, "U.S. Objectives and Programs...", 21 September 1950.

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and approval gave State guidances authoritative policy control over the psychological activities of the military services. With fighting in Korea and particularly during the first withdrawal of American and UN contingents southward, there was general agreement among the political and military leaders that the Korean action offered innumerable possibilities for psychological operations, if a national policy could be provided to coordinate the various service and agency activities in this field. State Department had a developed USIS activity in South Korea, operating on a peacetime basis, in June 1950. A psychological warfare planning nucleus had existed in the Intelligence Division of of the Headquarters of the Far Eastern Command since 1949. When the Korean incident started, however, neither the USIS in Korea nor the psychological warfare staff in the Tokyo Headquarters had developed or coordinated a plan for cooperative operations in an emergency. People in USIS and also in the Headquarters Staff undoubtedly were familiar with the SWNCC 304 series that in case of war, State's informational facilities in theatres of operation would come under the theatre commander. This transfer took place within two weeks, although not without some harassment and injured feelings.

While the administrative problem of psychological activity was settled by this unification, the problem of psychological policy control remained. The theatre took the position that its psychological warfare division, aware of the tactical requirements and responsible to the theatre commander, should determine the psychological warfare plans. State's representatives agreed that the tactical situation was important. They insisted, however, that the type of operation in Korea was such that explicit and controlling political directives were needed from the State Department. Here in new form was the old

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problem of World War II. Did the political agency, during actual military action even though not war, give directives to a theatre commander which would control his psychological warfare operations? It is not certain that the issue was ever raised in thosewords on the Washington level. The representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the Military Services, and of P Area in State, were clearly conscious of this issue, particularly in light of the Korean incident being classified as police action and the peculiar personality factors in the Far Eastern Command.

The Washington solution for this issue was accomplished informally by using the departmental consultants to the Secretary of State under NSC-59/1. State obtained interservice and JCS agreement to its policy guidances on the government's information program on Korea. These guidances controlled Voice of America output from the United States and its relay points throughout the world. The same guidance was also sent through Army communications to the Theatre Commander in Tokyo as approved national policy on psychological warfare. In this way the theatre commander was provided with propaganda guidances coming, as far as he officially knew, from the JCS. Even with the best of communications, Washington could not conceive of the many tactical variances arising from the rapid retreat, and almost equally sudden offensive, of the UN forces during 1950. Policy differences arose between Washington and the theatre commander and also between the civilian and military members of his staff, but these differences were in the main passed off as details of implementation rather than basic policy problems.

As the Korean action commenced, the policy liaison between departments in Washington continued mainly on an informal basis. In mid-August, however, State Department publically announced the

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establishment of a "National Psychological Strategy Board" to develop plans and guidances for the more effective implementation of America's foreign information program. The National Psychological Strategy Board was under the chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and consisted of the previously mentioned policy consultants under NSC 59/1 of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS and the Director of Central Intelligence. In addition, representatives of the National Security Resources Board and ECA joined in the discussions. This Board met weekly to discuss and give at least informal approval to State's weekly guidances. It also reviewed the psychological warfare planning activities of the IFIS staff. For example, in August, this Board recommended that additional research be started on balloons as possible means of getting American views to the Russian people if a war could not be avoided. 48/

Meanwhile the IFIS Staff had been attempting to develop an organization for psychological warfare planning during a national emergency. This was one of the three responsibilities assigned to IFIS under NSC-59/1 but at that moment, it was the only one on which State and Defense representatives in IFIS had some hopes of reaching an agreement. State officials were determined that any nucleus for peacetime psychological warfare planning be retained in the Department of State in view of Congressional legislation. On planning during wartime, JCS and the services wished to participate in policy planning as well as in coordination of psychological plans with military plans. State Department insisted that policy planning whether in peace or in war was the function of the Secretary of State. Because agreement could not be reached on the extreme positions and because

48/ (S) Under Sec/State to NSC, "/Second/ Progress Report...on the Foreign Information Program (NSC-59/1)", 17 October 1950. State Dept. Bulletin XXIII (28 Aug 1950) p. 335.

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psychological planning during a national emergency seemed most urgent, IPIS eventually came up with a proposal which was sent to the NSC as NSC-74.

This paper was a State Department proposal. Psychological planning in an emergency should be performed by an independent agency, the head of which would be appointed by, and be responsible to, the Secretary of State. The proposal continued the existent interdepartmental liaison, suggesting a board of policy consultants representing JCS, the services, CIA and the State Department, with a permanent staff from these same departments to prepare and coordinate the detailed plans and recommendations for psychological activity. It provided that the Secretary of State would be responsible for the formulation of policy and for the coordination of policy and plans for overt psychological warfare with the JCS and with covert planning. The Secretary of State would also be responsible for the implementation and coordination of the national psychological warfare effort outside of military theatres. The JCS would be responsible for the execution and coordination of all psychological measures in military theatres. This State proposal was opposed by the military, particularly the Secretary of Defense and the JCS. In view of the Korean situation, which was not war and certainly not peace, the military wanted the proposed psychological strategy board to be an independent agency, responsible only to the National Security Council or to the President. During the Fall of 1950, the NSC Senior Staff attempted to reconcile these divergent views. Admitting failure on 28 December 1950, the Senior Staff, in its own paper, NSC-74/1, reviewed the arguments on both sides and requested an NSC decision whether the proposed psychological strategy board should be under the Secretary

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of State or be an independent office under the National Security Council. 49/

Paralleling but apparently independent of the State-Defense differences about the proposed new agency to plan and coordinate the American psychological effort was CIA's developing demand for clearer directives covering covert operations. It will be recalled that OPC of CIA was the agency under NSC-10/2 responsible for the planning and execution of covert operations to carry out national policy. To provide policy guidance, and necessary administrative support from the Department of Defense and the Department of State, a policy liaison committee representing the Secretaries of State and Defense had been explicitly authorized by NSC-10/2. When JSPD was established in January 1950, its chief was invited to these weekly policy liaison meetings. His regular attendance developed into an extra-legal membership on that policy committee. However, with the outbreak of the Korean incident and particularly with the approved national policy set forth in NSC-68/2, the increased demand for covert operations raised worrisome problems for the head of OPC and subsequently for the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

[redacted] 25X1

49/ (TS) NSC-74, "Plan for National Psychological Warfare," 10 July 1950; (S) Memo, Exec Sec to Senior Staff, "The National Psychological Effort," 8 December 1950; (TS) NSC-74/1, "Plan for National Psychological Warfare," 28 December 1950.

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these covert activities, while directly authorized by NSC, required substantial increases in OPC personnel and funds as well as logistic support. These OPC requirements could only be provided by the Defense and State Departments since Congressional appropriations to CIA had been voted solely for its intelligence activities. The President's secret defense funds were not sufficient and it was not proper that they be used only for covert operations. There was also an administrative problem arising from these increased demands for covert operations. OPC would become a larger organization than its own administrative parent, Central Intelligence Agency. This administrative difficulty was a thorny issue in view of the unique arrangements which had been allowed to develop between the head of OPC and DCI. DCI, although authorized by NSC-10/2 to supervise OPC, had allowed OPC to go its own way. In the Fall of 1950 a new Director of Central Intelligence arrived. The new DCI determined that OPC would be an integral part of CIA and OPC would come under his policy, as well as administrative, responsibility. He also decided that if NSC wanted CIA to increase its covert activities, NSC should explicitly direct that the personnel and material support for such covert operations would be provided by the Departments of Defense and State. The CIA/OPC people, as well as the Director of Central Intelligence, also wanted more explicit policy guidance for covert activity from these Departments and from NSC. These covert problems were developing in CIA and being suggested to the NSC staff when that staff was concerned with the reconciliation of the State-Defense disagreement over the psychological strategy board. 50/

50/ Interviews with appropriate CIA authorities, with John Magruder, Rear Adm. Leslie Stevens. There is a large file of OPC working papers on this problem which has been collected under the heading, (TS) "Magnitude".

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December 19, 1951

The confusion in the covert psychological effort was brought to the attention of the National Security Council in early December. Central Intelligence was informed that the President was preparing to proclaim a state of national emergency. Covert operations under paragraph 4 of NSC-10/2 would then become the direct responsibility of the JCS. CIA desired to be certain that the National Security Council properly understood the implications of covert operations and that, if necessary, it would direct paragraph 4 in NSC-10/2 be held in abeyance. At an NSC meeting in early December the DCI presented this problem to the NSC as well as CIA's increasing responsibilities for covert operations. He clearly indicated the need for CIA having psychological policy directives interpreting the NSC objectives from an agency on a much higher level than the existing policy liaison committee. It is not clear what impression CIA's appeal had on the National Security Council. NSC did order that JCS' control of covert operations in case of a national emergency should be held in abeyance until this issue be further considered and a final decision given. There was no evidence of any NSC attitude on the requested policy directives to govern covert operations.

This CIA effort to improve the planning and administration of covert operations paralleled the disagreement between State and Defense on the psychological strategy board proposed in NSC-74. There was still another parallel development which seems to have substantially influenced the Presidential decision in early January to remove the issue of psychological operations from NSC. Congressional and public opinion had been anxiously aroused by the Soviet's atomic explosions. There had been Congressional proposals that the enormous appropriations for national defense and atomic development might better be used for overseas informational programs which might wean

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the world and even Russia away from aggressive action. There had also been serious Congressional discussion of an intensified American psychological effort to weaken the Russian position. With the blessings of State Department's Public Affairs people, Congress was considering a series of resolutions proclaiming America's continuing friendship for the Russian people as distinct from the Kremlin. It was hoped that such official statements might develop a psychological cleavage between the Russian people and their leaders. Similarly, in discussions of continued recovery aid there had been increased attention given to the use of such funds to entice the Russians and their satellites to peaceful cooperation with the Western powers. There were also rumors that Congressmen and influential business leaders were organizing to push for a stronger American psychological effort to counter the apparent Russian victories in the world-wide propaganda war. The National Free Europe Committees, more widely known by its well publicized Radio Free Europe, attracted a great deal of public attention in the Fall of 1950. In Congressional discussions, there were invidious comparisons between the approach of Radio Free Europe, a private adventure, and the official Voice of America in their respective programs to the Russian people. These elements raised the specter of a Congressional decision for an American psychological warfare organization.

It is not now possible to estimate the influences which resulted in the President's decision on NSC-74/1. The NSC staff had requested that the National Security Council decide whether the proposed psychological strategy board should be responsible to the Secretary of State or be an independent body. It is not clear whether the NSC made any recommendation to the President, but it is reported that the President, having already considered setting up an independent board, informed the

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NSC on 4 January 1951 that he was requesting the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and Admiral Sydney Souers to study and resolve the question for him. The President indicated that he was disgusted at the interagency bickerings and the continued inability of his two major executive departments to settle their own problems. He was, therefore, taking it out of the interdepartmental discussion and he would make a personal decision. However, months were to elapse before Souers and Lawton, the Director of the Budget, came up with the desired directive establishing an independent psychological strategy board which was approved and promulgated by the President on 4 April 1951. 51/

It would appear that the President had determined to establish a separate board for psychological activities before he assigned Souers and Lawton their task. During the subsequent three months, all the old arguments representing the positions of State, Defense and CIA were hashed over with Souers. Some Bureau of the Budget people were opposed to another separate agency. Defense and CIA apparently were in independent agreement on the desirability of an agency separate from State with coordinating authority but without operational responsibilities. Representatives of State long argued that any independent body must necessarily conflict with the policy planning prerogatives of the Secretary of State. State suggested that its existing National Psychological Strategy Board fulfilled all the functions and requirements of a new agency, if only the NSC or the President would formally sanction it. The "give and take" of the various positions was evidenced in the many revisions of the

51/ Interview with Rear Adm. Sydney Souers, USN, (Ret.)

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draft directive.[52]

Eventually in late March 1951, there was general, but not enthusiastic, agreement on a directive to establish a Psychological Strategy Board (PSB). This directive was approved and promulgated by the President on 4 April 1951. Like most government action, this directive was a compromise. PSB was an independent entity, but PSB actually was a committee of the top policy officials of the three interested agencies: State, Defense and CIA. An independent Director would be appointed by the President to provide a responsible person to present papers to the PSB and to execute its decisions. However, the directive explicitly stated that PSB and its staff would not become an operating agency. PSB was authorized to plan psychological operations on the strategic level of the NSC, to coordinate the implementation of the psychological strategy by the operating agencies, and to evaluate the results of the entire psychological effort in its fulfillment of national policy. Finally PSB was authorized to report directly to NSC and to the President. The major accomplishment of the directive for PSB was that interdepartmental planning and coordination in the psychological field was raised to a much higher level, just below the NSC but with a tenuous connection to the President. IFIS, and IFIO, under the NSC-43 and 59 series had been under the departments. PSB now was in a sense on a level parallel with, if not equal to, the departments.

The President approved PSB's establishment on 4 April 1951 but additional months elapsed before PSB met and its staff was organized. Hence, after four years of unsuccessful interdepartmental discussions about America's psychological activity, the separate interdepartmental

52/ Interview with Adm. Souers and Charles Schwartzwalder, Bureau of the Budget.

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organization recommended by SWNCC had been adopted. Only time will tell whether the PSB idea was the appropriate solution.

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

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Principles and Case Studies

Frank L. Goldstein,
Col, USAF

Benjamin F. Findley, Jr.,
Col, USAFR

Psychological Operations

Principles and Case Studies

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Frank L. Goldstein, Col, USAF

Co-editor

Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., Col, USAFR

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Foreword

From a military commander's perspective, the role of psychological operations (PSYOP) in the successful planning and execution of modern military operations is absolutely essential. The recent successes of PSYOP in Panama and the Persian Gulf amply demonstrate its importance in achieving our military objectives and national goals. PSYOP is an integral part of the United States Special Operations Command mission. Today, the military faces a dynamic and unpredictable world. PSYOP will remain a valuable instrument in our overall defense posture and will be a key asset in the fulfillment of US national policy.

Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies serves as a fundamental guide to PSYOP philosophy, concepts, principles, issues, and thought for both those new to, and those experienced in, the PSYOP field and PSYOP applications. This book clarifies the value of PSYOP as a cost-effective weapon and incorporates it as a psychological instrument of US military and political power, especially given our present budgetary constraints. The authors contribute to the understanding of psychological operations by presenting diverse articles that portray the value of the planned use of human actions to influence perceptions, public opinion, attitudes, and behaviors so that PSYOP victories can be achieved in war and in peace. The four sections classify articles with related themes into a common category.

Part I offers an overview of the nature and scope of PSYOP and serves as an introduction to the overall nature, historical background, concepts, and principles of psychological operations. These independent articles, which reflect the broad scope of historical development and thought about PSYOP, are intended to be a foundation for understanding the basic nature and key elements of PSYOP.

Part II follows with issues and influences related to developing effective US strategy, doctrine, and structure for conducting psychological and political warfare. The authors focus on those

psychological issues and roles that have been recurrent as our national policy, objectives, and strategy have been formulated and implemented. They explain historical and contemporary elements of the national policy process and the framework within which national PSYOP policy is formulated, administered, and implemented.

Part III deals with the objectives and activities of strategic, tactical, operational, and other types of PSYOP. These authors emphasize that all forms of PSYOP should primarily support the attainment of national policy and objectives. They conclude that the key to all US PSYOP is credibility of the message as defined by the influencing or changing of perceptions, 'attitudes, and behaviors through utilization of words and actions.

In Part IV the authors use case studies to present and clarify PSYOP goals, roles, and methods. One of the editors of this book condenses and analyzes (1) US and Vietcong PSYOP in the Vietnam War and (2) the Iraqi propaganda network. The other writers examine tactical and consolidation PSYOP activities in Operations *Just Cause* and Promote *Liberty* in Panama. They address (1) our national antidrug policy and its relationship to the role of military psychological operations and (2) the importance of the political-psychological dimensions of conflict and insurgency.

By addressing the breadth and depth of psychological operations thought, this collection of PSYOP articles serves as a valuable knowledge base for those who read it. A major purpose of the book is to pull together those previously published articles under one cover in one volume. *Psychological Operations* should stimulate your thinking and reinforce the value of PSYOP.

Frank L. Goldstein, PhD
Col, USAF
Dean of Research
Air Command and Staff College

Preface

This book explores the breadth and depth of fundamental PSYOP roles, principles, and methods. Many of these readings were previously published in professional journals. *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies is* **not a collective work and does not attempt to be. Each article is an independent effort and together they represent a cross section of what the "best and brightest" feel is key to both offensive and defensive psychological operations. What the 24 contributors share, besides their own particular expertise in PSYOP, is a recognition that a clear understanding of PSYOP is important to our national defense and to the way PSYOP should be conducted in the future.**

Understanding PSYOP is not a simple task. Historically, both military and civilian discussions of PSYOP throughout the leadership spectrum have regularly substituted cliches, myths, and untruths for hard evidence or analysis of what PSYOP is and how it can serve our national objectives. PSYOP policy and doctrine have not received their deserved attention while hostile PSYOP efforts against the US are misunderstood and often ineffectively countered.

Although the Soviet threat has ended, three Soviet PSYOP articles are deliberately included because the classic Soviet PSYOP model has been taught and integrated into third world countries all over the world and will continue to be an influence in the international arena.

In 1984, a major effort began to revitalize the state of psychological operations in the United States. That effort was spearheaded in 1985 by a document known as the DOD PSYOP Master Plan. The plan evolved over several years and revision began again in 1990, just prior to the Persian Gulf War. The plan directed the overall revitalization of US psychological operations; it directed that PSYOP be fully integrated into planning and military operations; it directed that PSYOP be considered for immediate and effective use in crises and hostilities; and it directed the use of overt PSYOP programs in

peacetime. The plan presented an across-the-board baseline of problem areas and laid out specific remedial actions for fundamental improvements in our capability to employ PSYOP in peace, crisis, and war.

This volume is also an ongoing effort. While the collected articles will expand both the knowledge and understanding of psychological operations past and present, many of these authors would not have written their articles without the initial revitalization-and Air University Press may not have published them had they been written. The essays present critical PSYO'p issues, problems, activities, and techniques in the book's four sections, which classify articles with related themes into a common category.

We must underscore the fact that these essays are independent of each other. Many were written and published decades ago, and most were originally published in differing formats with differing style requirements. Those that were written in the present tense years ago have been edited to reflect the past tense. We have retained the original flavor of each essay, but some style changes have been made to conform more closely to current Air University Press style. Some essays have notes, some don't; some have bibliographies, some don't; some have appendixes, some don't. We have retained the original styles, with this exception: Notes number 1 that appeared at the titles of some original essays have been removed and the references thereto have been moved to the bottom of the first page.

We are grateful to the 24 contributing authors and regret that we could not include biographical information on all of them; unfortunately, we were unable to obtain biographical data on Preston S. Abbott. We thank J. Schmier, B. Karabaich, and C. Williamson, who provided assistance to MSgt Blair and Col Goldstein, and we are especially grateful to Maj Thomas P. Sands, Florida ANG, who provided editorial assistance to the entire project in its early stages. We also extend our gratitude to those who provided outstanding administrative and technical support. In particular, Majors Stephen Asher, USAF, and James V. Keifer, USAF, Retired; Ms Victoria L. Blessing and Ms Eva E. Hensley; SFC Roger D. Crocker, USAR; SSgt Sherri Adler, USAFR; Sgt Manuel D. Gonzalez, USAFR; and A1C Jayme L. Laurent, Florida ANG.

PART I

Nature and Scope of Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

Introduction

The scope of military PSYOP during World War II, the Korean War, and in much of the 1960s was primarily limited to combat propaganda and psychological warfare (psywar). During those times, it was accepted as a specialized tactical application and as a subordinate operation. The experiences of these conflicts, especially the Vietnam War, convinced some American military and political leaders that the psychological dimension of national power and conflict encompasses diverse elements 'and many activities-nonmilitary as well as military-in both peacetime and war in support of our national policy and objectives. Its scope can vary from the tactical battlefield to the operational theater to the strategic levels of conflict to national political and military goals.

Part I serves as an introduction to the overall nature, historical background, and concepts of PSYOP, and to some principles that can be used for training in the field of psychological operations. The independent articles in this section reflect the broad range of historical development and thought about PSYOP and are intended to be a foundation for understanding the basic nature and key elements of PSYOP.

Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF, and Col Daniel W. Jacobowitz, USAF, Retired, provide a general introduction to and a commonly accepted definition of PSYOP. The authors explore the three types of PSYOP and give several examples of strategic, tactical, operational, and consolidation PSYOP. They divide propaganda into white, gray, and black classes, and present the various resources of psychological operations. The six major military objectives of PSYOP are condensed for the reader.

The late Col Fred W. Walker, USAF, Retired, presents strategic concepts for military PSYOP to enhance the overall understanding of the PSYOP dimension and its challenges. His emphasis is on the public's understanding that the US government does not engage in public disinformation activities in pursuit of national policy. He addresses strategic rather than tactical battlefield and operational PSYOP. He focuses on the concept that "truth is the best propaganda" and analyzes

efforts to counter Soviet global disinformation. Walker died before the dissolution of the Soviet Union; however, the article represents a clear and precise use of Soviet PSYOP between 1917 and 1990.

Col Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., USAF, Retired, provides a brief perspective on the evolution of military PSYOP. He addresses the 1985 Department of Defense (DOD) PSYOP Master Plan as the major framework for rebuilding worldwide military PSYOP capabilities in support of national objectives in peace and crisis and at all levels of conflict. Colonel Paddock presents several essential themes for remedial actions-developing comprehensive joint PSYOP doctrine, developing an adequate number of #PSYOP planners on joint staffs, and improving commanders' understanding of PSYOP capabilities and missions.

Col Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., USAFR, analyzes the many similarities between civilian business marketing and military PSYOP. His premise is that, just as marketing and promotion processes in business have dedicated necessary resources and utilized persuasive strategies and tactics to successfully influence perceptions, motivations, attitudes, and opinions to achieve results, so military PSYOP can and should employ similar approaches to market our country. Colonel Findley focuses on basic persuasion and marketing principles and on business lessons learned.

Psychological Operations

An Introduction



Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF
Col Daniel W. Jacobowitz, USAF, Retired

> *If your opponent is of choleric temper, try to irritate him. If he is arrogant, try to encourage his egotism. If the enemy troops are well prepared after reorganization, try to wear them down. If they are united, try to sow dissension among them.*
>
> – General Tao Hanzhang; translated by Yuan Shibing
> *Sun Tzu's Art of War: The Modern Chinese Interpretation*

PSYOP is a vital element within the broad range of US political, military, economic, and ideological actions. Properly employed, PSYOP reduces the morale and combat efficiency of enemy troops and creates dissidence and disaffection within their ranks. Psychological operations can promote resistance within a civilian populace against a hostile regime or be employed to enhance the image of a legitimate government. The ultimate objective of American PSYOP is to convince enemy, friendly, and neutral nations and forces to take action favorable to the US and its allies. Because of the nature of the parent society and the comparative case of detecting falsehood in a multimedia world, US overt PSYOP campaigns are limited to presenting factually correct material. It would be disingenuous to claim that a balanced picture is presented in US propaganda, but the actual material presented in any particular overt PSYOP message will be verifiable against independent sources.

Truth and falsehood in propaganda must be separated from overt and covert operations and the issue of white, gray, and black (false) propaganda. Overt propaganda is produced by a government or organization that takes responsibility for it. Because of police state conditions or tactical considerations, it

may have to be disseminated by covert means, such as agents who risk their lives to transport and distribute the materials. Overt propaganda may be true or false. Since the effect of propaganda depends on credibility, overt sources that utilize falsehoods quickly lose all effectiveness. Overt propaganda is also known as white propaganda because the source takes responsibility for it. Gray propaganda is material that is distributed without an identified source. It may be true or false. Black propaganda is material produced by one source that purports to have emanated from another source. Such covert produytions may be used to damage the credibility of a white (truthful) source by disseminating obvious falsehoods under the label of the previously trusted source. Black propaganda-if effective at all-quickly loses effectiveness unless the populace is particularly susceptible to rumors, manipulation, and distortion of fact. Nevertheless, black propaganda can be highly effective if properly planned. For example, should intel sources determine that an invasion is imminent, broadcasting that fact under an aegis purporting to be that of the potential invader removes all surprise and falsifies all the invader's claims of a "just" war.

Propaganda may legitimately be economical of the truth. For example, in describing the triumph of democracy there is no particular obligation to discuss the role of Boss 'tweed in urban politics.

Military psychological operations are inherently joint operations. Unified, joint task force, and other military commanders identify target audiences and develop PSYOP themes, campaigns, and products. These are submitted through channels to the joint chiefs for approval. The principles of developing a PSYOP campaign are applicable across the operational continuum. Although the complexity of the methodology varies with the level of conflict, considerations for development of PSYOP campaigns are the same for counterterrorism as they are for global war.

The psychological dimension covers the battlefield as well as the effects upon the soldiers fighting the battle, their military leaders and staffs, the political leaders, and the civilian population. On the field of battle, US forces want to face an enemy who is both unsure about his cause and capabilities

and sure about his impending doom; an enemy who, even if unwilling to surrender, has little will to engage in combat.

It is US policy that psychological operations will be conducted across the operational continuum. It must be understood that psychological operations are conducted continuously to influence foreign perceptions and attitudes in order to effect changes in foreign behavior favorable to US national security objectives. Any type or level of PSYOP can be conducted at any point along the operational continuum. The operational environment in which psychological operations are conducted does not, by itself, dictate or limit PSYOP actions or the level of PSYOP applied.

In environments short of declared war, national PSYOP policy is normally derived from official policy statements and declarations on US foreign policy as well as national security policy. Interagency coordination is required. During declared war, the policy emanates from the national command authorities (NCA) upon approval of plans submitted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). This national policy is executed through a strategy of coherent international information programs, which consist of US information dissemination efforts dealing with policy and information. It is essential that PSYOP themes and products reflect and support national policy, these overt messages are as official as any White House press release. Therefore, appropriate PSYOP policy and strategy must fully integrate Department of Defense (DOD) PSYOP into these international information programs to alleviate the potential for disseminating contradictory information.

Psychological actions such as show of force, cover, and deception have been used throughout history to influence enemy groups and leaders. Modern psychological operations are enhanced by the expansion of mass communication capabilities. Nations can multiply the effects of their military capabilities by communicating directly to their enemies a threat of force or retaliation, conditions of surrender, safe passage for defectors, incitations to sabotage, support to resistance groups, and other messages. The effectiveness of this communication on the target audience depends on their perceptions of the communicator's credibility-does the

communicator have the capability to carry out the threatened actions?

PSYOP actions convey information not only to intended target audiences but also to foreign intelligence systems. Therefore, PSYOP messages must be coordinated with cover and deception plans and activities, along with operational security planners, to ensure that essential secrecy is realized and that PSYOP messages reinforce cover and deception objectives. Skillful content analysts can determine overall intentions by carefully analyzing PSYOP messages and PSYOP planners cark screen their own products to ensure that only the overt intention is broadcast. The methodology of overt propaganda analysis is arcane and difficult, as much derived from art as science. Some practitioners believe the method is more valid when aimed at totalitarian propaganda than PSYOP produced by democracies. Democratic propaganda normally is far less patterned, possibly because the products reflect a less organized process-ad hoc arrangements, swiftly evolving policies, lack of hidden agendas, or, frequently, no agendas at all. Totalitarian-especially communist-propaganda may be easier to analyze because it is highly formalized and patterned.

There is a psychological dimension within any element of national power projection, particularly the military element. Foreign perceptions of US military capabilities are fundamental to strategic deterrent capability. Therefore, US policymakers must articulate our national and military actions (if we don't, others will). Communicating unambiguously to allies, enemies, and neutrals is a key element of US national strategy. The effectiveness of deterrence, power projection, and other strategic concepts hinges on our ability to influence the perceptions of others.

For these communications, any player in the US government or overall body politic may become an important tactical element regardless of the strategic position that the player holds. In conveying the will of the United States, the firm set of the president's jaw in drawing "a line in the sand" may have as much influence on international, and especially adversarial, understanding of US policy as the actions taken by the government. Supporting statements by other officials, including the secretary of state, congressional leaders, and

military commanders, similarly are tactical elements carrying out the information strategy. Tactical actions of this nature, delivered at the strategic level, are analogous to the actual tactical delivery of weapons to targets of a strategic nature in a shooting war. Since much of policy is devoted to achieving national goals while ameliorating genuine conflict and avoiding a shooting war, tactical performance of these roles by strategic elements of the political/ military system is critical to national policy. One of the benefits of the open political process-disseminated and monitored by a free and aggressive media-is that individuals who would be inadequate tactical communicators tend to be shunted away from positions for which the nation's fate requires skillful performance. Military PSYOP may be undertaken at the strategic level, augmenting other national communications systems, particularly in areas for which the peacetime national systems-such as the United States Information Agency-have no access.

In every case, it is crucial that military PSYOP be integrated with other national communications, since the audiences will accept military PSYOP messages as official positions. To ensure this process, military psychological operations rely on a planned, systematic process of conveying messages to, and influencing, selected foreign groups. The messages conveyed by military PSYOP are intended to promote particular themes that result in desired foreign attitudes and behaviors. Therefore, PSYOP may be used to establish and reinforce foreign perceptions of US military capability, determination, and responsiveness to US political goals and to support overall US policy.

Psychological operations are an important dimension of overall military operations. They may be used by commanders to influence the attitudes and behavior of foreign groups in a manner favorable to the achievement of US national objectives. Thus, the principal purpose of DOD PSYOP is to persuade foreign audiences to change or enhance attitudes or behaviors in a manner favorable to one or more national security objectives. Additionally, PSYOP can counter foreign propaganda that adversely affects the achievement of US objectives.

The United States typically distinguishes between PSYOP on a strategic level and PSYOP on a tactical, battlefield level.

Strategic psychological operations are usually considered an aspect of public diplomacy and are normally established and guided by intergovernment working groups created for a particular short-term situation or regional area of concern. The intergovernment groups meet periodically to clarify strategic PSYOP policy in light of political and military developments of the day. At the present time, however, the US government has no permanent mechanism to institutionalize this process.

In tactical or battlefield PSYOP, commanders use such techniques as loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops with the intent of generating a force multiplier without having to increase force size. Psyopsers support tactical deception, counterterrorism, counterpropaganda, and other nontraditional means as the tactical situation merits. PSYOP messages cannot replace tactical performance or redeem inadequate training, weapons, or tactics that result in poor combat performance. However, the methodology can increase the overall functional degradation of enemy capability. Missiles, bombs, bullets, and maneuvers establish the context for PSYOP multiplication and hastening the cumulative results of tactical competence. Psychological operations speed the positive effects of military prowess, and may, under certain conditions, delay the consequences of military failure. Because psychological operations multiply desired effects, positive outcomes can result in quicker victory at lower cost in material, time, and casualties. Whether strategic or tactical, PSYOP uses any available means of communication to achieve desired ends. In Western circles, truthfulness is a desirable goal in itself, and is the principal means for building credibility among targeted audiences. Success in PSYOP rests on thorough analysis and planning.

Modern PSYOP planning includes a target analysis that consists of several phases. The first phase identifies possible target audiences. Once the target audience is identified, such target characteristics as vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, conditions, and effectiveness are analyzed. Vulnerabilities are the four psychological factors that affect the target audience: perception, motivation, stress, and attitude. Susceptibilities include the degree to which the target audience can be

influenced to respond to the message it receives. Conditions of the target audience include all environmental factors-social, economic, political, military, and physical-that influence the target audience. Audience effectiveness is the capability of the target audience to carry out the psyopser's desired response. The concept of audience effectiveness is fundamental to PSYOP success at strategic and tactical levels. If the goal is functional destruction of an enemy tactical unit, the effective audience may be individual soldiers, who may be persuaded to desert, defect, or defect in place; that is, simply fail to perform without overtly resisting their commanders. Other goals may require finding different effective audiences. The responsive audience in a battlefield air interdiction campaign could be the civilian workers who repair damaged railroads and bridges. Truthfully reporting that they are at risk from restrikes of previously damaged targets may dissuade them from voluntarily working. However, if they are slave laborers, the audience may be nonresponsive regardless of their susceptibility. The responsive audience may be taskmasters, or high-level commanders. For example, the susceptibility of the high-level audiences may be threats of war crimes prosecution. Both audiences will have to be convinced, by multiple messages, if the campaign is to be effective. Once the above analysis of audiences is accomplished, the psyopser seeks to determine the specific psychological plan that supports the national objective.

Psychological operations have been a part of military strategy since armies first took the field of battle. The Persian Gulf War and the employment of PSYOP by both sides were the most recent chapter in a long history of PSYOP as an integral part of military strategy. Throughout much of military history, PSYOP's presence has been felt in battlefield campaigns. Psychological operations were integrated into the commander's scheme of maneuver before the label of PSYOP was invented and without the benefit of thorough or scientific planning. An early example of how PSYOP was planned and applied in ancient battle is contained in the writings of the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, who stated that the most noble victory was to subdue his enemy without a fight. Another was the successful exploits of Genghis Khan (the Mongolian

general Temujin), who would soften his enemy's will to resist by spreading rumors about his own army's strength and fierceness. His planning was simple and, seemingly, relevant and effective.

As early as the Battle of Bunker Hill, colonial military PSYOP operators used leaflets designed to work on the susceptibilities of the effective audience. Leaflets distributed among British troops in Boston by trusted colonial agents were based upon analysis of the situation and the conditions the British troops anticipated, as well as their motivation. Thus, some leaflets reported that food and provisions among the colonial troops were far superior to the hardtack fed the British, and that switching sides would result in an immediate improvement in diet. More important and effective was an appeal to a basic desire to improve the British soldier's status in life, an important factor in motivating enlistment. Many troops had joined merely to obtain subsistence or with the hope of achieving enough riches to obtain farmland. The most effective message slightly pointed out that to obtain land in the colonies, a soldier needed merely to desert and walk west until he found a suitable plot. Hessian mercenaries in particular responded to this appeal later in the war, and a considerable number of the present-day Pennsylvania Dutch owe their ancestry to the effectiveness of this appeal as these soldiers settled in a language-compatible area in which they were unlikely to be turned over to British authority. Colonial strategic psychological operations were masterful from inception, with Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine effectively working their various chosen audiences while Benjamin Franklin used his post in France to bolster not only continental support-which eventually resulted in the Franco-American force that was victorious at Yorktown-but also helped bring Lafayette, Pulaski, and Kosciuszko to American shores. The campaigns within Britain that drained political support for the war were most effective. Battlefield competence was important to the success of this effort and included not only victories at Trenton and other places but also the amazing raids by John Paul Jones upon English coastal towns, whose political effect far outshone their minimal military importance. James H. Doolittle's raid on Japan-undertaken for the same purposes

and with analogous military results-was foreshadowed in methodology and in equivalent technological means almost 150 years before.

In the American Civil War, both sides of the conflict directed strategic campaigns at England in the hope of winning support for their respective causes. It remains questionable, however, that these campaigns had been formally planned and that the proper resources were marshaled to execute them. The Southern campaign was virtually undercut by the Confederate refusal to sell cotton to Great Britain. This economic suicide overwhelmed any positive effects that media campaigns may have engendered.

During World War I, PSYOP came into its own as a formal activity. Almost all countries involved in the war used forms of strategic and tactical PSYOP. Many countries formed military units specializing in propaganda. These units' primary duties included distribution of leaflets by balloon and aircraft. The linkage among planning, resource mobilization, and execution by these agencies appeared to be an uncomplicated matter. How the PSYOP details were integrated into the shooting war of the day, or how well PSYOP induced surrenders, was not recorded for history. What is known, however, is that surrenders occurred with a positive correlation to PSYOP activities. Thus, military analysts began taking a new look at PSYOP as an ingredient with surprising impact on the battle. Psychological operations were a resource because they induced stress on both civilian and military forces of the enemy.

During World War II, propaganda activities became known as psychological warfare (psywar). Public broadcast radio, about 20 years old at this point, was called into play. Tank-mounted loudspeakers with a range of approximately two miles amplified the ability of the human voice to reach opposing combatants. Besides media programs, military actions were undertaken for their PSYOP effect. The Doolittle raid against Japan was considered an important PSYOP event for at least two reasons. The carefully planned raid demonstrated credibly to the Japanese that the US could reach and bomb their homeland, prompting them to take unnecessary steps for home defense. More important perhaps, news of the

success back home caused morale to soar in an American population desperate for a victory. Planning, mobilization, and execution all worked in this one instance. However, it must be noted that during this war, aircrews frequently expressed reluctance to risk themselves on leaflet-dropping missions because they lacked confidence in that methodology as a means of bringing victory nearer.

In the years that followed, PSYOP matured as a combat force multiplier, albeit through a series of starts and stops. During the 1950s, the Soviet Union made great strides in both strategic and internal PSYOP. Soviet client-states began very elaborate psychological operations for foreign insurgents and home consurhption. At the same time, little was apparently being planned in Western PSYOP circles.

Although strategic and tactical psychological operations were effectively integrated by the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam era, US PSYOP planning was not effectively formalized or coordinated with operations and troop mobilizations. It was in Vietnam that propaganda activities assumed the current term PSYOP-and television was a new medium. The North Vietnamese mastered the art of using the international media, particularly television, for their PSYOP. The US government was ineffective in both public information and public policy in mobilizing its public for the war. As a result of this negative experience in Vietnam, the US government learned the importance of domestic and foreign support of major policy goals.

In the more recent conflicts, PSYOP has been integrated with combat operations. In the Falklands, Afghanistan, Africa, South and Central America, Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf, PSYOP was included by all parties. PSYOP even became a critical part of the terrorist mode of operations during the seventies and were part of the Iraqi PSYOP plan when they threatened terrorist activities.

Any student of PSYOP will quickly learn how important PSYOP can be in political and military strategy. What every student should strive for is an internalization of the concept proposed by Sun Tzu, the Chinese military strategist, that to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy's

resistance without resorting to fighting. Because soldiers and civilians have not fundamentally changed in nature or psychology since Sun Tzu wrote these observations, they remain appropriate today.

Strategic Concepts for Military Operations

Col Fred W. Walker, USAF, Retired*

For many years, people have indicated a lack of understanding ~of exactly what military psychological operations (PSYOP) entail. News media refer to PSYOP as psychological warfare (psywar) and imply that there is some nefarious objective or purpose in such action. They usually indicate that there is some element of deliberate misinformation-or even some public lies-involved in such activity. It is time that these misperceptions were set straight. The public must understand that the United States government does *not* engage in public disinformation activities in pursuing national policy. This article concentrates on peacetime strategic concepts, setting aside the loudspeaker and leaflet activities of the battlefield.

Joint Pub *1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (1* **December 1989) broadly defines strategic psychological activities as "planned psychological activities in peace and war which normally pursue objectives to gain the support and cooperation of friendly and neutral countries and to reduce the will and the capacity of hostile or potentially hostile countries to wage war."**

This is demonstrably any program that supports a long-term effort to achieve a national or regional foreign policy objective through persuasion. We might consider the term *persuasive communications* **to mean the same thing as psychological operations.**

How did we become focused on strategic psychological activities? Quite fundamentally, various administrations assessed that the United States was falling behind in world

*Deceased 1990.

influence because the global propaganda and disinformation efforts of the Soviet Union were directed against US foreign policy objectives. As a result of this assessment, President Ronald Reagan directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to revitalize its psychological operations capabilities and use them to support national security objectives in all legal and proper areas.

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger ordered an extensive study on how best to implement the president's direction. This action resulted in a master plan to revitalize military capabilities and better apply them to support long-term peacetime national security objectives. Key elements in his plan involved (1) separating the profession of PSYOP from the more narrow field of special operations and (2) significantly restructuring staffs and units. He also recommended enhanced interagency coordination.

It is important to stress the fact that US military psychological operations in peacetime do not involve misinformation or anything related to the Soviet concept of disinformation. Truth must be our guideline in every undertaking. After World War II, Dick Crossman, the British master of international influence activities, counseled that truth is the very essence of strategic peacetime foreign policy efforts and that it should be our fundamental guideline. US policy must endorse his astute recommendation.

DOD is still engaged in a period of transition to revitalize its military PSYOP capabilities. We envision a number of strategic roles and missions, all of which support objectives derived from published national security policy.

According to the annual defense guidance document, our fundamental national security objective is to deter conflict. This is clearly a psychological phenomenon because it occurs in the mind of a potential enemy. When an enemy perceives that it would be too costly for him to attack or that he would probably lose if he started a war, then he elects not to attack and conflict has been deterred. His mental decision, based upon his perception of our capabilities and resolve, is the key element in the process of deterrence. Military PSYOP in support of this fundamental defense objective, then, should seek to clarify and focus this perception.

Military PSYOP programs designed to enhance deterrence should include those that support arms control talks as well as those that clarify and explain national aims for strategic nuclear force posture. Efforts to clearly describe our policies for peaceful military uses of space and the strategic defense initiative (SDI) can readily be listed as contributing to deterrence. The fact that the term *star wars* was publicly attached to the SDI program aided the Soviets considerably in their propaganda campaigns against it. There were two reasons for this: (1) the term evoked subconscious perceptions of scien V fiction and fantasy among various public audiences and (2) "wars" is perceived as aggressive rather than defensive. As a result, there was little support for the program. Nevertheless, little was done to decouple this negative terminology. In the future, more must be done to properly support national policy.

A simple thing like terminology can indeed be a major factor in various public audiences' acceptance of-or support for-any policy. Recent history shows that the term *neutron bomb* was a key element in the Soviets' eminently successful campaign a decade ago to prevent President Jimmy Carter from deploying enhanced radiation weapons in Europe. In like manner, we can recall how our national leaders were duped into referring to Iranian terrorists and kidnappers as students at the outset of the Iranian Embassy hostage debacle in 1979. These are clear examples of how terminology can sway public perceptions on a global basis.

Certainly, strategic military PSYOP programs should play a significant role in countering terrorism. In addition to gaining some control over media terminology, we need information programs that will disassociate terrorist groups from pockets of popular support. Such programs should publicly impugn the worth of the terrorists' objectives and denigrate their leadership. We should also seek to reduce their internal cohesion and cause them to waste their resources defensively; for example, in hiding and vetting new members.

Above all, we should seek to positively influence foreign policy efforts to reduce or eliminate foreign governmental support to terrorist groups. With firm evidence that the governments of Libya, North Korea, and Cuba support various

terrorist groups, we can and should make publicly supported diplomatic efforts against such governments. Although we have the capability to do this, there are tremendous administrative and bureaucratic hurdles to surmount in developing such programs.

There is a major role to play in countering global disinformation efforts as used by the former Soviet Union. A thoroughly documented Soviet disinformation campaign attributed the cause of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DOD experiments to develop biological warfare weapons. While this was a total falsehood and seemed preposterous to most Americans, the disinformation was found credible by several audiences elsewhere in the world. We are only at the beginning of the level of fear that this epidemic can cause in our world, but the Soviets and others recognized early on that fear inhibits rational thinking and vastly enhances the effectiveness of their propaganda and disinformation.

The second phase of their AIDS disinformation campaign began surfacing in foreign public news items that accused US military personnel stationed overseas of spreading AIDS in various host nations. News stories and leaflets with this theme appeared in the Philippines, Africa, and the Middle East. The obvious objective was to undermine US military presence and influence on a global basis. Still a foreign policy problem, it could be helped by a comprehensive and coordinated foreign policy that vigorously exposes and describes disinformation campaigns while pointing out extensive US efforts to control the disease.

Many are probably not aware that the Soviet Union engaged in a sinister and very dangerous game of economic warfare against the United States. The area of strategic metals provides a good example. Africa was the most visible battlefield in this subtle economic struggle, having as it does an abundance of these resources easily and economically available. The US is about 10 percent self-sufficient (within our borders) in supplies of this type; the USSR was about 90 percent self-sufficient. Metals such as chromium, cobalt, zirconium, titanium, and tantalum are essential to any modern high-technology industrial society. The military

dimension is obvious from the extent to which defense systems depend on technology.

The Soviets attempted to keep their supplies in the bank-mostly in Siberia, under the ice. They were content to compete with the US on the world market, thus driving up the price. In various countries of Africa, we saw propaganda, disinformation, and guerrilla warfare drive the price up and the Americans out. In Zaire, this combination of activities caused a 600 percent price increase for cobalt in a two-year time period (1979-81). Now, years later, we are still wondering how to gain control of this issue.

Other areas on the economic warfare front were international financing (manipulating debtor nations and credit extensions), protectionism (still an issue), and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Propaganda in these areas is increasingly more subtle and less noticed, but it should be monitored. Resulting evaluations should be placed in our national security and foreign policy development processes. And we must ensure that the military dimension is properly coordinated.

There is a military dimension in negotiations on the law of the sea-treaties involving fishing rights, oil drilling, navigation rights, and seabed mining. We also have legitimate national security interests in extradition treaties for terrorists and drug traffickers.

Persuasive communications in peacetime may be accurately likened to advertising and public relations programs. Secrets to success involve getting the facts out in clear and understandable ways, relating these facts to perceived human needs, and ensuring enough repetition so that the message is received and reinforced. Various target audiences have differing perceived needs, scripts, and priorities; therefore, the same message must be packaged in different ways in order to appeal to a wider spectrum.

The United States government has a wide variety of communication channels. Each major government agency has offices whose purpose is to announce its policies and explain how its activities support national policies and goals. The United States Information Agency is specifically charged with informing peoples in foreign nations about US policies and describing American culture and our democratic way of life.

This is done through speakers and seminars, press conferences, and various publications. Radio and television programming, such as the "Voice of America" and the new "Worldnet," are able to reach vast audiences.

Areas where there is the most room for improvement are in (1) coordinating various government agencies and (2) packaging the message to fit the audience. Often in crisis situations or periods of tension, the need for rapid response inhibits coordination among various branches of the government. Officials tend to couch their statements in terms they are comfortable with and to speak from their personal points of view, neglecting to consider the cultural aspects and aspirations of foreign audiences. Improvement in these areas is absolutely essential for more effective communications.

Repetition is also necessary. Government officials are busy people; they tend to make policy statements once, and then get on to the next item of business. But policy statements don't necessarily have a life of their own. Unless repeated in various ways and related anew to emerging situations, they tend to submerge in piles of records and gather dust in archives.

The Soviets clearly demonstrated that the most blatant lies can be successfully put across through massive repetition of disinformation and propaganda. In fact, repetition was the secret of their success. Some Soviet propaganda lines were constantly repeated for 50 years; although there was not a single economic success story arising out of a communist or socialist system, belief in this big lie continued over much of the world. People are still willing to give up their freedom for a dream that is inconsistent with the human condition. This is the threat we face from the competition.

Initial changes by Mikhail S. Gorbachev to the Soviet global propaganda machine reflected a stepped-up effort to supplant US power and influence. After the Twenty-seventh Party Congress in the spring of 1986, their propaganda apparatus was restructured and even more centralized. The International Information Department was disestablished and its responsibilities were consolidated within the International Department (ID) and the Propaganda Department (PD). The PD had been responsible for internal domestic propaganda. After

the changes, it had oversight for several activities oriented toward foreign audiences; for example, Tass and Novosti as well as Radio Moscow. This move reflected the theory that foreign propaganda and domestic propaganda are intimately linked, and that greater efficiency can be gained through centralization.

At the same time, Gorbachev's reforms (under his program of glasnost) were being widely touted in the West. Many were led to believe that this change represented a welcome softening of formerly hard Soviet propaganda lines. In fact, one of the major propaganda efforts to sugarcoat this program sought to convince people that the term glasnost meant "openness." A more acourate translation would be "publicity." Proper translation is not simply a semantic game; it shaped the debate on effective policy response toward the USSR.

Most analysts feel that the real intent of glasnost was not to create an open society, but to consolidate Gorbachev's power by modernizing the system and ending economic stagnation. Carefully staged events, such as the Moscow Peace Forum, dissident releases, rock concerts, and television shows, sought to take advantage of easily co-opted Western participants in order to improve external opinion of the Soviet Union, further Soviet propaganda lines, and secure badly needed Western technology.

Those events should have been viewed with extreme distrust, inasmuch as they represented a quantum leap in Soviet propaganda sophistication. We saw significant improvements beginning under Yuri V. Andropov's administration, with expanded use of professional psychology and psychiatry along with infusions of equipment and talent that increased the quality of Soviet PSYOP. Under glasnost, we watched a merger between these professional propagandists and the innocent Western media. It was and is a dangerous and threatening evolution.

Still, the Soviets lost control of glasnost, affording an opportunity to project democratic messages to various Soviet audiences while those channels were open.

If US government agencies can improve their coordination and persuasive communications capabilities, we may be able to slow and then reverse our losing trend in exerting world

influence. Propaganda and disinformation that seek to cause people to trade freedom for lies is a most insidious and dangerous threat, and freedom is far too precious a thing to be defended by haphazard efforts. We do have one significant advantage: There is no need to lie because properly packaged truth is the very best propaganda.

No More Tactical Information Detachments

US Military Psychological Operations in Transition



Col Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., USA, Retired

US military PSYOP today faces an uncertain future. This paper provides a brief perspective on the evolution of US military PSYOP during the twentieth century, examines the conditions that led to a revitalization of these capabilities during the 1980s, contrasts this revitalization with the international and domestic environment faced by the Department of Defense (DOD) today, and outlines some of the major challenges for the US military PSYOP community during a transitional period. [1]

A broad definition of psychological operations details the planned use of communications to influence human attitudes and behavior. They consist of political, military, and ideological actions conducted on target groups to create desired behavior, emotions, and attitudes. If used properly, PSYOP will precede, accompany, and follow all applications of force. The military should carry out this course of action under the broader umbrella of national policy. In addition, it should coordinate fully and carefully the military component of the overall PSYOP effort with other agencies of government.

More specifically, PSYOP can demoralize, disorient, and confuse hostile groups. Against such groups, psychological operations are employed as offensive weapons to enhance the overall effectiveness of military operations. They also can unite, inform, and bolster the morale of nonhostile groups. When targeting neutral or friendly groups, they are used to support military objectives by developing cooperative attitudes and behavior in the targeted group.

Evolution of US Military Psychological Operations

The level of interest in military psychological operations during this century has been episodic, basically rising and falling during and after the major conflicts in which US forces have been committed. Over this period, most of the activity in military PSYOP centered on the Army. The following brief historical perspective, therefore, focuses on the Army's experience to illustrate the fortunes of military PSYOP.

While giving psychological warfare (psywar) only token recognition' in World War I, the Army established both the Psychological Warfare Subsection of G-2 in the War Department and the Propaganda Section of G-2 in General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces. Military tactical psychological warfare centered on the production of leaflets; radios did not exist as a means of communication, and loudspeakers were primitive. Military propaganda concentrated on producing surrender appeals; balloons and airplanes were the primary method for their dissemination.

From 1918 to 1941, no psychological warfare office existed in the War Department. The lessons of experience were lost, and by 1941 only one officer on the War Department staff had had psychological warfare service in the previous war.

During World War II, most of the Army's operational work in psywar took place at the theater level, where the responsible organization was normally designated a psychological warfare branch (PWB). The largest of these organizations at the theater level, the PWB at Allied Forces Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ), was activated in North Africa in November 1942 at the order of Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower. It was expanded in February 1944 to the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF). Psychological warfare was defined as "the dissemination of propaganda designed to undermine the enemy's will to resist, demoralize his forces and sustain the morale of our supporters."[2]

The basic Army field operating unit for psywar was the Mobile Radio Broadcasting (MRB) Company. The equipment for this company was unlike anything conventional soldiers had seen in the field: public address systems, radios,

monitoring sets, loudspeakers, typewriters, mobile printing presses, and leaflet bombs. MRB units were usually divided by the separate Army groups and field armies into small teams, often to work in direct support of frontline conventional combat units. Five such units eventually served under PWD/SHAEF. Although these units resulted from improvisation in 1943 and 1944, the doctrinal and organizational concepts they embodied reappeared in the psychological warfare units formed during the Korean conflict.

During 1945-46, Army psychological warfare staffs and units dissipated with the general demobilization of the military establishment. Despite the efforts of a few senior civilian and military officials to retain a military PSYOP capability, the Tactical Information Detachment was the only operational psychological warfare troop unit in the US Army when the North Koreans attacked South Korea in June 1950. Organized at Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1947, this detachment had been reorganized as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company. Sent to Korea in the fall of 1950, it served as the Eighth Army's tactical propaganda unit throughout the conflict. Tactical propaganda, sometimes called combat propaganda, was directed at a specific audience in the forward battle areas and used in support of localized operations. Mobile loudspeakers mounted on vehicles and aircraft became a primary means of conducting tactical propaganda in Korea.

To conduct full-scale strategic operations, the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group was organized at Fort Riley and shipped to Korea in July 1951. The 1 st RB&L Group was specifically designed to conduct strategic propaganda in direct support of military operations. This propaganda was intended to further long-term strategic aims and was directed at enemy forces, populations, and enemy-occupied areas. The 1st RB&L Group had the equipment and capability to produce newspapers and leaflets, and to augment or replace other means of broadcasting radio propaganda. The group supervised a radio station network, known as the "Voice of the United Nations," and often produced more than 200 million leaflets a week that were disseminated by aircraft or by specially designed artillery shells. The leaflets expressed various themes. Some leaflets, for example, offered inducements for

enemy soldiers to surrender; others bolstered the morale of Korean civilians by proclaiming UN support.

Although the RB&L Group was a concept accelerated to meet the requirements of the Korean conflict, it performed functions similar to those used in psychological warfare in World War II. Its MRB Company bore a direct linkage to the mobile radio broadcasting companies formed under PWD/SHAEF to conduct operations in North Africa and the European theater during 1944-45. However, the MRB companies were organized during World War II to perform tactical psywar; radio later became an essentially strategic weapon that had no place in a purely tactical psychological unit. The strategic concept embodied ;n the RB&L Group was destined to figure prominently in the psywar capability that was subsequently formed as part of the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952. The tactical idea expressed by the L&L Company also influenced the capability that was developed there. As originally established at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the Psychological Warfare Center consisted of a psychological warfare school, the 6th Radio and Broadcasting Group, a psychological warfare board, and the 10th Special Forces Group. The mission of this unprecedented center:

> To conduct individual training and supervise unit training in Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Operations; to develop and test Psychological Warfare and Special Forces doctrine, procedures, tactics, and techniques; to test and evaluate equipment employed in Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Operations. [3]

After an initial burst of activity fueled by the Korean conflict and by fears of a possible outbreak of war in Europe, interest in the Psychological Warfare Center began to dissipate. Its -title was changed to the Special Warfare Center in 1956, but the Army's psychological operations capability had eroded by the early 1960s.

Consequently, an insufficient base of PSYOP-trained officers were available when the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion was activated in Vietnam in 1965. By 1967, the Army's PSYOP forces in Vietnam had been expanded to a group (the 4th) with four battalions, one in each of, the four corps tactical zones (CTZ). The group served under the commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, with the J-3's Psychological Operations Division exercising direct

staff supervision. The Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) provided US PSYOP policy guidance not only to the civilian agencies but also to all military PSYOP elements.

In addition to providing tactical support to field force commanders, the 4th Psychological Operations Group assisted the South Vietnamese government in its communication effort down to the hamlet level. The group headquarters operated a 50,000-watt radio station and high-speed heavy printing presses, published a magazine for Vietnamese employees working for US government and civilian agencies, and could research and develop propaganda materials.

In contrast, PSYOP battalions had light printing presses, a research and propaganda development capability, personnel to work with the US Air Force Special Operations units for aerial leaflet and loudspeaker missions, and ground loudspeaker and audiovisual teams. Loudspeaker and audiovisual teams operated with US divisions and brigades or with province advisory teams. The 7th Psychological Operations Group in Okinawa provided valuable backup support in printing and in disseminating leaflets at high altitudes.

During the height of US involvement in Southeast Asia, the Army stationed PSYOP units at Fort Bragg and in Germany, Panama, and Okinawa. These units were established in addition to the 4th Psychological Operations Group in the Republic of Vietnam. By the mid-1970s, however, all that remained in the active component was an inadequately staffed and antiquatedly equipped group at Fort Bragg-a condition that did not improve significantly for 10 years.

Revitalization of PSYOP in the 1980s

The 1980s saw an upturn in the fortunes of military PSYOP, made possible by several conditions. President Ronald Reagan, who assumed office with a strong anticommunist orientation, characterized the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" early in his tenure. He directed that a program be developed to support noncommunist insurgencies (the "Reagan Doctrine") around the world. With public opinion supporting him, President Reagan embarked upon a large buildup of the US defense establishment-a buildup that benefited military PSYOP.

The president then outlined, in a number of national security directives, his approach to the psychological dimension of national power. His initial national security strategy, announced in the summer of 1981, contained four basic components: diplomatic, economic, military, and informational. This emphasis on the psychological component was retained in subsequent Reagan national security strategies.

In January 1983, President Reagan signed National Security Decision 77, "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security." This directive defined public diplomacy **rather broadly, stating that it "is comprised of those actions of the U.S. Government designed to generate support for our national security objectives." The term generally evolved to embrace a broad range of informational and cultural activities. The decision also established an interagency mechanism to plan and coordinate public affairs, information, political, and broadcasting activities of the US government.**

In early 1984, the president directed DOD to rebuild its military PSYOP **capabilities. In response to this directive, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger launched a major evaluation of the department's capabilities and needs in psychological operations. This evaluation concluded that DOD's PSYOP capabilities had been allowed to atrophy over the previous decade. Across-the-board deficiencies had developed in policy guidance, roles and missions, doctrine, organization, force structure, operational concepts, planning, programming, training, logistics, intelligence support, readiness, personnel programs, and-most importantly-attitude, underscoring the need for education and heightened awareness at all levels of military and civilian organizations.**

DOD PSYOP Master Plan of 1985

Secretary Weinberger elected to use a DOD PSYOP master plan as the framework for rebuilding military PSYOP capabilities. Approved in mid-1985, the plan served as a comprehensive design for the fundamental improvement of the department's capabilities to effectively perform worldwide psychological operations in support of national objectives in peace and crisis and at all levels of conflict.

The plan specified a number of remedial actions-over 200, in fact-to be implemented over several years. Several essential themes manifested themselves.

The first theme highlighted the need to develop a comprehensive joint doctrine for the formulation, direction, coordination, and conduct of PSYOP in peace, crisis, and war. In effect, this doctrine provided a foundation for the revitalization effort. Among other things, it sought to enunciate the function of PSYOP as a force multiplier in all military activity, establish the conceptual framework for planning and implementation, and delineate roles and responsibilities of the several components. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) published this doctrine in 1987. It was later revised to reflect US experience with PSYOP in support of military operations in Panama and the Persian Gulf.

The development of doctrine was to be paralleled by major improvements in PSYOP planning, the second theme of the 1985 Master Plan. It devoted insufficient human talent to full-time, meaningful, sustained PSYOP planning at appropriate staff levels. The report card on this major deficiency offers mixed reviews, but some evidence of progress exists. Creation of a small psychological operations directorate, the first such office to exist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in over 20 years, indicated the seriousness with which Secretary Weinberger undertook the revitalization effort. The PSYOP staff element in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) was upgraded from a branch to a division. It also showed an increase in personnel, but later reverted to a branch and lost a few personnel spaces. The Department of the Army staff created a psychological operations and civil affairs division, where before only one full-time officer had been assigned to this activity.

Outside the Pentagon, a few changes occurred. Among the unified commands, United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) created a PSYOP detachment to augment its staff capability. The US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was established in 1987 at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Included in this unified command staff was a directorate for psychological operations and civil affairs (J-9). More recently, in 1990, the Army created the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command at Fort Bragg. Commanded by a USAR

brigadier general and staffed primarily by reserve component personnel on varying periods of active duty, this headquarters of 146 personnel (later reduced to 80) serves all active and reserve component Army civil affairs and psychological operations units. This new organization reports to the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) at Fort Bragg.

Much more remains to be done in this area, however. Perhaps the key requirement is that staff officers receive formal training in this specialized area and that psychological operations become an integral part of the operational course of action in any plan. A few innovative and resourceful staff officers can make a vast differgnce if they have access to a command's major planning activities. Because of the paucity of trained PSYOP staff officers in major commands, the burden for planning too often falls upon the Army's 4th Psychological Operations Group, the only active duty unit of its type among the services.

Development of adequate numbers of PSYOP planners is where the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps can make an important contribution to the revitalization envisaged in the 1985 Master Plan. The conduct of psychological operations is not the exclusive domain of such specialized units as those in the Army. In the current resource-constrained environment, only a small possibility exists that the other services will opt to field new PSYOP units. On the other hand, there is every reason to expect those services to develop fully qualified PSYOP planners to meet their own needs and to provide their proportionate share on joint staffs.

To help address this need and in response to the 1985 Master Plan, the Army's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg developed a joint PSYOP staff planning course in 1988. A large proportion of its students have been from the Army's reserve component PSYOP community. Too few representatives from the other services have participated, and it is uncertain how many of them actually were assigned to staff positions where their expertise could be utilized. Reportedly, the Army plans to eliminate the course in 1996. If it does, this will be unfortunate-it is the only formal joint PSYOP planning course currently available. What is needed instead is a renewed and continuous emphasis that would enable the course to fulfill its original purpose. This

will not happen, however, until the services begin to send more officers to the course and ensure their assignment to positions where their training can be utilized.

Closely related was the need to educate our officer corps on psychological operations, the third theme. As indicated earlier, the 1985 Master Plan stated that the root cause of the atrophy of our military PSYOP capabilities was a lack of understanding of psychological operations, their value, and their application. Some improvement was made in this critical area as a result of frequent briefings to senior commanders and staff officers by PSYOP personnel, the professionalism of PSYOP units in contingency planning and in support of conventional forces on joint training exercises, and the steady improvement of PSYOP studies and assessments in support of the unified commands and national level agencies. Certainly, the credible performance of PSYOP forces during combat operations in Panama and the Persian Gulf also played a key role in this regard.

Additionally, the PSYOP courses being presented by both the Air Force and the Army help to address the deficiencies in this area of PSYOP awareness and understanding. The Air Force's Joint Senior Psychological Operations Course, held four times a year by their Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field, Florida, provides selected senior officers and civilians with an awareness of how psychological operations can support national objectives throughout the spectrum of conflict. This course initially showed considerable promise as an educational tool, but it attracts too many personnel whose duties have little relationship with psychological operations. Again, this situation requires renewed and continuous emphasis to interested senior officials in key positions. Unfortunately, these personnel too often find it difficult to fit a three-or four-day course away from the office into their busy schedules. A shorter orientation-perhaps four hours, presented by a traveling team-should be considered as an addition to the present course.

As was the case before the Vietnam War, the 1985 Master Plan stated that PSYOP instruction in our mainstream service school system-where our future commanders and staff officers are trained-was limited or nonexistent. This situation not only made more difficult the PSYOP community's job of educating supported units on this unique weapons system-it

also had a negative effect when priorities concerning force modernization were being set.

To address this loss of PSYOP institutional memory, the under secretary of defense for policy, Dr Fred Ikle, sent letters in 1986 and 1987 emphasizing the secretary of defense's intention to revitalize our military PSYOP capabilities and offering an OSD presentation on psychological operations to commandants of the colleges and the command and staff colleges. The intent was to stimulate interest in a more extensive treatment of PSYOP in service school curricula. The military services were asked to review all levels of their professional military education (PME) curricula, both officer and enlisted, and to develop new educational goals that would upgrade their psychological operations PME. As a second part of this approach, OSD initiated a contract to develop applicable PSYOP curriculum materials for the services.

These materials were in fact provided to the services, but there is little evidence to suggest that the services integrated PSYOP into the curricula of their schools. Nor have great speakers made presentations on PSYOP to service schools in a coherent and consistent manner (some presentations are made in electives). Institutionalization of PSYOP understanding will not occur until service schools have removed this deficiency.

The fourth broad theme in the 1985 Master Plan encompassed the need to modernize our PSYOP force structure in terms of both personnel and equipment. With the exception of an increase of the 4th Psychological Operations Group's strength, the force structure today is essentially the same as in 1985. The Navy has an excellent radio and television capability in its reserves and a 10-kilowatt (kW) mobile radio transmitter that is assigned to its Tactical Deception Group (Atlantic), both of which can be used to support PSYOP activities. The Air Force has a National Guard squadron of specially fitted C-130 aircraft for radio and television support of PSYOP along with other duties. Also, a handful of Air Force officers with PSYOP expertise are serving in key positions in the Pentagon, among the unified commands, and at their Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field. The Marine Corps has two civil affairs groups with PSYOP as a secondary

mission in its reserves. Only the Army has active duty forces dedicated solely to psychological operations.

The 4th Psychological Operations Group at Fort Bragg is all that remains of the Army's active PSYOP capability. Assigned to the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, and to a part of the US Army Special Operations Command, the 4th Group has many worldwide missions and responsibilities. The 4th provides support to all levels of DOD, from unified command through division. It supports both conventional forces and special operations forces. In addition, it is often nailed upon to provide support to national level agencies and organizations. If any one military unit can be adjudged a "national asset," surely the 4th Psychological Operations Group fits the requirements.

Essentially, a military PSYOP unit engages in two broad activities: (1) research/ analysis and (2) operations. The first activity consists of continually monitoring and assessing psychological environments in specific foreign nations to determine how those situations affect the formulation and execution of US policies and actions. This research and analysis results in published studies and assessments that are unique; they provide the foundation for establishing psychological objectives that support US goals related to foreign nations or groups. Research and analysis is therefore essential to accomplishment of the second broad activity: planning and executing PSYOP campaigns that employ communications media and other techniques designed to cause selected foreign groups and individuals to support US national and military objectives.

In peacetime, a military PSYOP unit conducts research and analysis of specific geographic regions and target audiences, develops PSYOP plans to support conventional and special operations units, and participates in field exercises that employ these plans. Because of the paucity of PSYOP expertise at unified commands, the 4th Psychological Operations Group provides staff assistance and advice to headquarters and to other major commands.

It should be eminently clear from the foregoing that one active duty PSYOP organization cannot support all unified command requirements for mid- or high-level intensity

conflicts. The reserves are, therefore, a vital component of the "PSYOP community," since 73 percent of the Army's PSYOP mobilization capability lies in its reserve component units. Serving as the Army's planning agent to align the AC and RC units program (CAPSTONE, which links reserve units with the units they would support upon mobilization), the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) provides training assistance to, and coordinates the contingency planning efforts of, reserve units. The 4th Group assists USACAPOC in this effort.

Generally speaking, then, USACAPOC and the 4th Psychological Operations Group act as a "strategic nucleus" for the PSYOP community; they provide the bulk of peacetime and low-intensity conflict requirements, give direction and guidance to the PSYOP community for contingency planning and participation in peacetime exercises, and serve as the command and control nucleus for generally or partially mobilizing reserve component forces. The reserve component performs its planning and training responsibilities under the CAPSTONE program and prepares for general or partial mobilization in support of the unified commands.

Paradoxically, the successful CAPSTONE program underscores one of the PSYOP community's most glaring weaknesses: its limited capability to respond to peacetime and low-intensity conflict requirements. While mid- and high-intensity conflict requires either partial or general mobilization of the reserve component, the active component must provide most PSYOP activities during peacetime and at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.

As a result of initiatives undertaken in the early_ 1980s, the Army increased the strength of the 4th Group by 500 personnel, roughly doubling its size by the mid- to late 1980s. The 1985 DOD PSYOP Master Plan provided additional impetus for this increase. The reserve component PSYOP structure has remained relatively stable in recent years, with a little over 3,000 personnel.

In terms of personnel quality, the Army's military occupational specialty (MOS) for PSYOP enlisted personnel was a welcome accomplishment. Reports of the high quality of personnel being trained under this specialty have been encouraging.

Less encouraging was the Army's decision in the mid-1980s to remove its **officer PSYOP** and civil affairs MOS from the foreign area officer (FAO) specialty. The change was disturbing because it separated psychological operations from the specialty that had provided its intellectual lifeblood. The core of the area expertise (knowledge of foreign cultures) and the analytic capability of psychological operations fell within the FAO specialty.

The Army's initial decision included both PSYOP and civil affairs in the special operations functional area. Subsequently, however, the Army developed separate functional areas for PSYOP (FA 3913) and civil affairs (FA 39C). It remains to be seen whether this decision will provide the quality officers that previously had been produced by the FAO program.

With respect to the modernization of psychological operations equipment, the progress has been more positive. Several Army initiatives in the early and mid-1980s upgraded active and reserve component print, radio, loudspeaker, and audiovisual capabilities. The 4th Group's media production center, built in the mid-1980s, represented a quantum leap in the military's PSYOP capability to operate in a modern audiovisual environment. Similarly, the Air Force allocated funds to modernize its National Guard aircraft dedicated to support **PSYOP.**

Nevertheless, modernization of PSYOP-unique equipment requires continued emphasis. For example, with one exception, the old, relatively immobile 50,000 kW radios (the TRT-22s) in the PSYOP community have not been replaced. PSYOP loudspeakers once again need upgrading, and the Air Force needs a device that can rapidly release leaflets in high-altitude operations.

Two of the most controversial themes of the 1985 DOD PSYOP Master Plan were the organizational separation of psychological operations from special operations and its corollary, creation of a joint psychological operations center. Indeed, these were the only truly revolutionary initiatives in the original plan-and both failed.

The authors of the 1985 Master Plan believed that, in general, the subordination of psychological operations to special operations detracted from recognition of the overall applicability of PSYOP in times of peace, crisis, and war. The

1985 Master Plan, therefore, called for separating psychological operations from special operations throughout DOD, including departmental levels and all headquarters and staffs of the JCS, the services, the unified and specified commands, and the component and subordinate commands. The plan outlined several reasons for separating PSYOP from special operations.

Planning, particularly in the unified and specified commands, suffered because the sole PSYOP planner was usually located in the special operations staff element and was employed only part-time in psychological operations. This subordination detracted frdm the broader responsibility of planning psychological operations support for the theater's total requirements, particularly in those missions that link military psychological operations and national objectives, policy, and strategy, and that require in-theater interagency cooperation.

Further, the subordination of psychological operations units to the special operations field, including its command and control structure, contributed to the lack of understanding of PSYOP, its uses and capabilities, by military officers and senior civilians. This association and subordination caused many in the field to conclude that psychological operations were focused primarily in support of special operations missions.

While PSYOP does have a mission in support of special operations, it also has a much broader application in peacetime and in crisis-with or without accompanying military operations-and across the entire spectrum of conflict. In the 1980s, only 10 percent of the Army's psychological operations forces-active and reserve-were designated by contingency plans to support special operations units in wartime.

Similarly, the argument for separation of PSYOP from special operations was implicit in the Army's and JCS's arrangements for wartime command and control of psychological operations. In wartime, most of the PSYOP forces are aligned (within the unified commands) with a chain of command that is totally separate from that of special operations forces. PSYOP units are combat support forces and are employed at both strategic and tactical levels from the theater to the division as a matter of routine; special operations forces are employed primarily as strategic assets only on an exceptional basis.

Because of its controversial nature, the separation directed by the 1985 Master Plan was slow in implementation. To be sure, some important initial steps were taken. A new OSD psychological operations directorate established in January 1986 was assigned to the principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy and was separated from special operations in terms of overall policy responsibilities. On the joint staff, PSYOP was removed from the Joint Special Operations Agency and placed under the J-3. An important precedent was established on the Department of the Army staff when a separate PSYOP and civil affairs. division was created; and two unified commands-USSOUTHCOM and USCENTCOM—effected the separation (PSYOP from special operations) within their staffs.

But for the large part, separation did not take place among the unified commands, subordinate service headquarters, or at the operational level. The Army, for example, took the position that separation applied only to staff levels, not forces. A major reason for the delay, of course, was the uncertainty resulting from the congressionally mandated reorganization of special operations forces. This subject will be discussed later in more detail. Suffice it to say at this point that full separation did not occur.

The separation issue was closely related to the final major theme of the original master plan: creation of a joint psychological operations center. According to the master plan, psychological operations was sufficiently important to warrant the creation of a separate center dedicated to the long-term development and nurturing of this unique capability. This center eventually became the organizational and intellectual font of PSYOP within the Department of Defense.

The responsibilities for the center envisaged in the 1985 Master Plan included long-range strategic psychological operations plans; continuing education and training of personnel research and analytical studies; and development of equipment. The center was also to assist OJCS and OSD to develop, plan, and coordinate the defense portion of interagency activities, and to assist the unified and specified commands in their planning of psychological operations. To best accomplish these tasks, the plan favored the Washington, D.C. area for the center's location.

The joint psychological operations center was to consist of two separate but mutually supporting elements, one operational and the other developmental, each indispensable to the other. These elements were to have been the 4th Psychological Operations Group along with PSYOP spaces in the Army's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. This concept would have used existing PSYOP units and personnel spaces to provide the nucleus of initial manpower requirements.

The plan indicated that initially the center probably would be under Army management because the other services had few personnel to contribute. However, as representation from the other services increased to more than token level, the joint character of the center was to be emphasized by making its command rotational among the services. As with the separation theme, however, the joint psychological operations center envisaged by the original plan met with fierce resistance, particularly from the Army-which, of course, would have been the most heavily affected by the initiative.

Implementation of both initiatives-the separation of PSYOP from special operations and the creation of a joint psychological operations center-became, in effect, hostage to the resolution of several issues that resulted from the congressionally mandated reorganization of special operations forces. In October 1986, Congress passed a special operations force (SOF) reform package sponsored by Senators William Cohen (R.-Maine) and Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.). The law created a unified SOF command under a four-star general or flag officer, an assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, and a board for low-intensity conflict within the National Security Council (NSC). It recommended the appointment of a deputy assistant to the president for low-intensity conflict. Particularly important, it directed the secretary of defense to create a major force program category for DOD's five-year defense plan for special operations forces.

After passage of this legislation, a major question arose on whether to include PSYOP and civil affairs units in the assignment of forces to the new USSOCOM. Good arguments were presented on both sides of this issue. Two of the major advantages advanced for inclusion were that these forces would benefit from the sponsorship of a unified commander

and participation in the major force program for SOF. But the secretary of defense's previous guidance to separate PSYOP from special operations-as part of his decision concerning implementation of the 1985 DOD Psychological Operations Master Plan-had to be considered. After a lengthy review of this issue, Secretary Weinberger decided to assign Army and Air Force active and reserve component psychological operations and civil affairs units to USSOCOM, effective 15 October 1987.

Secretary Weinberger's decision, of course, sealed the fate of the two most controversial and far-reaching initiatives of the original plan: separation of PSYOP from special operations and creation of a joint PSYOP center. Separation at the operational level had ever taken place, since the Army's PSYOP forces remained under their special operations command at Fort Bragg. And separation at the staff level-which had seen some initial progress, at least in the Pentagon-would inevitably fail as well. On the joint staff, PSYOP was transferred back to special operations. And in May 1992, overall policy responsibility for PSYOP in OSD was moved to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

The secretary's decision also made moot the creation of a joint PSYOP center, as originally conceived in the 1985 Master Plan. The forces and personnel spaces scheduled for the nucleus of this project remained under the Army's special operations command and as part of USSOCOM. Even the creation of a much smaller version of the joint PSYOP center-located in the Washington, D.C. area and concentrating primarily on strategic PSYOP-has become unlikely in the current environment.

A candid assessment of the 1985 plan, therefore, provides mixed reviews. The most significant initiatives on increasing the strength of the 4th Psychological Operations Group-establishing an enlisted PSYOP MOS, modernizing PSYOP-unique equipment for both active and reserve component units, and undertaking detailed PSYOP contingency planning in support of the unified commands-were all undertaken by the Army in the early 1980s, prior to the 1985 plan. To be sure, the plan provided additional emphasis to help bring these initiatives to fruition, but the initial impetus came from

the Army. Improvements undoubtedly occurred in the formulation of joint doctrine, indoctrination of the officer corps, and staff planning, but these areas still require attention. And the two truly revolutionary themes of the original master plan-separation of PSYOP from special operations and creation of a joint PSYOP center-did not become a reality. In the final analysis, perhaps the greatest benefit to the PSYOP community was the morale-enhancing evidence of senior-level interest, due in large part to the dedication of the late Gen Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Retired, who spearheaded the 1985 plan while serving as the deputy under secretary of defense for policy.

Nevertheless, while the plan's ambitious goals were not fully realized, the revitalization efforts of the 1980s made possible the highly credible performance of PSYOP forces in Panama (Operations *Just Cause* and *Promote Liberty)* and the Persian Gulf (Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm).* The early integration of PSYOP into military planning for these operations-heretofore all too often a serious deficiency-contributed significantly to its successful utilization. In both contingencies, PSYOP forces employed a wide range of media, including loudspeaker broadcasts, radio transmissions, posters, and leaflets. Principal PSYOP objectives were to (1) cause the enemy to cease resistance and surrender, (2) solicit information and the tum-in of weapons, (3) inform civilians and keep them out of the battle areas, (4) establish a favorable image of friendly forces, (5) deflect hostile propaganda, and (6) support civil affairs units in emergency relief and consolidation activities. Overall, the goal was to enhance combat operations and reduce casualties on both sides. Successful accomplishment of this goal would have been doubtful without the increased personnel strength of the 4th Psychological Operations Group and the modernization of equipment for both active and reserve component PSYOP units brought about by revitalization.[4]

Thus, the revitalization of military PSYOP capabilities that took place during the 1980s was fueled by a presidentially inspired public perception of the common threat (i.e., the Soviet Union), a "defense consensus" which enabled massive increases in military budgets, several key Reagan administration national security directives that provided impetus for DOD, and the "top-down" emphasis of Secretary Weinberger

and a few key advisors which resulted in the 1985 DOD PSYOP Master Plan.

The Changing International and Domestic Environment

A comparison of these earlier conditions with the present environment provides some rather stark contrasts. The most dramatic change has occurred in the American public's perception of the threat.

An important stimulus for this change in attitude was the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet leader in 1985. His domestic political and economic reforms, the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the cessation of "Voice of America" jamming, his announced intention to reduce Soviet military forces by 500,000 men and cut their budget by 14.2 percent, and the intermediate nuclear forces arms control agreement were just some of the actions that helped to lessen international tensions. Polling data of US public attitudes depicted a startling change in just over a two-year period; by July 1988, 94 percent of voters believed that US-USSR relations were stable or getting better. Mr Gorbachev's policies led Margaret Thatcher to conclude in November 1988 that the cold war had come to an end.

If onlookers thought Thatcher's conclusion a bit premature, they should consider that the subsequent years have been truly mind-boggling. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the liberation of Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany and its emergence as a major power, and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union have been revolutionary geopolitical changes that few could have foreseen. Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin's signing of a historic strategic arms control agreement with President George Bush in June 1992 is only the most recent indicator that the cold war as we knew it has, in fact, ended.

During the same period that these momentous events have occurred in the international arena, Americans have become more preoccupied with domestic concerns. A lingering economic recession and high jobless rate, concerns over the burgeoning federal budget deficit, and deep-rooted problems of

the cities (as vividly seen in the Los Angeles riots) have taken their toll. In February 1992, the conference board's measure of consumer confidence registered its lowest level in 17 years; and in April, four-fifths of Americans surveyed said they believed the country was seriously on the wrong track. [5] **These domestic anxieties, coupled with the absence of a clearly discernible external threat, have led to growing pressures for steeper cuts in the defense budget and in foreign aid. The "defense consensus" of public and congressional support during the early Reagan administration has disappeared.**

Thus, thei context within which defense planning takes place is in transition, as William Hyland, editor of *Foreign Affairs,* **reminds us:**

> This time the cliche is true: this is a new era, but we are only in the opening phases. It is fruitless to search for a politically correct concept of the national interest to justify American foreign policy. Debating in these categories is itself an intellectual hangover from the Cold War. . . . The US defense posture is only in the preliminary stages of the restructuring that will follow the end of the Soviet threat. [6]

Challenges for Future US Military Psychological Operations

The challenges for military psychological operations are formidable. To be sure, inclusion of PSYOP forces in USSOCOM provides some assistance in meeting these challenges: a four-star proponent (the commander, USSOCOM) and, ostensibly, full participation in the major force program (MFP-11) for SOF. The clout of an assistant secretary of defense (ASD/SOLIC) also should benefit psychological operations at the policy level.

Nevertheless, three broad areas must be addressed if the PSYOP community is to emerge from this period of transition to play a viable role in our nation's security: (1) education of senior civilian and military officials on the value of the psychological dimension; (2) planning for the use of military PSYOP in a changing world; and (3) continued modernization of the PSYOP force structure.

Planning should begin now to ensure that the psychological dimension receives appropriate attention by the new administration-and OASD/SOLIC should play a leading role.

Unfortunately, a loss of momentum has occurred in this area. The national security strategy statements of President Bush (March 1990 and August 1991) placed a much less explicit emphasis on the informational element of national power than did those of Ronald Reagan. The Reagan administration directives that created interagency public diplomacy mechanisms, and that played a vital role in revitalizing DOD's psychological operations, have lain dormant. The NSC has paid little attention to this area.

A review of our national security strategy suggests that OSD, OJCS, and USSOCOM must continue to coordinate their efforts to have psychological operations considered by the NSC. DOY must intensify its efforts to educate new players on the NSC staff and to build allies among the key agencies in order to resuscitate existing national security directives-or create new ones-that provide guidance to psychological operations and public diplomacy activities. To address a long-standing deficiency, DOD sorely needs a senior-level NSC mechanism to integrate and direct the information and psychological operations activities of the various agencies. Such a forum also would provide a vehicle to overcome the differences in operational terminology that have plagued past efforts to integrate interagency planning in these areas.

To meet its needs in a changing world, DOD should undertake once again to update its bilateral agreements with the United States Information Agency (USIA), the Board for International Broadcasting, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). With diminishing budgets almost a certainty, it will behoove these agencies to pool their resources and accomplish common goals in the psychological dimension.

Another major task facing PSYOP advocates after every election is that of educating the new players in DOD. This process should begin after a major turnover of senior civilian officials has taken place. A good vehicle to accomplish this is the DOD PSYOP Master Plan. Inclusion of key advisors in the final staffing of the document would provide an opportunity for them to educate themselves on psychological operations. There is some symbolic value attached to having the secretary of defense sign the master plan: It provides visible evidence of top-down emphasis.

Similarly, a number of DOD directives affecting military psychological operations need to be modified and revalidated. Involving key civilian players in this process would provide an excellent opportunity to educate them about PSYOP. The same holds true for staffing the defense planning guidance and the national military strategy, both of which should follow publication of the president's national security strategy. Indeed, the current national military strategy, published in January 1992, contains no mention of the psychological dimension.

Renewed efforts must be made to indoctrinate the mainstream of the officer corps on psychological operations. High-level emphasis, continuously applied, will be necessary to remedy the long-standing absence of PSYOP instruction in most of PME. Until this is done, OSD, JCS, and USSOCOM should coordinate their efforts and provide annual presentations to the senior service schools and the command and staff colleges. Formation of a traveling team to provide instruction on PSYOP to major commands should be considered. Examples of the successful use of psychological operations in Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf would enhance the learning experience for commanders and staff officers. PSYOP should be integrated into computer-assisted war games and simulations. High-quality articles on psychological operations in professional military journals would help to publicize the successful use of this valuable force-multiplier. Institutionalization of military PSYOP will take root only when commanders are convinced that it is indispensable to combat effectiveness.

This education process must continue with planning for the utilization of military psychological operations. This will be a critical task during a period in which there is no apparent clear consensus about either US national security interests or the military's post-cold-war missions. Consider these words of Paul Hammond:

> Where strategy used to be something that we could think of as a plan to be executed, now it must be increasingly a set of capabilities for dealing with contingencies. Where strategy once was a matter of inventing the future, now it is increasingly a matter of adapting to it. [7]

This, of course, is what our present National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy attempt to provide: a broad focus, regionally oriented, and a "base force" to deal with an uncertain and rapidly changing world.

Within this context, military PSYOP advocates must demonstrate the applicability of psychological operations in all environments: support of conventional forces, low-intensity conflict, and special operations forces. Similarly, military PSYOP can play a valuable supporting role in the peacetime activities of the CINCs and other government agencies, such as the USIA and CIA.

First priority, however, must go to planning military PSYOP that will assist the unified commands-the combatant commands-and the conventional forces assigned to support them for various contingencies. As the military services reduce in size and units are withdrawn from Europe, a major realignment of Army PSYOP forces to other unified commands will take place. The CAPSTONE program provides an excellent vehicle to link these forces to the combatant commands for planning and participation in exercises. As the unified commands identify their priorities for contingency planning-a process of "emerging missions" that is likely to go on for some time-the PSYOP community must be alert to offer their services early on. In many cases, existing regional analytical studies will require revision, or the development of new ones, to provide the foundation for detailed PSYOP planning. Finally, supporting PSYOP plans should anticipate the new contingency plans of the unified commands and their assigned forces.

In addition to planning for mid- or high-intensity conflicts, the PSYOP community must plan for, and be prepared to participate in, peacetime and low-intensity conflict requirements. These requirements may include humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, disaster relief, counterdrug operations, civic action, unscheduled studies and assessments oriented to crisis areas, advisory mobile training teams for the military forces of friendly nations, staff assistance to unified commands, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, and support for DOD and non-DOD agencies. PSYOP forces-indeed, all special operations forces-provide versatile capabilities for

the National Command Authority to consider in the uncertain future environment.$

Closely related is this major challenge: to continue modernization of the PSYOP force structure in terms of both personnel and equipment. For the PSYOP community, the corollary to Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan's oft-quoted "no more Task Force Smiths" is "no more Tactical Information Detachments" (the only operational psychological warfare troop unit in the US Army when the Korean War erupted in June 1950; it consisted of two officers and approximately 20 enlisted men). In the face of continued pressures to reduce even more the size of the military, strenuous efforts must be made to avoid the fate experienced by the PSYOP community after every major conflict in this century. As recently as the early 1980s, the 4th Psychological Operations Group consistently reported the lowest readiness ratings in both personnel and equipment-and many reserve component units lacked items vital to mission accomplishment, including loudspeakers. This oversight must not recur.

In particular, the modest-but crucial-gains in personnel strength by the 4th Group during the revitalization of the 1980s must be preserved; the bulk of requirements for support of peacetime activities and low-intensity conflict will necessarily fall upon the active component. Over the long term, the key to military PSYOP viability will be the health of the Army's functional area for psychological operations (FA 39B). Continued high-level emphasis is needed to attract quality officers for this specialty, to provide them with excellent training, and to offer sufficient field grade billets for their utilization and career advancement.

The modernization of PSYOP-unique equipment undertaken in the 1980s, while beneficial, still has not been completed. The replacement for the TRT-22 radio, in particular, needs to be fielded. New loudspeakers are needed. Modernization, however, should be an ongoing process; emphasis needs to be placed on developing more mobile equipment for the future.

Being assigned to USSOCOM should help the PSYOP community in its perennial battle to obtain a proportionate share of dwindling resources or, put another way, to ensure that they do not suffer a disproportionate share of reductions.

However, a speedy resolution of whether or not military PSYOP will fully participate in MFP-11 for special operations forces is needed.

At the same time, the PSYOP community must demonstrate a fiscally responsible attitude by making maximum use of existing resources. This usage includes not only continued reliance on the reserve component for mobilization in mid-and high-intensity conflicts, but also in investigating ways in which specially trained reservists can be used to augment active component units for peacetime and low-intensity conflict requirements. Establishment of redundant capabilities should be avoided. For example, in the absence of a joint PSYOP cen~er in the Washington, D.C., area, the 4th Psychological Operations Group's regional analysts should provide maximum support to the JCS and OSD PSYOP offices-in neither of which have area experts been assigned. The use of new technologies to enhance military psychological operations capabilities without increasing personnel requirements also must be pursued. Overall, the keys will be cost-effectiveness and the utility of military PSYOP in both peace and war.

Summary

US interest in military psychological operations during this century has been episodic, basically rising and falling during and after major conflicts. The Reagan administration interrupted this pattern by providing the impetus for a revitalization of US military PSYOP during peacetime. The international and domestic conditions that made this possible have changed significantly, however, and the PSYOP community faces formidable challenges in maintaining a viable capability for an uncertain future. To address these challenges, emphasis must be placed on educating senior civilian and military officials concerning the value of psychological operations, on aggressive planning to support the emerging contingency and peacetime missions of PSYOP within the unified commands, and on continued modernization of the PSYOP force structure.

After having prevailed in the battle to gain control of military psychological operations forces and policy, the commander in chief, USSOCOM, and the assistant secretary of defense for

special operations and low-intensity conflict must play key roles in facing these challenges. For their part, the PSYOP community must demonstrate fiscal responsibility, maximum utilization of existing resources, and continued professionalism in accomplishing new missions. Working together, the goal of both the PSYOP community and its special operations leadership should be to ensure "no more Tactical Information Detachments" during this period of transition.

Notes

1. See Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. *Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982), 12.
2. Ibid., 143.
3. Ibid.
4. Dennis P. Walko, "Psychological Operations in Panama (Just Cause and Promote Liberty)"; Frank L. Goldstein and Daniel W. Jacobowitz, "PSYOP in Desert Shield/Desert Storm," in US Special Operations Command unpublished manuscript *"Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies"* May 1992, 45.
5. Norman J. Ornstein, "Foreign Policy and the 1992 Election," *Foreign Affairs,* Summer 1992, 3f.
6. William J. Hyland, "The Case for Pragmatism," *Foreign Affairs,* American and the World, 1991-1992, 42f.
7. Paul Y. Hammond, "The Development of National Strategy in the Executive Branch: Overcoming Disincentives" in *Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process,* ed. James C. Gaston (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1992), 16.
8. For a more complete discussion of the versatility of SOF, see Carl W. Stiner, "U.S. Special Operations Forces: A Strategic Perspective," *Parameters,* Summer 1992, 2-13.

Blending Military and Civilian PSYOP Paradigms



Col Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., USAFR

This article compares and contrasts the concepts, philosophies, processes, strategies, and major elements of the civilian business marketing system (BMS) with the military PSYOP system. The purpose is to inform the reader of the many similarities and successful applications of proven BMS approaches, both macro and micro, and how they relate to strategic and tactical objectives in PSYOP scenarios. The goal is to improve the reader's understanding that integrating the effective practices of civilian marketing systems into the military PSYOP sector is very important. A related goal is to offer recommendations.

In a business firm, marketing generates revenues by persuading specific customers to do something. Whenever you try to persuade somebody to donate to the United Way, refrain from littering the highways, save energy, vote for your candidate, or buy your service, you are engaging in marketing. The challenge that faces the BMS is to generate those revenues and results by satisfying a targeted customer and making a profit in a socially responsible manner. Since every aspect of our lives is affected by business marketing practices, often in ways we do not even consider, we need to understand the basic principles and concepts of effective marketing. Then we need to apply them to PSYOP.

Business Marketing Philosophy

The American Marketing Association defines marketing as "the process of planning and executing the conception, pricing, promotion, and distribution of ideas, goods, and services to create exchanges that satisfy individual needs and

organizational objectives." Inherent in this definition is an exchange process where two or more parties give something of value to one another to satisfy felt needs. The marketing function, simple and direct in subsistence-level economies, is more complicated in industrial societies. Nevertheless, the basic concept of exchange is the same. To understand the BMS philosophy, we must distinguish between a sales orientation and a marketing orientation. A sales orientation assumes that customers will resist purchasing products and services not deemed essential and that the task of selling is to convince them to buy something even if they do not need it. It is a "push'; effort, focusing on selling after the product exists.

A marketing orientation is different-it begins with the customer and integrates marketing into each function of a business. Marketing will initially establish what the customer wants and needs; it should play a lead role in planning, coordinating, and directing the organization's activities. It certainly does involve selling, but only after the customer's need has been established. If the marketing job has been done well, the customer doesn't need much persuading.

Military Psychological Operations Philosophy

Military PSYOP is a specialized field of persuasive communications. It involves formulation, conceptualization, implementation, and evaluation of government-to-government and government-to-people persuasion. It is a planned use of human actions to influence the attitudes of populations that are important to national objectives. Lt Col Philip Katz, USA, Retired, emphasizes that the critical variable in military PSYOP is that of influencing the perceptions, and thereby the will, of foreign populations. PSYOP can modify the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behaviors of a target audience. It can be directed at enemy forces to demoralize, disorient, and confuse them. It can induce defection, encourage dissident elements, and reduce combat effectiveness by adversely affecting the enemy's discipline and command and control functions. Directed toward neutral or friendly target audiences, it can be

used to unite them, boost their morale, and provide information designed to foster their understanding and cooperation.

To enhance the total opportunity for success, PSYOP must be integrated into, and considered in, all military decisions. Certainly, PSYOP planning should be concurrent with-and coordinated with-all operational planning. A few commentators imply that there is some nefarious objective and some element of deliberate misinformation involved in PSYOP. Therefore, it is important that the public understand the truth: the United States government does *not* engage in public disinformation activities!

Business Marketing Process

A company's complete marketing system consists of many processes and variables, some controllable and some uncontrollable. *Marketing* mix is the term that describes the combination of the four main controllable inputs that constitute the core of a company's marketing process: (1) the product or service, (2) the promotional activities, (3) the distribution system, and (4) the price structure. Each input has its own process, with key decisions to be made and activities to be accomplished.

The product mix involves policies, procedures, services, and activities related to the product lines to be offered, the markets to sell to. and the degree of product differentiation. The product mix also involves decisions about which product quantities to offer with which brands, in which packages, where, and when.

The promotion mix process begins with an analysis of the organization's overall mission, from which specific promotion objectives are determined. The promotion process consists of decisions and activities related to advertising, personal selling, publicity, and sales promotion. Activities include analyzing the promotion's target audience; selecting appropriate themes and symbols, following market segmentation strategies; deciding on the optimal blend of print, broadcast, and other media; setting sales quotas; conducting message pretests; and analyzing selected characteristics of the target market. Motivation, perception, attitudes, opinions, and stress are

considered. The promotion mix directly relates to the military PSYOP process and will be addressed later.

The distribution mix involves decisions about transportation, storage, and inventory. It also includes decisions about the type, quantity, and quality of wholesalers and retailers required.

The price mix includes methods for setting the right base price for a product. Discounts, allowances, markups, breakeven points, and pricing strategy are elements of the price mix.

Aside from these four controllable elements in the marketing mix, the manager must be concerned with uncontrollable forces in the environment. Marketing is affected by cultural factors, laws, economic conditions, competition, technology, and demography, none of which are controllable; neither are the firm's microenvironment of suppliers, marketing intermediaries, and customers.

Military Psychological Operations Process

Psychological operations can be divided into three general categories: strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategic psychological operations are conducted to advance broad or long-term objectives designed to create a favorable global environment for military operations. Operational PSYOP seeks to achieve midterm objectives in support of regional campaigns and major theater operations. Tactical psychological operations are conducted to achieve short-term objectives against an enemy force, in direct support of tactical units. According to Field Manual 33-1, Psychological Operations, the mission of PSYOP forces is to support conventional as well as special operations forces at all levels of war and within all degrees of the conflict spectrum-low intensity, midintensity, and high intensity. Overlapping missions and objectives can blur the distinction between the categories of PSYOP.

Propaganda development for PSYOP involves a multistep process that is very similar to the promotion mix process for the BMS. Initially, the unit's mission must be analyzed so the military PSYOP mission can be derived. Information must be collected and the target must be analyzed. Just as in the business promotion process, the vulnerabilities and susceptibilities

of the target audience are key factors. Appropriate themes, symbols, and media are selected, and propaganda messages are developed and pretested. Campaign approvals are acquired, propaganda is disseminated, and the impact of the psychological objective is assessed according to specific indicators.

Just as there are strategic, operational, and tactical levels of military PSYOP, there are corresponding levels in marketing planning. Louis E. Boone and David L. Kurtz define strategic marketing planning as "the process of determining the primary (long-term) objectives of an organization and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary to achieve those objectives." Tactical planning in marketing focuses on the implementation of short-term plans that must be completed near-term to implement overall strategies. Boone and Kurtz emphasize the necessity of adequate resource allocation in tactical planning. Certainly, this necessity should be recognized by military PSYOP planners.

Cultural Differences

The marketing manager in business and the military PSYOP specialist must understand a variety of influences on the promotion and persuasion processes in trying to satisfy the needs and wants of the target audience. Culture is at once the most basic and the broadest environmental determinant of individual behavior. Culture is comprised of values, ideas, attitudes, and other symbols that shape human behavior. The influence of culture is difficult to define because so many crucial elements are hidden from the participants of the system itself. Cultural patterns often exist as unrecognized assumptions that are taken for granted. Culture affects how and why people live and behave as they do, which affects the target audience's susceptibility to promotional themes and their buying/ accepting behavior. America has many ethnic, religious, racial, and economic groups, each of which has its own cultural values. And each of these groups has sub-cultures with norms and values that are used to define meanings and to specify needs and wants. Thus, individuals respond uniquely to persuasive messages and appeals.

Persuasive messages in military PSYOP and in business marketing must use symbols and themes that are easily recognizable and meaningful to the culture they are trying to reach. A key persuasion guideline is that one should not substitute one's own judgment and cultural values for the values and cultural characteristics of the audience being targeted. No market has been more frustrating and difficult for American business marketers than the Japanese market. Japanese culture has produced marketing institutions and promotional relationships that differ from those found in the United States.

While leading some university students on an industrial tour of Japan in 1981, for example, I found that the food distribution system there was different from that in the United States. Japanese wholesalers, unlike their US counterparts, are specialized sellers. They do not carry a complete line of products for a select group of stores. Instead, they carry a select line of noncompetitive products that they supply to all supermarkets. Japanese wholesalers take great pride in supplying all retail stores with an exclusive but narrow product line. The goal of American wholesalers is total distribution of a complete product line to a captive set of stores; the goal of the Japanese wholesaler is distribution of a limited set of products to all retail outlets. Culture is a major influence on marketing and PSYOP.

Social Influences

The social groups to which people belong or aspire -to belong help explain why they buy certain types and brands of products, shop in one type of store and not another, accept and believe certain ideas and persuasive messages, and spend their money in certain ways. A person's social class is a major influence on his style of life and an important factor in determining his social and economic behavior. A social class is a group of people whose members are nearly alike in terms of a characteristic that is valued in their group and that clearly differentiates them from others.

PSYOP specialists and promotion managers must be aware of social class influences on the acceptance of ideas and the

willingness to behave a certain way. Different persuasive appeals, different copy, different art, and different media may be needed to promote the same product to different social classes. An upper-middle-class wife may want products, ideas, and brands that are clear symbols of her social status. She may be highly susceptible to preselling through mass media. Conversely, a lower-lower-class wife may buy largely on impulse and may be influenced by point-of-purchase promotion materials. She may not care to read much, and the broadcast media may be of great importance in communicating with her.

When social influences are combined with foreign culture influences, we see how difficult it is to understand needs and behaviors well enough to persuade an individual to accept a PSYOP message. One way to exert influence on a social class in a culture is to identify and target opinion leaders. They are chosen on the basis of expertise as well as social position. Exposure to mass media is significantly greater among opinion leaders than among nonleaders-and mass media directly influence opinion leaders. It is important to note that opinion leaders are far more effective in securing opinion changes among followers than are the mass media. Thus, it is important in PSYOP as well as in marketing to identify and aim persuasive messages directly at opinion leaders.

Family Influences

An individual is born into a family and inherits a certain social status. That status remains until he becomes an adult. Of all face-to-face groups, a person's family plays the strongest role in basic value and attitude formation.

Early family training is not cast off easily; it remains to affect one's individual values, ideas, and behaviors. Even as the adult individual strives to acquire the prestige symbols of another class, latent family influences remain to sway acceptance of ideas and products. Most buying decisions and idea acceptances are made within a framework of experience developed within the family.

Needs and Motives

Personal determinants of behavior include needs, wants, motives, and self-concepts. All of these variables combine with the previously presented interpersonal and group factors to influence one's acceptance of an idea or purchase of a product. People have a need when they lack something useful, required, or desired. When a few needs are fairly well satisfied, others emerge. Some say needs are insatiable, incapable of ever being fully satisfied; thus, PSYOP specialists and marketers do not have to satisfy one need before progressing on to other needs. Several needs at several levels can be present concurrently to influence an individual's behavior, but this approach complicates the prediction of behavior. Abraham H. Maslow proposed a hierarchy of needs that includes the most basic: physiological, safety, social, esteem; and the highest: self-actualization. Motives are inner states that direct people toward the goal of satisfying a felt need. Examples of motives include high quality, conformity, low price, performance, ease of use, long life, prestige, friendship, the opposite sex, and a desire to be different.

One's self-concept includes feelings, perceptions, and evaluations of oneself as a person. How one perceives and evaluates one's own status in relation to others in the same social class and reference groups-and to one's own levels of aspiration-are prime forces in shaping one's self-concept. The self-concept is learned; it emerges through experiences with the environment and through interactions with other people. By observing socially acceptable and unacceptable behavior and comparing one's own behavior to them, one lays the basis for one's own self-concept. The self-concept is useful in PSYOP and marketing because, through their actions and purchases of products, individuals let others know who they are and what they hope to be or to do. The purchase of goods and the expression of ideas serve as social symbols that communicate meaning. The behavior of an individual will be directed toward enhancing his self-concept through the consumption of goods and the expression of ideas as symbols, allowing a prediction of events.

Perceptions and Attitudes

Everything a person knows about the world and what it contains comes from perceptions. Perception is the reception of stimuli through the senses and the attachment of meaning to them. Sound, light, odor, taste, and pressure are received by one's sensory receptors-ears, eyes, nose, tongue, and skin. These sensations are translated into perceptions that are altered by previous learning, beliefs, values, and attitudes, and then organized into meaningful concepts. People perceive things that make sense within the context of their beliefs, values, attitudes, and experiences. Since we cannot possibly perceive all i stimuli at any given time, our perceptions are highly selective and subjective; we see what we want to see and hear what we want to hear. Further, if we do not like what we perceive, we often distort or modify it.

Mass-marketing messages and PSYOP messages are based on selective perception. Because a large number of persuasive messages are directed at different target audiences, PSYOP specialists and marketers must carefully test the messages to be employed with representative targets. They must make every effort to ensure that the various target groups perceive the messages that were intended.

Attitudes are predispositions to respond in particular ways toward people, ideas, activities, or things. An attitude is not neutral; rather, it is for or against some person, object, or idea. An attitude is composed of three dimensions: cognitive (factual information), affective (feelings and emotions), and behavioral (tendencies to behave in a certain way). Attitudes affect both perception and behavior, and people resist changes- in their attitudes. The more closely an attitude is related to one's self-concept, the greater will be one's resistance to changing it.

To change an attitude, a PSYOP **specialist must (1) provide new information to enlarge and change the cognitive dimension; (2) attack the affective dimension of the attitude by associating the end-state of change with the desirable consequences that result; and/or (3) induce the person to engage in "attitude-discrepant" behavior (behavior that contradicts held preferences). Successful attitude-change approaches include using a trustworthy and credible source, drawing**

conclusions for the target, repeating the message, and using both one-sided and two-sided messages.

Successful and Unsuccessful Business Marketing

Businesses spend several billions of dollars each year on marketing, a fact that indicates the importance they place on it. According to an *Advertising Age* article, the top 100 firms spent more than $34 billion in 1989 for advertising. Advertising represents 'about 20 percent of total marketing expenditures. The top 10 advertisers spent more than $10 billion for advertising alone in 1989. Those companies have been successful. Failures do occur, however. A 1988 *Advertising Age* report, for example, lists these $100 million failures: Campbell's Red Kettle Soups, Ford's Edsel, DuPont's corfam, Hunt's flavored ketchups, and Gillette's Nine Flags Cologne.

Newspapers account for the largest annual advertising expenditure ($31.2 million in 1988). Other 1988 expenditures: television ($26.1), direct mail ($21.2), radio ($7.7), and magazines ($6.1). Use of advertising, however, does not guarantee success even if it is planned and implemented well. A key reason is that most people do not systematically process the information they receive through the marketing message. We are largely emotional, influenced by testimonials and emotional appeals-we do not logically consider pertinent criteria when we purchase products. It seems we are more influenced by the skill, appearance, and character of the presenter than the content of the message. A 1988 *Advertising Age* survey mentioned three of the most powerful ads in US history: Volkswagen's "Lemon," Marlboro's "Country," and Coca-Cola's "Real Thing." Aside from getting commitments from dealers to carry the product, the Coca-Cola ad was successful because it capitalized on the affective domain and the unsystematic emotional responses of people. A critical conclusion for PSYOP specialists and marketers is that the ad created a psychological idea of a unique and better taste. It focused on image and emotional themes through heavy repeat advertising and readily identifiable names, symbols, and packages. It also

linked abstract, beneficial images to the physical product-the implied associations of Coca-Cola with youth and authenticity.

Business Marketing Models

Marketing lessons can be learned from business failures as well as from effective marketing models. Burger Chef did not realize that economic conditions are major factors, did not adapt to changing consumer preferences, and did not meet target market expectations. Coors did not recognize changes in the environment that necessitated adjustments in marketing strategies' and did not take the time to continue developing an image of quality and great desirability. The World Football League lost credibility by taking actions counter to prior promises and by not paying strict attention to environmental variables.

After analyzing five leading models of consumer behavior, I have blended optimal elements from each to suggest a marketing model for the buyer's decision process. The model focuses on systematic thinking and defining relevant elements for making a buying decision. It attempts to explain the progressive process that a consumer might experience in buying products or accepting ideas. PSYOP specialists and marketers can anticipate effective messages if they understand the process through which buyers can progress. They can then address those messages to bring about the desired change in behavior. My buyer decision model is like any scientific problem-solving model except that it focuses on buyer behavior. It consists of five stages: problem recognition, information gathering, alternative evaluation, the decision to buy, and postpurchase evaluation. Initially, the target consumer recognizes a problem because of inadequate supplies, changing needs, or other internal or external activities. This first stage forces buyers to succinctly state the problem based on specific unfilled needs. Then the second stage begins the planned search for specific, relevant, and identical information on all possible products. Buyers must weigh the pros and cons of the various products based on a set of criteria during this third stage. In the next stage, they make the decision that best meets their needs and wants, and that satisfies the

expectations of influencers in their social groups. The fifth and final stage is the evaluation of that decision; it should not be omitted.

Effective Objectives

Specific marketing and promotion-persuasion objectives, based on the organization's general goals, should be established. Clearly stated objectives should exist for each promotion tool so that results can be measured against them. Advertising, personal selling, publicity, and sales promotion functions should have specific expected objectives that are measurable. Print, broadcast, and audiovisual media should also have specific objectives. Marketing objectives should meet certain criteria and should be built on a solid foundation of research that reveals what the targets want to buy. The objectives should be stated in terms of target benefits-and in quantitatively measurable terms. They should help attain and reinforce the firm's overall objectives, and they should be reviewed periodically.

The Ethics of Persuading

Many critics of marketing contend that persuasion is really manipulation-or even control-of consumers, unethically coercing them into buying products they do not want. Is it immoral to arouse fears of inadequacy to sell an antiperspirant? Is it wrong to use reference-group concepts to make a product more appealing? Is it improper to design products and appeals that enhance a buyer's self-concept in order to gain a sale? Some observers argue that embellishment and distortion are legitimate and socially desirable activities and that illegitimacy enters the picture only if there is falsification with larcenous intent.

That argument notwithstanding, however, truth is the best persuasion approach; it should be the fundamental principle in both business marketing and military PSYOP. Truth, which is basic to strategic peacetime foreign policy, should be our fundamental guideline. The ultimate questions concern "What is the truth?" and "Can consumers really be convinced to buy something they do not want?"

Target Market Analysis

Target market analysis is performed every time a marketing or PSYOP campaign is developed. It includes selecting a target, determining conditions that affect the target, analyzing target vulnerabilities, specifying target susceptibilities, formulating the persuasive objective, determining target effectiveness, and assessing campaign impact indicators. Once the conditions and vulnerabilities of the Iraqi soldiers were identified in the Persian Gulf War, individual susceptibilities for each vulnerability were specified. Because the coalition's bombing campaign was effective, the Iraqis had needs for food, shelter, water, medical attention, and basic safety. They were, therefore, driven to respond in an expected way. Target market analysis is key to successful marketing and PSYOP.

Recommendations

My recommendations, which are based on my own analysis, are intended to serve as suggestions for improved business marketing and military psychological operations. They emphasize the transfer of proven marketing and promotion strategies, concepts, and techniques from the civilian business marketing system to the military PSYOP system.

- A primary recommendation is to accept the marketing orientation (as opposed to a sales orientation). The marketing orientation begins with the customer's needs and wants, then integrates marketing into each function of the business to design the desired product. (The sales orientation focuses on the product characteristics and attempts to sell the existing product.)

Both PSYOP planning and marketing planning should be concurrent with, and coordinated with, all operational planning. Together, they should address the target audience's needs in any given situation. This relates to the function of PSYOP as a force multiplier in all types of military activity.

- Another recommendation is to ensure that marketing and PSYOP support all operations, to include production and finance in business or conventional and special operations in the military. This support should be for all levels of business

operations and all levels of war-strategic, operational, and tactical; low intensity, midintensity, and high intensity.

- **A commensurate resource and budget commitment to support adequate PSYOP and marketing is required so that PSYOP and marketing can be integrated into all operational planning. It is an absolute necessity that military PSYOP and business marketing planners understand the level of resourcing necessary to conduct a successful campaign; undercapitalization may doom an otherwise promising organization to failure.**
- **The business community and the military services must accept culture as the most basic environmental determinant of individual pehavior, and they must gather sufficient quantitative and qualitative information about it. Individual judgment and cultural values should not be substituted for those of your target audience.**
- **PSYOP specialists and marketing managers must be aware that social-class membership influences the acceptance of ideas, the willingness to behave a certain way, and the need to use different persuasive techniques and concepts.**
- **Persuasive messages should be aimed directly at opinion leaders; they are far more effective in securing changes among followers than are the mass media.**
- **It is important to make maximum utilization of family influence; research shows that it plays the strongest role in basic value and attitude formation.**
- **The PSYOP specialist and the business marketer must know the various needs of individuals and the corresponding specific persuasive appeals that can be employed to influence each need.**
- **Marketing and PSYOP professionals must recognize the dominant influence of the self-concept-and how consumption of goods and expression of ideas are directly based on that concept and on selective perception. They must understand the main behavioral dimensions of attitudes, so that appropriate techniques can be employed to change them.**
- **My final recommendation is an all-encompassing one. It refers to the need to educate our military and civilian leaders about marketing philosophy and psychological operations (as a unique weapons system). Also, managers and specialists**

already employed in the field need tactical training. The professional military education service school system should include courses designed to improve the awareness and understanding of PSYOP. The primary goal would be to enhance the understanding of strategic PSYOP and marketing, their benefits and long-term capabilities, and their applications in support of our national objectives.

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PART II

National Policy and PSYOP Planning

Introduction

This section presents articles about recurrent psychological issues and roles in formulating and implementing our national policy, objectives, and strategy. The authors explain historical and contemporary elements of the national policy process in **PSYOP** and the framework within which national PSYOP policy is formulated, administered, and implemented.

Dr Carnes Lord explores the historical influences on developing effective US strategy, doctrine, and organizational structure for the conduct of psychological and political warfare. While accepting that a psychological-political component is inherent in every use of the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of national power, he urges a rethinking of the role of political and psychological factors and a revitalization and integration of their capabilities into US national strategy. Dr Lord analyzes the influences of American cultural inhibitions and the media on psychological conflict.

Michael A. Morris reminds us that national policy objectives must be clearly defined so that military objectives and strategy can be precise. He emphasizes that clarification of political objectives is the responsibility of political leaders rather than military leaders. Morris concludes that propaganda advantages can be gained through clearly stated political objectives. He suggests guidelines for distinguishing clear political objectives from vague ones.

William F. Johnston focuses attention on psychological operations as a vital instrument in national liberation wars. He believes governments of countries threatened with insurgency should regard PSYOP, particularly face-to-face communications, as a first line of internal defense-the Vietnam lesson. He also wants more recognition of **PSYOP** as a major instrument of low-intensity conflict and the elevation of **PSYOP** planners to "first-team" status.

Lloyd A. Free examines the role of public opinion and the psychological dimension in international security affairs. He believes that while public opinion cannot be slavishly followed, psychological data should be collected and analyzed so that government can take this factor into account in planning.

Lt Col Philip K. Katz, USA, Retired, Ronald D. McLaurin, and Preston S. Abbott include a critical analysis of US PSYOP. They focus on the communications aspect of international relations and PSYOP, identify and assess the principles and critical developments in this field, and advance ideas for progress. They stress that intelligence is the most commonly overlooked prerequisite to effective PSYOP. Their focus on evaluating the effectiveness of PSYOP challenges the reader to systematically concentrate on results. This article is clearly a historical piece that sets the groundwork for producing effective PSYOP.

The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy



Dr Carves Lord

To recall the time when psychological-political warfare was widely, aclfnowledged by Americans as an important instrument of national strategy requires a certain effort of historical imagination. Such was indeed the case, however, from the early days of the Second World War until the mid-1960s. The experience of World War II convinced many American political and military leaders that the psychological dimension of conflict had become critical in the contemporary world.

Totalitarian regimes that employed modern communications technologies to specialize in ideology and subversion constituted a qualitatively new strategic problem for the West. The postwar years witnessed an outpouring of academic studies in this area, most of which took for granted the necessity and legitimacy of a vigorous American response to the emerging political-ideological threat posed by the Soviet Union and the international communist movement.'

The US government allowed its propaganda, and political warfare capabilities to wither in the years of rapid demobilization immediately following World War Il. Creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947, however, provided a fresh impetus and an organizational vehicle for covert psychological operations and political action in peacetime. The deteriorating political situation in Western Europe in the late 1940s created urgent objectives for the CIA's covert action directorate.

The coming of the Korean War stimulated improvements in US overt capabilities as well. In 1950, President Harry S Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board in the White House to provide a high-level focus for government-wide

activities in this area. The new International Information Administration was established within the State Department; military psychological operations were given new life (the Army established the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1952); and the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee attempted to provide operational coordination among the various involved agencies.[2] President Dwight D. Eisenhower moved to create the US Information Agency (USIA) as an autonomous agency reporting directly to the National Security Council.[3]

It can be questioned whether the US government as a whole was able, in the 1950s, to develop an effective doctrine and organizational structure for the conduct of psychological and political warfare. Sharp differences of opinion existed over fundamental questions of strategy toward the Soviet bloc and over the roles of key agencies such as CIA and USIA-and coordination among the agencies left much to be desired.[4]

It could perhaps be argued that militarization of the Vietnam War was the key factor underlying the progressive atrophy of US political warfare capabilities after the mid-1960s. However, it seems evident that larger issues of governmental organization and national style or culture also figured critically in this development. It should have been clear that the assignment of political warfare responsibilities to new agencies would not eliminate-and in certain respects would probably fortify-the sources of bureaucratic resistance to this new instrument of national power.[5] Finally, mention must be made of the cultural revolution that took place in the United States beginning in the mid-1960s. The shattering of the foreign policy consensus of the postwar decades (a result of Vietnam) meant, in the first place, a questioning of American values and the legitimacy of a leading world role for the United States. Such attitudes could only spell trouble for any strategy that depended on the confident projection abroad of America's political identity and values.

Any attempt to rethink the role of political and psychological warfare in US strategy today must take account of these fundamental and persisting obstacles. Before turning to consider them more systematically, however, it is necessary to sketch briefly the basic features of political and psychological

warfare and their relationships to other instruments of national power.

One problem is the general tendency to use the terms psychological warfare and political warfare interchangeably, not to mention a variety of similar *terms-ideological* warfare, the war of ideas, political communication, psychological operations, and more. The uncertainty of reference derives partly from the fact that this sort of warfare is waged to a considerable extent with weapons that are not truly distinctive. There are indeed distinctive psychological instruments-radio broadcasting, publications of various kinds, and educational and cultural prpgrams-that are capable of communicating information and ideas. But because these capabilities are easier to conceptualize, and to handle bureaucratically, the tendency has been to give them undue weight when it comes to defining the overall phenomenon.

There is a psychological dimension to the employment of every instrument of national power, emphatically including military force at every level. Similarly, major increments of military and economic power necessarily generate political effects. In thinking about psychological and political warfare, the tendency has been to think about the conflict of ideas, ideologies, and opinions. Yet the concept is in fact seriously misleading. Psychological-political warfare is also about cultural and political symbols, perceptions and emotions, behavior of individuals and groups under stress, and cohesion of organizations and alliances.

Using the term warfare to describe US psychological-political strategy in its broadest sense is itself problematic. Psychological-political operations need not be directed only to adversaries; neutral, allied, and semiallied nations potentially constitute highly important targets because our enemies will target them in efforts to break those alliances.

The English language apparently does not include a good term for designating psychological-political operations in their broadest sense. In recent years, and especially since the arrival of the Reagan administration, the term public diplomacy has gained considerable currency in Washington. Public diplomacy appears to encompass three distinct though closely related functions: international information, international political

action (or what may be called overt political warfare), and public affairs. The inclusion of public affairs is a recognition that it is impossible in a modern democracy to separate sharply information communicated to domestic audiences from that communicated to international audiences, but the domestic function associated with public diplomacy differs from traditional public affairs by virtue of its strategic approach and its active effort to shape the domestic political agenda. [6]

The public diplomacy rubric serves a useful purpose, but it is not and was not intended to be comprehensive. Covert political warfare was excluded from its purview from the beginning. Nor does it have any clear relationship to military psychological operations, to educational and cultural affairs, or to the range of US government activities that may be grouped under the general label of international aid and humanitarian affairs.

I would propose, if only for the sake of clarity, the following anatomy of basic psychological-political warfare functions.

Political warfare is a general category of activities encompassing political action, coercive diplomacy, and covert political warfare. In general, the first of these functions is performed by diplomatic personnel, the second by military and diplomatic personnel, and the third by intelligence personnel. Political action refers to a range of activities, including certain kinds of multilateral diplomacy, support for foreign political parties or forces, and support for or work with international associations of various kinds.? Coercive diplomacy refers to diplomacy presupposing the use or threatened use of military force to achieve political objectives.$ Covert political warfare corresponds roughly to the covert aspects of what the Soviets called active measures; it includes support for insurgencies, operations against enemy alliances, influence operations, and black propaganda. [9]

Psychological operations, once frequently used in a general sense to designate psychological-political operations as a whole, is probably best reserved for use as a term of art to designate military PSYOP.I° Military PSYOP can encompass both overt and covert activities in both peacetime and war, and its scope can vary from the tactical battlefield to the operational

and strategic levels of conflict. Historically, however, US military interest in PSYOP has focused heavily on tactical applications in wartime. Battlefield PSYOP is sometimes distinguished from consolidation PSYOP, which is geared to securing the loyalty and cooperation of civilian populations in combat areas and is closely related to civic action conducted by military forces in low-intensity conflict situations. Another related function is troop information or education, which serves among other things-much like public affairs in relation to public diplomacy-to counter the psychological operations of the enemy.

International communications encompasses international information and international educational and cultural affairs. USIA performs this range of functions, though other organizations-in particular, "Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty" but also the Departments of State and Defense-perform information functions of political or strategic importance as well. [11]

A further general category is *international aid and humanitarian affairs.* This category includes foreign economic and development aid, food aid, humanitarian assistance (rescue operations, disaster relief, famine relief, etc.), and technical assistance of various kinds. Many agencies involved in such activities, including the Defense Department, the Agency for International Development, and the Peace Corps, are organizations that have dedicated missions in this area. Although these functions are bureaucratically scattered and very largely autonomous, they have a very important psychological-political component. Whether intentionally or otherwise, they serve as significant instruments of US foreign policy and national strategy.

Finally, to repeat what was said earlier, a psychological-political component is inherent in every use of the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of national power. The art of negotiation rests on an understanding of individual and group psychology and a sensitivity to cultural contexts. Similarly, the exercise of military command at all levels involves an assessment of the psychological strengths and vulnerabilities of the enemy commander and his forces; deception and surprise are key elements of the military art. A

nation's economic and military strength creates political weight that can be exploited in a variety of ways to advance the national interest.

The impetus for rethinking the role of political and psychological factors in US national strategy has come primarily from the renewed attention given these matters by the Reagan administration. [12] Since 1981, a major effort has been under way to modernize and expand US government capabilities in the area of international communications, particularly radio and television broadcasting.

It remains doubtful that the administration has succeeded in overcoming the obstacles, both internal and external, to a thorough revitalization of US psychological-political capabilities and their full integration into national strategy. [13] In many respects, the cultural pressures working against such an effort are as strong as-or stronger than-ever. In addition to a kind of generic resistance to such activities on the part of Americans as Americans, there has been a wholesale loss of understanding and support of them among American elites in recent years. But perhaps equally troublesome is the resistance stemming from the national security bureaucracy itself and from the continuing weakness of integrated strategic planning and decision making at the national level.

Painful as it may be to face squarely the question of American cultural inhibitions in the area of psychological-political conflict, the effort is necessary-in order not only to develop intelligent approaches for dealing with them but also to achieve cultural self-consciousness, which is essential for effective participation in this kind of conflict. It is essential because Americans tend to assume that people everywhere are much like themselves, with similar fundamental motivations and views of the world. But blindness to differences in national characteristics is apt to be a fatal handicap for anyone attempting to affect the psychological orientation and political behavior of foreign audiences.

Perhaps the most severe single limitation in the American outlook is its tendency to discount the relevance of nonmaterial factors such as history, culture,, and ideas. Americans tend to assume that concrete interests such as economic well-being, personal freedom, and security of life and

limb are the critical determinants of political behavior everywhere. It is an interesting irony that such a view is so prevalent in a country as fundamentally idealistic as the United States while the importance the Soviets attributed to ideological factors stands in some tension with the materialistic basis of Marxism.

Connected with this emphasis on material considerations is the fact that Americans, unlike many peoples, are uncomfortable with personal confrontation and argument and do not customarily debate political and ideological questions in their private lives. Americans tend to look on the political realm as an arena not of conflict and struggle but of bargaining and consensus, where strongly held opinions and principled positions and disruptive of the process and to be discouraged. This tendency makes it extremely difficult for Americans to deal effectively in international settings where basic American values are under challenge. Furthermore, American notions of fair play and due process are subject to serious misinterpretation abroad. Americans' insistence on a presentation of both sides of any argument is frequently seen as reflecting a lack of self-confidence. In general, the openness and penchant for self-criticism in American society strike many foreigners as manifestations of weakness rather than strength.

Manifest or latent in the attitudes of many Americans toward the practice of psychological-political warfare is a distaste for any sort of psychological manipulation or deception. The idea that psychological-political warfare is a black art that can be morally justified only under the most extreme circumstances is a derivative of such attitudes. That such activities necessarily involve misrepresentation or deception is in any case far from the truth. (The conveying of purely factual information under certain circumstances can have powerful psychological effects.)

Military psychological operations, such as battlefield broadcasting, have as their primary purpose the saving of lives-enemy as well as friendly lives. Indeed, such activities make both moral and strategic sense. According to the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, "what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy. . . . Next best is to disrupt his alliances.... The next best is to attack his army....

The worst policy is to attack cities." As Sun Tzu puts it, "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." In other words, competence in the psychological-political sphere is the essence of a rational approach to war. [14] Failure to attain such competence within the limits of one's possibilities is a failure that is all too likely to be paid for in blood.

As important as the effect of these general cultural biases is the role of the American media. Developments in the culture and operating style of the prestige media in the United States in recent years have substantially complicated any effort by the US government to engage seriously in psychological-political conflict. Before the late 1960s, it may be argued, a satisfactory understanding existed between journalists on the one hand and American military and government officials on the other regarding the proper scope and limits of press coverage of national security and foreign policy matters. In particular, the press in wartime tended to adopt the national cause and to accept broad responsibility not only for protecting sensitive information but also for safeguarding the morale both of the troops at the front and of civilians at home

Since Vietnam, there has been a dramatic change. [15] In the general wreck of the national foreign policy consensus resulting from that experience, the media have adopted an increasingly skeptical attitude-not only toward the specific policies and actions of the incumbent administration but also toward many of the fundamental assumptions that had underpinned the global position and role of the United States since World War II. The legitimacy of the American defense and intelligence establishments in particular has been sharply questioned and subjected to scrutiny by the new style of investigative journalism inaugurated by the prestige press. Most significantly, the media ended their deference to and informal cooperation with an incumbent administration in favor of a posture of neutral observer or critic. One result of this shift has been a general refusal to take responsibility for the consequences of media coverage's effect on national security policy outcomes. [16]

This change in media attitudes is worth dwelling on, since the role of the media on the battlefield of the future is likely to decide whether the United States will be capable of conducting

effective military psychological operations. In general, the media now acknowledge a responsibility to avoid jeopardizing the lives of American soldiers engaged in military operations. But they do not recognize an obligation to refrain from publicizing information that demoralizes American troops, reveals aspects of American intelligence or military planning, undermines American diplomatic initiatives, or gives psychological aid and comfort to the enemy. This obligation is denied even though the ultimate effect of such disclosure may be to prolong military operations and cost American lives, not to speak of more generally damaging the international position of the United States and its ability to avoid future conflicts. Nor do the media recognize any obligations with respect to the domestic audience.

Of particular importance in this connection is the wartime role of television. To argue (as media spokesmen regularly do) that television coverage is essential to informed debate on the merits of a particular military action is unconvincing, not to say disingenuous. The information content of TV pictures is typically low or nonexistent, and the emotions such pictures arouse are more likely to defeat than to promote rational discussion. The rapid juxtaposition of death and destruction images torn out of any intelligible context, so common in television coverage of war, inevitably encourages the feeling that the war is futile, immoral, or absurd. [17]

Equally harmful is the practice-pursued well beyond the point of abuse by the networks in Lebanon in 1983-of interviewing American GIs on their feelings and views about the situation they happen to be involved in. To portray soldiers (and if they are looked for they will be found) who are confused, inarticulate, naive, or bitter about the reasons why a war is being fought or the way it is being conducted serves no purpose. The immediate danger to morale and the effect on allied and enemy perceptions are only part of the costs of such behavior. As in the case of media obsession with the families of terrorist victims, the effect is to pander to private concerns and emotions and to mobilize them in a way that greatly complicates the pursuit of rational policies by the US government.

All of this suggests that serious thought needs to be given to restricting or even eliminating at least television's presence on

the battlefield of the future, with or without the cooperation of the media. Particularly difficult, of course, is the question of censorship or restraint of the media during limited contingencies or undeclared wars such as Vietnam, Lebanon, or Grenada. Because the stakes in such conflicts are relatively low, the pressures for preserving peacetime rules of media engagement are difficult to resist. Yet it is precisely these conflicts in which the political and psychological element in war is predominant. These conflicts are therefore most directly susceptible to influence by media reporting. Devising acceptable arrangements for limiting media coverage of such wars in the future may well be critical if the United States is ever to engage in them successfully. [18]

The American media have also affected the US government's international information programs. Despite the popular image of the "Voice of America" and "Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty" as propaganda organs fully comparable to "Radio Moscow," they have been profoundly affected by the American media's evolution over the last two decades, as well as by the general cultural climate these media have reflected. Objectivity and balance as understood by the new journalism have become the standards for these radios as well. The point here is not that a balanced treatment of American or Soviet virtues and vices is not in some sense desirable, but rather that the domestic cultural context shapes-to an unhealthy degree-the aims and methods of the US international radios.

The effective conduct of psychological-political warfare by the United States is perhaps more immediately constrained by bureaucratic and organizational weaknesses within the US government itself. There is a connection between the inadequacy of US psychological-political warfare efforts in the past and the inadequacy of strategic planning and decision making at the national level. Precisely because the instruments of psychological-political conflict are not altogether distinctive, this arena requires fully integrated planning and coordinated operations throughout virtually the entire national security bureaucracy.

We need not dwell at length on the causes of the resistance to psychological-political warfare throughout the US diplomatic, military, and intelligence establishments; they are apparent to

most of those who have had direct experience in this field. The State Department continues to ply its trade very much in the spirit of the foreign ministries of nineteenth-century Europe, with only grudging accommodation to the role played by modern communications, public opinion, ideology, and political theater in contemporary international affairs. [19] The military services-in their preoccupation with technology, major weapon systems, and the big war-tend to neglect low-cost approaches to enhancing operational effectiveness, especially at the lower end of the conflict spectrum; and they tend to regard psychological-political warfare as someone else's busindss. [20]

The failure of both the State Department and the military to assume psychological-political responsibilities might seem to point to the intelligence community as the natural home for such activities. Yet the CIA has generally been unwilling or unable to allow the degree of coordination with other governmental entities that is essential for an integrated national strategy in this area. There is also a feeling at the agency that the era of CIA involvement in political or ideological struggles is essentially past-that an aggressive agency role can only jeopardize more important institutional equities.

What, then, would be involved in a revitalization of US psychological-political warfare capabilities? The foregoing discussion is not meant to suggest that fundamental change is a hopeless proposition-only that it is essential for us to be conscious of the obstacles to it. We must be particularly conscious of the less tangible obstacles that cannot be fixed by organizational rewiring or other short-term measures. At the same time, useful steps undoubtedly can be taken without creating a revolution in the way Americans behave or the US government conducts its business.

Perhaps the most promising area for change is in the field of military psychological operations. The fact that military psychological operations have generally been treated as a subspecialty of special operations is a good indication of the conceptual and operational limitations under which it has long labored.[21] Of course, the very identification of PSYOP as a special forces mission has tended to isolate it from normal military activities and bring it under a certain suspicion,

which its black connotations have further strengthened. But PSYOP has perhaps suffered most from identification with the hardware and missions of the tactical battlefield-that is, leaflet delivery, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasting. As a result of all this, PSYOP has had very low priority in terms of personnel, equipment, training, exercising, and doctrine. In addition, it has suffered from low visibility at senior command levels within the military (particularly outside the Army, which owns most PSYOP assets), not to speak of other US government organizations.

This situation is now beginning to change as a result of renewed interest within the military as well as at the national level. The rethinking of PSYOP roles and missions is still at an early stage, however, and basic doctrinal and organizational questions remain to be worked out. The Air Force and Navy appear not yet fully persuaded that PSYOP can be a responsibility of all the services and of all higher command echelons. There is increasing recognition that PSYOP need not be limited to the hardware-supported missions of the tactical battlefield but can have important applications at the operational and theater levels, particularly in low-intensity conflict situations. But there is as yet little apparent consensus on the role of PSYOP at the strategic level or in peacetime.

The tendency to think of PSYOP in terms of direct verbal communication is a strong one, and it reflects the nature of tactical PSYOP as historically practiced by the United States. However, this is a tendency that must be resisted if the full potential of nontactical PSYOP is to be realized and if the services are to embrace the full range of PSYOP activities as legitimate and proper military missions. The uniformed military generally acknowledge that the overriding purpose of US military forces is not to fight wars but to deter them. But deterrence is a psychological phenomenon, not a simple reflection of the quantity and quality of military forces; and there is every reason to suppose that foreign perceptions of US military power can be shaped in various ways to strengthen its deterrent effect. [22]

Even if one accepts that it would be difficult to shape Russian and Chinese perceptions of US power, a strong case can be made for the potentially high payoffs of efforts to shape

perceptions in third world countries. Within the third world, decision making is apt to be undisciplined, inadequately supplied with intelligence, lacking in orderly staff procedures, strongly influenced by the passing impressions and phobias of a small leadership element, and subject to sudden internal political challenge.

Much could be accomplished simply through deliberate exploitation of normal US military activities such as exercises, deployments, air and naval displays, and technology demonstrations. At a higher level of activity, with the movement of military forces dedicated specifically to a psychological-political mission, PSYOP measures shade into traditional coercive diplomacy. With activities such as naval port visits and presence, missions have generally not been understood as belonging within the PSYOP framework and do not appear to have been approached in a systematic or highly coordinated manner.

A characteristic weakness of America's approach to the use of force has been the tendency to draw sharp distinctions between wartime and peacetime. One result is the penalty exacted (in terms of organization, planning, and general readiness) in any transition from peace to war. Psychological-political warfare could compensate for temporary inadequacies in deployed US forces in severe crises or in the initial stages of war. In fact, this could be an important function for the United States. In general, a compelling case can be made for reviewing and enhancing the psychological-political component of US war planning and national-level crisis management operations.

The entire area of strategic war planning is of critical importance in this context, since it is the point at which the military, diplomatic, and psychological-political components of national strategy most closely converge. Efforts to enhance and better integrate strategic planning at the national level should focus on the difficult substantive and procedural issues involved in war planning. More generally recognized is the need for integrated interagency planning in crisis situations; but here as well the potential of psychological-political warfare seems not to have been fully realized.

The foregoing discussion highlights the part of this field that is the most neglected and at the same time the most

susceptible to immediate improvement. In low-intensity conflict theaters such as Central America, there is scope for application of, the full range of US psychological-political capabilities. The strategic importance of peacetime political warfare and international communications-with respect to the third world as well as the major powers-can hardly be overestimated. It seems clear that the best hope for diminution of political-military threats from major powers lies in the relentless exposure of their populations to information and ideas from the West. The opportunities for short-term gains should not be allowed to distract us from this fundamental strategic imperative.

Notes

1. See, for example, Paul Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1948); Leonard Doob, *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1948); Daniel Lerner, ed., *Propaganda in War and Crises* (New York: Stewart, 1950); William Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, eds., *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958); and W. Phillips Davison, *International Political Communications* (New York: Praeger, 1965).

2. On the early history of military psychological operations, see Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. *Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press [NDUP], 1982).

3. The originally top secret report of the president's Committee on International Information Activities, headed by William H. Jackson, is now available in Department of State (DOS), *Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1952-1954, vol. 2, pt. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1984), 1795-1867. Hereafter referred to as *Foreign Relations.*

4. Ibid., 1836-60. According to the Jackson committee report,

> the national information program has suffered from the lack of effective central direction. In spite of the establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board, coordination has been lacking and the various agencies concerned have largely gone their separate ways. Opportunities have been missed to take the offensive in global propaganda campaigns.... The headquarters staffs of all agencies engaged in information work should concentrate more on the conception, planning, and coordination of global campaigns and less on detailed control and execution of day-to-day operations (1840).

For pertinent remarks on the confusion regarding the mission of US information agencies, see pages 1836-38; also of interest is this remark concerning the military role:

> The contribution of the armed forces to political warfare has been limited by the lack of definition of the military role by higher authority, and by an inadequate understanding on the part of military authorities that they and their commands are full participants in the political aspects of the present struggle and must conduct themselves accordingly. Military commanders and planners tend to regard the allocation of military resources to current political operations as an unauthorized diversion from tasks for which the armed forces are explicitly responsible, (1860).

Eisenhower abolished the Psychological Strategy Board on the committee's recommendation, apparently on the grounds that psychological-political warfare was too closely bound up with US policy or strategy generally for such an arrangement to work effectively.

5. Consider, for example, John Franklin Campbell, *The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), 147-77.

6. A thoughtful discussion of the functioning of public diplomacy under the Reagan administration is provided by Gifford D. Malone, "Functioning of Diplomatic Organs," in Richard F. Staar, ed., *Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR* (Stanford. Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 124-41. See also Carves Lord, "In Defense of Public Diplomacy," *Commentary,* April 1984, 42-50.

7. The argument for a more political approach to multilateral diplomacy is cogently summarized by Richard S. Williamson, "U.S. Multilateral Diplomacy at the United Nations," *Washington Quarterly,* Summer 1986, 5-18. On the Soviet approach to political action, see, for example, James Atkinson, *The Politics of Struggle: The Communist Front and Political Warfare* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966); and Roy Godson, *Labor in Soviet Global Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, 1984). On the promotion of democracy as an objective of US policy, see William A. Douglas, *Developing Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Heldref Publications, 1972).

8. See, for example, James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* (New York: Praeger, 1971); and Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War. U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978).

9. See Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, *Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984). Soviet active measures *(activnyye meropriatia)* encompass what is here called political action as well as covert political warfare. For a general discussion, see Angelo Codevilla, "Covert Action and Foreign Policy, II," in Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Covert Action* (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, 1981), 79-104.

10. A collection of (generally older) materials on this subject is available in Ronald D. McLaurin, ed.. *Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

11. A discussion of the history of US international broadcasting is available in James L. Tyson, U.S. *International Broadcasting and National Security* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1983). For an overview of current US activities in this area, see United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 1986 *Report* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1986). Examples of public diplomacy materials produced by US government agencies are DOD, *Soviet Military Power* 1986 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1986) and DOS and DOD, *The Challenge to Democracy in Central America* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1986).

12. The role of information as an instrument of national strategy comparable to the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments was emphasized in an address of then National Security Advisor William P. Clark to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 21 May 1982. Administration studies of international information policy resulted in a presidential directive on this subject (NSDD 130) in March 1983. See "rune #Up for Term Two," *Chronicle of International Communication,* July-August 1984, 1.

13. For some critical reviews by recent participants, see the remarks of Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., and Gifford D. Malone in Staar, 297-99.

14. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War,* trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). 77-78.

15. Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower told a meeting of American newspaper editors in 1944: "I have always considered as quasi-staff officers, correspondents accredited to my headquarters." That reporters acquiesced in such treatment is scandalous for a contemporary journalist; see the discussion in Philip Knightly, *The First Casualty* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovicb, 1975), 315-17ff.

16. The gross abuses involved in media coverage of the Vietnam War have been well documented. See Peter Braestrup, *Big Story* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978); Robert Elegant, How *to Lose a War: The Press and Viet Nam* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1982; originally published in *Encounter,* August 1981).

17. An excellent brief analysis may be found in Mark Crispin Miller, "How TV Covers War." *The New Republic,* 29 November 1982, 26-33. Also of considerable interest is John Weisman, "Why TV Is Missing the Picture in Central America," TV *Guide,* 15 September 1984, 2-14.

18. The controversy arising from the exclusion of the press from the US action against Grenada in October 1982 led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate a review of policy regarding media participation in contingency operations, in the form of a special commission of military and media representatives headed by Gen Winant Sidle. Although this commission reached informal agreement on the principle of press participation in all military operations to the maximum degree consistent with operational security, the DOD has since indicated some reservations on this score, and there is little evidence that any significant movement has occurred on the media side. As one retired admiral is reported to have said, "Operational

security is not the problem; the problem is that when you write about us, you make us look bad." See Fred Halloran, "The Pentagon and the Press: The War Goes On," *New York Times, 29* January *1986:* and "Material and the Media," Essays *on Strategy and Diplomacy 2* (Claremont, Calif.: Keck Center for International Strategic Studies, *1984).*

19. Pertinent observations on the role of the State Department in the current administration's public diplomacy efforts are offered by Gifford Malone in Staar, *132-37.*

20. Consider the complaints of Fred W. Walker, "PSYOP Is a Nasty Term-Too Bad," *Air University Review 28* (September-October *1977), 71-76,* as well as Edward N. Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," in William A. Buckingham, ed., *Defense Planning for the 1990s* (Washington, D.C.: NDUP, *1984), 197-209.*

21. See the discussion in Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., "Psychological Operations, Special Operations, and US Strategy," in Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz, eds., *Special Operations in U.S. Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: NDUP, *1984), 231-51.*

22. Of interest in this connection is Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janis Gross Stein, Psychology *and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, *1985).*

When Are Political Objectives Clearly Defined?

A Historical Perspective

Michael A. Moms

National policy objectives should be clearly defined. Whether the goals are strategic or tactical, they must be delineated and articulated to those responsible for implementing them.

Since the difference between clarity and vagueness in political objectives is only a matter of degree, incomplete conceptions of vague political objectives obviously leads to incomplete conceptions of clear political objectives. Nevertheless, a rough distinction can be made between vague and clear political objectives after the nature of their relative difference is understood. Most observers acknowledge that political objectives should determine the nature of military objectives and strategy-which cannot be precise unless political objectives are clearly defined.

Clarity in political objectives is the responsibility of political leaders rather than military authorities; therefore, the military services cannot be expected to impose limits on their operations if the political objectives are vague.[1] In turn, if military power is to be used efficiently and without risk of major war, political objectives must not underestimate or overestimate the military capabilities at their disposal.

Correct Generalizations

The attempts of many authors to define clear political objectives are less perceptive than their analyses of the evils that result from objectives that are vague. Most envisage clear political objectives derived from an overall objective that reflects our national purpose. They point out that limited objectives determine the nature and extent of US involvement in limited wars or interventions. Some authors add that clear

political objectives also need to be flexible so they can be adjusted to meet changing conditions.

These statements about clear political objectives are correct generalizations. Clear political objectives should be limited and should not be achieved at the price of inflexibility. Changing circumstances will always make the task of formulating clear political objectives difficult. However, attempts to go beyond generalities belie incomplete conceptualizations of vague political objectives.

A Paradox

Political objectives evince much superficial continuity and, hence, an aura of decisiveness, although they may actually encompass and conceal considerable drift and indecision. Thus, while flexibility is necessary for adapting to changing circumstances, flexibility can also become largely synonymous with drift and indecision.

Nevertheless, political objectives still may remain constant in meaning over a period of time although different strategies may be required to implement them. The difficulty is in distinguishing between political objectives that only have superficial continuity of meaning and those that really are continuous in meaning.

This paradoxical nature of vague political objectives suggests a definition of clear political objectives. A political objective is clear when it continues to represent concern for the preservation of the same specific vital interest or for the same kind of postwar peace. If the objectives are clear in this sense, they can provide adequate political direction for the choice of military objectives and strategy.

Drift occurs when political objectives are not continuous in meaning or when they are so vague as to permit several divergent strategies to appear to be adequate ways of attaining objectives. In either case, drift rather than political objectives largely determines the nature of strategy.

However, this definition applies only to those specific political objectives that guide military strategy in a specific limited war or intervention. General foreign policy objectives are, perforce, vague. For example, support of the United

Nations and interest in a world free of aggression are general foreign policy objectives that attract popular support through their vagueness.

This suggested definition of clear political objectives needs to be elaborated further by examining its relation to the concept of vital interests. Since clear political objectives must represent concern for the preservation of the same specific vital interest, it is then necessary that vital interests also be clear and specific.

Propaganda Advantages

Some propaganda advantages can be gained by grandiloquent political objectives such as the Truman doctrine's aspiration to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures. However, even at that early date in the cold war, the rhetorical exaggerations involved touched off a debate charging that the United States was overcommitting itself.

The US strategy of support to Greece and Turkey against aggression refuted these criticisms; it was a clear and limited commitment. However, this clarity of strategy was due to the US policymakers' clarity of purpose and their clear grasp of US vital interests rather than to the clarity of publicly stated political objectives.

Occasionally, vital interests may be precisely formulated while political objectives are vague; for example, the Truman doctrine. Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult for political objectives to be clear when vital interests are abstract and vague.

The stark clarity of a direct Soviet confrontation with the West in the late 1940s made the determination of US vital interests relatively simple. The calculation of what were these vital interests became more complex and ambiguous as the communist threat became more diverse and subtle in the 1950s.

Abstract Vital Interests

As the paradox of abstract vital interests began to loom larger in US policy in the 1950s and 1960s, the need for clarity of political objectives continued and, perhaps, even increased as the nature of the threat changed and became more ambiguous. However, the precedent of vague political objectives set by the Truman doctrine's rhetoric continued to be the observed norm.

One of Robert E. Osgood's main themes in a 1968 paper illustrated the consequences of a heritage of vague political objectives and of increasingly vague and abstract vital interests. While the US postwar pursuit of policy objectives has shown much continuity, the US concept of its vital interests has been constantly expanding.

In Vietnam, where communist aggression was considered a threat to US security, the general requirements of containment led to an increasing US response with no question as to the precise relevance of the Vietnam War to US security. Osgood argued that the growth of multipolarity and the increasing complexity of the communist threat necessitated more precision in determining the extent to which our vital interests are involved in communist aggression.[2]

The paradox of abstract vital interests, then, reinforces the paradox of vague political objectives and vice versa. Together, they reinforce the indecision embedded in each vague paradox. This tends to result in policy drift and in inadequately considered, expanding commitments.

This vicious circle of vagueness and drift can be broken by efforts to relate vital interests more specifically to contemporary conditions and conflicts, and can be weakened by increasing the clarity of political objectives; that is, clarification of vital interests leads to clarification of political objectives and vice versa. More precise vital interests make it harder for political objectives to equivocate in claiming they are preserving the same specific vital interest.

On the other hand, greater clarity of political objectives would increase pressures on vital interests to be more precise. Greater clarity of political objectives would indicate the respective advantages and costs of implementing different

strategies and combinations of political objectives, which would in turn increase the chances that vague concepts of vital interests would be exposed. Such exposure would surely result in greater pressure for more precise definitions of vital interests.

Guidelines

The peculiar characteristics of vague political objectives suggest several guidelines for distinguishing clear political objectives froru vague ones. Clarity of political objectives is being achieved when the following questions can be answered in the affirmative.

Is the nature of the paradox of vague political objectives understood and consciously guarded against in defining political objectives?

Do political objectives help undermine the paradox of abstract vital interests? By indicating the respective advantages and costs of implementing different strategies, do political objectives expose vague conceptions of vital interests that unwisely require prohibitive costs?

In **choosing our military strategy, have we carefully considered the costs and benefits of attaining objectives that primarily demand military action versus the costs and benefits of attaining objectives that are more closely related to nation-building and internal security?**

Are drift and indecision being reduced in our political objectives, our conception of our vital interests, and our choice of military strategy?

Notes

1. Robert J. Bower, "Military Objectives in the Nuclear Age," Military *Review,* May 1966, 91-97.

2. Dr Robert E. Osgood, "Perspective on American Commitments," paper presented at the Sixty-fourth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 5 September 1968, 11, 17-19.

Some Thoughts on Psychological Operations



William F. Johnston

Governments of countries threatened with insurgency should regard PSYOP, particularly face-to face communications, as a first line o+f internal defense.

The intent of this article is not to proclaim PSYOP a panacea for "wars of liberation."' The intent is to focus attention on psychological operations as a vital instrument in Ho/Mao-type wars of national liberation, especially the early stages where revolutions are hatched from grievances of the masses by communist incubation and kept at the right emotional temperature by thousands of native agitators.[2] Without this skillful and massive agitprop and organizational effort, which has been characterized as "half the revolutionary task," there could be no successful liberation wars.

Auxiliary or Primary?

Psychological operations should have more recognition as important instruments of low-intensity conflict.[3] They have the capability to compete with the communists' conflict doctrine, which requires the integration of political, economic, psychological, and military factors of power. Aggressive nations can successfully use PSYOP **on a case-by-case basis in subversive insurgency-threatened countries. PSYOP use, however, must be carefully calculated in policy and operations to reach the grassroots level. Whoever gets to the people first, with ideas that stimulate self-interest, gains a decisive lead ... and that is precisely what happened in Vietnam.[4]**

Use of Media Discounted

Looking at the Vietnam War in retrospect, we see that the communists used all available media, from instigation through propaganda and guerrilla warfare to conventional military operations. Such sophisticated mass media as printed materials, leaflets, posters, pamphlets, and radio broadcasts were more obvious than the workhorse of the revolution: the agitprop cadre who operated on a face-to-face basis in the rural villages and hamlets. The US discounted the sophisticated media in the early days because it did not seem to play an important role.[5] What no one understood at the time was that radio was being used to communicate the Communist party line to the agitprop cadres in the remote areas of South Vietnam. They, in turn, were translating the party line into action among the masses. Based on opportunities at the local level, the actions generally consisted of study sessions (learning how to read and write Vietcong propaganda), demonstrations, parades, rallies, and any other activities that would get the people involved-ostensibly in furtherance of the peoples' interests, but with the end objective of strengthening the Communist party and weakening the opposition. The US did not appreciate the magnitude of the agitprop cadres-their numbers, their effectiveness, or the extent to which they were able to get the people engaged in furthering communist propaganda.

Douglas Pike, a noted expert, claims that the various social organizations created by the Vietcong in South Vietnam and used by the agitprop cadres were developed as "self-contained, self-supporting channels of communication." In his view, these organizations were the "secret weapon" and the "heart and power of the National Liberation Front (NLF)."[6]

Pike also revealed that the Vietcong "spent enormous amounts of time, energy, manpower, and money ... explaining itself to itself, to the other side, and to the world at large." He said they were "obsessed" with doing this. Pike found that the more he studied the Vietcong, the more "it became evident that everything the NLF did was an act of communication."[7] In other words, everything the Vietcong did was calculated to gain the optimum psychological effect.

Policymaker and Propagandist

In the communist world, psychological operations /warfare experts are represented at the highest levels of government and within the Communist party. One of their roles is to help make policy. PSYOP experts in the United States and most of the free world, however, (except for Nationalist China) appear to have little status and not much influence; several reasons are offered below.

1. Psychological operations /warfare, including propaganda, has a distasteful image. It is thought to deal in lies and variations of the truth, and is looked upon in general as a dirty business with which few wish to be associated.

2. Psychological operations cannot be scientifically evaluated as to effectiveness. PSYOP activities that cannot produce fast, measurable results are hard to sell. There are exceptions, of course; for example, when tactical PSYOP can be used to encourage a beaten enemy to surrender or in an amnesty campaign where the defectors can be counted.

3. There are very few professionally qualified and experienced PSYOP experts who also have sufficient acquaintance with the people of a specific foreign country. A major reason is that little status, low prestige, few rewards, and no high-level promotions are based on professionalism in psychological operations. There is no psychological operations career program; yet, attaining full qualification as a psychological operations expert on a specific foreign country is a lifetime job, not unlike the type of professionalism required of a psychoanalyst.

4. Insurgency-threatened countries do not give enough attention or importance to psychological operations. They often lack the know-how to start an effective psychological operations program, and they tend to place the same priority on PSYOP that the United States does in its support of that country.$ This priority is usually relatively low in proportion to the overall assistance provided by the US. While in the later stages of an insurgency the US may help with such sophisticated media as printed leaflets, radio, and TV, the US usually lacks expertise in the language and ways of the people. This expertise is necessary to provide advice on the content of the message to ensure that the message achieves the desired

effect. **The main burden of face-to-face education must be on the shoulders of the indigenous government and people.**

Another problem is that of convincing an insurgency-threatened government to establish an uncomplicated but credible amnesty program early in the insurgency. This program would provide, for insurgents who have changed their minds, a way out of the "victory or death" box that the guerrilla is usually in.

Chieu Hoi

The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Amnesty Program was one of South Vietnam's most successful programs. However, considerable time was required for the program to build up credibility and to achieve the desired results. [9] **Initially, Vietcong who wanted to defect believed, as the Vietcong indoctrination claimed, that they might be shot.**

After the low point at the end of 1964, the Chieu Hoi program showed a steady increase in the number of Vietcong returnees. In 1966 there were over 20,000 defectors, double the number of the preceding year. Total defections of Vietcong returning under this program numbered more than 75,000. [10] **If we accept the ratio of 10 government soldiers needed for each insurgent guerrilla, this program saved the GVN and the US a troop strength of over 750,000 soldiers. From the dollars-saved angle, the total cost of the program, using a figure of $127 to bring in a Vietcong defector, was around $9.5 million. Since the cost to kill a Vietcong is estimated at $300,000, killing this number of soldiers would have cost $2.25 billion.**

Indigenous Armed Forces

The United States can and should give a higher priority to encouraging insurgency-threatened governments to develop a professional psychological operations capability. This capability must include personnel, both American and indigenous, who can conduct face-to-face psychological operations. Indigenous PSYOP people must be able to

overwhelm communist-trained agitators in both quality and quantity of ideas related to peoples' desires and fears if they are to get the people motivated and committed to the government.

Indigenous military forces, paramilitary forces, or police forces would be good organizations to undertake increased PSYOP responsibilities in the rural areas. One reason is that these forces represent the best organized and most cohesive institutions in many developing countries, particularly in the rural areas. Also, better results will be achieved in the remote rural areas if the peasants know that an iron fist is underneath the velvet glove of the communists' friendly persuasion. (Changing the'ways of peasants is a real challenge.)

Every member of those military and police forces that are in contact with rural people should be trained to talk to the people-and doing so should be required as part of their duties. This would include interpreting news and participating in educational activities. They must also be prepared to discuss persuasively what the government is doing for the local people.

The main focus should be on developing specialized PSYOP units in the rural areas. These units should consist of local natives. Very important, also, is the establishment of a two-way communication system to ensure that popular grievances and good ideas get to the PSYOP planners and decision makers at the top level-and that governmental PSYOP policy guidance gets down to the lowest PSYOP level. This policy guidance must be centralized and controlled at the top, but implementation of the policy must be decentralized at the grass roots.

Lower-level PSYOP people should spend about one-half of their time in investigating and preparing so as to tailor their talks and educational activities to fit the local needs. Once the real needs of the rural people are ascertained and transmitted to the top echelons, there is more reason to hope that the government will help the people help themselves. This would go a long way toward preventing the communist agitators from generating revolutions out of grievances, hatreds, and social injustices.

Conclusions

In conclusion, insurgency-threatened governments can be expected to heed US advice if it is in the form of lessons learned at great cost. Indigenous governments must put a high priority on psychological operations, particularly on face-to-face education and on countering communist agitators. These governments must recognize that a face-to-face psychological operations capability must be developed from the people, by the people, and for the people of each particular language group, tribe, clan, or area of the country-and this takes time. Developing a successful capability requires careful selection and training of candidates. This is not something that can be "made in the USA" and exported.

The US military can and should develop mature, fully qualified, professional PSYOP experts who are experienced in the language and the thinking of a foreign people. Such experts could help governments with PSYOP organization and management, as well as providing support with our more sophisticated mass media. Psychological operations planners, both US and indigenous, must be raised to the first-team level. This is crucial for success! PSYOP planners must have ready access to top authorities. Governments must translate top-level interest and support into meaningful terms for people at the grassroots level. Feedback from the people to the top level is equally important. This interest from government is essential to winning and maintaining the support and loyalty of the people. Such a psychological operations program would be one of the cheapest and best security investments the US could make in the developing world.

Notes

1. This article consists of excerpts from "Neglected Deterrent: Psychological Operations in `Liberation Wars'," Transition, nos. 12 and 13 (January 1968): 58-65. Reprinted with the permission of the Foreign Affairs Executive Seminar, Foreign Service Institute, and its author. The communist psywar instrument was simply a means to an end-communist domination over everything that was not already under communist control.

2. Late in the China conflict, Gen George C. Marshall realized that the battle for the mind waged with ideas and propagated by mass communications media could be decisive in countering the liberation war in China. In

1947, upon return from his unsuccessful mission to China, Marshall said, "China might have been saved by the massive use of radio and motion pictures, on a scale hitherto unheard of." William Benton, "How Strong Is Russia? And How Weak?" *New York Times Magazine, 10* June 1956, 70.

3. Robert Holt and Robert Van de Velde, *Strategic Psychological Operations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 64. These authors state that the US has never fully understood the nature of the psychological instrument.

4. Stefan Possony in "Viet Cong Propaganda War," *Los Angeles Times, 11* July 1967, gives a good analysis of international propaganda based on captured documents. He concludes that although Americans are not conscious of it, the US was the target of a well-orchestrated and skillful Vietcong propaganda offensive after 1961.

5. Radio Hanoi and Vietcong clandestine transmitters were important for getting the Communist party line and other instructions to the leadership and agitprop cadres in remote areas-information which otherwise would have been delayed for weeks. Broadcasts were made in all five major languages used in Vietnam. Beginning in 1960, there was an increase in the use of all types of media in an accelerated propaganda offensive against the government of Vietnam.

6. Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), 124.

7. Ibid., ix.

8. See Slavko Bjelajac, "A Design for Psychological Operations in Vietnam," *Orbis,* Spring 1966. Bjelajac concludes that "psychological operations are indispensable" and in a Vietnam-type war "should be accorded a priority at least equal to any other weapon or technique in the Vietnamese protracted conflict."

9. The task of defecting a Vietcong in the Chieu Hot Program was primarily a psychological operations task. However, Aid for International Development (AID) Vietnam played an important role, since AID furnished the resources for most of the food, housing, and allowances given to the Chieu Hot.

10. Bob Considine, "Pacification Cadres," *Philadelphia Inquirer,* 19 September 1967.

The Role of Public Opinion



Lloyd A. Free

Public opinion cannot be slavishly followed, but psychological data should be collected and analyzed so that government can take this factor into account in planning.

The following excerpts are from an exchange of letters that took place at about the time of the Vietnam moratorium in the fall of 1969. One writer was a Georgetown University sophomore with the unknown name of Randy Dicks, the other a president of the United States with the well-known name of Richard Milhous Nixon.

Randy wrote the president:

I think that your statement at your recent press conference that "under no circumstances" will you be affected by the impending antiwar protests in connection with the Vietnam moratorium is ill-considered, to say the least. It has been my impression that it is not unwise for the President of the United States to take note of the will of the people. After all, these people elected you. You are their President.

The president replied, in part:

There is a clear distinction between public opinion and public demonstrations. To listen to public opinion is one thing; to be swayed by public demonstration is another.... Whatever the issue, to allow Government policy to be made in the streets would destroy the democratic process. It would give the decision not to the majority and not to those with the strongest arguments, but to those with the loudest voices.

Introduction

What is the role-the actual and proper role-of public opinion in international security affairs? And how, if public opinion does and should count, is majority opinion to be determined?

The assumption that public opinion, both at home and abroad, is somehow important is borne out by the efforts of political leaders to woo it and by the practices of governments to influence it. All major governments in the world today, and many of the minor ones, spend varying amounts of time, money, and attention on attempts to influence the opinions of their own citizens and the citizens of other countries.

Yet, even in our recent history, when a sense of the importance of public opinion has become more self-conscious than it used to be, there have been unbelievers. Harry Truman, whom I nevertheless admire as one of our great presidents, was one of them. When Mr Truman faced a problem, hb would find a principle involved, often a moral principle, and then make his decision accordingly. And he would stick to that decision come hell or high water. With this approach, public opinion and opinion polls are irrelevant, you simply do what you think is right.

The late, great John Foster Dulles adopted this same approach. He once said in my presence:

> If I so much as took into account what people are thinking or feeling abroad, I would be derelict in my duty as Secretary of State.

Another of our great secretaries of state, Dean Acheson, claimed, disapprovingly, that Americans have a "Narcissus psychosis." "An American," he wrote, "is apt to stare like Narcissus at his image in the pool of what he believes to be world opinion." After making the point that the only honest answer people generally could give to questions about the specifics of foreign policy would be a "don't know," he made this observation:

> World opinion simply does not exist on matters that concern us. Not because people do not know the facts-facts are not necessary to form opinions-but because they do not know the issues exist.

Thus, we are faced with some very basic questions: Does **such a thing as world opinion exist? Do people in the United States and other parts of the world really have meaningful opinions of any significant scope in regard to international issues? If so, are these opinions of importance to foreign relations and international security affairs? Your own instinctive answer to these questions may be an unqualified**

"yes" or an unqualified "no," but after years of experience in the public opinion field, my own answer is very equivocal-namely, it all depends.

Definitions and Assumptions

To start with, I must define some of the terms we will be discussing. An opinion, in my terminology, is simply an expressed attitude-an attitude that is communicated. An attitude, on the other hand, is really more of a perception-a way of looking at a given subject.

In the course of our lives, we build up all sorts of assumptions based on our experiences and these assumptions influence what we perceive as the world in which we live. In other words, we participate in creating our own realities and our attitudes spring from these "realities." They are the result of an interplay of our assumptions, as shaped and modified by experience. In a very real sense, if an individual has no assumptions concerning a given subject, or that are capable of being related to that subject, he can have no attitudes-and hence no opinions. And any opinions expressed by an individual will be meaningful only if he in some way relates the subject to his own purpose, no matter how narrow or broad it may be. The range of his sense of purpose is delimited by his "reality world."

Every individual has blind spots of greater or lesser scope-that is, subject matter areas about which he has no assumptions and, hence, no attitudes. It is difficult for many people to realize what a large proportion of the people of the United States, not to mention the underdeveloped areas of the world, have no assumptions, attitudes, or information about international affairs.

Let me cite from a study I did in this country a few years ago. One-quarter of the American public had never heard or read of NATO, only 58 percent knew that the United States is a member of NATO, and only 38 percent knew that the Soviet Union was not a member-facts which go to the very nature and fundamental purpose of our most important alliance! One-quarter of the adults in this country did not even know that the government of mainland China is communistic!

In short, at least two-fifths of even the American people are far too ignorant about international affairs to play intelligent roles as citizens of a nation that is the world's leader-and only about one-fourth are really adequately informed. The situation in most other countries of the world is far worse, particularly in underdeveloped areas. For pollsters to ask these uninformed people about specifics of foreign policy is obviously an exercise in futility. Looked at in this perspective, one can begin to see the validity of Dean Acheson's views and to question the common assumption that, if enough people at home and abroad are persuaded to adopt a given opinion, then the policy of their government will be affected-at least in democracies.

Opinion Leaders and the General Public

Before we write off the importance of public opinion in international security affairs, however, let us introduce some other aspects of the problem. First, we must recognize that when it comes to the "nitty-gritty" day-to-day decisions on specifics, public opinion usually has no effect. Either the public has no opinions on the matter or people do not know that decisions are being made. On a broad range of matters that are publicly known, there is usually an educated elite who do have meaningful opinions, in varying degrees of intensity, about international security matters.

This elite may be of greater or lesser size, depending upon which country is involved and which issue is in question. However, the fact that it may be small does not derogate its power. We can meaningfully define world opinion abroad or significant opinion at home in terms of the publics that count in the particular situation, whether limited or mass.

Beyond this, however, elements of the public can and often do get into the act, not only in the United States, but also in the underdeveloped areas. The people may lack meaningful opinions on a wide range of specifics about international matters, but their broader assumptions may come into play at certain times and places to make a given international issue a matter of public concern. Often this applies only to a minority of the greater public; frequently the people are whipped up and

organized for ulterior ends, whether by the communists or by local leaders-but react they do!

Publication

The action may be as peaceable as signing a petition or writing a letter to the local newspaper (both of which are apt to be relatively ineffective), or to writing a personal letter to the president (as Randy Dicks did), or writing to one's congressman. (The latter action may actually be of some influence; the attention paid by members of Congress to their mail is out of all proportion to its significance as a barometer of public opinion.)

But, increasingly, more extreme manifestations of public action-demonstrations, picketing, and rioting-reflect attitudes that are strongly held by at least some segments of the public. These forms of public action have become a phenomenon of worldwide scope. For example, rioting in Japan and Korea made it exceedingly difficult for the two governments to normalize their relations. Demonstrations in Panama were unquestionably instrumental in causing the US-after a decent interval, of course-to agree to revise the Panama Canal Treaty. Demonstrations and potential riots in the Middle East have made it difficult for the Arab governments to follow a policy of moderation in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Anticommunist violence in Indonesia strengthened the hand of the army against the Communist party in a struggle that has had profound international implications. Anti-Vietnam protests in the United States unquestionably affected the calculations of the North Vietnamese, not to mention those of our American leaders.

But the greater public also gets into the act in a more regular and generally more peaceable way in the form of periodic elections, not only in the democracies but also in some of the semidemocracies (if not the "guided democracies"). In such elections, international matters can and often do enter as central issues of the campaign.

But then, one does not have to search very far back in US history for other examples: Woodrow Wilson's campaign theme, "He kept us out of war," helped him win the election in 1916; and Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower's promise to go to Korea

increased his landslide victory in 1952. In fact, it is almost axiomatic that whenever war or peace seems to be at issue, the public in almost every country will exhibit deep concern in ways that have political meanings.

Global Public Opinion

More broadly, a close study of the matter has convinced me that there are widely shared attitudes on international matters, amounting in many instances to consensuses which governments simply must take into account. Sometimes these consensuses are global. With apologies to Dean Acheson, there are, on occasion, worldwide or virtually worldwide reactions on matters that concern us.

One occasion was the Suez affair in 1956. I have little doubt that the United Nations well-nigh universal condemnation of the Israeli-British-French invasion of Egypt was supported by what can only be called a consensus of world opinion-a consensus shared even by many people in both the United Kingdom and France.

A similar consensus of condemnation seems to have existed over the Soviet Union's occupation of Czechoslovakia-a consensus apparently shared even by a good many people who were communists themselves.

Another is the worldwide impact of Russia's launching the first two sputniks in 1957, followed by its subsequent achievements in space. These developments led to reevaluations of the relative standings of the two superpowers, extending not only through official circles and elites but to general publics as well. In fact, data show that people throughout the world ranked the Soviet Union and the United States just about equally in terms of power and importance in those days, an enormous contrast from the days before 1957.

This perceived equality contributed, along with other developments, to the idea that a stalemate existed-a notion that affected the foreign policies of most of the world's nations.

Regional and National Attitudes

Short of these global consensuses, some basic attitudes are so widely held in certain regions or areas that they must be taken into account, both by the governments which rule there and by others dealing with them. The phobia in Latin America against American intervention is one example. Similarly, in almost all of Africa and Asia, basic attitude patterns opposed to imperialism and neocolonialism are deeply rooted. Other examples are the anti-Israeli "set" of the Arab world and, fortunately for us, the anti-Chinese bias in much of Southeast Asia.

In addition, there are many situations where there is a meaningful consensus of public opinion in particular countries. One example is the almost universal aspiration that the West Germans held for Germany's reunification. Other examples are the fear and hatred of Germans that were held by most Russians and Poles, and the Japanese public's opposition to full-scale rearmament.

The American people, too, have certain fixed ideas. One is opposition to foreign aid: Six out of 10 Americans favor either reducing economic aid to foreign countries or ending it altogether. Another is the very high degree of concern to keep our military defense strong at the same time that more than one-half of the public thinks we are spending too much on defense. In a related vein, almost six out of 10 Americans think the US "should take all necessary steps to prevent the spread of communism to any other parts of the free world, no matter where." Anticommunism is, in fact, clearly one of the strongest factors in Americans' ideas about US international security policies.

Policies and Opinions

In any particular country at any given time, there are programs and policies for which no government or leader can engender public endorsement. In other words, the climate of opinion imposes limits-sometimes very broad, sometimes very narrow-on each government's area of maneuver. In the extreme, certain things are virtually taboo; in other cases, thev

are merely impolitic; in still others, particularly where public opinion is either in agreement, nonexistent, divided, or lacking in intensity, anything is acceptable. Although policymakers sometimes appear blind to the fact, the achievement of many-if not most-of the international security objectives adopted by the United States presupposes certain perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors on the part of various persons in this and other countries.

Usually, on day-to-day matters, the opinions of key members of Congress and/or officials of foreign governments are important for the accomplishment of particular US objectives. On more important matters, the list of people who have influential opinions may include members of elite groups that have power or influence in our own or other societies. Often, the educated elements of the general public may also have a bearing on the success or failure of US policies. Frequently, the opinions of peoples as groups are important, either because popular support or cooperation is necessary or because the people show their concern by way of protests, demonstrations, or elections.

Often, psychological factors are critical to the success of US policies. If these factors are absent, it is futile to adhere to a policy which presupposes them. Taking into account, for instance, the feelings of the majority of the Chinese people toward the Chiang Kai-shek regime in 1949, no amount of effort or determination on the part of the United States could have prevented a communist takeover of mainland China. As another example, consider that the US supported French rule in Algeria for years, despite the fact that the psychology of the Algerians-not to mention the French-made this goal impossible.

In another aspect of French international security affairs, it was public opinion, more than anything else, that forced the French military to fight the Indo-Chinese war with one hand tied behind its back; victory was impossible. The French people would not condone the necessary national effort, so the government found it impolitic to send draftees to fight in Indochina. The current malaise in the European community and the disarray in NATO are prime examples of the limits that psychological factors can place on national objectives.

Public Opinion, Political Pressure, and Prophecy

Finally, to prove what a valid prophet I can be on occasion-and, of course, I like to forget those instances where my judgment proved faulty-let me quote from a lecture I delivered when the trends of American opinion about the war in Vietnam were still pretty obscure.

> Our own Government will undoubtedly now have to face up to the fact that the American people are sick and tired of the war. It is my considered judgment as a so-called "expert" that we are in the early stages of an inexorable tide in favor of pulling out of Vietnam. There may be riptidA from time to time which will temporarily obscure the direction of the current, but it is my belief that however you and I may feel about the matter, the movement down below will continue ever more strongly in favor of disengagement.)

Of course, as usual when I stick my neck out, I had some data to rely on. In the aftermath of the Tet offensive, studies conducted in this country showed that in mid-February 1968, immediately after the offensive, the majority of Americans remained hawks. In fact, hawkish sentiment increased in the immediate sense after the Tet offensive, favoring further escalation of the war. One-quarter of the American people advocated gradual escalation and no less than 28 percent opted for "an all-out crash effort in the hope of winning the war quickly, even at the risk of China or Russia entering the war."

By June of the same year-1968-the picture had changed materially. One-half of the public had shifted to the "dove" side, with 7 percent favoring a cutback in the American military effort and 42 percent wanting us to discontinue the struggle and start pulling out of Vietnam-this latter figure being almost double what it had been just four months earlier.

By June of 1970, Gallup had found that the proportion of people thinking that the US had "made a mistake in sending troops to fight in Vietnam" had risen from 25 percent (in March of 1966) to 56 percent. About one-half of the people now favored withdrawal, either immediately or at least by July 1971.

Policymakers and Public Opinion

There is a real question about the sensitivity of our policymakers to psychological factors that have a bearing on the success or failure of our international security objectives. There is also a question about those policymakers' receptivity to the results of public opinion polls and other forms of policy-oriented psychological research. I can only speak on the basis of my own experience and that of my late associate, Hadley Cantril, plus years of personal observation of the government process. And from these points of view, I would say that the record is spotty at best. However, recent presidents have shown an awareness of the importance of psychological factors.

Oddly enough, the supreme example of sensitivity to public opinion-and of consummate ability to influence it-came in the earliest days of scientifically conducted polling. The man of the hour was Franklin D. Roosevelt. Tommy Corcoran once credited Roosevelt with having said, in effect, that he was the captain of the ship but that events and public opinion limited his power while providing instrumentalities for exerting power.

Particularly after the adverse reactions to his famous "quarantine" speech, Roosevelt was determined not to get too far out in front of public opinion in connection with the war in Europe-nor to stay any farther behind than he thought he had to. In this connection, he followed the polls with great interest-particularly charts of American public opinion specially prepared for him by Mr Cantril, who had conducted surveys throughout this period.

President Eisenhower

President Dwight D. ("Ike") Eisenhower was less consciously interested in domestic public opinion polls than Roosevelt had been. This was probably in part because Ike was so popular and his administration so relatively noncontroversial. But I know from my own experience that he was deeply interested in the opinions of people in other countries. While working with Nelson Rockefeller, who was a consultant to the president in

1955, 1 started a series of periodic reports on the psychological situation abroad.

The president read these reports carefully and followed them with great interest. (The common notion that he did not read documents is ridiculous; every single report I submitted to him through Rockefeller was read-and annotated-by the following morning. And this goes even for a 67-page document, single-spaced, which I know he read in full because he corrected a typographical error in his own hand on the next-to-last page!)

On more than one occasion, after John Foster Dulles had given one of his masterful briefings to the National Security Council (NC), the president was heard to say, "But, Foster, you forget the human side," as he pulled out one of my reports and read from it. As a result of that, I was the second most hated man (by Dulles) in Washington, Rockefeller being the first!

By 1955, my reports to President Eisenhower had shown a sharp increase in skepticism abroad about America's peaceful intentions. This skepticism helped to create receptivity to an idea that Rockefeller had advanced and which had been cold-shouldered-namely, the "Open Skies" inspection proposal. When Eisenhower finally propounded Open Skies, it had as great a psychological impact as any one-shot propaganda move since World War II.

President Kennedy

Jerome Wisener says that John Fitzgerald Kennedy knew clearly that he could exercise his power only if he had the consensus of the people and the Congress behind him. As a result, Kennedy was a fervent believer in polling. He depended heavily on the findings of special surveys conducted for him by Lou Harris on domestic opinion, including international issues. He also followed closely the United States Information Agency (USIA) data on opinion abroad. On a number of occasions, he personally requested that certain surveys be made-especially in Latin America.

In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, USIA found that Fidel Castro was little known in Latin America and was generally viewed by the public with considerable allergy. Subsequently,

the Kennedy administration adopted a relatively low-keyed approach to Castro and Castroism.

President Johnson

In the early days of his administration, Lyndon Baines Johnson regularly used Oliver Quayle's polls, including those on international issues. President Johnson kept a loose-leaf notebook, not only of the latest surveys taken in the United States by Quayle, Gallup, and Harris, but also of polls conducted abroad.

Following ithe American intervention in the Dominican Republic, I sent to the White House a report I had prepared in June of 1962, *Attitudes, Hopes and Fears of the Dominican People.* It showed that the Dominicans, as of then at least, were the most pro-American, anticommunist, anti-Castro people we had found in any part of the world. Not only did President Johnson read the report; the White House had it duplicated and distributed at the highest level and said that it had proved "very helpful." I have little doubt that this report was one of many factors that influenced the Johnson administration to shift from supporting the military junta to working toward a coalition solution.

Against such "successes" as these, however, must be set some glaring "failures," where research findings were ignored in framing US policies. The most cataclysmic of these had to do with the Bay of Pigs invasion. A year before, I had managed "by the skin of my teeth" to get a public opinion study done in Cuba. It showed that Castro was overwhelmingly popular with the Cuban people. There was a small opposition, but it was confined almost entirely to the city of Havana. Thus, whatever the expectations of those who planned the invasion, it came as no surprise to many that there was no popular uprising to assist the Bay of Pigs invaders.

The study had been made available to the government as well as to the public, and had actually been sent up to the White House. However, between the time the report was issued and the attempted invasion, there had been a change of administration-Kennedy had come into the White House. And our findings were not called to the attention of the new

president or anyone on his staff when they were considering the question of invading Cuba.

Although called a "success" when submitted to President Johnson after the Dominican intervention in 1965, a Dominican study conducted after the fall of Trujillo found that the invasion had been a "failure" when the results were originally made available to the government in 1962. The report included the following flat statement:

> An extremely serious situation of popular discontent and frustration, fraught with a dangerous potential for upheaval, exists in the Dominican Republic. Never have we seen the danger signals so unmistakably clear.

Yet, despite this urgent warning, the US government devised well-merited but long-range solutions to Dominican problems and neglected short-term emergency programs which might have avoided later problems.

The neglect of such research findings demonstrates a fact which has become crystal clear to me from my years of experience within the State Department and my subsequent observations as a researcher and government consultant. A considerable proportion of our government, with particular reference to the State Department and the Foreign Service, tends to be insensitive to the importance of psychological factors in international affairs. Within our US government there is no systematic collection of such data and, despite the interest of the White House, no systematic marshalling of whatever material may be available. (It is not without significance that the special polling of American public opinion that was inaugurated by the State Department after World War II and was conducted under the very distinguished and able direction of Schuyler Foster, whom some of you probably know, was discontinued in the latter half of the 1950s.)

As to psychological factors abroad, more than one ambassador has echoed the words of one of their colleagues: 'To hell with public opinionl I'm here to deal with the government, not with the public!" He said this, incidentally, while serving in a country which later went into an acute crisis because of public turbulence.

It is against this multifaceted background that I said the record of our policymakers is spotty when it comes to paying

attention to "the psychological." Some policymakers (particularly at the highest level) have paid attention; some have not.

Conclusion

In closing, let's put this whole matter into broader perspective. No responsible critic maintains that our government should slavishly follow public opinion or that US foreign policy should be based exclusively, or even primarily, upon courting momentary popularity at home or abroad. Often, governments that deserv4 the adjective "responsible" will have to fly squarely in the face of domestic opinion while attempting to change it.

Bill Moyers once told a story that is pertinent in this respect: During a period of crisis, President Johnson and his advisors were meeting in the cabinet room to discuss alternative courses of action. At a particularly exasperating moment, when no option appeared likely to succeed, one of the men exclaimed wearily: "If we only knew what the people of this country really want us to dol" The president studied his melancholy advisor for 39 seconds, then answered: "If we knew what they wanted us to do, how could we be sure that we should do it?"

Any government worthy of its name has to do what it thinks necessary for the good of the country, but its course can be greatly eased if it has public opinion on its side. Decision making demands a knowledge of how the people are thinking and feeling-and why.

Even more often, governments must fly in the face of opinion abroad. This is especially true of the United States as it pursues its role of world leadership: if we aid India to rearm against the Chinese threat, we are bound to incur the wrath of Pakistan; we cannot assist Israel without provoking an anti-American outburst from the Arab world; fighting the war in Vietnam enraged the "doves" in many parts of the world. It is clear, then, that a certain price must be paid in at least psychological terms-and it should be incurred knowingly, after both a careful assessment of the benefits and risks and a calculated attempt to devise ways to minimize unfavorable impacts and maximize favorable ones.

After the Tet offensive, Gen William C. Westmoreland said that the results were psychological, not real. Well, he and his colleagues had better learn that when it comes to accomplishing US objectives, psychological factors can be just as "real" as guns, ships, planes, or nuclear weapons. This is because human beings are always the ultimate movers and shakers, and humans are psychological animals.

In **short, psychological data needs to be systematically collected and cranked into the intelligence appraisals of given situations. And these data, both domestic and foreign, should be taken into account in framing foreign policies and enunciating interfiational positions. The psychological requirements for achieving US objectives need to be carefully calculated from the start, and every effort must be made, through leadership, persuasion, and public diplomacy, to secure their fulfillment.**

Simply put, psychological data is essential if the United States is to be an effective leader in today's world. And its employment is imperative if the president of the United States is going to lead a unified American people into the future.

Notes

1. Lloyd A. Free, "'The Role of Public Opinion," *The Forum*, Spring 1971, 55; lecture, National War College, Fort Lesley McNair, Washington, D.C. Reprinted with the concurrence of the National War College and the courtesy of the author.

A Critical Analysis of US PSYOP



Lt Col Philip P. Katz, USA, Retired
Ronald D. McLaurin
Preston S. Abbott

In an era during which it has become very fashionable to discuss the psychological aspects of international relations and during which the study of that field has been greatly influenced by psychological theories and research, particularly in America, little attention has been focused on the communications aspect of international relations; that is, psychological operations. In this essay, we identify and assess the principles of-and some developments in-this field. We also advance several modest proposals for further progress in analysis.

Introduction

Psychological operations is that specialized field of communications that deals with formulating, conceptualizing, and programming goals, and with evaluating government-to-government and government-to-people persuasion techniques. Properly defined, PSYOP is the planned or programmed use of human actions to influence the attitudes and actions of friendly, neutral, and enemy populations that are important to national objectives.) The critical variable is, then, the perceptions of foreign populations.[2] Propaganda is only the most obvious example of a persuasive communication. Because psychological operations are designed to influence actions or attitudes, the parameters of the field can be seen in terms of Harold D. Lasswell's classic communications model:

Who Says What
In Which Channel
To Whom
With What E, ffect.[3]

We know that a government spokesman is saying something in some channel to foreign populations with a view to influencing them. The specific operation is then defined on the basis of what, in which channel, and with what effect. Psychological operations, then, is a truly interdisciplinary phenomenon, lying in the interstices of psychology, sociology, communication, and political and military sciences.[4,5] PSYOP is communication that "embraces the study of persuasiveness, on the one hand, and persuadability on the other. It also involves the study of attitudes-how they are formed and how they can be changed."[6] In practice, however, psychological operations requires inputs from linguists, ethnologists, historians, cultural anthropologists, and area specialists, along with others from the humanities, natural sciences, and social sciences.

Historical Review

Leaders have used persuasive appeals as far back as recorded history allows us to search; Americans, authors of the Declaration of Independence and other brilliant psychological operations, were far from unfamiliar with this tradition.$ The process of psychological operations remains essentially what it was when Gideon defeated the Midianites but, like many other human enterprises, it has become infinitely more complex. The development of mass communication-broadcasting, worldwide wire news services, mobile printing presses, motion pictures-provides instruments of psychological operations previously undreamed of, as may be seen from the scale on which they were used in World War II as compared with previous wars.

No one who lived through or read about the collapse of France in 1940 will ever forget Goebbels's development and use of psychological operations as major political and military weapons of attack. The Nazis orchestrated the use of radio, the press, demonstrations, group meetings abroad, agents, displays, fifth-column terrorism, and, once the attack started,

screaming dive bombers (the memory of which is terrifying to many). The Nazis gave the first full-dress demonstration of what psychological operations can accomplish with the new tools of mass communication and the new weapons of military warfare. And once the meaning of what they had done came to be understood, all the major combatants who had not already done so were compelled to institutionalize psychological operations in their own plans and concepts of modern war. Nevertheless, while there were many programs, no systematic, centralized planning was undertaken in the United States until World War II[9,10]—and the organization and resources developed during the war were quickly reduced following its conclusion. There was some effort to study the lessons learned from PSYOP programs, but the analyses were disseminated unevenly in the government and military services. The civilian Office of War Information (OWI) was disestablished and the propaganda function was passed to the Department of State.

During the 1950s, however, American psychological operations received renewed attention. The highly ideological character of the cold war rivalry and the political nature of the Korean War led to an emphasis on the psychological aspects of conflict. Courses of instruction were developed and "PSYOP" was rationalized within the services. In the civilian government structure, PSYOP was rationalized within the United States Information Agency (USIA). During this period, which was characterized by a political more than a military conflict, channels such as "Radio Free Europe," "Radio Liberation" (later "Radio Liberty"), "Radio in the American Sector" (RIAS), and the "Voice of America" (VOA) were primary PSYOP agents. They communicated news, ideas, and opinions across political boundaries-not infrequently with significant effects.

Unquestionably, the largest American effort in psychological operations since the second World War occurred during the Vietnam War. From the 1950s until the early 1970s, the US government placed substantial emphasis on psychological aspects of its world role, first in its rivalry with the Soviet Union, second in its assumption of global leadership, and finally in Vietnam and other local conflicts. However, the growth of detente and the apparent failure of PSYOP in Vietnam contributed to a continuation of the pattern whereby persuasive

communications resources are drastically reduced when there is no longer a perceived immediate need for them.

General Principles

Effective psychological operations requires several basic ingredients: adequate intelligence, coherent organization, sound planning, and a systematic evaluation of feedback. Intelligence is the most commonly overlooked prerequisite to an effective PSYOP program. From a PSYOP perspective, intelligence is the basis for understanding the communications, emotions, attitudes, and behavipr of individuals and groups.

Basic to the understanding of persuasive communications is the fact that audience factors are the principal constraint on communication effects. Although studies have been conducted on source attractiveness, trustworthiness, and background, it is the audience's perceptions of credibility that count. [11] Explorations of the phrasing, ordering, and other presentation factors continue to show that the critical variables in determining communication effects are audience factors-education, exposure to opposing views (previous or subsequent to the message), extant opinions, and culture. [12] In addition, such wholly audience considerations as target composition and persuadability are clearly beyond the influence of any communicator. [13]

Since the target population in effect sets the parameters of persuasion, intelligence must provide sufficient accurate data to support the development of programs and messages to optimally affect the audience in all its diversity. [14] Information must be timely, thorough, and systematic.

Organization is important because it must unify the diverse parts of the complex process of intercultural communications. Without sound organization, no single aspect of the process can contribute efficiently to the system. Breakdowns will occur within as well as between program responsibilities. Examples are given below.

Planning is essential at all levels, from tactical operations to long-range, strategic activities. The psychological plan, the basic instrument for integrated and concerted operations, must be designed to exploit all of the source advantages possible. The plan should use intelligence to determine the

media, messages, and compositions most likely to support the attainment of national objectives.

To implement PSYOP plans, the program must extend beyond words to actions-and actions must be an extension of words. An effective program of persuasive communications draws on real action attributes and elaborates a realistic and concrete future course. Political and military actions are critical elements in psychological operations.

In order to continue to improve the effectiveness of the program, a system to collect, analyze, and exploit feedback on past operations must be established. Because of the weakness of traditional measures of PSYOP effects, this requirement has too often beeA neglected.

Organization

It is perhaps a truism to say that an organization should be so constituted that it is capable of effectively carrying out the functions assigned to it. In this section, we emphasize the essential functions of psychological operations and explain how these functions are currently managed in the United States.

An institutionalized structure is essential for the effective implementation of psychological programs. There must be a defined organizational structure with clear lines of authority and responsibility for the development and implementation of policy, plans, and operations. Whether strategic or tactical in scope, the psychological operations mission requires the staff and personnel necessary to develop and implement policy, develop and execute plans, collect intelligence, evaluate programs, and conduct operations.

Policy

A first requirement for conducting meaningful psychological operations is the national-level development and implementation of clearly articulated PSYOP policy in support of political, social, economic, or military goals. The government must establish realistic policy goals to ensure consistent and credible operations. Credibility of policy objectives is the core

element in effective psychological programs. False or inconsistent national policy can destroy the best plans and programs.

One example of a poor policy and a lack of understanding was Hitler's attitude toward the Vlasov movement in which he failed to exploit the psychological aspects of Russian Nationalism in 1943.[15, 16] Based on policy, appropriate psychological objectives to support operations can be articulated. Programs designed to implement objectives should not be academic-they must be credible and an integral part of the operational environment. For example, if the psychological objective is to induce enemy defection atld/or surrender, appropriate actions must be taken by military commanders to ensure that friendly forces clearly understand the surrender policy, will honor safe-conduct leaflets, and will establish appropriate policy concerning the good treatment of enemy prisoners in POW camps. In an insurgency or political environment, the government must develop and implement a credible amnesty policy regarding the insurgents and their supporters.

In the United States, the development and implementation of psychological policy is the responsibility of the executive branch of government. The National Security Council, Department of State (DOS), USIA, and other appropriate departments and agencies form a joint working group or task force to develop psychological policy for an international crisis, event, or a US overseas program. This is an ad hoc group, and policy is determined by consensus.

In peacetime, the US ambassador is responsible for implementing PSYOP policy overseas. In the case of Vietnam, policy was directed from Washington to the US Embassy in Saigon. It was implemented by the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO). More than 60 policy guidance directives were issued by JUSPAO on such diverse topics as 'The Use of Prisoners of War in PSYOP Output," "PSYOP Support of Pacification," and "PSYOP Aspects of the Refugee Program." US officials made every effort to develop and promulgate policy directives in conjunction with the Vietnamese government, but such coordination was the exception rather than the rule.

Planning

By definition, a psychological operation is the planned and programmed use of communication media and/or other actions to influence emotions, attitudes, and behaviors of selected target audiences. Planning is the key to psychological operations (random and isolated actions cannot produce consistent results). Planning is essential for psychological operations at all levels-from the strategic and long-range national plan to the PSYOP annex for tactical operations at the battalion command level.

When implemented, the plan becomes the basic instrument and authority for the conduct of psychological operations. One key element in conducting a psychological offensive is the integration of all available assets and their concentration on significant objectives and target groups based on the reality of military, political, or economic operations. The PSYOP plan is the crucial ingredient for integrated and concerted operations. Generally, psychological plans should consist of (1) concept of operations, (2) definition of target groups, (3) clear definition of objectives, (4) general thematic guidance for each objective, (5) injunctions or prohibitions in respect to themes, (6) time-table or schedule to ensure staged and fully orchestrated multimedia operations, and (7) definitive instructions for PSYOP units and assets.

Currently within the US government, there is no central mechanism for the planning of psychological operations. The USIA issues program guidances to its overseas services and divisions. In turn, the United States Information Service (USIS) (overseas) develops country plans which are annual information/cultural programs tailored for a particular country. The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for developing psychological plans in support of military contingency operations. Military plans are informally coordinated with the DOS, USIA, and other appropriate agencies.

United States PSYOP planning during the Vietnam period was the primary responsibility of the US Embassy, Saigon. In JUSPAO, the Office of Plans, Policy, and Research was responsible for those plans relating to political, economic, and social programs as well as Republic of Vietnam psychological

operations in support of Chieu Hoi (open arms), pacification, and other programs.[17] On the other hand, the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV, developed and implemented plans in support of military operations and selected programs directed to target groups in North Vietnam. Generally, PSYOP plans were coordinated with the Republic of Vietnam through its Ministry of Information and/or the Vietnamese Joint Military Command.

Intelligence

Intelligence is the basis for understanding communications, emotions, attitudes, and behaviors of individuals and groups. Y. Tanaka has proposed a three-step strategy of cross-cultural communication that involves quantitative and qualitative analyses of attitude components within a target population, systematic use of a multichannel and multistep flow of communication, and a strategy in which communication is by deed and words.[18] It is significant that the first step in his strategy is the collection of PSYOP intelligence-the one critical step that is often neglected by the political or military planner.

There are three basic requirements for collecting, collating, and analyzing PSYOP data. First, it is essential that managers and media personnel have a thorough understanding of the psychological aspects of the target audience. Anyone engaged in communication and propaganda programs must have certain information about the audience-background, literacy, preferred languages and dialects, art forms and symbols, and key emotional symbols. In addition, PSYOP personnel should have a thorough understanding of the social, political, religious, economic, and military attitudes that are prevalent in significant population groups. With such knowledge, communication programs can be developed to restructure hostile or negative attitudes, reinforce friendly or favorable attitudes, or reinforce /change neutral attitudes, when appropriate.

The second requirement is for timely and systematic operational feedback. Specifically, information is needed regarding the effort being made to support PSYOP objectives, tasks, and themes aimed at definitive target groups. These

data are essential for analyzing the success or failure of PSYOP programs and strategy.

The third requirement is for timely and systematic feedback from the target audience when a PSYOP campaign is in progress-a substantial task when the full range of communication media is used. A careful and candid analysis is necessary in order to determine which messages and channels of communication worked well and why, what the mistakes were, and what can be done to avoid future errors and failures.

In 1966, a senior foreign service officer of the USIA listed a number of factors that were inhibiting the effectiveness and measurement of PSYOP programs in Vietnam.

1. We "fly by the seat of our pants" both in setting goals and measuring our success.
2. Our assessment is superficial because we are not experts and because reporting requirements tend to emphasize deeds and statistics and not attitude, opinion, and behavior change.
3. USIA is oriented more to media than to audience.
4. We deal too frequently with accidents rather than essences, which leads to confusion of ends and means.
5. There is a basic lack of research data.
6. We attempt to change rationally attitudes that are basically emotional.
7. We are often confused by changing goals in the field versus our long-range basic mandate.
8. We lack orientation toward communications as a whole and communications research in particular.
9. There is a communications gap between Washington and the field, between media product and field need. [19]

Weaknesses in measuring the effect of USIA programs were stated by another senior officer.

1. The system is too simple in theory and too unclear in practice.
2. Our objectives are very broad, our specific knowledge very narrow. While we can never have all the knowledge we need, we can narrow the gap in some respects.
3. Much basic data on which to base evaluations is missing; e.g., the extent to which messages are directed to

target audiences, whether the messages are received, and whether they are understood.

4. There is at present too little operational research directed at the question of results.

5. Too much evaluation is being done by operators themselves. The evaluation is therefore subjective.

6. In the rush of day-to-day business, the hard questions are often postponed indefinitely.[20]

No single government agency is responsible for the systematic collection of PSYOP intelligence. The Office of Research in the USIA sponsors ad hoc research and conducts some overseas field surveys in order to evaluate selected media output. Intelligence specialists in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Department of State) are primarily interested in political information. In a similar vein, the Defense Intelligence Agency is principally interested in the collection and analysis of "hard" military intelligence such as order of battle and weapon systems data. US Army PSYOP intelligence teams generally do not possess the resources or the scope of knowledge required to evaluate the psychological environment of potential target groups around the world.

In Vietnam, as during the Korean War, an attempt was made to overcome PSYOP deficiencies in intelligence by sponsoring ad hoc studies and surveys. However, PSYOP intelligence requirements do not lend themselves to ad hoc or temporary measures: The problem is operational, it is dynamic, and it requires constant attention by professionals who are a permanent part of the team.

A computer-oriented system is being developed by the US military to correct some of the inadequacies in PSYOP intelligence, especially in appraising the success or failure of propaganda programs. This system, known as the PSYOP Automated Management Information System (PAMIS), will be discussed in subsequent sections of this essay.

Operations

Within the US government, the USIA is responsible for educational, cultural, and informational programs and

operations overseas. Its operations in Washington (for overseas audiences) include a broadcast service (primarily the "Voice of America"); information center services that support overseas exhibits and information centers; a motion picture and television service that prepares films and audio tapes for release overseas; and a press and publication service that prepares and distributes magazines and other printed matter to overseas posts. Most of USIA's day-to-day operations are the responsibility of the USIS,[21] which is a part of the US overseas mission. The organization and activities of the USIS are dependent on various protocols and agreements between Washington and the host nation.

The US military services have their own PSYOP units and, when authorized by the president, can support USIA operations overseas. Military PSYOP units are composed of various teams that can be put together to accomplish specific missions and functions. US Army PSYOP responsibilities include propaganda development, audio visual production, research and analysis, graphics production, printing, radio operations from mobile studios and transmitters, and loudspeaker operations.

In Vietnam, US military PSYOP favored an organizational arrangement that heavily involved the USIA. JUSPAO was established in Saigon in May 1965, a result of the National Security Council directive. JUSPAO was a PSYOP command supported by USIA, DOD, and USAID (US Agency for International Development). The director of JUSPAO (minister/councillor to the ambassador) issued policy directives (to both military and civilian agencies) and conducted the full range of strategic and tactical operations. At its peak JUSPAO was composed of about 250 US officers, more than half from USIA, and about 600 Vietnamese employees. Within the staff of MAC V was the Psychological Operations Directorate, a separate staff section that was later put under the operations chief, the J-3. The military also had operational control of a large PSYOP field unit-the Fourth PSYOP Group. Additional support was available from the Seventh PSYOP Group, which was located on the island of Okinawa.

Programs and Operations

While it is true that Vietnam represented the largest post-World War II American venture into psychological operations, the magnitude and breadth of the US effort there makes Southeast Asia an atypical example of American communications programs-even if a rich source of perspectives.

The major continuing US effort in this field is that of USIA, including the VOA.[22] Through periods of attention to and neglect of military PSYOP, USIA has been the principal[23] channel of American communications to foreign audiences.[24] The USIA was significantly affected by the detente in US-Soviet relations; fcor example, its once- anticommunist rhetoric has become anachronistic. Its other functions in information dissemination and cultural exchange have withstood the passage of time far better. This is hardly surprising, since persuasive communications have marginal value as opinion changers but are much more effective in attitude reinforcement.[25]

Pre-Vietnam

Specific efforts mounted by US psychological operations before Vietnam include, most prominently, campaigns in Lebanon (1958,[26] 1962[27]) and the Dominican Republic (1965[28]), and American efforts concerning Africa also grew after about 1960. Throughout the entire period, "Radio Free Europe,"[29] "Radio Liberty,,,[30] "Radio in the American Sector" (Berlin),[31] and other propaganda outlets were directed toward the USSR and Soviet-dominated areas.

The evolution of the postwar world left the United States, notwithstanding its early history and national values, in the position of the world's most important status quo power.[32] American international communications were therefore generally antirevolutionary, frequently supporting unpopular regimes in the name of stability.[33] In some cases (e.g., Lebanon) the programs were reasonably effective, but psychological effort success is difficult to separate from the nature and success of the overall political or military activity.

Vietnam

The importance and priority that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong (VC) put on psychological operations are well known, as in the slogans "Political activities are more important than military activities," and "Fighting is less important than propaganda." Vo Nguyen Giap in his *People's War, People's* Army quotes as one of Ho Chi Minh's cardinal principles of political warfare, "Do not attempt to overthrow the enemy but try to win over and make use of him."

As noted above, in 1965 JUSPAO was established to coordinate the US policies and personnel involved in psychological operations. A major portion of the new US PSYOP effort was to be devoted to the Chieu Hoi returnee program (an attempt to win over and make use of the VC). There was to be optimum coordination and integration of both US and Vietnamese operations at all levels, with overall supervision from JUSPAO and the Republic of Vietnam Ministry of Information (MOI) through the Vietnam Information Services vested in a combined US-Vietnamese coordinating committee at the national level with representation from MACV, JUSPAO, General Political Warfare Directorate (GPWD), and MOI.

"Guidelines to Chieu Hoi Psychological Operations: The Chieu Hoi Inducement Program" was prepared in April 1966 by JUSPAO. It centralized policy planning and decentralized operational planning. Execution was assigned to the local level. Development and mass production of PSYOP materials were done by JUSPAO in accordance with tactical needs determined by the field. In addition to JUSPAO, MACV (the 4th US Army PSYOP Group) operated an extensive program, much of which was devoted to the Chieu Hoi inducement program.34, 35

Content of PSYOP material, targeted on the potential rallier, was focused on his grievances, emotions, and aspirations-not on ideological commitment (except in the case of hard-core VC). The insurgent was encouraged to return to his home by the creation of trust in the government as just and generous. Former insurgents were used in preparation of the material to the maximum extent possible-they, rather than the Americans, knew the modus operandi of the enemy and were a part of the indigenous culture.

The leaflet-distributed from aircraft and by hand-proved to be the most practical means of disseminating the Chieu Hoi message. The ubiquitous "safe conduct pass," which literally blanketed South Vietnam, was probably the most effective message. Though there were thousands of other leaflets stressing many other themes,[36] the safe conduct pass was most often described by ralliers during interrogation as the one most seen and the one most conducive to rallying. After one battle, 90 percent of those VC who could be searched-the dead, wounded, and captured-had the safe conduct leaflet.[37] By the spring of 1971, JUSPAO had distributed nearly four billion leaflets in the campaign to persuade "men to rally to the GVN [Goverment of the Republic of Vietnam] under its amnesty program."[38]

No discussion of the factors motivating defection is complete without mention of the carefully structured program of rewards given to those who rallied and indeed even to those who influenced a VC to rally. The Chieu Hoi weapons reward program paid a returnee for weapons he turned in or for weapons that he was able to recover after he rallied. This program was successful in locating large weapons caches. The weapons reward system was established by official decree of the Chieu Hoi Ministry of the GVN.

The Vietcong military forces neutralized through the Chieu Hoi program were equal to about one-fifth of the total of all their forces killed or captured by military action. More than 4,000 men from the government of the Republic of Vietnam or its allies would have been required to effect the same result through military action.[39]

Besides the safe conduct leaflet and rewards program, testimonials from Hoi Chanh (former VC) proved to be effective in the total psychological process of attitude change. It was determined that the Hoi Chanh testimonial should contain four essential elements: a photograph and complete individual description of the Hoi Chanh; an indication of why he rallied; discussion of the good treatment he received; and an appeal to his former comrades to rally. Experience in the field showed that when a PSYOP person wrote a testimonial message for a Hoi Chanh, it was usually recognized as propaganda. The best approach was for the Hoi Chanh to address his message

specifically to his former unit and address some of his former comrades by name. He should tell enough about himself to convince the recipients of the message that he is in fact alive and well. The operative word in all Hoi Chanh testimonials was credibility. Themes were suggested to the returnee, but the language was his own. In many instances, audio tapes were prepared of Hoi Chanh testimonials for broadcast by air-to-ground loudspeaker systems and radio.

Poetry, music, and art were effective PSYOP media directed to hostile as well as friendly target groups. The messages were emotional in tone and concerned such time-tested themes as love, family, religion, home, holidays, and national heroes. [40]

It became apparent as a result of operational experience that direct psychological operations, aimed at modifying attitudes and behavior, must be preceded by propaganda that is indirect in character, slow and general in nature. It should seek to create an atmosphere of favorable preliminary attitudes. No direct psychological operations can be effective without a proper foundation. Safe conduct passes and testimonials are one type of foundation; that is, they inform the enemy soldier that if and when he decides to surrender, certain protocol will be observed. The best psychological operations involve face-to-face persuasion. The following example of PSYOP messages being reinforced by face-to-face persuasion was provided by a former deputy leader of a VC surgical team who was also a Communist party member.

> The Chieu Hoi leaflets were dropped by airplanes very often. I read some of them . . . At that time I didn't really believe in the leaflets because I was told by the cadres that the government wanted to cheat Front people by its Chieu Hoi program. Although I didn't believe what the leaflets said, I had something in my mind about leaving the Front. When my friend, Mr. Thiet, came to tell me about the government's treatment toward the ralliers, I believed him. I believed that I wouldn't be beaten up by the GVN as the cadres had said, because my friend was one of the ralliers, and he wasn't beaten up or punched down into the sea. [This refers to VC claims that GVN troops took the Hoi Chanh up in a helicopter and then threw them into the ocean.] On the contrary, he was well-treated by the government. He was given a job, and he was free to visit his family when he wanted. [41]

Another type of foundation used in an insurgency environment was a magazine disseminated in Vietnam called Long *Me.*

The primary target audience for the magazine was the families, friends, and sympathizers of the VC. The 62-page, full-color magazine was distributed bimonthly to villages and districts known to be sympathetic to the VC. It was distributed by priests, merchants, school teachers, bus drivers, fortune tellers, armed propaganda teams, and others. Long Me was also distributed through direct mail. It contained feature stories, poems, short novels, cartoons, and art. The feature stories were factual, and they emphasized the positive features of the new life offered to former VC. Long Me's indirect approach worked well. The staff of Long Me, with the exception of one American (Philip Katz), was composed of former communist propagandists.

Not all propagandists in Vietnam believed in the slow and indirect approach. Many messages were harsh, explicit, and direct; for example, this leaflet was prepared and disseminated by an American military unit:

> The sky soldiers of the US 173d Airborne Brigade are here to destroy you. We have killed hundreds of your comrades with our powerful bombs and artillery and invincible ground troops. You will die a senseless death and be buried in an unmarked grave in an unknown jungle. Rally now before it is too late.

Propaganda must be continuous and lasting-continuous in that it must not leave any gaps in logic and continuity of themes, lasting in that it must function over a period of time. The principle of repetition plays an important role in persuasive communication.

PSYOP is not magic; effective communication is based on slow and constant impregnation. PSYOP is not a stimulus that disappears quickly; it consists of successive messages and actions aimed at various emotions or thoughts through many instruments of communication. Effective psychological actions should be continuous; as soon as the effect of one message is weakened, it should be reinforced by another.

Post-Vietnam

After the conflict in Southeast Asia, the United States once again moved away from systematic, coordinated psychological operations on a government-wide scale. As in the past, military

human resources for PSYOP were reassigned or neglected. The USIA had no intensive focus, and USIA efforts were only marginally coordinated with other US persuasion programs. The lessons of the past concerning the potential value of PSYOP, the importance of coordinated, systematic planning, and the value of continuous communications as facilitator (even during periods of strategic security) were once again ignored. [42]

Effectiveness

Probably the most elusive single area in the analysis of psychological operations is the evaluation of PSYOP effectiveness. How can effectiveness be measured? Polling dominates much of our political life, and market research is considered fundamental to sound business practices; yet PSYOP operates in an anachronistic world where direct audience analysis is often impossible.

Effectiveness of persuasive communications is generally viewed in terms of the degree to which attitudes are changed or reinforced. However, studies have conclusively demonstrated that PSYOP directed at denied or hostile areas should aspire to modify peripheral attitudes only, not fundamental ones.[43] Our government's persuasive communications to foreign audiences enjoy very limited parameters of only potential effect.[44]

The relatively small range of impact and the difficulty of measurement are primary constraints in the evaluation of effectiveness. The fundamental question is, how successful are the communications in terms of the limited objectives? Sometimes, however, practitioners have been forced into a secondary question: Assuming the general principles we have identified to be optimum, to what degree are the communications congruent with them?

Another major impediment to effectiveness assessment is the nonpersuasive nature of psychological operations. One is inclined to think in terms of the critical message directed at the critical audience at the critical moment. In fact, the vast majority of propaganda and other instruments of PSYOP consist of what L. John Martin has called facilitative com-

munication (*not* persuasive communication).[45] That is, PSYOP is designed to keep the lines open-maintain the channel and its credibility-in *preparation* for the critical movement, message, and audience. Since the purpose of the messages sent in facilitative communication is *not* persuasive, how do we measure their effectiveness? To what extent should the two types of communication, which are purposively related but conceptually discrete, be evaluated by a single measure?

> If we could select our audience on the basis of certain idiocratic factors-objective physical and personal characteristics peculiar to an individual, such as age, sex, race, education-we might increase by a statistically significant fraction the proportion of those influenced by a message. But we would have no control over such factors as personality and susceptibility to persuasion, existing values, beliefs and opinions or attitudes toward the objects, subjects and situations involved in the persuasive message. We can choose our communicator but not determine his image. We can select the vehicle of transmission but not the channel of reception of the target of our communication. We could maximize the effect of all these factors for a single individual, especially if we were able to subject him to intensive precommunication analysis. But there is no way that this can be done for the diverse assortment of individuals who normally make up the audience of the mass media, the vehicles most commonly used in international propaganda.[46]

For lack of a criterion,[47] **as well as for the inability to secure direct access to the audience and the recognition of the inherent limits of persuasive communications, the most common evaluations of effectiveness have been output measures, despite their notorious limitations.[48] A second approach has been to focus on reception, in general, this area has not attracted much attention. The final type of analysis-effects measures-may be both direct and indirect.**

Direct measures of effects can involve the use of polling or survey data. In peacetime, such information can be gathered in interviews with traveling foreign nationals,[49] direct mail questionnaires, and polling in the audience's country. In war, or when relations between the sender (source) and receiver (audience) countries are strained, only some-or none-of these may be practicable. In these cases, refugees[50] and prisoners of war[51] have been used to gather effects data. However, such groups often have inherent disadvantages as a population-they may not be a representative sample, and

identification of the role of any individual message in their decision to defect is usually elusive.

Indirect measures include the content analysis of intercepted mail, mail drops,[52] captured documents, broadcasts and telecasts, and target area public media.[53]

Trends

In an effort to institutionalize PSYOP intelligence, the US military designed and developed a computer-oriented system called PAMIS.,This information system was designed to fulfill several objectives: (1) to provide the spectrum of information needed to support PSYOP organizational elements for the planning, implementation, and evaluation of PSYOP programs; (2) to encourage (indeed, to enforce) methodologies to support information-gathering programs; and (3) to provide an appropriate automatic data-processing system for the storage, analysis, and utilization of the gathered data.

PAMIS encompasses these three systems:

Foreign Media Analysis (FMA) System,[54]
PSYOP Foreign Area Data System (PFAD),[55] and
PSYOP Effects Analysis System (PEAS).[56]

The primary objective of FMA is to provide statistical data obtained from publications and radio broadcasts of selected foreign countries. The data collected includes information about their propaganda objectives and strategy; propaganda themes used to support these objectives; propaganda trends; the tone and intensity of media coverage related to domestic themes, foreign governments, international organizations or political movements; and propaganda techniques and tactics. Another FMA objective is to provide clear-text abstracts on important events, subjects, and persons as they are treated in the public media of the selected countries.

The objective of PFAD is to provide the US military PSYOP community with uniform methods and procedures for the collection, storage, and rapid retrieval of data needed for planning and operations. The PFAD was designed to accomplish the following tasks:

- define parameters for the collection of PSYOP-relevant data;
- provide uniform procedures and methods for collecting and reporting such data;
- provide a retrieval system that has a centralized data bank, the core of which is a set of over 1,600 foreign area data descriptors, and that permits retrieval of two types of reports: annotated bibliographic material and narrative summaries of subject data; and
- provide for continuous and rapid updating of PSYOP foreign area information.

The compwter system provides the PSYOP community with social, cultural, economic, political, communication, and other information that is needed to make decisions on aspects of PSYOP policy, planning, allocation, and deployment of resources and operations.

PEAS was designed to collect, store, and process data from a sample of a target audience in order to measure the success or failure of **PSYOP** messages and programs. The system also stores and processes data about friendly and hostile PSYOP activities and actions. Timely, accurate reporting on the purpose (objectives and tasks) of friendly PSYOP programs is essential, as are facts about the distribution and intensity of efforts expended on specific target audiences. Although hostile PSYOP activities and actions usually do not directly affect friendly messages, systematic monitoring of hostile propaganda and other actions provides analysts with many clues about how enemy elites react to our PSYOP programs. In fact, when respondents from the target population (such as prisoners, defectors, and refugees) are not available, the content analysis of hostile media can be the most valuable source of feedback concerning the impact of friendly programs.

A significant objective of PEAS is to institutionalize methods and procedures for analyzing **PSYOP** programs and strategies so that the successes and failures of strategic and tactical programs can be measured. PEAS was therefore designed to provide the following:

- **uniform (institutionalized) procedures and methods for reporting and describing all PSYOP activities in a theater of operations;**
- **rapid retrieval of command and control data to determine how effort and cost relate to objectives and tasks;**
- **the data necessary for analysts to correlate operational data with specific military target groups and segments of the civilian population;**
- **data for a continuous evaluation of the initial impact of** PSYOP messages (audio and print) directed to general or **particular target groups;**
- **uniform procedures and methods for reporting and analyzing hoAtile propaganda and action directed to friendly military and civilian populations; and**
- **data needed for an independent audit and assessment of military PSYOP by the joint or other appropriate command.**

To accomplish the above, PEAS was designed to accept, store, and process data inputs into three computer files.

The ACTH file of PEAS was designed to institutionalize the reporting of military psychological activities at each command level. This reporting system provides commanders with systematically collected data for command and control of the full range of PSYOP activities. Specifically, the ACTIV file provides information about the quantity of effort being directed in support of specific programs or campaigns, in support of PSYOP objectives, tasks, and themes, and toward definitive target groups. In addition, this file provides information about the amount of effort allocated to each channel of communication (such as print, radio, and loudspeaker). Also available is information about psychological actions such as show of force, exploitation of new weapons, and supply drops.

Much basic data is needed for making evaluations: To what extent are our messages directed to specific target audiences? What are our objectives? Are our messages received and understood? PEAS will provide many answers to these questions.

The IMPACT file of PEAS was designed to institutionalize the collection of data about the effect of specified propaganda messages, activities, and programs. The data collection format

was designed to be manageable for prisoner of war or other interrogations at any level of command. Each IMPACT computer record pertains to a respondent's (such as POW) reaction to an electronic or printed message or action. In the first step (of the interrogation process), the respondent is required to select from a catalogue of PSYOP messages that he has seen or heard. The IMPACT data record is then completed for those messages identified by the respondent.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to present the details for the multitude of inputs and outputs of the ACTIV file of PEAS, but both quantitative (statistical) and qualitative (textual) reports are available to analysts and other users of the system. These reports provide gross information related to four indicators of PSYOP impact.

- Understanding: Did the audience understand the language and symbolism used in the message?
- Credibility: Was the content credible, or did the audience view the message as obvious propaganda?
- Influence: Did the message influence the respondent to act in a way favorable to the sponsor of the message?
- *Irritation:* Did the language, symbolism, or other aspect of the message irritate the audience?

Statistical analysis of such data should reveal the specific themes and messages that were successful; it should also reveal those messages that failed. In addition, PEAS should provide analysts with a generous number of textual responses, in the respondent's own words, that explain the reasons for both success and failure.

PEAS will provide military commanders with the range of information needed to evaluate the impact of psychological operations. No longer will number of leaflets produced or hours of broadcast time be the only-or even the basic-criteria for evaluating PSYOP programs.

The POLWAR file of PEAS provides uniform procedures and methods for reporting and analyzing hostile propaganda and action directed to US military-and other friendly-populations. Data from this file allow for the continuous monitoring of hostile POLWAR activities at the tactical command level. It is this file of the PEAS that interfaces with the FMA system. The

POLWAR file is concerned with those communications, propaganda, and actions that take place in a combat environment and are directed at friendly military and civilian audiences. This contrasts with the FMA system, which is concerned primarily with strategic objectives and which deals with data obtained from newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasts directed to their own domestic audiences.

Conclusions

Tanaka's concept of cross-cultural communication, noted above, emphasized the systematic use of multichannel, multistep flo* of communication, and a strategy in which communication is by both deed and word.

Propaganda must be total. A modern psychological operation must utilize all of the technical means at its disposal-the press, radio, TV, movies, posters, meetings, and face-to-face persuasion. There is no psychological operation when meetings and lectures are sporadic, a few slogans are splashed on walls, radio and television presentations are uncoordinated, and news articles are random. Each communication medium has its own particular mode of influence-alone, it cannot attack individuals, break down their resistance, or make their decisions for them. A film does not play on the same motives, does not produce the same feelings, does not provoke the same reactions as a leaflet. The very fact that the effectiveness of each medium is limited to one particular area clearly shows the necessity of complementing it with other media. A word spoken on the radio is not the same as the identical word spoken in private conversation or in a public speech. Nor does a word appearing in print produce the same effect as the same word when it is spoken. To draw the individual into the net of persuasion, each technique must be utilized in its own specific way, directed toward producing the optimum effect, and orchestrated with all the other media. Each medium reaches the individual in a specific fashion and makes him react anew to the same theme-in the same direction, but differently. Thus, no part of the intellectual or emotional personality is left alone.

Effective totalitarian regimes have a clear understanding of the psychological aspects of military actions. These regimes

employ propaganda for psychological impact every day, and propaganda is fully institutionalized within the political and military structure of these states. Furthermore, these regimes are sensitive to the psychological environment of their target audiences and are able to orchestrate the various instruments of communication to promote unity in their own ranks and unity with their own people while promoting divisiveness in enemy forces.

As a democracy, the United States has tried to renounce domestic propaganda; as a nation in a highly competitive political world, America must use psychological operations. As yet, however, the formula that would support both these aims without their working at cross-purposes has not been found-a fact made quite evident by the awkwardness that characterizes US PSYOP efforts at home and abroad.

Psychological operations can be among the most suitable and effective weapons in pursuit of US national objectives in this unstable and sometimes threatening world. PSYOP exploits military readiness already required for other purposes without requiring the use of military force. It draws power from the strength of Western democracy and the universals of civilization. It can encourage masses of people to develop untapped natural resources and to oppose totalitarian regimes.

The requirements for effective psychological operations are considerable. Modern persuasive communication is not a haphazard, hit-or-miss activity but a well-coordinated, sustained effort. It demands a broad and thorough knowledge of a wide variety of psychological, sociological, and cultural factors. It also requires planning well in advance of events. It must, at all times, serve under an appropriate form of centralized direction with trained personnel and dedicated resources. Contemporary psychological operations is not an amateur's game.

Notes

1. This definition is adapted from Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1974. Psychological operations* is a broader term than *psychological warfare* in that it deals with friendly and neutral, as well as hostile, audiences.

2. See R. J. Barret, "PSYOP: What Is It?" Military Review 42 (1972): 57-72. For an excellent study of the dynamics of international perception, see Robert A. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

3. Harold D. Lasswell, "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society," in L. Bryson, ed., The Communication *of* Ideas (New York: Harper and Row, 1948).

4. Indeed, the four principal figures in the establishment of communications research-the fundamental PSYOP root-were two psychologists (Paul Lazarsfeld and Carl Horland), a sociologist (Kurt Lewin), and a political scientist (Harold Lasswell).

5. Wilbur Schramm, "Communication Research in the United States," in idem, ed., The Science *of* Human Communication (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 1-16.

6. Y. Tanaka, "Psychological Factors in International Persuasion," The Annals *of* the American Academy *of* Political and Social Science 398 (1971): 50-54.

7. Historical literature dealing with US PSYOP is far from rich. It includes the following: W. E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, eds. A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958); M. Dyer, The Weapon on the Wall (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959); Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in World War I (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971); D. Lerner, Sykewar (New York: George W. Stewart, 1951); and P. M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1954).

8. H. Butterfield, "Psychological Warfare in 1776: The Jefferson-Franklin Plan to Cause Hessian Desertions," Proceedings *of* the American Philosophical Society 94 (1950): 233-41.

9. Relatively little has been written in recent years about the so-called Creel Committee, the Committee on Public Information, created by United States President Woodrow Wilson after the United States entered World War I. Substantial writing on the committee appeared in the interwar period. Even about the Second World War it could be said that "U.S. propaganda agencies created during [the war] were more the result of trial and error planning and ad hoc improvisations than of careful blueprinting."

10. Daugherty and Janowitz, 126.

11. C. I. Hovland, I. L. Janis, and H. H. Kelley, Communication and Persuasion (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953); C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change (Philadelphia, Pa.: W. B. Saunder, 1965); C. I. Hovland and I. L. Janis, Personality and Persuasibility (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959); R. L. Rosnow and E. J. Robinson, eds., Experiments in Persuasion (New York: Academic Press, 1967).

12. C. I. Hovland, The Order *of* Presentation in Persuasion (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1957).

13. Hovland and Janis.

14. Tanaka, 50-54.

15. In the summer of 1942 Russian Lt Gen Andrei A. Vlasov was captured by the Germans. The Germans soon learned that Vlasov wanted to lead a Russian national army of liberation into the Soviet Union. General Vlasov (a Russian military hero) was willing to collaborate with the Germans for the sake of Russian national independence. Hitler, however, saw Vlasov at most as a tactical propaganda tool to weaken the Soviet forces: "promises might be given to him and deserters who came over to join him (the Vlasov movement), but on no account should these promises be kept."

16. R. Gehlen, *The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen* (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1972), 84.

17. The Chieu Hot program was the campaign to encourage "ralliers" (Hot Chanh) to come over to the Republic of Vietnam side. Only South Vietnamese NO were eligible. Substantial publicity was given to the act of "rallying"—to the motivations and aspirations of the Hot Chanh, the benefits of rallying, and the like.

18. Tanaka.

19. US Information Agency, *Proceedings of the Seminar on Effectiveness,* R-121-66 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Policy and Research, 1966).

20. Ibid.

21. The *agency* responsible for programs and operations is USIA; the overseas *posts* are USIS posts, and they form an integral part of the US country team headed in each country by the chief of mission, usually an ambassador.

22. There have been many proposals over the years to sever VOA from USIA, but for the present the tie remains.

23. Other US institutions principally involved on a continuing basis include the National Security Council, the DOS, the Agency for International Development, and the DOD.

24. A major source on USIA is J. Henderson, *The United States Information Agency* (New York: Praeger, 1969); M. G. Lawson et al., *The United States Information Agency during the Administration of Lyndon B. Johnson, November 1963-January 1969* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1968) is an administration history of some value in understanding USIA. T. Sorenson, *The Word War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1968) gives an excellent overview of the problems and competing principles with which such an agency must deal. A more critical, briefer, but equally stimulating presentation-is K. R. Sparks, "Selling Uncle Sam in the Seventies," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 398 (1971): 113-23.

25. I. T. Mapper. *The Effects of Mass Communication* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960).

26. B. H. Cooper, Jr., "The Undenounced Intervention," in Ralph D. McLaurin et al., ed., *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976), 241-46; Idem, "Accentuating the Positive," in ibid., 280-86.

27. R. Nathan, "Cuba: Strategic Dilemma," in ibid., 259-61; B. H. Cooper, Jr.. "Effective Diplomacy: An Exit from Armageddon," in ibid., 386-91.

28. B. H. Cooper, Jr., "Teamwork in Santo Domingo," in ibid., 229-32; Idem, "Divided Counsels," in ibid., 262-66.

29. R. T. Holt, ***Radio Free Europe*** (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958); A. A. Mitchie, ***Voices through the Iron Curtain: The Radio Free Europe Story*** (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1963); and J. R. Price, ***Radio Free Europe -A Survey and Analysis*** (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Services, 1971).

30. J. C. Whelan, ***Radio Liberty-A Study of Its Origins, Structure, Policy, Programming, and Effectiveness*** (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Services, 1972).

31. E. Taylor, "RIAS: The Voice East Germany Believes," ***The Reporter, 10*** November 1953,28-32.

32. R. L. Heilbroner, "Counterrevolutionary America," ***Commentary*** 43 (1967): 31-38.

33. G. V. Allen, "What the U.S. Information Program Cannot Do," in J. B. Whitton, ed., ***Propaganda and the Cold War*** (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963).

34. The Chieu Hoi inducement program was a campaign to reward Hot Chanh who turned over weapons. (The reward was money.)

35. J. A. Koch, ***The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam (1963-71)*** (Washington, D.C.: DOD, Advanced Research Projects Agency, R-1172-ARPA, January 1973).

36. See Philip P. Katz, ***Communicating with the Vietnamese through Leaflets*** (Saigon: Joint US Public Affairs Office, 1968).

37. Ibid., 66.

38. Ibid., 68.

39. Ibid.

40. Philip P. Katz, ***A Systematic Approach to PSYOP Information*** (Kensington, Md.: American Institutes for Research, 1970).

41. Joint US Public Affairs Office, PSYOP ***in Vietnam: Indications of Effectiveness*** (Saigon: JUSPAO Planning Office, 1967), 120-21.

42. See L. A. Free, VOA Language Priority Study, Washington, D.C., US Information Agency, 1969.

43. D. Lerner, "Is International Persuasion Sociologically Feasible?" ***The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*** 398 (1971): 41-49.

44. D. D. Smith, "Some Effects of Radio Moscow's North American Broadcasts," ***Public Opinion Quarterly*** 34 (1970-71): 539-51.

45. L. John Martin, "Effectiveness of International Propaganda," ***The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*** 398 (1971): 61-70.

46. Ibid.

47. D. D. Robinson, *A Brief Review Study of the Problems of Criteria in Psychological Warfare* (Columbus, Ohio: Battelle Memorial Institute. Remote Area Conflict Information Center, 1967).

48. Daugherty and Janowitz, 681-84.

49. L. B. Szalay, "Audience Analysis," *Congressional Record* 148 (6 March 1972): 53426-28.

50. Whelan.

51. Philip P. Katz. "A Survey of PSYOP Intelligence," in Ronald D. McLaurin et al., ed., *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations,* 478-94.

52. Mail drops for these purposes are addresses purportedly for give-aways or other contacts. All mail arriving at these addresses is then analyzed for background data-location, age, and sex of correspondent.

53. McLaurin, chaps. 8 and 9.

54. Philip P. Katz, PSYOP *Automated Management Information System (PAMIS): Foreign Media Analysis* (Kensington, Md.: American Institutes for Research, 1972).

55. Philip P. Katz, PSYOP *Automated Management Information System (PAMIS): Foreign Area Data Subsystem (PFADS)* (Kensington. Md.: American Institutes for Research, 1973).

56. Philip P. Katz, PSYOP *Automated Management Information System (PAMIS): PSYOP Effects Analysis System* (Kensington, Md.: American Institutes for Research, 1976).

PART III

Strategic, Tactical, and Operational PSYOP

Introduction

This section deals with the objectives and activities of strategic, tactical, operational, and other types of PSYOP. **In all forms, PSYOP primarily supports the attainment of national policy and objectives. The key to all US PSYOP is credibility of the message. Evaluation is based on changing perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors.**

Certainly, the ideology of a government plays a role in its PSYOP methodology and its international communications. The authors offer articles about Soviet PSYOP campaigns and activities with a credibility/ disinformation perspective.

DeWitt S. Copp discusses Soviet active propaganda measures, including forgery, agents of influence, and disinformation. His discussion serves as a historical summary of Soviet campaigns and ideology.

James Melnich emphasizes mirror imaging in Soviet propaganda. His essay is useful in understanding the overall Soviet PSYOP threat and possible related weaknesses.

Lev Yudovich reveals the significant threat and impact of the Soviet military doctrine of cultivating hate in their soldiers. This doctrine was designed to make Soviet soldiers psychologically prepared to act in dangerous situations and to believe in victory.

Dr Joseph S. Gordon focuses on research, target analysis, pretesting and effects analysis, and propaganda analysis. He concludes that intelligence activities are critical to PSYOP.

George V. Allen, former director of USIA, states that we must be realists and understand that a combination of political, economic, psychological, and military efforts are necessary. He believes that propaganda alone in the short run can do little to solve problems. Allen advocates an honest, objective, and truthful information program that faithfully relies on the individual to make right decisions.

Lt Col John Ozaki, USA, addresses the planning and coordination of successful defector programs as another form of combat power. He emphasizes the characteristics and techniques of a sound program to defeat insurgency movements.

Ronald D. McLaurin emphasizes that PSYOP at the tactical level can contribute to the major strategic objectives of a government and a reacquisition of the loyalty and support of the population.

Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., reviews and analyzes selected US and Vietcong PSYOP in the Vietnam War.

Soviet Active Measures

DeWitt S. Copp

Although Vladimir I. Lenin did not coin the term *active measures (aktivnee meropriyatia),* **he originated and set in motion all its component parts. Those parts included the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Section A of the first chief directorate of the KGB, and the propaganda department (PD) of the Central Committee.**

The ID is the coordinating center for Soviet active measures. Its lineage can be traced directly to Lenin's formation of the Comintern in 1919. Lenin's purpose for the Comintern, or Third **International, was to advance the cause of global revolution by forming communist parties in noncommunist countries and creating conditions for revolt through propaganda and agitation. The approach was adaptable to political realities.**

The International Department, formed in 1957, was a sophisticated apparatus at the summit of Soviet power. It carried the view of the leadership, bringing influence to bear on any area-political, military, or economic-that would aid or abet Soviet policy. At the same time, it sought to denigrate and undermine the policies of the noncommunist world, particularly those of the United States. More politically realistic than its Leninist ancestor, the ID's purpose was to manipulate public opinion and gain the acceptance of Soviet ends. The ID's secretary was Anatolii F. Dobrynin, who had served as Soviet ambassador to the United States for 24 years. He was appointed to his post by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev in June 1986, several months after the important Twenty-Seventh Congress of the CPSU.

The ID worked closely with the propaganda department, headed by Party Secretary Aleksander N. Yakovlev, who had served for 10 years as Soviet ambassador to Canada.

The propaganda department employed dual courses of action. It orchestrated the line of the party, utilizing Soviet and bloc media, and overtly replayed disinformation generated by the active measures apparatus. Since the PD embodied the former international information department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, it covered both the Soviet home front and the foreign scene.

One of Lenin's first acts on seizing power was to establish the Cheka, dr secret police. He knew that without such an instrument of fear, his movement could not expect to survive. That circumstance did not change, but the Cheka became the KGB-and its activities were worldwide!

Section A of the KGB's first chief directorate worked in liaison with the ID in carrying out covert Soviet active measures. These efforts included disinformation operations, the placement of forgeries, and the managing and directing of knowing and unknowing agents of influence-professionals in sensitive positions, both private and public-whose activities were frequently of great value in the Politburo's plan to gain acceptance of its position on major issues.

Together, the ID, the KGB, and the PD were the architects and planners of Soviet active measures. With an estimated annual budget of $4 billion, their combined efforts were a major force in the mechanics of Soviet foreign policy.

Stanislav Levchenko, a former major in the KGB, was acting director of line PR of the Soviet active measures group in Tokyo when he defected to the United States in 1979. In his 13-14 July 1982 testimony at the Hearings before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, he gave the following appraisal.

> The size of the overt and covert active measures is massive ... I can tell you from an insider's vantage point that the ID and the KGB receive all the resources and personnel needed to carry out this massive effort. There are never any shortages. Of course, this is not a recent development. An examination of the history of the CPSU will demonstrate the importance of such tactics . . . all active measures operations are assessed against a set of standards. Success is a vital

ingredient. The growth of the Soviet active measures effort over the last five to ten years is due to progress in the field.

Forgeries

Soviet active measures were carried out within a spectrum of white (overt), gray (semicovert), and black (covert) operations. It was in this last area that the crafting and placement of forgeries was conducted by section A of the first chief directorate of KGB. KGB's management of forgeries was global, and was linked to the use of Soviet assets in whatever locale the particular forgery was to be surfaced. The KGB's purpose in placing fdrgeries was to undermine US relations with allies and nonaligned governments and to influence public opinion against US policies concerning sensitive issues. An additional purpose was to convince those affected by the impact of the forgery that decisions announced by the United States cannot be believed because underlying them were secret plans that were harmful in their implication and intent.

For example, an obscure French-language weekly newspaper in Madagascar-Carrefour (Crossroads)-carried on its front page (summer 1985) a purported letter from a US Army medical doctor at Walter Reed Research Institute written to a supposed superior at the Pentagon. The substance of the forgery indicated that US and South African scientists were secretly working on psychotropic chemical weapons and so-called ethnic weapons that would kill only black-skinned people.

The forgery contained numerous technical errors, and its falsity was quickly exposed by the United States Information Agency (USIA). However, this did not stop Tass (the Soviet official news agency) at year's end from running the forgery as a true account. Tass lifted it from Krasnaya Zuezda (Red Star), the official publication of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, under the headline "Sinister Plans."

The purpose of the forgery was to instill and spread the belief that the US government is vicious, racist, and scientifically willing to pursue inhuman ends. That KGB effort to arouse black Africa failed-the forgery was not picked up by other African newspapers and outlets. However, one of the basic

consistencies of the active measures apparatus was that of repetition. A lie once told is never discarded, no matter how thoroughly exposed. In June 1987, in a meeting with USIA Director Charles Wick, who was in Moscow for the opening of a USIA cultural exhibit, the director of Novosti repeated the ethnic weapon lie. Wick walked out of the meeting. Novosti, a supposedly independent Soviet news agency, is heavily staffed by the KGB.

The KGB made a practice of attacking US scientific and medical activities on a broad scale, employing not only forgeries but also disinformation by clandestine radio stations. One such KGB effort was mounted through "Radio Halgan," operated by a communist-front group of Somali dissidents in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The station reported that the president of Somalia was negotiating with the US commander of Central Command to lease Somali territory near the border of Kenya to bury US nuclear waste in exchange for a large aid program ($400 million). This completely false broadcast was quickly reported (as straight news) by newspapers in Kenya as well as by the AP and other wire services, which replayed the message as far away as Rome and Vienna.

In spite of US proof that no such meeting ever took place (the president of Somalia was out of the country at the time) and the fact that the US does not bury nuclear waste anywhere outside its own borders, the account took on a distorted life of its own. The false story, which was reprinted in numerous publications throughout Africa, produced this headline: "Africa a Global Dustbin for Nuclear Waste."

Soviet active measures operations, using forgery and disinformation, ran the gamut from clumsy and crude to sophisticated and clever. One example of the latter bore the unique distinction of being a double forgery.

The point of attack was Cyprus. The intent was twofold: to damage US-Greek Cypriot relations and to instill fear in the minds of the European public regarding US and NATO plans.

The KGB target was the Greek Cypriot newspaper *Simerini.* A document came into its possession, supposedly forwarded by a Cypriot official who, in turn, had purportedly received it from a British MP, Sir Frederic Bennett. His letter to an unnamed official was a forgery: "Your Excellency, I have received a letter

which contained [sic] information about your country. Since I am not an expert on the problem of the area in which your country is located, I have decided to write to you and enclose the attached letter." The attached letter appeared on the front page of *Simerini.* It, too, was a forgery. Its author was supposedly the US Air Force vice chief of staff, who was allegedly writing to US Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, on an urgent matter. The matter concerned the US use of bases in northern Cyprus under Turkish occupation for intended operations in the Middle East. Also, and most importantly, it concerned the evacuation of US soldiers and their families and other US citizens in case of nuclear war in Europe. The forgery elaborated on the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe and their possible use in support of the president's strategic schemes.

Swift action on the part of USIA P/G, USIS Nicosia, and Sir Bennett exposed the double forgery for what it was. Its publication and *Simerini's* failure to write a retraction undoubtedly had a very negative effect upon Greek Cypriots who accepted the forgery as valid, but it did not gain European press attention.

To the KGB, a forgery's failure to attain the full effect in no way impeded the continuing attack. Was the forgery's purpose to convince Latin Americans that the US was plotting with Chile to inject Chilean troops and weapons into Central America? Was the purpose to disrupt the first legitimate elections in Guatemala in 30 years by indicating US manipulation and control of the election's outcome? Was its purpose to sway the Indian public into believing that the CIA was responsible for the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi? Or was its purpose to "get away with" the murder of 269 KAL passengers by claiming that the civilian airliner was on an espionage mission?

Perhaps the forgery's purpose was all of these; in any event, the work of Section A of the KGB's first chief directorate continued without letup. Its endeavors apparently were not moderated in any form by the new spirit of Geneva or by glasnost.

Agents of Influence

Of all Soviet active measures, the most effective and the most difficult to expose was the KGB's utilization of agents of influence. Agents of influence were individuals who, either knowingly or unknowingly, sought to implant Soviet policy positions into decisions made by international organizations (such as the UN) and governmental departments. They also sought to influence congressional actions, public beliefs, and national attitudes concerning world affairs. A case in point is the former senior Norwegian government official, Arne Trehold, who frequently represented his government in negotiations with the Soviets. In June 1985, Trehold was convicted of espionage; he had been a known KGB agent of influence from 1974 to 1983.

Obviously, exposing such agents was a difficult task. At times, there were 700 Soviet diplomats assigned to West European posts. Additionally, 570 Soviets were attached to UN organizations in Europe and 1,200 Soviet bloc diplomats were serving overtly in similar capacities. Finally, and perhaps of greatest significance, there were more than 200 Soviet journalists in Western Europe. The CIA estimated that at least one-third of the nearly 2,500 Soviet and Soviet bloc diplomats and representatives (trade and commercial) were either KGB or GRU (Soviet military) agents.

An unknown percentage were engaged in political espionage, enlisting and utilizing agents of influence. Through the testimony of Soviet and bloc defectors, who were previously involved in active measures, we know that journalistic cover was a KGB priority. It gave the agent an opportunity to legitimately meet a wide range of potential contacts.

Such a person may have been an unwitting agent, a dupe of KGB subtle persuasion and psychological manipulation. Not infrequently, that person was also a journalist. Caught on the hook of his own ego by a KGB operative, who appeared to be anything but, the unwitting agent was slowly and gently played through flattery and praise. He was given a chance to contribute an article to a select group of Soviet intellectuals, after which more articles were accepted and he received payment. Inside information was exchanged for inside

information until the unwitting agent began writing or broadcasting information that favored a particular Soviet line. The line could be political, military, scientific-anything that contributed to influence. In some cases the end result was blackmail, in others it was not. In all cases, however, the KGB's aim was served. There were no figures on agents of influence-only the knowledge that they were in our midst.

The term communications warfare sums up the totality of Soviet active measures-the use of words as weapons in all forms of media. Participants in this strategy were Soviet international fronts: propaganda organizations that conducted their activities under the semicovert direction and control of the ID. Lenin referred to the concept of fronts-groups that denied their Soviet connection while pushing the Soviet line-as transmission belts. Soviet fronts were in the vanguard of preaching, publishing, and fostering Moscow's aims.

Soviet International Fronts

The Soviets had 13 major international fronts and numerous smaller offshoots and satellites. Together they formed an interlocking network that specialized in advancing the Soviet propaganda line within noncommunist countries and the UN, and in emphasizing peace and disarmament as viewed from the Kremlin.

Months before General Secretary Gorbachev accepted President Reagan's invitation to meet in Geneva in November 1985, the fronts had received their marching orders from the ID. Meeting in Helsinki in April of that year, the leader of the 13 fronts drafted plans to launch an all-out campaign against the strategic defense initiative (SDI). The Helsinki gathering was hosted by Romesh Chandra, President of the World Peace Council (WPC, the largest and best known of the Soviet fronts). Chandra was also a member of the Politburo of the Indian Communist Party. Several weeks prior to the conference, the WPC had launched a global appeal against Washington's "space madness," proclaiming "No!" to Star Wars.

After that, the Soviet campaign to attack SDI and generate fear about it was unceasing. Through their publications, demonstrations, and forums, the fronts churned out a stream

of disinformation on SDI-never pointing out, of course, that SDI is a nonnuclear system whose purpose is to destroy missiles, not people.

A broad-gauged view of the campaign occurred in Prague in July 1985 when the Christian Peace Conference (CPC) held its sixth All-Christian Peace Assembly. The CPC had been a Soviet international front since its formation in Prague in 1958; its purpose was to encourage noncommunist clergymen and their congregations to support Soviet policy, including the invasion of Afghanistan. Nearly 800 participants from 97 countries attended the assembly. At the weeklong sessions, staged to address the social and economic ills of the world, a single message overrode all else: SDI meant the militarization of space. SDI was the promotion of an aggressive policy, a web of deception. SDI was a frightening expression of human hubris.

The Soviet propaganda efforts did not succeed in changing President Reagan's strategic policy at the Geneva Summit or, nearly a year later, at Reykjavik. This lack of success, however, did not halt the ongoing Soviet effort against SDI.

Soviet international fronts never admitted defeat on any issue, and they claimed victory in President Carter's 1977 decision to forego stockpiling the neutron bomb in NATO arsenals. In following ID instructions, their emphasis could shift from the neutron bomb to INF, to chemical-biological warfare (CBW), to SDI. All Soviet policy issues played continuing roles in the fronts' propaganda.

To conceal the obviousness of their real purpose, some fronts (such as the WPC), formed additional fronts and satellites. The Vienna-based International Institute for Peace (IIP) is one example; its hierarchy was made up of high-ranking officers of the WPC. The IIP sought to attract noncommunist academics and professionals who were willing to accept the false notion that the institute was a place where scientists from East and West could frankly exchange research results on all aspects of the peace issue.

Another WPC offspring was the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces (ILF), which was formed at WPC headquarters in Helsinki in 1973. Like the IIP, the ILF was heavily staffed by WPC officers. The ILF held a series of dialogues on peace

issues; for example, opposing SDI and NATO's INF deployment. Mostly, these conferences were held in Vienna, their WPC connection carefully obscured. The ILF was turned on and off as the Soviet International Department required.

Another Soviet front that was created through WPC organizational efforts was Generals for Peace and Disarmament (GPD). Its membership comprised 13 retired senior NATO officers. Foremost among them was Italian Gen Nino Pasti, who had once served as NATO deputy commander. He and four of his fellow members were closely associated with the WPC. Unlike other Soviet fronts, the GPD held no conferences on its own. Some of its members either attended, or sent frequent statements of support to, the major front peace congresses. The members also wrote books and pamphlets that attacked NATO policies and that tacitly-sometimes vigorously-supported the Soviet line. Based in London and chaired by retired Brig Michael Harbottle, the GPD was found by the British Foreign Office to have collective views that were contrary to those of the British government and its allies. Brigadier Harbottle and some others did a considerable amount of traveling, seeking media interviews and public forums from which to speak against allied military strategy. Harbottle took credit for arranging four meetings with retired Warsaw Pact generals in which there was unanimous agreement that the United States was a threat to world peace.

The propaganda drive of the Soviet fronts for 1986 was a coordinated campaign to dominate the UN-proclaimed International Year of Peace (IYP). As nongovernmental organizations (NGO) were granted consultative status with UN economic and social departments and agencies, the fronts positioned themselves to lead the IYP celebration. (The IYP chairman, Viacheslav A. Ustinov, was under secretary general for UN political and security council affairs.)

In all, there were more than 800 NGOs, only seven of which were Soviet-directed fronts. Yet, when the 250-member Conference on Non-Governmental Organizations (CONGO) elected a 20-member board to direct operations, five of the board members were representatives of the seven Soviet fronts. In January 1986, the CONGO met again in Geneva to hold conferences under the slogan "Together for Peace." Of the

18-member executive committee chosen to organize and direct the congress, six of the delegates were representatives of Soviet international fronts-and the WPC was separately selected to coordinate CONGO activities with the UN governing body.

Throughout 1986, these particular fronts, calling themselves closely cooperating NGOs, preached the Soviet propaganda line on disarmament and peace. They collectively moved toward a climactic assembly held in October 1986 in Copenhagen under the rubric of a World Peace Congress. An attempt was made to indicate that the congress organizers had been drawn from a broad political spectrum. Such was not the case, however: The WPC-at roughly three-year intervals-was the planner, organizer, and director. The last world peace congress was held in Prague in 1983. The WPC sought to conceal its role in the Copenhagen Congress, but Denmark's Social Democratic Party (SDP) exposed it and declared that this widely heralded peace gathering was nothing more than a Soviet front operation. The Danish press reported accordingly. This exposure did not stop the event, but the SDP spokesman issued this statement: "The members of the Congress Preparatory Committee do not represent a broad selection of political affiliations. We have checked the names of the people on the organizing committee and the vast majority are Communist."

Nevertheless, some 2,000 delegates and peace activists from around the world assembled to attack US policies, support the Soviet Union, and damn SDI. It seemed appropriate that the five-day peace congress ended in a wild melee when protesters against Soviet human rights violations attempted to make their point. After that, the Soviet international fronts were less vocal and more restrained, and Soviet propaganda was promulgated more directly by Soviet entities; for example, the Soviet Friendship Society.

The Gorbachev Era

When President Reagan met with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva in 1985, their views of disarmament revealed major differences. There was one area, however, in which all

participants at the summit appeared to be in agreement: the need to have a greater degree of cultural and personal exchange and a lesser degree of suspicion, animosity, and cold-war propaganda.

Perhaps it was a new beginning. The media proclaimed it the spirit of Geneva; Gorbachev called it glasnost (openness). It does not appear, however, that this spirit trickled down to the purveyors of Soviet active measures. Consider, for example, the following:

- **The Tass disinformation report on US scientists developing ethnic weapons to be used against South African blacks was repeated as 'recently as June 1987.**
- **Post-Geneva Soviet and surrogate propaganda implied that the CIA was behind the assassination of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme.**
- **Post-Geneva Tass claimed that the US Air Force had bombed Honduran peasants with poisonous substances at night. (The charge was completely refuted by Honduran health officials.)**
- **Lies emanating from Moscow and carried by Soviet surrogates (e.g., the New Delhi *Patriot*) maintained that the CIA was involved in the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the Air India crash, and rebellion among the Sikhs.**
- **The Soviet press alleged that the United States continued to create biological warfare weapons when, in fact, the United States was in full compliance with the 1972 treaty that banned the production of biological and toxic weapons.**
- **Soviet sources alleged that the CIA perpetrated the 1978 Jonestown massacre in Guyana (a US congressman and 918 cult members were killed). The story appeared first in *Izuestiya* on 30 January 1987 and again in the Leningrad Komsomol (communist youth organization) newspaper on 10 April 1987. A particularly gruesome account, containing photographs from Jonestown, appeared in the 2-8 March issue of *Nedelya,* a Sunday supplement of *Izuestiya.* Soviet media accounts were based on the book, *The Murder of Jonestown A CIA Crime,* published by a Soviet Ministry of Justice publishing house.**

The Soviet AIDS Campaign

A recent campaign on acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) provides insight into the methods used by the Soviets to spread a totally false story; that is, that the AIDS virus was scientifically engineered in a US laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland, and released into the mainstream by criminals and homosexuals who had volunteered to be guinea pigs. In October 1985, *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* attempted to launch such a campaign through the New Delhi *Patriot,* but there was only sporadic pickup by the foreign press. In May 1986, the *Litgaz* newspaper of the Soviet writer's union tried again; again, there was little outside response.

During these scattered Soviet attempts to sell the idea that AIDS was a made-in-the-USA product, US Ambassador Arthur Hartman wrote letters of protest to the editors of the publications involved, but the letters were not published. The ambassador later made the letters public, pointing out that the accusations were false and that the scientific claims were ridiculous.

The Harare Nonaligned Summit (NAM) became the launch pad for another Soviet-directed AIDS disinformation campaign that was to have far more success than the previous attempts to sell the lie. For several months prior to the NAM, Soviet and pro-Soviet media had claimed that the US government (CIA) was out to wreck the NAM, but no mention was made of the US being responsible for AIDS.

The opening attack came just prior to the summit with articles in the *Harare Sunday Mail* and the *United News of India,* reporting the distribution of a scientific tract to the delegates titled *AIDS U.S. Homemade Evil, Not Made in Africa.* (Its actual title was *AIDS-Its Nature and Its Origin,* but it sought to sell the aforementioned thesis.) The false claims of the document failed to take hold at the conference, due in part to a swift retraction by the *Harare Sunday Mail,* which carried an interview with an American virologist on the faculty of the University of Zimbabwe. The virologist found the document to be totally without scientific merit.

There was no further mention of AIDS until Novosti, the Soviet news agency, reported from Moscow that two French

scientists had confirmed that AIDS was the result of bacterial warfare testing in the United States. That same day in Damascus, *Al Thawra* ran the Novosti account on its front page. Two days later, "Radio Prague" broadcast the same story in its English language Afro-Asian service program. Tass then repeated the disinformation that AIDS had been developed at Pentagon laboratories at Fort Detrick, Maryland. This story was also reported in Kampala in the leftist magazine *Weekly Topic.*

Later, the London *Sunday Express,* certainly no part of the Soviet active measures apparatus, ran an interview story with Professor Jgcob Segal and his wife, Lilli, principal authors of the Harare Summit AIDS document. The *Express* reported that Segal, and to a lesser degree his specialist colleagues (Dr John Seale of London and Dr Robert Strecker of Glendale), contended that the killer AIDS virus was artificially created by American scientists during laboratory experiments which went disastrously wrong and that a massive cover-up has kept the secret from the world until today. This totally erroneous front-page claim had the effect the Soviets sought. Coming from London in a conservative publication, the disinformation caught hold.

In the week that followed, 14 USIS posts reported reprintings of the *Express* story. By end of the month, the total approached 30. Publications in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, India, and Western Europe carried the disinformation. In Wellington, New Zealand, The *Dominion* ran the story on its front page under the heading, *Bizarre Theory on AIDS Origin.* In Helsinki, although a tabloid carried the piece, it also carried this quote from a noted Finnish AIDS expert, Dr Jukka Suni: "I know of Doctor Segal and of his reputation. He is a 'prophet of doom' who has been getting worse year after year."

In Eastern Europe, only in Poland was the *Express* article replayed. It was featured in the Polish government daily, which made a connection with the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* account of October 1985. Several days later, the Soviet press weighed in through Tass and *Pravda.* The Soviet official news agency used reports from its New York correspondent, who had cited out of context a National Academy of Science report on AIDS. Tass attempted to link factual scientific information with Segal's

Fort Detrick disinformation. Segal was again referred to inaccurately as a French scientist.

Pravda went a vicious step further, running an editorial cartoon that showed a man in medical dress handing a beaker full of swastikas suspended in liquid to a second man wearing a US military officer's uniform. The officer is handing the doctor a wad of dollars. The beaker is labeled "AIDS virus." A number of corpses lie on the floor. Ambassador Hartman again wrote letters of protest, this time to the editors of Tass and *Pravda.* As before, he received no response.

Result of USIA/State Response

Although the disinformation campaign was initially successful, rebuttals from USIA and State Department INR quickly helped to reverse original media acceptance of the Soviet effort. Adding to this was the stabilizing effect of two widely attended AIDS conferences in Brazzaville and Berlin. In Brazzaville, where representatives of 37 countries gathered under the chairmanship of Dr Johnathan Mann, AIDS director of the World Health Organization, no mention was made of the campaign. In Berlin, it was dismissed as being unworthy of comment.

As a result, many of the publications that had carried the *Sunday Express* story printed retractions (which included a modified backdown by the *Express* itself). In a stinging editorial, the *Hindustan Times* declared that not a single reputable scientific journal had supported the thesis that AIDS was man-made. Almost every Western specialist is convinced that the AIDS virus mutated naturally and spontaneously from an animal virus.

In Brazil, *O Estado de S. Paulo* observed that AIDS and *disinformatza* are very similar in their corrosive action: One infects and destroys the body while the other succeeds in shaking and disorienting the soul. There are two basic questions at the root of this Soviet active measures campaign: Where did the claim originate? Who are the scientists who have attempted to spread them?

In July 1983, the New Delhi *Patriot* published a letter from an unnamed "well-known American scientist and anthropologist

who wished to remain anonymous." The letter was a lengthy undocumented account of how the AIDS virus was developed by the CIA and the Pentagon. Fort Detrick, Maryland, was reported by the writer to be the place where the disease was created. He added just as incorrectly that a similar US laboratory in Lahore had bred super mosquitoes and other insects that could spread dangerous diseases such as yellow fever, dengue, and encephalitis. The only source the unknown writer gave for any of this information was the totally unreliable cult organization, the Church of Scientology.

Literaturnaya Gazeta used this rambling piece of gobbledygook as its source in its October 1985 story. So did the Segals in their document presented at Harare. Jacob Segal was born in Leningrad and was a longtime resident of the Soviet Union before moving to East Berlin. He is a 75-year-old retired biologist and self-announced AIDS specialist who failed to attend the mid-November Berlin conference on AIDS. He maintained that AIDS was first tied to Fort Detrick by a British researcher who published an article in a New Zealand journal. Segal's wife, Lilli, however, offered a different source-the East German Urania Press. Urania's prime function was to disseminate Soviet propaganda.

Lilli Segal is a retired researcher and professor of epidemiology. She survived Auschwitz and has been a resident of the GDR since 1953. She and her husband worked as biology instructors in Cuba for several years. Both have been retired from Humboldt University since 1983. Their AIDS thesis was absurd, according to world reknowned AIDS specialists. It had no bearing on serious scientific knowledge of the virus. It was on a par with the Segals' attempt to link the surfacing of the disease in New York City with its proximity to Fort Detrick. Their report stated that criminals who had engaged in homosexual practices during the long time of their imprisonment "obviously" concentrated in the nearest big city after their release and it was therefore logical that the first AIDS cases should have been registered in New York. In fact, however, New York is 250 miles from Fort Detrick while Baltimore is only 45 miles and Washington, D.C., 50 miles from that installation. Further, President Richard M. Nixon called a halt to all offensive biological warfare experimentation

in 1969. **In its place, a vaccine program was instituted at the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. The laboratory's work was focused on finding vaccines against biological warfare.**

Fort Detrick is not used entirely for military purposes. Of the 25 tenants on the installation, one is the Frederick Cancer Research Facility. It operates under the direction of Health and Human Services with a department devoted to AIDS research. It has never been a military component. Other research is conducted by the Department of Agriculture in both foreign and domestic crop diseases. Fort Detrick's raison d'etre is to cure, not to inflict; to prevent, not to infect.

It should be added that neither Dr John Seale, London **venereologist, nor Dr Robert Strecker, California gastro-enterologist, both of whom were quoted in the Sunday Express, subscribed to the disinformation regarding Fort Detrick.**

Conclusion

The twisted course of the Soviet active measures AIDS campaign can be traced back to a Soviet-aligned Indian newspaper. It quoted an unnamed individual whose line of lies took root in the Soviet press and briefly flourished via a Soviet-bloc document that was completely lacking in scientific credibility. Later, a new piece of AIDS disinformation emerged from India. It attempted to link the disease to a Union Carbide pesticide. Still later, a Communist party member in the Indian parliament sought to press the AIDS-made-in-the-US line. Nevertheless, the disinformation boomeranged on the Soviets; many publications around the globe have come to recognize and understand the nature of this Soviet active measure.

Appendix A

Weinberger Forgery

A few years ago, a forged document purporting to be a speech by US Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger surfaced in the Federal Republic of Germany. The document is dated 25 November 1983. No such speech was ever made, and Secretary Weinberger never made the remarks attributed to him. The document was a complete fabrication. Its aim was to convince Europeans that the US purpose in developing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was not only to gain US military superiority over the USSR but also to dominate its NATO allies. Both goals were supposedly to be accomplished largely by U$ control of space through SDI, which was described in the forgery as an offensive system.

The concepts used in the document did not reflect US government thinking, but were, in fact, what the Soviets wanted West Europeans to believe about US views. Although for the most part the forgery was written in acceptable English, several mistakes in word usage indicated that the drafter's first language was not English. For example, it asserted that the United States sought "prevalence" over the Soviet Union at all (military) levels. The forger(s) confused *prevalence* with *superiority*.

A major point made in the forgery was that the United States would suffer a disastrous depression without SDI. However, the key and distinctive error had the secretary of defense commenting that the Soviets have not been engaged in an SDI program of their own. In fact, Secretary Weinberger, the president, and other leading US defense spokesmen had pointed out repeatedly that Soviet scientists had been at work on a similar project since 1968.

The Weinberger forgery is one of several addressed in this report. All sought to undermine US policies and intentions.

Disinformation Hits Home

Soviet disinformation attempted to "hit home" with a forged letter purportedly written by Herbert Romerstein, United States Information Agency (USIA) Soviet active measures coordinator to US news organizations. The Washington Post

approached USIA with the forged letter, which Mr Romerstein had supposedly sent to Senator-Select David Durenberger (R.-Minn.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The forgery was cleverly conceived but poorly executed. Its purpose was to smear USIA by making it appear that the agency was proposing that the United States should make false claims about the Chernobyl nuclear accident.

The forgery alleged that Mr Romerstein proposed to Senator Durenberger that USIA disseminate rumors about the accident. The forgery suggested that "our associates in European information media" spread reports that would include the following details:

- the "number of victims should be alleged to be somewhere between 2,000 and 3,000";
- a "mass evacuation of population from the 100-mile zone" around Chernobyl should be alleged to have occurred; and
- "transport problems, shortage of various goods, chaos, and panic should also be given publicity."

The forgery also recommends that "our allies should be influenced so as to make a request for compensation for contamination of their territory." The document takes advantage of the insights offered by hindsight. It is backdated to 29 April 1986, the day after the Chernobyl accident was first reported by the Soviets and just before rumors (of exactly this nature) began to appear.

Had the forgery been accepted by the press, it would have given currency to the notion that rumors about Chernobyl had been generated by USIA rather than by the Soviets' refusal to release sufficient data about the events surrounding Chernobyl. At the same time, USIA would have been cast as a manipulative, rumor-mongering propaganda apparatus free to dictate to senators and unnamed "associates" in the European media.

Poor execution, however, ruined the Soviet attempt. The forgery was not composed correctly and it contained an incorrect address for Durenberger. Its falsity was easily ascertained by journalists who telephoned the USIA and Senator Durenberger's office.

Ironically, Romerstein's forged signature was taken from a letter he had previously sent to Lt Gen Robert L. Schweitzer,

head of the Inter-American Defense Board, informing General Schweitzer about a forgery purportedly written by him. Even more obvious, the word copy in Romerstein's handwriting at the top of the Chernobyl forgery is identical to a notation made on copies of the letter to General Schweitzer.

The forgery had all the hallmarks of a Soviet active measure, although its sloppiness probably indicated an operation executed by personnel in the United States rather than those in the Moscow Center, who could be expected to produce a more professional product. In analyzing forgeries, one key is to determine who benefits. Certainly, Soviet purposes would have been served if the USIA had been blamed for the bad press that was actually caused by Soviet intransigence and stonewalling over Chernobyl.

Levchenko on Dobrynin

At a USIA briefing on 20 August 1986, at Washington's Foreign Press Center, former KGB major and active measures specialist Stanislav Levchenko made some observations about Anatolii Fedorovich Dobrynin, former Soviet Ambassador to the US who later headed the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee's International Department.

Mr Dobrynin's appointment to the International Department post had been the subject of much speculation in the American press. As a former staff member of the International Department, Levchenko's perspective on this issue was instructive.

Basically, Levchenko discounted the theory that Dobrynin's appointment was "positive for the future development of healthy relations between the Soviet Union and the United States."

> I dare to disagree with this point because if Mr Gorbachev really wanted him to do that kind of job, he could have made him, let's say, first deputy foreign minister in charge of bilateral relations with the United States, and he could spend all his days and nights working in that field. Instead, Anatolii Dobrynin becomes chief of the International Department, which, in another parlance, is the largest subversive mechanism in the world. The purpose of that department is not enhancement or deepening of bilateral or multilateral relations at all. It's just the contrary. It is the department which, among many other

functions, is disseminating disinformation in the interests of the politburo and running all sorts of operations in that field.

Levchenko believed that Dobrynin would reinvigorate the active measures operations of the International Department and use his knowledge of the United States to bring a new professionalism to its activities.

He, of course, knows about some flaws which the active measures machine had during the last couple of years when his predecessor, Boris Ponomarev, was really getting old. I personally have no doubt that Mr Dobrynin will try, within a rather short period of time, probably within this year, to restructure the mechanism in such a way that it will work better, on a much more professional basis, that sloppiness will probably disappear, and that the scale of operations against primarily the United States and NATO countries on a global basis will definitely be enhanced. That's my projection.

Levchenko's final assessment on Dobrynin: "He is the person who has close to perfect knowledge of the United States. He's probably one of the best specialists in the Soviet Union on the United States, who is generally considered to be a very talented, bright person who is, of course, a devoted Communist and quite a devoted person to the cause of the politburo."

National Security Council Forgery

A very well-done and ambitious forgery surfaced in Lagos, Nigeria. It bears the title, "US Strategy in Foreign Policy 1985-1988" and falsely claims to be a "copy of a summary paper on **US foreign policy approved by the (United States) National Security Council (NSC) in February 1985." A section of the forgery dealing with purported US policy in Africa was published in Lagos in the weekly magazine Africa Guardian. Its broad scope and relative professionalism increase the chances that it may reappear in other areas.**

The forgery was a 10-page, single-spaced document lacking any identifying symbols and classification markings. It was divided into eight topical sections dealing with US policy toward important regions. It was cleverly crafted, skillfully weaving together US policy with phony assertions that would outrage foreign as well as domestic audiences. For example, the United States was falsely portrayed as believing that "a

preemptive strike potential, together with guidance, communications and intelligence systems of high sophistication, would guarantee our security to a degree which would permit us to exert severe pressure on the Soviet Union to the point of issuing an ultimatum if necessary."

Other false assertions were that:

- **The United States was seeking "the establishment of an effective first-strike (nuclear) capability by the year 1995."**
- **"Strategic superiority" was the goal of US policy, and advances in military technology might "suggest" or "even demand a preemptive strike."**
- **NATO allies should be pressured "to conform to US policies."**
- **The US problem with the Greek leadership was that it had an "independent attitude."**
- **The United States is opposed to curbs on nuclear and chemical weapons.**
- **In Nicaragua, "US military intervention cannot be ruled out, keeping in mind the lesson of Grenada."**
- **The Organization of American States "should be made to accord with our national interests."**
- **A negotiated settlement between Vietnam and an ASEAN bloc over Cambodia "in no way corresponds with US interests."**
- **Japan must agree to a stronger US military presence in that country and to increase its military strength through the purchase of US arms.**
- **The United States will "seek to hold China to policies corresponding with US global interests."**
- **The United States feels that China has an "unpredictable political future" and an "absence of stable power succession procedures."**
- **The United States opposes the successful implementation of China's modernization program because it "might lead to rivalry or even confrontation with the United States."**
- **"Nothing short of Qadhafi's assassination will bring any significant change in Libyan policies of support for international terrorism."**
- **Israel is referred to as "the Jerusalem government," implying recognition of Jerusalem as the capital.**

- **The United States is planning to use the rapid deployment force for "preemptive operations" if a "threat to our interests" arises.**
- **The Soviet presence in Afghanistan is seen as a "propaganda bonus" which can be utilized to increase US military and political power in the Persian Gulf region, perhaps even leading to "the restoration of American influence in Iran."**
- **The main lines of US policy in Africa are to exploit the area as a necessary source of raw materials and to control African affairs in conjunction with South Africa.**

Many other themes and subthemes were planted in this lengthy forgery. As with the other forgeries mentioned above, this one appears to be a product of the Soviet Union or one of its surrogates. The themes cited reflect Soviet claims about US policy.

The Assassinations of **Olof Palme and Indira Gandhi**

If one were asked to name the major similarity between the gunning down of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme and the gunning down of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the answer would be that the Soviet Union, by innuendo, falsely accused the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of committing both crimes and repeated the lie through its propaganda outlets.

On 31 October 1984, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India was assassinated by Sikh members of her bodyguard. Several hours after the murder, "Radio Moscow" declared the assassins had "received their ideological inspirations" from the CIA. "Radio Moscow" broadcast a familiar litany of disinformation, accusing the CIA of guilt in the assassination of world leaders over a 25-year period.

Pro-Soviet Indian publications were quick to pick up the Moscow line. They added their own embellishments, some directly accusing the United States of having murdered Mrs Ghandi. These claims were replayed by the Soviet press. Responsible Indian newspapers would have none of it, however. A *Hindustan Times* **editorial summed up public**

reaction: "The Soviet media saw in the grim event a golden opportunity to mount cold war propaganda against the United States.... Cold War propaganda on such a tragic occasion by the Soviet Union is uncalled for and most unfortunate." President Reagan called the Soviet allegation, "the world's biggest cheap shot in a long, long time."

The Soviet lie became a double lie when Secretary of State Shultz confronted Soviet Prime Minister Tikhanov at Mrs Ghandi's funeral and Tikhanov denied that his country was making such claims. The Indian government, in a determined investigation of the assassination, found no trace of any US involvement.

These events occurred about a year before President Reagan met with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva and some 15 months before the murder of Swedish Prime Minister Palme. It was hoped that the Geneva meeting would bring a change in the kind of outrageous disinformation that had been spewing out of Moscow day in and day out.

Prime Minister Palme was killed on a Friday night. The next day, Tass published a commentary on Palme's death. The commentary was written by Anatoly Krasikov, deputy director of Tass. Krasikov's commentary, according to the Swedish daily *Aftenpost,* **"indicated that CIA is behind the murder." This commentary employed exactly the same kind of slippery innuendo "Radio Moscow" had used in implying that the CIA was responsible for Indira Ghandi's assassination.**

The next day (Sunday, 2 March), *Pravda,* **the official Communist Party newspaper, added its commentary. The writer, Chingiz Aytmatov, academician of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and delegate to the 27th Congress of the CPSU, raised a basic question and then answered it. Who was, or who were, the assassin(s)? We do not yet know, but it is clear even now that the terrorist crime was committed by forces that are interested in shifting whole countries and regions to the right and in intimidating the public, which heeds the voice of an honest individual.**

Response from the Swedish newspaper *Morgenbladet* **was swift. In an editorial titled "Grotesque," it attacked Gorbachev's ¦mouthpiece" in choosing to exploit the situation at a "tragic moment." It went on to say, "the real question is what Gorbachev**

means with his fine words about detente and peace when he allows such gross propaganda. There is brutal contradiction between the hopes he has expressed for a relaxation of internal tension and his continued hammering on public opinion with anti-.American propaganda."

On Monday, the New Delhi Hindi daily *Navbharat* **carried a Moscow dateline report: "The official agency Tass has alleged that the assassination of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme was the handiwork of the CIA." Other Indian publications, particularly those that were pro-Soviet, repeated the accusation and parallels were drawn between the political viewpoints of Mrs Ghandi and Mr Palme.**

In the course of the next few days, the Tass-Prauda effort was replayed in a number of locales-Ghana, Malta, Australia, Uruguay, Peru. In the latter two countries, the publications were Communist Party weeklies. In Australia, the conservative daily Australian concluded an account by its Moscow correspondent with a quote from former Swedish Prime Minister Falldin: "I refuse to believe it is a political assassination.... This must be the work of a lunatic."

Elsewhere around the globe, the Soviet accusation was ignored; but that was not the end of it. Seventeen days after the murder, Aytmatov, the writer of the Prauda commentary, was interviewed by the Swedish newspaper *Dagens Nyheter.* **"Aytmatov was now clearly alarmed that his words would be interpreted" to suggest the CIA had committed the crime. But the Prauda writer's retraction was something less than unequivocal: "The people who murdered Olof Palme do not need to come from the United States or the CIA-even though it does seem to be the case of reactionary forces."**

The Soviet academician was simply following the standard Leninist technique of hedging his Prauda commentary with obfuscation. However, just as the Soviet-oriented accusations of CIA guilt in the assassination of Indira Ghandi continued to surface, so, too, did those about Olof Palme. His name was added to the long list of assassinated leaders that Soviet disinformation organs recited on a regular basis as victims of CIA operations.

Yellow Rain Again

Certain characteristics in Soviet active measures operations followed a consistent pattern. One was to try and reverse blame for Soviet Military actions by accusing the United States and its allies of carrying out exactly the same acts. This was done not only by describing the Soviet techniques originally followed, but also by employing the same terminology; for example, *yellow rain.*

In March and November 1982, the US State Department presented to the United Nations reports of "Soviet involvement in provision and use of toxin weapons." The reports offered "information, Vvidence and an analysis of results the United States had obtained on the use of toxin and other chemical war agents by the Soviets in Afghanistan, and by the Lao and Vietnamese under Soviet supervision in Laos and Kampuchea." The victims referred to chemical agents that had been sprayed and dropped on their villages by plane, helicopter, and artillery shell as yellow rain. Between August 1983 and February 1984, further evidence of yellow rain attacks in Southeast Asia were submitted by the United States to the UN. These charges were angrily denied by the Soviets, who submitted their own scientific paper. It maintained that Agent Orange, the defoliant used by the US to clear jungle areas during the Vietnam War, had contaminated the elephant grass. Its infected spores, the Soviet government claimed, had been carried by prevailing winds into Laos and Kampuchea where they had tainted the environment and brought illness and death to those affected. Scientifically, this explanation was recognized as hogwash.

By the end of 1985, reports of yellow rain in the aforementioned areas had "diminished in number." But on 7 February 1986, yellow rain was suddenly in the news again. This time, the area was Honduras and the culprit was the US Army. The newspaper *Tiempo,* reporting from San Pedro Sula, quoted a leftist trade union publication which maintained that the US Army was spraying lethal chemicals on civilians in northern municipalities for experimental purposes. The chemicals, it reported, caused fainting and convulsions. Further, it said that strange sores appeared on the bodies of

children. The report said that the affected communities had requested investigations by health authorities.

In the first published accounts of the reported problem, no mention was made of yellow rain. On 22 February, Tass quoted *Red Star,* the official Soviet Ministry of Defense newspaper: "The United States is carrying out criminal experiments with chemical weapons in Honduras. . . . U.S. aircraft have been scattering yellow toxin in the air similar in its characteristics to the highly toxin 'Agent Orange.'. . . Eyewitnesses to the secret flights by the US aircraft say that 'yellow rain' falls every time the aircraft appear."

That same day, "Radio Moscow" offered a commentary, repeating the same accusations and using the same terms. But the accusation went even further. The commentator said the Pentagon was preparing to launch chemical and biological warfare against Nicaragua and was responsible for an epidemic of dengue that had hit that country earlier. Some of these charges were picked up by the Panamanian press, which added that the yellow rain story had been born of a theory "between groups of the Honduran Left."

Previously, the US Embassy in Tegucigalpa had denied that US forces were testing chemical weapons anywhere in Honduras, "least of all against the civilian population." Not only had a US medical team investigated the charges, but so had the US military and a Honduran congressional group. Under the heading "Congressmen find downpour of calamities instead of yellow rain," the newspaper La *Prensa,* along with other Honduran publications, including T1empo (which had broken the original story), cited the cause of the problem as an epidemic of mange stimulated by a lack of hygiene; the germ had spread through physical contact.

The daily *El Haraldo* carried an interview with Honduran Army Chief of Staff General Humberto Regalado Hernandez, who said that a military investigation coincided with state and private reports. The disease, he said, had been known since biblical times as scabies and was not the result of chemical gases dropped from unidentified aircraft on evening flights. The only flying in the area had been done by Honduran crop dusters who were spraying sugar cane.

The general added that he believed the purpose of the stories was to discredit US military detachments that were training in Honduras. Another possibility, he said, "is that the USSR, via Cuba and Nicaragua, is using sophisticated methods.... The presence of `yellow rain' in our homeland was ruled out, but there is evidence that the local fifth column is carrying out disinformation campaigns ordered by the Soviet connection in Tegucigalpa." This Soviet yellow rain story was turned off by the combined actions of the Honduran government and the press.

Appendix B

Former Soviet International Front Organizations

Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)

Christian Peace Conference (CPC)

International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)

International Federation of Resistance Fighters (IFIR)

International Institute for Peace (IIP)

International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)

International Radio and Television Organization (OIRT)

International Union of Students (IUS)

Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)

World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)

World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)

World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)

World Peace Council (WPC)

Appendix C

Generals for Peace and Disarmament

British Guiana
Generalmajor Gert Bastain

Canada
Major General Leonard V. Johnson

Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
Generalmajor Gunter Vollmer

France
Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti

Greece
General Georgios Koumanakos
Admiral Miltiades Papathanassiou
Brigadier Michalis Tombopoulos

Italy
General Nino **Pasti**

Netherlands
General-major Michiel H. von Meyenfeldt, Chairman

Norway
General Johan Christie

Portugal
Marshal Francisco da Costa Gomes
General Rangel de Lima

United Kingdom
Brigadier Michael Harbottle OBE

What Soviet PSFOP Mirror Imaging Can Tell Us



James Melnich

Soviet psyoperators were sometimes ignorant of significant nuances concerning the societies they targeted for propaganda development. Though time and experience tended to improve certain technical aspects of Soviet PSYOP, Soviet psyoperators sometimes continued to reach down into their own limited Soviet experiences for examples and themes that they projected onto the Western societies they were attacking in their propaganda. Study of this mirror-imaging process can be very revealing and may point out important weaknesses. This is true even though some segments of the Soviet PSYOP hierarchy appeared to have gained in sophistication. Identifying some of these tell-tale characteristics will help us to assess the overall Soviet PSYOP threat.

Glasnost, Gorbachev, and Disinformation

The campaign of glasnost in the Soviet Union under Mikhail S. Gorbachev, with its emphasis on a more open Soviet press, by no means signaled an end to Soviet disinformation. On the contrary, since the press in the USSR began writing on many topics previously considered taboo, there were more opportunities for mirror-imaging disinformation to present itself-perhaps with some new twists.

For example, we can examine one of Gorbachev's perceptual blunders concerning the United States and see how it relates to the concept of mirror imaging. In early 1987, Gorbachev met with several US congressmen in Moscow. In the course of their discussions, he suggested that America create separate states for blacks, Puerto Ricans, and citizens of Polish background.[1] Apart from this being a ludicrous and insulting

recommendation, it provides some insights into the Soviet system. To begin with, it demonstrates Gorbachev's ignorance of the internal policies of the United States. Further, it assumes that we have a Polish problem that must be dealt with. From the standpoint of mirror imaging, it suggests that the Soviets dealt with many of their minority problems by sending minorities to autonomous regions somewhere in the Soviet Union.

The Soviets had serious minority problems, especially with their Central Asian Muslims. There have been riots in Kazakhstan, demonstrations in the Baltic states, demands by Crimean Tatars for their rights, and pressures for greater Jewish emigration. Demographic analysis of the Soviet population suggests that the Great Russian nationality itself was becoming a minority in its own country as Central Asian birthrates skyrocketed.

As Soviet policymakers sought answers to these problems, Soviet propagandists were producing disinformation about an alleged Western ethnic bomb supposedly targeted against US minorities. This propaganda is an excellent example of mirror imaging. What some in the Soviet Union undoubtedly wished they themselves had, they projected as a policy practiced by their ideological enemy. This disinformation example shows us both the Soviet propagandists' intense prejudice and how limited their worldview really was. It is an example that is repeated over and over in a variety of contexts, whether one is considering AIDS, baby parts, or chemical weapons.

One might add that, although the Soviet Union did have its share of extremely sophisticated propagandists, such as Georgii Arbatov of the Institute of the USA and Canada, Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev, and Vladimir Posner of Radio Moscow, the fact that Gorbachev himself could make such an error should tell us something about the attitudes of rank-and-file Soviet propagandists.

Ultimate Enemy Projections

Soviet propaganda was rife with allusions to the ultimate enemy, whether that enemy be world imperialism, Nazi storm troopers, supporters of SDI, Zionism, or religious activists in

the Soviet Union. The ultimate enemy was usually portrayed as being antihuman and opposed to everything the Soviet Union stood for. For example, Zionism was defined as a "deadly enemy of the Soviet State from its very beginning." [2] There was usually a plurality of Soviet ultimate enemies, depending on the international situation. An ultimate enemy in Soviet propaganda was first dehumanized, then made part of an anti-Soviet worldwide conspiratorial network (i.e., Afghan freedom fighters became bandits fighting as agents of US imperialism; unofficial religious groups in the Soviet Union were linked with dark forces from abroad).

In attempting to describe the ultimate enemy, whoever and whatever that might have been at a given time, Soviet propagandists sometimes drew from actual Soviet acts of barbarism. Thus their disinformation, as a form of mirror imaging, reflected back into the pool of Soviet reality. For one example, I will draw from personal experience.

In the early 1980s, I met a Soviet emigre woman who was convinced that evangelical Christians in the Ukraine sacrificed babies by rolling them in barrels with spikes as part of some religious ritual. She, of course, had never witnessed such a thing, but said that she had heard about those people when she lived in the Soviet Union. Obviously, she was the victim of very gross Soviet disinformation-and there were other Soviet campaigns in which other religious groups were under attack by the state. One can find numerous articles accusing Soviet Baptists of drowning children or performing other dark and perfidious acts-the whole purpose being to defame the targeted group and further isolate them from the general population.

Nevertheless, the matter of the spikes continued to bother me: why such a particular disinformation image? Where did it come from? Did a propagandist simply make it up out of thin air, or did it spring from some other source? I have no final answer to this question, but a year or so later, when I was reading Michael Voslensky's work, *Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class,* a particular passage leapt out at me. Voslensky, in quoting a 1920s account about the Cheka (the earliest forerunner of the KGB), recounted various Cheka methods of torture and execution of their victims. One such method was

reported this way: "at Voronezh they put their victims naked in barrels spiked on the inside and rolled them."[3] This account and recent Soviet disinformation against religious groups are separated by more than one-half century. Are they somehow related, or did later Soviet propagandists simply make up the recent vicious accusation out of thin air? One cannot be certain, of course, but I would posit this as a possible example of a mirror image projected out of the past.

Zionism and Nazism

In examining the concept of ultimate enemy in Soviet propaganda, we might also consider Soviet disinformation that compared and linked Zionists with Nazis. One would be hard-pressed to find a more vicious lie, but such comparisons fit Soviet concepts of the ultimate enemy very well. They also furthered Soviet foreign policy goals in the Middle East. Virulent anti-Semitism was imbedded in Soviet society, along with fears of a Jewish conspiracy dating back to the fraudulent Protocols of the Elders of Zion. There was also the memory of Nazi fascism, which cost 20 million Soviet lives during World War II and the fear that German revanchism would once again rear its ugly head. Soviet propagandists simply combined the two images.

What this tells us is that the Soviet propaganda machine (regardless of its short-term goals for the propaganda, such as defaming Israel in third world countries) was itself convinced that there were many real enemies, both within and outside the Soviet Union.[4] These were then reduced to extremely crude and violent images and made a part of an ongoing international conspiracy. They probably also believed that such ultimate enemy projections were both necessary and useful for their own population. While many societies resort to ultimate enemy projections and stereotypes in propaganda during wartime, the Soviet Union appears to have been one of the few nations to do it consistently over time during periods of peace.

As a footnote, one might consider how sensitive the Soviets themselves were to being stereotyped in the West. The TV series "Amerika" showed the Soviets as adversaries, but adversaries possessing many human characteristics-a far cry

from the ultimate enemy. Yet the program was denounced in almost apocalyptic terms by Soviet spokesmen-and threats were made prior to its airing. Soviet propagandists continued to show daily hatred against the West on a massive worldwide scale, with only an occasional protest from the West when the results of a given lie would have had serious and undeniable consequences.

The Invasion of Grenada

In late 1983, the Soviet newspaper *Izuestiya* not only attacked ~he United States for invading Grenada but also accused US forces (allegedly quoting the Mexican newspaper *El Dia)* of using chemical weapons to poison some 2,000 Grenadens, including women and children, and of recording their suffering and deaths on film. This gruesome fabrication, which was read by millions of Soviet citizens, further stated that the bodies were shipped back to the United States for additional study. The author of that article was A. Kuvshinnikov. [5]

For a long time I tried to discover who A. Kuvshinnikov was or is, or whether it was a pseudonym. Then another article by A. Kuvshinnikov appeared in *Izuestiya* on 21 August 1987. This article was said to be from the US correspondent at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Centers It is likely that these articles were written by the same person. In his especially pernicious article about Grenada, Kuvshinnikov attempted to set up a parallel between the WWII Nazi death camps with their human experiments and the US invasion of Grenada. This is another example of the ultimate-enemy image. No citation was given for El *Dia,* which was described by *Izuestiya* as an influential Mexican newspaper.

Soviet propagandists apparently believed that their audience would accept such base lies to some extent. And were these articles also designed to mitigate the effect of certain Soviet actions? In my opinion, they may tell us in part what the Soviets themselves have done or are capable of doing. The horrors of Afghanistan, as recounted by refugee survivors of Soviet atrocities, come to mind. Were the consciences of some Soviet veterans returning from Afghanistan (who may have

participated in brutal crimes against civilians) eased when they thought the United States had done worse?

Mirror imaging in Soviet propaganda is, I believe, an analysis area of great value to all who study the former Soviet Union-especially those who seek to understand the nature and depth of Soviet PSYOP.

Notes

1. *Novoe Russkoe Slovo* (The New Russian Word), 19 April 1987.
2. See V. Alekseev and V. Ivanov, "Zionism in the Service of Imperialism," International Affairs 6 (1970): 59, in Baruch A. Hazan, *Soviet Propaganda:* A *Case Study of the Middle East Conflict* (New Brunswick. N.J.: Transaction Books, Keter, 1976), 150.
3. Michael Voslensky, ***Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class*** (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1984), 279, in P. Milyukov, *Rossiia Na Perelome 1* (Paris, 1927): 193.
4. For a fascinating account of alleged Politburo views of worldwide conspiracies, see Arkady N. Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985).
5. A. Kuvshinnikov, *Izvestiya,* 9 December 1983, 4.
6. Ibid., 21 August 1987, 4.

Indoctrination of Hate

Lev Yudovich

Soviet military doctrine required the soldier to develop a strong feeling of hatred. This hatred was cultivated so the soldier would (1) believe in victory, (2) be willing to act in a dangerous situation, and (3) be psychologically prepared to operate under the conditions of modern war.

> In case of war, the Soviet soldier will face a strong and brutal enemy who has been well indoctrinated in a spirit of irreconcilability toward the Soviet people. The Soviet soldier must therefore have a clearly defined attitude for the enemy: hate, contempt, and a feeling of superiority over them. We must show the soldier the strong and weak points of our enemies. We have to define the enemy in terms of his psychological characteristics (or stereotypes) that are related to his nationality or ethnic group. [1]

The Soviet soldier was constantly being indoctrinated to develop hatred for the West. The indoctrination of hate started with the myth of a US threat to the Soviet Union. This myth allowed Soviet political and military leaders to keep the entire country in a state of tension and stress. The myth also made it easier to justify military spending and the consequent lowering of standards in domestic life. The American threat to the Soviet Union was the fundamental thesis of Soviet propaganda.

The aim of Soviet propaganda was to create a stereotyped pattern of thinking and reacting. The myth helped Soviet military and political leadership instill prejudice in the soldier. He was trained to become suspicious of foreigners and their way of life. His suspicion and deep distrust became the basis for hate. According to the Soviet view, "the political myth is an

This article provided courtesy of the US John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Part of an original work titled, *An Assessment of the Vulnerability of the Soviet Soldier.*

ideological tool of the imperialists and a tool for psychological manipulation of the masses" (Col Gen D. Volkogonov). Thus the Soviet authorities use the very same technique that they accuse the enemy of employing.

The Soviets instilled hatred for the United States even in peacetime. They justified this approach by explaining that, in the past, the final moral hardening of the soldier could be achieved during the course of combat. In the future war, however, there will not be enough time for psychological preparedness. The soldier must, therefore, be prepared through training. He must put aside any moral convictions he might have and bi; oriented only toward accomplishing his mission.

Hate produces excitement-and excitement can overcome the soldier's fear. To develop hatred, political workers used a wide variety of indoctrination methods (e.g., discussions in small groups, lectures, and political reviews) and every form of media. Deception, falsification, discreditation of Western leaders, and even cartoons became methods for building up hate. The US soldier was shown as a hireling, a mercenary, and a freelance murderer with a very low moral level. He had no convictions, and his main reason for fighting was to get money. The Soviets stated that the US soldier was not reliable in Vietnam. As the military situation in Vietnam got worse, said the Soviets, there were more deserters, and racial tensions increased. The reason they presented such distorted views was simple-to cultivate hate.

In 1952 the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR published a book written by Col Polkovnik B. W. Karpovich titled *The Ideological Indoctrination of Soldiers in the Armies of the United States and Great Britain.* **This book was aimed at military readers. The author pictured American soldiers as fascists and animals.[2] When a young man enters the US Army, he stated, all training is aimed at turning him into a skilled murdererr[3] American officers encourage US soldiers to be murderers and rapists. In the Korean War, according to the colonel, all American soldiers raped Korean women and girls, and officers created special brothels in which Korean women were forced against their will to provide sexual services for the soldiers.[4] American soldiers,**

he said, far exceed the Nazis in their gangsterism, brutality, and greed.[5]

Although those statements were made around 1952, this method of describing American soldiers persisted. Despite détente, indoctrination of hate continued. In 1986, for example, the Main Political Administration ordered the use of a film, "Hate the Imperialists,"[6] and a 1968 article, "The Psychology of Murder and Torture," which purported to picture the American soldier.? Political workers indoctrinated hate during every major maneuver from Dnepr to Shield '84.[8] One dramatic example of such indoctrination utilized the site of Nazi victims' mass graves. Veterans and former partisans assembled for ceremonies at those sites and stated their recollections of Nazi brutalities. The political workers pointed out that imperialists had produced these atrocities and had also committed acts of brutality in oppressing national liberation movements that developed in other countries. These comparisons were used to unmask the imperialistic threat of Soviet enemies-the Americans.

Political workers in the Strategic Rocket Forces used every moment of their contact with soldiers, even appealing to the soldiers while they were on combat alert duty. Soldiers on duty in underground rocket bunkers were visited by political workers.[9]

Even in the face of new political thinking aimed at reducing the mutual military threat of the Soviet Union and the United States, the Soviets continued to instill hatred for Americans in their regular indoctrination programs. For example, a Soviet military journal included an article stating that hatred should be developed because "hate is the most important quality of the soldier and sailor since it promotes vigilance and combat readiness. Our hatred for imperialist plunder has deep roots. Our class adversaries are stained with the blood of millions of Soviet people who were killed during the wars initiated by imperialist aggressors. These imperialists are responsible for the trouble and suffering of millions of people all over the world. Our right to hate the imperialists is justified by their current blood policy and their intent to invade our homeland with weapons of mass destruction."[10]

The Soviets were developing not only hatred but also arguments to justify it and explain to the Soviet soldier why he should hate the Americans. An important reason for hatred was to overcome the Soviet soldier's interest in the American lifestyle and any sympathy he might have for such American items as jazz, cars, and freedom to travel. Hatred was used to build up a distrust of everything foreign.

During the fifties, there was little difference between the Soviet military evaluation of the American soldier and the evaluation used in propaganda. Both evaluations were summarized by F. O. Mikchei: "American soldiers are very dynamic and have good technical skills, but they lack discipline' and have low moral qualities. They have only a narrow political mental outlook."'' In the seventies, that evaluation started to change.

The majority of Soviet military writers pointed out that, in a future war, American soldiers would be well indoctrinated for fighting the Soviet Union. [12] **"The future war will be very severe because the American soldier has a very strong anticommunist view. He is aggressive and ready to carry out his officers' orders. He is ready to be exposed to reasonable risks. He is obsessed with the idea that he is a superman. However, he is a selfish person, wants to make a profit, uses drugs and alcohol, and he is inclined to desert."** [13]

Although Soviet military leaders changed their assessment of the American soldier, Soviet propagandists clung to their old picture of the American military gangster-murderer. Because the good fighting quality of the American soldier was recognized, propaganda was increased. Every attempt was made to show that the American soldier was actually an object of scorn. The propagandists stressed the message that the American soldier must be thoroughly hated. Such hatred produced the Nazi holocaust.

Notes

1. M. P. Korobeinikov, *Sovremenniy Boy I Problemi Psikhologii.*
2. Polkovnik B. W. Karpovich, *"Ideologicheskaya Obrabotka Soldat A rmiy USA i Anglii"* (Moscow: Voyenizdat Ministerstva Oboroni, 1952), 10.
3. Ibid., 53.
4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., 61.
6. *Kommunist Vooruzennikh Sil,* no. 2, 1986, 82.
7. *Voyenniy Vestnik* 4, 1968, 119.
8. *Voyenny-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* 3, 1987, 67.
9. *Kommunist Vooruzennikh Sil,* no. 3, 1987, 39.
10. *Communist ofArmed Forces* 14, July 1986, 71.
11. F. O. Mikchei, *Atomnoye Oruzhie V. Armii (Moscow:* Izdatelstvo Inostrannoi Literaturi, 1956), 39-40.
12. Korobeinikov, 9.
13. K. Volkogonov, *Psihologicheskay Voyna* (Moscow: Voyennoye Izdatelstvo, 1984), 263.

Intelligence and Psychological Operations

Col Joseph S. Gordon, USAR

Intelligence is an inextricable element of PSYOP in all phases of its activities, from the planning and conduct of operations to the evaluation of its effectiveness. For this discussion, PSYOP intelligence includes that which is generated by a PSYOP organization's own research and analysis assets as well as the intelligence which is obtained from other agencies. The major areas of intelligence activities in support of PSYOP are research, target analysis, pretesting and effects analysis, and propaganda analysis. [1]

Research

Research is geared to support the mission of PSYOP, which is to create in hostile, friendly, or neutral foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior to support the achievement of national objectives. The effective PSYOP campaign requires systematic research of the highest scholarly standards. Intelligence required for PSYOP can be divided into two categories: basic and current.

Basic PSYOP intelligence consists of general information on such topics as the history, society, politics, economy, communications media, and military forces of a given country or region. Such information is kept in files of pertinent documents and a library of area studies books. When time and resources permit, the general information is digested in the production of studies that are tailored to support PSYOP. One example is the basic PSYOP study, which supplements area studies by focusing on relevant PSYOP issues, defined as highly emotional matters, deeply rooted in a particular country's history, customs, fears, or foreign policy. The issues

are selected largely for their ability to support PSYOP objectives that are classified as either cohesive or divisive.

Cohesive issues exploited could help strengthen or more closely unite the total society or particular target group. Divisive issues exploited could contribute to the separation of a group from the greater society or to the disorganization of a people. The basic study should also provide information on national symbols, emotive music, or pertinent graphics that could be used in the development of PSYOP materials. PSYOP intelligence analysts also produce special studies in response to timely events or to the need for greater focus and depth on an aspect of a country or society not covered elsewhere.

Current intelligence is obtained from all possible sources and is used to update studies and files. Should a PSYOP campaign be implemented, it is essential that current intelligence be considered to ensure that the issues already identified still pertain and that the themes and materials developed for use in the campaign are still valid.

The sources of PSYOP intelligence are diverse. But most of the intelligence required to conduct PSYOP is generally obtained from unclassified sources: newspapers, magazines, books, academic journals, studies, and foreign broadcasts. Classified reports on pertinent subjects are distributed to PSYOP organizations. Such organizations may also request intelligence collection for specific items of factual information.

Liaison with other agencies outside the Department of Defense (DOD) often can produce valuable information. Some agencies that can assist PSYOP in obtaining information about local conditions in foreign areas include the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of State, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), the Library of Congress, and the US Information Agency (USIA). USIA not only conducts public diplomacy, telling America's story to the world, but it also undertakes extensive foreign media analysis, audience research, and public opinion polls. Finally, human intelligence is important-especially to gather information about denied areas in both peace and war. The sources of human intelligence include emigres, refugees, and prisoners of war.

No discussion of intelligence research is complete without mentioning the qualifications of the analyst. Because PSYOP

demands extensive knowledge of the history, politics, society, economy, culture, and military affairs (to name a few) of a given area, research is usually a team effort. However, the individual analyst qualifications should include mastery of research and writing techniques, earned advanced academic degrees, considerable experience living in a foreign culture, and knowledge of languages pertinent to the region. The complete analyst should also be able to read the French and German languages, and should have as much information as possible on countries of the third world. Highly capable intelligence analysts are essential for a successful PSYOP program.

Target Analysis

The intelligence effort in target analysis can be divided into five elements, the first of which is to determine key audiences. Based on systematic research, one determines the major elements of a given society delineated by such factors as geography, ethnic origin, religion, race, economic status, and social position. Two basic criteria are used to select PSYOP targets. One must first consider the importance of the target to the PSYOP mission, then the probability that the target can be moved to support the objectives of the campaign. In other words, one asks whether the target has influence and whether it can be persuaded to use this influence in ways that would aid US national interests.

The second element of target analysis is to determine the attitudes of key audiences. Basic research provides intelligence on long-standing attitudes toward political, military, economic, and social subjects. This information is refined as much as possible to delineate the views of various age cohorts, social strata, and occupational groups.

The third element is an analysis of current vulnerabilities within specific audiences-in essence, an updating of the preceding element to determine the level of dissension, fear, or complaints at the time of the PSYOP campaign. When properly assessed in a timely manner, such fears and anxieties can be exploited as target vulnerabilities in a PSYOP program.

The fourth element is a decision regarding message content and means of communication. The vulnerabilities and attitudes of the target provide a foundation on which to build thematic materials for a PSYOP campaign. These materials must support the plans and policies of the campaign, and the vulnerabilities/attitudes they are based on must be an accurate assessment determined by scientific analysis and evaluation. Further, it is essential to determine which means of communication (e.g., radio, television, leaflets, face-to-face) are most capable of reaching the target.

The fifth element of target analysis, testing the contents and measuring the effects of a PSYOP message, is an extensive one. It requirfs a separate discussion.

Pretesting and Effects Analysis

The pretesting of PSYOP materials is a crucial phase of a campaign. It is good to determine in advance that the message is clear and potentially effective. It is also good to avoid the small errors, which are easily made, in idiomatic language or cultural incongruities that can immediately destroy credibility. There are several methods for pretesting PSYOP materials, many of which can also be used to analyze the effects of communication. But testing is usually highly problematic in that the targets of the campaign are generally located in denied areas. To partially compensate for this problem, prisoners of war, refugees, or other emigres from the denied area can be utilized.

The general sample survey is perhaps the best systematic method for determining the effects of media content. It can be used before, during, and after a PSYOP campaign. The survey involves asking significant questions of a relatively small sample of scientifically selected persons to ensure representativeness. This technique determines whether the message is understood, credible, evokes the desired response, or has provoked undesirable effects.

Another method of testing PSYOP material is the panel, which differs from the survey in that the panel participants are repeatedly questioned at regular intervals in the course of the campaign. There are at least two variations of this technique.

One variation involves choosing a small group of people to represent some larger population segment. The success of the representative panel is, of course, dependent on the selection process. Success also requires rather free access to the audience. The second variation attempts to compensate for the lack of access by assembling a group of knowledgeable panelists to discuss the merits of the PSYOP materials in question. The discussion panel has a weakness, however: significant views can be suppressed by peer-group criticism.

A final method of testing is the individual interview. Ideally, it should be performed by a trained psychologist. The main purpose of the individual interview is to obtain insights into the deeper meaning of events and to clarify the mechanisms by which these meanings are formed, perpetuated, and changed.

Measuring the effects of a PSYOP campaign is a most complex and frustrating task. One is reminded of the Madison Avenue executive who lamented that half of his firm's advertising was effective, but he did not know which half. The above-mentioned techniques of analysis can also be used in an attempt to determine the effects of a campaign. There are also two other indicators, the first of which is physical response to the campaign. If the audience acts as the PSYOP message suggested (e.g., to defect, surrender, or cause a disturbance), there is evidence of effectiveness. One must be aware, however, that this action could have been caused entirely or in part by other factors. The other indicator of PSYOP effectiveness is through analysis of the opposing media. By monitoring the press, radio, propaganda, and other documents and publications, one can find evidence of the opposition's response to our campaign.

Propaganda Analysis

Analysis of propaganda is most valuable for a number of purposes. Examination of the opposition's domestic propaganda-that directed at its own population-can be exploited in two ways. First, it can reveal general intelligence about the political, economic, social, and military situation in a given country (if not the possible intentions of action in a given situation).

Second, domestic propaganda in revealing such information may also disclose vulnerabilities that can be used in our PSYOP campaigns. Further analysis of external propaganda directed at our side can serve as a basis for our own counter-propaganda activities as well as a basis for our public information efforts to defend against the effects of opposition propaganda or our own population or armed forces.[2]

Regardless of the purpose or kind of propaganda, one focuses basically on seven questions in its analysis. What is the source? What is the objective? Who is the target? What attitudes are being exploited? What techniques are used? What media are employed? How successful is the propagandist in accomplishing the objective?

Although these analytical questions may seem rather simple, answering them can require sophisticated examination of the propaganda materials. It is not sufficient to merely deal with the themes and the logic conveyed in the propaganda message, one must pay much attention to the psychological meaning of the total package, including its symbols, use of language, and other emotional accouterments. One should be thoroughly familiar with the myriad of propaganda techniques (one author listed 77 different ones). Our counterpropaganda and public-information efforts must deal with the techniques as much as the themes of opposition propaganda if they are to be effective.

Although good intelligence is important in all military operations, it seems even more important to PSYOP. It is critical throughout the spectrum of operations from the initial planning to the campaign evaluation. PSYOP is not only a user, it is also a producer of intelligence. It is capable of contributing to the overall national effort as well as servicing its own needs.

Notes

1. A valuable source of this paper was Ronald D. McLaurin, ed., *Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations* (New York: Praeger, 1982). Especially useful was Part IV: "Intelligence and Research," which included among other pertinent articles the following: Philip P. Katz, "Intelligence for Psychological Operations," and "Exploiting PSYOP Intelligence

Sources," 121-54. Also very useful was Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 33-1, Psychological Operations, 1979.

2. In addition to FM 33-1 cited above, the following works were consulted for propaganda analysis: Leonard W. Doob, Public Opinion and Propaganda (New York: Henry Holt, 1948); D. Lincoln Harter and John Sullivan, Propaganda Handbook (Media, Pa.: 20th Century Publishing, 1953); and William Hummel and Keith Huntress, The Analysis of Propaganda (New York: William Sloane, 1949).

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What the US Information Program Cannot Do

George V. Allen

An international information program cannot change the basic attitudes and opinions in foreign countries.

One of the great American fallacies is the notion, prevalent among people in all walks of life, that we need to explain ourselves, our policies, and our way of life to foreign peoples so they will love us-or at least will understand and sympathize with our point of view. I submit, however, that this point of view is not realistic and that those in the academic world and other professionals in communications should be tough-minded enough to face certain facts squarely and realistically.

While I was director of the United States Information Agency (USIA), I was often asked by congressmen to explain why the "Voice of America" (VOA) seemed to have difficulty in getting the American story across to the people of foreign countries. It should be very simple, I was told. You need to explain that the American way of life-including our democratic principles, our respect for human rights, and our private enterprise-has produced the highest standard of living in the world. Everybody admitted that not only the upper strata but the comr cicm man in the United States had more of the good things in life-more shoes, clothes, leisure time, music, vacations, and opportunities for advancement than people of other countries. Why can't you just keep pointing that out to them on VOA?The job should be easy.

However, Uncle Sam was regarded as Mr Rich. We were presumed, with some justification, to want things to remain

Excerpts from John Boardman Whitton, ed., "What the U.S. Information Program Cannot Do," *Propaganda and the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963). Reprinted with the permission of the Public Affairs *Press,* copyright holder.

more or less as they were. We talked a good deal about evolution instead of revolution, and we made it clear that we did not want the government of Cuba to seize American-owned sugar refineries or other American property without adequate and prompt compensation. We insisted on reforms (e.g., Latin America under the Alliance for Progress) but we wanted them to be instituted by orderly legal process while the miserably poor wanted to turn the world upside down overnight. They regarded the United States as basically in favor of the status quo. (All rich people are supposed to be that way.)

More significant, perhaps, is the fact that Moscow was regarded by most of the poor people around the world as the friend of the poor and of the rebel. When one asks how it is possible that so many Cubans were attracted towards Moscow rather than the United States, the painful but realistic answer is because they thought Moscow was more likely to support them than we were. Demagogues such as Fidel Castro or Juan D. Peron, who depended for their chief support on the rabble, were likely to shout defiance at Uncle Sam-and their followers were likely to cheer them for it.

The "Voice of America" could not change the basic fact that the US was rich while most people in the world were poor. The more we talked about our high standard of living, the fewer friends we had.

What is the answer? For those of us concerned with communications, we must recognize the facts of life. We must try to see ourselves as others see us. We must understand *their* motivations and reactions as we try to help them understand ours. We have put too much emphasis on explaining our point of view and not enough on understanding theirs.

Let us turn now from economic to political matters. One of the principal foreign policies of the United States has been the decision to participate in and foster collective security for the nations of the free world. The purpose of the USIA, in the words of President Eisenhower shortly after the agency was established in 1953, "shall be to submit evidence to peoples of other nations, by means of communication techniques, that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace." In other words, we must make our

policies as convincing and acceptable to foreigners as we can, presuming that our policies are in harmony with their proper aspirations.

I was in India when the United States gave military aid to Pakistan under our collective security policy. The archangel Gabriel could not have made this palatable to the Indians or convinced them that it was compatible with their aspirations-legitimate or otherwise. There was no policy we could have adopted that could have convinced both sides we were their friends.

The heavy responsibilities of the United States sometimes require us to take positions that please nobody. There is danger in expecting too much of communications techniques. I was once told that only the VOA could win the Berlin disputel

There is a tendency for college professors to claim too much for the growing field of communications (sometimes improperly called psychological warfare). Many universities are rapidly developing studies, and even faculties, in this specialized field. But if those in the academic world and we in government overstate our case for communications, we are likely to make trouble for ourselves. Propaganda can do little to remove the basic problems of the have-nots, the national rivalries of Pakistan and India, or the racial animosities of Africa. And whatever communications can do will take a long time. Like education, communication is not likely to avoid takeovers in third world countries.

We must put forward an honest, objective, and truthful information program and then make it available in comprehensible terms to as many people as possible by the most effective media. Then we must rest our case with the common sense of mankind. I suppose one must have a mystic faith, as Jefferson did, in the ability of the common man to make a right decision when given adequate information and freedom of choice. If you do not have this faith, I doubt that you should be in the communications field.

Let me repeat, however, that we must be realists. Nations will be saved from aggression by a combination of forces, including political, economic, psychological, and military-the latter being possibly the most significant in our present sad state of international chaos.

Defector Operations

Lt Col John Ozaki, USA

Defector operations must be carefully planned and coordinated at all levels.

Because of the economic and political instability that prevails during internal defense operations, many insurgents can be persuaded to return to their government's cause if a sound defector plan is instituted. The successful campaign against the Huks in the Philippine Islands and the more recent Chieu Hoi (open arms) defector program in Vietnam tell us it is possible to formulate a defector program for internal defense and development. Success, of course, depends upon proper implementation.

The successful defector program requires national coordination, and it should have the objective of supporting the existing government. Specifically, that objective may be met by any of the following:

- **Inducing the maximum number of insurgents to discontinue voluntary support of the insurgent program and to support the legally constituted government.**
- **Exploiting for intelligence and psychological operations those individuals who have returned to the side of the government.**
- **Fulfilling promises to defectors by providing to them and their families security and economic support, to include vocational and job opportunities that help them become self-supporting.**

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- **Enlisting the defectors for specialized jobs and units where their knowledge of the enemy's techniques can be utilized.**

To increase the chances of a successful defector program, US representatives to the host country at the national level should seek approval of the following policies, especially in cases where the United States is advising a host country on military matters:

- **The host country should' establish an agency to be responsible for execution of all aspects of the defector program, which should be equal in status to major components of the government such as the military departments and the national police. This agency's organization should function on the principle of centralized direction and decentralized execution from the national to the lowest level.**
- **US agency responsibilities and policies for defector operations must be clearly established from the national level down to receipt of a defector by a combat unit.**
- **Combined agreements should be made whereby a review of performance can be accomplished for the purpose of replacing ineffective administrators.**
- **The responsible US agency should have control of funds provided by the United States that are used in direct support of the defector program.**
- **Combined civilian and military counterparts should be established at each level where major defector operations take place. These would include district, sector, regional, and national levels as appropriate to the territorial organization of the country.**

The objective of the inducement program is to prepare the members of the insurgent forces to quit their cause and join the legitimate government. The overall effect lets the insurgents know that the government is aware of their plight and wants to forgive and welcome them back. Closely associated with this program is the requirement of informing loyal citizens and military organizations about the program. These are the groups that play an important role in the rehabilitation of the defectors. The loyal citizens must accept

the defectors back into the society or the defectors will probably return to the insurgent side.

Inducement operations are the responsibility of PSYOP personnel although intelligence organizations also play a major role in this part of the program. The intelligence community provides PSYOP personnel with information gained from interrogations designed to determine why insurgents have quit their cause. If feedback provided by intelligence is timely and valid, this information can be used to induce more insurgents to quit their cause. Intelligence organizations benefit from this type of mutual support because, with more insurgents defecting, there is the probability of increased intelligence.

Themes

Before a PSYOP program is implemented, a careful analysis is made to determine the vulnerabilities of the insurgents. Common vulnerabilities of insurgent forces are hardships, disillusionment because of slow progress, and fear of getting killed. To be effective, the term *hardship* must be translated into meaningful facts such as insufficient medical services, low pay, and long family separations. The success of any PSYOP effort depends on close coordination with intelligence agencies.

Maximum use of radio, loudspeakers, newspapers, leaflets, and other publications will be the mainstay in the dissemination link. The PSYOP operator, however, constantly seeks new and unusual techniques to spread the word of the government concerning the promises of the defector program. Innovations such as badges, postage stamps, and imprinted balloons publicize the defector program. Encouraging local government officials to speak about the program may also help.

PSYOP Utilization

Former insurgents are used to the maximum extent possible in inducement operations. They are extremely effective in developing PSYOP material because they know the environment and the modus operandi of the insurgent. If defectors are

integrated into the PSYOP effort, their knowledge of the habits, customs, and idiom of the insurgents will make the PSYOP effort more effective. Additionally, these individuals are used in evaluating PSYOP material before it is disseminated.

Small units of armed defectors are organized to perform propaganda missions in locally contested areas. Such units are effective because they speak with firsthand knowledge. For security purposes, selected individuals of known loyalty are incorporated in these special units.

An effective system of rewards is one of the most important aspects of a defector program. Rewards are coordinated to ensure that each defector is paid for the assistance he provides to the government and that the pay is equitable. A central office monitors all rewards and establishes a well-publicized standard scale to ensure that rewards are in line with those previously paid. Defectors are questioned to determine whether they have received all rewards due them.

Speed in making payment is necessary so that the impact of the deed is not lost; consequently, funds should be made available to local officials so that rewards can be paid immediately. When security permits, rewards should receive wide publicity so all can see that the government lives up to its word. This added emphasis may induce other defections, particularly when large sums of money are involved.

Exploitation of the returnees involves obtaining information, disseminating the intelligence derived from this information, and using the intelligence to defeat the enemy. The following major considerations concern the exploitation of defectors:

- Treatment promised to returnees must be delivered. Initial reception is particularly important because it has an important bearing on how much an individual will contribute to the government. A returnee who is properly treated may even volunteer for intelligence and PSYOP roles. On the other hand, an individual improperly treated becomes an easy target for reindoctrination by antigovernment forces.
- Qualified interrogators are available at the lowest level possible, which is important because of the insurgent's characteristic of frequently moving. It is imperative that defectors be interviewed within the first few hours after

defection to determine their knowledge. Interviewers also need the necessary communications to disseminate information to responsive units. When the number of qualified interrogators is limited, consideration should be given to pooling and dispatching them by air as the situation requires.

- Security must be provided for both the defector and the defector's family. Insurgent forces are likely to place maximum effort on retaliating against a defector (and the defector's family) to discourage other defections.
- Clearly defined policies on exploitation must be established.

One of the major problems confronting a commander is that many of his, officers and men will not trust the returning defectors. To counter this logical distrust, the commander implements a massive command information program that includes handling, treatment, and use of defectors. Experience proves that one of the best ways to reverse the feeling of distrust is to publicize the help that defectors give to the friendly forces. The returnee's knowledge of the insurgents' tactics, terrain, and current situation is invaluable to the countering forces.

One of the government's most difficult tasks is to identify the enemy and the defector is often the only person who knows the enemy; consequently, a major task of friendly military personnel is to exploit this knowledge. Former insurgents may be used as scouts, guides, members of collection and reconnaissance units, and monitors for interpreters.

Special interrogation procedures are necessary for working with a defector. Experience has shown that most defectors will talk freely without the use of pressure. Generally, the best technique is to employ the interview method. The interviewer first must gain the confidence of the defector, and interviews should not be continued unless the interviewer believes that good rapport and communication have been established. Because most defectors are highly apprehensive immediately after their escape, it often requires several interviews to establish communication. It may be useful to have earlier defectors talk to all new returnees, telling them that they have made the right decision by defecting.

The interview environment is extremely important. Although a private room is desirable, elaborate equipment is not

necessary. With new defectors, it is helpful to have intelligence requirements mentally fixed so that resort to paper and pencil is not necessary. The defector should be convinced that he is important and has valuable information that can be used to help defeat the enemy.

Rapid and accurate interrogation of knowledgeable returnees is necessary if effective exploitation is to be accomplished. Generally, the best procedure is to use normal military communications to report information gained from interrogations. Communications between police, government officials, and other sources are coordinated because many insurgents defect to governmental agencies other than military units. Reporting by those agencies helps to speed information to the user.

If the country is so organized, there is a military reporting headquarters at district, province, and region. Forms used for reporting must be simple, and some basic information should be reduced to blocks for check marks. It often will be beneficial if the forms are bilingual.

Intelligence agencies keep the lower echelons informed of any special requirements so that special reports can be forwarded. Each echelon in the reporting channel keeps a reference file on all defectors. The file contains basic information, such as date of rally, area of operation, former job with insurgents, special knowledge, and disposition. The information is readily available so that an individual can be quickly located for exploitation at any time.

Security

Security for defectors is essential. If the exploitation program is working well, the insurgents will counter it with attacks against individual returnees and compounds where returnees are kept. Normal active and passive security measures are improved by organizing the defectors into self-defense units. Special protection is given to high-level defectors-perhaps evacuating them from the immediate battle area even though they may be able to provide exploitable tactical information.

Special consideration must also be given to a defector's family. Immediately after a person defects, the family should be located. If they are in an enemy controlled area, their identity may have to be concealed before the defector can be exploited. When defectors cannot be exploited because of the family's location, plans should be made to evacuate the family to a secure area.

A successful defector program includes effective means for returnee rehabilitation, a phase that requires national support. Planning and coordination of national resources are required when jobs, arable land, and educational facilities are to be provided.

Reception Centers

Rehabilitation begins at the reception center as soon as a returnee has been exploited for intelligence and PSYOP. Centers are established in secure areas near the defectors' homes, if possible. It is of utmost importance that all promises disseminated by the PSYOP program be fulfilled as soon as possible.

A new returnee is made to feel welcome. Experience has shown that an effective way to help a new returnee overcome initial shock is to assign him a sponsor-a returnee who has been at the center for some time. A special ceremony (such as a retreat formation) is held to introduce this individual to the rest of the group. In addition to temporary jobs, such as sponsoring members, returnees are hired to fill as many of the permanent administrative jobs at the center as possible. They know the problems of the returnee; therefore, they are very effective in rehabilitating the former enemy.

While at the centers, individuals are given reindoctrination courses on government objectives and the responsibilities of individual citizens. Detailed programs of instruction are centrally prepared, and supporting reference materials are provided to the rehabilitation administrators.

Vocational training may be centralized because of limited facilities and qualified instructors. This training is on a voluntary basis, and national coordination is required to

ensure that those individuals who successfully complete vocational training become gainfully employed.

To assist in their own protection, defectors should be organized into self-defense groups. The rehabilitation complex should be tied into the defense plan of the area, with some government forces placed in the center or located close by. Within the center, planted returnees are used to determine whether the enemy is trying to infiltrate the program. These specially trained individuals determine whether the center is providing the defectors all benefits due them. They also evaluate the center's overall effectiveness.

The defector program must include a follow-up phase to determine whether the defectors are remaining loyal to the government and becoming self-supporting. Field representatives working with the police receive information from defector program administrators when defectors have moved into their areas. These representatives determine what problems, if any, the defectors are having in being accepted by the general population. As a minimum, a system must be established whereby a former insurgent is required to register with the police in the area where he resides. The police would then be responsible for the security and surveillance of these individuals.

Returnees whose home areas are under insurgent control may require temporary homes. It is not advisable to place them in defector villages because they then become easy targets for the insurgents, which makes it harder for them to be accepted by the general public. Defectors resettle where they can find employment in trades learned during the rehabilitation portion of the program.

History demonstrates that a sound defector program is a valuable aid in defeating an insurgent movement. A good defector program supports the existing government by reducing the number of active insurgents, gaining support from the general population, and providing information that can be exploited to defeat the enemy. A good defector program is another form of combat power. To neglect it invites a longer conflict and unnecessary casualties.

Tactical PSYOP and Strategic Objectives

Ronald D. McLaurin

Exploitation *of* tactical opportunities for strategic PSYOP can be crucial to achievement *of* long-term goals.

A major cause of disaffection from the government during the early years of the Hukbalahap insurgency (1946-64) in the Philippines was the mistreatment endured by the populace at the hands of Philippine security forces. Accounts of individual abuses by police powers in the Philippines are legion. From independence until 1950, the poorly trained security forces suffered from bad morale and worse discipline. In the field, troops typically foraged for supplies at the expense of poor peasants. Indiscriminate weapons firing resulted in unnecessarily high noncombatant casualties. Worse, the Philippine constabulary sometimes shelled whole villages when some residents were suspected of harboring or abetting Huks. Suspects were seized without due process of law, then beaten or otherwise treated inhumanely. Police corruption was widespread and resulted in such bitter, frustrating experiences for the peasants that many of them supported or joined the Huks.I

After Ramon Magsaysay became secretary of national defense in September 1950, however, many important and effective steps were taken to protect noncombatants during tactical operations and to build confidence in their military forces.

The first step, an innovation in tactical organization, improved the supply situation in the armed forces. (Inadequate supplies had led to foraging by troops in the field.) The introduction of self-sufficient battalion combat teams (BCT) reduced the interdependence level, which had slowed army responsiveness. The BCTs displayed initiative, flexibility, and resistance to Huk intelligence-gathering. BCTs were "autonomous in almost

every sense except for strategic command, which was placed under the commander of the four military areas in the country."[2]

Second, in those cases where security forces abused their authority or did not treat civilians with respect, an effort was made to ensure that prompt and appropriate punishment was meted out. Because the objective was popular sympathy, not merely appropriate punishment, a certain degree of publicity attended these self-administered acts of justice on the part of the military.[3]

Third, civil affairs officers were attached to each unit to contact and work with the people-to inform them of the government's objectives and to make the military aware of the needs, interests, and problems of the local citizenry. This activity was designed to overcome the troops' previous lack of positive contact with the Filipino masses. It resulted in close relationships, more effective civic action programs, and better tactical intelligence. Civil affairs officers were also responsible in large measure for the implementation of the population protection programm[4]

A further instrument to ensure that the armed forces acted with self-restraint toward the civilian population consisted of an arrangement with the Philippine telecommunications facilities whereby any citizen, for the equivalent of five cents, could send a telegram of complaint about troop behavior directly to Secretary Magsaysay's office. The secretary maintained a pledge to respond to each complaint and initiate an investigation into the circumstances that gave rise to it within 24 hours. The availability of this means to redress grievances, and the government's determination to follow through, were impressed upon the armed forces for maximum deterrent effect.[5]

Yet another change involved the dispatch of military doctors with individual units in the field. This function served both the military and noncombatants in the area. The doctors provided medical aid to civilians who were injured through either combat or accident. They also gave general medical attention to people who in many cases had never seen a doctor before.[6]

As the program to protect and work with the indigenous population progressed, even more flexible approaches were essayed in an effort to ensure the protection of civilians from

abuse, loss, or casualty during tactical operations. By May 1954, "the patrols were firing at the Huks only as a last resort."[7] Through these and other initiatives, PSYOP at the tactical level contributed to the major strategic objective of the government reacquisition of the loyalty and support of the population.

Notes

1. See, for example, Richard M. Leighton, Ralph Sanders, and Jose N. Tinio, *The Huk Rebellion: A Case Study in the Social Dynamics of Insurrection* (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1964), 29, 33, 35, 58; Albert Ravenholt, "The Philippine Republic: A Decade of Independence," in *Britannica Book of the Year* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1957), 51; *The Philippines: A Young Republic on the Moue* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1962), 79-80; Carlos P, Romulo, *Crusade in Asia: Philippine Victory* (New York: The John Day Company, 1955), 87, 124, 130-31; Carlos P. Romulo and Marvin M. Gray, *The Magsaysay Story* (New York: The John Day Company, 1965), 109, 123; Alvin H. Scaff. *The Philippine Answer to Communism* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955), 28, 35, 36, 49-62, 119; Frances Lucille Sterner, *Magsaysay and the Philippine Peasantry: The Agrarian Impact on Philippine Politics,* 1953-1956 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961), 26, 224 (n. 12); Napoleon Valeriano, "Military Operations," in Counter-Guerrilla Operations in the Philippines, 1946-1953: A Seminar on the Huk Campaign held at Fort Bragg, N.C., 15 June 1961, mimeographed), 29: and Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T. R. Bohannan, *Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 98, 133.

2. J. Gualberto Planas, "One Year of Secretary Magsaysay," *Philippine Armed Forces Journal* 4 (August-September 1951): 14; and Valeriano.

3. Republic of the Philippines, Executive Order 113 April 1950: Alfonso A. Calderon, "Philippine Constabulary," *Philippine Armed Forces Journal* 3 (September-October 1950): 4; Romulo, 131; Romulo and Gray, 124, 127; Scaff, 36; Robert Ross Smith, "The Philippines, 1946-1954," in D. M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al., *Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, vol. 1, The Experience in Asia* (Washington, D.C.: The American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, February 1968), 496; and "The State of the Peace and Order Campaign," *Philippine Armed Forces Journal* 4 (January-February 1951): 12, 13.

4. Valeriano and Bohannan, 106, 211-13, 221.

5. Ibid.; Charles Wolf, Jr., *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, July 1965), 22.

6. Charles W. Thayer, *Guerrilla* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 41.

7. Scaff, 135.

PART IV

Case Studies of PSYOP Applications

Introduction

These case studies present and clarify PSYOP goals, roles, and methods. Col Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., USAFR, condenses and analyzes US and Vietcong PSYOP in the Vietnam War. He analyzes the Chieu Hoi campaign, the vulnerabilities of the North Vietnamese army and the Vietcong soldier, and summarizes the key US and Vietcong PYSOP appeals and techniques.

MSgt Richard A. Blair, USAFR, and Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF, 'present the Iraqi propaganda network used during the Persian Gulf' War. They explore Iraq's skill in creating and using a variety of media outlets, internally and externally.

Col Dennis P. Walko, USA, details tactical and consolidation PSYOP activities in Operations *Just Cause* and Promote *Liberty* in Panama. He presents major PSYOP lessons learned.

Laurence J. Orzell shows that Poland's underground media were nongovernmental PSYOP in action as well as a significant part of the Polish sociopolitical scene. According to Orzell, this underground media enabled the Poles to resist the enforcement of the adoption of communist ideals and values.

Colonel Goldstein refers to the 1986 Libyan Raid as a PSYOP effort and reports the results.

Maj James V. Keifer, USAF, Retired, discusses national antidrug policy and relates the role of military psychological operations in solving drug problems.

The late Gen Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Retired, discusses the importance of the political-psychological dimensions of conflict and insurgency. He explores, through several examples, the failure of the American public, the media, and even our bureaucracy, to recognize and counter political and psychological warfare conducted against US policies.

In Major Keifer's second piece, he gives an overview of the psychological dimension of the Persian Gulf War relative to the diplomacy process and the quick end to the war.

Colonel Goldstein and Col Daniel W. Jacobowitz, USAF, Retired, in case studies on Operations *Desert Shield/Desert Storm,* support the urgent need to increase US sensitivity to the psychological dimension of warfare. They not only solidify the

PSYOP requirement but also point out our weaknesses and future challenges.

US and Vietcong Psychological Operations in Vietnam

Col Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., USAFR

This paper reviews and analyzes selected US and Vietcong PSYOP strategies, tactics, and problems in the Vietnam War. Included are the Chieu Hoi campaign, the vulnerabilities of the North Vietnarhese Army and the Vietcong, and key PSYOP techniques of both the US and the Vietcong.

Coordination of Decentralized United States Psychological Operations Agencies

The US PSYOP effort during the Vietnam War was decentralized among the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the US Information Service (USIS), and the Agency for International Development (AID). Each agency was responsible for one or more aspects of the foreign information/ PSYOP effort conducted in South Vietnam. The agencies "operated independently of each other," according to Ronald D. McLaurin of the American Institute for Research in Washington, D.C. In 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson established the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) to integrate the PSYOP activities, to avoid duplication of effort, and to increase the overall effectiveness of the effort.

According to then 4th PSYOP Group Commander Taro Katagiri, the variety of agencies involved made it difficult to coordinate the PSYOP effort as well as to establish centralized control and direction in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in 1968-69. There were repeated examples of lack of coordination. Mr Katagiri recalled that on 16 February 1969 there was an airborne leaflet mission in which a total of 84,000 leaflets were disseminated without prior coordination with the area task force PSYOP officer. And US PSYOP teams sometimes

appeared at hamlets on audiovisual or loudspeaker missions only to discover a province team conducting a similar mission.

Roles and Goals in Vietnam

PSYOP responsibilities grew during the war without the guidance and control necessary to accomplish the corresponding goals. The breadth of American roles and goals led to rapid growth in the size of US PSYOP elements. PSYOP goals:

1. **undermine popular support for the insurgents,**
2. **enhance the image of the government of the RVN,**
3. **increase Vietnamese understanding of, and elicit support for, US policies in Vietnam, and**
4. **engender international support for US policy in Vietnam.**

Relatively few PSYOP-experienced personnel were available, however, and those few were spread among the many groups involved in PSYOP. According to MACV, the US PSYOP mission in Vietnam included the following entities:

- **the American Embassy in RVN,**
- **the Mission PSYOP Committee,**
- **the JUSPAO,**
- **MACV,**
- **Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS),**
- **US Army Republic of Vietnam (USARV),**
- **the 4th and 7th PSYOP Groups,**
- **Naval Forces, Vietnam (NAVFORV), and**
- **the Seventh US Air Force.**

In PSYOP Policy number 51, 28 December 1967, the JUSPAO Planning Office established the following PSYOP priorities:

1. **the Government of Vietnam (GVN) image,**
2. **Chieu Hoi (come home),**
3. **revolutionary development (agriculture and improved living standards self-help projects),**
4. **refugee program,**

5. public safety,
6. the US image,
7. GVN mass media advisory effort, and
8. telling the Vietnam story.

The Chieu Hoi Campaign

Two special PSYOP targets were the Vietcong (VC) and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) soldiers in South Vietnam. Two Chieu Hoi operations carried out in the Delta during 1970 and 1971 proved that PSYOP and combat pressure working together could get results. The operations were Operation *Roundup* in Itien Hoa Province and Project *Falling Leaves* in Kien Giang Province. Operation *Roundup* produced hundreds of enemy defectors, according to Colburn Lovett, a USIS foreign service information officer. One PSYOP technique was to take pictures of ralliers/defectors and have them sign a simple message on a leaflet, encouraging their comrades to join the cause. Another technique was to use loudspeaker teams of former VC soldiers who were sent back into the areas of their units to speak to their comrades in the bush. Project *Falling Leaves* combined Vietnamese and US personnel working in joint PSYOP activities. Armed propaganda teams (100 percent ex-VC) made deep penetrations and extensive face-to-face communications. All possible media were used, including boat-carried loudspeaker teams, leaflet drops, radio tapes, and television appeals by former VC.

There are significant PSYOP lessons here for all commanders. During the two-month period in 1971 when intense PSYOP supplemented military action, there were 1,150 defectors, while in the six weeks before and the four weeks after the intensive PSYOP campaign, there were only a total of 211 defectors. PSYOP, if applied on an intense scale, is of significant value to commanders in securing the surrender of enemy forces. The author believes that military operations conducted without PSYOP support will not be as successful as those conducted with it.

A PSYOP project initiated by Special Forces in conjunction with a detachment of the 245th PSYOP Company, JUSPAO, and the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) had as its

objective bringing Vietnamese government presence back to the area around Duc Co in Pleiku Province. The area had slipped into the contested category. Using the Duc Co Special Forces Camp as its base, the PSYOP effort was aimed at all of the villages and hamlets within a 10-kilometer radius. This Chieu Hoi campaign, adopted in 1963, offered communist soldiers forgiveness and exoneration for temporarily slipping into the alien communist path. They could return home to their families and the just cause of the republic. The term *surrender* was not used. Medics held sick calls over a four-day period to attract the sympathetic attention of the villagers. Over 800 villagers were treated during this four-day period. Face-to-face contact allowed the representatives of the VIS to stress the theme that the VC were preventing peace while the government of Vietnam was working for peace. Valuable information concerning the popular resentment toward VC methods came to light and the team members were careful not to make the same mistakes, particularly with regard to pressures exerted to bring villagers to propaganda sessions. At the end of four days, the operation was judged to be a success, so much so that the wives of eight VC persuaded their husbands to seek amnesty as Chieu Hoi returnees.

Vulnerabilities of the North Vietnamese Army Communist Soldier

The NVA soldier in South Vietnam presented a particularly difficult target for GVN/US PSYOP aimed at inducing surrender or defection. He had a relatively high state of indoctrination, which was reinforced by a range of psychological controls that included self-criticism sessions, the three-man cell, and endless repetition of communist themes. A contributory reason for the resistance of NVA soldiers to Chieu Hoi inducements was that defection for most did not hold the promise of an early family reunion. (Defecting Vietcong were South Vietnamese who were going home.) Moreover, unlike the VC guerrilla who may be a teenager conscripted from his hamlet and sent into battle without much party schooling or political indoctrination, the NVA soldier was the product of a closed totalitarian society. He had been subjected to com-

munist indoctrination from his earliest school days. This made him more resistant to PSYOP entreaties. Further, the NVA soldier found himself fighting in a region unfamiliar and semi-antagonistic to him, usually in relatively uninhabited areas and with little chance for contact with the civilian population.

US/GVN PSYOP messages pointed out three options: (1) to rally, take advantage of the Chieu Hoi program and quickly become a free citizen of the RVN; (2) surrender as a prisoner of war and await repatriation at the end of the war in the safety and relative comfort of a prisoner of war camp; and (3) counsel NVA soldiers to devote all their efforts to individual survival rather than getting killed or maimed for an unjust cause. Even a partial success in this PSYOP effort would contribute to shortening the war by reducing the combat effectiveness of NVA units.

The vulnerabilities of NVA soldiers did not change much throughout the war. Separation from families, the hardships of infiltrations, fear of allied arms, and, perhaps most significantly, the contrast between what they had been told by the cadre and what they actually experienced, were the major exploitable weaknesses.

The surrender program for the Northern troops (Chieu Hoi) received the greatest amount of American emphasis and money. Reception centers for defectors (hoi chanh) were built at various locations throughout the country. They usually remained in the camps from 45 to 60 days before being released and resettled. They were given rewards (e.g., money to buy food) for turning in their weapons. NVA soldiers realized that defecting might prevent them from ever going home to the North.

Key Psychological Appeals

According to Vietnam veteran and former Air Force intelligence officer Lt Col Robert Chandler, five major US PSYOP appeals were applied in Vietnam:

1. fear of death,
2. jungle hardships,
3. loss of faith in victory,
4. concern for family, and
5. disillusionment.

The aim of the fear appeal was to convince the enemy that he faced an overwhelming danger of being killed if he remained with the communists. Message themes included "death lurks everywhere," "born in the north to die in the south," and "no shelters are safe from the bombs of the B-52." Not all fear appeals were successful, however: In one appeal, fear leaflets imprinted with the ace of spades as a sign of death were dropped and decks of cards with prominent aces of spades were left along VC trails; unfortunately, Vietnamese card decks did not include the ace of spades. Another example of fear-appeal failure was the use of gruesome leaflets depicting corpses. This had a boomerang effect because the hoi chanh felt that thq government was gloating over the deaths of fellow Vietnamese.

The hardship appeal reminded enemy soldiers of their loneliness, homesickness, poor living conditions, and insufficiencies in food and medical supplies. The "loss of faith in communist victory" appeal sought to convince the enemy that the Republic was winning the struggle. It emphasized battlefield losses and the number who had already rallied. The "concern for family" appeal, one of the most effective, was very emotionally based. Loneliness, nostalgia, and the desire to return home to loved ones were primary factors motivating communist soldiers to defect or surrender. The disillusionment appeal was based on the idea that the North Vietnamese soldier might be able to withstand fears and hardships as long as he was convinced that Hanoi's aims were just, but would be more willing to defect when he became skeptical of them.

Four special PSYOP techniques were employed in Vietnam: distribution of safe conduct passes, money for weapons, focus on returning home to celebrate during the Tet New Year, and armed propaganda teams composed of hoi chanh. Many PSYOP professionals believe these teams were effective because of their personal touch to the Chieu Hoi invitations.

Important Nonmilitary Considerations

There were several misconceptions about PSYOP. Taro Katagiri, former 4th PSYOP Group commander in Vietnam, believed that many people considered PSYOP a separate and

distinct activity, unrelated to other functions-especially in nonmilitary situations.

PSYOP was not amply exploited to support economic programs such as rural construction, political programs, medical assistance, or humanitarian efforts. Another misconception was that PSYOP involves just verbal communications and, thus, many Americans were insensitive to nonverbal gestures, posture, signs, and physical appearance.

An individual's response to persuasive communication in any culture is based on and reinforced by his regular interpersonal relationships. An individual usually consults a member of his/her primary group, a friend or relative, before taking action in response to persuasive messages. A great number of the VC rallied/ defected to the Chieu Hoi program through an intermediary who was a relative or trusted friend. Many did not defect until they received assurance from a relative or friend that the government would keep its promises concerning good treatment and other aspects of the amnesty program.

Cultural Considerations in Vietnam

For the Westerner, one of the most important elements to understand about Vietnamese culture is the completely personal basis of the society. '"Truth" for the Vietnamese is not the factual statement or actual occurrence of an event; it is in the pleasantness of personal relationships. A Vietnamese's entire character lies in not giving or receiving personal embarrassment or shame. For example, it would not be culturally correct for a Vietnamese to shout at or reproach a waiter over bringing the wrong meal order.

He would either quietly request a change or simply eat the wrong meal and pleasantly smile. Understanding and progress are less important than pleasant associations. Distrust of strangers is a part of Vietnamese culture, and Vietnamese people politely keep their distances. Vietnamese answers to questions will reflect what the questioner may want to hear. A Vietnamese will avoid lengthy associations with strangers but will be pleasantly polite. The Vietnamese culture places a very high value on the family and on elder citizens.

Vietcong Techniques

According to Philip Katz, the reverse of the trusting value was used by the VC in their attempt to deter defection. His example is of a VC or NVA soldier who claims to his comrades that he was captured by the GVN or US forces and had subsequently escaped. He testifies that while a prisoner he was treated badly and that he had firsthand knowledge that the government of Vietnam did not abide by their good treatment promise.

Katz says that research findings substantiate the fact that intimate Vietnamese associates tend to hold opinions and attitudes in common and are reluctant to depart unilaterally from their groul3 consensus. They talk frequently among themselves and establish a trusting bond of friendship upon which to primarily base their decisions. Interpersonal communication is highly valued; mass media are of secondary importance. I

Vietcong National Liberation Front

Douglas Pike presents the three VC PSYOP programs of dan van, dich van, and binh van. Dan van was the VC effort to develop support in areas that it controlled while dich van was the effort to develop support in GVN-controlled areas. Binh van was the recruiting program among Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops and GVN civilian servants. Destruction of South Vietnam's armed forces was the overriding priority for the VC; violence, armed attacks, assassinations, kidnappings, terrorist acts, and binh van were employed.

The top objective of binh van was to induce unit desertions, preferably accompanied by an act of sabotage. The next highest objective was to induce individual military desertion or civilian defection, preferably accompanied by an act of destruction or a theft of key documents. Next was to induce major and significant opposition within the military or civil service, either covertly or overtly.

Binh van PSYOP techniques included the following:

1. enunciation and constant restatement by all possible means of a liberal VC policy toward recanting military and civil servants, including prisoners;

2. wide and intensive use of terror and psychological intimidation against key officials and military units, including killing every person;

3. use of penetration agents to infiltrate and develop support within the military and civil service;

4. use of family ties and friendships to induce or coerce military personnel and civil servants to desert, defect, or covertly serve the VC;

5. tangible and intangible rewards for those who deserted or defected, (for example, the VC announced it gave $2,000 to a group of deserters in Long An Province);

6. encouragement among potential draftees to oppose the military draft; and

7. distribution of two songbooks containing 20 songs. The emotional songs were about the homeland and total victory. They contained communist ideas, praised party leadership, and presented the great qualities of the communist guerrillas. Cultural dramas were also used to promote the cause.

US PSYOP objectives in the Vietnam War were ill-fated from the beginning, primarily because of the "foreign invader" image of the United States. US psychological operations were used simultaneously as a means of achieving US foreign policy goals and as a substitute communications tool for the Republic of Vietnam to create nationalism. We misjudged the will of the communists to prolong the revolution and bring about reunification. We also misjudged Vietnamese reluctance to support any central government. In addition, we could not win the support of the US Congress to fight the type of war that needed to be fought. Instead, we fought a protracted war that was doomed. We lost the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese and our fellow Americans; we lost them to the PSYOP of the Vietnamese communists. *We must learn the values of strategic, operational, and tactical PSYOP from this devastating experience.*

Notes

1. Philip Katz, PSYOP and Communication *Theory*.

The Iraqi Propaganda Network

MSgt Richard A. Blair, USAFR
Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF

During the Persian Gulf War, Iraq had considerable success in mounting a psychological warfare (psywar) campaign that reached a wide domestic and foreign audience. While some might attribute this success (at least in part) to overzealous international media providing newsworthy coverage of events in the Gulf, the bulk of the accomplishment is a credit to Iraq's skill in creating and using a variety of media outlets as propaganda dissemination mechanisms.

Following his established pattern, which was designed to prevent the accumulation of power within any one governmental entity, Saddam Hussein distributed propaganda duties among many offices within the government and the Baath Party. While most of these offices officially answered to the Ministry of Culture and Information (MCI), they were actually managed through informal channels by the Baath Party, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), and Saddam Hussein himself.

Within Iraq, all broadcast facilities are owned and operated by the Broadcasting and Television Organization of the MCI. Prior to the invasion, Iraqi broadcast capabilities included two prime-time television broadcasts, two domestic radio services- "Baghdad Domestic Service" and "Voice of the Masses" (VOM)- and shortwave radio broadcasts of VOM in Kurdish, Turkoman, and Assyrian.

Shortly after the invasion, Iraq took over Kuwait's radio facilities and began operating the Provisional Free Kuwait Government Radio program. They also implemented at least five additional shortwave radio programs designed to undermine the Saudi and Egyptian governments and the morale of Arab troops in the Gulf. [1]

Once Allied coalition bombing commenced, the Iraqi broadcasting capability was severely hampered. Iraq's television capability was completely destroyed and the only radio broadcasts noted were "Baghdad Domestic Service" and "Voice of the Masses"-both operating at greatly reduced signal strength.

The printed media within Iraq was also largely controlled by the government. The Baath Party published the largest daily newspaper in the country, *Al-Thawrah.* **The MCI managed Al-Jahameer Press House, which published two other widely read dailies in Iraq, the Arabic-language Al-Jumhuriyah and the English-language** *Baghdad Observer.* **The Ministry of Defense also published an Arabic daily newspaper,** *Al-Oadisiyah,* **and other ministries and agencies of the government sponsored the majority of some 12 weekly papers and monthly magazines published in Iraq. Even where they did not control a publication directly, the government still influenced its contents-the MCI's General Establishment for Press and Printing licensed and censored every publication that appeared in the country.**

The Iraqi government also expended considerable resources to reach foreign audiences. Iraqi television aired video clips to foreign broadcast organizations over both ARABSAT and INTELSAT. The Iraqi News Agency (INA) gathered and translated news and commentary from Iraqi press, radio, and television sources and disseminated reports by wire to subscribers around the world. The INA distributed its material even further through its participation in the Non-Aligned News Agency Pool, a service of the Non-Aligned Movement that facilitates the sharing of news items among member nations.

Iraq also controlled several other significant media resources, the most notable of which was the "Voice of the Palestine Liberation Organization," a radio program produced by Palestinian elements in Baghdad and broadcast over the Iraqi shortwave radio network. They had varying degrees of influence over some ideologically compatible media like the Libyan news agency JANA and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) radio in Algiers. By mid-November, Iraq was successful in rallying information officials of Palestine, Tunisia, Jordan, Yemen, Mauritania, and Sudan to issue a joint statement endorsing the Iraqi position and discussing ways of bolstering

media cooperation to confront the intensive hostile media campaign launched by the United States and its allies.

Additionally, Iraq took advantage of every opportunity to provide its views to foreign news agencies through government officials, both at home and abroad. For example, an informal examination of three days' worth of Iraqi propaganda in mid-August revealed official statements made to the press in various countries by three RCC members, seven government ministers, 10 ambassadors, a governor, a military commander, and the speaker of the National Assembly.

Iraq also displayed great success in varying the spokesmen mouthing their propaganda. Sometimes this simply took the form of issiling statements in the name of various groups or individuals; for example, the children and vanguards of Iraq or the American hostage Golden Johnson. More often, it consisted of quoting pro-Iraqi statements elicited from various amenable personalities such as Palestinian leaders George Habash and Nayif Hawatimah or of distorting statements by world leaders whose condemnations of Iraq left room for misinterpretation.

Iraq allowed the first Western journalists into Baghdad on 18 August 1990. Later, however, all foreign journalists except a news team from Cable News Network (CNN) were expelled- and these journalists were always strictly controlled. They were escorted everywhere, and all news reports leaving Iraq were censored by the government. Although most of the world knew that Iraq was censoring these journalists' reports, use of this link to the CNN network still greatly enhanced many of Iraq's propaganda campaign objectives.

Additionally, Iraq used covert methods to access outlets that could not be influenced openly or directly. Stories of wide-spread Iraqi bribery surfaced continuously throughout the crisis. Supposedly, influential members of various countries were offered valuable gifts and monetary compensation to promote pro-Iraqi sentiment. One confirmed report of this activity resulted in the expulsion of an Iraqi Embassy official in Pakistan for "providing financial assistance for the publication of propaganda materials against the state [of Pakistan]."2

Iraq also financed several newspapers in Western Europe to gain Arab support throughout that region. However, toward

the end of the crisis, several of these newspapers either closed down or reduced operations. It is uncertain whether Iraq gave up this project due to budgetary reasons, lack of discernible positive results, or a combination of both.

Iraq's counterpropaganda efforts completed the network. With some modifications, Iraq took the approach that nearly all hostile themes and attacks should be countered openly and vociferously. Therefore, the Iraqis collected hostile propaganda, analyzed it, developed appropriate themes in response, and inserted them into their own campaigns within hours. For example, within hours of President George H. Bush's address to the US Congress on 11 August 1990, INA carried a lengthy rebuttal and Aent it out over the newswire. Shortly thereafter, INA carried a second long rejoinder composed by Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. By the evening of the 12th, the editors of every Iraqi daily paper had prepared, for publication in the morning papers of the 13th, their own attacks on the speech. To complete the cycle, INA then compiled a summary of the newspapers' criticisms that was circulated on the newswires early on the 13th.

In analyzing Iraq's success in disseminating propaganda to foreign and domestic audiences, three key components are easily identifiable. First, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait grabbed world interest and focused international media. Second, the government's skillful use of modern technology in mass communications provided it with instant access to the world populace. And third, Iraq used aggressive and imaginative propaganda campaigns to obtain and retain the widest possible mass audience.

By combining these three elements, Iraq not only made significant contributions to its national objectives but also created a powerful force multiplier. This multiplier presented the illusion that the Iraqi military capabilities and will to fight were much stronger than reality proved them to be.

Iraq's achievements in coordinating their internal and external propaganda efforts resulted in significant success in reaching world audiences. Although ultimately unsuccessful, the Iraqi effort clearly demonstrates that imaginative use and integration of today's mass communications technology allows any country to influence audiences well beyond their borders.

Notes

1. These five shortwave radio programs were "Holy Mecca Radio," first observed on 10 August 1990; "Voice of the Egypt of Arabism," first observed on 11 August 1990; "Voice of the Peninsula and the Arabian Gulf," implemented on 29 August 1990; "Voice of Peace," implemented on 11 September 1990; and "Voice of Arab Awakening," first observed on 13 October 1990.
2. Pakistani newspaper *Markaz, 16* January 1991.

Psychological Operations in Panama During Operations *Just Cause* and *Promote Liberty*

Col Dennis P. Walko, USA

US military psychological operations units figured prominently in 013eration *Just Cause* in Panama. Even US television viewers gained some appreciation of PSYOP; they saw broadcasts from the former Panama Defense Force-dominated national television channel that included "mysterious" US and Panamanian nation symbols. They saw safe conduct passes dropped on Panama Defense Force and "Dignity Battalion" (DIGBAT) positions, and they heard tactical loudspeakers appealing to enemy forces to cease resistance and surrender. Perhaps our country's last television view of PSYOP activity in Panama was that of the loudspeaker in front of the Papal Nunciature blaring heavy metal rock music to "drive Noriega out of his mind" or "keep him awake."

Military PSYOP disappeared from US public view immediately after Noriega surrendered to US authorities, only to reemerge during Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm.* Americans once again were exposed to news articles featuring PSYOP leaflets and loudspeakers.

In each case, the attitude of our mass media and the ensuing public response were favorable to PSYOP. Articles in newspapers and journals portrayed PSYOP as both cost effective and critical to success. Official and unofficial US military circles said PSYOP was a valuable force multiplier that had induced enemy forces to abandon their positions or surrender, thereby reducing loss of life on both sides.

Less conspicuous was the bulk of psychological operations during *Just Cause.* Most PSYOP activities and accomplishments in Panama were hardly noticed by either the US public

or the general military community. The special operations community, however, did notice. The lessons learned in Panama were incorporated into standing operating procedures. Where possible, immediate changes were made to capitalize on the PSYOP successes of *Just Cause* and *Promote Liberty*. This led to improved production, performance, and effect in the next contingency, which took place within six months after the return of the last PSYOP elements from Panama. Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* employed PSYOP at an order of magnitude and effectiveness that many credit to the lessons learned from Panama.

Recognizing that much of *Just Cause* and its complementary civil-military restoration operation, *Promote Liberty is* still classified, this article has been prepared to informally discuss PSYOP during the Panama contingency. It will briefly cover the evolution of PSYOP plans and operations, describe their objectives, and show how PSYOP were successfully executed. Hopefully, this piece will show there was a lot more to PSYOP during this contingency than rock music and surrender appeals, and that **PSYOP** did, in fact, contribute significantly to the overall success of the operation.

Panama contingency plans had been under development for years prior to *Just Cause*. These contingencies were to range from evacuation of US and third country nationals to full-scale combat operations against Noriega, his Panama Defense Forces (PDF), and (later) the DIGBAT goon squads. The latter targets were increasingly viewed as threats, not only to Panamanians, but also to US dependents. Contingency planning culminated with consolidation and reconstruction operations to follow any combat scenario.

Psychological operations were well integrated into the planning process. The worst-case scenario involved combat operations in Panama. For this option, planners recognized the importance of promoting prompt cessation of hostilities and minimizing civilian casualties. The following were key concerns for this option:

- US casualties
- Panamanian civilian casualties
- Collateral damage

- Delay in US troop withdrawal
- Disinformation and hostile propaganda

The five concerns were interrelated. If the PDF offered concerted resistance to US troops, casualties on both sides would escalate, civilians would likely suffer, Panama City and US military installations might sustain severe property damage, and US troops could become bogged down in an effort which would increasingly be susceptible to counterproductive local, US, and worldwide criticism. Related to all this was the concern that the Noriega-controlled Panamanian media-essentially a propaganda machine-would continue to broadcast material detrimental to US interests and stir up doubts as to the effectiveness of our operations.

Additional concerns for consolidation or reconstruction operations included repairing the government and economic infrastructure and establishing a functioning democracy. Specific PSYOP missions and requirements were identified to support contingency plans and address all the aforementioned concerns.

On the tactical level, loudspeaker teams were scheduled to accompany all major ground combat units. Their objective was to convince the enemy to cease resistance and surrender while advising innocent civilians how to stay out of harm's way. As the plan matured over time, loudspeaker teams received increased emphasis: a few months prior to the operation, the designated commander for Joint Task Force-South (CJTF-South), then Lieutenant General Stiner, directed that loudspeaker teams be provided to each infantry battalion (Army and Marine Corps) and each SEAL battalion-equivalent participating in the assault phase of the operation. This was probably the highest loudspeaker-to-combat force ratio in the history of the US military.

On the national-strategic level, a PSYOP task force would be formed, based upon the regionally oriented 1st PSYOP Battalion (Bn) augmented with additional loudspeaker, radio, and television assets from the 4th PSYOP Group (Gp). The PSYOP task force (TF) main body was to deploy early, assume control of ongoing tactical PSYOP, and provide general PSYOP support to the operation, employing full media production and

dissemination capabilities. Its objectives were to conduct national-level PSYOP designed to minimize interference and resistance, and to foster support for US military operations and efforts by the Panamanian government to restore law and order.

Various prepackaged PSYOP materials-prerecorded TV, radio, and loudspeaker tapes; radio and loudspeaker scripts; music; and designs for printed leaflets and posters-were developed from 1987 to 1989. These were approved by an interagency committee headed by the commander of US Army South.

The commander of the 1st PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group, based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was the designated commander of the PSYOP TF in the eventuality of any Panama contingency. He was responsible for developing detailed contingency PSYOP plans, annexes, and products, and for coordinating all PSYOP-relevant details with USSOUTHCOM and XVIII Airborne Corps. Prior to the actual operation, often during routing trips to Panama, the commander and other members of his command visited many of the principal target locations and identified potential production facilities-a precaution against a late arrival of PSYOP production equipment.

Facilitating this planning process was the fact that successive I st PSYOP Bn commanders served as CINCSOUTH's senior theater PSYOP officer, knew most key players on the USSOUTHCOM and USARSO staffs, and had a small liaison cell located in the USSOUTHCOM J-3 directorate. Furthermore, once the XVIII Airborne Corps commander (General Stiner) was designated CJTF for the contingency, coordination between the battalion and that headquarters (including one-on-one meetings with General Stiner) became a frequent affair. General Stiner would later assume overall responsibility for planning and commanding the operation. He took a personal interest in PSYOP, further enhancing their planning, coordination, and execution.

By March and April 1988, Noriega had increased provocative actions against US forces in Panama, having sent harassment patrols into the US-controlled Arraijan tank farm (fuel storage and distribution depot adjacent to Howard Air Force Base) and the nearby US Army ammunition storage facility. At this point,

the National Command Authority ordered additional security forces deployed to Panama, with additional deployments in May 1989. Included among these forces were an additional infantry brigade, military police, and three PSYOP loudspeaker teams. These forces remained in Panama until hostilities were initiated.

The three loudspeaker teams deployed as a tactical detachment with sufficient personnel, vehicles, radios, and speaker systems to permit reconfiguration as five teams if the need were to arise. As time dragged on, soldiers and equipment were rotated to and from Panama to such a degree that virtually every battalion in the 4th PSYOP Gp had an opportunity to deploy soldiers to Panama. This would prove extremely important: by the time of the contingency, a large number of PSYOP soldiers had firsthand knowledge of the area, the equipment, the supported commanders already in Panama, and the Spanish language.

As tension in Panama grew, loudspeaker personnel became integral members of US tactical exercise and security forces. These units often became embroiled in PDF and DIGBAT-orchestrated protests during several of the increasingly frequent exercises conducted by US forces to reassert US treaty rights. The loudspeaker teams not only effectively employed prerecorded tapes which would also be useful later, during the contingency; they prepared other announcements on the spot. These encounters served as valuable training and experience for PSYOP soldiers who would support *Just Cause* and *Promote Liberty*.

Two events in Panama were to have a significant effect upon PSYOP planning for the contingency. The first was Noriega's nullification of the May 1989 Panama presidential elections. Besides the obvious worsening of Panama's internal conditions and international relations, this act gave US PSYOP a number of obvious themes for use against Noriega and his "inner circle." It also heightened the probability of a combat contingency and energized even greater attention to the contingency planning process (including PSYOP planning and preparation). From this point forward, both the 1st PSYOP Bn commander and the 4th PSYOP Gp commander spent increasing time in Panama, providing PSYOP planning expertise to

CINCSOUTH, his staff, and the US Country Team. (In fact, both officers were to return from lengthy TDY in Panama within 72 hours of the events that precipitated Operation Just *Cause.)*

The second event was the failed 3 October 1989 coup attempt by members of the PDF against Noriega. After the coup attempt, Noriega rapidly purged the PDF of its more moderate leaders and boosted training for the paramilitary DIGBATs. Prior to this coup attempt, the US combat contingency plan had focused on removing Noriega and his cronies from power while leaving the PDF institution alone; under these new conditions, it became increasingly clear that, in the eventuality of a contingency operation, the JTF would not be able to operate within those limited US objectives. Therefore, PSYOP materials that had been prepared prior to the coup required revision. The most time-consuming revisions were those associated with audiovisual products that had been prepared for possible broadcast over television.

As time passed and the situation in Panama worsened, it became clear to the 1st PSYOP Bn commander that he could no longer keep television and radio broadcast tapes up to date. To have done so would have worn out personnel of both the battalion and the 4th PSYOP Gp's Strategic Dissemination Company. Since these products were classified TOP SECRET-SPECAT, they could only be produced at night and on holidays when noncleared soldiers were off duty and away from the media production facility. Furthermore, this activity was beginning to tie up personnel who were key to other ongoing PSYOP activities in the USSOUTHCOM area of operations. Thereafter, for initial operations the PSYOP TF would depend upon the battalion's prerecorded music tracks, silent footage and logs, and written scripts that could be modified at the last minute and read "live" by PSYOP broadcast announcers. In fact, such modifications for radio and television broadcasts were made by the commander, from Panama, over long-distance telephone within hours prior to commencement of hostilities. All were used during the first 24 hours of Just *Cause,* constituting the first official US broadcasts in Spanish heard by the Panamanian population.

After General Thurman's assumption of command on 30 September 1989, the failed coup attempt that shortly followed, and General Stiner's designation as CJTF-South, conditions in Panama continued to deteriorate. US concerns for the safety and protection of US lives and property were heightened; preparation and coordination for a Panama contingency involving full-scale combat operations were intensified.

As a result, 4th PSYOP Gp loudspeaker personnel at Fort Bragg were placed on recall status for possible deployment on short notice. Loudspeaker system shortfalls were identified and additional systems were obtained from Army Reserve PSYOP units. Loudspeaker broadcast scripts in English and



Source: 1st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 1. These bilingual booklets were carried by tactical PSYOP loudspeaker teams, along with prerecorded tapes of the same messages in Spanish. Note the messages in the extract; US troops did not mince words.

Spanish were refined by the 1 st PSYOP Bn and published in a small handbook. Prerecorded tapes for loudspeaker broadcast were revised and additional announcements were recorded. Tapes and booklets were taken to Panama for use by the deployed teams if the time came to execute the contingency.

The 1st PSYOP Bn commander was designated by General Stiner as a member of a 20-man JTF-South staff element identified to predeploy to Panama in advance of the assault forces if the contingency were to be executed. As it turned out, this predeployment would prove important to the success of PSYOP in the Panama contingency. With the exception of the three loudspeaker teams already in Panama and the loudspeaker teams accompanying the airborne and special operations assault forces, the PSYOP TF would not arrive in Panama until after initial assault operations.

The commander, his forward liaison cell, the loudspeaker detachment, a prepositioned 4th Gp AM radio broadcast team, Volant Solo PSYOP TV/radio broadcast aircraft from the 193d Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Pennsylvania ANG, and the USSOUTHCOM J-3 PSYOP office would comprise the PSYOP planning, coordination, development and dissemination capability in Panama until D + 3. Late arrival of the main body notwithstanding, PSYOP employed a full range of media and other activities in support of initial combat operations-and with good effect.

During the early morning of 18 December 1989, two days after the fatal shooting of a US serviceman and the harassment of another and his wife by members of the PDF, the 20-man advance JTF-South staff element administratively and clandestinely deployed to Panama. The 1st PSYOP Bn commander assumed control of his forward elements in accordance with prior arrangements with USSOUTHCOM headquarters, although the members themselves still had not been informed of the pending operation, and in fact were not to be told until the night of the assault.

At 1900 hours, 19 December, the 1 st PSYOP Bn commander assembled the members of his liaison element, the loudspeaker detachment commander (now the company commander who, coincidentally, was in Panama conducting his assumption of command property inventory), and the commander of the

prepositioned AM radio broadcast team to notify them that Just Cause was to be executed on 20 December. The commander then organized the element to function on a 24-hour basis as his ministaff, interim PSYOP development cell, and radio broadcast team. Consistent with the JTF OPLAN, the loudspeaker detachment would break down into five teams which would link up with their designated supported units. The other loudspeaker teams and PSYOP liaison officers that were called for in the plan would deploy with their supported combat units and would operate in an attached or OPCON status-a command and control relationship which caused problems, as will be discussed later.

This sri jall PSYOP force was prepared to work in shifts until the PSYOP TF arrived. Although envisioned to function only for about the first 24 hours of the operation, it was this small group which planned, coordinated, and ran psychological operations for the first three days of the contingency. Once the remainder of the PSYOP TF had commenced operations, the liaison element continued as the JTF PSYOP staff section and PSYOP TF liaison at the JTF-South headquarters, maintaining continuous coordination with all elements of the JTF and coordinating aviation requests and leaflet drops.

In addition to AM radio broadcasts, initial PSYOP activities involved TV broadcasts of prepackaged materials from the 193d SOG's Volant Solo aircraft. The recently revised scripts were read live by PSYOP soldiers who had been picked up at Pope AFB, North Carolina, while the aircraft was en route to Panama. These broadcasts-all in Spanish-notified the Panamanian population of US intent and advised how to avoid accidentally becoming a casualty. (These were the "mysterious" broadcasts that puzzled some of the US media in Panama.)

The TV channel used for broadcasts by Volant Solo was Channel 2, the national channel commandeered by the Panamanian military shortly after the 1968 coup d'etat and controlled by the military until 20 December 1989. It was targeted for psychological impact, to deprive Noriega of his principal TV media, and to ensure prompt reception by the populace. To this end, and according to the OPLAN, Channel 2's broadcast capability was neutralized by special operations forces at approximately H-hour, and Volant Solo began

broadcasting on the frequency. The broadcast facility was shut down in such a manner as to enable prompt restoration of capabilities once the US and new Panamanian government were in full control of the situation.

The PSYOP element commenced activities by making use of the same previously prepared scripts and recordings being broadcast via Volant Solo. Soon it was heavily involved in preparing scripts and acquiring news items and music adequate to keep the Panama City area receiving Volant Solo's broadcasts and the nationwide audience receiving the AM radio station's broadcasts 24 hours per day. This was a major undertaking: Scripts would have to be developed, coordinated with the staff, and translated into acceptable Spanish so the Panamanian population would listen and understand. All of the PSYOP soldiers were actively engaged in this process. Fortunately, all were bilingual and thoroughly familiar with the situation in Panama. Tapes of popular music were available to maintain audience attention between announcements.

Safe conduct passes were prepared at and distributed by the printing facilities at the main US military print plant at Corozal. (Later versions, as well as other products, were printed on presses deployed with the PSYOP TF and on captured presses at Noriega's former PSYOP facility on Fort Amador.) It should be noted that Gen Marc A. Cisneros, CG USARSO, signed the leaflet, as opposed to CINCSOUTH (General Thurman), or CJTF-South (General Stiner). General Cisneros had already established a good reputation among the Panamanian population and the PDF, and therefore was expected to have greater credibility as a known entity. As events proved, his reputation would be a valuable commodity, not only as endorser on subsequent surrender appeals, but in personally arranging the surrender of regional PDF garrisons by telephone.

These first safe conduct passes were printed on newsprint. Three hundred thousand of them could be printed and chopped into bundles rapidly in a form that could be handled by two of the cell's PSYOP sergeants with a pickup truck. Furthermore, US helicopter crews could easily take on 30,000 or more leaflets and toss them over target areas without difficulty due to their compactness and small size. If the

PASAPORTE A LA LIBERTAO

ESTE PASAPORTE ES PARA EL USO DE MIEMBROS DE LA F.F.D.O., BATALLON DE LI OIGMIO AD Y LI COOEPAOI. SI SE PRESENTA ESTE BOLETO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS, LE GARANTIZAMOS SU SEGURIDAD, ACCESO A FACILIDADES MED[illegible] COMIDA, Y UN LUGAR DE DESCANSO Y A(c1W[AAa0".
RECUERDEN: NO HAY QUE SUFRIR MÁS.

GENERAL MARC A. CISNEROS
COMANDANTE DE TROPAS DEL EJERCITO SUR

PASAPORTE A LA LIBERTAO

SAFE CONDUCT PASS

THIS PASS tS FOR USE BY POF, OIGMTY nATTAUON. AHO COOEPAOI MEMBERS.
1 THE BEARER OF THIS PASS, UPON PRESENTINGIT TO ANY U.S. MILITARY MEMBER, WILL BE GUARANTEED SAFE PASSAGE TO U.S. FACILITIES THAT WILL PROVIDE MEDICAL ATTENTION, FOOD, AND SHELTER.

GENERAL MARC A. CISNEROS
CG, US ARMY SOUTH

SAFE CONDUCT PASS

Source: 1 st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 2. Three hundred thousand of these safe conduct passes were printed on newsprint as an expedient. They were printed in Spanish on one side but in English on the other so that US troops understood what was being promised. These were proven effective in the early stages of Just Cause, especially when accompanied by loudspeaker broadcasts.

contingency had taken place during the rainy season, this approach might not have worked very well since the newsprint would have rapidly disintegrated on contact with water. Had heavier paper stock been used, however, the leaflets would have taken longer to print and might have been too bulky and heavy for the small detachment to handle.

These safe conduct passes were dropped by helicopter on targets of opportunity and on locations identified by PSYOP soldiers. Helicopter pilots often carried bundles of leaflets just in case an opportunity would present itself for their use. Later versions of these passes were also distributed as handouts from loudspeaker teams and other US forces.

One of the earliest indicators of effectiveness was the successful employment of loudspeakers and leaflets in support of US Marines at La Chorrera, a small village on the outskirts of Panama City and Howard AFB. The Marines had encountered heavy resistance from PDF and DIGBAT members for the first 24 hours. The Marines ceased fire for the night. Surrender appeals were then blared over loudspeakers as safe passage leaflets were dropped. Resistance ceased early the next morning without an additional shot being fired. Surrendering personnel came forward clenching the safe conduct passes.

Colocated with the PSYOP cell was the commander of the Joint Audiov1sual Detachment (JAVDET), a unit comprised of multiservice elements from the Joint Combat Camera Center. Although not in command of the JAVDET, the PSYOP TF commander could request specific video coverage by the detachment. He then had a significant amount of footage already available when the main body of the PSYOP TF arrived with organic camera teams and audiovisual production capability. One copy of every cassette produced by the JAVDET was delivered to the PSYOP TF.

The JAVDET's transportation asset were extremely limited, but the PSYOP TF commander was able to match up these cameramen with several of the vehicle-mounted loudspeaker teams already in-country. It was largely the videos obtained by these photographers that were used in initial PSYOP audiovisual operations. Also, since these videos were not PSYOP products, they were provided by the JAVDET to the US media through program action officer (PAO) channels. PSYOP loudspeaker soldiers and activities therefore wound up receiving higher visibility in the US media than would have been the case otherwise.

Immediately upon activation of the 10,000-watt AM PSYOP radio station and commencement of the initial assaults on 20 December, the new president of Panama, Guillermo Endara, communicated with the Panamanian masses principally via this station. Among Endara's first announcements was the promise that anyone turning a weapon in to US forces would be paid $150 for it.

The "money for guns" concept had been envisioned as a viable PSYOP technique to promote cessation of hostilities. Results during *Urgent FYiry* in Grenada had been successful, even though undertaken late in the operation. In the case of Panama, the initiative was taken early; it paid off. The PSYOP radio station explained and promoted turn-in procedures to combatants and to the Panamanian population. The newly arrived PSYOP TF commenced preparation of numerous printed leaflets and posters to convey information leading not only to the rapid surrender of PDF and DIGBAT personnel, but to their turning in individuals and cached weapons as well.

Early in the operation, PSYOP soldiers supported civil military operations, including the displaced persons (DP) camp hastily established in Balboa Village. A tactical PSYOP loudspeaker team set up full-time operations in the compound and amplified PSYOP radio broadcasts over the loudspeaker system to put the people at ease and keep them informed. This team, along with other PSYOP soldiers, moved throughout the camp, handing out newspapers prepared by the PSYOP TF, pretesting proposed PSYOP products, chatting with the people, observing their actions, and reporting potential problems to the camp administrators-members of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion.

A primary problem associated with the DP activity was rumor control. By building rapport and establishing information programs with the DPs over time, PSYOP soldiers established their credibility and were able to neutralize rumors before they expanded to crisis proportion. When an improved, expanded DP facility was completed at the Panamanian-controlled portion of Albrook Field, PSYOP soldiers helped prepare the population of the Balboa camp to minimize apprehension about the move to the new site and to enhance control during the move itself.

The tempo of PSYOP increased dramatically as time progressed and the PSYOP TF became fully operational. Additionally, the 4th PSYOP Gp commander arrived as senior PSYOP commander in-theater-serving as special PSYOP advisor and expeditor for General Thurman. The group commander used the full range of media to convey public information while soliciting cooperation and support from the

ES TU DEBER

MAXIMO QUE SE PAGARA:

$25 POR SUFICIENTE CANTIDAD DE MUNICION

$25 POR GRANADA

$30 FOR GRANADA RP(;

S 100 FOR PISTCLA

S 115 FOR ESCOPETA

$150 POR RIFLE AUTOMATICO

1130 FOR MINA

$5000 MAXIMO

POR ALMACENAMIENTOS DE ARMAS

COOPERA CON NOSOTROS

RECOMPENSA MAXIMA POR
ALMA CENAMIENTOS DE ARMAS

PUNTOS DE F;NTRE(:A

·Departamento a Poi.- cerca de la parte de +lr++ d<l n<r,< Albrook

·Gimnasio Nacional (Frente al Anon Ien)

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PROCEDIMIENTOS DE ENTREGA

1. REMUEVE EL CARGADOR Y MUNICIONES DEL ARAB

L ATA UN PANG RLANCO AL ARMA.

/. ACERCATE CON EL ARMA SOSTENIDA BIEN EN ALTO POR EL CAÑON.

< SIGUE LAS INSTRUCCIONES DE LAS AUTORIDADES.

COOPERA CON TU GOBIERNO Y AYUDA A
LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS ESTADOUNIDENSES
UNIDOS ALCANZAREMOS LA LEY, EL ORDEN Y
LA SEGURIDAD PUBLICA

SINTONIZA A A.M. 1160

Source: t st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 3. A series of posters and handbills advertised the reward program for weapons. (Interestingly, a Panamanian showed up in an armored vehicle and asked what the reward was for it. Since the maximum authorized amount for any one item was $150, US troops offered $150. After a short negotiation session, the Panamanian accepted the offer.)

Source: 1 st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 4. Christmas cards were distributed during Just Cause to enhance relations and rebuild national spirit; 10,000 of the first and 30,000 of the second were distributed-mostly by hand and by helicopter drop.

military in identifying and apprehending PDF and DIGBAT members and arms caches.

Posters, leaflets, radio broadcasts, and television announcements solicited information and provided telephone numbers to be called by those wishing to volunteer information regarding weapons or PDF and DIGBAT fugitives. These techniques were effective. Within minutes after dissemination of printed material or broadcast of the information, the designated telephones began to ring and information poured in. It was also found that new posters, especially "wanted" posters bearing photographs of PDF and DIGBAT fugitives, had to be printed and distributed continuously because people removed them from walls to avoid identification, to keep as souvenirs, or possibly take them home for study and future reference.

Other products focused on establishing a favorable image of US forces, explaining US motives, and providing information needed to reestablish the normal routine. Products of the latter category were in demand because the former PDF-dominated Panamanian media was essentially shut down. In fact, the newspapers printed by the PSYOP TF were so sought after by the public that enterprising Panamanians grabbed bundles of them and sold them to passers-by.

At this point, it should be stressed that all products were tested prior to dissemination. Product review and approval was extended to the level of the executive office of the Panamanian government in order to reduce the probability of error. (A classic example of such an error on the part of an enemy occurred during *Desert Shield/Storm* when an Iraqi propaganda announcer warned US military personnel that their wives were fooling around with movie stars such as Bart Simpson!)

A short case study is presented here for the purposes of clearly demonstrating the complexity of PSYOP product development during *Just Cause* and, later, *Promote Liberty.* During the operation, the PSYOP TF developed a product bearing the multicolored image of the Panama national seal. The insignia was surmounted by an eagle. Due to the poster's size and complexity (five colors), the prototype was assembled and sent to the Corozal print plant. The workers at the plant

SE BUSCA

TTE CNEL LUIS A. CORDOBA

Ex jefe official do intcligcncia. Ex-miembro del Conscjo Estrat6gico Militar CEM. Rcsponsablc por el arresto do los oficialcs del G-2 cnvucltos en cl golpe de rnarzo do 1988. Ex-jefe del DNTT y la 5ta zona militar. Trigueño, complexión mediana, cabello ncgro, ojos castanos, estatura 5'8' y peso 160 Lbs.

SI TIENES INFORMACION ACERCA DEL PARADERO DE ESTA PERSONA, LLAMA AL TELEFONQ:

25 55-24

Source: 1 st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 5. Several versions of these kinds of posters were employed by members of the Joint Task Force in attempts to round up former members of the Panama Defense Forces and Dignity Battalions. These posters, along with radio and television announcements, not only contributed to the prompt identification and capture of fugitives but also served to reassure the Panamanian populace that US forces were actively seeking to round up those individuals most capable of orchestrating retaliatory actions or restoring the "old order."

Source: 1 st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 6. "Wanted" handbill

TRIBUNAL ELECTORAL LEGALIZA
Al. GOIIIERNO DE ENDARA

LINEAS PARA REPORTAR INFORMACION

SINTONIZA A A.M. 1160

CAPTURADO

COL ANGEL ALBERTO MINA

CON CA UIESA DISCUIFS1
LOS RUMANOS EL FUTURO

TIMISOARA, RUMANIA (UPI) -

Source: 1st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 7. Note that this PSYOP newspaper advertises the radio station frequency, announces a recent capture of a PDF officer, and provides telephone numbers for reporting locations of arms, munitions, criminals, and criminal activities. Panamanians picked up bundles of these newspapers and sold them.

remembered that they had produced similar images before the contingency and still had the master plates; they therefore used these plates. The resulting product was indeed beautifully done. Only one problem: the PSYOP TF S-3 realized that, instead of the traditional eagle atop the Panama crest, there was a North American bald eagle-not exactly the kind of thing that would make us popularl

When redone, the revised poster with correct eagle and crest, was tested again "just to be sure." Again, a problem surfaced-according to the National Code of Panama, the crest was supposed to appear in a field of green, and the proposed poster would have done just that. Unfortunately, the proposed green was the color of one party of the Panama coalition government-one which was becoming increasingly viewed by Panama political opponents as trying to muscle out the other two coalition parties.

The poster finally came out with the eagle and crest on a neutral background. The lesson here is that pretesting and posttesting, including the actual colors to be used, are fundamental to the PSYOP development and production process.



Source: 1 st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 8. This small red, white, and blue poster was printed on heavy stock paper and was distributed throughout Just *Cause* and Promote *Liberty.* It was displayed on military vehicles and handed out by US troops. Its objectives were to portray US-Panamanian teamwork and to reduce perceptions of US forces as military invaders or occupiers. Within days after dissemination commenced, Panamanian commercial vendors were peddling T-shirts and other paraphernalia bearing the same logo.

This process is crucial-and testing needs to be done right. Additionally, all PSYOP campaigns and products require extensive staff coordination and personal review by the PSYOP TF commander.

As the situation further stabilized, it became increasingly important to get the commercial media "back in business." Shortly after the first day of operations, the PSYOP TF commander began to receive personal telephone calls from media representatives willing to get their TV and radio stations back on the air in support of the US and the new government-but only if they and their personnel would be escorted by US soldiers or transported under guard while their facilities were guarded by troops of the JTF. There existed considerable concern for possible terrorist acts by DIGBAT goons still at large, including possible murder or sabotage.

Initially, soldiers and vehicles could not be spared by either the PSYOP TF or JTF-South to satisfy all commercial media's conditions. Nor did the PSYOP TF have the weapons necessary to provide appropriate security. However, at about 2 100 hours the night after Noriega obtained sanctuary in the Papal Nuniciature, a team of PSYOP soldiers entered the TV Channel 2 broadcast facility and began broadcasting prerecorded tapes of cartoons from the station library. By morning, most of the commercial broadcasting crew had arrived, along with a large crowd of Panamanians enthusiastically waving Panamanian and US flags. They were celebrating the arrival of US troops and the "grand reopening" of their singing channel.

The commercial crews volunteered to restore operations as the PSYOP team temporarily observed and screened their material to ensure that it was not counterproductive to US aims or those of the new government. Another TV channel (4) was similarly reactivated the same day.

Most of the principal radio and television stations in and around Panama City were back on the air within days, temporarily under observation by or supervision of either US PSYOP personnel or Panamanian officials with whom PSYOP had established a working relationship. These media not only broadcast materials prepared by the PSYOP TF, but also prepared and broadcast excellent programs on their own. Their

programs supported US military forces and the government of Panama.

By 8 January, the PSYOP TF had produced and disseminated over one million leaflets and handbills, 50,000 posters, 550,000 newspapers, and 125,000 units of miscellaneous other printed materials. Volant Solo had conducted TV broadcasts for the first several days, the PSYOP AM radio station had been operating 24 hours a day, and countless messages had been aired on commercial radio and television stations and published in commercial newspapers. Loudspeaker teams continued to support tactical units by broadcasting advisories, interacting with the population, and providing timely PSYOP advice to US commanders.

Psychological operations figured prominently in the successful US efforts to flush Noriega out of the Papal Nunciature, where he had sought refuge. They played a significant role in establishing the Panama Public Force-the new police force designed to replace the old PDF. PSYOP teams circulated through Panama City and other population areas, assessing conditions and public attitudes, interacting directly with the public and with US combat and security forces, and resolving difficulties when they arose.

All of the first series of US PSYOP objectives were accomplished during *Just Cause. US* combat elements began to depart in early January 1990. Focus shifted to the consolidation of the new government in Panama and the restoration of the public information infrastructure. The PSYOP TF was stood down, replaced by a PSYOP support element comprised of 48 personnel.

This element, consisting of stay-behind PSYOP soldiers from *Just Cause* and a civilian analyst from the 1st PSYOP Bn, provided PSYOP support to the newly created Military Support Group. This unit then provided US military support to the government of Panama during the nation assistance and civil-military operations of *Promote Liberty*. From mid-January to the end of February, the PSYOP support element produced and disseminated more products and planned and executed more activities than all those in support of *Just Cause* combat operations.



Source: 1st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 9. One of many later versions, this poster not only indicates procedures for surrendering arms but also identifies turn-in locations and their hours of operation. Subsequent versions left some of the data blank so that Special Forces soldiers in the countryside could fill in the information and administer similar programs.

The highly efficient and productive mini-task force increasingly worked in conjunction with the new government, the commercial media, the US Embassy, the Military Support Group, and JTF-Panama to create conditions favorable for restoring democracy, the economy, and public security. Major emphasis was placed on these objectives:

- Maintaining support for US objectives in Panama.
- Professionalizing the newly formed Panama Public Force and Panamanian Police Force (PNP)-constituted principally by former members of the PDF.
- Gaining public support for the Public Force and PNP.
- Enhancing the effectiveness and prestige of the new government.
- Neutralizing disinformation and hostile propaganda directed against the government, the Public Force/PNP, and the US.

By the end of February, these PSYOP soldiers had been redeployed to Fort Bragg. They were replaced by 8th PSYOP Bn soldiers augmented by linguists and area experts from the 1st PSYOP Bn and by camera and audiovisual technician teams from the 4th PSYOP Gp's Strategic Dissemination Company. This group continued operations, employing the full range of dissemination media, until stood down in May 1991. The final PSYOP objectives envisioned for Panama contingency operations had been accomplished.

From beginning to end, PSYOP supported all stated US military and political objectives. During the initial stages of the assault, PSYOP loudspeakers, leaflets, TV and radio announcements successfully appealed for cessation of hostilities; surrender of weapons and members of the PDF and Dignity Battalions; and compliance with measures promulgated by the newly formed Panamanian government. Psychological operations enhanced credibility of US military forces, assisted in gaining and retaining popular support for US actions, and helped reduce the potential for damaging disinformation and hostile propaganda.

As the operation progressed, psychological operations and PSYOP forces were fully integrated into consolidation operations and emergency relief activities while fostering an



Source: 1st PSYOP Battalion, US Army

Figure 10. The PSYOP support element coordinated directly with JTF-PM, ground forces, other elements within the MSG, the Panamanian government, and the US Embassy.

atmosphere of return to normalcy. Announcements via US military PSYOP and commercial news media supported this process. Through programs and information developed or disseminated by PSYOP soldiers, 193d SOG Volant Solo technicians, and host-nation affiliates, Panamanians knew when and where to go to satisfy their fundamental needs. Through this process, PSYOP supported not only the theme of legitimacy of the US operation, but also the legitimacy of the newly formed government of Panama.

During the final phase of military operations, US PSYOP supported an orderly return of control to the host-nation government, addressed major sanitation and health threats, and continued military information programs. All of this facilitated prompt return of the deployed US military personnel to CONUS.

Finally, as a natural consequence of these accomplishments, psychological operations and PSYOP units gained recognition among many important US commanders of combat and combat support units participating in the operation. Not only did PSYOP affect them personally by assisting in the reduction of casualties

and damage on both sides, but also assisting in presenting the most favorable image of their commands to the Panamanian population and to the world.

Many of these accomplishments cannot be measured in quantifiable terms. However, there were obvious indicators of success:

- **surrender of enemy forces after exposure to loudspeakers and leaflets;**
- **immediate public response to posters, loudspeakers, and TV/radio announcements, resulting in valuable information and intelligence;**
- **civilian compliance with instructions conveyed via PSYOP media;**
- **virtual absence of hostile propaganda and disinformation which could have obstructed the mission; and**
- **prompt restoration of commercial information services, which contributed to the legitimacy of the new democratic government.**

Many valuable lessons were learned by the PSYOP **community itself:**

- **The PSYOP TF commander simultaneously serving as JTF PSYOP officer, theater PSYOP officer, and PSYOP TF commander enhanced initial planning and coordination. As the operation progressed, however, these duties overextended the capabilities of the commander to the extent that he encountered difficulty supervising and controlling the many disparate and geographically separated PSYOP elements and operations.**
- **The requirement that PSYOP TF simultaneously provide JTF staff support, control tactical assets, and develop and disseminate PSYOP products stressed the capabilities of the task force to the breaking point. The battalion staff and company configurations did not easily adjust to the requirements of a task force much larger and more complex than experienced before. Of particular concern was an inability to control the tactical** PSYOP **teams, which were vital to successful PSYOP campaign planning and evaluation. Attaching these teams OPCON to combat commanders while optimizing on-site responsiveness during the assault phase detracted from**

overall PSYOP TF performance during consolidation activities. These teams should have reverted to a direct support status under operational command of the PSYOP TF as soon as that force had the ability to fully exercise that function. Unfortunately, that capability did not materialize until the majority of the teams had returned to the US.

- **Augmentation from other battalions of the 4th PSYOP Gp was essential to the success of the PSYOP TF. However, due to the peacetime configuration and functioning of the group, which only occasionally involved an integration of effort across battalion lines, the full talents and capabilities of soldiers and equipment were extremely difficult to exploit in Panama.**
- **The L-Peries modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) for the 4th PSYOP Gp and its subordinate units was not optimally suited to requirements of the contingency.**

Some of the "good things" that were either learned or reinforced are listed below.

- **Early integration of PSYOP into the contingency planning process helped ensure overall success of the operation.**
- **Tactical loudspeaker teams contributed to demoralization of the PDF and DIGBATs and to cessation of hostilities and surrender. The teams used prepackaged scripts and recordings, but frequently employed their own ingenuity and linguistic capability "on the spot" to deal with both hostile forces and the civilian population. Tactical commanders of Army forces, Marine Corps forces, and Navy SEAL forces placed considerable importance on these teams.**
- **The Panama population listened to, and complied with, instructions and advisories from US military PSYOP TV, AM radio, and loudspeaker broadcasts.**
- **The working relationship that the 4th PSYOP Gp commander and the 1st PSYOP Bn commander enjoyed with the XVIII Airborne Corps commander and stag, and with CINCSOUTH and his staff prior to Just Cause and Promote Liberty, undoubtedly resulted in a degree of understanding and trust which were critical to the success of joint PSYOP throughout the contingency operation.**
- **Psychological operations soldiers and airmen were well trained, motivated, self-confident, and effective.**

Certainly, some of the problems and some of the "success stories" were situation dependent and can never really be formalized. However, in June 1991-less than six months after the Panama contingency was executed and only weeks after return to CONUS by the last 8th PSYOP Bn members of the PSYOP Support Element-the 4th PSYOP Gp was provisionally reorganized. Regionally oriented battalions remained, but the group was now organized according to an operational concept suitable for a wide variety of contingencies.

The reorganized 4th's basic tenets:

- The 4th PSYOP Gp commander would deploy to the theater headquarters, along with a small headquarters element, to provide PSYbP advice and assistance to the supported theater CINC and act as "expeditor" for PSYOP-related actions. (This happened informally in Panama, when the 4th PSYOP Gp commander performed this function not only for the PSYOP TF but also for the 96th Civil Affairs Bn, the 112th Signal Bn, and the 528th Support Bn-three units which were at that time under the 4th's peacetime command and control. The concept proved so beneficial to both the PSYOP TF and to CINCSOUTH that it was formalized.)
- The PSYOP TF would continue to be commanded by the theater PSYOP battalion commander, but with two other PSYOP battalion commanders working for him:
  1. A tactical commander (the commander of the reconfigured 9th PSYOP Bn) would control all PSYOP loudspeaker teams and other tactical PSYOP assets and ensure support to other tactical elements of the JTF. The 9th PSYOP Bn would train for these support missions worldwide.
  2. A media production commander (the commander of the new provisional PSYOP Dissemination Bn) would produce all printed products, recordings, and audiovisual products, and would run all radio and television broadcast operations.

Since the 4th PSYOP Gp would now be provisionally organized to operate the same in peacetime as in war, it was presumed that overall effectiveness of contingency PSYOP would improve.

The opportunity to validate the new concept presented itself sooner than anyone could have expected. Within one month

after the 4th PSYOP Gp's reorganization, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. When PSYOP forces deployed to Saudi Arabia, they did so in the configuration described above. It worked, and worked well! It is estimated that 29 million leaflets and many hours of loudspeaker and radio broadcasts During *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* resulted in thousands of Iraqi soldiers being influenced by PSYOP to abandon their positions and equipment and to surrender.

One can only speculate on what might have been the results had PSYOP forces not participated in these contingencies, but the indicators of success are pretty clear. In the author's opinion, these successes are a tribute to the PSYOP soldiers, civilians, anal airmen-past and present-whose competence, dedication, and ingenuity most certainly saved US and Panamanian lives and contributed to mission success. Their accomplishments have resulted in increased recognition of the value of PSYOP by senior military commanders and their staffs, and by other agencies of the US government. However, this renewed interest and understanding is highly perishable. We still have a long way to go before the potential of strategic, operational, and tactical PSYOP-and the forces which plan and execute these operations-is fully realized.

Psychological Operations in Action

Poland's Underground Media

Laurence J. Orzell

Poland offers a fascinating example of nongovernmental psychological operations in action. Drawing upon that country's long tradition of a conspiratorial press, dissidents affiliated with the banned Solidarity trade union and other organizations engaged in the large-scale production of underground newsletters, leaflets, books, and other printed materials designed to influence popular perceptions. The dissidents also utilized electronic media such as radio and cassettes.

Those activities reflected a broad range of antiregime opinion, but their overall purpose was twofold: to supply uncensored information on political, social, and economic issues, and to maintain a spirit of opposition among the populace. While the dissidents would probably have described their efforts as purely informational or journalistic, their activities could accurately be described as peacetime, nongovernmental PSYOP. This article places the Polish opposition's PSYOP efforts within their historical context but focuses on the period following the imposition of martial law (December 1981). In particular, the analysis examines the type of underground print materials produced, the means used to prepare and disseminate them, the government's response, the main themes the dissidents sought to propagate, and the opposition's use of electronic media. The article concludes with an assessment of the overall significance of those efforts.

The Polish resistance, whether directed against czarist Russia, Nazi Germany, or native communist rulers, recognized the value of PSYOP. When the Poles revolted against Russia in January 1863, they formed a conspiratorial government that not only conducted urban guerrilla warfare; it also organized an underground press which contained manifestos directed at

Poles, Lithuanians, Byelorussians, and Ukrainians. Although this effort failed, it contributed to the maintenance of armed resistance. The underground media played a much greater role during World War 11. The Home Army *(Armia Krahiwa),* Poland's chief resistance group, regularly published an *Informational Bulletin (Biuletyn Informacyjny),* copies of which circulated from hand to hand and thus indirectly supported diversions and armed opposition to the Nazis. Other groups, ranging from the far right to the extreme left on the political spectrum, also produced leaflets *(ulotki)* and other publications. So extensive was this network that the London-based Polish government-in-exile issued a postage stamp in 1943-itself a form of PSYOP-commemorating the underground press *(prasa podziemna).*

Armed resistance to foreign domination proved impractical following the communist consolidation of power after World War 11, but dissident psychological operations eventually came to assume even greater importance. Antiregime intellectuals benefited from their government's reluctance to engage in extensive repression during the 1970s-lest Poland risk losing the economic benefits of detente-and they established a variety of illegal publishing ventures. One group in particular, the Workers' Defense Committee (later renamed the Social Self-defense Committee), distinguished itself through its publications: *Communique (Lomunikat), Information Bulletin (Biuletyn Informacyjny),* and *The Worker (Robotnik).* Dissidents also set up an Independent Publishing House, better known by its Polish acronym NOWA, which produced numerous literary works and several periodicals. Despite periodic harassment by the authorities, NOWA and similar illegal publishing enterprises prepared materials targeted at laborers, students, farmers, and other social groups. There can be little doubt that these publications, which advocated political pluralism and respect for human rights, helped forge the broad social alliance which led to the formation of Solidarity during July and August 1980.

Both the regime and the workers used PSYOP extensively during the 1980 strikes. For instance, when the authorities distributed leaflets questioning the striker's motives, the workers responded with broadsheets of their own, counseling

resistance in the face of what they termed government disinformation. The government's acceptance of the strikers' "Twenty-one Demands" effectively extended legal recognition to unofficial publishing activities. The subsequent "Gdansk Agreement" obliged the regime "to respect freedom of speech and ... not to suppress independent publications." Solidarity quickly took advantage of this unprecedented concession. The union published its own national organ, *Solidarity Weekly (Tygodnik Solidarnosci),* and regional branches followed suit with a plethora of journals and newsletters. The union press both reflected and shaped the popular perception that the government could not be trusted to carry out the Gdansk accord. Not surprisingly, these publications represented one of the principal targets of repression when the authorities declared martial law on 13 December 1981.

Despite internment, arrests, and confiscations, the underground press quickly reappeared and assumed an even greater importance due to the fact of dissatisfaction. Some activists who were placed in internment camps in 1981-82 even managed to produce handwritten newsletters. For instance, internees at a detention camp in Nowy Lupkow prepared several issues of a newsletter entitled *Our Bars (Nasza Krata),* named after the prison bars which isolated them from society. Copies of *Our Bars,* reportedly circulated outside the camp, counseled the maintenance of worker-intellectual ties in the face of government repression. The vast majority of underground publications produced during and after martial law emanated from small groups of individuals in larger cities and towns who had avoided capture. The importance of these PSYOP efforts in dissident strategy became clear when Solidarity's underground Provisional Coordinating Committee issued a declaration in 1982, stressing the need to "organize the independent circulation of information" and thereby "expose the propaganda goals of the authorities."

The underground press produced nearly 1,000 different periodicals, approximately 400 of which appeared repeatedly, some on a regular basis. While it is difficult to estimate the total readership, the sheer number of publications suggests that these materials enjoyed wide circulation, primarily in urban areas. During the first four months of martial law, the

underground published 100 different titles. Many of the early editions bore the simple yet historically significant title *Information Bulletin (Biuletyn Informacyjny)* and consisted of one or two pages. As might be expected, the majority of these materials were prepared in Warsaw, Poznan, Wroclaw, Lodz, and Gdansk. Press runs varied from several hundred to over 10,000, depending largely upon available equipment and printing supplies. During the martial law period (December 1981–July 1983), most of these publications emanated from the remnants of these periodicals, including *Mazovian Weekly (Tygodnik Mazowsze)*, which was prepared by union activists in Warsaw! but Solidarity cells in factories and other local enterprises also issued short newsletters.

Solidarity activists did not, however, constitute the only source of clandestine periodicals in Poland. The publications of other underground groups assumed somewhat greater prominence after 1985, due at least in part to the increasingly dim prospects for the union's revival. Nearly all of these groups professed loyalty to Solidarity's ideals, but they also expressed a variety of opinions that distinguish them from the Solidarity mainstream. Three of these organizations merit particular attention. One, known as the Committees for Social Defense *(Komitety Obrony Spolecznej)*, issued a journal called KOS, which was directed primarily toward an intellectual audience. The Fighting Solidarity *(Solidarnosc Walczaca)* group published a paper of the same name, advocating a more confrontational stance than that favored by most Solidarity leaders. The Confederation for an Independent Poland *(Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej)*, a right-of-center group that antedated Solidarity, disseminated its strong critiques of the regime through its journals *Independence (Niepodleglosc)* and *We Don't Want Commies (Nie chcemy komuny)*. Further, publications targeted at specific social groups such as teachers, university students, and medical workers also attained greater prominence.

Several clandestine publishers branched out into the production of full-length books, an effort that gave rise to greater coordination among the underground media. In October 1986, representatives of several underground journals formed a Social Council for Independent Publishers. At the same time, several publishers concentrated on books rather than periodicals

because sales of the latter proved less profitable. Because this might portend a shift from shorter periodicals to longer products, some activists called for renewed emphasis on journals. Much of the debate centered on the role of the Consortium of Independent Publishers, a group founded in 1986, which sought to promote greater cooperation and minimize duplication within the underground media. Defenders of the consortium claimed that periodicals would continue to play a key role. In June 1986, the consortium helped found an Independent Publishers' Insurance Fund to reimburse members whose operations were closed by the authorities.

Leaflets, handbills, and other ephemera were also used by the Polish opposition, but they declined significantly with the decline in large-scale demonstrations. During the martial law period, the underground produced leaflets in connection with local strikes and other public protests. For example, activists printed and distributed a small leaflet announcing the place and time of a pro-Solidarity rally in Warsaw scheduled for May Day 1985. Leaflets were also used to alert the populace of the time and frequency of Radio Solidarity broadcasts. Still other broadsheets were designed to identify and disgrace those who cooperated with the regime during martial law. For instance, one handbill, entitled "List of Collaborators," purported to be a commendation from the government. The citation praised the recipients for their assistance and contained a blank space for insertion of the collaborators names.

Polish underground PSYOP also relied heavily upon the dissemination of nonverbal symbols by means of mock postage stamps and currency. In 1984, for example, the opposition produced a series of stamps portraying dissident leaders such as Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik. That same year, the Solidarity organization in Krakow issued a stamp in honor of George Orwell. During 1986, dissidents printed a set of stamps commemorating " 150 Years of the Underground Press in Poland." In addition, the underground produced forged Polish currency bearing the portrait of Lech Walesa in place of the figures who appeared on genuine banknotes. Dissidents reportedly printed a banknote containing the likeness of Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski and the inscription, "30 Pieces of Silver." Crude forgeries of US currency, designed as novelty items, also

appeared. During 1985, for instance, an oversized counterfeit of a $100 bill appeared in Poland with Walesa's picture in place of Benjamin Franklin's portrait.

The producers of underground publications faced a variety of obstacles. Dissidents understandably were reluctant to discuss openly the details of production and dissemination techniques. Most individual publishing enterprises were comprised of small numbers of people who strived to keep their identities and the location of their equipment well-concealed. Materials were first produced on typewriters using carbon paper or on mimeograph machines but the opposition increasingly came to rely on offset and silk-screen presses. The printing process was itself dispersed, particular functions being assigned to different locations. According to the production chief, Warsaw's *Tygodnik Mazowsze* needed 37 apartments, 30 of which were used in preparing each issue. Funds to acquire and maintain equipment came from publication sales, but Solidarity sympathizers abroad also collected financial assistance and made it available. The dissemination of underground publications necessarily involved significantly large numbers of people and great risk. Once printed, copies were reportedly sent to a variety of locations, where *kolportery* (literally, "hawkers") collected them for delivery to subscribers. In the case of *Tygodnik Mazowsze,* this led to the creation of a huge distribution network.

The Polish government responded to underground publishing with a curious strategy that blended harassment, repression, propaganda attacks, disinformation, and apparent neglect. The regime attempted to limit underground publications through strictures on the availability of printing supplies. Stationery shops were required to record all purchases of more than 1,000 sheets of paper. Agents of the Security Service *(Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa)* reportedly monitored such purchases and penetrated several underground organizations. From time to time, officials arrested individuals connected with dissident publications. Anyone engaged in such activity could be detained for 48 hours and fined up to 50,000 zlotys-the amount earned by an average Pole in two months. The authorities sometimes confiscated automobiles belonging to distributors, presumably to hamper the latter's ability to

continue their work. In some cases, the Security Service closed printing operations completely.

The regime also conducted a major PSYOP effort of its own to discredit the underground media. This campaign contained a variety of themes, one of which posited that underground publications were tools of the West-especially the United States. For example, the official press frequently claimed that US dollars were sent to the underground to ferment unrest in Poland. Also, infrequent factual errors in the underground media offered opportunities for the regime to attack their credibility. Moreover, government agents periodically engaged in black propaganda. In some instances, portions of genuine publications, were excised and replaced with forged texts. On other occasions, security officials produced forgeries of entire journals. And in still other cases, erroneous or otherwise embarrassing information was covertly supplied to publishers who reproduced it in good faith. For the most part, however, underground publishers discovered and exposed such activities.

Despite governmental attempts to close them down, Poland's underground media remained prodigious by East European standards. True, the sheer extent of underground publishing rendered it difficult for the regime to suppress such activity entirely, even if Polish officials had made a concerted effort to do so. Nevertheless, why they did not adopt even stronger measures raises some interesting questions. It may well be true, as one Western journalist suggested, that the government could not stamp out the underground media without causing uproar at home and making Poland an international outcast. This consideration might have grown even greater after Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in the USSR. The regime might also have concluded that it could not hope to win genuine popular support and must therefore tolerate the phenomenon. Then, too, government officials might have believed that the underground press allowed dissidents to vent their frustrations in a relatively harmless manner so long as opposition remained largely confined to the realm of theory.

The underground press criticized and challenged the political, social, and economic status quo. During the martial law period, dissident media served primarily to report instances of repression and to encourage resistance among the

populace. For example, they published information on political prisoners, endorsed strikes and demonstrations, and advocated noncooperation with the regime (e.g., election boycotts). When it became apparent that direct confrontation would not bring about the restoration of Solidarity (or other reforms), the underground press as a whole resigned itself to a long-term struggle with the authorities.

Underground publishing reflected a variety of political trends, from right-wing Polish conservatism to liberal democratic socialism. However, nearly all publications shared some common goals. According to a report issued in early 1987 by the Social, Council for Independent Publishers, they strived to propagate undistorted Polish history, Poland's struggles for independence, the postwar rule of communism in Poland, and methods of national resistance. In this way, they hoped to expose "ideological myths" and "propaganda falsehoods of the communists."

In its attempts to achieve these goals, the underground press addressed a wide range of domestic and international issues. Violations of human rights and the absence of genuine democracy in Poland continued to bulk large in its reportage, but it also devoted significant attention to economic affairs in light of the chronic shortages and debt problems that plagued the Poles. It reflected and encouraged debates over the extent to which dissidents might work for reform through participation in legal organizations such as the workers' councils that were set up following the banning of Solidarity.

Significantly, the emergence of the Freedom and Peace Movement (Wolnosc i Pokoj), which encouraged arms reduction and resistance to compulsory service in the Polish People's Army, also received favorable attention from the underground media, as did environmental issues. Particularly noteworthy was the underground media's increased coverage of international questions such as US-Soviet arms negotiations, Gorbachev's apparent efforts at internal reform, and economic developments in China. Despite glasnost and perestroika, however, the underground media generally continued to criticize the Soviets and praise the Americans.

The underground press clearly constituted the principal means for the dissemination of opposition PSYOP, but

dissidents also extended their efforts to the realm of electronic media. Radio broadcasting proved to be highly vulnerable to jamming and to detection by the authorities, but it continued to resurface from time to time. Dissidents with some experience in electronics constructed ersatz transmitters and made brief broadcasts on FM frequencies from the roofs of large buildings. Collectively called Radio Solidarity, such transmissions first appeared on the airwaves during April 1982, after which they were broadcast in several different cities. Program content was necessarily limited, but broadcasts usually addressed such current affairs as price hikes or the significance of historical anniversaries. In some instances, these transmissions successfully overrode television signals in order to convey a brief verbal message or a "still" image of the slogan Solidarnosc *zyje* (Solidarity lives).

Dissident psyopsers also made good use of videocassette recorders (VCR), audiotape recorders, and even microcomputers. Poland contained an estimated 500,000 to 700,000 privately owned VCRs. The NOWA underground publishing enterprise distributed not only Western films but also videocassettes on Polish subjects produced by the Paris-based Videoknotakt organization. Domestic productions, such as filmed interviews with Lech Walesa, also circulated widely. Government authorities attempted to suppress this activity-primarily by confiscations at the border-but the trade continued to flourish. The underground also prepared and disseminated a large variety of audiocassettes containing antiregime songs, news commentaries, interviews, and lectures on Polish history. Some of these tapes reportedly were broadcast over factory loudspeaker systems. Finally, several clever computer owners managed to generate antiregime texts or games. According to an acerbic report published in the hard-line military newspaper *Zolnierz Wolnosci (Soldier of Freedo",* Western interests inspired some programmers to create programs that promoted anticommunist attitudes.

Despite various crackdowns by the authorities, the underground media remained a part of the Polish sociopolitical scene. Dissidents stood in a centuries-old tradition of conspiratorial information activity, and their eagerness to utilize modern technology rendered it virtually impossible for the

regime to suppress their efforts. As suggested above, the government might have decided to tolerate this situation; nevertheless, the opposition media in Poland provided a real-world example of the success that can be attained through nongovernmental PSYOP.

The Libyan Raid as a Psychological Operation

Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF

The use and employment of US forces in psychological operations is a basic but little understood part of US doctrine. The use of US forces to achieve national strategic and tactical security objectives is the basis of PSYOP planning. Security objectives include the influencing of friendly, neutral, and/or enemy audiences to behave favorably or unobstructively toward US national security. A psychological operation is any operation that conveys selected information and indicators to foreign individuals and groups and influences emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of the target audience. Such an operation should also induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior that are favorable to US objectives. The target audience is a foreign group that may include hostile military forces but can also be neutral or friendly.

The stated purposes of the US raid on Libya as reported in the press were to emphasize the cost of state-sponsored terrorism, to damage terrorist operations, and to encourage internal insurrection *(New York Times,* **5 May 1986). 1 view the US Libyan raid as strictly a psychological operation, an operation planned and carried out to achieve a psychological point of view.**

An analysis of the Libyan situation prior to the US raid would have revealed the following scenario.

- **Was a psychological operation required? The answer would be yes. The United States needed to influence attitudes and behaviors concerning terrorism among enemy, friendly, and neutral audiences, especially with Libya and Muammar** Qadhafi.

- **What would be the best psychological operation approach? The best approach in consideration of prior attempts to influence Qadhafi and others would be a limited tactical air strike.**
- **What was the psychological situation? The psychological situation revealed that many nations, friendly, neutral, and enemy, were not taking seriously the US concern about state-sponsored terrorism. Colonel Qadhafi had revealed himself to have mood swings and to be susceptible to depressive episodes. Intelligence and the media revealed that there was underlying dissatisfaction within the Libyan government with the current policies of Qadhafi. Additionally, the world had just been --objected to a series of terrorist acts and appeared receptive to such a raid.**
- **Would an air strike have a strategic psychological effect? A successful air strike against Libya and Qadhafi could produce the following: (a) notice to all nations that the US would not tolerate state-sponsored terrorism, (b) notice to Qadhafi that his power was not absolute, (c) notice to anti-Qadhafi forces in Libya that the current actions of Libya could reap dire consequences for all, (d) a reduction in terrorist acts as Qadhafi and his forces would be forced to regroup, and (e) additional time to get other Western nations more involved in antiterrorist operations. On 15 April 1986, the United States, using Air Force and Navy resources, carried out a bombing raid on Libyan targets.**

The results of that raid among enemies:

- **Qadhafi instructed his operatives to deemphasize attacks on US military targets but to look for easier US targets** (*Washington Post, 4* **May 1986).**
- **The Soviets contended that Libya's failed defense was a failure of men, not weapons-some Libyan officers were purged.**
- **The absence of any promised Soviet military support and the fact that the Soviet Union and Libya did not negotiate a formal treaty pledging Moscow to come to Colonel Qadhafi's aid demonstrates that the USSR was not willing to back up Qadhafi with more than words** (*Christian Science Monitor,* **24 April 1986).**

- **There was a decline in Qadhafi's popularity-and some decline was already ongoing due to economic policy.**
- **The Soviets openly questioned Qadhafi's wisdom-a high Soviet official was quoted as saying "Khadafy is a madman on top of a pile of gold" (Washington Post, 24 April 1986).**
- **Syria publicly and openly rejected the idea that Syria has any connection with terrorist activities.**
- **The Soviets found themselves in a double bind: if they helped Qadhafi too much they would drive him further away from conservative Arab support. If they didn't help him, he might destroy himself and the Soviet foothold in the Middle East.**

Results of the raid among neutral nations:

- **Sixty-five percent of the French people supported the United States and were critical of their own government's nonsupport (Washington Post, 24 April 1986).**
- **Saudi Arabia rejected a Libyan appeal for financial aid (Washington Post, 1 May 1986).**
- **Several Arab nations, while delivering perfunctory denunciations of the United States, privately expressed congratulations. Two Arab countries didn't even issue any complaints (Iraq and Tunisia). Egypt's, Oman's, and United Arab Emirates' official responses were noticeably mild. The newspapers of Jordan and Tunisia did not run editorials on the action (Los Angeles Times, 27 April 1986).**
- A **Libyan call for an emergency Arab summit meeting resulted in Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia stating they would be unable to attend.**

The raid's results among friends:

- **There was strong support against terrorism at the Tokyo Economic Summit.**
- **European allies were persuaded to take basic concerted action against terrorism-a blow for reason as well as deterrence (New York Times, 24 April 1986).**
- **Despite an initial outcry, west European countries moved with quiet determination on four fronts: They kicked out a number of Libyan diplomats and suspected agents, significantly increased intelligence through sharing and coordination,**

encouraged their nationals to leave Libya, and quietly cut much of their trade with Libya (*Boston Globe,* 25 April 1986).

In terms of Colonel Qadhafi's own personality, he made no major radio, TV, or personal appearance for almost six months. On the 16th anniversary of his expelling the US from Wheelus Air Base, a major event in Libya to which the foreign press was invited to hear a major speech, Qadhafi did not appear. Fewer than 2,000 attended. Videotapes were presented, revealing an exhausted-looking Qadhafi fidgeting in his chair, speaking in a hoarse voice, and making a speech devoid of his usual fiery rhetoric. This lackluster performance reinforced the belief that' Qadhafi was slow to recover from the shock of the 15 April raid (*Time Magazine,* 23 June 1986). He began to reappear late in August 1986 in both public and TV formats.

The raid's effect on underlying dissatisfaction within Libya can be supported by the following comments:

- Qadhafi is still in control but soul-searching is under way. He began relooking at Libyan efforts in Chad and Sudan. Some senior Libyan leaders have talked openly about a lower Libyan profile in terrorism (*Washington Post, 4* May 1986).
- The US raid forced Qadhafi to share power with the four members of Libya's ruling Revolutionary Council (*Time Magazine,* 23 June 1986).
- A summary of several stories can equate to the notion that the raid may have strengthened Qadhafi in the limited sense that the masses may now not be ready to overthrow him. However, the regular officer corps and influential citizens may be more willing to attempt to modify his behavior.
- It should be noted that without US intervention, 10 attempts to remove Qadhafi by members of his military have occurred since 1980 (Los *Angeles Times,* 27 April 1986).

The reception of the raid by the countries of the world was to some extent known before the raid and should be judged more as action taken than in words spoken. The European allies, recipients of most terrorist acts carried out against the West, are always fearful of additional acts. Since the raid, there has been unprecedented security and the sharing of antiterrorist information. An economic summit took place in which terrorist

activities were discussed and meaningful ground rules were set up by the Western allies.

The raid on Libya appears to have been extremely successful as a psychological operation; yet it is doubtful that it was originally planned as a psychological operation. While any operation can have a psychological component, often that component is not a major consideration in planning and its effects are underestimated. If the raid had been originally planned as a psychological operation, the attack on Qadhafi's personal dwelling would have had to remain on the target list. But the tactical air strike would not need to be as accurate in a PSYOP mission. For example, the use of sonic booms and attacks on less-defended targets would most likely have produced the same results. However, in the final analysis, if senior planners considered the Libyan raid as a psychological operation, it achieved all its goals.

The Role of Military Psychological Operations in Support of National Antidrug Policy

Maj James V. Keifer, USAF, Retired

> *War does not belong in the realm of arts and sciences; rather it is part of man's social existence.... Politics, moreover, is the womb in which war develops.*
>
> -Carl von Clausewitz

The United States is engaged in a war against a drug culture that threatens to destroy the nation's social-political-economic fabric. The war is being fought on both domestic and foreign fronts against a culture of users and providers of illegal drugs. The national drug control strategy targets both supply and demand. National policy statements by Congress in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and by the president's 1990 strategy statement imply this to be a war of annihilation, but limited two- and 10-year goals make deterrence more realistically the objective of this strategy-deterring illegal drug use and trafficking. The US military, as an instrument of national policy, has been brought actively-although with definite limits-into this engagement. To fight the war, the US military establishment has decided-or has had decided for it-to avoid using one of its most potent weapons: PSYOP. Ironically, the US government believes it is important to bring other psychological instruments on both domestic and foreign fronts. If this country expects to achieve victory over illegal drugs, biases against the use of US military PSYOP should be recognized and put aside.

Is the nation truly at risk? What is the national antidrug policy, and what are its priorities, goals, tools, and strategies? What is the role of the US military in pursuing national antidrug policy? How can US military PSYOP be employed to

support the war against illegal drugs? To answer these questions, this essay examines how our national leaders define the threat. It also reviews recent drug policy, strategy, goals, and objectives, concentrating on those roles in which the military and PSYOP are most likely to become engaged.

The Threat Defined

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 221 of 1986 defines international drug trafficking as a national security threat to the United States. With the signing of this directive, the president placed illegal international drug trafficking on the official agenda of the National Security Council (NSC). This action established a requirement for the secretary of state to coordinate, through the chiefs of missions, all drug-related assistance, information, and activities within foreign countries. The State Department also served as the link between Central Intelligence and insurgency. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was assigned responsibility to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence on the trade of illegal drugs. The secretary of defense was tasked to manage military drug-related activities, including plans, operations, intelligence support, drug interdiction, training of foreign military counterparts, and other related support.[1]

Even with the threat established, national policy and objectives were ambiguous at best. Activities reflected need for a national mechanism to coordinate interagency efforts and to provide expert, professional guidance. The political community saw the need for a clear-cut policy to attack the drug problem and put substance behind rhetoric. Things began to move-in the terms of Clausewitz, "If war is part of policy, policy will determine its character. As policy becomes more ambitious and vigorous, so will war."[2]

The President of the United States and the US Congress declared war on drugs with the passing of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.[3] This legislation established the National Drug Control Program (NDCP) and created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) within the Executive Office of the President, effective January 1989.[4] William J. Bennett was named director of ONDCP to orchestrate the

activities of participating agencies that were contributing to the combined effort. His position was designed to provide guidance, consistency, and continuity, and to resolve jurisdictional disputes.

Bennett's assignment to head ONDCP, leading a serious combined interagency effort, and to implement a comprehensive program to fight a burgeoning social-economic-medical problem, signaled an increased resolve in antidrug policy. Legislation directed the ONDCP director to set policies, objectives, and priorities for the NDCP and to provide the annual national drug control strategy for the president's presentation to Congress by 1 February each year. Congress required the strategy to include both long-range goals and short-term (achievable within two years) measurable objectives. Further requirements were to (1) define the balance between expenditures for supply reduction and demand reduction and (2) submit a review of state and local government efforts to support the program'[5]

National Drug Policy

Responsible directly to the president for recommending changes in the program's organization, management, and budget, the director of ONDCP serves as the executive branch representative on drug issues before Congress. He or she coordinates and monitors the implementation, execution, and fulfillment of the program's policies, objectives, and priorities by designated agencies. When agencies' policies fail to meet the responsibilities required by the national drug control strategy, the director notifies the agency head and directs that measures be taken to comply. The director also serves as chief consultant to state and local governments on national drug control matters.s

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 provided the director with three principal subordinates: a deputy director for demand reduction, a deputy director for supply reduction, and an associate director to head a Bureau of State and Local Affairs. The president was responsible for nominating appointees to these positions. When confirmed by the Senate, they were prohibited from simultaneously holding other federal govern-

ment positions.? The act recognized "the magnitude of the illicit drug problem and the threat it poses [to the] national security of the United States."[8] Disavowing proposals to decriminalize drugs, the act went on to say that "legalization of illegal drugs ... is an unconscionable surrender in a war in which, for the future of our country and the lives of our children, there can be no substitute for total victory."[9] It then proclaimed, "It is the declared policy of the United States Government to create a Drug-Free America by 1995."[10]

The primary executive branch departments and agencies responsible for illegal drug supply reduction activities include the departments of Justice, Treasury, State, Transportation, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Interior, and Defense; the Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International Development, the United States Information Agency (USIA), and the United States Postal Service. Those designated as primaries for demand reduction activities include the departments of Health and Human Services, Education, Housing and Urban Development, Labor, and Veterans Affairs. Additionally, the judicial system and various state and local agencies support the NDCP activities.

As the lead federal agency for the war on illegal drug trade, ONDCP was tasked to outline the national strategy, establish tangible short- and long-term goals, and coordinate and monitor those departments, agencies, and bureaus designated to take the battle to the enemy. The office published National *Drug* Strategies in September 1989 and January 1990. These documents served as the president's reports to Congress on the status of activities and intentions of the National Drug Control Program.[11]

Prior to establishing the ONDCP, the Executive Office of the President had promulgated the National *Drug* Strategy and Implementation Plan of 1988. This document identified six presidential goals: drug-free workplaces, drug-free schools, expanded treatment, improved international cooperation, strengthened drug law enforcement, and increased public awareness and prevention. Strategy focused on reducing the supply of illegal drugs, both grown in and imported into this country, and on reducing the demand for illegal drugs in the United States. The plan characterized the drug problem as multidimensional,

involving medical, legal, security, economic, social, and educational aspects. The threat was defined in terms of drug type, production source, production increase, international cartel control, use of high technology, increased violence, and high-profit/low-risk crime.[12] President George H. Bush, in a September 1989 televised address to a nationwide audience, introduced the first strategy produced by the Office for National Drug Control Policy. His presentation outlined domestic and foreign objectives of a multifaceted attack on illegal drugs. On the domestic front, the president said the battle would be fought through programs of deglamorization, education, rehabilitation, and punishment. Foreign measures centered around programs of eradication, interdiction, extradition, and certification.

In his introduction to the 1989 *National Drug Control Strategy,* the director acknowledged that the national policy as articulated in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988-"it is the declared policy of the United States Government to create a Drug-Free America by 1995"[13]—is admirable but unrealistic.[14] Bennett proposed in its place, "the highest priority of our drug policy must be a stubborn determination further to reduce the overall level of drug use nationwide-experimental first use, ,casual' use, regular use, and addiction alike. „[15]

This report from ONDCP concluded that the situation concerning illegal drugs was deteriorating rather than improving. Crime, health, and economic factors pointed to a growing problem. (Evidence at the time-figures showing declining casual use-suggested that the problems were primarily caused by addiction.) On both the foreign and domestic fronts, illegal drugs were cited as being imminently available; and the problems were readily evident. Commenting on the need to put realism into the national antidrug abuse policy statement, Bennett charged that a de facto policy vacuum existed. He said it was time to accept the fact that the war on drugs, to be effective, would be protracted in both time and reach. Serious, coordinated efforts and significant resources were needed to get a grip on the demand for and supply of illegal drugs.[16] Saying it would lead to a national disaster, Bennett articulated his adamant opposition to proposals for legalizing drugs.[17]

While building on the strategy from the Executive Office of the President, the 1989 *National Drug Control Strategy* was more than mere restatement of the 1988 plan. Unrealistic goals were rewritten and valid strategies were reorganized. The 1989 document outlined the national priorities as: (1) the criminal justice system, (2) treatment programs, (3) education, community, and business actions, (4) international initiatives, (5) interdiction activities, (6) research, and (7) intelligence. As mandated by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, two- and 10-year objectives were listed. A statement on the process of implementing the national priorities was submitted with funding requirements. State- and local-level legislation initiatives were proposed to add consistency to activities below the federal level. The report articulated the importance of comprehensive information management to the program. 18

The strategy recognized the contributions of a comprehensive information management program to the success of the antidrug campaign. In Bennett's introduction of the strategy, he expressed that coherent and coordinated policy-making depended upon the timely sharing of information. "Our national policy must be to maximize the sharing and use of relevant information among appropriate government organizations and to minimize impediments to its operational use."[19] He focused on improving automated data-processing systems and command, control, and communications (C3) networks. In this context, information management referred to the intelligence function and communications systems rather than programs to provide people with educational material or persuasive information.

While the 1989 *National Drug Control Strategy* outlined initiatives that targeted supply-side activities, no relevant clear-cut policy statement on them was articulated. To remedy this omission, Bennett stated in the 1990 report that "the policy of the United States is to disrupt, to dismantle, and ultimately to destroy the illegal market for drugs."[20]

The 1990 *National Drug Control Strategy* was essentially a continuation of the previous year's strategy. Its major goals included (1) restoring order and security to American neighborhoods, (2) dismantling drug-trafficking organizations, (3) helping drug users break their habits, and (4) preventing

those who have never used illegal drugs from starting. The strategy again called for cohesive, multifront attacks on both the supply and demand sides of the drug problem. In addition, the program's purpose was (1) to reduce to the maximum degree possible illegal drug supply and availability, (2) to provide treatment for users of illegal drugs and to actively discourage people from becoming involved with illegal drugs, and (3) to provide robust enforcement of drug laws by holding traffickers, sellers, the money-laundering structure, buyers, and users accountable.[21] National priorities for the strategy were directed as follows:

1. **strengthening the criminal justice system,**
2. **expanding and improving drug-treatment programs,**
3. **developing programs to keep illegal drugs out of education systems, communities, and the workplace,**
4. **pursuing international initiatives,**
5. **enhancing interdiction efforts,**
6. **building on the research agenda, and**
7. **coordinating the intelligence agenda.[22]**

Both supply and demand aspects were targeted for attack by the criminal justice system through actions to deter the use of illegal drugs, to disrupt the trafficking network, and to arrest, prosecute, and punish drug criminals. The 1990 strategy reinforced the 1989 strategy, which called for dismantling trafficking systems by apprehending and prosecuting organization leaders and accomplices, and by taking away their illegally acquired wealth. The goal of additionally holding buyers, sellers, and users accountable was to make illegal drugs less desirable, more expensive, and harder to get.[23]

The Office of National Drug Control Policy recognized that the US could not expect to unilaterally win the war against illegal drugs. The 1989 international strategy was designed to disrupt and dismantle the multinational criminal organizations that support the production, processing, transportation, and distribution of drugs to the United States and to other nations. Building on that strategy, the 1990 programs were aimed not only at drug-producing, transit, and consumer countries, but also toward nations still experiencing few or no problems with illegal drugs by helping to strengthen resolve and resistance to

use and trafficking inside their territories. The 1990 report articulated the need for international cooperation if objectives were to be met.

Three near-term goals the national strategy sought to attain in the international arena were as follows:

1. providing support to help strengthen the political will and institutional capabilities of three Andean Ridge countries (Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia) by enabling them to fight illegal drug-producing and drug-trafficking organizations in their respective countries,
2. helping law enforcement and military structures of the three countries to combat cocaine trade more effectively, and
3. incapacitating trafficking organizations that operate in the three countries. To ensure understanding of and to develop support for the measures, the 1990 strategy tasked that "U.S. information and public awareness programs will explain and support the attainment of the three goals outlined above."[24]

The 1990 strategy added a new dimension-the implementation of international public information initiatives to directly support other international policies and programs. "An active public information campaign will provide vital information to foreign publics, leaders, and government officials to build support for United States and host country actions to combat drug production, trafficking, and consumption."[25] Receiving policy guidance from the Department of State (DOS), the USIA (with support from other federal agencies) was assigned responsibility for coordinating and leading the international information effort. These initiatives focused on informing foreign audiences about the problems caused by illegal drugs with respect to their national security, economic welfare, and environment. International information programs were to educate foreign audiences about the consequences of using illegal drugs. Another initiative of the international information program was to describe the US domestic drug problem and the progress experienced in fighting it.[26]

The 1990 *National Drug Control Strategy* included a commitment to long-term research in the fields of treatment, education and prevention, criminal justice, and drug use.

Research provided a base of knowledge for fighting the drug problem and a foundation for future strategies. Research projects included these:

1. developing enhanced databases on drug production and consumption, and on the economic impact of drugs, including cost/benefit analyses of programs designed to reduce drug use;
2. developing regional and state drug-related data to improve the analysis and accuracy of assessing drug control effectiveness;
3. expanding domestic programs to collect information on illegal drugs and their use;
4. increasing scientific and technological research projects focused on strengthening drug enforcement and interdiction capabilities; and
5. increasing research into drug treatment to emphasize complications caused by addiction, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), and pregnancy.[27]

The intelligence agenda, designed to understand and fight illegal drugs better, included acquisition, analysis, and management of information. The National Drug Intelligence Center was tasked to coordinate, consolidate, and distribute pertinent information to appropriate agencies. Responsibility for coordinating and overseeing drug-related intelligence-gathering activities of the national foreign intelligence community was tasked to the DCI. The strategy required all members of the nation's foreign intelligence community to share data relevant to drug trafficking and drug-related money laundering. This included requiring DOD's intelligence components to actively support the collection of foreign drug-related intelligence requirements outlined in the *National Drug Control Strategy.*[28]

To effectively manage the National Drug Control Program, ONDCP established coordinating mechanisms, developed report and study requirements, and set up systemic measures to oversee priority objectives. The Supply Reduction Working Group, the Demand Reduction Working Group, the Research and Development (R&D) Committee, and the Drug-Related Financial Crimes Policy Group were created to coordinate

interagency activities. Drug control program agencies were created within federal departments, agencies, and bureaus to manage the organizations' internal activities and serve as single points of contact for responding to drug issues. Lead agencies were designated to direct, coordinate, and provide expertise to specific activities. Management studies included the Executive Reorganization Study, the Department of Justice Reorganization Report, the R&D Facilities Plan, and reports on communications and automated data-processing initiatives. The Office for Treatment Improvement was created within the Department of Health and Human Services to lead the federal effort to improve the nation's drug-treatment activities. Information clearinghouses were set up in departments, agencies, and bureaus to access data readily. The National Drug Intelligence Center was established to oversee information management. Statutes were implemented at state and local levels to deny convicted drug offenders access to specific federal benefit programs. A programming and budgeting system was created within ONDCP. Model legislation on drug-free workplaces was provided to state and local governments.[29]

Information management initiatives-developing command, control, communications, and intelligence networks-were built on the previous year's strategy. The only notable difference was in the change of the terms from communications to telecommunications. The strategy again focused on upgrading hardware, integrating systems, and providing means for secure communications. The DOD, as executive agent for implementing communications systems, created the Counter-Drug Telecommunications Integration Office within the Defense Communications Agency to serve as the focal point for all telecommunications activities related to the enforcement of drug policy.[30]

An Assessment

Both the president (NSDD 211, 1986) and Congress (Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 1988) unambiguously articulated official positions that illegal drugs are a threat to national security. They agreed that the political objective, elimination of demand for and supply of illegal drugs, deserved an extensive effort and merited significant expenditure of resources. The problem

was identified in global terms with an objective to co-opt worldwide support for counternarcotics initiatives. War was declared-not the conventional sense of a military shooting war (although blood most certainly was to be shed), but one of police actions, economic sanctions, information activities, social programs, and other nonmilitary means.

The enemy in this war is the drug culture-drug cartels and drug users. The drug cartels cannot be likened to the contemporary economic entities; a cartel is a flexible system of organizations involved in growing, producing, transporting, distributing, selling, and money-laundering processes. High profitability has provided them an immense resource base. The cartels are motivated by profit rather than ideology. Users of illegal drugs cut across the full spectrum of society, from the homeless to professionals to influential leaders. The group includes both casual and addicted drug abusers. Their motivations for using illegal drugs are equally diverse.

Just as the war against illegal drugs is not fought against a conventional enemy, it should not be considered an ideological conflict. It is unlike most other political wars including the War on Poverty waged by the Great Society during the 1960s. Because the drug problem transcends many cultural boundaries, care must be taken to consider relevant issues such as social, health, safety, and economic factors, and to avoid morality issues. In seeking international cooperation, the perception of selling American values to other countries must be avoided. Actions and propaganda should be controlled, so as to preclude being tagged "Yankee imperialism" or "American hegemony."

The closest parallel we have to this war is the battle against alcohol that took place during prohibition-a war that was lost but that certainly compromised national objectives. Proponents of legalization can be expected to argue the logic of prohibition repeal in their efforts to sway the public to support such measures. The reasons for prohibition's failure must be understood if history is not destined to repeat itself. Care must also be taken in arguing against legalization to avoid the pitfalls of incomplete truths and invalid logic that cannot stand the tests of intense scrutiny or time.

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, in declaring that national policy was to make a drug-free America by 1995, reflected election-year rhetoric. Remarkably, the political process that created this legislation didn't prevent the promulgation of a generally comprehensive[31] and reasonably good product-but it did serve to dilute some of the potential it carried. While putting together a product calculated to appeal to the American public, members of Congress ensured that their power would not be diminished.[32] Appropriately, the legislation directed attacks against both supply and demand of illegal drugs.[33] It also stressed both counterforce and countervalue strategies. With respect to one strategy that has been suggested by some-the legalization of certain drug offenses-Congress refused to compromise.[34] On the positive side, the single-point manager established a mechanism for coordinating efforts and resolving disputes. The requirement that leaders of the ONDCP not hold any other public office kept the president from appointing part-time people.[35] On the negative side, the political nature of the legislation tied the effectiveness of the program to (1) its position on the president's agenda and (2) its proximity to election day.

Supply-side measures receive the attention of Congress, but the trafficking of illegal narcotics isn't their exclusive target. Prevention and treatment programs for this legislation demand side attention. Certification requirements focus on governments of countries in which drugs are produced and through which they transit. Measures to break up money-laundering schemes put pressure on a shadowy support structure that helps the cartels to reap the huge profits of their trade. Opposition to decriminalizing illegal drugs, while supportive of the national policy stated by Congress, will eventually generate the requirement to produce facts from research to support this stance.

The most notable shortcoming of the legislation is the comparatively little formal authority given the director's position, particularly in the light of its extensive responsibilities. The director has few immediately assigned resources and only limited fiscal control. While Congress is expected to keep its control over the purse, authorizing the director to manage the

distribution of confiscated assets/ resources would provide the position with a significant carrot for resolving turf battles.

Most of the combatants in the drug war are assigned to the numerous supporting departments, agencies, and bureaus. With no formal control over them, the director must resort to convincing, persuading, or otherwise getting these supporting elements to do the work according to plans. Resolution of problems and conflicts tends to be a matter of Capitol Hill politics,[36] a personality-dependent requirement ideally suited to a person with good diplomatic skills. Disagreements of consequence must be resolved by the president or significant others in the Washington community. Further, few would argue that the director's position holds stature equal to such leaders as the secretary of state, secretary of defense, attorney general, or national security advisor. Not a formal member of the cabinet or the NSC, the director sits in only when the topic of illegal drugs is on the agenda.

Articulating the national policy for demand-side measures, Bennett's September 1989 *National Drug Control Strategy* changed Congress's declaration from unrealistic (drug-free America by 1995) to inconsequential (reduce overall level of drug use). Only one of the strategy's two- and 10-year goals[37] serves to measure the ultimate objective of the national policy statement for supply reduction to destroy the illegal market for drugs. The objectives and strategies formulated by the ONDCP represent a significant step forward from the Just-Say-No! domestic policy and interdiction instruments of the Reagan administration. Recognizing the complexity of the problem, the strategy addresses supply and demand, domestic and foreign arenas, law enforcement and prevention and treatment programs, counterforce and countervalue measures, and casual use and addiction. Quantified objectives are provided to measure some effects of the program. The two- and 10-year goals appear to be realistically achievable, even possibly unambitious. (Figures show a steadily diminishing demand for illegal drugs.) Bennett's uncompromising position on decriminalization is based on emotional grounds. Research needs to be directed to prove the validity of this position; that the effects of the drugs themselves, rather than their criminal status,

have accelerated and amplified social, economic, health, and safety decay.

The strategy outlined in the reports by ONDCP has many strong points. It states that one strategy alone will not win the war. Efforts to reduce the demand cannot be expected to work without measures against supply production and vice versa. The high profitability of drug trafficking will lead to aggressive marketing efforts by the cartels to counteract gains of demand-side programs. Interdiction efforts may thwart transportation networks and make smugglers think twice before trafficking the products, but cartels will fight these measures by cultivating new markets, developing new transportation strategies and transit rodtes for their products, and increasing rewards to their couriers. By the same token, supply-side measures alone can be unsuccessful. As long as drugs are available to tempt people, a portion of the population will use them. Treatment programs are extremely costly and none has escaped problems with recidivism. Incarceration is likewise costly and has hardly proved effective when not supported by other measures.

Research and development (R&D), essentially an investment process, is the primary way this nation will come up with different and improved ways to fight illegal drug use. It serves as the tool for innovating new ideas and technologies. The commitment to R&D acknowledges the long-term nature of the war against drugs. One of the foremost obstacles the ONDCP faces is a dearth of accurate, up-to-date information concerning illegal drug use. Previous surveys were conducted too infrequently and were of limited or irrelevant scope. They lacked sufficient scientific rigor to be reliable measures. This was one of the primary factors for understated program goals of the initial strategy published in September 1989. Funding for databases will enable them to be expanded and updated more frequently, increasing both the reliability and utility of the information gathered. Some R&D projects are being designed to improve the effectiveness of prevention and treatment programs by helping to reduce the demand side of the equation. Other programs are being advanced to improve technology for detecting drugs and for systems to compile, communicate, and coordinate information to help supply-reduction efforts.

Recognition of the need for international consensus is an important element of the program. Not only are bilateral agreements needed with drug production and transit countries to help them fight their internal enemies, but worldwide cooperation is also an instrumental part of finding a solution to this global crisis. Crop eradication projects will still take place, but the program has been deemphasized because of some counterproductive effects. (As drug-producing plants constitute the primary cash crop in many Andean Ridge countries, many farmers side with revolutionary factions, creating additional problems for their governments.)

Another lgey element to the strategy is the importance given to information, education, and publicity programs (essentially, programs of advocacy under politically palatable titles) on both domestic and foreign fronts. The success of information strategies relies on communicating in understandable terms the consequences of illegal drug activity. Some initiatives are designed to persuade nonusers not to start, users to seek treatment, and traffickers to cease their activities. Because international understanding and backing are imperative to the ultimate success of this program, other initiatives seek support from the world community for our national objectives.

The formation of coordinating committees is another program strength that promotes the sharing of ideas, resources, and information.[38] These committees establish mechanisms to prevent one agency from unwittingly doing something that conflicts with other efforts. This initiative improves cost-effectiveness and prevents potential fratricide. A notably missing committee is one to coordinate publicity, information, education, diplomacy, and persuasion activities of federal, state, and local agencies.

The strategy is not without its share of weaknesses. Because it is a long-range program, it will test the national patience of people who are accustomed to instant gratification. This constituency in turn will challenge the resolve of politicians whose primary concern is their own reelection. These same policy architects, if they don't perceive the threats-the threat drugs pose, and threats to reelection-as imminent, will most likely prove unwilling to commit sufficient assets over the long run to achieve success.

While expenditures have increased dramatically, the total program budget compared to low-end estimates of profits made by drug traffickers gives the impression that the administration is still trying to win votes rather than the drug war. This is particularly true because funding is dedicated to supply-reduction measures. Less than one-fifth of antidrug funding goes to prevention and treatment programs. Funding for prevention and treatment, as well as alternative programs, gets the short end of the stick when compared to the amount given to the interception of smuggled goods.

The strategy for providing support to state- and local-level government programs relies on the provision of matching funds by the lower levels to qualify for the federal money. This reliance depends not only on the availability of funds for these purposes but also on political popularity. To attract popular support to raise the taxes needed to fund these programs, results will have to be visible with high payoffs.

The inclusion of measurable objectives is laudable, but the selected objectives-with the noted exception of drug availability reduction-tend to measure only the demand side of the program. While this helps to dissuade "body-count" tactics, these objectives fail to measure the effectiveness of component strategies and programs.

The national policy of interrupting cartels as a departure point to their eventual dismantling and destruction implies a short-term goal of harassment. It serves to challenge cartels to produce new ways to circumvent measures. The absolute nature of the national policy-ultimately to destroy the illegal market for drugs-represents the objective of annihilation. If this is not wishful thinking but the true goal, then half-hearted measures will fail in the long run.

Bringing the military into the counternarcotics strategy was an expedient decision for the political leadership, but one the military leadership looked upon with skepticism. The political side saw it as a way of putting defense dollars to a tangible use. Political reasoning generally followed this theme: while ships and planes are out on training missions, they can be on the lookout for drug smugglers. The military establishment saw itself being dragged into a war with no measurable objectives; a war that could not be won. Through appropria-

tions bills, Congress provided funds to fight the drug problem, thus easing military apprehensions about taking the costs out of the operating budget. Defining the Defense Department's fiscal authority for 1990, Congress dedicated $450 million to counterdrug activities.[39] This funding included $28 million for R&D projects and $40 million for catchall expenses defined as additional support to the Office for Drug Control Policy.[40, 41] The bulk of the spending authority, $182 million,[42] was to support interdiction in its lead role of detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime smuggling activities. While the added fiscal authority generated interest, the lack of significant measures of effectiveness make military counternarcotics activities a, readily available political and media target. Coupled with operating restrictions, in spite of the loosening of the *posse comitatus* statute, DOD resources offer more potential than support. Its role as lead agency in the C 3 arena should easily show more cost-effectiveness than interdiction responsibilities when networks are completed and figures come in.

If national objectives in the war against illegal drugs are met, the achievement will ultimately be a psychological one. Activities must be carried out on both domestic and foreign fronts. They must target both supply and demand cultures, support counterforce and countervalue measures, and address prevention and treatment. National resolve must be communicated in clear and concise terms. Persuasion will require both action and propaganda.[43]

For political reasons and other expediencies, these messages will have to be carried to their audiences by many different agencies. The 1990 strategy announced campaigns to provide information to foreign audiences. In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress established the requirement for the Office of National Drug Control Policy to activate a program to publicize the penalties for violating the legislation.[44] Agency turf battles during World War II and the American cultural distrust of the psychological instrument led to prohibitions against the USIA's communicating directly to a domestic target audience. Similarly, the *posse comitatus* statute and other restrictive measures prevent US military resources from conducting ac-

tivities intended to influence US citizens. Domestic programs, therefore, must be carried out by other agencies.

In the foreign arena, the psychological dimension must be exploited by all agencies involved in activities. Actions must be reinforced by publicity campaigns to ensure that maximum benefits are reaped. Successes must be underscored and punctuated, letting others know that alternatives exist and that consequences are in store for unacceptable behavior.

Co-opting the support of nongovernment special interest groups is another potential role for the psychological instrument. Informing the public of the harm illegal drugs do to the environment, the economy, the health, and ultimately the strength of a nation could serve to coalesce and polarize "watchdog" groups, directing outrage and magnifying public opinion against cartels and their support structures. For instance, environmental groups such as Greenpeace might find that the rape of the Andean Ridge ecosystem is a target for one of their campaigns. The focus of attention by television programs such as "60 Minutes" on chemical companies that exercise irresponsible management of precursor materials might cause them to rethink their motives for profit and to tighten control mechanisms.

The top echelon of the cartel structure is not invulnerable to psychological inducements. For all their wealth, they are virtual prisoners, unable to attain status or to travel any appreciable distance from their fortified homesteads. Psychological initiatives can highlight and amplify the social isolation these people face. Rivalries between cartels can be exploited, as can rivalries between ideology-motivated revolutionary movements and the greed-motivated cartels.

The across-the-board rejection of any form of decriminalization places an even greater demand on the psychological dimension. Diplomacy has been described as a process of political compromise between nations.[45] Because the drug culture has no national identity and because compromise has been determined unacceptable, diplomacy would seem to be limited to securing international cooperation from nations predisposed to strong antidrug policies. The goal is to convince people not to use illegal drugs, to convince cartels that it isn't in their profit-motivated interest to traffic illegal drugs, and to

convince the world community to act together to stop the trafficking of illegal drugs. Two overriding principles should guide the psychological effort: (1) truth is the best propaganda; and (2) words must follow action. [46]

To support the first principle, the government needs to intensify its R&D studies to come up with irrefutable reasons not to decriminalize drugs. These studies should compare health and safety, sociological, and economic factors upon which illegal drugs are claimed to have an impact, comparing states and nations that have and have not decriminalized drugs. This type of research should then establish a mechanism to control the impact of the criminal status of drugs. Emotional appeals will,only have temporary effects on the behavior of their target audiences. A comprehensive interagency campaign using facts should be developed by a coordinating committee. Likewise, morality inferences concerning drugs must be carefully tailored to the morals of target cultures.

While it has been written that words are mightier than the sword, they must be based on substance. The principle that propaganda must follow action recognizes that the propagandist shouldn't make claims he is not willing to back up or promises he can't keep. Credibility is ideally established through performance of actions that serve as examples of what may be yet to come. This performance establishes both capability and resolve. If the government seeks to alienate cartels from their surrounding populaces by promising to reward and protect informants, it must be prepared to back up its words or suffer from challenges to its resolve.

Alternatives must be either available or provided. For instance, coca-growing campesinos cannot be expected to voluntarily stop growing a profitable cash crop without the assurance they will receive a reasonable price for harvesting something not considered illegal. Likewise, others throughout the cartel structure must see some viable way to generate an income if they are to be induced to get out of the drug-trafficking business.

Where then does the US military PSYOP community fit into the equation? First and foremost by ensuring that the actions of DOD (maritime and aerial interdiction and detection; monitoring and developing C3 networks) are favorably

communicated to the world community. This supports the premise of following actions with words-making would-be smugglers aware of the diminished likelihood of their success and profit, and broadcasting the nation's resolve to stop drug trafficking. Another role is in working with foreign counterparts to help them master the use of psychological instruments against illegal drugs. For countries whose military forces are used to combat drug traffickers, US military PSYOP forces can conduct seminars on the value of psychological operations, train their contemporaries, and participate in bilateral exercises to hone skills. For those countries whose enforcement agencies are civilian, US military forces can support USIA programs of assistance.

Direct measures to communicate with foreign civilian populaces, while not out of the scope of possibility, are more appropriately the responsibility of the USIA. That doesn't preclude a military PSYOP role but suggests coordination of ideas, information, and efforts. This role can be particularly important because the lead agency suffers from a significant funding lack, given its responsibility to execute the national strategy.

If the US government is to destroy the market for illegal drugs successfully, the psychological dimension will be a significant factor. Military PSYOP resources can contribute to achievement of the national objectives, but only if they are allowed to be used. To that end, institutional biases will have to be broken. Ironically, such a breaking of biases is a psychological phenomenon. This process will include overcoming Western cultural fears of manipulation, resolving interagency turf battles, motivating the military establishment to consider nonlethal weapons, and educating the members of the media. These audiences must be made to understand that psychological activities are amoral,[47] that they support national policy, and that advances in technology have made far-reaching communications faster and stronger.

Dyer states the need for a national college to educate leaders on the nature of the instrument and how it helps them to implement policy.[48] The public, he says, "must be educated on what these activities are and how they contribute to functioning of the government."[49] Within the military community, education on the psychological dimension needs to be expanded. In

addition to courses of instruction at the Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field, Florida, and the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, blocks of instruction should be included in service academies and in professional military education courses at all levels. The Defense Information School at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, should include psychological operations orientation in its military public affairs training curricula. Select members of the media should be invited to attend military orientation courses.

Bennett resigned from his position as director, commenting that he had accomplished what he had set out to do. Acknowledging that the war was not yet won, he offered that indicators were showing great promise.[50] His abrupt departure provided focus on a national program whose status was being subordinated by events in the Middle East. The war is still far from over, and it will not be over until the national policy is achieved or rescinded. While national policy is likely to undergo redefinition, particularly as accurate and up-to-date information enhances the nation's databases, rescission is unlikely. Changing peoples' attitudes, opinions, and behavior will be a long-term psychological process-a process to which the military PSYOP community has much to offer. The sooner political and military leaders recognize this, the sooner the problem will be resolved.

Notes

1. Betac Corporation, *Department of Defense Counterdrug Baseline Report (21* July *1989), 2-10* through *2-11.*
2. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, *1976), 606.*
3. US Congress, *Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,* Public Law *100-690,* 100th Cong., *18* November *1988.* Sec. *4801* states that problems caused by illegal drugs pose a threat to the national security of the United States.
4. Ibid., Title I, Subtitle A, sec. *1002, 102* Stat. *4181.*
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., Title I, Subtitle A, sec. *1003, 102* Stat. *4182-83.*
7. Ibid., Title I, Subtitle A, sec. *1002, 102* Stat. *4181.*
8. Ibid., Title IV, Subtitle I, sec. *4801, 102* Stat. *4294.*
9. Ibid., Title V, Subtitle A, sec. *5011, 102* Stat. *4296.*
10. Ibid., Title V, Subtitle F, sec. *5251, 102* Stat. *4310.*

11. Ibid., Title I, Subtitle A, sec. 1003, 102 Stat. 4182.

12. Ibid., Title I, Subtitle A, sec. 1005, 102 Stat. 4185-86.

13. Public Law 100-690, Title V, Subtitle F, sec. 5251, 102 Stat. 4310.

14. Office of National Drug Control Policy, *National Drug Control Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), 9.

15. Ibid., 8.

16. Ibid., 1-4.

17. Ibid., 9.

18. Ibid., 43-44, 84-90, and 131-36.

19. Ibid., 93-97.

20. Office of National Drug Control Policy, *National Drug Control Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), 1 (hereafter cited as ONDCP 1990 Strategy).

21. Ibid., 1-9.

22. Ibid., 12-85.

23. Ibid., 12-27.

24. Ibid., 51.

25. Ibid., 59.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., 74-81.

28. Ibid., 82-85.

29. Ibid., 107-16.

30. Ibid., 123-28.

31. One hundred eighty-seven pages detailing everything from American Indian cultural exceptions to penalties for the use of firearms in conjunction with a criminal drug offense.

32. Congressional oversight committees provided the director power to influence but not control their agencies' activities.

33. Public Law 100-690, Title V, Subtitle F, sec. 5251, 102 Stat. 4309.

34. Ibid., Title V, Subtitle A, sec. 5011, 102 Stat. 4296; and Title VI, Subtitle F, sec. 6201, 102 Stat. 4359.

35. Probably most noteworthy, the vice president, the office that ran this program under the Reagan administration, is excluded.

36. Capitol Hill gamesmanship is well covered by Morton Halperin s Bu-*reaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974).

37. ONDCP 1990 *Strategy,* respective 10 and 50 percent reductions in drug availability, 120.

38. ONDCP 1990 *Strategy,* 107-16.

39. Defense Authorization Act for 1990-1991, 103 Stat. 1562, Public Law 101-89, 29 November 1989, Title XII; and Public Law 101-65, 21 November 1989, Title VII; Stat. 1128.

40. Ibid., sec. 1205.

41. Ibid., sec. 1202.

42. Ibid., sec. 1204.

43. Murray Dyer, *The Weapon on the Wall* (1959; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1979), 35-37. Mr Dyer's fifth premise, words are rooted in action. Action demonstrates capability and resolve; propaganda communicates and intensifies the actions' effects.

44. Public Law 100-690, Title V, Subtitle A, sec. 5011, 102 Stat. 4296.

45. Martin Wright, *Power Politics,* ed. Hedley Ball and Carsten Holbraad (Leicaster, U.K.: Leicaster University Press, 1978), 27.

46. From premises outlined by Dyer in chap. 2.

47. Dyer claims they "cannot make the necessary decisions . . . only explain and interpret them," 213.

48. Ibid., 187-90.

49. Ibid., 199.

50. The price of cocaine had risen sharply and street supplies were down.

Political-Psychological Dimensions of Counterinsurgency

Gen Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Retired

This paper concentrates on the psychological aspects of conflict because the psychological dimension deserves discrete treatment as the least appreciated dimension-and the least employed-by the United States and most of its allies. Conflicts erupt among groups of men, nations, or coalitions of nations from collision of aims or objectives for which the antagonists are prepared to fight and die. The conflict ends, at least temporarily, when one side makes the decision that there is more to be gained-or less to be lost by allowing the antagonist to prevail. The side that desists has simply lost the will to continue the conflict.

An adversary's will can be eroded and broken in a number of ways: by military force (the application, or threat of application, of violence); by economic strangulation; by loss of external support; by apathy; and by military defections. Normally, it takes a combination of these to bring about an adversary's calculus that the "jig is up." Sometimes, one master stroke will suffice. Hopefully, nations can resolve the issue without the application of military force. To win without fighting, in the words of Sun Tzu, is "the acme of generalship." Any political leader or military commander should accomplish the mission in the most expeditious fashion and at minimum human cost.

The term psychological warfare (psywar), for all its shortcomings, succeeds in combining two meaningful subjects, both as old as man. Certainly, it is better than psychological operations which, as my mentor Paul Linebarger once said, leaves the issue entirely neutral. Psychological warfare seeks to achieve the objective where military force is unavailable or

inappropriate, or where it can combine with the military to minimize expenditures while maximizing effects.

The Old Testament's "Book of Judges" provides one of the earliest and most effective examples of psychological warfare. Gideon-an imaginative fellow-and his troops were on the verge of being annihilated by a Midianite force of vastly superior strength. The Midianites were encamped in preparation for decisive assault on the morrow. But Gideon had an inspiration: Since the basic fighting unit of all armies in the thirteenth century B.C. was a 100-man formation, each with one trumpeter and one torch bearer, he reckoned he could create the impression of a 30,000-man force with 300 men properly equipped. Gideon selected 300 men and provided each with a lamp, a water pitcher, and a trumpet (we are not told where he found the extra trumpetsl). At nightfall, he had the 300 light their lamps (which were placed inside the pitchers so as to hide their light) and deploy at designated intervals around the Midianite camp. On his signal, they all broke their pitchers, lighting up the perimeter, and blew madly on their trumpets. The Midianites were startled out of their sleep and their wits. They fought among themselves, then gave up and retreated. (The Hebrew chronicler gives credit for this to the Lordl)

Gideon's deception is not an isolated example, as any serious student of ancient military history can confirm. Psychological warfare seeks to persuade by nonviolent means. By its very nature, psychological warfare is open-ended; it defies an accurate all-encompassing definition. The best descriptor-although by no means all-inclusive-is propaganda, which unfortunately, has severe political handicaps on the American domestic scene. It ought not be in such disrepute; after all, it derives from the name of that department of the Vatican Curia which had the duty of propagating the faith. Propaganda is simply the *planned* use of any form of communication designed to affect the minds, emotions, and actions of a given group for a specific purpose. This is precisely the aim of what we see on the television screen at all-too-frequent intervals-a field of endeavor in which the United States is preeminent.

So, psychological warfare is really not all that esoteric or mysterious. Whether in support of the national security or for

the profit of shareholders, the effectiveness of propaganda depends on adherence to four basic ground rules: a clear-cut aim or purpose, a well-defined target audience, a credible message, and a reliable means of communication or dissemination. Gideon met these criteria in spades. His aim was to demonstrate that he had been greatly reinforced; his target audience was the immediately opposing army; the established rules of counting made his message credible; and the light and noise ensured that the message was received. To be sure, it is rarely that easy; or as quickly mounted; or as clearly measurable.

The American View of Psychological Warfare

The psychological weapon has never been accepted as a permanent instrument of national security policy by the executive branch, the Congress, or the American people. Its use, under various names, has been supported as an essential expedient only in periods recognized as war. To be sure, in the early days of the cold war, there was considerable enthusiasm for institutionalizing a national structure and capability to exploit international communications as a psychological tool in furtherance of national policy.

The concept was never implemented, due in part to substantial differences within the executive branch about the value and propriety of this genre of activities. These differences precluded the enunciation of an integrating doctrine and the necessary coordination of departmental programs. In greater part, however, the failure to implement was due to the American character, which is at once idealistic and pragmatic, distrustful of political intrigue, and impatient for quick solutions. These traits are reinforced by the rather simplistic and innocent view of the world that most Americans have.

For these reasons, instances of US attitudinal readiness-and US capabilities-to engage in psychological warfare have been rare, coinciding with the two world wars. Those efforts were indeed national because the target audience conspicuously included the American public itself. But while psychological operations in the two world wars (particularly the British in World War I) provided important support, they were not

crucial to the final outcome. Those conflicts were waged militarily, with political and psychological assistance.

Wars of national liberation reverse the weighting of factors. They are fought politically and psychologically, with the assistance of military capabilities. They integrate political, psychological, social, and military aspects to exploit national vulnerabilities, erode all national institutions, and support an eventual insurgent takeover. Their choice of weapons puts a conventional high-technology force at a disadvantage. The psychological challenge is explicit in the hallmarks of the insurgent force: its tight, inner political structure; the strong motivation of all ranks; the ability to find concealment within the civil population; and identification with one or more popular causes.

Past Experience in Counterinsurgency

The wars of national liberation that have erupted in the third world over the past four decades document the crucial role of the psychological weapon in determining the final outcome. Not all involved the United States, even indirectly; but all were replete with useful lessons for those perceptive enough to appreciate and assimilate them. In those instances where the United States was in some way engaged, its record in exploiting the psychological dimension is uneven. Two examples will serve to support this judgment.

The Philippine government campaign against the Huks in the early 1950s stands as a model of the imaginative employment of psychological warfare, strategically and tactically. The charismatic and insightful Secretary of National Defense, Ramon Magsaysay (who was later to become president), and a small cadre of exceptionally gifted US advisors, achieved spectacular success in arresting the momentum of the insurgency and then breaking its back with a wide-ranging series of programs which integrated military, political, and psychological actions. Most of the ideas and initiatives were conceived by the advisors, but-and this is important-the detailed planning, the message content, and the operational execution were all Filipino.

Magsaysay knew instinctively that the key to defeating the guerrillas was to deprive them of support within the rural population and to swing that support to the government. He also recognized that the soldier was the most visible symbol of government in the countryside and that the government would be judged by the actions of its soldiers.

As a first order of business, therefore, Magsaysay set about reindoctrinating the entire Philippine army. Its multiple roles were protector of the people, guerrilla fighter, and contributor to the morale and welfare of the civil population. He made this indoctrination meaningful by promoting only those who were demonstraply effective ambassadors of good will and were also effective combat soldiers. He provided rations for the troops that were adequate not only for their own consumption, but also for donations to villagers in dire need, and he made extensive use of medical and engineer personnel for civic actions of the most basic sort. Finally, Magsaysay established a "hotline" to his immediate office for complaints about troop malperformance and a staff to immediately investigate those complaints in the field, convincing one and all that he was serious about making the army a credible symbol of good and caring government.

Every effort was made to publicize, nationwide, the new order in the army and what was being accomplished thereby. To accomplish this, Magsaysay used press releases, unit newspapers for troop consumption (and for subsequent distribution to local civilians), movies of operations and civic actions (for showing in remote areas by civil affairs officers), and traveling road shows. Programs to win the support of civilians were complemented by others directed at the insurgents themselves.

One such program provided surrenderees (and even those who had been captured) the wherewithal to start life anew for self and family: substantial acreage in a resettlement area and a loan of building materials, tools, food, and seed. This program stimulated many surrenders, but its indirect effect was even greater. Much of the population had supported the guerrillas because their avowed motive was to gain "land for the landless." When it became apparent that the objective

could be achieved without fighting, the moral obligation to support the guerrillas disappeared.

A second program involved liberal rewards for the death or capture of Huk leaders who were brought in or killed by their own comrades. The principal values of this program lay in widening the gulf between civilians and guerrillas, and in heightening hostilities within the guerrilla ranks. Accompanying these major programs were more specifically targeted initiatives: appeals from mothers to their guerrilla sons; rumors to destroy the credibility of those politicians who were deliberately obstructing the Magsaysay programs; widespread distribution of posters exposing Huk leaders as criminals wanted for documented murder, kidnapping, and rape; and exploitation 'of native superstitions.

The concomitant of steadily increasing popular support for the government-as symbolized by the army in the field-was better intelligence and more effective operations against the guerrillas. By 1953, the insurgency was no longer a menace to the national security of the Philippines.

What lessons can be drawn from the significant contribution of psychological warfare to the success of the Philippine counterinsurgency campaign? One is that Magsaysay had his priorities right. In most third world countries, the soldier in the field is the embodiment of the government. His conduct will determine the nature of the relationship between the population and the government in rural areas. The soldier must therefore be made the most useful symbol possible, demonstrating the moral justification for government. It is a nondelegable command responsibility, at all levels, to ensure this.

Another is that several factors combined to swing popular support to the government through actions of the Philippine military:

1. leadership and command emphasis (notably including careful indoctrination of the soldier);
2. a dedicated element in each headquarters to plan and supervise implementation;
3. psywar programs carefully tailored to the attitudes and needs of the groups at whom targeted; and

4. quality advisors with the professional competence, empathy, and passion for anonymity to gain and maintain access to the decision makers.

No one spent any time attempting to define boundaries of, or responsibilities for, conduct of psychological operations. It was everybody's business to support the overarching aims: develop confidence in the government and render the insurgency futile. This was achieved by the remarkable integration of concrete and useful actions, increasingly effective field combat operations, and support from information/psywar initiatives.

Vietnam was an entirely different story. There was an illuminating exchange between Col Harry Summers and a North Vietnamese officer in Hanoi during the prisoner of war exchange negotiations in 1973. Summers made the point that the American army had never been bested in battle to which the response was "Quite true, but that is totally irrelevant." The communists' political and psychological campaigns were decisive-on the international scene, within the American body politic, and in-country. The tragedy is that our failure to mobilize international and domestic support for the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters mirrored our Vietnam experience in those key arenas.

A comprehensive and authoritative account of psychological operations in Vietnam has yet to be compiled. When accomplished, it will record some brilliant successes at the tactical level and some failures at the strategic level. The latter included an inability to cope with the impact of modern mass communications (history's first televised war); the lack of psychological/ political actions to condition audiences and establish context for major military activities as, for example, the invasion of Cambodia; inability to erase the perception that it was our war, not a South Vietnamese war; and ineffectiveness of advice and resources devoted to aid the government of South Vietnam to make its case, improve its image, and enhance its performance on and off the battlefield. Responsibility for these failures did not rest solely-or even predominantly-with Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO). It was shared with the political and military leadership in Washington and in-country, with United States Information Agency (USIA)

ambivalence about the merits of psychological warfare and its role therein, and with a military educational system that failed to inculcate in all ranks the fundamental tenets of counterinsurgency.

This evaluation in no way denigrates the dedication of the JUSPAO leadership and members. And, in all fairness, even programs of heightened impact would not have resulted in a different final outcome. Psychological warfare can enhance political, social, and military programs; but if those programs are seriously deficient, it cannot erase their faults.

The differences between the Philippine and Vietnamese experiences acre dramatic.

- In both cases, the key objective was to win the support of the population. In Vietnam, that objective was not achieved. Admittedly, the Vietnamese government faced much more difficult challenges, explicit in a more numerous, better organized, more deeply imbedded, and more highly motivated opposition.
- Unlike in the Philippines, psywar personnel in Vietnam did not have direct and continuing access to the top political and military leadership or to the high-level planners. A number of first-class research projects, which were developed by social scientists, political psychologists, and cultural anthropologists, constituted guidelines for effective psychological initiatives. For the most part, these projects were simply filed.
- The Philippines' psychological programs were indigenous in content and means of communication. In Vietnam, impatience (to which short tours contributed) stimulated the Americans to do too much themselves. Not only was this conceptually wrong, it was also operationally ineffective because most of the Americans involved had no more appreciation of the political and cultural realities of Vietnam than we did of Lebanon in 1983.

Prospects for the Future

As the decade of the sixties ended and that of the seventies began, many observers believed that the United States would develop a comprehensive and prudent doctrine for psychological

operations. In fact, some thought, the government would have no choice but to do so. Some even thought there would be extensive research to determine the most efficient and effective methods of applying psychological techniques and weapons.

Alas, it was not to be! The United States is still without the requisite national doctrine. Worse yet, there is less acceptance of the legitimacy of psychological warfare as a tool of statecraft by the State Department and the USIA than was the case in 1970. There has been scant modification of the long-held view that the conduct of psychological operations is an exclusively military task-appropriate in war, but deplorable in peace. The recognition has not dawned that such activities are fundamental to effective counterinsurgency efforts and must be primarily conducted by non-DOD agencies.

There have been some modest advances under the current administration. In 1984, a landmark National Security Defense Directive (NSDD) established international communications as a major instrument of national security policy and assigned specific tasks to executive departments and agencies. Only one section dealt with psychological operations-and then solely in a military context. It directed the revitalization of the armed forces' capabilities to conduct such activities in support of military operations in crisis and in war. Typically, the NSDD did not establish any effective interagency mechanism for orchestrating and coordinating the various international communication capabilities.

Using the NSDD as leverage, the secretary of defense directed the preparation of a Psychological Operations Master Plan (which he subsequently approved in toto). Its purpose was to remedy the deficiencies that had developed since Vietnam-deficiencies in force structure, operational concepts, planning, research, training, intelligence support, personnel programs, and understanding the potential of psychological operations as a military force multiplier. The plan included these important actions:

1. JCS development of a comprehensive joint doctrine to cover employment to strengthen deterrence, in crisis and in war, as the foundation of the revitalization effort;

2. augmentation of planning capability on major combatant command staffs;

3. functional separation of special and psychological operations at staff and organizational levels, formally recognizing that the latter is inherent in all military activity across the spectrum of conflict;

4. reindoctrination of the officer corps through appropriate instruction within the mainstream service school systems and including psychological operations in training exercises;

5. modernization of equipment and force structure; and

6. most significant of all, the phased development of a Joint Psychological Operations Center as the font for doctrine and conceptualization, for the direction of research and analysis, for planning support of the unified and specified commanders, and for assistance to the secretary and the chairman in developing defense positions on national psychological plans and campaigns.

It will take much hard work and continued command prodding to see these initiatives through to fruition. Absent an institutionalized mechanism at the national level, the psychological dimension of contingency planning is handled on an ad hoc, fragmented basis. DOD has repeatedly urged the establishment of a national psychological operations committee, which would, inter alia, do detailed planning for the marshaling and orchestration of all government and quasi-government communication capabilities in support of military contingency plans or external crises short of direct military involvement.

It is understood that the concept of the committee has been approved in principle, but has not been activated due to the strong reservations of the USIA. Conceivably, the congressionally mandated Board for Low-Intensity Conflict at National Security Council (NSC) level will provide impetus for the interagency psychological operations structure as an essential adjunct for sound planning.

Meanwhile, one Army unit (the 4th PSYOP Group) strives valiantly to plug the national gap. It has produced excellent how-to-do-it plans for focusing all relevant national capabilities in support of several countries under threat. The professionalism

of the group is gaining recognition in key sections of the national security community. Both the group's planners and its colleagues on the ground can take much credit for the improvements that were wrought in the Salvadoran army.

Clearly, we are ill-prepared for the psychological dimension of the next major counterinsurgency that will engage the United States. The guidelines for enhancing performance are the major lessons gleaned from our past experience.

The first guideline--a truism meriting underscoring-is that the message communicated must be indigenous in content and in execution, leastwise within the confines of the supported country. The United States will have major tasks in ensuring political support for a beleaguered country on the international scene and here at home. In-country, the burden will fall on the shoulders of a few carefully chosen and highly qualified individuals who will operate in an advisory role, either formally or informally. The proportions of civilian and military advisors must be aligned to the structure of the host government; and while under the general supervision of the chiefs of the US Diplomatic Missions, they must work with and for their foreign colleagues.

Collectively, the US advisors must have a profound knowledge of the country-its culture, its customs, its political and social substructures, and the characteristics of its population. To ensure that depth of confidence, the group must be reinforced by-or be able to draw on the support of-the expertise of sociologists, clinical psychologists, and cultural anthropologists. They must, of course, be equally well informed about all aspects of the insurgency, its operating methodologies, its motivations, and its vulnerabilities. The challenge-a cross-cultural one-to those advisors will be to help the supported government shape and articulate value-based themes to which the population can relate. They must then ensure that all actions of the government and its personnel are consistent with-and reinforce-those themes.

A second, closely related guideline is to eliminate the mind-set that the practice of psychological warfare is the province of odd fellows steeped in the occult. To be sure, there are pressing requirements for full-time specialists and dedicated (albeit all-purpose) equipment. But these requirements deal

with only a portion of the psychological dimension in counter-insurgency: the detailed target research and analysis within both the native population and the insurgent structure; analysis of, and counters to, insurgent propaganda; and the offensive against the insurgents to confuse, confound, exacerbate vulnerabilities, and induce defections.

That sector aside, psychological operations (how badly we need other terminologyl) do not have a separate compartment. They may at times be a part of public affairs, civic action, troop information, civil affairs, public diplomacy, humanitarian aid, or political action. As exemplified by the campaign against the Huks in the 1950s, everyone can and should aid in the psychological enhancement of all programs to gain and maintain the allegiance and support of the target audience: the population itself. The sine qua non for attainment of that objective are concrete programs that are sound in design, sound in content, and professionally implemented.

The complementary-usually crucial-task is to multiply the impact of those programs and underscore the relevance of those programs to national aspirations. Completion of this task will require unceasing exploitation of every medium of communication, from ensuring the proper deportment of soldiers in face-to-face contact with villagers to sending traveling shows throughout the countryside to presenting sophisticated TV programs.

Conclusion

My advocacy of the extraordinary importance of the psychological dimension at any level of conflict notwithstanding, I am not sanguine about our government's capacity to exploit this nonintrinsic instrument of national power (or, indeed, even to comprehend its potential for enhancing national security).

Most worrisome is the failure to recognize-let alone take measures to counter-psychological and political warfare waged against our policies with the intent to undermine them; here, the cost of inaction is real and heavy. The stark fact is that the American public, the media, and even the bureaucracy, are generally oblivious to the scope and sophistication of this genre.

South Africa commanded center stage in Western consciousness because there was a spectacularly successful (and still ongoing) psychological warfare campaign. It was carefully orchestrated, replete with misinformation, and aided and abetted by our own gullible media. The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua had similar success. Thanks almost exclusively to the efficacy of its propaganda, there was more active support among the American public for the Sandinista regime than for the freedom fighters that our own government backed. Awareness that the integrity of our own political and decision-making base is under threat should lead to actions that would expose and neutralize our adversaries' efforts. Hopefully, such awareness will stimulate utilization of psychological and political warfare initiatives to further the positive goals of American foreign policy.

The Psychological Dimension of the Military Element of National Power

Maj James V. Keifer, USAF, Retired

> *War does not belong in the realm of arts and sciences; rather it is part of man's social existence.... Politics, moreover, is the womb in which war develops.*
>
> *If war is part of policy, policy will determine its character. As policy becomes more ambitious and vigorous, so will war.*
>
> **-Carl von Clausewitz**

The six-month Persian Gulf War, popularly called the One-Hundred-Hour War, recently took us through the continuum of the policy process. Economic sanctions were applied by a world community united with a degree of resolve seldom seen; but because these actions take time, and time favored Saddam Hussein, they were never given the opportunity to prove their effectiveness. Through diplomacy, essentially a government-to-government process of negotiation and compromise, the political leaders of the world tried to defuse the situation. Because both sides held nonnegotiable positions, with no room for compromise, the prospects for a diplomatic solution were nonexistent. Diplomacy did, however, play an instrumental role in uniting coalition forces. Was a peaceful resolution out of the picture? It evidently wasl

While the political and economic elements of national power played out their hands, two others came to the forefront. These were the military and the psychological elements. These two elements, working together, seemed to constitute our best opportunity for a peaceful resolution; and after failing to achieve a peaceful solution, these two elements worked together to enable us to win, win quickly, and win with the least possible bloodshed and destruction.

How could the military instrument offer a peaceful solution? By itself, not at all. However, with the psychological element ... ?

At the turn of the century, under Theodore Roosevelt's motto, Walk Softly and Carry a Big Stick, the United States practiced a policy called gunboat diplomacy. We built a reputation for "sending in the Marines" to achieve our national objectives. After a while, all we had to do was steam a ship to the coast; through intimidation, we achieved our objective.

Turning now to the recent Gulf conflict, we hoped to persuade Saddam Hussein to unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait through our military buildup in the Middle East. We felt that qur recent excursions to Libya, Grenada, and Panama would certainly have impressed upon Saddam that we had the ability and resolve to settle the score militarily. And part of the psychological factor was Saddam's knowledge that his forces were equipped with hardware that was no match for our high-tech weapon systems. Another psychological factor was that, while Saddam didn't mind sending tens of thousands of Iraqis to martyrdom, he had no intention of becoming a martyr himself. The world community isolated Saddam and communicated unity on the issue through strategic psychological operations. Through theater PSYOP, we tried to convince him that it wasn't worth the cost to fight for a losing cause. Unfortunately, Saddam wasn't convinced; and neither were the Tikritis who supported him.

The psychological dimension played an important role in limiting the loss of lives and property. On the field of battle, we wanted to face an enemy who was unsure about his cause and capabilities but sure about his impending doom; an enemy who, even if unwilling to surrender, had little will to engage in combat. Through tactical PSYOP, we hoped to convey to the Iraqi military the futility of their position; we succeeded.

In the Middle East, the Andean Ridge, the Philippines, and throughout the world, the psychological dimension plays an important role in the achievement of national objectives. It serves the same purpose, and can be likened to, the aggressive marketing campaigns of Madison Avenue; that is, to affect the behavior of a target audience. Where Madison Avenue sells products and services, psychological operations sell ideas and ideology.

It's safe to say that all governments throughout the world make use of psychological tools during peacetime as well as during war. Activities are organized at two levels: international (we call these publicity, public diplomacy, and psychological operations) and in-country (we call these publicity, public relations, and public affairs). [1]

The use of any and every element of national power carries with it psychological effects.[2] To this end Murray Dyer wrote, "the highest levels of government now recognize that in any decision on national policy there are psychological factors that must be taken into account."[3] He cited the psychological dimension's cutting across departmental boundaries as the reason for an ongoing turf battle between the Department of Defense and the Department of State for control of the psychological instrument.[4]

The term *national power* describes the ability of a nation to influence other nations.[5] Deterrence, a fundamental national security objective of the United States for years, is essentially a psychological phenomenon.[6] Potential enemies perceive the cost of attack to be far greater than any possible gains. The assessment is based on the perception of this country's capabilities and resolve. Military psychological operations reinforce this perception by clarifying and repeating it. Edward N. Luttwak says it is an important message-one that must be communicated across the range of social and economic classes.[7]

Ronald D. McLaurin, author of *Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations, says* that the reason for much of America's diplomacy and policy, both actions and words, is specifically to influence the behavior of other governments.[8] Martin Wright distinguishes diplomacy from propaganda:

> Diplomacy is the attempt to adjust conflicting interests by negotiation and compromise: propaganda is the attempt to sway the opinion that underlies and sustains the interests. Conversion therefore undercuts the task of compromise.[9]

How does the military element of national power support the psychological dimension? One fundamental foreign policy objective is to concentrate and optimize power. Other things equal, a nation that can back up its policies with coercive force holds a distinct advantage over less-capable nations. The

projection of power is a central concept of international relations. Luttwak states that power, the influence of one state over others, may be measured in terms of the perception of the audience. To be effective (powerful), perceptions are precisely what foreign policy must affect. 10 **The projection of US military power is often used as a force of political persuasion.** 1i **Such activities as port visits, bilateral exercises, firepower demonstrations, and special deployments help project power, as does the high-technology aura of US military hardware. Propaganda can be used effectively to reinforce and intensify these measures, but it must be carefully crafted to prevent counterproductive perceptions.**

How, then, do psychological operations support strategic military objectives? The ability of nations to gather information, and to assess and interpret its relevance, isn't equal; what is perceived can be quite disparate from reality. With effects multiplied by differences in culture, experience, and expertise, the gap between perception and reality-misinterpretations-can lead to the misunderstanding of intentions, problems in resolving differences, and other dangerous situations. [12] **Psychological operations bridge the gap.**

If psychological operations are so important, why do they carry the stigma that seems to be attached? In the foreword to *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the U.S. Approach,* **Bradley C. Hosmer, president of the National Defense University, observed that "the negative connotations in the West of the word propaganda suggest we have treated political war as incompatible with democratic values and traditions." Frank R. Barnett, in the afterword to the same book, expressed also that "some would argue that the ethics of democracy preclude too strenuous a concern with propaganda." These statements unmasked American cultural bias toward the terms** *propaganda* and *psychological operations.* **Dr Carries Lord, in "The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy," also noted this phenomenon:**

> Manifest or latent in the attitudes of many Americans toward the practice of psychological-political warfare is a distaste for any sort of psychological manipulation or deception. The idea that psychological-political warfare is a black art that can be morally justified only under the most extreme circumstances is a derivative of

such attitudes. That such activities necessarily involve misrepresentation or deception is in any case far from the truth. But even assuming that some such element is inseparable from effective psychological-political operations, the moral calculus is by no means as clear as is frequently made out.[13]

The American attitude toward fair play reflects a disaffection for the use of any psychological manipulation. Gen Robert C. Kingston, commenting on "Political Strategies for Revolutionary War," by Richard H. Shultz, Jr., attributes this apprehension to past abuses of psychological tools by totalitarian regimes: "Many people in this country think that psychological operations equate to the Big Lie, suggestive of Goebbels and Hitler, and that we should not use it." [14] **The late Gen Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Retired, provided comments on the institutional reluctance to consciously resort to perception for influencing activities. "The psychological weapon (and the political premises which govern its employment) have never been accepted as a permanent instrument of national security policy by the Executive Branch, the Congress, or the American people."** [15] **Cultural will, readiness, and the ability to conduct psychological operations have tended to surface only during wars. Ironically, it has been during wartime that the American public has become a primary target audience for national nonmilitary** psychological operations.

Dr Lord credits the American media with helping to intensify cultural biases of the public through implications that underhanded objectives or purposes constitute the basis for such activities. He notes that claims of disinformation or public lies are often attached to media comments on psychological activities.

Dr Lord writes that the employment of psychological tools is further hampered by systemic weaknesses of the bureaucracy. From the top, he says, inadequate strategic planning and decision **making prevent PSYOP from being considered, much less employed. The US diplomatic, military, and intelligence establishments distrust and resist any use of political-psychological warfare. Dr Lord charges that the State Department hasn't changed its diplomatic techniques in 200 years, ignoring the shrinking of the world brought about by dramatic advances in communications technology.** [16]

The Department of Defense doesn't escape Dr Lord's criticism of institutional bias; he contends that, for reasons that are both similar to and different from those of State, military leaders have likewise tended to overlook the value of the psychological dimension, particularly outside tactical applications:

> The military services, in their preoccupation with technology, major weapon systems, and the big war, tend to neglect low-cost approaches to enhancing operational effectiveness, especially at the lower end of the conflict spectrum; and they tend to regard political-psychological warfare as someone else's business. [17]

Even the PSYOP community itself has struggled with its name for years, proposing such terms as *perception management, public diplomacy, political communication, influence operations,* and *international information.* **In his article "By Any Other Name" in** *Perspectives* **(the magazine of the Psychological Operations Association), Col Thomas Taylor offered the title "Perception and Deception," suggesting the acronym, P&D.I [8] Lt Gen Michael Carnes, director of the Joint Staff, urged a name change in his address to the Psychological Operations Association at the 1989 Worldwide Psychological Operations Conference, commenting that "you can't call soap 'dirt' and expect it to sell."**

This struggle for a new name begs a couple of questions. General Carnes's "soap/dirt" analogy is faulty. First, the term *psychological operations* **is amoral and the community is not responsible for bias against it. It would be more to the point that people think of "earth" or "topsoil" in terms of** *dirt, filth,* **or grime.** And **second, terms considered more acceptable-***politically* and *popularly* **fail to aptly describe the activity. A soldier in the battlefield making loudspeaker appeals to the enemy is not performing "political communications" or "international information."**

Personally, I don't find the terms *psychological operations* or *propaganda* **objectionable. What is needed is to market these words so that their pejorative connotations die out. Psychological operations help to save lives by using words, instead of bombs and bullets, to deter, or in the failure of deterrence, help win wars.** In *The Weapon on the Wall,* **Murray Dyer opines that the profession "is an honorable and important means, ranking with instruments of diplomacy, the military art, and**

economic measures."[19] One of his premises states that this discipline is a reflection of free will, a factor of public opinion. He's quick to point out, however, that this premise does not apply in a totalitarian state. Dyer says the way to overcome the institutionalized bias is through education. I agree: Education, coupled with advocacy, is the answer. The challenge is to encourage others to become disciples, too.

Notes

1. Ronald D. McLaurin, ed., "Organization and Personnel," in *Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 55.

2. Field Manual 33-5, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), 78.

3. Murray Dyer, *The Weapon on the Wall* (1959; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1979), 231.

4. Ibid., 69-73.

5. Martin Wright proposes that nations came into being with the decline of medieval Christendom when man's loyalty shifted to the state (king) and away from the estate (baron) and church (pope). He states the word *nation* came into being at the end of the French Revolution. A nationality was a collective people with a consciousness of historic identity expressed in a distinct language. Martin Wright, *Power Politics,* ed. Hedley Ball and Carsten Holbraad (Leicaster, U.K.: Leicaster University Press, 1978), 27.

6. Fred W. Walker, "Truth Is the Best Propaganda," *National Guard Magazine,* October 1987, 28.

7. Edward N. Luttwak, "Perceptions," in Ronald D. McLaurin, ed., *Military Propaganda,* 267.

8. Ronald D. McLaurin, ed., "Psychological Operations and National Security," in *Military Propaganda,* 2-3.

9. Wright, 89.

10. Luttwak, "Perceptions and the Political Utility of Armed Forces," in Ronald D. McLaurin, ed., *Military Propaganda,* 275.

11. Refer back to opening comments on gunboat diplomacy.

12. Luttwak, 267–68.

13. Dr Carnes Lord, "The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy," in Carnes Lord and Frank R. Barnett, ed., *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the U.S. Approach* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988), 22-23.

14. Robert C. Kingston, "Comments," in Carnes Lord and Frank R. Barnett, ed., *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the U.S. Approach* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988), 142.

15. The late Gen Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Retired, "Political/Psychological Dimensions of Counter-Insurgency," an essay of this publication.

16. Lord, 23-28.

17. Ibid., 27.

18. Thomas H. Taylor, "By Any Other Name," *Perspectives* 5 (Spring 1989): 9.

19. Dyer, 194.

PSYOP in Desert Shield/ Desert Storm



Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF
Col Daniel W. Jacobowitz, USAF, Retired

Understanding the role of psychological operations in the Gulf War requires more than a glimpse of its contributions to military conflicts. To understand PSYOP, we must place it within the context of the times; specifically, in the sequence of events that led to Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm.*

When Saddam Hussein began to build his military strength along the Kuwaiti border, the United Nations (UN) began to react. Through a series of 13 resolutions, the UN demanded that Iraq end its aggression and pull out of Kuwait. Embargoes were established and ultimatums were delivered. Member states, including the US, Egypt, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, deployed forces and/or equipment. Virtually the entire Western world-and a majority of Arab nations-opposed Iraq. Americans at home overwhelmingly came to the support of the president's actions (in contrast to the domestic situation during the Vietnam conflict).' The US government clearly articulated its policies and goals, having developed them through full, rapid, public debate, involving the executive branch, the Congress, and even the judiciary, which rejected various legal challenges to the evolving policies.

A new force, the international electronic news media, became a critical element in the successful execution of the war. In particular, coverage by the Cable News Network (CNN) demonstrated the power of international broadcasting and involved itself as a medium both to aid and to deter Iraqi PSYOP plans. In true democratic media tradition, the accumulation of factual reporting allowed knowledgeable audiences to correctly characterize Saddam's plans and behavior.

The Iraqi propaganda system is pyramidal, with the top spot occupied by Saddam Hussein. Control is maintained at the

top, with many outlets, both overt and covert, at the bottom. Iraqi propaganda flows from the Ministry of Culture and Information (MCI) under the strict supervision of the Baath Party, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), and Saddam Hussein. Iraq's propaganda system was closely modeled after the Soviet system and is similar to that of most other totalitarian states.

An overriding aspect of Iraqi propaganda is the use of religious words and phrases. The techniques of Iraqi propaganda during the course of the crisis reflected the same style used by the Iraqis before the Gulf War. This campaign emphasized religious symbolism, Arab nationalism, and praise of Saddam Hussein. These themel reflected Iraqi culture and politics, demonstrating the fallacy of planning PSYOP based on the characteristics of the sender (rather than the nature of the receiver).

The Iraqis selected the following four objectives for their initial PSYOP campaign:

1. Rationalize their invasion of Kuwait.
2. Gain support of Arab masses.
3. Discourage nations from participating in the UN embargo.
4. Discourage or hinder military attacks on Iraq.

Four themes were generated from these objectives:

a. The revolutionary forces in Kuwait had asked for Iraqi help.

b. Iraq is the champion of oppressed Arabs.

c. The West is depriving the Iraqi people of food and medicine.

d. Iraq will withdraw from Kuwait after a short time. 2

Later, a fifth objective-rationalizing the incorporation of Kuwait as a permanent province of Iraq-was established.

The MCI distributed the themes to the various media outlets for dissemination. This system worked very well, enabling the MCI/Baath Party to coordinate the campaigns, to react to impact indicators of current campaigns, and to initiate new campaigns on short notice. Some of the campaigns were selectively distributed to increase the stress impact on the target. Other

campaigns used all media to ensure the widest possible distribution in the shortest amount of time.

Few limitations were placed on the type or content of Iraqi propaganda. At no time did missing or contrary facts interfere with Iraqi operations. If needed, documentation was simply manufactured. In the Iraqi PSYOP system, few restrictions are placed on efforts used to further an Iraqi goal. Furthermore, their campaigns did not have to follow any consistency, logic, or form; it was acceptable to criticize the Multinational Force's (MNF) bombing as being inaccurate on one day and, on the next day, to rest a theme on the destruction wrought by highly accurate MNF bombing. As far as Iraqi media were concerned, MNF bombing accuracy varied with the need to enhance the Iraqi propaganda campaign.

Saddam's use of PSYOP had varying results. Saddam used Scud attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia as a political weapon to divert coalition attention and military effort from the main battlefield. The ever-present threat of chemical warheads was a major factor in his plan. According to Lt Gen Tom Kelly, operations chief for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Scuds were "of little military significance." Nevertheless, they produced emotional and psychological effects. Although Saddam induced fear among the Israelis and Saudis, and consternation among the coalition in general, his plan ultimately grounded on the rocks of military reality. However, Saddam's combination of useless military technology and a politically diverse targeting policy did serve to divert valuable coalition resources from other targets to the difficult task of Scud hunting.

Saddam's tactical purpose was achieved, but his strategic purpose was thwarted by dual coalition responses. Coalition tactical air efforts against the Scuds helped the Israelis maintain their policy of restraint, while the technological breakthrough of Patriot missiles calmed both Israeli and Saudi publics and further demonstrated coalition invincibility. Tactical military response, based on military competence and technological superiority, blunted a political weapon aimed at the heart of the coalition.

Iraqi efforts to use Western television as a relay for propaganda programs failed to convince important world audiences, although they may have been somewhat effective within the

Arab world. Among those efforts were Saddam's personal appearances with hostages, whom he attempted to characterize as "guests" of the Republic of Iraq. But Saddam's campaign was doomed by the perfectly natural and spontaneous negative reaction of a little British boy whom Saddam tried to convince of his good will. In this case the attempt to manipulate Western media completely backfired, as repetition of this scene throughout the Western world established public opinion of the true nature of the hostage situation. Further, it exposed Saddam's manipulative efforts and seriously eroded whatever credibility he retained.

Later Iraqi broadcasts were to fall flat as a result of Saddam's loss of credibility. For example, scenes of bomb damage at the otherwise unidentified building presented by the Iraqis as the Baby Milk Factory (with signs and workers' jacket logos conveniently in English) were quickly dismissed as crude propaganda by all except the most gullible or anti-Western. The nonsequitur of the signs and the behavior of the Iraqi media escort personnel (who limited reporter access within the site) conflicted with Iraqi claims. And when Western intelligence analysts demonstrated that the claimed bombing damage to cultural facilities in Iraq (the bombing of which is forbidden by the accepted laws of war) had in fact been faked by Iraqi wrecking crews, the remaining shreds of Iraqi television propaganda credibility were destroyed.[3]

Controversy still rages, particularly within the TV news industry, on the wisdom of continuing censored and pressured TV broadcasts from within the enemy capital. The TV broadcasts had both positive and negative tactical effects. Coalition operators were able to conclude from viewing scenes from Baghdad, or from the disappearance of live TV from Baghdad, that certain targets had been effectively struck.

In addition, the televised appearance of downed coalition pilots proved counterproductive for Iraq's objectives. Instead of convincing the coalition partners to acquiesce, a worldwide audience was appalled by the battered physical condition of the captives-and their orchestrated, mechanical admissions of guilt were painfully transparent. A backlash effect inspired greater support for the coalition.

A closer look at this one aborted Iraqi campaign will help clarify the propaganda process. The Iraqi goal of this propaganda campaign was to break the coalition. The Iraqi leadership concluded that if US public opinion could be marshaled against the war in the same way it was during the Vietnam conflict, the US would withdraw. Toward that end, the propagandists attempted to mimic some of the successful tactics used by the government of North Vietnam. One of the tactics employed was on-camera interviews of captured coalition pilots. The Iraqis thought that presenting these interviews would stimulate the US public to call for the withdrawal of US forces and the pursuit of peaceful options. Instead, outrage at Iraq's obvious violation of the Geneva convention resulted in even greater backlash against Saddam.

The highest echelons of the MCI/Baath Party made the decision to use captured allied pilots for propaganda purposes. The Iraqi News Agency, one of the principal media outlets to the West, managed the entire campaign. The plan to exploit allied pilots for propaganda included this strategy:

- capture several pilots,
- parade them through the streets,
- put them on television with prepared questions and answers,
- view the impact of the broadcasts through the Western media, and
- disseminate broadcasts to media and determine their impact.[4]

The initial problem that Iraq faced was how to disseminate their product; the coalition had damaged most of Iraq's television broadcasting capability early in the conflict. The Iraqis were forced to use a surviving low-power television transmitter, which they used to televise the parade of coalition pilots through the streets of Baghdad. But Iran was the only country that could receive their transmissions, and the Iranians did not share them with the world in a manner that suited the Iraqi purpose.

To circumvent this problem, the Iraqis videotaped interviews of the pilots and delivered them to various Western news

agencies. The interviews of the pilots were choreographed with specific questions and answers.

Interviewer:	What's your opinion of this aggression against Iraq?
Pilot:	I think this war is crazy and should never have happened. I condemn this aggression against peaceful Iraq.
Interviewer:	What do you think about this aggression against Iraq?
Pilot:	I think our leaders and our people have wrongly attacked the peaceful people of Iraq. 5

In the interviews the pilots told their families that they were being treated well. The MCI/Baath previewed and approved the interviews before releasing them to the media.

The response to the broadcast came very swiftly. All Western government, public, and media severely condemned the broadcasts and use of the downed pilots in this manners The world-wide condemnation was so overwhelming that the broadcasts, which had begun on 20 January, ended on 24 January. On 25 January, the MCI announced that the interviews of captured pilots would stop.

Another of Saddam's PSYOP efforts were the radio broadcasts to US troops in the field by "Baghdad Betty," reminiscent of those by Tokyo Rose during World War II. Intended to lower US troop morale, Betty's messages veered into the farcical as she warned American servicemen that their wives back home were sleeping with famous movie stars like Tom Cruise, Arnold Schwarzenegger, and Bart Simpson.

PSYOP, as used by Iraq, was intended to produce the greatest amount of negative stress within the coalition forces, the civilian population of those governments, and upon the civilian and political leadership of surrounding Arab states. As previously stated, the PSYOP efforts against the military forces of the coalition had minimal effects. However, the PSYOP effort aimed by Iraq at certain segments of the coalition countries and surrounding Arab nations was notable.

Saddam's propaganda effort as a stress-inducing instrument appears to have been as intense as the effort put forth by North Vietnam during the latter part of the Vietnam War. The

Iraqi PSYOP effort was clearly intended to pressure those nations supporting the coalition and those UN resolutions imposed on **Iraq. Another Iraqi effort was to gather support for economic sanctions as an alternative to military action. Later, efforts were made against economic sanctions. Iraq portrayed the US, and specifically President George H. Bush, as the main opponent to Saddam. Some of the key themes used in these campaigns:**

- **The war was really about access to oil.**
- **The US was using the war as an excuse for imperialism.**
- **The US was propping up a corrupt government in Kuwait.**

These attacks, targeted at the populations of Great Britain, Germany, France, Australia, Canada, the United States, and the Arab nations of the coalition, had varying degrees of success.

The Iraqi campaign against imperialism was a carbon copy of earlier Vietnam-era themes. Saddam spoke of the Gulf crisis as another Vietnam and painted a portrait of the US and coalition partners as embarking on another mistake. A great deal of effort was put into the following propaganda themes:

- **The US was embarking on another dirty war.**
- **The war would be very bloody and would last a long time.**
- **The US would again be divided over the war.**
- **Again, the poor and the minorities are fighting a war for the rich and powerful.**

Saddam Hussein's speeches were filled with images of certain **doom, Vietnam-style-body bags returning home by the thousands, an enemy who could wait out the bombing to fight a bloody ground war, and an environment that would be as inhospitable as the jungle. He expected average citizens to recoil from the horror of such a war and spread more propaganda to dissuade the voters from supporting the coalition effort. A wedge between the Western nations would, in his mind, eventually result. The strategy is reflected in media writing around the world.**

> Iraq is no Panama and Saddam Hussein no General Noriega.. . . The United States might be mired in the sands of the Arabian deserts just as they were bogged down in the paddy fields of Vietnam. (*New Straits Times*, 13 August 1990.)

> It was clear from the beginning that the Persian Gulf conflict would not only be resolved in the hot dunes of the desert, but also in the

> quicksand of US public opinion.... While the public's reaction against the US involvement in Vietnam took years to materialize, it has developed very quickly [for the Middle East] . . . This is a fortunate development. *(La Jornada, 22* October 1990.)

> [Saddam] seeks to break Western solidarity and above all to put the Bush Administration in a corner. Time is in favor of Iraq now that US public opinion is gaining a clearer dimension of the high cost in human life of military action in faraway lands. *(La Nacton, 22* August 1990.)

> The military force building up against Saddam Hussein is such that a spark may be struck at any moment. The United States will be in danger of sinking into the sand, as it once did in the rice paddies of Vietnam. *(La Suisse, 23* August 1990.)

> There's the strongly-held belief that the [Vietnam] experience has rendered America incapable of marshalling public support to launch another war. *(Irish Independent, 20* September 1990.)

While the Iraq propaganda effort certainly caused some confusion, and increased the stress of susceptible segments of the audience, neither public opinion nor the world media were moved as the Iraqi president had hoped. The public within the US and other coalition countries was determined to show support for their soldiers stationed in the Gulf. Neither slogans nor disrespect of military forces gained popularity during the war.

The failure of most Iraqi propaganda was in its credibility. While Saddam himself believed much of his propaganda, it appears that most of the world did not. His biggest successes were in the Arab world; and even in those countries, success was neither significant nor complete on any issue. The propaganda, in general, was far below the level of sophistication of effective audiences. Politically aware segments of the population, who would be inclined to be antiwar in general, were, if anything, turned off by the crude Iraqi attempts to manipulate their sincere beliefs. The clear articulation of goals, international support through the coalition and the UN, and the effective, low-casualty military action, rendered Iraqi propaganda ineffective.

Coalition Psychological Operations

In **contrast to Saddam's efforts, coalition PSYOP efforts significantly affected Iraqi soldiers. First, the coalition efforts**

were of a more tactical nature (i.e., focused on *convincing* Iraqi troops to surrender). Second, the combining of PSYOP with the air and ground campaigns was intended to affect both soldiers and senior military leadership.

Tactical PSYOP in the Persian Gulf proved effective and efficient in terms of four principal sets of operations: [7]

- radio *transmissions,*
- loudspeaker broadcasts,
- leaflet *disseminations,* and
- enemy prisoners of war (EPW) team actions.

Operational success resulted from effective innovation in the field and from well-executed, time-sensitive planning. To a lesser extent, tactical operations proceeded from the deliberate planning model. Using the four identifiable sets of operations, PSYOP was implemented by various agents and organizations, ranging from theater-level cells to small, three-person teams serving in direct support of the forward combat units. [8]

The four operations showed different levels of effectiveness as to their impact on the Iraqi target audience. Table 1 lists the efforts and the relative effectiveness resulting from the four operations collectively.

Table 1

Exhibit I PSYOP Effort and Relative Effectiveness in the Persian Gulf

Effort
29 Million Leaflets Dropped In-theater
17 Hours Per Day of Radio Transmitting
19.5 Hours Per Day Aerial Broadcasting
Relative Effectiveness
73 Thousand Iraqis Reached through PSYOP
70% EPWs Report Messages Had Impact on Surrenders

Source: United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), "Post Operational Analysis: Iraqi Psychological Operations During Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM," SOJ9, 1992.

The four operations focused on the intended Iraqi audience in concert with effective air and ground campaigns. However, because PSYOP had been slighted in the theater operational plan, this combination was not used at first. The result of this combined PSYOP, air, and ground effort was the influencing of an unexpectedly large number of Iraqi prisoners to surrender.

The four sets of operations-radio transmission, loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflet drops, and the actions taken by EPW teams-were conducted in January and February 1991.[9] The coalition initiated its tactical leaflet and radio activities in January 1991 to coincide with the start of the air campaign and terminated them in March and May, respectively. The loudspeaker and EPW actions began in February with the start of the groufid campaign and ended in March and April.

An important precept at work in the radio and leaflet operations was reinforcement. Tactical PSYOP personnel announced to Iraqi ground units that a bombing was to occur at a specified time and place.[10] The next day, they announced that a bombing had indeed occurred as warned (only if the event had occurred as planned). The repeated cycles of announcement and execution helped persuade the Iraqis that the message and delivery means were credible and that surrender was a viable alternative to useless death.[11]

Radio Transmissions

Six broadcast platforms were established and used in the Persian Gulf theater of operations. Three were Volant Solo using EC-130 aircraft platforms (retransmissions made via modified USAF C-130 aircraft) and three were ground radio stations: "Voice of the Gulf," "Voice of America" (DOD-loaned equipment), and "Free Kuwaiti People." According to now declassified message sources, the radio stations were managed and run almost exclusively by US Central Command (USCENTCOM) as part of its theater operational plan. Thus, these stations were integrated into the overall combat-PSYOP effort relatively early. Programs consisted of pretaped messages broadcast continuously each day for about 17 hours. Messages conveyed such themes as the inevitability of defeat, Saddam's inappropriate leadership, and surrender

appeals. A typical message transmitted over an established "surrender hotline": "YOUR DIVISION WILL BE BOMBED TOMORROW. ABANDON YOUR EQUIPMENT, LEAVE YOUR LOCATION NOW, AND SAVE YOURSELVES."

The relative effectiveness of these radio transmissions, in terms of audience exposure, was approximately 58 percent (versus zero for no transmissions). The degree of persuasiveness relative to no transmissions was estimated to be 46 percent. Impact on surrender reached about 34 percent. [12]

Such moderate values, according to some thinking, may be reflective of a culture whose primary representational systems (or language channels) seemed not to be auditory, but visual (as with leaflet drops) and kinesthetic (as with the humane actions of EPW teams). [13]

Loudspeaker Broadcasts

Typical PSYOP was accomplished in the theater of operations by two- or three-person loudspeaker teams in direct support of forward combat brigades. Teams consisted typically of one or two noncommissioned officers and an interpreter or communications specialist.

Loudspeaker teams broadcast messages that had been prepared and dubbed onto audiotapes and distributed to them and other teams by the 4th PSYOP Group by way of its product dissemination battalion. Occasionally, a team would ad-lib a broadcast if pressures of the moment demanded variation from the prepared script and if the language skill and initiative of the team so permitted.

Loudspeaker broadcasts generally produced moderate effectiveness in terms of audience exposure, persuasiveness, and impact on surrender. The rather uneven successes of the loudspeaker operations were found to be similar to those of radio transmissions, although some results, arguably positive, were obtained through the convincing appeals of enterprising loudspeaker teams. At least one team induced a captured Iraqi sergeant to make heartfelt appeals to his comrades across a berm using the very loudspeaker system that induced him to surrender. [14] Feedback from some EPWs indicated that, while

"leaflets and radio showed us how to surrender, loudspeaker teams told us [exactly] where [to do it]. ^ 15

The following account by SSgt Edward Fivel, 9th Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG), illustrates the operation of his loudspeaker team and its unusual effectiveness.

> We had to convince the company commander of our parent unit to let us PSYOP people try ousting those Iraqi soldiers from their underground bunker. We kept telling him there was nothing to lose by trying, especially since the pounding all morning by the 101st [Airborne Division] hadn't done anything.
>
> So the three of us gave it a try. We arranged for the Blackhawk [helicopter] to ride us to the site of the bunker and we began dropping surrender leaflets. Then we returned to base and found that nothing had happened-no surrenders, no movement, nothing.
>
> We tried something else. We hopped back on the Blackhawk and returned to the bunker area, this time intending to use our loudspeaker system and a pretaped message given by headquarters. We picked a spot on the ground about 800 meters from the bunker and started broadcasting. Nothing happened. I guess we couldn't be heard over the loud racket of our helicopter.
>
> We asked the pilot to land us on the ground not too far from the bunker. With what you might call serious reservations, he eventually landed us, feeling a little protected, I guess, by the three Apaches and one Blackhawk whopping above our heads and to our right. He took off immediately, saying he'd stay in contact by radio.
>
> The three of us were now on the ground. We were facing this enemy bunker that Intelligence says has 20 enemy soldiers who might be waiting to greet us. We picked up our loudspeaker equipment-the transmitter and the speaker-and ran about 200 meters closer to the bunker. We sat the equipment down and again started playing the cassette surrender tapes. Still no movement.
>
> Then our team leader decided to lift up the speaker. He lifted it and began carrying it even closer to the bunker. He toted that speaker exactly 50 more meters. I knew the distance because that's the length of the electrical cord he stretched out to the end, 50 meters. The team leader was very close to the enemy now.
>
> Then he suddenly stood straight up and pushed the speaker high over his head [like some kind of statue showing a big trophy to a crowd far away]. I told the other guy back with me watching all this, our communications man, to quit playing the taped message and go live, and to keep doing it. The guy had just gotten out of language school, so he could handle the Iraq language pretty well. He talked loudly through the speaker in four message sets.

That worked. A crackling voice came through our radio from the helicopter pilot who was still hanging up there with us. The pilot had spotted some movement. Then we saw Iraq soldiers begin climbing out of the bunker in front of our team leader. They were waving little white flags and carrying no weapons.

That was about it for us in that scene because our pilot said over the radio that he was landing to pick us up so he could refuel back at 101 division base. He was running real low on fuel. We didn't see how many Iraqis came out of that bunker, although we had counted up to about 20 of them before we took off.

When we got back to base, the three of us and our pilot began receiving weird congratulations. We weren't sure why. Seems that over 400 Iraqis eventually came out of the bunker, all without a fight.

For the next couple of days every helicopter the 101 had was flying back and forth carrying Iraqi soldiers from the bunker to a forward EPW camp. The camp must have been getting pretty crowded. The big thing we realized later was that these actions had kicked off the "Hail Mary" play in the ground war because they fixed the Iraqi units on line in front of us, letting our endrunners in the other division make their wide sweep around the main Iraqi force.

Leaflet Drops

Leaflets and other forms of print PSYOP proved especially effective. Of the targeted audience-300,000-plus Iraqi troops-approximately 98 percent of them read or were otherwise exposed to the 29 million leaflets dropped in the theater.[16] **Many EPWs were found clutching leaflets in their hands or hiding them somewhere on their uniforms as they raised their arms to surrender.[17] An estimated 88 percent of the Iraqi forces were influenced by the leaflet drops as intended, and 77 percent were persuaded to quit the fight through the combination of combat-leaflet operations and credible tactical military threats and actions.[18]**

Leaflets appeared to be effective in the Persian Gulf crisis. Their language was simple and straightforward. Appeals were visual for an audience that seemed to respond psychologically and emotionally to visual means. Whether the leaflets' effectiveness stemmed from psychological reasons or simply from the sheer volume of leaflets that descended on the Iraqis daily is open to interpretation. Weather conditions and low leaflet loss, combined with a generally effective theme, audience

vulnerabilities, and effective coalition military action, resulted in an unprecedented success in inducing surrenders. The leaflets enabled many Iraqi soldiers, who were not highly motivated to support Saddam's war of conquest, to avoid sacrificing their lives in a doomed cause.

Still, some curious effects were attributed to at least some of the leaflet designs. These were effects that startled even the Arab partners who had supposedly provided input to the format.[19] PSYOP personnel later learned that the leaflets' effectiveness would likely have been enhanced had design consideration been given to the nonverbal, cultural cues that were read by the Iraqis as subtext.[20]

If this concept (subtext in language) escaped or seemed vague to designers and others at first, the application certainly became clear with each EPW whom they later interviewed during *Desert Storm* and similar situations.[21] Theater PSYOP personnel came to realize that they had missed an important dimension of cultural communication when designing the leaflets. In some cases, the PSYOP personnel were able to make adjustments and manage reprints; in others, they learned the cultural lessons after the cessation of hostilities.

An important illustration of this concept was the subtextual message transmitted by the color red. When red ink was included in leaflets, presumably for function or appeal, Iraqi soldiers typically hesitated or avoided approaching a leaflet sticking out from the sand nearby. They simply feared and disdained red as a signal for danger.[22]

Whenever Iraqis read a leaflet that showed a coalition soldier without a chin beard gesturing affably to an Iraqi, the reader became distrustful. To an Iraqi a chin beard signals a certain Muslim holiness and trust he could not find on a clean-shaven chin.[23]

When the Iraqis scrutinized a leaflet that showed Iraqi EPWs enjoying a bowl of fruit given by their captor, they were disappointed at seeing no bananas in the bowl. Bananas are a favored delicacy in Iraqi culture.

When an Iraqi soldier saw words encircled in the familiar thought bubble of Western comic strips, he became thoroughly confused. Unlike the English-speaking world and some other cultures, Iraqi culture does not link bubbles, words, and

pictures.[24] **However, this technique had been so internalized by the leaflet designers, that they were unaware that some cultures use other clues to indicate which cartoon character is speaking.**

Overall, *PSYOP in Desert Storm* **was among the most successful media-based PSYOP campaigns ever undertaken. Planners incorporated PSYOP into air operations from the outset and relied on leaflets to multiply the stress induced by unopposed bombing raids.** *Desert Storm* **coalition PSYOP proved the value of this combat adjunct at the tactical level and reaffirmed the overriding importance of credibility. Iraqi disdain for truthfulness contrasted vividly with Western** punctiliousness in behavior and leaflet preparation. Coalition **determination to stick to truthful overt PSYOP, relying on credible military performance to override minor cultural missteps in message preparation, proved successful in inducing thousands of early surrenders. The bottom line of coalition policy was met-casualties were reduced on both sides.**

Notes

1. *Newsweek,* 25 February 1991.

2. USSOCOM, "Post Operational Analysis: Iraqi Psychological Operations During Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM," SOJ9, 1992.

3. The US is not signatory to the 1954 Hague cultural property convention, but the US Army integrated the treaty interdictions in 1955. W. Hays Parks, fn 212, 60.

4. USSOCOM.

5. Ibid.

6. Such use of prisoners is forbidden by the laws of warfare. The failure of the Iraqi plan was partially engineered by such clever Yankee air pirates as Lt Jeffrey Zaun, who adapted the methods used by US airmen and sailors in the Vietnam War. Zaun augmented the battering of his face and exaggerated his inappropriate behavior to inform the world the Iraqis were maltreating him. What is more amazing is that the Iraqis would peddle these devastating tapes. The coalition pilot's actions were so effective that future conflicts may finally see the end of such illegal exploitation of prisoners.

7. USSOCOM.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Commander, 4th Psychological Operations Group, interview with author, 1991.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. USSOCOM.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.

Epilogue

Lt Gen Samuel V. Wilson, USA, Retired

If past events are indeed prologue to the future, then understanding the early nature and scope of psychological operations, synthesizing the PSYOP lessons learned from historical national *policy* planning and from strategic, tactical, and operational PSYOP applications, can foreshadow even greater progress and success in accomplishing our national interests and objectives in political and military environments. *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies is* the catalytic framework toward that end, since it reflects the foundation of PSYOP knowledge and wisdom.

It is critical that those involved with PSYOP-whether they are military commanders, political leaders, new PSYOP technicians, or experienced PSYOP practitioners and staff officers-become familiar with this book to better understand the importance that military PSYOP plays as a cost-effective, force-multiplier instrument of US military and political power. Such understanding is especially necessary today, given our military budgetary constraints, the existing nuclear, biological, and chemical threats, and our dynamic, complex, and worldwide arena of operations. Sun Tzu's strategy in 500 B.C. of subduing the enemy without engaging him is not only apropos but quite probably necessary for our very propagation.

The reader can learn much from parts II and III, which present various articles on national policy, PSYOP planning, and strategic and tactical PSYOP. Part III is especially significant since today much of the third world still uses Soviet PSYOP doctrine. In fact, those who would argue that the communist ideological threat has diminished with the demise of the Soviet Union, and that the US PSYOP focus should be abated, need to take heed of the various strategic and global resurgencies and the Vietnam legacy presented in part IV. One of the most important reasons for the communist "ideo-military"

victory in Vietnam, for example, was that American strategic PSYOP had no political or moral acceptance as a necessary foundation of our national policy. We should not minimize the urgent need to increase American sensitivity to the psychological dimension of warfare, and these articles and case studies support that theme. The articles on our recent actions in Panama and in *Desert Storm* not only solidify the PSYOP requirement but also point out our weaknesses and future challenges.

These authors lead us to believe correctly that the PSYOP weapon system, if employed properly, must precede, accompany, and follow all military force employments while being closely codrdinated with all agencies of government and while being systematically integrated with US national security policy and objectives throughout the spectrum of conflict and in peacetime. PSYOP is indeed a phenomenon in itself.

Contributors

Preston S. Abbott

George V. Allen, retired career foreign service officer, has served as ambassador to Iran, Yugoslavia, India, and Nepal, and as Greece's assistant secretary of state for Near East, South Asia, and African Affairs. Other positions he has held include director, US Information Agency; president, Tobacco Institute; and director, Foreign Service Institute.

MSgt Richard A. Blair, USAFR, a military intelligence analyst in the Reserve, is staff assistant to the senior military liaison and defense advisor, United States Information Agency, Washington, D.C. He was recalled to active duty during the Persian Gulf War to provide ongoing analysis of Iraqi psychological operations for Headquarters US Special Operations Command.

DeWitt S. Copp served as an Army Air Force Air Transport Command pilot in North Africa and the Middle East in World War II. Since the war, he has specialized as a book, film, and news writer in military aviation and foreign affairs. Copp has served on the staff of "Voice of America" as a writer-editor and with the United States Information Agency as policy officer on Soviet disinformation.

Col Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., USAFR, is a politico-military affairs officer with the Directorate of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, J-9, Headquarters US Special Operations Command. He holds a PhD degree in business. Colonel Findley has been a regular speaker at the USAF Special Operations School and a guest instructor at the Air University Center for Professional Development. He previously won the PSYOP Outstanding Instructor's Award and was the outstanding USAF Academy liaison officer for the Alabama-Northwest Florida

Region. Colonel Findley is a graduate of Air War College and is the author of several books.

Lloyd A. Free, president, Institute for International Social Research, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. His former positions include editor, Public *Opinion Quarterly;* **director, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, during World War II; assistant military attache, Switzerland; acting director, Office of International Information, State Department; advisor to Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson; and advisor/consultant to Vice President Nelson Rockefeller.**

Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF, is dean, Education and Research, Air Command and Staff College, Air University. Formerly he served as deputy chief, Policy and Concepts Division, Directorate of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, J-9, Headquarters US Special Operations Command and as chief, Psychological Operations Branch, at the USAF Special Operations School. Colonel Goldstein earned a PhD degree in educational psychology and is a graduate of the USAF, British, NATO, and German PSYOP courses. He is a well-known writer and speaker among military audiences.

Col Joseph S. Gordon, USAR, professor of European studies at the Defense Intelligence College. He has taught history at Campbell College and at Duke University, where he earned a PhD degree in European history. Colonel Gordon's interest in psychological operations derived from three years as an intelligence analyst with the 4th Psychological Operations Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He is a graduate of Army War College.

Col Daniel W. Jacobowitz, USAF, Retired, is assigned to strategic missile operations and the political-military field at Air University. Following his Titan II missile assignment, he had consecutive tours in Military Civic Action in Thailand. Colonel Jacobowitz has previously been on the faculties at Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College and was operations officer of the Psychological Operations

Division, Combined Forces Command, Korea. After a tour in the State Department, he served as director of Psychological Operations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as director of the Center for Treaty Implementation, US Southern Command, Panama. He joined the Gulf War Air Power Survey team in 1991.

William F. Johnston is a member of the staff and faculty, National Interdepartmental Seminar, in the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare at the Foreign Service Institute. He has had several special warfare-type assignments, including command of a psychological warfare (psywar) battalion in US Army, Pacific. ~Johnston is a former chief of the Joint United States Public Affairs Planning Office, Vietnam.

Lt Col Philip P. Katz, USA, Retired, is a senior research scientist, American Institute for Research. He has been a psychological operations (PSYOP) instructor and lecturer at the Army Special Warfare Center, a PSYOP officer at the Department of Army, senior PSYOP officer for US Army, Pacific, and senior program manager for Development of Strategic Psychological Operations in Support of Field Activities, Vietnam. Colonel Katz developed a computerized PSYOP management information system for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of the Army. He is the author of several studies on psychological operations.

Maj James V. Keifer, USAF, Retired, is a psychological operations staff officer in the Directorate of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, J-9, Headquarters US Special Operations Command. He earned his master's degree in public administration from the University of Oklahoma and is a graduate of PSYOP courses instructed by the US Air Force and Army, the British army, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Major Keifer's career has included experience in space operations, audiovisual media production and management, and public affairs.

Dr Carnes Lord earned PhD degrees from both Yale and Cornell Universities. He has been a distinguished fellow at the

National Defense University, an assistant to the vice president for National Security Affairs, and a foreign affairs officer with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He has had consultant and director positions at the National Security Council and at the National Institute for Public Policy. Dr Lord's assignments at universities and colleges have been as assistant professor in the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, instructor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, and lecturer in the Departments of Classics and Political Science at Yale University.

Ronald D., McLaurin is a research scientist, American Institute for Research. His previous positions include assistant for Africa, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) and management assistant, Office of the Secretary of Defense. McLaurin is the author and contributor to studies on the analysis of foreign policy, international politics, and social and international conflict.

James Melnich is an analyst, Soviet Internal Affairs, Defense Intelligence Agency. He holds an MA degree from Harvard University. Melnich formerly served as director, Russian Émigré Center in Chicago.

Michael A. Morris is a fellow at the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. He formerly served on the faculty at Gallaudet University.

Laurence J. Orzell served as European branch chief, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, 1st Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He taught European and American history at Marywood College and the University of Scranton. Orzell's publications on Polish history and immigrants have appeared in *Polish Review, Mid America,* and *Polish American Studies.*

Lt Col John Ozaki, USA, is a career military officer assigned to the Department of Army. He has served with the Army Security Agency, Headquarters 7th Army, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and in the infantry in Korea. Colonel

Ozaki is a graduate of Army Command and General Staff College.

Col Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., USA, Retired, served three combat tours with Special Forces units in Southeast Asia and held positions on the faculties of Army Command and General Staff College and Army War College. Other assignments include the Department of the Army Staff and the Secretary's Policy Planning Staff, Department of State. Colonel Paddock was commander of both the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion and the 4th Psychological Operations Group, and was director for Psychological Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense. He earned his MA and PhD degrees from Duke University and is author of U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins.

Gen Richard G. Stilwell (1917-91), USA, Retired, served in a number of key military and civilian positions throughout his professional life. He was commandant of cadets at the US Military Academy, commander of the 1st Armored Division and the 24th Army Corps, Vietnam, and chief of staff for General Westmoreland. As a civilian, the late General Stilwell served as under secretary of defense for policy and chairman of the DOD Security Review Commission.

Col Fred W. Walker (1942-90), USAF, Retired, was the first chief of the Psychological Operations Directorate, J-9, United States Special Operations Command. The late Colonel Walker was a pilot, parachutist, and past chief, PSYOP Division, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. An author and speaker on special operations throughout DOD, he was a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College, Air War College, and the US Air Force Academy.

Col Dennis P. Walko, USA, master parachutist and licensed professional engineer, is chief of the Command Support and Coordination Division, Directorate of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, J-9, Headquarters US Special Operations Command. He has served in the Civil Affairs-PSYOP Exchange Office to the Colombian Army General Staff, as civic action

coordinator to the El Salvador Combined General Staff, and as commander of the 1st Psychological Operations Battalion. Colonel Walko is a graduate of Command and General Staff College and the Inter-American Defense College.

Lt Gen Samuel V. Wilson, USA, Retired, is president, Blackburn College, Carlinville, Illinois. Before his retirement in August 1977, he had served in combat during World War II with the Office of Strategic Services, in the 1944 North Burma Campaign with "Merrill's Marauders," with the US Defense Attaché/Moscow, in Vietnam as associate director for field **operations at the US Agency for International Development and, later, as US mission coordinator and minister-counselor for the US Embassy in Saigon. General Wilson has been Special Forces Group commander; assistant commandant of the Army's Special Warfare School; deputy assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations; deputy to the director of Central Intelligence; director, Defense Intelligence Agency; adjunct professor of political science, Hampden-Sydney College; chairman, Military Board of Virginia; chairman of the Secretary of Defense's Special Operations Policy Advisory Group; staff consultant to House and Senate Armed Services Committees; advisor on foreign technology, Los Alamos National Laboratory; and senior consultant at the Betac Corporation, Arlington, Virginia.**

Lev Yudovich, born and educated in the USSR, emigrated in 1977 to the West. He is an international author of numerous articles on Soviet political and military subjects. He was a platoon and company commander in the Red Army during World War II and a former practicing defense attorney in Moscow. Yudovich has served on the staff of the US Army Russian Institute as professor of military and political science. He has written more than 200 articles for "Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe" on Soviet political, military, and economic policy.

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Psychological Warfare

by Paul M. A. Linebarger

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Psychological Warfare

By
PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER
School of Advanced International Studies

DUELL, SLOAN AND PEARCE
NEW YORK

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MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR
GENEVIEVE, MY WIFE,

WITH LOVE

Preface to the Second Edition

The present edition of this work has been modified to meet the needs of the readers of the mid-1950s. The material in the first edition following page 244 has been removed; it consisted of a chapter hopefully called "Psychological Warfare and Disarmament." A new Part Four, comprising three fresh chapters, has been added, representing some of the problems confronting students and operators in this field. Pages 1-243 are a reprint from the first edition.

This edition, like the first, is the product of field experience. The author has made nine trips abroad, five of them to the Far East, since 1949. He has profited by his meeting with such personalities as Sir Henry Gurney, the British High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya, who was later murdered by the Communists, meetings with Philippine, Republic of Korea, Chinese Nationalist, captured Chinese Communist and other personalities, as well as by association with such veterans in the field as General MacArthur's chief psywar expert, Colonel J. Woodall Greene. To Colonel Joseph I. Greene, who died in 1953, the author is indebted as friend and colleague. He owes much to the old friends, listed in the original acknowledgment, who offered their advice and comment in many instances.

Many readers of the first edition wrote helpful letters of comment. Some of their suggestions have been incorporated here. The translators of the two Argentine editions of this book; the translator of the Japanese edition, the Hon. Suma Yokachiro; and the translator of the first and second Chinese editions, Mr. Ch'ên En-ch'êng—all of them

have made direct or indirect improvements in the content or style of the work.

The author also wishes to thank his former student, later his former ORO colleague, now his wife, Dr. Genevieve Linebarger, for her encouragement and her advice.

The author hopes that, as U. S. agencies and other governments move toward a more settled definition of doctrine in this field, a third edition—a few years from now—may be able to reflect the maturation of psywar in international affairs. He does not consider the time appropriate for a fundamental restatement of doctrine; he hopes that readers who have suggestions for future definitions of scope, policy, or operations can communicate these to him for inclusion in later printings of this book.

P.M.A.L.

3 August 1954

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book is the product of experience rather than research, of consultation rather than reading. It is based on my five years of work, both as civilian expert and as Army officer, in American psychological warfare facilities—at every level from the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff planning phase down to the preparing of spot leaflets for the American forces in China. Consequently, I have tried to avoid making this an original book, and have sought to incorporate those concepts and doctrines which found readiest acceptance among the men actually doing the job. The responsibility is therefore mine, but not the credit.

Psychological warfare involves exciting wit-sharpening work. It tends to attract quick-minded people—men full of ideas. I have talked about psychological warfare with all sorts of people, all the way from Mr. Mao Tse-tung in Yenan and Ambassador Joseph Davies in Washington to an engineer corporal in New Zealand and the latrine-coolie, second class, at our Chungking headquarters. I have seen one New York lawyer get mentally befuddled and another New York lawyer provide the solution, and have seen Pulitzer Prize winners run out of ideas only to have the stenographers supply them. From all these people I have tried to learn, and have tried to make this book a patchwork of enthusiastic recollection. Fortunately, the material is non-copyright; unfortunately, I cannot attribute most of these comments or inventions to their original proponents. Perhaps this is just as well: some authors might object to being remembered.

A few indebtednesses stand out with such clarity as to make acknowledgment a duty. These I wish to list, with the caution that this list is not inclusive.

First of all, I am indebted to my father, Judge Paul M. W. Linebarger (1871-1939), who during his lifetime initiated me into almost every phase of international political warfare, whether covert or overt, in connection with his life-long activities on behalf of Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Nationalists. On a limited budget (for years, out of his own pocket) he ran campaigns against imperialism and communism, and for Sino-American friendship and Chinese democracy, in four or five languages at a time. For five and a half years I was his secretary, and believe that this experience has kept me from making this a book of exclusively American doctrine. There is no better way to learn the propaganda job than to be whipped thoroughly by someone else's propaganda.

Second only to my debt to my father, my obligation to the War Department General Staff officers detailed to Psychological Warfare stands forth. By sheer good fortune, the United States had an unbroken succession of intelligent, conscientious, able men assigned to this vital post, and it was my own good luck to serve under each of them in turn between 1942 and 1947. They are, in order of assignment: Colonel Percy W. Black, Brigadier General Oscar N. Solbert, Colonel Charles Blakeney, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Alexander Holmes Thomson, Colonel John Stanley, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hirsch, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Buttles, Colonel Dana Johnston, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Tatum, and Lieutenant Colonel Wesley Edwards. Their talents and backgrounds were diverse but their ability was uniformly high. I do not attribute this to the peculiar magic of Psychological Warfare, nor to unwonted prescience on the part of The Adjutant General, but to plain good luck.

Especial thanks are due to the following friends, who have read this manuscript in whole or in part. I have dealt independently with the comments and criticism, so that none of them can be blamed for the final form of the book. These are Dr. Edward K. Merat, the Columbia-trained MIS propaganda analyst; Mr. C. A. H. Thomson, State Department international information consultant and Brookings Institution staff member; Professor E. P. Lilly of Catholic University and concurrently Psychological Warfare historian to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Lieutenant Colonel Innes Randolph; Lieutenant Colonel Heber Blankenhorn, the only American to have served as a Psychological Warfare officer in both World Wars; Dr. Alexander M. Leighton, M.D., the psychiatrist and anthropologist who as a Navy lieutenant commander headed the OWI-MIS Foreign Morale Analysis Division in wartime; Mr. Richard Hirsch; Colonel Donald Hall, without whose encouragement I would never have finished this book; Professor George S. Pettee, whose experience in strategic intelligence lent special weight to his comment; Colonel Dana Johnston; Mr. Martin Herz, who may some day give the world the full account of the mysterious Yakzif operations; and Mrs. M. S. Linebarger.

Further, I must thank several of my associates in the propaganda agencies whose thinking proved most stimulating to mine. Mr. Geoffrey Gorer was equally brilliant as colleague and as ally. Dean Edwin Guthrie brought insights to Psychological Warfare which were as much the reflection of a judicious, humane personality as of preeminent psychological scholarship. Professor W. A. Aiken, himself a historian, provided data on the early history of U. S. facilities in World War II. Mr. F. M. Fisher and Mr. Richard Watts, Jr., of the OWI China Outpost, together with their colleagues, taught me a great deal by letting me share some of their tasks and my immediate chief in China, Colonel Joseph K. Dickey, was kind to allow a member of his

small, overworked staff to give time to Psychological Warfare. Messrs. Herbert Little, John Creedy and C. A. Pearce have told me wonderful stories about their interesting end of propaganda. Mr. Joseph C. Grew, formerly Under Secretary of State and Ambassador to Japan, showed me that the processes of traditional responsible diplomacy include many skills which Psychological Warfare rediscovers crudely and in different form.

Finally, I wish to thank Colonel Joseph I. Greene in his triple role of editor, publisher and friend, to whom this volume owes its actual being.

While this material has been found unobjectionable on the score of security by the Department of the Army, it certainly does not represent Department of the Army policy, views, or opinion, nor is the Department responsible for matters of factual accuracy. I assume sole and complete responsibility for this book and would be glad to hear the comment or complaint of any reader. My address is indicated below.

PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER

2831 29th Street N.W.
Washington 8, D. C.
20 June 1947

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PART ONE
DEFINITION AND HISTORY

CHAPTER 1
Historic Examples of Psychological Warfare

Psychological warfare is waged before, during, and after war; it is not waged against the opposing psychological warfare operators; it is not controlled by the laws, usages, and customs of war; and it cannot be defined in terms of terrain, order of battle, or named engagements. It is a continuous process. Success or failure is often known only months or years after the execution of the operation. Yet success, though incalculable, can be overwhelming; and failure, though undetectable, can be mortal.

Psychological warfare does not fit readily into familiar concepts of war. Military science owes much of its precision and definiteness to its dealing with a well defined subject, the application of organized lawful violence. The officer or soldier can usually undertake his task of applying mass violence without having to determine upon the enemy. The opening of war, recognition of neutrals, the listing of enemies, proclamation of peace—such problems are considered political, and outside the responsibility of the soldier. Even in the application of force short of war, the

soldier proceeds only when the character of the military operation is prescribed by higher (that is, political) authorities, and after the enemies are defined by lawful and authoritative command. In one field only, psychological warfare, is there endless uncertainty as to the very nature of the operation.

Psychological warfare, by the nature of its instruments and its mission, begins long before the declaration of war. Psychological warfare continues after overt hostilities have stopped. The enemy often avoids identifying himself in psychological warfare; much of the time, he is disguised as the voice of home, of God, of the church, of the friendly press. Offensively, the psychological warfare operator must fight antagonists who never answer back—the enemy audience. He cannot fight the one enemy who is in plain sight, the hostile psychological warfare operator, because the hostile operator is greedily receptive to attack. Neither success nor defeat are measurable factors. Psychological strategy is planned along the edge of nightmare.

The Understanding Of Psychological Warfare.

In a formal approach to this mysterious part of the clean-cut process of war, it might be desirable to start with Euclidian demonstrations, proceeding from definition to definition until the subject-matter had been delimited by logic. Alternatively it might be interesting to try a historical approach, describing the development of psychological warfare through the ages.

The best approach is perhaps afforded by a simplification of both a logical and historical approach. For concrete examples it is most worthwhile to look at instances of psychological warfare taken out of history down to World War II. Then the definitions and working relationships can be

traced and—with these in mind—a somewhat more detailed and critical appraisal of World Wars I and II organizations and operations can be undertaken. If a historian or philosopher picks up this book, he will find much with which to quarrel, but for the survey of so hard-to-define a subject, this may be a forgivable fault.

Figure 1: A Basic Form of Propaganda. This American leaflet, issued during the Philippine landings, was dropped on inhabited Philippine areas in order to obtain local civilian cooperation with the landing forces. It can be called the "civilian-action" type.

Psychological warfare and propaganda are each as old as mankind; but it has taken modern specialization to bring them into focus as separate subjects. The materials for their history lie scattered through thousands of books and it is therefore impossible to brief them. Any reader contemplating retirement from the army to a sedentary life is urged to take up this subject.[1] A history of propaganda would provide not only a new light on many otherwise odd or trivial historical events; it would throw genuine illumination on the process of history itself. There are however numerous instances which can be cited to show applications of psychological warfare.

The Use Of Panic By Gideon.

One of the earliest (by traditional reckoning, 1245 B.C.) applications was Gideon's use of the lamps and pitchers in the great battle against the Midianites.

The story is told in the seventh chapter of the Book of Judges. Gideon was in a tactically poor position. The Midianites outnumbered him and were on the verge of smiting him very thoroughly. Ordinary combat methods could not solve the situation, so Gideon—acting upon more exalted inspiration than is usually vouchsafed modern commanders—took the technology and military formality of his time into account.

Retaining three hundred selected men, he sought for some device which would cause real confusion in the enemy host. He knew well that the tactics of his time called for every century of men to have one light-carrier and one torch-bearer for the group. By equipping three hundred men with a torch and a trumpet each, he could create the effect of thirty thousand. Since the lights could not be turned on and off with switches, like ours, the pitchers concealed them, thus achieving the effect of suddenness.

Figure 2: Nazi Troop Morale Leaflet. In this leaflet, used on the Italian front in 1944, the Nazis did not call for any specific action from their American GI readers. Their aim was merely depression of American morale for future exploitation by action propaganda. Note the extreme simplicity of the message. Throughout World War II, the Nazis were misled by their own tendentious political intelligence reports and consequently overestimated the kind and degree of American opposition to Franklin D. Roosevelt. They mistook normal complaint for treasonable sedition; hence, leaflets such as this seemed practical to the Germans.



Figure 3: One of the Outstanding Leaflets of the War. Prepared in 1945 for distribution by B-29s operating over Japan, this leaflet lists eleven Japanese cities which were marked for destruction. The leaflet is apparently of the civilian-action type, calling on Japanese civilians to save their own lives. At the same time, it had the effect of shutting down eleven strategically important cities, thus hurting the Japanese war effort while giving the

Americans a reputation for humanity and also refuting enemy charges that we undertook indiscriminate bombing.

Figure 4: The Pass Which Brought them in. Germans liked things done in an official and formal manner, even in the midst of chaos, catastrophe and defeat. The Allies obliged, and gave the Germans various forms of very official-looking "surrender passes," of which this is one. The original is printed in red and has banknote-type engraving which makes it resemble a soap-premium coupon. (Western Front, 1944-45, issued by SHAEF.)

He had his three hundred men equipped with lamps and pitchers. The lamps were concealed in the pitchers, each man carrying one, along with a trumpet. He lined his forces in appropriate disposition around the enemy camp at night and had them—himself setting the example—break the pitchers all at the same time, while blowing like mad on the trumpets.

The Midianites were startled out of their sleep and their wits. They fought one another throughout their own camp. The Hebrew chronicler modestly gives credit for this to the Lord. Then the Midianites gave up altogether and fled. And the men of Israel pursued after the Midianites.[2] That settled the Midianite problem for a while; later Gideon finished Midian altogether.

This type of psychological warfare device—the use of unfamiliar instruments to excite panic—is common in the history of all ancient countries. In China, the Emperor-usurper Wang Mang on one occasion tried to destroy the Hunnish tribes with an army that included heavy detachments of military sorcerers, even though the Han Military Emperor had found orthodox methods the most reliable; Wang Mang got whipped at this. But he was an incurable innovator and in 23 A.D., while trying to put down some highly successful rebels, he collected all the animals out of the Imperial menagerie and sent them along to scare the enemy: tigers, rhinoceri, and elephants were included. The rebels hit first, killing the Imperial General Wang Sun, and in the excitement the animals got loose in the Imperial army where they panicked the men. A hurricane which happened to be raging at the same time enhanced the excitement. Not only were the Imperial troops defeated, but the military propaganda of the rebels was so jubilant in tone and so successful in effect that the standard propaganda theme, "Depress and unnerve the enemy commander," was fulfilled almost to excess on Wang Mang. Here is what happened to him after he noted the progress of the enemy: "A profound melancholy fell upon the Emperor. It undermined his health. He drank to excess, ate nothing but oysters, and let everything happen by chance. Unable to stretch out, he slept sitting up on a bench."[3] Wang Mang was killed in the same year, and China remained without another economic new deal until the time of Wang An-shih (A.D. 1021-1086), a thousand years later. Better psychological warfare would have changed history.

Field Propaganda Of The Athenians And The Han.

A more successful application of psychological warfare is recorded in the writings of Herodotus, the Greek historian:

> Themistocles, having selected the best sailing ships of the Athenians, went to the place where there was water fit for drinking, and engraved upon the stones inscriptions, which the Ionians, upon arriving the next day at Artemisium, read. The inscriptions were to this effect, 'Men of Ionia, you do wrong in fighting against your fathers and helping to enslave Greece. Rather, therefore, come over to us or if you cannot do that, withdraw your forces from the contest and entreat the Carians to do the same. But if neither of these things is possible, and you are bound by too strong a necessity, yet in action, when we are engaged, behave ill on purpose, remembering that you are descended from us and that the enmity of the barbarians against us originally sprang from you.'[4]

This text is very much like leaflets dropped during World War II on reluctant enemies, such as the Italians, the Chinese puppet troops, and others. (Compare this Greek text with *Figure 5*.) Note that the propagandist tries to see things from the viewpoint of his audience. His air of reasonable concern for their welfare creates a bond of sympathy. And by suggesting that the Ionians should behave badly in combat, he lays the beginning of another line—the propaganda to the Persians, "black" propaganda making the Persians think that any Ionian who was less than perfect was a secret Athenian sympathizer. The appeal is sound by all modern standards of the combat-leaflet.

Another type of early military propaganda was the political denunciation which, issued at the beginning of war, could be cited from then on as legal and ethical justification for one side or the other. In the Chinese *San Kuo* novel, which has probably been read by more human beings than any other work of fiction, there is preserved the alleged text of the proclamation of a group of loyalist pro-Han rebels on the eve of military operations (about A.D. 200). The text is interesting because it combines the following techniques, all of them sound: 1) naming the specific enemy; 2) appeal to the "better people"; 3) sympathy for the common people; 4) claim of support for the legitimate government; 5) affirmation of one's own strength and high morale; 6)

invocation of unity; 7) appeal to religion. The issuance of the proclamation was connected with rather elaborate formal ceremony:

> The House of Han has fallen upon evil days, the bonds of Imperial authority are loosened. The rebel minister, Tung Cho, takes advantage of the discord to work evil, and calamity falls upon honorable families. Cruelty overwhelms simple folk. We, Shao and his confederates, fearing for the safety of the imperial prerogatives, have assembled military forces to rescue the State. We now pledge ourselves to exert our whole strength, and to act in concord to the utmost limit of our powers. There must be no disconcerted or selfish action. Should any depart from this pledge may he lose his life and leave no posterity. Almighty Heaven and Universal Mother Earth and the enlightened spirits of our forefathers, be ye our witnesses.[5]

Any history of any country will yield further examples of this kind of material. Whenever it was consciously used as an adjunct to military operations, it may appropriately be termed military propaganda.

Figure 5: Revolutionary Propaganda. When revolution favors one side or the other in war, revolutionary propaganda becomes an instrument which is used by one constituted government against another. This leaflet was issued by the Azad Hind Fauj (Free India Army) of the Japanese puppet Subhas Chandra Bose. (Singapore, then called Shonan, 1943 and 1944.) The leaflet avoids direct

reference to the Japanese, and is therefore "block" propaganda. Its theme is simple: the British are alleged to eat while the Hindus starve. At the time, this argument had some plausibility. There was famine in Bengal, but no white men were found among the thousands of emaciated dead.

Emphasis on Ideology.

In a sense, the experience of the past may, unfortunately, provide a clue to the future. The last two great wars have shown an increasing emphasis on ideology or political faith (see definition, page 30 below) as driving forces behind warfare, rather than the considerations of coldly calculated diplomacy. Wars become more serious, and less gentlemanly; the enemy must be taken into account not merely as a man, but as a fanatic. To the normal group-loyalty of any good soldier to his army, right or wrong, there is added the loyalty to the Ism or the Leader. Warfare thus goes back to the Wars of Faith. It is possible that techniques from the Christian-Mohammedan or from the Protestant-Catholic wars of the past could be reëxamined with a view to establishing those parts of their tested experience which may seem to be psychologically and militarily sound in our own time. How fast can converts be made from the other side? In what circumstances should an enemy word of honor be treated as valid? How can heretics (today, read "subversive elements") be uprooted? Does the enemy faith have weak points which permit enemy beliefs to be turned against personnel at the appropriate times? What unobjectionable forms should leaflets and broadcasts follow in mentioning subjects which are reverenced by the enemy but not by ourselves?

Figure 6: Propaganda for Illiterates. Propaganda reached out for the mass audience in World War II. Some of the most interesting developments in this line were undertaken by CBI Theater facilities and their Japanese competitors. The leaflet shown above is designed to tell its story in Hindustani (Devanagari script) or in Romanized Hindustani to Indians who could read either form, and in pictures to the illiterates. It starts with the Union Jack and ends with the Congress flag used by the puppet pro-Japanese Indian leader, Subhas Chandra Bose.

Figure 7: Propaganda Through News. News is one of the best carriers of psychological warfare to the enemy. One of these

newspapers is directed by the Allies to the German troops in the Ægean Islands; the other by the Germans to the Americans in France. Of the two, the Allied paper (in German) is the more professional job. Note the separation of appeals from the news, the greater newsiness of the news columns, and the explanation provided for third-party civilians in their own Greek language (top right).

The expansion of the Islamic Faith-and-Empire provides a great deal of procedural information which cannot be neglected in our time. It has been said that men's faith should not be destroyed by violence, and that force alone is insufficient to change the minds of men. If this were true, it would mean that Germany can never be de-Nazified, and that there is no hope that the democratic peoples captured by totalitarian powers can adjust themselves to their new overlords or, if adjusted, can be converted back to free principles. In reality warfare by Mohammed's captains and successors demonstrated two principles of long-range psychological warfare which are still valid today:

A people can be converted from one faith to the other if given the choice between conversion and extermination, stubborn individuals being rooted out. To effect the initial conversion, participation in the public ceremonies and formal language of the new faith must be required. Sustained counterintelligence must remain on the alert against backsliders, but formal acceptance will become genuine acceptance if all public media of expression are denied the vanquished faith.

If immediate wholesale conversion would require military operations that were too extensive or severe, the same result can be effected by toleration of the objectionable faith, combined with the issuance of genuine privileges to the new, preferred faith. The conquered people are left in the private, humble enjoyment of their old beliefs and folkways; but all participation in public life, whether political, cultural or economic, is conditioned on acceptance of the

new faith. In this manner, all up-rising members of the society will move in a few generations over to the new faith in the process of becoming rich, powerful, or learned; what is left of the old faith will be a gutter superstition, possessing neither power nor majesty.

These two rules worked once in the rise of Islam. They were applied again by Nazi overlords during World War II, the former in Poland, the Ukraine and Byelorussia, the latter in Holland, Belgium, Norway and other Western countries. The rules will probably be seen in action again. The former process is difficult and bloody, but quick; the latter is as sure as a steam-roller. If Christians, or democrats, or progressives—whatever free men may be called—are put in a position of underprivilege and shame for their beliefs, and if the door is left open to voluntary conversion, so that anyone who wants to can come over to the winning side, the winning side will sooner or later convert almost everyone who is capable of making trouble. (In the language of Vilfredo Pareto, this would probably be termed "capture of the rising elite"; in the language of present-day Marxists, this would be described as "utilization of potential leadership cadres from historically superseded classes"; in the language of practical politics, it means "cut in the smart boys from the opposition, so that they can't set up a racket of their own.")



Figure 8: One of the Mongol Secret Weapons. The Mongol conquerors used rumor and terror in order to increase their military effectiveness. Once they came to power, they used spectacular military displays as a means of intimidating conquered peoples. This old French engraving shows a war-howdah mounted on four elephants allegedly used by Kublai Khan, grandnephew to Genghis Khan and friend of Marco Polo the Venetian. Obviously impractical for field use, the vehicle is well suited for ceremonial display and mere mention of it is a factor for "warfare psychologically waged."

The Black Propaganda Of Genghis Khan.

Another demonstration of psychological warfare in the past was so effective that its results linger to this day. It is commonly thought that the greatest conqueror the world has seen—Temujin, the Genghis Khan—effected his Mongol conquests with "limitless hordes" of wild Tatar horsemen, who flooded the world by weight of sheer numbers. Recent research shows that the sparsely settled countryside of Inner Asia could not have produced populations heavy enough to overwhelm the densely settled areas of the great Mongol periphery by weight alone. The empire of the Khan was built on bold military inventiveness—the use of highly mobile forces, the full use of intelligence, the coordination of half-global strategy, the application of propaganda in all its forms.[6] The Mongols were fighting the Sung Dynasty in

China and the Holy Roman Empire in Prussia four thousand miles apart when neither of their adversaries knew (in more than rumor) that the other existed. The Mongols used espionage to plan their campaigns and deliberately used rumor and other means to exaggerate accounts of their own huge numbers, stupidity, and ferocity. They did not care what their enemies thought as long as the enemies became frightened. Europeans described light, hard-hitting *numerically inferior* cavalry as a "numberless horde" because Mongol agents whispered such a story in the streets. To this day most Europeans do not appreciate the lightness of the forces nor the cold intelligence of command with which the Mongols hit them seven centuries ago.

Genghis even used the spies of the enemy as a means of frightening the enemy. When spies were at hand he indoctrinated them with rumors concerning his own forces. Let the first European biographer of Genghis tell, in his own now-quaint words, how Genghis put the bee on Khorezm (Carizme):

> And a Historian, to describe their Strength and Number, makes the Spies whom the King of *Carizme* had sent to view them, speak thus: They are, say they to the Sultan, all compleat Men, vigorous, and look like Wrestlers; they breathe nothing but War and Blood, and show so great an Impatience to fight, that the Generals can scarce moderate it; yet though they appear thus fiery, they keep themselves within the bounds of a strict Obedience to Command, and are intirely devoted to their Prince; they are contented with any sort of Food, and are not curious in the choice of Beasts to eat, like Mussulmen [Mohammedans], so that they are subsisted without much trouble; and they not only eat Swines-Flesh, but feed upon Wolves, Bears, and Dogs, when they have no other Meat, making no distinction between what was lawful to eat, and what was forbidden; and the Necessity for supporting Life takes from them all the Dislike which the *Mahometans* have for many sorts of Animals; As to their Number, (they concluded) *Genghizcan's* Troops seem'd like the Grasshoppers, impossible to be number'd.
>
> In reality, this Prince making a Review of his Army, found it to consist of seven hundred thousand men....[7]

Enemy espionage can now—as formerly—prove useful if the net effect of it is to lower enemy morale. The ruler and people of Khorezm put up a terrific fight, nevertheless, despite their expectation of being attacked by wolf-eating wrestlers without number; but they left the initiative in Genghis' hands and were doomed.

However good the Mongols were in strategic and tactical propaganda, they never solved the problem of consolidation propaganda (see page 46, below). They did not win the real loyalty of the peoples whom they conquered; unlike the Chinese, who replaced conquered populations with their own people, or the Mohammedans, who converted conquered peoples, the Mongols simply maintained law and order, collected taxes, and sat on top of the world for a few generations. Then their world stirred beneath them, and they were gone.

The Blindness Of John Milton.

Moving across the centuries for an example, it is interesting to note that John Milton, author of *Paradise Lost* and of other priceless books of the English-speaking world, went blind because he was so busy conducting Oliver Cromwell's psychological warfare that he disregarded the doctors' warning and abused his ailing sight. And the sad thing about it was that it was not very good psychological warfare.

Milton fell into the common booby-trap of refuting his opponents item by item, thus leaving them the strong affirmative position, instead of providing a positive and teachable statement of his own faith. He was Latin Secretary to the Council, in that Commonwealth of England which was—to its contemporaries in Europe—such a novel, dreadful, and seditious form of government. The English had killed their king, by somewhat offhanded legal procedures,

and had gone under the Cromwellian dictatorship. It was possible for their opponents to attack them from two sides at once. Believers in monarchy could call the English murderous king-killers (a charge as serious in those times as the charge of anarchism or free love in this); believers in order and liberty could call the British slaves of a tyrant. A Frenchman called Claude de Saumaise (in Latin form, Salmasius) wrote a highly critical book about the English, and Milton seems to have lost his temper and his judgment.

In his two books against Salmasius, Milton then committed almost every mistake in the whole schedule of psychological warfare. He moved from his own ground of argument over to the enemy's. He wrote at excessive length. He indulged in some of the nastiest name-calling to be found in literature, and went into considerable detail to describe Salmasius in unattractive terms. He slung mud whenever he could. The books are read today, under compulsion, by Ph.D. candidates, but no one else is known to find them attractive. It is not possible to find that these books had any lasting influence in their own time. (In these texts written by Milton in Latin but now available in English, Army men wearying of the monotonous phraseology of basic military invective can find extensive additions to their vocabulary.) Milton turned to disappointment and poetry; the world is the gainer.

The vocabulary of seventeenth-century propaganda had a strident tone which is, perhaps unfortunately, getting to be characteristic of the twentieth century. The following epithets sound like an American Legion description of Communists, or a Communist description of the Polish democrats, yet they were applied in a book by a Lutheran to Quakers. The title of the tirade reads, in part:

> ... a description of the ... new Quakers, making known the sum of their manifold blasphemous opinions, dangerous practices, Godless crimes, attempts to subvert civil government in the churches and in

> the community life of the world; together with their idiotic games, their laughable action and behavior, which is enough to make sober Christian persons breathless, and which is like death, and which can display the lazy stinking cadaver of their fanatical doctrines....

In its first few pages, the book accuses the Quakers of obscenity, adultery, civil commotion, conspiracy, blasphemy, subversion and lunacy.[8] Milton was not out of fashion in applying bad manners to propaganda. It is merely regrettable that he did not transcend the frailties of his time.

Other Instances From History.

Innumerable other instances of propaganda in warfare and diplomacy could be culled out of history; these would not mean much if they were presented as mere story-telling. The cultural factors would have to be figured out; the military situation would need to be appraised in realistic terms; the media available for psychological warfare would have to be charted pretty carefully, before the instances would become usable examples. Here are some of the most promising topics:

- Naval psychological warfare techniques used by the Caribbean pirates to unnerve prospective victims.
- Cortez's use of horses as psychological disseminators of terror among the Aztecs, along with his exploitation of Mexican legends concerning the Fair God.
- The failure of Turkish psychological warfare in the great campaigns of 1683 which left the issue one of purely physical means and cost Turkey the possible hegemony of central Europe.
- The propaganda methods of the British East India Company in the conquest of India against overwhelming

Indian numerical superiority. (Edmond Taylor mentions these in his *Richer by Asia*.)

The preventive psychological warfare system set up by the Tokugawa shoguns after 1636, which bottled up the brains of the Japanese through more rigorous control than has ever been established elsewhere over civilized people.

The field psychological warfare of the Manchus, who conquered China against odds running as much as 400 to one against them, and who used terror as a means of nullifying Chinese superiority.

The propaganda of the European feudal classes against the peasant revolts, which identified the peasants with filth, anarchy, murder, and cruelty.

The Inquisition considered as a psychological warfare facility of the Spanish Empire.

The agitational practices of the French Revolutionaries.

Early uses of rockets and balloons for psychological effect.

The beginnings of leaflet-printing as an adjunct to field operations.

Such a list just begins to touch on subjects which can and should be investigated, either as staff studies or by civilian historians. Collection of the materials and framing of sound doctrines for psychological warfare are no minor task.

THE
Sad Estate
OF THE
KINGDOM,

Figure 9: Black Propaganda from the British Underground, 1690. When William of Orange took the crown of England away from the timid rascal, James II, he met opposition from the Loyalists devoted to the Stuarts. This broadsheet demonstrates an early form of black propaganda. It also provides a good instance of propaganda material borrowing a familiar form of expression in order to get its message across, in this case, the tradesman's enumeration of debit and credit.

Address to the Soldiers.

AN OLD SOLDIER.

Figure 10: Secret American Propaganda Subverting the Redcoats. Readers of Charles Dickens' great novel, *Barnaby Rudge*, will remember that anti-Catholicism was a lively

propaganda issue in England at the time of the American Revolution. This American propaganda avoids discussion of the theme of American independence—a topic on which Englishmen were liable to hold united opinions—and instead attempts to subvert British troops by means of the anti-Catholic appeal. (Original source unknown; from War Department files. Probable date, 1775.)

PROSPECT HILL.

I. Seven Dollars a Month. — —
II. Fresh Provisions, and in Plenty. — —
III. Health. — — — —
IV. Freedom, Eafe, Affluence and a good Farm.

BUNKER'S HILL.

I. Three Pence a Day.
II. Rotten Salt Pork.
III. The Scurvy.
IV. Slavery, Beggary and Want.

Figure 11: Desertion Leaflet from Bunker Hill. This leaflet is as valid today as the day it was written. No source is indicated, but neither is any attempt made to suggest a false source different from the true one; it is in modern parlance "grey" propaganda. Wealth, food, health and economic status are played up simultaneously; difficult political issues are not argued—they are sidestepped.

The American Revolution.

In the American Revolution, psychological warfare played a very important role. The Whig campaign of propaganda which led up to colonial defiance of Britain was energetic and expert in character, and the very opening of hostilities was marked by passionate appeals to the civilian population in the form of handbills. The American forces at the Battle of Bunker Hill used one of the earliest versions of front-line combat propaganda (see Figure 11). The appeal was as direct as could be wished. Artful use was made of the sharp class distinctions then existing between British officers and enlisted men; fear was exploited as an aid to persuasion; the language was pointed. Even in our own time, the Bunker Hill propaganda leaflet stands as a classic example of how to do good field propaganda.

The Americans made extensive use of the press.[9] When the newspaper proprietors veered too far to the Loyalist side, they were warned to keep to a more Patriotic line. If, in the face of counter-threats from the Loyalists, the newspaper threatened going out of business altogether, it was warned that suspension of publication would be taken as treason to America. The Whigs, before hostilities, and their successors, the Patriots of the war period, showed a keen interest in keeping the press going and in making sure that their side of the story got out and got circulated rapidly. In intimidation and control of the press, they far outdistanced the British, whose papers circulated chiefly within the big cities held as British citadels throughout the war. Political reasoning, economic arguments, allegations concerning the course of the war, and atrocity stories all played a role.

Figure 12: Money as a Carrier of Propaganda. The note on the left above is French revolutionary currency; observe the use of revolutionary slogans. Next to it is the famous Russian 10,000 ruble bill which calls for the world revolution in seven languages. The Japanese peso note (at top of page 22) carries American propaganda on the reverse; captured notes were overprinted by Psychological Warfare Branch during the Philippine campaign and

dropped back on the enemy. The two five-rupee notes date from the Japanese occupation of Burma. The lower of the two was issued by Americans as a means of deriding the Japanese.

George Washington himself, as commander of the Continental forces, showed a keen interest in war propaganda and in his just, moderate political and military measures provided a policy base from which Patriot propagandists could operate.

Some wars are profoundly affected by a book written on one side or the other; the American revolutionary war was one of these. Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* (issued as a widely sold series of pamphlets) swept American opinion like wildfire; it stated some of the fundamentals of American thinking, and put its bold but reasonable revolutionary case in such simple terms that even conservatives in the Patriot group could not resist using it for propaganda purposes.[10] *Common Sense* has become a classic of American literature, but it has its place in history too, as "the book that won the war." Other pamphleteers, with the redoubtable Sam Adams in the lead, also did well.

American experience in the Mexican war was less glorious. The Mexicans waged psychological warfare against us with considerable effect, ending up with traitor American artillerymen dealing out heavy murder to the American troops outside Mexico city. Historians in both countries gloss over the treason and subversion which occurred on each side.

In the Civil War, psychological warfare was practised by both Lincoln and the Confederacy in establishing propaganda instrumentalities in England and on the continent of Europe. The Northern use of Negro troops, which was followed, at the end of the war by the Confederate plans for raising Negro troops, did not become the major propaganda issue it might have because of the

community of feeling on the two sides, indecision on each side as to the purpose of the war (apart from the basic issue of union or disunion), and the persistence of politics-as-usual both North and South of the battle line.

Boers And Burmese.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, two sets of British wars indicate the effect psychological warfare can play. The British conquered both Burma and the Boers. The Burmese were more numerous, had the larger country, and (if they had had leadership comparable to the Japanese leadership of the time) could have developed the larger military potential. But Burma was conquered by the British in a final war which went on quietly and ingloriously. No nation came to their aid. They did not even get a chance to surrender. The British simply ended the war in the middle by announcing the end of the Burmese government, and by making a one-sided declaration that Burma was annexed to the Empire of India. The political death of Burma occurred on 1 January 1886, but the event has been forgotten.

The Boers, on the other hand, made a stir throughout the world. They got in touch with the Germans, Irish, Americans, French, Dutch, and everybody else who might criticize Britain. They stated their case loudly and often. They waged commando warfare, adding the word *commando* to international military parlance, and sent small units deep into the British rear, setting off a mad uproar and making the world press go crazy with excitement. When they finally gave in, it was on reasonable terms for themselves; they left the British with an internationally blacked eye.

Nobody remembered the Burmese; everybody remembered the Boers. The Boers used every means they

could think of; they did everything they could. They even captured Winston Churchill.

These examples may show that the military role of propaganda and related operations is not as obscure or intangible as it may have seemed. They cannot be considered history but must be regarded as a plea for the writing of history. More recent experience is another question, and involves tracing the doctrines pertaining to psychological warfare which have now become established military procedure in the modern armies.

CHAPTER 2
The Function of Psychological Warfare

Psychological warfare in the broad sense, consists of the application of parts of the science called psychology to the conduct of war; in the narrow sense, psychological warfare comprises the use of propaganda against an enemy, together with such military operational measures as may supplement the propaganda. Propaganda may be described, in turn, as organized persuasion by non-violent means. War itself may be considered to be, among other things, a violent form of persuasion. Thus if an American fire-raid burns up a Japanese city, the burning is calculated to dissuade the Japanese from further warfare by denying the Japanese further physical means of war and by simultaneously hurting them enough to cause surrender. If, after the fire-raid, we drop leaflets telling them to surrender, the propaganda can be considered an extension of persuasion—less violent this time, and usually less effective, but nevertheless an integral part of the single process of making the enemy stop fighting.

Neither warfare nor psychology is a new subject. Each is as old as man. Warfare, being the more practical and plain subject, has a far older written history. This is especially the case since much of what is now called psychology was formerly studied under the heading of religion, ethics, literature, politics, or medicine. Modern psychological warfare has become self-conscious in using modern scientific psychology as a tool.

In World War II the enemies of the United States were more fanatical than the people and leaders of the United States. The consequence was that the Americans could use and apply any expedient psychological weapon which either science or our version of common sense provided. We did not have to square it with Emperor myths, the Führer principle or some other rigid, fanatical philosophy. The enemy enjoyed the positive advantage of having an indoctrinated army and people; we enjoyed the countervailing advantage of having skeptical people, with no inward theology that hampered our propaganda operations. It is no negligible matter to be able to use the latest findings of psychological science in a swift, bold manner. The scientific character of our psychology puts us ahead of opponents wrapped up in dogmatism who must check their propaganda against such articles of faith as Aryan racialism or the Hegelian philosophy of history.

Psychological Warfare as a Branch of Psychology.

Good propaganda can be conducted by persons with no knowledge of formal psychology. The human touch, the inventive mind, the forceful appeal—things such as these appear in the writings of gifted persons. Thomas Paine never read a word of Freud or Pavlov, yet Paine's arguments during the Revolutionary War played subtly on every appeal which a modern psychologist could catalogue. But war

cannot, in modern times, assume a statistical expectation of talent. Psychology makes it possible for the able but ordinary statesman or officer to calculate his persuasion systematically and to obtain by planning those results which greater men might hit upon by genius.

What can psychology do for warfare?

In the first place, the psychologist can bring to the attention of the soldier those elements of the human mind which are usually kept out of sight. He can show how to convert lust into resentment, individual resourcefulness into mass cowardice, friction into distrust, prejudice into fury. He does so by going down to the *unconscious* mind for his source materials. (During world War II, the fact that Chinese babies remain unimpeded while they commit a nuisance, while Japanese babies are either intercepted or punished if they make a mess in the wrong place, was found to be of significant importance in planning psychological warfare. See below, page 154.)

In the second place the psychologist can set up techniques for finding out how the enemy really does feel. Some of the worst blunders of history have arisen from miscalculation of the enemy state of mind. By using the familiar statistical and questionnaire procedures, the psychologist can quiz a small cross section of enemy prisoners and from the results estimate the mentality of an entire enemy theater of war at a given period. If he does not have the prisoners handy, he can accomplish much the same end by an analysis of the news and propaganda which the enemy authorities transmit to their own troops and people. By establishing enemy opinion and morale factors he can hazard a reasoned forecast as to how the enemy troops will behave under specific conditions.

In the third place, the psychologist can help the military psychological warfare operator by helping him maintain his

sense of mission and of proportion. The deadliest danger of propaganda consists of its being issued by the propagandist for his own edification. This sterile and ineffectual amusement can disguise the complete failure of the propaganda *as* propaganda. There is a genuine pleasure in talking back, particularly to an enemy. The propagandist, especially in wartime, is apt to tell the enemy what he thinks of him, or to deride enemy weaknesses. But to have told the Nazis, for example, "You Germans are a pack of murderous baboons and your Hitler is a demented oaf. Your women are slobs, your children are halfwits, your literature is gibberish and your cooking is garbage," and so on, would have stiffened the German will to fight. The propagandist must tell the enemy those things which the enemy will heed; he must keep his private emotionalism out of the operation. The psychologist can teach the propaganda operator how to be objective, systematic, cold. For combat operations, it does not matter how much a division commander may dislike the enemy; for psychological warfare purposes, he must consider how to persuade them, even though he may privately thirst for their destruction. The indulgence of hatred is not a working part of the soldier's mission; to some it may be helpful; to others, not. The useful mission consists solely of making the enemy stop fighting, by combat or other means. But when the soldier turns to propaganda, he may need the advice of a psychologist in keeping his own feelings out of it.

Finally, the psychologist can prescribe media—radio, leaflets, loudspeakers, whispering agents, returned enemy soldiers, and so forth. He can indicate when and when not to use any given medium. He can, in conjunction with operations and intelligence officers, plan the full use of all available psychological resources. He can coordinate the timing of propaganda with military, economic or political situations.

The psychologist does not have to be present in person to give this advice. He does not have to be a man with an M.D. or Ph. D. and years of postgraduate training. He can be present in the manuals he writes, in the indoctrination courses for psychological warfare officers he sets up, in the current propaganda line he dictates by radio. It is useful to have him in the field, particularly at the higher command headquarters, but he is not indispensable. The psychologist in person can be dispensed with; the methods of scientific psychology cannot. (Further on, throughout this book, reference will be made to current psychological literature. The general history of psychology is described in readable terms in Gregory Zilboorg and George W. Henry, *A History of Medical Psychology*, New York, 1941, and in Lowell S. Selling, *Men Against Madness*, New York, 1940, cheap edition, 1942.)

Propaganda can be conducted by rule of thumb. But only a genius can make it work well by playing his hunches. It can become true psychological warfare, scientific in spirit and developed as a teachable skill, only by having its premises clearly stated, its mission defined, its instruments put in systematic readiness, and its operations subject to at least partial check, only by the use of techniques borrowed from science. Of all the sciences, psychology is the nearest, though anthropology, sociology, political science, economics, area studies and other specialties all have something to contribute; but it is psychology which indicates the need of the others.

Psychological Warfare as a Part of War.

An infantry officer does not need to study the whole nature of war, in order to find his own job. Tradition, military skill, discipline, sound doctrine—these have done the job for him. Sun Tzu, Vegetius, Frederick, Clausewitz and a host of lesser

writers on war have established the place of combat in war, and have appraised its general character.

How much the traditional doctrines may be altered in the terrible light of atomic explosion, no one knows; but though the weapons are novel, the wielders of the weapons will still be men. The motives and weaknesses within war remain ancient and human, however novel and dreadful the mechanical expedients adopted to express them.

Warfare as a whole is traditionally well defined, and psychological warfare can be understood only in relation to the whole process. It is no mere tool, to be used on special occasion. It has become a pervasive element in the military and security situation of every power on earth.

Psychological warfare is a part of war. The simplest, plainest thing which can be said of war—any sort of war, anywhere, anytime—is that it is *an official fight between men*. Combat, killing, and even large-scale group struggle are known elsewhere in the animal kingdom, but war is not. All sorts of creatures fight; but only men declare, wage, and terminate war; and they do so only against other men.

Formally, war may be defined as the "reciprocal application of violence by public, armed bodies."

If it is not *reciprocal*, it is not war, the killing of persons who do not defend themselves is not war, but slaughter, massacre, or punishment.

If the bodies involved are not *public*, their violence is not war. Even our enemies in World War II were relatively careful about this distinction, because they did not know how soon or easily a violation of the rules might be scored against them. To be public, the combatants need not be legal—that is, constitutionally set up; it suffices, according to international usage, for the fighters to have a reasonable minimum of numbers, some kind of identification, and a

purpose which is political. If you shoot your neighbor, you will be committing mere murder; but if you gather twenty or thirty friends, together, tie a red handkerchief around the left arm of each man, announce that you are out to overthrow the government of the United States, and *then* shoot your neighbor as a counterrevolutionary impediment to the new order of things, you can have the satisfaction of having waged war. (In practical terms, this means that you will be put to death for treason and rebellion, not merely for murder.)

Finally, war must be *violent*. According to the law of modern states, all the way from Iceland to the Yemen, economic, political, or moral pressure is not war; war is the legalization, in behalf of the state, of things which no individual may lawfully do in time of peace. As a matter of fact, even in time of war you cannot kill the enemy unless you do so on behalf of the state; if you had shot a Japanese creditor of yours privately, or even shot a Japanese soldier when you yourself were out of uniform, you might properly and lawfully have been put to death for murder—either by our courts or by the enemies'. (This is among the charges which recur in the war trials. The Germans and Japanese killed persons whom even war did not entitle them to kill.)

The governments of the modern world are jealous of their own monopoly of violence. War is the highest exercise of that violence, and modern war is no simple reversion to savagery. The General Staffs would not be needed if war were only an uncomplicated orgy of homicide—a mere getting-mad and throat-cutting season in the life of man. Quite to the contrary, modern war—as a function of modern society—reflects the institutional, political complexity from which it comes. A modern battle is a formal, ceremonialized and technically intricate operation. You must kill just the right people, in just the right way, with the right timing, in

the proper place, for avowed purposes. Otherwise you make a mess of the whole show, and—what is worse—you lose.

Why must you fight just so and so, there and not here, now and not then? The answer is simple: you are fighting against *men*. Your purpose in fighting is to make them change their minds. It is figuratively true to say that the war we have just won was a peculiar kind of advertising campaign, designed to make the Germans and Japanese like us and our way of doing things. They did not like us much, but we gave them alternatives far worse than liking us, so that they became peaceful.

Sometimes individuals will be unpersuadable. Then they must be killed or neutralized by other purely physical means —such as isolation or imprisonment. (Some Nazis, perhaps including the Führer himself, found our world repellent or incomprehensible and died because they could not make themselves surrender. In the Pacific many Japanese had to be killed before they became acceptable to us.) But such is man, that most individuals will stop fighting at some point short of extinction; that point is reached when one of two things happens:

Either, the defeated people may lose their sense of organization, fail to decide on leaders and methods, and give up because they can no longer fight as a group. This happened to the American Southerners in April, 1865. The President and Cabinet of the Confederate States of America got on the train at Richmond; the men who got off farther down the line were "refugees." Something happened to them and to the people about them, so that Mr. Davis no longer thought of himself as President Davis, and other people no longer accepted his commands. This almost happened in Germany in 1945 except for Admiral Doenitz.

Or, the defeated people can retain their sense of organization, and can use their political organization for the purpose of getting in touch with the enemy, arranging the end of the war, and preparing, through organized means, to comply with the wishes of the conquerors. That happened when Britain acknowledged American independence; when the Boers recognized British sovereignty; when Finland signed what Russia had dictated; and when Japan gave up.

Sometimes these things are mixed. The people might wish to make peace, but may find that their government is not recognized by the enemy. Or the victors may think that they have smashed the enemy government, when the new organization is simply the old one under a slightly different name, but with the old leaders and the old ideas still prevailing.

It is plain that whatever happens wars are fought to effect a psychological change in the antagonist. They are then fought for a psychological end unless they are wars of extermination. These are rare. The United States could not find a people on the face of the earth whose ideas and language were unknown to all Americans. Where there is a chance of communication, there is always the probability that one of the antagonistic organizations (governments)—which have already cooperated to the extent of meeting one another's wishes to fight—will subsequently cooperate on terms of primary advantage to the victors. Since the organizations comprise human beings with human ways of doing things, the change must take place in the minds of those specific individuals who operate the existing government, or in the minds of enough other people for that government to be overthrown.

The fact that war is waged against the minds, not the bodies, of the enemy is attested by the comments of

military writers of all periods. The dictum of Carl von Clausewitz that "war is politics continued by other means" is simply the modern expression of a truth recognized since antiquity. War is a kind of persuasion—uneconomical, dangerous, and unpleasant, but effective when all else fails.

Ideology.

An ideology is a system of deep-rooted beliefs about fundamental questions in human life and affairs.[11] Ideology also plays a part in psychological warfare. A difference in beliefs which does not touch fundamentals is commonly termed a difference of *opinion*. You may believe in high tariffs; and I, in no tariff. You may believe in One World; I may not. You may support Republicans; I, Democrats. Despite these differences both of us can still believe in dollars as a method of paying income, in marriage as a system of setting up the family, in private property for most goods industrial or personal, in the Government of the United States, in majority rule, in democratic elections, in free speech, and so on.

If our difference of opinion is so inclusive that we can agree on nothing political, our differences have gone from mere opinion into the depths of *ideology*. Here the institutional framework is affected. You and I would not want to live in the same city; we could not feel safe in one another's presence; each would be afraid of the effect which the other might have on the morals of the community. If I were a Nazi, and you a democrat, you would not like the idea of my children living next door to yours. If I believed that you were a good enough creature—poor deluded devil—but that you were not fit to vote, scarcely to be trusted with property, not to be trusted as an army officer, and generally subversive and dangerous, you would find it hard to get along with me.

It was not metaphysical theories that made Protestants and Catholics burn one another's adherents as heretics in early wars. In the seventeenth century, the Protestants knew perfectly well what would happen if the Catholics got the upper hand, and the Catholics knew what would happen if the Protestants came to power. In each case the new rulers, fearful that they might be overthrown, would have suppressed the former rulers, and would have used the rack, the stake, and the dungeon as preventives of counterrevolution. Freedom cannot be accorded to persons outside the ideological pale. If an antagonist is not going to respect your freedom of speech, your property, and your personal safety, then you are not obliged to respect his. The absolute minimum of any ideology is the assumption that each person living in an ideologically uniform area (what the Nazi General Haushofer, following Rudolf Kjellen, would call a *geo-psychic* zone) will respect the personal safety, etc., of other individuals in the same area.

In our own time, we have seen Spaniards get more and more mistrustful of one another, until years of ferocious civil war were necessary before one of the two factions could feel safe. Spain went from republican unity to dictatorial unity in four years; in neither case was the unity perfect, but it was enough to give one government and one educational system control of most of the country. The other countries of the world vary in the degree of their ideological cohesion. Scandinavia seemed serene until the German invasion brought to the surface cleavages, latent and unseen, which made Quisling a quisling. Russia, Italy, Germany and various other states have made a fetish of their ideologies and have tried to define orthodoxy and heresy in such a way as to be sure of the mentality of all their people. But most of the countries of the world suffer from a considerable degree of ideological confusion—of instability of basic beliefs—without

having any immediate remedy at hand, or even seeking one.

Education.

Education is a process usually institutional by which the people of a given area transmit to their successors, their own children, the purely practical information needed in modern life, together with a lot of other teachings designed to make good men and women, good citizens, good Christians or other believers, of them. In the democratic states this process is ideological only in some parts of the curriculum; elsewhere in the field of opinions, the government seeks to control ideology only negatively—through laws concerning obscenity, blasphemy, subversion, and so on.

In the states which are ideologically self-conscious and anxious to promote a fixed mentality, the process of education is combined with agitation and regulation, so that the entire population lives under conditions approximating the psychological side of war. Heretics are put to death or are otherwise silenced. Historical materialism and the Marxian "objectivity," or the *Volk*, or *Fascismo*, or *Yamato-damashii*, or "new democracy" is set up as the touchstone of all good and evil, even in unrelated fields of activity. Education and propaganda merge into everlasting indoctrination. And when such states go to war against states which do not have propaganda machinery, the more liberal states are at a disadvantage for sheer lack of practice in the administrative and mechanical aspects of propaganda. Education is to psychological warfare what a glacier is to an avalanche. The mind is to be in both cases captured, but the speed and techniques differ.

Salesmanship.

Salesmanship is related to psychological warfare. Propaganda is often compared to another art of our time—industrialized salesmanship through mass printing and telecommunications. This bad parallel was responsible for much of the inept American propaganda overseas in the early part of the war; some of our propagandists had a fundamental misconception of the nature of wartime propaganda.

Allegiance in war is a matter of ideology, not of opinion. A man cannot want his own side to lose while remaining a good citizen in all other respects. The desire for defeat—even the acceptance of defeat—is of tragic importance to any responsible, sane person. A German who wanted the Reich to be overthrown was a traitor to Germany, just as any American who wished us to pull out of the war and exterminate American Jews would have been a traitor to his own country. These decisions cannot be compared with the choice of a toothpaste, a deodorant, or a cigarette.

Advertising succeeds in peacetime precisely because it does not matter; the choice which the consumer makes is of slight importance to himself, even though it is of importance to the seller of the product. A Dromedary cigarette and an Old Coin cigarette are both cigarettes; the man is going to smoke one anyhow. It does not matter so much to him. If Dromedaries are associated in his mind with mere tobacco, while Old Coins call up unaccountable but persistent memories of actresses' legs, he may buy Old Coins. The physical implements of propaganda were at hand in 1941-1942, but we Americans had become so accustomed to their use for trivial purposes that much of our wartime propaganda was conducted in terms of salesmanship.

In a sense, however, salesmanship does serve the military purpose of accustoming the audience to appeals both visual and auditory. The consequence is that competing, outside

propaganda can reach the domestic American audience only in competition with the local advertising. It is difficult for foreign competition to hold attention amid an almost limitless number of professionally competent commercial appeals. A Communist or Fascist party cannot get public attention in the United States by the simple expedient of a "mass meeting" of three hundred persons, or by the use of a few dozen posters in a metropolitan area. Before the political propagandist can get the public attention, he must edge his media past the soap operas, the soft drink advertisements, the bathing beauties advertising Pennsylvania crude or bright-leaf tobacco. The consequence is that outside propaganda either fails to get much public attention, or else camouflages itself to resemble and to exploit existing media. Clamorous salesmanship deadens the American citizen to his own government's propaganda, and may to a certain extent lower his civic alertness; but at the same time, salesmanship has built up a psychological Great Wall which excludes foreign or queer appeals and which renders the United States almost impervious to sudden ideological penetration from overseas.

Psychological Warfare and Public Relations.

Psychological warfare and public relations are different in the direction in which they apply. Psychological warfare is designed to reach the enemy. Public relations is designed primarily to reach the home audience. Both reach neutrals, sometimes confusingly much. In some nations, the two functions were combined in a single instrumentality, as in the Japanese *Joho Kyoku* (see page 184, below). The American army and navy traditions of public relations are based on the ideas that the news should be as complete as military security may permit, that it should be delivered speedily and interestingly, that it should enhance the

confidence of the people in their armed services, and that its tenor (no less than its contents) should not aid the enemy morale. These ideas are justified in terms of sound newspaper practice, but they can lead to a weak psychological warfare position when we must deal with an inventive and enterprising enemy.

It is not possible to separate public relations from psychological warfare when they use the same media. During World War II, the Office of War Information prepared elaborate water-tight plans for processing war news to different audiences; at their most unfortunate, such plans seemed to assume that the enemy would listen only to the OWI stations, and that the American public releases issued from Army and Navy would go forth to the world without being noted by the enemy. If a radio in New York or San Francisco presented a psychological warfare presentation of a stated battle or engagement, while the theater or fleet public relations officer presented a very different view, the enemy press and radio were free to choose the weaker of the two, or to quote the two American sources against each other.

Psychological Warfare and Morale Services.

All modern armies, in addition to public relations, also employ morale services facilities—officers or employees whose function it is to supply troops with entertainment, educational materials, political indoctrination, and other attention-getting materials. Morale services are the prime overt defense against enemy psychological warfare, and by a program of keeping the attention of the troops, can prevent the enemy from establishing effective communication. During World War II, the Armed Forces Radio Service of the United States established global radio service for Americans, and incidentally turned out material

of top importance to United States propaganda. Naturally, enemy and allied peoples would pay more serious heed to communications from Americans *to* Americans than they would to materials which they knew had been concocted for themselves. The American morale services in the last war indignantly rejected the notion that they were a major propaganda facility, rightfully insisting that their audience counted on getting plain information, plain news, and plain education without ulterior propaganda content. The fact that in a theater of war *all communication has propaganda effect* was not always taken into account, and only on one or two critical occasions was there coordination of stress and timing.

It must be said, however, that propaganda by any other name is just as sweet, and that the conviction of the propagandist that he is not a propagandist can be a real asset. Morale services provided the American forces with news, entertainment, and educational facilities. Most of the time these morale facilities had huge parasitical audiences —the global kibitzers who listened to our broadcasts, read our magazines, bought our paper-bound books on the black markets. (It was a happy day for Lienta University at Kunming, Yünnan, when the American Information and Education set-up began shipping in current literature. The long-isolated Chinese college students found themselves deluged with good American books.)

The morale services lost the opportunity to ram home to their G.I.-plus-foreign audience some of the more effective points of American psychological warfare, but they gained *as propagandists* by not admitting, even to themselves, that they *were* propagandists. Since the United States has no serious inward psychological cleavages, the general morale services function coordinated automatically with the psychological warfare function simply because both were produced by disciplined, patriotic Americans.

In the experience of the German and Soviet armies, morale services were parts of a coordinated propaganda machine which included psychological warfare, public relations, general news, and public education. In the Japanese armies, morale services were directed most particularly to physical and sentimental comforts (edible treats, picture postcards, good luck items) which bore little immediate relation to news, and less to formal propaganda.

Related Civilian Activities.

In a free nation, the big media of communication will remain uncoordinated even in time of war. The press, the stage, motion-pictures, part of the radio, book publishing and so on will continue. Psychological warfare has in such private facilities a constantly refreshed source of new material for news or for features. By a sparing but well considered liaison with censorship, psychological warfare can effect negative control of non-governmental materials, and can prevent the most overt forms of enemy propaganda from circulating on the home front.

News becomes propaganda when the person issuing it has some purpose in doing so. Even if the reporters, editors, writers involved do not have propaganda aims, the original source of the news (the person giving the interview; the friends of the correspondents, etc.) may give the news to the press with definite purposes in mind. It is not unknown for government officials to shift their rivalries from the conference room to the press, and to provide on-the-record or off-the-record materials which are in effect *ad hoc* propaganda campaigns. A psychological warfare campaign must be planned on the assumption that these civilian facilities will remain in being, and that they will be uncoordinated; the plan must allow in advance for interference, sometimes of a very damaging kind, which

comes from private operations in the same field. The combat officers can get civilian cars off the road when moving armored forces into battle but the psychological warfare officer has the difficult task of threading his way through civilian radio and other communication traffic over which he has no control.

Psychological warfare is also closely related to diplomacy. It is an indispensable ingredient of strategic deception. In the medical field, psychological warfare can profit by the experiences of the medical corps. Whenever a given condition arises among troops on one side, comparable troops on the other are apt to be facing the same condition; if the Americans are bitten by insects, the same insects will bite the enemy, and enemy soldiers can be told how much better the American facilities are for insect repulsion. Finally, psychological warfare is intimately connected with the processing of prisoners of war and with the protection of one's own captured personnel.

Psychological warfare is a field to itself, although it touches on many sciences and overlaps with all the other functions of war. It is generally divisible into three topics: the general scheme of psychological warfare, the detection and analysis of foreign psychological warfare operations, and the tactical or immediate conduct of psychological warfare. Sections of this book deal with each of these in turn. In each case it must be remembered, however, that psychological warfare is not a closed operation which can be conducted in private, but that—to be effective—psychological warfare output must be a part of the everyday living and fighting of the audiences to which it is directed.

CHAPTER 3
Definition of Psychological Warfare

Psychological warfare seeks to win military gains without military force. In some periods of history the use of psychological warfare has been considered unsportsmanlike.[12] It is natural for the skilled soldier to rely on weapons rather than on words, and after World War I there was a considerable reluctance to look further into that weapon—propaganda—which Ludendorff himself considered to be the most formidable achievement of the Allies. Nevertheless, World War II brought a large number of American officers, both Army and Navy, into the psychological warfare field: some of the best work was done without civilian aid or sponsorship. (Capt. J. A. Burden on Guadalcanal wrote his own leaflets, prepared his own public-address scripts, and did his own distributing from a borrowed Marine plane, skimming the tree tops until the Japanese shot him down into the surf. He may have heard of OWI at the time, but the civilians at OWI had not heard of him.)

Psychological warfare has become familiar. The problems of psychological warfare for the future are problems of *how better* to apply it, not of whether to apply it. Accordingly, it is to be defined more for the purpose of making it convenient and operable than for the purpose of finding out what it is. The whole world found out by demonstration, during World Wars I and II.

Psychological warfare is not defined as such in the dictionary.[13] Definition is open game. There are three ways in which "psychological warfare" and "military propaganda" can be defined:

first, by deciding what we are talking about in a given situation, book, conversation, or study course;

second, by determining the responsibilities and authority involved in a given task;

or third, by stating the results which are believed to be accomplishable by the designated means.

Plainly, the staff officer needs a different definition from the one used by the combat officer; the political leader would use a broader definition than the one required by soldiers; the fanatic would have his own definition or—more probably—two of them; one (such as "promoting democracy" or "awakening the masses") for his own propaganda and another (such as "spreading lies," "corrupting the press," or "giving opiates to the people") for antagonistic propaganda.[14] Definition is not something which can be done once and forever for any military term, since military operations change and since military definitions are critically important for establishing a chain of command.

The first method of definition is satisfactory for research purposes; it may help break a politico-military situation down into understandable components. The second method —the organizational—is usable when there exists organization with which to demonstrate the definition, such as, "Propaganda is what OWI and OSS perform." The third method, the operational or historical, is useful in evaluating situations after the time for action has passed; thus, one may say, "This is what the Germans did when they thought they were conducting propaganda."

Since the first lesson of all propaganda is *reasoned disbelief*, it would be sad and absurd for anyone to believe propaganda about propaganda. The "propaganda boys" in every army and government are experts at building up favorable cases, and they would be unusual men indeed if they failed to work up a fine account of their own performance. Propaganda cannot be given fair measurement by the claims made for it. It requires judicious

proportioning to the military operations of which it is (in wartime) normally a part.

Broad and Narrow Definitions.

The term *propaganda* springs from the name of that department of the Vatican which had the duty of propagating the faith. A multitude of definitions is available. Among Americans, Walter Lippmann, Harold Lasswell and Leonard W. Doob have done some of the most valuable critical, analytical, and historical writing, but a host of other scholars have also made contributions, some of them works of very real importance.[15] For the purposes of explaining what this book is about, propaganda may be defined as follows: *Propaganda consists of the planned use of any form of communication designed to affect the minds, emotions, and action of a given group for a specific purpose.*

This may be called the broad definition, since it would include an appeal to buy Antident toothpaste, to believe in the theological principle of complete immersion,[16] to buy flowers for Uncles on Uncles' Day, to slap the Japs, to fight fascism at home, or to smell nice under the arms. All of this is propaganda, by the broad definition. Since War and Navy Department usage never put the Corps of Chaplains, the PX system, the safety campaigns, or the anti-VD announcements under the rubric of propaganda, it might be desirable to narrow down the definition to exclude those forms of propaganda designed to effect private or nonpolitical purposes, and make the definition read:

Propaganda consists of the planned use of any form of public or mass-produced communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given group for a specific public purpose, whether military, economic, or political.

This may be termed the everyday definition of propaganda, as it is used in most of the civilian college textbooks.[17] For military purposes, however, it is necessary to trim down the definition in one more direction, applying it strictly against the enemy and making it read:

Military propaganda consists of the planned use of any form of communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given enemy, neutral or friendly foreign group for a specific strategic or tactical purpose.

Note that if the communication is not *planned* it cannot be called propaganda. If a lieutenant stuck his head out of a tank turret and yelled at some Japs in a cave, "Come on out of there, you qwertyuiop asdfgs, or we'll zxcvb you all to hjkl, you etc.'s!," the communication may or may not work, but—in the technical sense—it is not propaganda because the lieutenant did not employ that form of communication planned and designed to affect the minds or emotions of the Japanese in the cave. Had the lieutenant given the matter thought and had he said, in the Japanese language, "Enemy persons forthwith commanded to cease resistance, otherwise American Army regrets inescapable consequences attendant upon operation of flamethrower," the remark would have been closer to propaganda.

Furthermore, propaganda must have a known purpose. This element must be included in the definition; a great deal of communication, both in wartime and in peacetime, arises because of the pleasure which it gives to the utterer, and not because of the result it is supposed to effect in the hearers. Sending the Japanese cartoons of themselves, mocking the German language, calling Italians by familiar but inelegant names—such communications cropped up during the war. The senders got a lot of fun out of the message but the purpose was unintelligently considered.

The actual effect of the messages was to annoy the enemy, stiffening his will-to-resist. (Screams of rage had a place in primitive war; in modern military propaganda they are too expensive a luxury to be tolerated. Planned annoyance of the enemy does, of course, have its role—a minor, rare and special one.)

"Psychological warfare" is simple enough to understand if it is simply regarded as application of propaganda to the purposes of war, as in the following definition:

Psychological warfare comprises the use of propaganda against an enemy, together with such other operational measures of a military, economic, or political nature as may be required to supplement propaganda.

In this sense, "psychological warfare" is a known operation which was carried on very successfully during World War II under the authority of the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is in this sense that some kind of a "Psychological Warfare Unit" was developed in every major theater of war, and that the American military assimilated the doctrines of "psychological warfare."

However, this is only one of several ways of using the term, "psychological warfare." There is, in particular, one other sense, in which the term became unpleasantly familiar, during the German conquest of Europe, the sense of *warfare psychologically waged*. In the American use of the term, psychological warfare was the supplementing of normal military operations by the use of mass communications; in the Nazi sense of the term, it was the calculation and execution of both political and military strategy on studied psychological grounds. For the American uses, it was modification of traditional warfare by the effective, generous use of a new weapon; for the Germans it involved a transformation of the process of war itself. This is

an important enough distinction to warrant separate consideration.

Warfare Psychologically Waged.

Various labels were devised to name Hitler's queer, terrifying strategy for the period 1936-1941. One writer, Edmond Taylor, called it "*the strategy of terror*" in a book by that name (Boston, 1940), and also "the war of nerves." Another, Ladislas Farago, a political journalist who started out as an authority on the Axis fifth column in the Near East and ended up in American naval psychological warfare planning, put forth a book called *German Psychological Warfare: A Critical, Annotated and Comprehensive Survey and Bibliography* (New York, 1941), which digested hundreds of German works on topics pertaining to psychology and war, much of this material concerned personnel practices, psychosomatic medicine, and other non-propaganda aspects of psychology, but the book as a whole was an impressive demonstration of how much the Germans had done to make their war scientific. Other articles and books on the Nazi "inventions" followed in rapid succession.

After the excitement had died down, it was found that the novelty of the German war effort lay in two special fields:

first, the perfect or perfect-seeming synchronizing of political, propaganda, subversive, and military efforts;

second, the use of the findings of modern psychology for the attainment of military goals.

The Germans set the pace, in the prewar and early war period and United Nations psychological warfare tried to keep up, even though the two efforts were different in scope and character.

In conquering Europe, the German staff apparently used opinion analysis. Much of this analysis has turned out to have been superb guesswork; at the time, it looked as though the Nazis might have found some scientific formula for determining just when a nation would cave in. In the conduct of war, the Germans waged a rapid war—which was industrially, psychologically and militarily sound, as long as it worked. Their "diplomacy of dramatic intimidation" used the war threat to its full value, with the result that the Czechoslovaks surrendered the Sudetenland without a shot and then submitted themselves to tyranny half a year later; the Germans wrung every pfennigs worth of advantage out of threatening to start war, and when they did start war, they deliberately tried to make it look as horrible as it was. The psychologists had apparently taught the German political and military intelligence people how to get workable opinion forecasts; German analysis of anti-Nazi counterpropaganda was excellent. Add all this to strategy and field operations which were incontestably brilliant: the effect was not that of mere war, but of a new kind of war—the psychological war.

The formula for the psychological war is not to be found in the books of the psychologists but in the writings of the constitutional lawyers. The totality of war is a result of dictatorship within government; total coordination results from total authority. The "secret weapon" of the Germans lay in the power which the Germans had openly given Hitler, and in his use of that power in a shrewd, ruthless, effective way. The Führer led the experts, not the experts the Führer. If the Germans surprised the world by the cold calculation of their timing, it was not because they had psychological braintrusters inventing a new warfare, but because they had a grim political freak commanding the total resources of the Reich. Even in wartime, no American President has ever exercised the authority which Hitler used in time of peace;

American Cabinet members, military and naval figures, press commentators and all sorts of people are free to kibitz, to offer their own opinions, to bring policy into the light of day. That is as it should be. The same factors which made "psychological warfare" possible in the beginning of the war were the ones which led to Germany's futile and consummate ruin in 1944-45: excessive authority, an uninformed public, centralized propaganda, and secret political planning.

That kind of "psychological warfare"—war tuned to the needs of fanatically sought lusts for power, war coordinated down to the nth degree, waged in the light of enemy opinion and aiming at the political and moral weaknesses of the enemy—is not possible within the framework of a democracy. Even from within Imperial Japan, Pearl Harbor had to be waged secretly as a *purely* naval operation; those Japanese who would have told the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals that an unannounced attack was the best way to unify all American factions *against* Japan were obviously not brought into the planning of the Pearl Harbor raid. The Japanese still had too much of their old parliamentary spirit left over, as Ambassador Grew's reports show; the military had to outsmart the home public, along with the foreigners. In the Western dictatorships, the home public is watched by élite troops, secret police, party cells, and is made the subject of psychological warfare along with the victim nations. Hitler could turn the war spirit on and off; the Japanese did not dare do so to any effective extent. "Psychological warfare" was too dictatorial a measure even for prewar Japan; it is therefore permanently out of reach of the authorities of the United States. After war starts, we are capable of surprising the enemy with such things as incendiary raids, long-range bombers, and nuclear fission; but we cannot startle with the start of war. The United States is not now capable and—under the spirit of the

Constitution, can never be capable—of surprising an enemy by the *timing of aggression*. If the same were true of all other nations, peace would seem much nearer than it does.

German psychological warfare, in the broad sense of warfare psychologically waged, depended more on political background than on psychological techniques. Disunity among the prospective victims, the complaisance of powers not immediately affected, demonstration of new weapons through frightful applications, use of a dread-of-war to harness pacifism to appeasement, the lucky geographic position of Germany at the hub of European communications—such factors made the German war of nerves seem new. Such psychological warfare is not apt to be successful elsewhere except for aggressions by dictatorships against democracies; where the democracies are irritable, tough, and alert, it will not work at all.

The psychological warfare which remains as a practical factor in war is therefore not the Hitlerian war of nerves, but the Anglo-American application of propaganda means to pre-decided strategy. Let him who will advocate American use of the war of nerves! He will not get far with commentators publishing his TOP SECRET schedule of timing, with legislators very properly catechizing him on international morality, with members of his own organization publishing their memoirs or airing their squabbles right in the middle of the operation. He would end up by amusing the enemy whom he started out to scare. Psychological warfare has its place in our military and political system, but its place is a modest one and its methods are limited by our usages, morality, and law.

Propaganda: Definitions.

Propaganda has been defined (above, page 39). It remains to distinguish some of the other technical and professional terms which apply in this field. In operational terms, propaganda can be distinguished by the consideration of five elements:[18]

1. Source (including Media)
2. Time
3. Audience
4. Subject
5. Mission

These factors are given in approximate order of importance to the analyst, and provide a good working breakdown for propaganda analysis when expert staffs are not available. The five factors can be remembered by memorizing the initial letters in order: S-T-A-S-M. The last factor, "Mission," covers the presumed effect which the enemy seeks by dissemination of the item.

Without going into the technique of field propaganda analysis (described below, page 115), it is useful to apply these analysis factors to the definition of some subordinate types of military propaganda.

Source is the most important. If the source is open and acknowledged,the government issuing it is putting the propaganda on the record before the world, and must therefore issue the propaganda with a certain amount of dignity and with an eye to the future. If the source is faked, then it is important for the government or army to make sure that the faking is a good job, and that the propaganda cannot readily be traced back. Two very different techniques are employed. Open sources require responsible public officials, preferably men with international reputations, who

will get the best effect from use of the name and facilities of the government. Use of an open source usually (but not always) implies belief of the disseminator in the veracity of his materials. Fabricated sources require persons adept at illicit imaginativeness, impromptu forgery, and general devilment, combined with a strong sense of discipline and security. The United States was so chary of mixing the two kinds of propaganda during World War II that it operated them in different categories, giving rise to the three following types:

White propaganda is issued from an acknowledged source, usually a government or an agency of a government, including military commands at various levels. This type of propaganda is associated with overt psychological operations.

Grey propaganda does not clearly identify any source.

Black propaganda purports to emanate from a source other than the true one. This type of propaganda is associated with covert psychological warfare operations.

White propaganda is shown in figure 4 which does everything possible to make the message the official message of the British and American governments. The border is done up in handsome banknote fashion; the great seals of the nations are handsomely displayed; the signatures of the commanding generals are shown as further attestation of the openness and good faith of the issuer of the propaganda.

Figure 38 was also prepared by British-American authority; it too had the job of making Germans surrender. But in this case, nothing was done to make the British-American source evident; indeed, every effort was made to hide the source, so that the German who read it would think that it came from within his own territory. The two different kinds of

propaganda were both of them needed; each supplemented the other but they had to be kept apart as far as possible.

In the field of radio, the difference between Covert and Overt was even more plain. During World War II, the ether over Europe was filled with appeals from radio stations both public and covert in character. The British spoke to the Germans over B.B.C., making no effort to conceal the fact that they were British. But they also spoke to the Germans over clandestine stations, which pretended to be free-lancing Nazis, German army stations, or freedom group operations. The Germans, comparably, beamed official German news to the United States in English; but they also pretended to be Americans broadcasting from an isolationist radio in the American mid-west. In some cases, the belligerent powers used the identical radio transmission facilities for overt and covert propaganda. Radio Saipan, under the Americans, was most of the time the relay for the acknowledged San Francisco programs; intermittently OSS borrowed it, and it then became a "Japanese" station. (Under such conditions, black radio cannot remain black very long.)

In terms of the timing, propaganda can be subdivided into two further categories, strategic and tactical. Strategic propaganda is conducted with no immediate effect in view. Its purpose is to wear down the enemy by psychological changes that may extend over months. Figure 19, warning the Germans of the remote future, is an example of this in leaflet form. Tactical propaganda is operated to accomplish an immediate short-range purpose, and normally does not cover a long time-span. Only in a few cases, such as leaflets for a besieged enemy unit, is tactical propaganda run for a purpose that encompasses a long delay between the operation and the expected result. These two forms may be defined as follows:

Strategic propaganda is directed at enemy forces, enemy peoples, and enemy-occupied areas in their entirety, and—in coordination with strategic planning—is designed to effectuate results planned and sought over a period of weeks, months, or years.

Tactical propaganda is directed at specific audiences, usually named, and is prepared and executed in support of localized combat operations.

Another set of distinctions can be set up, depending on the relationship of the propaganda operation to the simultaneous hostile propaganda operations, namely offensive or defensive propaganda. Before the advent of World War II, this distinction appeared to be significant but experience on almost all fronts indicated that it meant little when applied to day-in day-out necessities of actual practice. Propaganda is so intimately keyed to the news and opinion situation that it does not usually bear elaborate pre-operational analysis. Elaborate planning very often ends up in the locked files; the distinction of offensive and defensive means little in routine work. However, for the sake of the record, the distinction can be listed:

Defensive propaganda is designed to maintain an accepted and operating form of social or other public action. (Soviet propaganda for the Five Year Plans is a conspicuous instance.)

Offensive propaganda is designed to interrupt social action not desired by the propagandist, or to predispose to social action which he desires, either through *revolutionary* means (within the same society) or *international*, either diplomatic or belligerent (between different societies).

Another set of distinctions arises from the purpose which the propaganda officer or group may have in mind for the people whom he addresses. These distinctions, like offensive-defensive, are theoretical rather than practical, and did not often appear in the actual operations, although all the more hush-hush plans made elaborate references to them:

Conversionary propaganda is designed to change the emotional orpractical allegiance of individuals from one group to another.

Divisive propaganda is designed to split apart the component subgroups of the enemy and thereby reduce the effectiveness of the enemy group considered as a single unit. (An instance is provided by the Allied effort to make German Catholics think first as Catholics, then as Germans.)

Consolidation propaganda is directed toward civil populations in areas occupied by a military force and is designed to insure compliance with the commands or policies promulgated by the commander of the occupying force.

Counterpropaganda is designed to refute a specific point or theme of enemy propaganda. (Japanese charges of American atrocities usually followed American charges of Japanese atrocities.)

Except for those terms that are firmly rooted in the literature of propaganda, most of the distinctions can be forgotten; the basic distinctions are those determined by the task involved, and not by the propaganda content.

World War II brought up a very sore issue between military and civilians with respect to propaganda in areas with unsettled governments—such as Darlanist North Africa,

Communist China, all of Siam. (See, also, discussion of World War II, below, page 77 ff.) In these areas every military act involved the definition of the political relations of the United States Government to the governments locally enjoying authority. Were we at war with them, or not? And so on. In these cases, politics itself became a vital foundation to propaganda, especially when the local authorities were themselves active in the propaganda field. The American theater and unit commanders had to decide what kinds of political promises they could or could not make. In this job, they had a more difficult task than did the British, who possessed in the Political Warfare Executive a pooling facility which coordinated foreign policy with propaganda.[19] Could we promise freedom from France to the Algerians? Or immunity to the Siamese who re-doublecrossed in the matter of allegiance and got ready to subvert the Japanese? Or the Yenan people who wanted us to highjack the Generalissimo as a price of their support? Or the Indonesians who might oppose the Japanese and already opposed the Dutch? Such questions transcended propaganda. Their decision made propaganda, or unmade it; but the deciding power was outside the authority of the propaganda people.

Political warfare is therefore, in administrative terms, a higher-level activity than propaganda, and may be defined as follows:

Political warfare consists of the framing of national policy in such a way as to assist propaganda or military operations, whether with respect to the direct political relations of governments with one another or in relation to groups of people possessing a political character.

Such policy-framing does not normally fall within the authority of the Army or Navy, though these may be consulted and called upon to effect appropriate military action. An outstanding instance of the use of political warfare was President Roosevelt's impromptu enunciation of the theme "Unconditional Surrender" at Casablanca. The theme affected not only our propaganda, but the types of surrenders which American generals could accept from Germans.

CHAPTER 4
The Limitations of Psychological Warfare

Psychological warfare cannot be known simply in terms of what it is; it must also be understood in relation to the limits which are imposed on it. The limitations can be described under four headings:

political limitations;

security limitations;

limitations arising from media;

limitations of personnel.

Like all limitations, these are handicaps only to the person who lacks the courage and resourcefulness to turn them into assets. Propaganda is dependent on politics, even for such

front-line requirements as "definition of the enemy," yet intelligent exploitation of political goals yields valuable results. Security is an asset to any army; its price is rarely too high a price to pay for protection, but a selective and flexible censorship can lead to positive advantages. *Media*—that is, the actual instrumentalities by which propaganda is conveyed—are the ordnance of psychological warfare. They limit the performable job but they also make it possible in the first place. And as in any military operation, success depends most of all on proper use of personnel.

Each of these merits discussion. The experience drawn upon has, in almost all instances, been that of World War II. As in most other fields, common sense runs a close second to experience as a guide in new methods of struggle.

Political Limitations of Psychological Warfare.

Politics has great influence on the content of psychological warfare. The relationship between two warring states is not one of complete severance; on the contrary, in wartime the relationship becomes abnormal, acute, sensitive. Each belligerent takes a strong interest in the other, in its affairs and weaknesses. During World War II the American armed services, government, and people learned more about the Japanese than they would have in twenty years of peacetime education. Japanese names made news. The purposes and weaknesses of the Japanese became the objects of hatred and—along with the hatred—intense scrutiny.

Each warring nation tries to turn the known enemy interest in itself into favorable channels. The propagandists of each country try to give the enemy the news which the enemy wants, while so arranging that news as to create a drop in enemy morale, to develop uncertainty in enemy

policies, to set enemy cliques into action against each other. The propagandist sometimes becomes very agitated because he recognizes as a technician propaganda opportunities which national policy prohibits his using. The propagandist who is so intent on his target that he forgets his broader responsibilities can often spoil the entire operation.

German broadcasters who emphasized the anti-capitalist character of National Socialism in the programs beamed to Eastern Europe found that B.B.C. picked up the most tactless statements and repeated them to Western Europe, where the Germans posed as anti-Bolshevik champions of private property. American attacks on the Germans for associating with Japanese monkey-men were passed along by the Japanese to the Chinese, who did not like the slur either. The most notorious example of backfiring propaganda was of course the famous "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion" phrase, which may have made James G. Blaine lose to Grover Cleveland in the national election of 1884; the phrase was used by a Republican clergyman in New York, referring to the Democrats, and implied that the Wets (anti-prohibitionists), Catholics, and Southerners were important components in the Democratic Party. (This may have been true, but it pleased none of them to have the matter pointed out with such epithets; the phrase succeeded in its short-range purpose, that of rousing Republicans, but failed by rousing the enemy even more and offending neutral-minded persons as well.)

The balance between home-front politics and field psychological warfare is difficult to maintain. The closer the psychological warfare officer is to the enemy, the more apt he is to think of the mission in terms of getting the enemy to come on over. Why quibble about a few phrases if the words will save lives, matériel, and time? Unfortunately the phrase that is successful against the enemy on the battle

front may prove to be an irritant to the home public, with the sure consequence that the enemy will pick it up and send it back to do harm. Similarly, home-front propaganda can get out to do the theaters of operation harm: "Do your utmost—save lard!" sounds silly to men in combat areas.

This can be illustrated by the propaganda problem of the Japanese Emperor. It would have helped domestic American politics to call the Japanese Emperor a monkey, a swine, a lunatic, a witch-doctor or comparable names; some people did so. But if the American government had done so at home for the purpose of rousing its own public, the Japanese home public would have been roused even more with the net result that the Americans would have lost by such attacks. If the Russians promised—as in another instance they are reported to have done—good food and warm clothes to the Germans on the winter fronts, the Nazis passed that promise along to the Russian civilians, who would not think well of Stalin's letting Fascist invaders be plump and snug while they themselves nearly starved. For the enemy audience, it is good to portray excellent care of enemy personnel; for the home audience, it is poor. For the home audience it is sometimes good to present the enemy as ruthless lunatics, beasts in human form, cruel degenerates, and so on; but the same claims, falling into enemy hands, can be used to the disadvantage of the originator by being relayed to the enemy home audience.

Furthermore, sound psychological warfare must take account of the fact that its ultimate aim is the successful ending of the war. For the end to be successful it must occur—the fighting must stop and the nations must enter into altered but renewedly peaceful relations. Propaganda that promises the enemy too much will alienate both allies and home public. But propaganda that promises bloody vengeance hurts possible peace movements in the enemy camp. None of the great powers in World War II went so far

as to promise specific frontiers for the postwar period. They kept their promises vague, knowing that a definite promise would please somebody but alienate everyone else; furthermore, by not promising, the expectations of the hopeful parties can be kept at a higher pitch. If the French do not *know* that they will get the Saar they will fight so much the harder; but if they are promised the Saar they come in a very short while to regard the promise as a settled matter, and proceed to ask for something else. Meanwhile, other possible claimants to the Saar either have a sense of grievance or lose interest in the matter. For this reason, postwar political uncertainty can be a propaganda asset.

President Roosevelt, in his conduct of the political world role of the United States, promised Manchuria to the Chinese, Korea "in due course" to the Koreans, and the integrity of the French Colonial Empire to the French; outside of that he avoided specific promises. In another instance (to put a complicated matter baldly), the British promised Palestine to both the Arabs and to the Jews in World War I, and consequently got themselves into a political mess which, thirty years later, was still a mess.

Definition of the Enemy.

Another significant connection between politics and propaganda is found in definition of *the nature of the enemy*. For combat operations, it is easy (most of the time) to tell who the enemy is; he is the man with the other uniform, the foreign language, the funny color or physique. For psychological operations, it is not that easy. The sound psychological warfare operator will try to get enemy troops to believing that the enemy is not themselves but somebody else—the King, the Führer, the élite troops, the capitalists. He creates a situation in which he can say,

"We're not fighting *you*." (This should not be said too soon after extensive use of bombs or mortars.) "We are fighting the So-and-so's who are misleading you." Some of the handsomest propaganda of World War II was produced by the Soviet experts along this line. Before the War was over, Soviet propaganda created a whole gallery of heel-clicking reactionary German generals *on the Russian side*, and made out that the unprofessional guttersnipe Hitler was ruining the wonderful German Army in amateurish campaigns. Joseph Stalin's ringing words, "The German State and the German *Volk* remain!" gave the Russians a propaganda loophole by which they implied that Germany was not the enemy—no, not Germany! just the Nazis. This was superb psychological warfare, since the Russians had already built up the propaganda thesis that the common people (workers and peasants) were automatically—by virtue of their class loyalty—on the side of the workers' country, Russia. That left very few Germans on the other side.

For psychological warfare purposes, it is useful to define the enemy as:

(1) the ruler;

(2) or the ruling group;

(3) or unspecified manipulators;

(4) or any definite minority.

It is thoroughly unsound to define the enemy too widely. On the other hand, too narrow a definition will leave the enemy the opening for a peace offensive if the ruler dies, or if the ruling group changes part of its composition. It was fear of a peace move by the German generals, plus the desire to maintain the precarious anti-German unity of the occupied countries, which led the United States and Britain to adopt the policy of defining the German Reich rather than

Naziism as the enemy. In the instance of Japan, we defined the enemy as the militarists and "Fascists," with the capitalists a poor second, and left the Emperor and people with whom to make peace.

If the psychological warfare campaign is operated for a definite political purpose, it is possible for politics to be an aid rather than a limitation. The operator can describe his own political system in its most radiant light. He can say complimentary things about the enemy leaders or groups who might come over (though he should avoid giving them the kiss of death which the Nazis gave certain prominent American isolationists, by praising them too much). He can promise his own brand of Utopia.

If the politics are defensive, vague, well-meaning but essentially non-committed, psychological warfare has to avoid making blunders. In World War II we could not say that we were against one-party states, because our largest ally (Russia) was a one-party state. We could not attack the ruin of free enterprise by the Japanese and German governments since socialism existed on the Allied side too. We could not bring up the racial issue, because our own national composition rendered us vulnerable to racial politics at home. There was a huge catalog of *Don'ts* (usually not written down but left to individual judgment) in every propaganda office. Whenever we violated them, we paid the price in adverse opinion.

Promises.

Finally, psychological warfare must avoid promises that may not be kept. The Americans during World War II never promised much as a government, but individual American agents promised all sorts of things which could not be delivered. We promised the Dutch their homeland and

empire by implication; we promised the Indonesians self-government, also by implication; and we promised everybody, including the Japanese, access to Indonesian raw materials. It is highly probable that individual Americans, off-the-record, stated that they "expected," "hoped," or "thought" that their government would fulfill each of these promises. The three are not compatible, especially the first and second. The New York banker, James Warburg, has written a book, *Unwritten Treaty*, pointing out that the United States promised just about everything to everybody during the war (he was in OWI and he ought to know), and that it is going to take a generous, wise, and intelligent foreign policy to fulfill—even in part—the promises which we made. The promises of the loser are forgotten; he can write them off and start international policies with a clean slate. But the promises of the victor remain, and have to be carried out or else repudiated.

The psychological warfare officer should not make promises to persons in occupied territory, to friendly guerrillas, to underground movements, or to enemy troops when those promises are not backed up by word-for-word quotations from the head of his government or someone of Cabinet rank. The promises may not conform with promises which other psychological warfare officers are making to other groups. (In China, some American officers told the Chinese Communists that the Chinese Communists were wonderful people, and would be sure to get American material aid and political sympathy against Chiang Kai-shek. At the same time, other American officers told the Chinese government people that the United States did not propose to short-circuit recognition of the Chinese government, or to interfere in internal Chinese affairs. The two sets of Chinese heard about the American promises and, for a while, could not decide whether Americans were fools or liars. Much the same sort of thing happened in our dealings with French,

Serbs, and Poles.) It is a poor piece of work for a combat officer to promise elections , liberties, labor rights, or even food to people in his path, unless the rear echelon people will be able to deliver the goods when they come up. And it is an irresponsible radio or leaflet man who makes promises without finding out whether his government is in a position, in relation to the political situation, to back up the promises one way or other. His nation itself will be called a liar if he slips up.

Security Limitations.

Another serious set of limitations arises from security problems.

The very conduct of psychological warfare encroaches upon perfectionist plans for security. Security is designed to keep useful information from reaching the enemy; propaganda operations are designed to get information to him. Security is designed to keep the enemy from knowing true figures; but propaganda must have a lot of good, current, *true* information if it is to be believed. Security demands that military and naval news be withheld until the extent of the enemy's knowledge is known; propaganda is designed to tell the enemy the news faster than his own sources tell him, thus discrediting enemy news. Security demands that dubious persons, intimately associated with the enemy, be kept away from communications facilities; propaganda officers have to keep an eye open for people who speak the enemy language well, who can address the enemy sympathetically and get his attention, who have a keen appreciation of the enemy culture.

Often, it is plain, psychological warfare and security officers get in each other's way. This conflict was lessened by American censorship organization during World War II.

The United States Office of Censorship under Byron Price achieved a distinguished record of smooth, reasonable, and modest operation. It took an adult view of the intelligence of the American public, and permitted bad news to reach the public except when the Services or the White House intervened. Much of the story of this office is told in Theodore Koop's exciting book, *Weapon of Silence*,[20] which makes it plain that censorship sought to avoid developing negative psychological warfare campaigns on its own initiative.

The usual wartime security procedures apply with special force to psychological warfare operations. Civilian employees who are qualified as political experts, as writers, or as propaganda analysts are often well-educated and artistic. They are apt to value classified information highly for the pleasure which they can derive by violating security—that is, by showing "people they can trust" how much they are "in on" certain operations. The temptation to show off is almost irresistible. (The vice is not unknown even in military echelons.) An atmosphere of excessive security easily degenerates into melodrama, bringing out in many individuals a silly zest for displaying to others how much TOP SECRET information they possess. Where military and civilian personnel work together, this human weakness is stimulated by rivalry. Even among the Germans in World War II, propaganda groups were easily infected by an atmosphere of gossip and intrigue.

Security Procedures.

Security procedures for psychological warfare involve the usual common-sense precautions which apply to all operations, and which may be summarized in the following rules:

(1) Classification should be kept at an absolute minimum. No information should be classified unless there are genuinely strong reasons for supposing that it would benefit the enemy. Classification and declassification should be the responsibility of designated officers trained for the task. (In World War II, many American civilians classified information recklessly, with the result that all classification became a subject of disrespect. The author once found a highly classified inter-Allied plan in the hands of an elderly woman stenographer in Washington, who safeguarded the information by leaving the papers in a desk drawer which had no pull. The drawer had to be opened with a nail file and that fact comprised the "security.")

(2) Security should apply, generally speaking, to units as a whole, taking working units up to the limit of face-to-face working acquaintance as a base. It is unsound procedure to give certain individuals a higher level of information than others, since the privileged individuals will be tempted to display their inside knowledge, and the underprivileged individuals will be goaded by unwholesome, resentful, and acute curiosity. Either the entire unit should be given the information, or denied it.

(3) Security should not be applied for editorial purposes. Censorship is a separate function. Improper security procedures, vesting arbitrary powers in stated officers, may tempt the security officer to express his personal literary, artistic, or political preferences under the guise of maintaining security. The inevitable consequence is the breakdown of both security and of procedure. Censorship should be applied in conformity with national or theater censorship policies. Review and estimate of radio or leaflet output is another function.

(4) Security for printed materials is easy enough to maintain. The leaflets can be sent to the G-2 to check, or

wherever else security functions may be vested. Radio security is another problem. Experience in World War II indicates that spot news cannot wait for routine security, but must be processed through. Two types of control, supplementing one another, are desirable:

Security liaison on a 24-hour basis should be available to the radio operatives for the rapid processing of military news. The security duty officer should be indoctrinated with an attitude of cooperativeness, based on an understanding of the value of propaganda, and should conceive it as his mission to explain the needs of radio propaganda to his superiors, rather than taking the attitude of being superior to the radio operatives. There is a sound psychological reason for this. The presence of a sympathetic security officer will increase cooperativeness on the part of the propaganda broadcaster. An unsympathetic one will merely maintain the official dignity of his office and position. High morale on the part of script writers is more important than high morale of security officers.

Security supervision can be exercised by monitoring facilities: that is, the security officers can equip themselves with a good radio receiver and listen to the broadcasts without ever meeting the broadcasters. A critical frame of mind on the part of such security personnel is desirable. Unlike liaison officers, they need not be cooperative. Since their criticism applies after the operation, they can afford to apply rigorous standards. (During most of 1942 and 1943, no one in Washington had any idea of what actually *went out* from San Francisco. The civilians who broadcast to Japan received elaborate orders to do this and to do that, but the Washington policy-makers did not know what was going on the air. On one occasion, the civilian propaganda broadcasters told the Army in Washington that the information was too highly classified to be released or

circulated. The result was that Army and Navy found out what OWI was doing by receiving reports from listeners in the Pacific.)

Security liaison can check propaganda output in the process of transmission; security supervision can check the output after it goes on the air, and can transmit through channels recommendations for punitive or corrective action. The final military connection should exist (for an all-military psychological warfare group) in the person of a responsible commanding or executive officer. For a civilian group functioning under military control the military connection should lie in the hands of an officer capable of watching a great deal and of saying little. Attempts by security to act as propagandists have been found to be as disastrous as the efforts of operators to get along without security.

Media Limitations.

Psychological warfare should not broadcast into areas in which radio sets are unknown. Psychological warfare should not drop books to illiterates. These rules seem obvious but they have often been violated. Psychological warfare should not assume that an extensive news or morale campaign is going to achieve the desired results unless there is trustworthy intelligence to the effect that propaganda is getting through.

It is ridiculous to broadcast to the masses of a country when the masses are known not to have radio facilities. This was done in the anti-Japanese broadcasts of OWI, at least in the early part of the war, in which mass-audience soap operas and popular music were sent to Japan on the short-wave—this despite reports that short-wave sets were almost unknown outside governmental or plutocratic circles. What was known was that the Japanese government itself had

listening facilities, and that the content of American broadcasts was relayed through Japanese military and governmental groups. The propaganda (to fit the medium, radio) should have been designed *to affect the persons actually reached*, and not an audience known to be out of reach. The mere fact that enemy counterpropaganda mentions one's own material is nothing more than a professional exchange of compliments. Goading the enemy radio into a reply may be fun, but unless non-propagandists are known to be listening, the fun is expensive and unprofitable.

(It is really fun, though. The author suggested in the spring of 1942 that the San Francisco radio carry an item to the effect that "American art lovers" hoped the Japanese would move their priceless books and paintings away from the great cities. This was preparation for eventual nagging on the topic, "the air raids will get you if you don't watch out!" The radio civilians in San Francisco put the item on the air. Nothing was heard from the Japanese on the subject. Four days later, Radio Luxembourg [then under Nazi control, of course] broadcast in German to Europe that a spokesman for the "beastly American Air Ministry" had told the Japanese that the Americans planned to destroy cultural monuments. The Nazi commentator added that this was characteristic of the actions of uncivilized Americans. New York picked up the German broadcast. The author enjoyed seeing his item go all the way around the world, but in retrospect he wonders whether he did any good other than to please himself. He did do the actual harm of giving the Nazis another point to distort.)

Media consist simply of the facilities possessed. These are, most commonly:

(1) Standard-wave radio;

(2) Short-wave radio;

(3) Loudspeakers;

(4) Leaflets;

(5) Pamphlets;

(6) Books;

(7) Novelties.

The limitations consist simply of applying the right medium at the right time. Radio broadcasts need be made only when receiving sets are known to exist. Written material should be dropped only to areas in which at least some people can read. (The OWI in China, at the request cf CBI Forward Echelon Headquarters, made up the leaflet showing pictures only. This was designed for the aboriginal hillmen between China and Tibet—to tell them to rescue downed American pilots. Broadcasting to these people would have been as profitable as spitting in the ocean. None of them could read, much less understand radio.) The probable number of listeners or readers should be calculated conservatively, taking enemy policing, amount of enemy interest, customs of the people, tension among enemy troops or civilians and other appropriate factors into account.

Occasionally propaganda media exceed the expected limitations. The Americans and British dropped leaflets on Berlin. The leaflets had little key numbers in the corners, showing to which series they belonged, and could thus be arranged in series. The Germans prohibited civilians from picking up the leaflets. The Nazi authorities followed up the prohibition by sending the *Hitlerjugend* and *Hitlermädel* out to pick up the leaflets and turn them in for destruction. The boys and girls did their job with gusto. Vast quantities were turned in for destruction. What the Nazis discovered—too

late, too late—was that the schoolchildren had begun collecting the leaflets, using the key numbers to make up perfect sets. Some numbers were rarer than others, so that the Hitlerite children swapped Allied leaflets all over Berlin, trying to make up attractive albums. Mother and Father—who did not dare pick the leaflets up off the street for fear the Gestapo might be watching—found a convenient file, reasonably complete, in the room of little Fritzl or Ermintrude! The most hopeful British or American planner could not have counted on such a happy result.

Maximum Performance of Personnel.

Another limitation, to be found in any psychological warfare operation, is that imposed by the types of personnel available. It would be a rash commander who assumed that he had air support because he saw airplanes—without knowing whether air crews were available. A microphone does not make a propagandist. Personnel using the speaking voice have to be good speakers; merely knowing the language is not enough. Writing personnel must be up to the level of professional writers. On the other hand, the available personnel must not be driven above its limits of performance: often an attempt to do a too-professional job will defeat the propaganda. (When the Japanese pretended to be perfectly American, and used the corny obsolete slang of the 1920's, they aroused more contempt than they would have done had they confined themselves to rather bookish, plain English.)

The psychological warfare operation must be gauged to the personnel facilities no less than to the material facilities. (In China, the author sat in with an expert on medieval and modern Japanese art, who was writing leaflets which were to be dropped on the Japanese garrisons of the Yangtze cities. The expert wrote pure, dignified Japanese, but the Chinese-

Japanese language experts brought up the point, "Would the Japanese common soldier understand this kind of talk?" For a while, we had no plain-spoken Japanese at hand, and we had to send our Japanese leaflets from Chungking up to Yenan, where the Japanese Communists read the leaflets and wrote back long detailed criticisms.)

Whenever the politico-military situation permits, it is sound procedure to check output with live enemies, either interned civilians or captured military personnel. A shrewd interrogator can soon find out whether the comments from the enemy jury are honest or not.

Intelligent psychological warfare procedures have often turned liabilities into assets. Absence of a good orchestra has compelled propagandists to make up current music schedules by recording enemy musical programs, re-broadcasting them with new spoken commentary. Failure to obtain native speakers (such as genuine home-grown Japanese, or Chinese with the properly slurred Wu dialect) has led to the use of substitutes that proved better than the original. There is no point in trying to establish *rapport* with the enemy unless you talk his language with effortless perfection on the one end of the scale—or else admit that you really are a foreigner, on the other end of the scale. It is easier to build up the image of a trustworthy enemy than it is to create trust in a traitor. Frequently the attempt to talk the enemy's own language is less successful than a frank acceptance of handicaps.

In actual practice this means that either—

(a) the speaker should be authentically perfect in use of the enemylanguage, whether spoken or written as script; *or*

(b) the speaker should make no effort to conceal his foreign accent.

In British broadcasts to Germany, for example, it was found to be desirable for the radio announcers to have British accents in their German, rather than the Viennese or Jewish lilt which many of them did have. A Nazified audience was so infected with anti-Semitism that no Jewish speaker could carry much weight, no matter how cogent his arguments nor how eloquent his appeals. The British tone in the voices of other speakers actually helped carry conviction. The Germans were prepared to listen to a genuine Britisher, and might have been disappointed if he had spoken letter-perfect *German*.[21]

Furthermore, with the perfect speaker of the enemy language there is always the question, "What is that guy doing over there?" A traitor is less appealing than an open enemy spokesman; a traitor has to be sensationally good in order to get across at all. Lord Haw Haw was one of a kind, but he seems to have had genuine theatrical talent along with a crazy zeal which persuaded his hearers that though he was on the wrong side, he did believe his own line. The perfect speaker, whether enemy renegade or friendly linguist, has an inglorious role at the beginning of war, when enemy morale is high and the enemy population has not had time to think over the problem of changing sides. Only toward the end of the war, or in any morale downgrade, the man who says, "Come on over! See? I'm here. It's fine," has a chance of being believed.

The propaganda administrator must use his personnel thoughtfully. It is a waste of talent and—in advance field units, of life as well—to impose tasks which operatives cannot handle. An American *nisei* from California should not be asked to talk slangy *Edokko* Japanese; a soldier detailed to psychological warfare, because of some special linguistic qualification, should not be considered a great journalist, radio commentator, or actor just because he speaks the right language. If he is given a microphone, and the feeling

of having an audience (one that cannot write adverse fan mail), it will be easy for the average man to overestimate the effect of his own talk. The intelligent officer tries to see his staff as the enemy would see them; he keeps their limitations in mind. If they speak the enemy language perfectly, they fall under suspicion as traitors; if they speak it poorly, they may sound like bunglers or jackasses. Nevertheless, propaganda must come from men and through words written by men, and the flavor must be fitted to the situation. Advance planning should therefore consider the available personnel as an actual factor in estimating the situation.

Counterpropaganda.

Counterpropaganda could be listed as a limitation, as the enemy combat strength is sized up in physical warfare. This, however, is one of the points at which psychological warfare differs from other forms. If the propaganda message is worth putting across, it need not be geared to what the enemy is saying. Enemy propaganda should, in well conducted operations, be taken into account only when it becomes an asset. That is, the enemy need only be heeded when he tells a whopping lie, or comes forth with a piece of hyprocrisy so offensive to his own people that it needs little improvement to be adapted for counterpropaganda. Most enemy themes are beyond reach, especially those of inter-ideological warfare. The Nazis and Russians made the best propaganda against each other when they got down to the basic necessities of life, not when they were trying to weave finespun theories about each other's way of thinking or of life. Refutation is a joy; it is delightful to talk back. But the best propaganda is only incidentally counterpropaganda. It uses enemy blunders and counteracts enemy success by building up unrelated successes of its own.

This does not mean that propaganda analysis is not needed. Somewhere in every psychological warfare unit there must be an intelligence group servicing the operation. If, for example, the enemy has announced that the candy your aviators are dropping is poisoned (and has proved it by dropping some of "your" candy, made by his black-operations boys and actually poisoned), there is no point in calling him a liar; you may not know for some time whether poisoned candy has been dropped or not. If the enemy commander has shown his troops photographs of prisoners whom your side has taken and "murdered" (according to his well staged photos), it is not a good idea to ask people to surrender without sending along equally convincing pictures of well cared for prisoners. If the enemy alleges that you and your allies are rioting in the streets or stealing each other's womenfolk, or that one of you is doing all the fighting while the other sits around in safe staging areas, it may be a good idea to send along some leaflets showing inter-allied cooperation on your side, or to run a few radio shows on the subject.

This consists merely of reckoning the enemy propaganda as part of the psychological warfare situation, and of using the enemy as part of the background to your own advantage. The moment you start letting him take the initiative, your propaganda wags along behind his. Tell *his* people something *he* can't deny. Let him sit up nights worrying about how he will counteract *you*. Make him drive his security officers crazy trying to release figures that will please your G-2 in order to reassure his home audience. Really good propaganda does not worry about counterpropaganda. It never assumes that the enemy propagandist is a gentleman: he is by definition a liar. Your listeners and you are the only gentlemen left on earth.

CHAPTER 5
Psychological Warfare in World War I

World War I saw psychological warfare transformed from an incidental to a major military instrument, and later it was even called the weapon which won the war. The story spread, since the Germans liked to imagine that they had been talked out of winning, and since ex-propagandists among the Allies enjoyed thinking that their own cleverness had been decisive when even the tremendous violence of trench warfare had produced nothing more than a stalemate. If psychological warfare is considered in the broad sense, it seems plain that it was among the decisive weapons of 1914-1918. The political decency of the Allies, the appeal of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, the patent obsolescence of the Kaiser and what he stood for, the resurgence of Polish, Baltic, Finnish, Czechoslovak and South Slav nationalisms—all these played a real part in making Germany surrender in 1918. More real than the role of guns, men, ships, planes, tanks? This cannot be answered: it is like asking of a long-distance runner whether his heart, lungs, legs, or head contributed most to his success. Since war is waged by and against all parts of the human personality—physical condition, skills, intelligence, emotions, and so on—it is impossible to distinguish between the performance of one kind of weapon and the other in the attainment of a goal itself complex—governmental surrender. Only a weapon which left no enemy survivors could claim for itself undisputed primacy in victory.

Propaganda came to prominence in war because the nations involved had made mass-communications part of their civilian lives. The appearance of huge newspapers, systematic advertising, calculated political publicity, and opinion manipulation in other forms made it inevitable that

skills which developed in civilian life should be transferred to the military. In general, *the psychological warfare efforts of each belligerent were the direct equivalent of his peacetime nonpolitical propaganda facilities*. (By way of exception, the peculiar genius of the Bolshevik leaders stimulated a propaganda effort disproportionate to the facilities, either of personnel or matériel, to be found in pre-1914 Russia.)

Nations rarely change their basic character in time of war. When war starts it is usually too late to re-educate generations already grown up, teach them wholly new skills, or develop administrative or operational procedures unknown in peacetime life. Sometimes, by great effort, a nation can transform a small available cadre into large, new and effective units on the political, military, economic or social fronts. Even then, the character of the war effort will be colored and influenced by the experience of the men undertaking it. The British had, in 1914, one of the world's finest news systems, a highly sophisticated press, and extensive experience in international communication for technical and commercial purposes, notably the undersea cable system, and they turned these to war use with considerable smoothness. The Germans had a far more regimented press and a more limited network of commercial and technical connections. The British, furthermore, had a diplomatic and consular service of superb quality; comparable German services included a much higher proportion of bunglers and enthusiasts.

From the very beginning the British had the lead. They nailed German propaganda as propaganda, while circulating their own as news, cultural relations, or literature. The Germans who boasted that they were a "cultured" people had their naïveté rewarded when the British let the German word *Kultur* become a synonym for boorish pedantic arrogance. The Germans had the awful habit of putting many of their own unattractive emotions into words, and the

even more ruinous habit of then printing the words. In many instances, the British simply let the Germans think up braggadocio or vengeful phrases, then circulated the German phrases to the world. The English language was permanently enriched by some of these: *strafe* comes from the German plea that God "strafe" (punish) England. The actual "Hymn of Hate" was originally a song made up by Germans for Germans. The word "Hun" was applied to the German Army by Kaiser Wilhelm himself, and so on. Furthermore, the Germans created in their press and information services a condition of bureaucratic snafu which has rarely been excelled in any war. National character certainly worked out its automatic vengeances in World War I.

The American psychological warfare effort of 1917-1919 also drew heavily on familiar skills: the American press, second only to that of the British at the time; the church, Y.M.C.A., and Chautauqua groups; and the wealth of private clubs which flourish under our liberal system of laws and usages. Other nationalities made efforts similarly in keeping with their peacetime facilities. The Japanese were adroit, but even at that time confused by the mix-up of trying to be a "civilized" power but simultaneously expansionist. The French showed high professional skill in adapting their military and diplomatic personnel to propaganda tasks. France's position as battleground ensured her of the rage of her own people and the sympathy of neutrals, giving propaganda from Paris a hearing. The Chinese, though undergoing the downfall of the Yüan Shih-k'ai dictatorship and lapsing into chaos, maintained an impeccable diplomatic front and played a weak hand for everything it was worth; they had their private quasi-war with the Japanese in 1915. That they did so while putting the blame for Allied disunity squarely on the Japanese where it belonged is to their credit.

The weight of the propaganda war, as of the material war, fell on its prime contestants, Britain, Germany, and the United States. The private and revolutionary groups which emerged as the revolutionary governments played a vigorous part because they had few other functions to distract their attention. The Republic of Czechoslovakia got its start in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1918, and fought psychological warfare from the instant it took form; not till later did it assume the weightier and more expensive responsibilities of ruling and warring.

The British Effort.

In World War I, the British made most of the mistakes and learned most of the lessons which the Americans were to make and to learn in World War II. The British Foreign Office formed a War Propaganda Bureau in 1914, but a great deal of the effort was done by private facilities (patriotic associations) or by lower political and military echelons of the government and armed forces—and without coordination. Things became so confused that at the mid-point of the war, the British organized a Department of Information with Colonel John Buchan at its head. (Buchan will be remembered by all adventure-lovers as author of *The Thirty-nine Steps*, *The Courts of the Morning*, and other first-class thrillers; he was also made a peer under the style, Lord Tweedsmuir, and became a popular Governor-General of Canada.) Buchan did not always get along with the committee which floated above him, telling him how to run his business.

The British, like the Germans, had immense organizational difficulties. The British ended up by inventing a distinction of roles. Thus they finished World War I with two separate propaganda agencies. The Ministry of Information, under Lord Beaverbrook, with Colonel Buchan as Director of

Intelligence, carried on civilian psychological warfare outside Britain; the National War Aims Committee carried on civilian psychological warfare within Britain. Military psychological warfare was carried on by military and civilian agencies, both. The British required five years of honest effort, bitter wrangling, and positive political invention in order to devise a psychological warfare system sufficient to meet the needs of a great power at war. They did not let their administrative difficulties prevent their conduct of correct, poised and highly moral propaganda, nor impede their use of plentiful funds and high ingenuity in getting their propaganda across.[22]

The British set the pace in coordinating political warfare with news-propaganda, and in effecting workable liaison between national policy-makers and operational and public-relations chiefs of the armed services. It is not likely that, even in World War II, the Americans—within the looser, younger, bigger framework of our more compendious government—achieved as good results in terms of timing. State-War-Navy-OWI-OSS-Treasury timing of related events or news items was obtained through most of World War II in the following manner: the federal agency affected did whatever it was going to do anyhow, and other federal agencies took notice after the event, initiating their related actions, if any were feasible, then and only then. The British sought to get around this in World War I by correlating their policy toward various countries with their policy involving different departments. They were not totally successful but they learned a lot; the net product of their propaganda was, for most of its purposes, superb.

The German Failure In Propaganda.

German writers, after World War I, sometimes attributed the superiority of the British in propaganda to the innate

fiendishness of Britishers as contrasted with the gullible purity of Germans. The psychoneurotic non-com who made himself famous to the world's cost did not make this mistake. In *Mein Kampf* Hitler stated categorically that the British had understood the professional touch in propaganda while the Germans had not. Hitler's contempt for the masses was shown in his explicit statement of their inattentiveness, their poor response to formal logic, their affirmative reaction to simple one-sided reiteration. He said: "[In England] ... propaganda was a weapon of the first class, while with us it was a sop to unemployed politicians...." German nationalists of whatever stripe found themselves in accord when they blamed their military defeat on the enemy's use of propaganda. They thus succeeded in maintaining the myth, already sedulously inculcated for two centuries, that the German army could not be beaten in the field. The extremists and crackpots among them went on to develop the "stab-in-the-back" theory that an unbeaten Germany was betrayed from within by Jews, socialists, and democratic people. (The mutually exclusive alternatives—namely that either Allied propaganda was fiendishly good, and the Germans merely innocent victims, or else that Allied propaganda was ineffectual and the anti-war sentiment a purely German development—did not keep the Hitlerites from exploiting both alibis simultaneously.)

The postwar period of the 1920's saw, therefore, the curious spectacle of the Germans lauding American psychological warfare, and counting it as a major factor of defeat, while the Americans naturally emphasized the fighting record of American troops.

As for Kaiserist propaganda, it started out with the twin curses of amateurishness and bureaucracy, each of them crippling but deadly when paired. German writers and scholars ran wild in 1914 and 1915 in trying to put the blame on the Allies; amateurish in public relations, they

succeeded in arousing a tremendous amount of antagonism. They were handicapped by the ponderosity of the German Imperial Government, by the intervention of persons unfamiliar with news or advertising (at that time the most obvious sources of civilian propaganda personnel), and by a military stodginess which made German press communiqués infuriating even to anti-British readers. Overseas propaganda developed through poorly secured clandestine channels, and was mixed up with espionage and sabotage personnel. Inescapable "breaks" gave all German agents a bad name. George Sylvester Viereck, who has enjoyed the odd distinction of being our most vocal pro-German sympathizer in both wars with Germany, later wrote a naïve but revealing account of his operations under the title *Spreading Germs of Hate* (Boston, 1930). (No British information officer was guilty, even after the war, of a comparable breach of taste.) Viereck praises the British for their sang-froid and skill; coming from him, the praise is more than deserved.

More seriously, German propaganda lacked both organization and moral drive. Lieutenant Colonel Nicolai, the Imperial German General Staff officer responsible, puts part of the blame on the German press and on the press officers of the Army and the Reich: "In fact, the enemy remained virtually untouched by any kind of German propaganda. This reproach falls against the press, it would seem, as well as on the responsible officials.... Internationally minded papers themselves failed to cooperate. Yet it was precisely these which were circulated and esteemed abroad. Newspapers with other (pro-militarist) editorial policies, failing to get leadership from the Government, could not aim at any unified effect.... Instead, the goal of the governmental press leadership remained a thoroughly negative one: to prevent the press from doing harm to national policy."[23]

Without developing his theme into systematic doctrine for psychological warfare, the German colonel stated the basic defect of World War I from the German point of view. Writing in 1920, he went on to say: "The enemy alleges simply to have copied our front-line propaganda when he initiated his. In so doing, he is guilty of a deliberate untruth, made for the sake of removing the moral blot which is attached to his victory...." Nicolai could not overcome the supposition that propaganda was a dirty and unsoldierly device and that it was much more honorable for armies to exchange loss of life than to save men on both sides by talking the enemy into surrendering, but he went on to the real point at issue. "Furthermore, it was not moralistic misgivings which kept us from applying to the enemy front lines a propaganda campaign as successful as theirs, but very sober practical obstacles. There were available to us none of the (psychological) points of attack at which propaganda would have been effective against the enemy forces, points such as the enemy found in our own domestic conditions. What was lacking was political propaganda as precursor of military."

What the Germans failed to learn in World War I, they later learned and applied in World War II. The German Imperial Government started in 1914 with a defiant assurance of its own power. Power was not sought among the masses so far as Kaiser Wilhelm was concerned; one inherited it from one's ancestors, along with an army, and the masses had better keep their noses out of it. The Hitlerite German government of 1939 began its world war only after two decades of shrewd, conscienceless, bitter domestic propaganda. Hitlerism had come to power by first wooing and then bullying the common man, and the Nazi chiefs, in their strategy of terror or "warfare psychologically waged," subsequently applied the same tactics to the international community. Hitler conquered Europe with these tactics; he

started with flattery, made scenes, and ended with cold brutality. These were the skills of the urban slum.

The Creel Committee.

The fabulous American propaganda, of which the Germans expressed such dread, was the work of two agencies. The civilian agency was the Committee on Public Information, universally known as the "Creel Committee" after its chairman, Mr. George Creel. The military agency was the Propaganda Section (or Psychologic Section), G-2D, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, under Captain Heber Blankenhorn.

The Creel Committee had the superlative advantage of possessing a chief who enjoyed the confidence of the President and whose participation in national policy was on a high enough level to give propaganda coordination to other governmental policies on a basis of equality. Creel himself considered the task to be one of advertising, and he organized his Committee with extreme looseness, expanding it rapidly. Although his total gross budget for the war was only a fraction of OWI's budgets in World War II, he systematized most of the publicity activities then available.

News services were maintained by means of a news bureau in Washington that fed material to the commercial press and processed other material to publicity missions abroad. Heavy emphasis was placed on the home audience for Creel's mission covered all phases of propaganda work. Sections were set up for posters, advertising, "Four Minute Men" (volunteer local speakers in all American communities), films, American minority groups and the foreign-language press, women's organizations, information bureaus, syndicated features, and cartoons. The young but already large American motion picture industry was made a

channel whereby American propaganda movies went to both the United States and overseas audiences. In one instance Creel got the American producers to threaten Swiss exhibitors with a boycott unless they showed American propaganda film along with the features.

Missions were sent to France, England, Italy, Switzerland, Holland, Spain, Scandinavia, Mexico and other Latin American countries, China, and Russia. It was not considered necessary to send American propagandists to Japan in World War I. The Japanese were given the American propaganda file and were asked to use it; they said they would.

The Creel Committee was run in simple, almost chaotic fashion. Agencies proliferated whenever a new idea turned up. The basic concept was that of domestic American agitation, as practiced commercially through advertising and socially through the civic clubs. The war propaganda left a rather bad taste in the mouth of many Americans, and the boisterous joviality of the arousers probably produced negative attitudes which encouraged pacifism and isolationism in the postwar years. The purely technical side of the work was done well, but at the terrible cost of overshooting national commitments.

America emerged from the war disappointed at home and discredited abroad—so far as the heated propaganda of "making the world safe for democracy" was concerned. A more modest more calculated national propaganda effort would have helped forestall those attitudes which, in turn, made World War II possible. Creel and his fellow-workers did not remember that beyond every war there lies a peace, in its own way as grim and difficult as war. They did not understand that no war is the last war, that leeway must be left for propaganda to be effective *again*. They said that

World War I would be the last of all wars; perhaps they believed it themselves.

General Pershing's Headquarters.

The civilians of the Creel committee patronizingly claimed to have helped the G-2 men at A.E.F. Headquarters run psychological warfare. In the official history of Captain Blankenhorn's group, which centered from the very beginning on leaflet production, there is little reference to outside aid. Radio did not exist as a means of mass communication, and loudspeakers then surpassed an ordinary megaphone very little, if at all; hence communication with the enemy had to be through print. Leaflets were basic.

The Americans at A.E.F. concentrated on morale and surrender leaflets. They did work that was superb from the point of view of common-sense psychology. They used British and French experience in applying techniques of leaflet distribution, making inventions and improvements of their own. Balloons and airplanes were the chief methods for air distribution; the plane-borne leaflet bomb was a development of World War II. Extensive improvements were made in the procedures of leaflet distribution by means of mortars.

The morale leaflets used the anti-militarist, pro-democratic sentiments of the world at that time. The autocracy and inefficiency of the German government provided an excellent target. Since propaganda against the upper classes was not yet regarded as a Communist monopoly, considerable appeal was introduced for the common German soldier against his generals, nobles, officials, and capitalists. German nationalism was attacked by means of sectional appeals to Lorrainers and Bavarians.

The news that America was in fact producing vast weapons, that the American army was truly in Europe, that the German retreats were really serious—these were used in morale form (see below, page 212) rather than as spot-news leaflets.

It was in the primary mission of combat propaganda—the inducement to surrender—that the Americans excelled themselves. They produced limitless appeals (see Figure 13) promising the Germans first-class American food when they surrendered. Emphasis was indeed on all surrender themes—good food, human care, privileges under international law, patriotic value of remaining alive, opportunity to return to loved ones, and so forth. But the Americans went over these variously, and came back to the topic of food. For an army of hungry men who knew that their homeland starved behind them, the enumeration of things to eat had obsessive value.

Haughty and incompetent, the German high command tried to counteract Allied leaflets—particularly the American leaflets—by the use of appeals to "disregard propaganda." While the German armies plainly backed down toward defeat, such German statements preached about the situation. They did not put the common soldier's plight in concrete terms. They did not say, "You will be unemployed, poor, sick, dishonored, lonely, if you surrender. Your wife will be beaten by Frenchmen, your daughters raped by savages, your father and mother starved to death by the food prices." Such tactics had to wait for a later war. In 1918, the German command, senile and fussy, pointed out that enemy leaflets were propaganda (nasty! nasty!) and that good German soldiers would remember their duty. For men who probably imagined they could smell white bread baking, bacon frying, and coffee cooking across the lines, such wordage was nonsense. The Germans came on over to surrender.

Figure 13: Surrender Leaflet from the AEF. Though this American combat leaflet from World War I copies the original form of the German *Feldpostkarte* (field postcard, an early precursor of the V-mail form), it is not black propaganda since neither source nor intent is concealed. "When you are taken prisoner, by the Americans, give this to the first officer who checks your identities." The prisoner is commanded to fill in his own battle-order history. By marking out appropriate items, he indicates whether he is hurt or not and can explain that he is well cared for and fed "beef, white bread, potatoes, beans, plums, genuine bean coffee, milk, butter, tobacco, etc."

Captain Blankenhorn's unit, without benefit of psychologists, developed a German morale analysis chart. This was made up before scientific polling had become a common technique, and was consequently based on a group of selected known factors given arbitrary weight and then averaged into a total. It was not, "number of German prisoners per hundred who express attitudes characterized by doubt" but "the U-boat situation," "unity in Germany," and other abstracted generalities which were used as controls. The chart was carefully kept, and sought to follow morale from its causative factors rather than by a percentage count of attitudes discovered in the newspapers or among prisoners.

The Bolshevik and Chinese Revolutions.

The dynamic propaganda development of this period came about in Russia. The Russian revolution began as reaction to an adverse military situation, disesteemed leadership, economic hardship, and long overdue reforms. In its first, or constitutional phase, it had an inevitableness about it; there was little resistance to the revolution, and the popular mood was one of relief, joy, easement. However, the majority group of the Russian Socialists interpreted the Marxist philosophy to mean (putting it bluntly) that the end is justified by the means. They believed that they had developed a system of politico-economic forecasting which, while not always certain, was close to certain. And they further believed that no one else, lacking this system of forecasting, could lead the workers and peasants to their historically inevitable freedom. This philosophy may sound beside the point, but it is not. Such abstruse doctrines of Hegelianism and Marxism were used by the majority-Socialists (known by their Russian name, *Bolshevik*) to give themselves a sense of unconditional rightness. From the first phase of the revolution on, the Bolsheviks pitilessly sabotaged all other democratic groups. There was no point in helping other groups, when Bolsheviks alone had the inner secrets of history at their command.

In the geniuses Lenin and Trotzky, the Bolshevik movement found its leadership. Lenin had no use for democracy as it was known in America. To him it was a sham, a front for the great capitalist trusts, which—even though the capitalists themselves might not know it—were doomed to get bigger on a shrinking market, until international capitalist war, bankruptcy, and working-class revolution was the result. Lenin was as sure that this would happen as he was that the sun would rise the next morning. The only dispute was the matter of timing; a few Bolshevik

pessimists thought that the capitalist world might last into the 1920's.

Such a frame of mind led to a very deadly kind of psychological warfare. The Bolsheviks despised their opponents, desiring to "liquidate" them (this meant breaking down a group and preventing its reforming as a group, but came above all to mean mass murder). They were so antagonistic to the "capitalist" world that they hated God, patriotism, national history, churches, money, private property, chastity, marriage, and verse that rhymed, all with equal intensity. Moscow became the Mecca for the eccentrics and malcontents of the world and for some years Russia was in fact looser in morals than any other civilized country.

Hatred for the capitalist world enabled the Bolsheviks to throw Russian Czarist patriotism into the discard. They delighted in getting Russian troops to desert at the front; the Germans delighted in this, too. But the Bolsheviks were certain they would have the last laugh because they knew it was only a matter of weeks or months before the revolution —the *inevitable* revolution, forecast by Karl Marx's peculiar economics—broke out in Germany as well. The Russian devil-may-care attitude toward all established forms of society was perfectly characterized by Trotzky's flip but deadly answer to the German military negotiators at the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. When the Germans balked at some point, "All right," said Trotzky, "no war and—no peace."

The Germans insisted that if the Bolsheviks did not sign the dictated peace terms the German army would make more war.

Fine, said Trotzky in effect, he didn't mind. Go ahead and make war. It wouldn't worry him or his army. They would go

somewhere else and would refuse to play games with capitalists.

This stopped the Germans in their tracks. They did not want to send their troops into a starving country that roared with subversive doctrines. They knew that while Trotzky wasted their time quibbling over negotiations, his printing presses worked night and day telling the German troops that the war was over, that capitalism was on its way out, that the workers' revolution was coming, everywhere, for everybody, with food, peace, plenty, atheism and all the other delights of the good Bolshevik life. The Russians finally signed the surrender treaty but in point of fact, the German divisions on the Eastern front were contaminated by Bolshevism, and when they came back across Germany they brought the message of freedom and peace with them. Germany did have an abortive Communist revolution—partly because of Russian operations—though it was stopped by an alliance of the moderate Socialists and the dependable remnants of the army.

The Russians went on merrily through a living hell. For five more years the Bolshevik leaders held their country together with wretched industrial production, poor food, bad weapons. They had amazingly high morale among their own select Bolshevik group, and against the common people they had two weapons, propaganda and terror. (The terror was symptomatic of the first of the modern totalitarian dictatorships; its domestic police role is not a part of psychological warfare.)

The Bolshevik propaganda was probably the finest propaganda effort ever known in history down to that time—down, perhaps, all the way to our own time. The political limit was beyond reach; anything in the old world was fair game. Things the sober Soviet citizen of 1946 would regard with veneration were open to ridicule in 1919-1922:

patriotism, religion, national sovereignty, international law, treaties with or between capitalist states. There flowed from Russia a world-wide stream of propaganda, mostly clandestine, some of it overt. In every nation of the world there was, to a greater or less degree, a "Red scare"; the propaganda of the Bolsheviks was regarded as having mystical subversive powers which no other operation could match. In retrospect it seems absurd that anyone could have worried about the Americans of the 1920's revolting against their own Constitution; but a lot of people, including the Attorney General of the United States, did indeed worry.

They had cause for alarm though not for the reasons they supposed. Much of the magic of Bolshevik propaganda arose from its taking up where British, French and American propaganda left off. The psychological warfare of the Allies had made the sad mistake of promising a new, a better world to everyone on earth. When the war ended, and conditions went back to normal, many people in the world did not consider "normalcy" the fulfillment of that better world. The Bolshevik propaganda reaped the harvest which the Allied propagandist had sown and then left untended. Expectations, whipped up beyond normal, turned to Bolshevism when the Western democracies abandoned both domestic and foreign propaganda operations. The strategic advantage of Bolshevik propaganda was overwhelming. The Allies had gotten the world ready for it, so that the wild Utopia of the Leninists temporarily made sense to millions.

This does not mean that the Bolshevik propaganda of the 1920s was not good. It was good, technically, psychologically, politically—but good in terms of achieving an immediate scare at the cost of long-range confidence. The eventual cost to the Soviet Union was terrible. The Soviet government isolated itself and declared a condition of open psychological warfare against every other government on earth, including the United States. (This so

exasperated Presidents Wilson, Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover that they refused to recognize the Soviet Union.) The Bolshevik propaganda was carried by:

Russian government channels;

Communist "party" channels (the Communists not really being a political party, anywhere, but using the name "party" to designate the hierarchy of a dogmatic, ruthless and fanatical political religion);

trade unions;

individual subversive operators;

"cover organizations";

trade, consular and other official missions;

leaflets in the mails;

posters, books and other literature;

films;

radio.

The theme throughout was plain: the world revolution is coming, by inescapable economic laws discovered by our theory. The world revolution, which *will* come, will remove the *owning* classes from control of the productive capital, and will put all capital in the hands of the workers. "The expropriators will be expropriated." Thereupon the economic laws we have found in Marx's books will cease their bad influence and will guarantee world peace, world prosperity, happiness, human freedom. This is not an appeal (they said); this is *science*. This is *objective*. We *know*. Listen!

The Communists harped on these basic themes. They waged political warfare along with the psychological. Every attempt of the non-Communist countries to discuss the situation was termed "conspiracies of the warmongers." The

word "democratic" was reserved to the Communists or to non-Communists who were certain to cause Communism no trouble. The Communists invented an entirely new vocabulary, which the Soviet and other Communist papers still use, with meanings that have the same emotional value (plus-value, or, "that's *good*!") as in America or Britain, but which have entirely different meanings in concrete practice. "Democracy" means "free elections"; "free elections" mean that the people elect "democratic leaders"; but "democratic leaders" are not the people who are elected in non-Communist countries. Non-Communist leaders are usually dubbed "tools" or "stooges" of something; they are "servile" or "reactionary." Real "democratic leaders" are only those people approved by the international Communist movement. It *knows*. By *science*.

What was the net effect of such psychological warfare? In the first place, much use of common terms without regard to ultimate fulfillment means that Communist propaganda is self-defeating. It can succeed only in situations of desperation, anarchy, or terror. That is satisfactory to the Communist leaders, because they think their *science* tells them that the capitalist states will lead to desperation, anarchy and terror anyhow. Secondly, Communist propaganda sacrifices all other values to the propaganda. One has to be a religious fanatic (of the Marxist sort) to turn it out; one has to be ready for a totally new creed in order to keep on accepting it. International understanding, patriotism, truthfulness, freedom of action, artistic conscience—all these are sacrificed to propaganda. In the end, *everything is propaganda* to the Communist. Nothing which hurts Communism can be true. They have their *science*. (If you would like to look at this fabulous *science*, read *The Communist Manifesto*, V. I. Lenin's *The Teachings of Karl Marx*, and Stalin's latest current compilation of speeches. You will be impressed by the crazy logic, the

genuine but ill-informed zeal.) Third and most important, Communist psychological warfare is continuous. The themes may change—sometimes provocative, sometimes almost conciliatory—but the machinery, the operation, does not. Communist propaganda is therefore seasoned and professional, dependent on a powerful police-state at home and on uneducated or emotionally ill fanatics abroad, except for those few countries where Communism is so stable as to attract hard-headed or practical idealistic men.

This Bolshevik success, rather than the splendid but short-lasting accomplishments of the Allies in World War I, kept psychological warfare on the map. Modern Communism is permanent psychological warfare in action.

The Communist leaders unwittingly made a tremendous mistake between 1922 and 1927. They invited the military and political staff of the Chinese Nationalists (Kuomintang) to cooperate with them. Filled with their own Communist sense of certainty, it never occurred to them that anyone else could outsmart them. The Chinese did. Their military chief of mission in Moscow learned everything that the Communists had to teach about irregular fighting, subversive propaganda, revolutionary situations, mass agitation. He then went home and got more Communist aid to carry out the military phase of the Nationalist revolution, which started under way in the summer of 1922. The old war-lord armies were helpless in the face of agents, agitators, poster crews, student strikes, press propaganda and indoctrinated troops. The most sensational war in modern Asia involved relatively little combat. The Nationalist leader used all the Communist psychological warfare techniques, and added a few more of his own. His name was Chiang Kai-shek.

In 1927 the Communists began a debate in Moscow as to whether they had used the Nationalists enough or not. One

group said they might as well liquidate the Nationalists, Sunyatsenism, Chiang Kai-shek and all; the other said they should use the Nationalists a little longer, to carry on the struggle against American, Japanese, and British "imperialism." Chiang Kai-shek displayed a keen interest in these formal theoretical discussions which, thanks to his Moscow training, he understood perfectly. While the Communists were still debating when and how to hijack him, he hijacked them. In the fall of 1927, he turned against them, using the weapons of terror and propaganda, and then shifting to the more solid ground of economic development. They have not forgiven him. Nationalist China to this day possesses a working duplicate of the Moscow propaganda facilities which the Communists, unconscious of the humor of it, call "fascist." (What is anti-Communist for whatever cause *is* Fascist, they say.)

The Russian revolution of 1917-1922 and the Chinese revolution of 1922-1927 represent the situations created by Communist psychological warfare. Since that time, except for Spain, Communist psychological warfare has failed in every single attempt to come to power outside Russia. Following World War II, Communist psychological warfare proved itself capable of holding countries only *after* the military force had occupied or won them. The magic has gone out of Communist propaganda; it can keep control only with heavy military pressure behind it. But in the far past, it has been capable of winning—as in Russia and China—without outside military aid. With a renovation of techniques, doctrines, and personnel, it may do so again.

CHAPTER 6
Psychological Warfare in World War II

Bolshevik accomplishments in psychological warfare were often regarded as part of the peculiar mischief of Marxism, not as techniques which could be learned and used by other people. Similarly, the history-making sweep of the Chinese Nationalist armies northward in 1922-1927 was considered to be specially and incomprehensibly Chinese; possible lessons which might have been learned from Chinese Communist psychological warfare were left unheeded by officials and students in the West. Meanwhile Germany, the greatest power of Europe, had been fighting bitter internal psychological warfare battles[24] which looked like heated internal politics. Not until Adolf Hitler assumed the Reich's Chancellorship and began using his Brown-shirt methods for foreign affairs did other people wake up to the existence and application of the new weapon.

(The War College files, for example, show that not one single officer was assigned full-time to study of these problems during 1925-1935. For the entire period 1919-1929, there are listed only two War College research papers on the subject. Yet the American Army was far from negligent. It was an excellent army, though crippled by outright poverty of personnel and materials. The Army was simply American, and like the rest of America for a while took the world for granted.)

The National Socialist German Workers' Party, as Hitler called his movement, was a conglomerate built up around a few determined fanatics. The Nazis do not appear to have believed their own doctrines to anything like the degree to which the Communists believed theirs. From the first, the Nazis regarded propaganda very consciously as a new, fierce instrument which led to the accomplishment of *modern* power. The Communists had proclaimed that democracy was a fake; the Nazis agreed. The Communists had shown that a minority with a sacred mission of its own invention could get mass support for a government that

claimed to be *for* the people, even though it was obviously not by the people nor *of* them. The Nazis took this as a model. The Communists had shown that a modern man-god could be set up and worshipped in a twentieth-century state, and called leader (*Vozhd* in Russian). The Nazis elevated the Soviet practice all the way into a principle, the principle of the leader (*Führer* in German).

The Communists had shown that an organization calling itself a *party*, actually a quasi-religious hierarchy with strong internal discipline, definite membership, and active organizational components, could control fifty times its own membership. The Nazis organized the same general sort of party, copying the Italian Fascists in part, but copying more from the direct example of the German Communists right in front of them. The Communists had shown that such a movement needed to have youth branches, women's organizations, labor sections, clubs of its own, and so on, calling this "mass organization." The Nazis copied this too.

The machinery of Naziism was in many ways a copy of Communism, applied to allegedly different ends, (the Nazis had an Aryan myth; the Communists had their pseudo-economics). But the important thing about them both was the destruction of the *end* by the *means*; the problem of getting and keeping power despite the people was so obsessive that propaganda became all-important. Theoretically, the *end* (to the Nazi, German world rule; to the Communist, the fulfillment of history in universal communism) was the most important thing. But since any means at any time which led to that end was good, and since the Party bosses were the sole ones who could determine whether a particular action led to the very remote end or not, the outcome in both Russia and Germany became the conscienceless seeking of power for its own sake.

The new psychological warfare, a cause as well as a means of World War II, arose from the subjection of other considerations to *propaganda*. The propaganda addict takes everything with a ton of salt; what he does believe is lost in what he doesn't believe. The ordinary controls of civilized life—regard for truth, regard for law, respect for neighbors, obedience to good manners, love of God—cease to operate effectively, because the propaganda-dizzy man sees in everything its propaganda content and nothing else. Everything, from a girl dancing on a stage to an ecclesiastic officiating in a cathedral, is either *for* him or *against* him. Nothing is innocent; nothing is pleasurable; everything is connected with his diseased apprehension of power. Before he gets power, he hates the people who have power; he does not trust their intelligence, esteem their personalities, believe in their good will, or credit their motives.[25] They must be scum, because they hold power when *he*, the propaganda-infatuated man, is a member of the group that *should* hold it. Yet when such a man comes to power he hates his colleagues and comrades. Remembering the cold cynical way in which he himself sought power, knowing that his brother fanatics have the same ruthless arrogance, the propaganda-using Party man cannot trust anyone. Blood purges, mass trials, liquidations, removal of families, concealment of crimes—all these result from the establishment of propaganda in an overdeveloped role.

It is against such people that we—ordinary folk, Americans—dared wage psychological warfare during World War II. Propaganda had grown into ideology; the world was convulsed with monstrous new religions. For instance: the greatest journalist of the Soviet Union, Karl Radek, was placed on trial for treason. He was asked by the prosecutor, Vyshinsky,

"These actions of yours were deliberate?"

Radek answered: "Apart from sleeping, I have never in my life committed any undeliberate actions."[26]

This answer sums up the mood of the totalitarian who is obsessed by propaganda. He comes to believe that all activity, whether his own or of other people, has meaning. He had developed the sense of responsibility that made him violate tenets which Americans, in a free society, regard as fundamental to human nature: things like self-respect, kindliness, love of family, pity for the unfortunate.

This kind of mentality was found chiefly in the National Socialist and Communist states, and to a lesser degree in dictatorships such as Italy; by contrast, reactionary Japan was almost democratic. This mentality makes it possible for the ruler to control his own people enough to undertake "warfare psychologically waged." Without domestic fanaticism and domestic terror, governments have to fall back on "psychological warfare"—that is, the mere supplementing of politics and military operations by propaganda. It is vain to expect a free people in a free country to submit to such humiliating control, even for the purpose of winning a war. What made the psychological warfare of World War II peculiar was the fact that our enemies fought one kind of war ("warfare psychologically waged," or total war) and we fought them back with another. Theoretically, it is possible to argue that we had no business succeeding.

But we did succeed.

The Pre-Belligerent Stages.

The propaganda-conscious Axis states had first to control their own people enough to wage aggressive war. They then had to split their possible enemies, to make piecemeal victory possible. They had to stay on good terms with the

Soviet Union (Hitler till 1941; Japan till the last week of war). They had to frighten their immediate enemies while assuring their eventual enemies. This called for a great deal of propaganda.

Pre-belligerent operations required extensive use of "black" propaganda. Since their political systems aroused hostility and anger in audiences which they wished to address, the aggressors sought to disguise their propaganda. They used pacifist groups to keep the democracies from rearming. Militarist groups were encouraged to keep the democracies from undertaking domestic reforms or discussing military matters with Russia. Financial groups were contacted to preserve the fiction of normal international relations. Cultural groups were employed to preserve friendliness for their respective nationalities as such. The Japanese did a little global propaganda and for a while subsidized several magazines in this country, but in general they concentrated their main effort in the immediate area of their military operations.

It was the Germans who developed world-wide pre-belligerent propaganda to a fine art. They exploited every possible disunity which could contribute to the weakness of an enemy. They were not choosy about collaborators. If the Communist Party of the United States lent a hand (as it did between September, 1939 and June, 1941, terming the war "an imperialist war"; after Russia got in, the war was called "the democratic anti-fascist war"), the Nazis did not object. They willingly listened to men who had fantastic schemes for world peace and later used such men as aids in getting appeasement. They tried to rouse Catholics against Communists, Communists against democrats, Gentiles against Jews, whites against negroes, the poor against the rich, the rich against the poor, British against Americans, Americans against British—anyone against anyone, as long as it delayed action against Germany and weakened the

enemy potential. They went to special pains to organize German-speaking minorities in non-German countries, but they never neglected using people who had no open connection with Naziism at all.

This work was performed, so far as the open propaganda itself was concerned, through the instrumentalities of the Reich's Ministry for Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment under control of that malignant intelligence, Paul Josef Göbbels. The broader program was not solely a publicity matter, and was operated chiefly through Party channels. The German capacity to learn was demonstrated by the contrast between World War I and World War II. In World War I the Germans lacked political motifs, professionalism, and coordination; in World War II they had all of these.

German Accomplishments.

Three basic propaganda accomplishments were achieved by the Germans. First, in the political warfare field, they succeeded in making large sections of world opinion believe that the world's future was a choice between Communism and Fascism. Since they and the Communists agreed on this the point seemed well taken. Actually, there is no historical or economic justification for supposing that those two forms of dictatorship constitute a real choice in the first place, or that the civilized and truly free countries need ever depart from their ancient freedoms in the second place.

Second, in the strategic field, they made each victim seem the last. There was still hope that war would not arise, even while the Spanish Republic was being strangled before the eyes of the world. The British hoped that they could stay out even after Czechoslovakia fell. Astute though the Russians were, they hoped to stay out even after Britain and France fought. And as late as December 6, 1941 many

Americans still believed that the United States would avoid war. This suited the Nazis' book; take them on one at a time.

Thirdly, in the purely psychological field the Germans used outright fright. They made their own people afraid of Communist liquidations. They brazenly showed movies of their blitzkriegs to the governing groups of prospective victims, just to lower morale. When one nation is really ready to fight, and the other knows it, the nation that doesn't want to fight can be reduced to something resembling a nervous breakdown by constant uncertainty. (The author was in Chungking during the summer of 1940, when the German propaganda agent, Wolf Schenke, showed these German movies to the Chinese leaders. The author asked for an invitation and did not get it; it was for Chinese only, said Schenke. But the Chinese were not awed, or made fearful of the power of Japan's ally. They simply said, "Nice movie ... that's the kind of thing we used to do in the Ch'in dynasty," and let it go at that.)

The British-German Radio War.

With the outbreak of war the British and Germans found radio at hand. Neither had to change broadcasting policies a great deal. Each could reach almost all of Europe on standard-wave; each could jam the other's wave lengths, never with complete success, and the struggle centered around a contest for attention. Who could get the most attention? Who could get the most credence? Who could affect the beliefs, emotions, loyalties of friendly, neutral, and enemy listeners the most?

Figure 14: Radio Program Leaflet, Anzio, 1944. These leaflets were dropped by the Germans on American troops at Anzio in April 1944. They show an interesting tie-in between two forms of propaganda. The counterpropaganda to the British Broadcasting Corporation is slight; chief emphasis is on entertainment value of the German radio programs. (From photograph taken by Signal Corps and released through War Department Bureau of Public Relations.)

The Germans showed evidence of real planning. Their public relations facilities were perfectly geared to their propaganda facilities. When the Germans wanted to build the British up for a let-down, they withheld military news favorable to themselves. During the fight for Norway, they even spread rumors of British successes, knowing that if British morale went up for a day or two, it would come down all the harder when authentic bad news came through the War Office. When the Germans wanted to turn on a war of nerves, their controlled press screamed against the victim; when they turned it off their press was silent. The Germans thus had the advantage of not needing to make much distinction between news, publicity, and propaganda. All three served the same purpose, the immediate needs of the Reich.



AMERICAN SOLDIERS!

Remember those happy days when you stepped out with your best girl "going places and doing things"?

No matter

whether you two were enjoying a nice juicy steak at some tony restaurant or watching a thrilling movie with your favourite stars performing, or dancing to the lilt of a swing band

you were happy.

WHAT IS LEFT OF ALL THIS?

Nothing! Nothing but days and nights of the heaviest fighting and for many of you

NOTHING BUT A PLAIN WOODEN CROSS IN FOREIGN SOIL!

FILL IN THIS BLANK AND KEEP IT

USE BLOCK LETTERS.

TO BE TRANSMITTED BY JERRY'S FRONT RADIO:

Name: _____

Rank: _____

Serial Number: _____

Address: _____ Street

Town: _____

County: _____

Figure 15: Radio Leaflet Surrender Form, Anzio, 1944. Willingness of prisoners to surrender sometimes involves speedy communication of their names to their families, as in the preceding illustrations. At other times, prisoners are very unwilling to be identified and want their faces masked. This leaflet combines radio program announcements with the standard surrender pass.

The Germans put on the following types of news propaganda:

(1) Official OKW (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*, or *Wehrmacht* HQ) communiqués. (These rarely departed from the truth, though they naturally gave favorable situations in detail and unfavorable ones scantily.)

(2) Official government releases, marked by considerable dignity, possessing more political content than the military communiqués.

(3) News of the world, part of it repeated from the British radio, part plain non-controversial news (for stuffing), and part (the most important part) news of genuine curiosity value to the listeners but which, at the same time, had the propaganda effect of damaging belief in the Allied cause.

(4) Feature items, comparable to feature articles in newspapers, which tried to concentrate on a single topic

or theme.

(5) Recognized commentators, speaking openly and officially.

(6) Pseudonymous commentators, pretending to speak from a viewpoint different from that of the German Government, but who were announced as being broadcast over the official German radio system. (Of these the British traitor William Joyce, since hanged, known as "Lord Haw Haw," was the most notorious. His colleagues were the American traitors Fred Kaltenbach and Douglas Chandler. At the end of the war Chandler was tried in Boston and sentenced to life imprisonment but Kaltenbach fell into Soviet custody and died.)

(7) Falsified stations, which pretended to have nothing at all to do with Germany. (The "New British Broadcasting Company" transmitted defeatist propaganda with a superficial anti-German tone. Others took a strong Communist line and sought to build up opposition to the British government within England.)

(8) Falsified quotations on the official German radio. (Sometimes it was easier to make up an imaginary foreign source, ostensibly quoted in the German program, rather than to set up a special fake program for the purpose.)

(9) "Planted" news sources quoted on the German radio. (A great deal of the German news was culled out of Swedish, Spanish and other papers which were either secretly German-controlled or which—as in the case of the United States papers involved—were so sympathetic to Germany that they voluntarily printed German-inspired news which the Nazis could then quote from a "neutral" or "enemy" source.)

(10) Open falsification of BBC (British Broadcasting Company, the official British agency) materials—at which the Germans were not necessarily caught by their ordinary listeners, but at which BBC caught them.

(11) Ghost voices and ghost programs, transmitted on legitimate Allied wave lengths when the Allied transmitters went off the air, or else interrupting the Allied broadcasts by transmitting simultaneously.

Figure 16: Invitation to Treason. Another German leaflet, also from Anzio, combines the radio surrender-notice form with a political invitation to Britishers to commit treason. The Germans had a few British traitors in their "Legion of St. George," and a few American civilian renegades, but in general this line of appeal was useless. The last paragraph of the appeal is such naïve trickery that it probably aroused suspicion in the minds of the men it was supposed to persuade.

Of all these, it was soon found that the communiqués and government releases were the most important, although the bulk of the station time had to be diversified with other types of program. The Germans and British both found that radio was important as a starting point for news. It was more valuable to have the press (as in England) or rumor (as in Germany) pass along an item than it was to rely on the direct listeners. Each side sought to make opinion analyses of the enemy; some of the British studies were clever in technique. The radio propagandists had to ask

themselves *why* they made propaganda. It is simple to make mischief, spreading rumors or putting practical jokes into circulation. Such antics do not necessarily advance a military-political cause. Sustained psychological warfare required—as both British and German radio soon found out—a deliberate calculation of the particular enemy frame of mind to be cultivated over a long period of time. When radio stations had to broadcast day after day whether anything happened or not, it became difficult to continue to circulate news without faking it and losing the confidence of enemy listeners.

On the German side, the German radio had the forced attention of the entire world. As long as the Germans had the strategic initiative for field warfare, they were in a position to make news scoops whenever it suited them. The security policies of the Allies often gave the Germans a monopoly of news on a given operation. There was never any danger that the Germans were not listened in on; the danger the Nazi operators had to worry about was disbelief. Hence the Germans tried to keep a moderate tone in their news, tried to prepare between crises for the news that would become sensational during crises.

The Germans soon learned a basic principle of war radio. They learned not to permit radio to run ahead of their military capacities. At first, when their spokesmen promised attainment of a given goal by a given time, and the army failed to live up to the schedule, the British radio picked up the unfulfilled promise and dangled it before the world as proof that the Germans were weakening. The Germans thereupon effected Army-radio liaison so that the radio people could promise only those things which the army was reasonably sure of delivering. (When Allied propaganda analysis woke up to this fact, it added one more source of corroboratory intelligence to be checked. (See page 126.))

The British had their hands full getting news out in the languages of the occupied countries. It was immensely difficult for them to follow the politics of the underground. German counterespionage, under the deadly *Sicherheitsdienst*, made it difficult to keep track of opinion in the occupied countries. Work against Naziism depended on the temper of the people; propaganda against collaborators had to distinguish between outright evil collaborators and those public officials who stayed on out of a sense of mistaken or necessary duty. The British did not necessarily announce themselves at any time as anti-Communist, and collaborated for short-range purposes with Communists all over the Continent. Mr. Churchill himself shifted his North Balkan political support from Mikhailovich to Broz-Tito. But it was vitally necessary to know just how and when to change support from one group to the other. Since the undergrounds had very few radio transmitters, and none of these was reliable during most of the war, the British faced the task of providing radio facilities for all of the occupied countries. The consequence was to make their radio warfare highly sensitive to politics; they had to address the right people with the right language at the right time, on penalty of failure.

Figure 17: Anti-Radio Leaflet. Sometimes ground-distributed leaflets were used in an attempt to counteract enemy radio propaganda. This leaflet, circulated in France by the Nazis, uses the form of an Allied leaflet and accuses the Armed SS of wanting such things as a decent Europe, and end to atrocious killings every twenty-five years, and a worthy life. Allied broadcasters are identified as Jews.

To effect this end, the British set up an agency which never had an American counterpart, the Political Warfare Executive (known by its initials, PWE). This agency had representation from the War Office, the Admiralty, the Foreign Office, and the Ministry of Information. The PWE was the policy-servicing and coordinating agency for all British external propaganda, and left the execution of its operations to the Ministry of Information (MOI) and to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). British radio propaganda maintained a high level of effectiveness. American officials and propagandists often complained that the British were running the entire war in their own national interest. The charge was unjust. The British had facilities for knowing exactly what they wished to do and when they wished to do it. If the Americans came along without clear policies or propaganda purposes, it was natural that the British should take the lead and let the Americans string along if they

wished. Furthermore, the British were usually scrupulous in yielding to America's primary interest in areas they felt to be American problems—Japan, China, the Philippines. They were least cooperative when the OWI tried to spread the ideals of Mr. Henry Wallace in Burma or to explain the CIO-PAC to the Hindus.

No clear victor emerged from the Anglo-German radio war; the victory of the United Nations gave the British the last say. In the opinion of many, the British were one war ahead of the United States. They had profited by their World War I experience, and by their two years' operational lead which they had on the Americans. But side-by-side with the Germans, it is harder to appraise their net achievements. The British had immense political advantages; the resentment of a conquered continent worked for them. But they had disadvantages too. The enemy worked from the starting point of a fanatical and revolutionary philosophy; the British had the tedious old world to offer. The postwar interrogations of civilians in Germany showed that an amazingly high proportion of them had heard BBC broadcasts, and that many of the ideas and attitudes which the British propagandized were actually transmitted to the enemy. On the British side, it is almost impossible to find any surviving traces of the effect of Nazi propaganda. Had the war been purely a radio war this test might be conclusive. But if psychological warfare supplements combat, combat certainly supplements propaganda. The great British and American air raids over Europe unquestionably created an intense interest in British and American plans and purposes.

It is historically interesting to note that the Germans went on fighting psychological warfare even after the death of Hitler and the surrender of the jury-rigged government of Grossadmiral Karl Doenitz, which functioned 6-23 May 1945 at Flensburg under Allied toleration. This resulted from the

inability of the 21st Army Group swiftly to initiate information control. The Flensburg radio, still under Nazi direction, emphasized Anglo-American differences with the Soviet Union in every possible way short of direct appeals. German naval radio also carried on propaganda for a while, using topics such as the sportsmanship of the German surrender, the hatred of the German Navy for atrocities committed by the Nazis, and the usefulness of the phantom government to the Western Allies.

Black Propaganda.

Subversive operations formed a major part of the Nazi pre-belligerent effort. The Germans planted or converted quislings wherever they could, and when they failed to have time to prearrange stooges they converted them rapidly after arrival. (A major cause of the German defeat is to be found in the fantastic political policies followed in the Ukraine and neighboring Soviet Socialist Republics. In these areas, despite the Soviet boast that Russia had no fifth columnists within her borders, the Germans found thousands of helpers. The Nazis organized a large army (General Vlassov's Russian Army of Liberation) out of Soviet prisoners, and these troops were usable and docile. But in the political warfare field the Germans were too cocksure. They let their men go wild in orgies of cruelty against the local population; the economic system went entirely to pieces. The natives then became convinced that the worst possible conditions of Sovietism were infinitely better than the best that Naziism could offer.)

These subversive groups were formed by political means. Propaganda aid was offered to such an extent that it was often difficult to tell how much of the quisling movement was spontaneously native, and how much mere cover for a purely German operation.

In the latter phase of the European war, the Russian Communists followed the German Nazi example of having tame natives ready to take over the government of occupied areas. In Poland, the so-called Lublin Committee took over the government from the constitutional Polish Government-in-exile at London. In Jugoslavia, the Russian-trained propagandist, Tito, seized the leadership from the recognized Minister of War, Draja Mikhailovich, after the British and American governments had shifted their support to him; later Mikhailovich was put to death. The Russian army brought along to Germany a considerable number of German Communists. In Czechoslovakia the strength of the constitutional regime was such as to compel the pro-Russians to allow the prewar leadership a precarious toehold in the new government. The same cadres of sympathetic persons who had been useful as propaganda sources for psychological warfare during the period of hostilities became useful instruments of domination after hostilities ended. The British and Americans, with their belief that government should spring from the liberated and defeated peoples, did not prepare and equip comparable groups to rival the Communist candidates; only in Italy and Greece did the friends of the Western Allies stay in power, and then only because they were the nearest equivalent of *de jure* authorities. In the Scandinavian and Low Countries the national leadership reemerged without prodding or interference by the Western Allies; they passed from the sphere of psychological warfare (that is, of being someone's cover) to that of world politics.

Specific black propaganda operations were of considerable value. However, black propaganda is more difficult to appraise than overt propaganda. Analytical and historical studies, gauging the results obtained by Black operations in relation to their cost, are not yet available.

(Certain particular operations are described later in this book, pages 208 and 237.)

American Operations: OWI and OSS.

Long after the outbreak of war in the Far East, and even after the coming of full war in Europe, neither the civilian nor military portions of the American government possessed propaganda facilities. This is not as serious as it may sound, for the United States is lucky in possessing a people well agreed on most fundamentals. The commercial press, radio, magazine, and book publishing facilities of the country for the most part expressed a national point of view without being prodded. (The isolationist issue never brought in the question of America's basic character.) Before the war, and even after the government entered the field, private American news and publishing continued to engage in operations which had the effect if not the intention of propaganda. OWI at its most vigorous could scarcely have reached the audience that had been built up by the *Time-Life-Fortune* group, not to mention the *Reader's Digest*, both of which became truly global in coverage during the war years. American movies already had a world-wide audience. The propaganda turned out unwittingly by such agencies may not have had the gloss and political smoothness of Dr. Paul Josef Göbbels best productions, but it had something no government propaganda had—the possession of a readership all of which was unmistakably voluntary, obtained by the appeal of authentic interest and entertainment—and proved by an ability to charm money out of people's pockets.

The American problem of propaganda was thus not a simple one. Total psychological warfare was out of reach if we were to remain a free people. Otherwise the simple-seeming thing to have done would have been to put a

government supervisor in every newspaper, radio station and magazine in the country, and coordinate the whole bunch of them together in the national interest. Simple-seeming. Actually, such an attempt would have been utter madness, touching off a furious political fight within the country and meeting legal obstacles which would have remained insurmountable as long as there was a Constitution with courts to enforce it. The simplest official action which the United States could take was therefore hedged about by the presence of private competitors who would watch it enviously, jealous of their established rights and privileges, and by the operational interference which vigorous private media would have on public media.

The then Mr. or Colonel, later General, William Donovan had tasted the delights of political warfare when President Roosevelt sent him to Belgrade to talk the Serbs into fighting instead of surrendering. He was successful; the Serbs fought. He came back to the United States with a practical knowledge of what political warfare could do if qualified personnel operated on the spot. The outbreak of the Russo-German war lent urgency to American action in the political-intelligence field as well as in the propaganda field. On 11 July, 1941 President Roosevelt issued an order appointing Colonel Donovan as Coordinator of Information. The agency became known by the initials COI.[27]

The primary mission of COI was the collection of information and its processing for immediate use. Large numbers of experts were brought into its Research and Analysis Branch, designed to do for the United States in weeks what the research facilities of the Germans and Japanese had done for them over a matter of years. The inflow of material was tremendous and the gearing of scholarship to the war effort produced large quantities of political, sociological, geographic, economic and other monographs, most of them carefully classified SECRET, even

when they were copied out of books in the Library of Congress. However, it was not the research wing of the COI that entered the broadcasting field.

Radio work was first done by an agency within COI called FIS—Foreign Information Service. In the few months before Pearl Harbor the group became organized in New York under the leadership of Robert Sherwood, the dramatist, and got a start in supplying the radio companies with material. The radio scripts were poorly checked; there was chaos in the matter of policy; little policing was possible, and the output reflected the enthusiasm of whatever individual happened to be near the microphone. Colonel Donovan had moved into this work without written and exclusive authorization from the White House; hence there followed a lamentable interval of almost two years' internal struggle between American agencies—a struggle not really settled until the summer of 1943, well into the second year of war. The occasion for struggle arose from lack of uniform day-to-day propaganda policy and from an unclear division of authority between the operating agencies. But the work was done.

Radio operations had to be coordinated with strategy on the one hand and foreign policy on the other, and we sought to develop methods for doing this. It is significant that all the major difficulties of American psychological warfare were administrative and not operational. There was never any serious trouble about getting the facilities, the writers, the translators, the telecommunications technicians. What caused trouble were problems of personality and personal power, resulting chiefly from the lack of any consensus on the method or organization of propaganda administration.

Military Intelligence Division had created an extremely secret psychological warfare office at about the time that the COI was established; this had broad intelligence and policy functions, but no operational facilities. It was headed

by Lieutenant Colonel Percy Black, who began auspiciously by putting Dr. Edwin Guthrie in office as his senior psychological adviser. This ultra-quiet office was called Special Study Group; it and the COI developed very loose cooperative relations, consisting chiefly of SSG making suggestions to COI which COI might or might not use as it saw fit. Meanwhile, the Rockefeller Office was conducting independent broadcasts to Latin America; the Office of Facts and Figures was dispensing domestic information; and at the height of the psychological warfare campaigning, there were at least nine unrelated agencies in Washington, all directly connected with psychological warfare, and none actually subject to the control of any of the others.[28]



Chart I (Source: The author's observations.)

A year of wrangling produced the solution, after a Joint Psychological Warfare Committee had been set up under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and had failed to fulfill an effective policy-supervising function. On 13 June, 1942 the President created the Office of War Information. This agency was given control directly or indirectly over all domestic propaganda, and over white propaganda abroad, except for the Western Hemisphere, which remained under the Rockefeller Committee in the State Department. The FIS was taken from the COI, and the COI took on the new name of OSS—Office of Strategic Services—under which it retained three major functions:

(1) continuation of scholastic and informal intelligence;

(2) black propaganda operations (given *explicit* authority only in March, 1943);

(3) subversive operations, in collaboration with regular military authority.

The OWI was placed under Mr. Elmer Davis, a Rhodes scholar and novelist who had become one of the nation's most popular radio commentators. The FIS was perpetuated under the control of Mr. Robert Sherwood, who had a most extraordinary coterie of odd personalities assisting him: Socialist refugees, advertising men, psychologists, psychoanalysts (of both the licensed and lay varieties), professional promoters, theatrical types, German professors, a commercial attaché, young men just out of college, oil executives, and popular authors (novelists, slick writers, Pulitzer winners, pulp writers, humorists, poets and a professional pro-Japanese writer, fresh off the Imperial Japanese Embassy payroll).

The War Department agency, under the Military Intelligence Service of G-2, had been renamed Psychological Warfare Branch and had executed within the G-2 structure the equivalent of a knight's move in chess, ending up at a new place on the TO with no observable change in function or authority; it had passed under the authority of Colonel (later Brigadier General) Oscar Solbert, a West Pointer with wide international and business experience; he had been out of the Army as a top official with Eastman Kodak, after a cosmopolitan army career which sent him all over Europe and gave him one tour of duty as a White House aide. With the establishment of OWI, Colonel Solbert's office fissiparated like an amoeba; the civilian half of Psychological Warfare Branch, with a few officers, went over to OWI to be a brain-trust for the foreign broadcast experts, who failed to

welcome this accession of talent; the military half remained as an MIS agency until 31 December, 1943, when OWI abolished its half and MIS cooperated by wiping out the other, leaving the War Department in the middle of a war with no official psychological warfare agency whatever, merely some liaison officers. Psychological warfare became the responsibility of designated individual officers in OPD—(the Operations Division of the General Staff), an outfit celebrated for conscientious overwork, as well as in MIS and the War Department got along very nicely. Meanwhile OWI and OSS fought one of the many battles of Washington, each seeking control of foreign propaganda. The D.C. and Manhattan newspapers ran columns on this fight, along with news of the fighting in Russia, Libya, and the Pacific. For one glorious moment of OSS, it seemed that the President had signed over all foreign propaganda functions conducted outside the United States to OSS, cutting the OWI out of everything except its New York and San Francisco transmitters; the OWI was stricken with gloom and collective indigestion. The next day, the mistake was rectified, and OWI triumphantly planned raids on the jurisdiction of OSS. Meanwhile, the following things were happening:

Highly classified plans for psychological warfare were being drafted for both the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. These were discussed at various meetings and then classified a little higher, whereupon they were locked up, lest the propaganda writers and broadcasters see them and break security on them by obeying and applying them.

Broadcasts—thousands of words in dozens of languages—were transmitted to everyone on earth. They were written by persons who had little if any contact with Federal policy, and none with the military establishment, except for formal security. The plans at the top bore no observable relation to the operations at the bottom.



Chart II (Source: Bureau of the Budget: *The United States at War*, Washington, 1947, p. 225.)

Figure 18: Anti-Exhibit Leaflet. In the China Theater, we heard that the Japanese had organized a big exhibit in Canton, showing the starved and apathetic population some pieces of shot-down planes as demonstration of defeat of American air power. We made up this leaflet quickly, and dropped it on the city while the exhibit was still in progress. (China, 1944.)

When Washington agencies wanted to find out what the broadcasts really were saying, the actual working offices at

New York and San Francisco, their feelings hurt at not having been consulted by the Joint Chiefs, refused (on *their* security ground) to let anyone see a word of what they were sending out. This baffled other Washington agencies a great deal. (The author, who was then detailed from the War Department to OWI, outflanked this move in one instance by getting a report on a San Francisco Japanese Broadcast from the Navy Department. It had been monitored by an American submarine out in the Pacific.)

Large overseas offices were set up at various foreign locations. Some of these went down to work quickly, efficiently, smoothly, and did a first-class job of presenting wartime America to foreign peoples; others, with the frailties of jerry-built government agencies, lapsed into inefficiency, wild goose chases, or internal quarrels.

Lastly, the poor British officials continued to wander around Washington, looking for their American opposite numbers in the propaganda field—looking for one and always finding a dozen.

That was in 1942-1943.

By 1945, this had all become transformed into a large, well run, well integrated organization. Three weeks before Japan fell, the OWI finally prepared an official index of its propaganda "Directives"—that, is, of the official statement of what kinds of propaganda to make, what kinds not to make. The overseas units had been associated with the metropolitan short-wave. Personnel had been disciplined. Techniques had become more precise. Under the command of Lieutenant Commander Alexander Leighton, an M.D. who was also a psychiatrist and anthropologist, careful techniques were devised for the analysis of Japanese and German morale. Comparable though dissimilar work on Europe had been done by a staff associated with Harold Lasswell. The propaganda expert Leonard W. Doob had been

appointed controlling and certifying officer for every single order of importance.

The military relationship had been clarified. The War Department, acting through G-2, had reestablished a psychological warfare office under the new name of Propaganda Branch, under the successive commands of Lieutenant Colonel John B. Stanley, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Buttles, and Colonel Dana W. Johnston. The new branch undertook no operations whatever, but connected War Department with OWI and OSS for policy and liaison, and represented one-half of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (an appropriate naval officer from a comparable office representing the other half) at the weekly policy meetings of OWI. Military needs in psychological warfare had been settled by regarding the Theaters in this respect as autonomous, and leaving to the respective Theater Commanders the definition of their relationships with OWI and OSS, and their use of each. OSS and OWI had passed the stage of rival growth, and consulted one another enough to prevent operational interference. Each had sufficient military or naval supervision to prevent interference with cryptographic security, communication and deception operations.

The Lessons.

The major job of psychological warfare passed to the Theaters. In some theaters this was kept by the commander directly under his own immediate supervision, and OWI was used simply as a propaganda service of supply. In others, OWI was an almost independent agent. In some places, OWI worked with OSS as in the European Theater, in others independently, as in the China-Burma-India Theater. In one, it worked completely without OSS (SWPA), since General MacArthur did not let OSS into his Theater at all. (OSS got in

the general area anyhow; with Navy permission, it turned up blithely, highly nautical on Saipan.) These Theater establishments were the ones that set up local standard-wave programs which the enemy could hear in volume. They provided the loudspeaker units which were taken right into combat. They serviced the ground and air combat echelons with leaflets as needed. They moved along behind the advances, opening up information booths and explaining to liberated natives why each did not get the four freedoms, the three meals a day, and the new pair of shoes he thought he had been promised by the American radio.

These military establishments are better described under operations, since it was their functioning which defined—down to the limit of present-day experience—American military doctrine concerning the conduct of psychological warfare in theaters of war. In concluding the historical summary of psychological warfare, it is interesting to look at three major points which emerge plainly from the experience of World War II—points which either were not discovered in World War I, or else failed to make an impact on the minds of the responsible officials and informed citizens.

The first of these is simple. It became almost a litany with Colonel Oscar Solbert, when he sought to indoctrinate civilian geniuses with military proprieties: *Psychological warfare is a function of command.* If command chooses to exercise it, it will succeed. If command neglects it, or if it is operated independently of military command, it will either interfere with the conduct of war proper, or it will be wasted. It took us two bitter years to learn this lesson. Political warfare cannot be waged without direct access to the White House and the Department of State; field operations cannot be conducted unless they meet at some common staff point with field command. No one can succeed in improvising alleged policy and presenting that policy as United States

policy, and get away with it. Sooner or later actual policy catches up with him. In the field, no civilian can write leaflets for air or ground distribution unless he has some idea of when, where, why, and how they will be used.

The second lesson of World War II, set forth by Colonel Solbert and Dr. Edwin Guthrie was simply this: *Atrocity propaganda begets atrocity.* Everyone knows that war is cruel, sad, shameful to the soul of man; everyone knows that it hurts, degrades, injures the human body; everyone knows that it is not pleasant to undergo, nor even to look at. If any particular war is worth fighting, it is worth fighting for some reason other than the crazily obvious one—the fact that it is already war. It is a poor statesman or general who cannot give his troops and people an inspiring statement of their own side in war. Atrocity propaganda reacts against war in general; meanwhile, it goads the enemy into committing more atrocities. The anti-atrocity rule was not lifted in World War II (save for one or two notable exceptions, such as President Roosevelt's delayed announcement of the Japanese having executed the Doolittle flyers) except for the specific purpose of preventing some atrocity that seemed about to occur in a known situation from actually occurring. Atrocity propaganda heats up the imagination of troops, makes them more liable to nervous or psychoneurotic strain. It increases the chances of one's own side committing atrocities in revenge for the ones alleged or reported. Furthermore, atrocity propaganda scares the enemy out of surrendering, and gives the enemy command an easier responsibility in persuading their troops to fight with last-ditch desperation.

The third lesson was equally simple: *America does not normally produce psychological warfare personnel in peacetime, and if such personnel are to be needed again, they will have to be trained especially and in advance.*

Qualifications for Psychological Warfare.

Effective psychological warfare requires the combination of four skills in a single individual:

(1) An effective working knowledge of U.S. government administrationand policy, so that the purposes and plans of the government may be correctly interpreted.

(2) An effective knowledge of correct military and naval procedure and of staff operations, together with enough understanding of the arts of warfare, whether naval or military, to adjust propaganda utterance to military situations and to practical propaganda operations in forms which will dovetail.

(3) Professional knowledge of the media of information, or of at least one of them (book-publishing, magazines, newspapers, radio, advertising in its various branches), or of some closely related field (practical political canvassing, visual or adult education, etc.).

(4) Intimate, professional-level understanding of a given area (Italy, Japan, New Guinea, Kwangtung, Algeria), based on first-hand acquaintance, knowledge of the language, traditions, history, practical politics, and customs.

On top of these, there may be a possible fifth skill to make the individual perfect:

(5) Professional scientific understanding of psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, political science, or a comparable field.

The man who steps up and says that he meets all five of these qualifications is a liar, a genius, or both.

There is no perfect psychological warrior.

However—and the qualification is important—each psychological warfare team represents a composite of these skills. Some members have two or three to start with, the others virtually none. But all of the personnel, except for men with peculiarly specialized jobs (ordnance experts; cryptographers; translators; calligraphers), end up with a professionalism that blends these together. They may not meet professional standards as officials-officers-journalists-Japanologists-psychoanalysts when they return from psychological warfare operations against the Japanese, but they have met men who are one or more of these, and have picked up the rudiments of each skill—enough, at least, to suspect what they do not know.

The advertising man or newspaperman (skill 3) who goes into psychological warfare must learn something of the enemy, neutral or friendly groups whom he addresses (skill 4), something of United States civilian government procedures (skill 1), something of military or naval organization and operations (skill 2) and ideally something of psychology or sociology or economics, depending on the topic of his work (skill 5).

Figure 19: Propaganda Against Propaganda. As an occasional stunt, propaganda is directed against propaganda. Hitler did so in his book, *Mein Kampf*. The leaflet, shown in the original and in facsimile, was used by the Allies on the Germans in the West. A German leaflet, addressed to their own troops ("defensive propaganda"), was picked up, X'd out, copied, and refuted.

The psychological soldier deals with enemy troops in their *civilian* capacity; he addresses them as *men*, he appeals to their non-military characteristics in most instances, and he does not follow sportsmanship, as men did in other wars, by helping the enemy command maintain discipline. Furthermore, the soldier works with writers, illustrators, translators, script-writers, announcers and others whose skills are primarily civilian, and he takes his policy cues from the civilian authority at the top of the war effort. An infantry colonel does not have to worry about what the Secretary of State is saying, if the colonel is on the field of battle. But an officer detailed to psychological warfare must remain attuned to civilian life even if he has seen no one out of khaki for two months straight.

Personnel was probably the biggest field problem of the entire war. Should psychological warfare be needed again, it will take careful culling of personnel to obtain the necessary

staff and operators. The continuation of psychological warfare techniques, in part at least, by both civilian and military agencies in time of peace will, it may be hoped, provide the U.S. with a cadre for the next time. Very little of the living experience of the Creel Committee was carried over into OWI. Walter Lippmann, who had worked with both Creel and Blankenhorn, was not a participant. Carl Crow, the advertising man and writer from Shanghai, worked on China for the Creel Committee in World War I and on China again for OWI in World War II. He was exceptional, and took no major part in setting up indoctrination. One of the OWI executives in 1946, shortly after his return to civilian life, read James Mock and Cedric Larson's account of the Creel Committee, *Words That Won the War* (Princeton, 1939); his interest was avid. When he finished, he said,

"Good Lord, those people made the same mistakes we made!"

He had forgotten that the Creel Committee record had been available all the way through.

Effects of American Operations.

The net effects of the work of civilian-operated propaganda are hard to appraise because the radio broadcasts and leaflets for civilians were designed to have a long-range effect on the enemy. Statistical computations come to nothing. It would appear likely that some parts of our psychological warfare actually lengthened the war and made it more difficult to win. The "unconditional surrender" formula, the publicity given to proposals for the pastoralization of Germany, the emphasis on Japanese savagery with its implied threat of counter-savagery were not overlooked by the enemy authorities. It is certain that other parts of our psychological warfare speeded up the end

of the war, saved lives, increased the war effort which was enormous when measured in terms of the expenditure of manpower, matériel and time involved.

Figure 20: Re-Use of Enemy Propaganda. Leaflets sometimes develop an enemy pictorial or slogan theme and use it effectively against the original disseminators. Employing the colors and insignia of the U.S. Air Force, this Nazi leaflet for Frenchmen makes no attempt to minimize American bombing to the French. Instead, it uses the Allied heading, "The hour of liberation will ring...." Then it adds the grim point, "Make your will, make your will."

One operation alone probably repaid the entire cost of OWI throughout the war. The Japanese offered to surrender, but with conditions. We responded, rejecting the conditions. The Japanese government pondered its reply, but while it pondered, B-29s carried leaflets to all parts of Japan, giving the text of the Japanese official offer to surrender. This act alone would have made it almost impossibly difficult for the Japanese government to whip its people back into frenzy for suicidal prolongation of war. The Japanese texts were checked between Washington and Hawaii by radiophotograph and cryptotelephone; the plates were put into the presses at Saipan; the big planes took off, leaflets

properly loaded in the right kind of leaflet bombs. It took Americans three and a half years to reach that point, but we reached it. Nowhere else in history can there be found an instance of so many people being given so decisive a message, all at the same time, at the very dead-point between war and peace.

The Japanese had done their best against us, but their best was not enough. We got in the last word, and made sure it was the last.

Soviet Experience.

Soviet psychological warfare used Communist party facilities during World War II, turning them on and off as needed. But Soviet psychological war efforts were not characterized by blind reliance on past experience. They showed a very real inventiveness, and the political policies behind them were both far-sighted and far-reaching.

The Soviet government was the one government in the world which could be even more totalitarian than Nazi Germany. Many Americans may consider this a moral disadvantage, but in psychological warfare it has very heavy compensating advantages. The Soviet people were propaganda-conscious to an intense degree, but the authorities took no chances. Revolutionary Communist themes were brilliantly intermingled with patriotic Russian items. Army officers were given extraordinary privileges. Everyone was given epaulettes. The Communist revolutionary song, the famous *Internationale*, was discarded in favor of a new Soviet hymn. History was rewritten. The Czars were honored again. The Church was asked to pray for victory. The Soviet officials were able to tailor their social system to fit the propaganda. They did so, even to the name of the war. They call it the Great Patriotic

War. Outsiders may murmur, "What war is not?" But the Russian people liked it, and the regime used traditionalism and nationalism to cinch Communism in the Soviet Union.

In their combat propaganda the Russians were equally ruthless and realistic. They appealed to the memory of Frederick the Great of Prussia, they reminded the Germans of Bismarck's warning not to commit their forces in the East, they appealed to the German Junker caste against the unprofessional Nazi scum who were ruining the German army, and they used every propaganda trick that had ever been heard of. They turned prisoners into a real military asset by employing them in propaganda, and talked a whole staff of Nazi generals into the Free Germany movement.

Only in radio did the Russians retain some of their old revolutionary fire with its irritating qualities for non-Communist peoples. This was explicable in terms of the audience. The Russians could keep their domestic propaganda half-secret by imposing a censorship ban on those parts of it, or those comments on it, which they did not wish known to Communists abroad. The censorship was a permanent institution, in war and out, and therefore did not impose special difficulty. They could keep their front-line propaganda quiet, since they did not allow their Allies to send military observers up front, and the Nazis could be counted on not to tell the world about effective anti-Nazi propaganda. But their radio propaganda had to be audible to everyone. Hence the radio propaganda was the least ingenious in using reactionary themes effectively. The Russians and Germans both used black radio, but since each policed the home audience rigorously against the other, it is possible that the efforts cancelled out.

Japanese Developments.

The Japanese invented little in psychological warfare. They made excellent and judicious use of news to the American audience. They actually got much more official Japanese news into the American press during the war years than they had succeeded in placing during peacetime, when they had offices in American cities. They did so by maintaining the regular Domei news service in English-language Morse wireless for the American press, ready-edited for the newspaper offices. They put by-lines on the stories and it is said they sometimes even told the American newspapers: "Please hold until nine AM Eastern War Time. Thank You. Domei." In dealing with Asiatic audiences, special Japanese *butai* did a great deal of black propaganda along with subversive operations, but they displayed little initiative as to the use of basic techniques. Their chief merits were industry, patience, and the delivery of a first-class news service.

Chinese Uses.

The Chinese Communist forces broke all records for certain specialized aspects of combat propaganda. Japanese prisoners were given cordial welcome, better food than they had in the Army, the company of maidens, rich gifts, and political indoctrination about the freedom of Japan. These soldiers then went with the Chinese Communists back to the front lines and talked Japanese sentries out of their strong-points. The Yenan forces went to great pains with this propaganda, and even "elected" a Japanese prisoner to the City Council of Yenan. The author talked with the Political Director of the Chinese Communist authority at Yenan, and with some of the Japanese in Communist China. There was evidence of a real understanding of the problems of the Japanese common soldier, and of real sympathy with him, which the Japanese enlisted men were quick to feel. The Communists went so far as to throw gift packages into the Japanese lines—not booby-traps, just nice gifts with the polite request for a reply. They learned the names of Japanese field telephone operators, and then spliced into the line and argued politics with them in a rough and jolly way. When they had enough prisoners they kept the most promising converts for political training. They fed the ordinary prisoners well, entertained them royally, and sent them back to their own lines with the suggestion that the Chinese Communists would appreciate it if their good Japanese brethren would in combat please shoot their rifles in the air, thus making sure of not hitting Communists while at the same time avoiding unnecessary trouble with the Japanese officers.

Under "Chiang the Chairman," the Chinese national government waged a dignified, humane kind of psychological warfare against Japan. Few people remember an odd chapter

out of modern history, the Chinese bombardment of Nagasaki, although it is possible that Asiatic historians of the future will make a substantial contrast between the Chinese who struck the first blow at that city and the Americans who struck the last. Shortly after the outbreak of the full quasi-war between China and Japan in 1937, the Generalissimo ordered his bombers to attack Japan. American-built Chinese bombers appeared over Kyushu, the first invaders to show up since the shoguns repelled Kublai Khan 656 years earlier. But instead of dropping bombs, they dropped leaflets denouncing aggression and inferentially pointing out that while the Japanese were uncivilized enough to bomb their fellow-Asiatics, the Chinese were too civilized to undertake reprisals in kind.

The Generalissimo's troops also had fraternization and front-line propaganda, but not to the extent to which the Chinese Communists did. The Generalissimo himself followed a very liberal (not in the Leftist but the true sense) political line toward Japan. He uttered no threat of vengeance. He was the first leader of a great nation to say that the Japanese Emperor question was to be settled by letting the Japanese themselves choose their own form of government after the war was all over. He had Japanese on his political staffs—democratic persons whom his officials encouraged—and regular Japanese broadcasts were kept up throughout the war on the Chungking radio.

PART TWO
ANALYSIS, INTELLIGENCE, AND ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

CHAPTER 7
Propaganda Analysis

Opinion analysis pertains to what people think; propaganda analysis deals with what somebody is trying to make them think. Each form of analysis is a new and flourishing field in civilian social research; the bibliographies of Smith, Lasswell and Casey, and the current reviews in the *Public Opinion Quarterly*[29] demonstrate the existence of a large and growing literature on the subject. Each year, new textbooks in the field or current revisions of old ones can be counted on to bring scholastic and scientific findings up to date.

Technical writings on visual education, religious conversion, labor organization, practical politics, revolutionary agitation, and on commercial advertising have frequent bearing on propaganda analysis.

Propaganda cannot be analyzed in a logical vacuum. Every step in the operation is intensely practical. There is nothing timeless about it, other than that common sense which is based on the nature of man. The ancient Chinese three-character classic, from which several billion Chinese have tried to learn to read, says:

Jên chih ch'u
Hsing pên shan;

Hsing hsiang chin,
Hsi hsiang yüan.

Freely translated, this means, "When people are born, they all start *good*, but even though they all start out about the same, you ought to see them after they have had time to become different from one another by picking up habits here and there!"[30] The common nature of man may be at the basis of all propaganda and politics, but incentives to action are found in the stimuli of varied everyday environments. Certain very elementary appeals can be made *almost* without reference to the personal everyday background ("cultural-historical milieu") of the person addressed. Yet in a matter as simple as staying alive or not staying alive—in which it might be supposed that all human beings would have the same basic response—the difference between Japanese and Americans was found to be basic when it came to surrender. To Japanese soldiers, the verbal distinction between *surrender* and *cease honorable resistance* was as important as the difference between life and death. The Japanese would not survive at the cost of their honor, but if their honor were satisfied, they willingly gave up.

Propaganda is directed to the subtle niceties of thought by which people maintain their personal orientation in an unstable interpersonal world. Propaganda must use the language of the mother, the schoolteacher, the lover, the bully, the policeman, the actor, the ecclesiastic, the buddy, the newspaperman, all of them in turn. And propaganda analysis, in weighing and evaluating propaganda, must be even more discriminating in determining whether the propaganda is apt to hit its mark or not.

Monitoring.

The first requisite of propaganda analysis is materials to be analyzed. In time of peace, it is usually enough to send a subscription to the newspaper, magazine, or pamphlet series, and to buy the books as they come out. Poster propaganda is more difficult to obtain, and frequently requires on-the-spot contacts. Dr. David Rowe brought back from Occupied China, in the early days of the Sino-Japanese war, a spectacularly well done and interesting series of Japanese and quisling posters. They were not hard to come by, once he was there, but he had to go about twenty thousand miles to get them and return.

In obtaining printed propaganda, better results will be achieved if the same sources are followed consistently over a period of time than if one triumphant raid is carried through. The choice may look like this (*see Chart III*). If, in this instance the propaganda analysis is to be a one-man enterprise in a small country or area in time of peace, the one man can collect all the different kinds of samples in March and can then spend several months trying to see how they add up. By the time his analysis is ready, it will be badly dated and will necessarily be less interesting to the recipients than would a report which was up-to-the-week. Furthermore, unless the analyst knows the area very well indeed, he will risk mistaking transient issues for basic ones. If the Old Agrarians happen to be accused of Right Wing Deviationism during the week of 3-10 March, the analyst may falsely conclude that the Old Agrarian issue is tempestuous or profound.

Unless he has a large staff, faces a special crisis or pursues a scholarly purpose, the analyst does well to pick the alternative illustrated in the vertical column. He should pick his media carefully, accepting the advice of people who know the area intimately. In an opinion-controlled area, it is wise to take both a direct government propaganda paper and an opposition of semi-independent paper, if such exist.

Local papers are often better guides to domestic propaganda than are big metropolitan papers. The propagandists of the country know that foreigners may watch the big papers, and they will reserve their most vicious, naïve, or bigoted appeals for the local press.



Chart III

Along with the local press of one or two selected localities, the analyst should select several government personages and should follow every word of theirs he can find. The basic principle is for the analyst himself to determine the range of materials to be covered by deciding his own work-load in advance. This in turn depends on the time he has available for the task, his mastery of the language, his interest in the projects, probable interruptions due to semiofficial elbow-bending, and other personal factors.

The rule remains: *Consistent analysis of the same output with reference to basic topics over a sustained period will inevitably reveal the propaganda intention of the source.* (It must be pointed out that the expert analyst still is needed to select topics and to confirm interpretations.) To make a first guess as to whether the intended effect is being achieved or not, the analyst uses himself as a propaganda guinea pig. What does he think of the issues? What might he have thought otherwise? What would he think if he were a little less intelligent, a little more uncritical, than he is? And to complete the analysis, the analyst must go out to the audience that receives the materials and find out what effect

the propaganda has had by asking them about it (see interrogation, page 145).

Printed Materials.

The most readily available sources of propaganda are not printed ones. Especially in time of hostilities, it may not be easy to subscribe to enemy materials by the process of sending an international postal money order. Delays involved in transmitting the printed materials may make them useless for spot analysis, and valuable only for long-range basic studies of morale. The propagandist who is being analyzed may oblige by reading large numbers of editorials on the radio. (During the last war, officers and citizens occasionally exploded with alarm when Radio Tokyo quoted a *Life* or New York *Times* editorial several hours after it appeared. They naturally supposed that the Japanese had a secret short-wave transmitter running from New York City direct to Tokyo, and overlooked the fact that the OWI may have quoted long excerpts in slow Morse code on its trans-Pacific beam to China. The Japanese had picked it up, used subquotes, and beamed it back.)

Printed matter goes on the air in any major news operation. It is only a matter of time before telephoto facilities develop in line with the experimental New York *Times* edition printed in San Francisco during the United Nations organizational conference. This was sent, all in one piece, by wirephoto to Frisco and reprinted. The delay between the two editions was merely a matter of minutes. In the future, wireless telephoto may reduce this to seconds, so that all belligerents can simply tune in on each other's major newspapers.

Radio.

For the present radio remains the biggest source of propaganda intake. Radio is convenient. It can be picked up illegitimately without too much fear of detection. For the cost per person reached, it is certainly the cheapest way of getting material to millions of people promptly. It lends itself to monitoring, and even standard (long) wavelengths can be picked up from surprisingly great distances.

The only defense against enemy use of radio monitoring or broadcasting consists of the application of wired radio—which means plugging all the radio sets in on the telephone circuit, putting nothing on the air, and defying the enemy to eavesdrop. If the radio sets are then policed, and are made incapable of receiving wireless material, that particular audience is effectively cut off from the enemy. (When the Red Army, with its acute propaganda-conscious security, moved into many Eastern European cities, the first thing it did was to round up all the radios which the Nazis had overlooked. This prevented the liberated peoples from being enslaved by the "filthy reactionary lies" of the American and British governments, and made sure that the peoples would stay liberated under influence of their local Soviet-controlled newspapers.)

Wired radio is expensive. Radio suppression is difficult; the successful concealers of radio receivers become two-legged newspapers and go around town spreading all the hot dope which the authorities are trying to suppress. Scarcity puts a premium on such news; rumor then becomes unmanageable. Except for strangely drastic situations, it is probable that the great powers will continue to tolerate radio reception even though it may mean letting foreign subversive propaganda slip in now and then.

It is therefore likely that radio broadcasts will be available for monitoring for the pre-belligerent stages of the next war, should war come again in our time, and that radio may last through a great part or all of the duration of the war. Factors

which cannot now be foreseen, such as radio control of weapons, will affect this.

Radio propaganda analysis follows the same considerations as those which govern choice of materials for analyzing printed matter. It is a surer method to follow one or two programs on a station than to make wide random selections. A standard-wave transmitter to the home audience comes closer to revealing the domestic scene than would a global rebroadcast of ostensibly identical material. Radio has a further advantage over print. Few nations print out separate propaganda for each foreign-language area, while almost every large and medium-sized country has international facilities for broadcast. Since the programs are beamed to different language groups, the senders automatically make up propaganda lines for each audience.[31]

Attentive monitoring can provide material for distinguishing the various lines which any given nation is sending out to its friends, neighbors, or rivals. Frequently the differences between these lines make good counterpropaganda. If you hear the Germans telling the Danes that all Nordics are supermen and all non-Nordics scum, while telling the Japanese that the National Socialist idea of the world transcends pluto-democratic race prejudice, put the two quotations together and send them back to the Danes and the Japanese both.

Radio, unlike print, cannot be held for the analyst's convenience. It is physically unhandy to try to file actual recordings of enemy broadcasts for preservation and reference. When the analysis center is large, as it would be if near the headquarters of a government or a theater of war, the difficulties of monitoring involve problems of stenographic and language help. The monitors themselves can then be stenographers, taking verbatim dictation. They write down the enemy broadcast word-for-word, either right off the air or from records. The editor then selects the most

important parts of the day's intake for mimeographic or other circulation. Important material can be put in a daily radio summary of enemy propaganda for the area monitored. The rest of it can be sent along by mail, put in files and classified (lest the enemy government find out what its own propagandists really were saying), preserved on the recording, or destroyed.

During World War II these basic verbatim reports played a very important part. The Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service did the job for the United States, operating through the war years under the Federal Communications Commission. It has since been shifted from FCC to the War Department, and from the War Department to the Central Intelligence Group. Its materials sometimes are unclassified, although during most of the war they were marked *restricted*, and they are not available to the public except through microfilm copies of the Library of Congress file. These FBIS daily reports skimmed the cream off the enemy news broadcasts, and included editorial or feature material which might have intelligence or policy interest.

Monitoring by a Single Individual.

Where monitoring must be done by a single individual or a very small staff, it is desirable to find a basic news broadcast and to take it down verbatim where possible. This gives the analyst the chance of a second look at his materials and keeps him from having to make snap judgments of what is important and what is not, right during the course of the broadcast. Selection of a basic news program, followed by reference to speeches, plays, lectures and other programs that indicate the over-all tone of the day's output, will make it possible for one person to do an adequate monitoring job on about one-eighth of his full-time work per station. This does not leave him time to do much fancy analysis, or to

prepare graphs, but he can pass along the general psychological warfare situation so far as that particular beam on that particular transmitter is concerned.

The most likely situation for the isolated consul, businessman, officer, missionary, or amateur is one in which he can get a certain amount of stenographic help in taking down the broadcast material. The radio for monitoring varies in accordance with general reception conditions. Practically all the U. S. Army Signal Corps receivers will perform satisfactorily for local monitoring; so too will ordinary private sets, including the larger portables. An automobile radio can often be driven away from interference and from a hilltop or the edge of a lake can pick up a standard-wave station that cannot be distinguished on a much larger house set in the city. For transoceanic or world-wide reception, a short-wave receiver is of course necessary.

It is unwise to pick a sample that involves too much rapid speech, such as a foreign soap opera. The best reception is almost always the Morse code transmission of news or the slow dictation-speed reading of news from one central station to outlying news offices or substations. Selection of a program which usually comes in, arrangement for a verbatim copy of the program, daily checking of the news under standard analysis procedures—this gives a very fair cross-section.

One man sitting at Hankow could find out just what both the Generalissimo and the Chinese Communists were trying to tell the French-understanding and the Dutch-understanding listeners in the Far East. Another with pipe and slippers in Brussels could keep tab on the basic Russian lines to the Spanish-speaking world. Such monitoring obviously comes in handy for newspapers, commercial firms, governments, military establishments, speculators, and research institutions.

Identification: Propaganda vs. Truth.

The point will invariably arise: "This tells me how to listen to a foreign radio. Okay, I'll get the news, the lectures, the plays—all the rest of it. But so what? How am I going to know what's the truth and what's propaganda? How can I tell 'em apart? Tell me that!"

The answer is simple: "If you agree with it, it's truth. If you don't agree, it's propaganda. Pretend that it is all propaganda. See what happens on your analysis reports."

Propaganda was defined (at the beginning of this book) as follows: *Propaganda consists of the planned use of any form of communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given group for a specific purpose.* Taking a lesson from Communist theory, we can say that any form of mass-communication is operated for propaganda purposes *if no other motive for running it is evident*. Human beings talk; they like to talk. Much private talk is idle—but only an imbecile would talk over a radio network just for the pleasure of hearing himself talking. Propaganda is presentation for a purpose; it is the *purpose* that makes it propaganda, and not the truthfulness or untruthfulness of it.

The collected news of any modern country contains more truth each day than any one man can could read in a lifetime. The reporters, editors, writers, announcers who collect truth not only collect it; they select it. They have to. Why do they select it? That is the propaganda question. If they select it to "affect the minds and emotions of a given group for a specific purpose," it is propaganda. If they report that a little girl fell out of bed and broke her neck—with the intent of frightening parents among their listeners into following the Safe Homes Week Campaign—that is propaganda. But if they report it because it is the only death in the community, and because they might as well fill up the

program, it is not propaganda. If you put the statement on the air, "An American negro workman in Greensboro, N. C., got eighty cents for a hard day's work last week," that can be presented and interpreted as:

(a.) simple news, if there is something more to the story, about what the man said, or how he spent the eighty cents on corn meal to feed his pet tarantula;

(b.) anti-capitalist propaganda, if you show that eighty cents is mighty little money for American business to pay its workers;

(c.) pro-capitalist propaganda, if you show that the eighty cents will buy more than two weeks' wages of a worker in the city of Riga, when it comes to consumer goods;

(d.) anti-White propaganda, if you show the man got only eighty cents because he was a Negro.

And so on, through a further variety of interpretations. The facts—man, happening, amount, place, time—are *true* in each case. They could be sworn to by the whole membership of an interfaith conference. But the interpretation placed on them—who communicates these facts to whom? why? when? —makes them into propaganda.

And interpretation can no more be true or untrue than a Ford car can be vanilla or strawberry in flavor. The questions of truth and of interpretation are unrelated categories. The essence of motive is that it is ultimately private and impenetrable, and interpretation commonly involves imputation of motive. You can dislike an interpretation; you can kill a man for believing it; you can propagandize him out of believing it; but you cannot sit down and *prove* that it is untrue. Facts and logic are useful in propaganda, but they cannot be elevated to the point where you can say, "Is it propaganda or is it true?" Almost all good propaganda—no matter what kind—is true. It uses truth selectively.

There is no secret formula which, once applied, provides an unfailing test for propaganda. It is not possible for a person unfamiliar with the part of the world affected, with the topic discussed, with the interested parties, and with the immediate politics involved to put his finger on an item and say, "This Rightist charge is propaganda," and then to turn and say, "But that Rightist statement is not propaganda. It is fact." Untruthful statements are made at times for other than propaganda purposes; truthful statements may be propaganda or not. The analyst must himself be an interested party. He must determine ahead of time what he will regard as propaganda, and what not. And he must do so by delimiting the field of his analysis before he starts. No one person or staff of people could ever trace all the motives behind a single statement; even to attempt that, he would have to be a novelist of the school of Marcel Proust. (And he would end up feeling like James Joyce, Gertrude Stein, or Franz Kafka.)



Figure 21: Mockery of Enemy Propaganda Slogans. Home-front propaganda was sometimes repeated in an inappropriate place, in order to achieve an effect contrary to that originally intended. These Nazi leaflets, dropped on American detachments in Europe,

used modifications of the "It's Your Job!" posters and advertisements used by the U.S. for home-front purposes.

Figure 22: Mockery of Enemy Propaganda Technique. When the content of enemy propaganda cannot be attacked, the media themselves can sometimes be criticized. This German leaflet attempted utilization of potential suspicions of Hollywood. In so doing, it used three techniques: built up from a news item, suitably faked; raised suspicion of the movies which the Germans knew our Army showed for morale purposes; and spread racial hate.

The analyst looks in the direction in which the message is going. He defines the *propaganda presentation* of the people who get the message in terms of *all the public information to which the persons addressed have access*. If he does not know the purpose of the message, he may divine it from the character of the audience and from the effect he presumes the message may reasonably be expected to have upon the audience. If he does not know the audience, he can at least follow the physical transit of the message. In what language does it move? Whence? Whither? When?

Figure 23: Direct Reply leaflet. World War II propagandists often succumbed to the temptation of using the enemy materials and sending them right back. Sarcasm can be effective if the reader identifies himself with the speaker and not with the addressee. In this Nazi leaflet from the Anzio beachhead, the Germans probably antagonized more Americans than they befriended. A simple statement of the news would have been more effective. (Signal Corps photo.)

The Stasm Formula.

The formula given earlier (page 44) was found useful in the spot analysis of German broadcasts, both open and clandestine, and Japanese materials, during the last months of the war. The formula reads:

Source (including Media)

Time

Audience

Subject

Mission

The neologism, *Stasm*, may serve a mnemonic purpose.

The formula works best in the treatment of monitored materials of which the source is known. First point to note is

the character of the source. There are several choices on this: the true source (who really got it out?) and the ostensible source (whose name is signed to it?); also, the first-use source (who used it the first time?) and the second-use source (who claims merely to be using it as a quotation?). Take the statement: "Harry said to me, he said, 'I never told anybody that Al's wife was a retired strip-teaser.' Mind you, I don't pretend to believe Harry, but that's what he said, all right." What are the possible true sources for the statement of fact or libel concerning Al's unnamed wife? What are the alternatives on ostensible sources? First use? Second use? The common sense needed to analyze this statement is of the same order as the process involved in analyzing the statement: "Reliable sources in Paris state that the visit of the American labor delegation has produced sensational repercussions in Moscow, and that Moscow, upon the basis of the American attitude, is determined to press for unification of the entire German labor movement."

Figure 24: Black Use of Enemy Subversive Materials. This leaflet, printed in brilliant red, white and blue, was found in the printshop of a Nazi military propaganda company overtaken in Lorraine. It apparently dates from 1939-40, when the Soviet Union and Nazi Germans were at peace, with the result that Communists throughout the world opposed the "imperialist war." The leaflet may or may not be duplicated from a French Communist original; the important thing is its reuse by the Germans. This constitutes black propaganda in one of its purest forms.

It is soon evident that the mere attribution of source is a job of high magnitude. A systematic breakdown of the STASM formula produces the following analysis outline, applicable to any single propaganda item, civil or military, in war or peace, spoken, visual, or printed. There are many other possible arrangements; the one given below is not represented as having official sanction or mysterious powers of its own. It has simply worked well for the author.



Figure 25-A: Black Use of Enemy Information Materials. The Nazis used this leaflet on the Western Front. The real source was a German propaganda unit; the ostensible source was U.S. Army facilities. Note that the leaflet has nothing to do with stopping VD among troops, which is what the originals sought; instead, its effect is to depress American troop morale.



Figure 25-B: Block Use of Enemy Information Materials. Compare this with the preceding leaflet. The real source in both cases is enemy. The ostensible source in both cases is the U.S. Army. The ostensible mission in both cases is the prevention of VD. But the mission is entirely different in the second leaflet. The first was

addressed to troops—Americans—designed to make them feel bad. The second was dropped on civilians—Filipinos—whom the Japanese thus tried to stir up against the Americans. (Leyte Campaign. Courtesy of Mr. Robert Kleiman.)

Complete Breakdown of a Single Propaganda Item.

a. *Source*

(1) True source ("Where does it really come from?")

(a) Release channel ("How did it come out?") if different from true source without concealing true source

(b) Person or institution in whose name material originates

(c) Transmitting channel ("Who got it to us?"), person or institution effecting known transmission—omitting, of course, analyst's own procurement facilities

(2) Ostensible source ("Where does it pretend to come from?")

(a) Release channel ("Who is supposed to be passing it along?")

(3) First-use and second-use source (first use, "Who is said to have used this first?"; second use, "Who pretends to be quoting someone else?")

(a) Connection between second-use source and first-use source, usually in the form of attributed or unacknowledged quotation; more rarely, plagiarism

(b) Modification between use by first-use and second-use sources, when both are known

(i) Deletions

(ii) Changes in text

(iii) Enclosure within editorial matter of transmitter

(iv) Falsification which appears deliberate

(v) Effects of translation from one language to another

b. *Time*

(1) Time of events or utterance to which subject-matter refers

(2) Time of transmission (publishing, broadcasting, etc.)

(3) Timing of repetitions

(4) Reasons, if any are evident, for peculiarities of timing

c. *Audience*

(1) Intended direct audience ("in English to North America"; "a paper for New York restaurant operators")

(2) Intended indirect audience (program beamed "in English to North America" but actually reaching Hong Kong and Singapore by deliberate plan of the sender; "a paper for New York restaurant operators" being faked and sent to Southeast Europe in fact)

(3) Unintended audience (a Guadalcanal native studying *Esquire*; your aunt reading the *Infantry Journal*; a Chinese reading American wartime speeches against the "yellow devils" of Japan)

(4) Ostensibly unintended direct audience (such as an appeal to strikers in very abusive-sounding language, sent to businessmen to build up opinion *against* the strikers, or Hitler's black use of the forged Protocols of the Elders of Zion)

d. *Subject* ("What does it say?")

(1) Content listed under any convenient heading as though it were *straight news or intelligence*

(2) Content epitomized as demonstrating *new propaganda technique* (such as, "*Now* they're trying to get us out of Tientsin by appeals to our isolationists!")

(3) Content which may be useful in *counterpropaganda* (such as, "They said that the Greeks are our witless puppets, so let's pass that along to the Greeks")

(4) Significance of content for *intelligence analysis* (examples: When the Japanese boasted about their large fish catch, it was an indication their fishing fleet was short of gasoline again, and that the fish catch was actually small; when the Nazis accused the Jews of sedition, it meant that rations were short and that the Nazi government was going to appease the populace by denying the Jews their scanty rations by way of contrast)

e. *Mission*

(1) Nation, group, or person attacked

(2) Relation to previous items with the same or related missions

(3) Particular psychological approach used in this instance (such as wedge-driving between groups, or between people and leaders, or between armed services; or demoralization of audience in general; or decrease of listeners' faith in the news)

(4) Known or probable connection with originator's propaganda plan or strategy



Figure 26: Religious Black. Perhaps because of their contact with Americans who happened to be missionaries, the Japanese overemphasized the effect of religion on Americans. They attempted crude appeals on religious themes. It is doubtful that leaflets such as this had any practical effect. (Philippines, 1944-45.)

Figure 27: Malingerer's Black. One of the favored targets of block propaganda is the malingerer. Suspicion of successful malingering inevitably hurts the morale of a unit. Even if the enemy's instructions are not followed, the troops may suspect genuine psychoneurotics of having faked their troubles. Almost all participants in World War II issued such instructions; the Allied samples are not available for publication. This is a Japanese leaflet from the Philippines, 1944-45.

Such an outline would be useful only if it were applied in common-sense terms, without turning each item into an elaborate project and thus losing the woods in the trees. In most cases, it would suffice to state the item briefly for reference and study in the order of the entries. When poorly trained help is available, it is of course necessary to print or mimeograph a form to be used.

It is as vain to prescribe a propaganda analysis procedure without knowing the user as to prescribe an office filing system while knowing neither the nature of the office nor the kind of files kept. In time of war, subordinate commanders in operational areas will need to keep files at a minimum, while rear echelon or national facilities may be able to keep files of enormous range and thoroughness. In the recording of a large number of propaganda items, however, the material becomes hopelessly unmanageable unless there is some standardized system for organizing it. Mere alphabetization leads inevitably to the question, alphabetization of what?, and the analysis function can be exercised more readily in terms of the *sources* of propaganda than in terms of its incidental topics.

Identification of Enemy Plans and Situations.

Propaganda has its inevitable mirror image which gradually becomes plain to the analyst. If the analyst is careful, using shrewd judgment in appraising specific missions, he will gradually see forming in his files a record of the immediate and long-range aims of the propaganda originators. This becomes possible only when enough material is available, over a period of time to make up a complete list of the probable enemy propaganda objectives for the period covered. The intent of propaganda is always a result observable as action, however remote the action may be from the date of operation. Much of the propaganda of the Communist Party in the United States is directed to the inculcation of correct *scientific* thinking (see pages 70-74) which will be of decisive use only when the remote Day of Revolution arrives. Few of the Communist leaders, even in private conference, would venture to predict the exact year of the Day of Revolution; some may not even expect to see it; but they believe that if the propaganda is effective, the "proletariat" will be "militant" and its leaders will be

conscious of their "historic role." From the propaganda of today, the action may be anticipated, no matter how distant it may seem; once the action is determined, the relation of other propaganda items to that action can be traced.

In war, the action sought is something militarily harmful to the enemy—strikes against his production, panic in his population, complaint from his consumers, mistrust from his newspaper readers and radio listeners (resulting in eventual subversive or negative action on their part), surrender of his troops, disunity of his political leadership to be expressed in deadlocks, and so on. In pre-belligerent or peacetime propaganda, the action sought is against the war-making capacity of the audience—against war itself, if the propagandist feels that his own population is in no immediate danger of being infected by defeatism.

Estimating the Enemy's Propaganda Situation.

In addition to presenting a picture of the enemy goals, and of the psychological means he considers to be useful in reaching those goals, propaganda analysis is also valuable in presenting the enemy's own propaganda situation. He avoids certain topics because he must. He talks about others because circumstances force him to do so.

For example, if the Germans stop talking about rations for Jews (in the World War II situation), it may be that their own people, filled with anti-Semitic poison, have been protesting the issuance of rations. Alternatively, it may mean that the Nazi authorities have just cancelled Jewish rations and are letting the Jews starve or are murdering them overtly. If the Germans follow this up with an item on the poor barley crop, it may be that they are preparing the sentimental and humane listeners in their own audience for the announcement of Jewish starvation. If they run Paris-quisling accounts of Jewish hoarding, and of Jews concealing large

quantities of food, it means that they are almost certain to be under pressure to explain their Jewish policies and that, therefore, two factors face the German propagandist: first, he must get ready to announce the attack on the Jews; second, he thinks that the Jewish situation is going to arouse anti-Nazi sentiment even in Germany (if these are German-language programs) and he is therefore compelled to defend something because public opinion is believed by him to be against it. Out of a silence (no further news on rations), a domestic item (poor barley crop), and a foreign item (Paris Jews allegedly hoarding), it is possible to reconstruct a whole situation. The reconstruction may fall, if other interpretations arise, but it provides a starting guess.

The situation of enemy morale is often reportable through propaganda analysis long before it can be described by eyewitnesses. Omissions of attacks on the Church may indicate that the religious problem has become touchy. Failure to attack Communism may mean that the government is seeking a diplomatic deal with a Communist state. Mention of children may refer to the fact that parents complain of cold schools, bad food, absent doctors. Good morale is shown by a quiet tone in propaganda; bad morale is shown by extremes, whether of silence or of great vehemence. It is useful to know what the enemy propagandist thinks he is doing, what he considers the obstacles to his propaganda. Such considerations inevitably get to be embodied in the propaganda itself. A tone of extreme defiance, poor international cooperation, war bluster and so on may often spring from the desire to divert a hungry or discontented home public from its real worries at home to imaginary worries abroad.

Propanal as a Source of Military Intelligence.

Propaganda analysis, or *propanal* for short, can serve as a very useful adjunct to military intelligence even if when not directly connected with counterpropaganda operations. In the first place, the enemy must give news, comment, opinion, entertainment in order to get attention. The incidental content and make-up of this propaganda is itself useful study material. If his ink is bad, his paper poor, his language incorrect, it shows shortages of supply and personnel. If he boasts about his victories, he usually gives his version of place names and aids cartographic reporting. In mentioning the names of heroes, he may supply order-of-battle. In making a good story out of his economic situation, he fills in missing statistics; even if the figures are falsified, they must be falsified for a purpose and can be used in conjunction with others in making up an estimate.

Nothing is as smart as a human being except another human being. What any one man can try to achieve in the way of deceit, another man can try to figure out. The bulk of propaganda, short of peremptory tactical leaflets, is filled with information about the enemy's personnel, his opinion of himself, his opinion of you, his state of mind, his order of battle, his economic system, and all the rest. The Japanese government, throughout the war, kept the United States informed *in English* of the changes of ministers and other high officials in the Japanese government. This gave us good political background. There was no use their trying to hide it over a long period of time, and presumably *Joho Kyoku* (the Imperial Japanese Board of Information) figured that the help it gave the Americans, in filling out their political intelligence files for them, would be more than counterbalanced by the fact that such news would make American newspapermen, officials, officers and others read the propaganda in order to get the facts.

Over and above the direct contribution to straight news or intelligence, enemy propaganda in times of war or crisis

affords a clue to enemy strategy. If the coordination is not present the propaganda may do the enemy himself harm. But the moment coordination is present, and one end of the coordinate is handed over to us, we can start figuring what the coordination is for. Sometimes propaganda is sacrificed for weightier considerations of security; German propaganda gave little advance warning of a war with the U.S.S.R., and Soviet propaganda gave none. In other instances, the coordination does give the show away.

In 1941-1942, the Japanese radio began to show an unwholesome interest in Christmas Island in its broadcasts to Japanese at home and abroad. Christmas Island, below Sumatra, was pointed out as a really important place, and tremendously significant in naval strategy. Subsequently the Japanese armed forces went to and took Christmas Island. The home public was delighted that this vital spot had been secured. Of course, Christmas Island was not as important as the Japanese radio said it was, but the significant thing was that the radio talked about it *ahead of time*. For what little it was worth the Japanese had given us warning.

Enemy realization of an impending defeat may be preceded by disparagement of the importance of the area in which the defeat is to take place, or by description to the home audience of the enormous strength which enemy forces face at that particular place. Enemy action—when the enemy is security-minded—may be anticipated from his complete silence on something which he would normally talk about. It must have seemed odd that the Americans stopped talking about nuclear fission altogether, when prewar years had seen a certain number of news items on the subject in the New York press each month.

A nation getting ready to strike *à la* Pearl Harbor may prepare by alleging American aggression. A nation preparing to break the peace frequently gets out peace propaganda of the most blatant sort, trying to make sure that its own

audience (as well as the world) will believe the real responsibility to lie in the victim whom he attacks. Hitler protested his love of Norwegian neutrality; then he hit, claiming that he was protecting it from the British. No hard-and-fast rules can be made up for all wars or all belligerents. The Germans behaved according to one pattern; the Japanese, another.

For example, the German High Command sought to avoid bragging about anything they could not actually accomplish. They often struck blows without warning but they never said they would strike a blow when they knew or believed that they could not do it. The British and Americans made up a timetable of this, and were able to guess how fast the Germans thought they were going to advance in Russia. Knowing this, the British and Americans planned their propaganda to counter the German boasts; they tried to pin the Germans down to objectives they knew the Germans would not take, in order to demonstrate to the peoples of Europe that Nazi Germany had finally bitten off more than it could chew.

Later, the Allies remembered this German habit when the Nazis on the radio began talking about their own secret weapons. When the British bombed the V-1 ramps on the French coast, the German radio stopped that talk. The British therefore had additional grounds for supposing that the ramps they had bombed were a part of the secret weapon the Germans bragged about. The British further knew that the Germans would try to counter the psychological effect of the announcement of Allied D-Day with some pretty vivid news of their own. When the German radio began mentioning secret weapons again, the British suspected that the Germans had gotten around the damage done to the ramps. D-Day came; the Germans, in one single broadcast designed to impress the Japanese and Chinese, announced that the secret German weapon was about to be turned

loose, and that more such weapons would follow. One day later the first V-1 hit London.



Chart IV

In order to follow this type of propaganda, a quantitative chart is needed. A sample imaginary chart for a three-month period is given in chart IV. This chart reveals at a glance the fact that the enemy kept mentioning food supply and naval warfare until the middle of March, because he presumably thought his blockade runners would bring in more food. After March, food drops in emphasis but naval warfare continues to be stressed. In May, following enemy admission to himself of the hopeless naval situation, naval warfare drops almost altogether out of sight. Foodstuffs continue to be modestly mentioned as the enemy explained away minor difficulties, but the use of secret weapons propaganda shows that the enemy propagandists had to have something sensational to keep up the courage of the home audience. Whether the enemy really had a secret weapon or not, depends on the national character, past records, and so forth. The Germans and Japanese both said they had world-shaking secret weapons. The Germans delivered; the Japanese did not.

Such quantity records will also be useful in showing the enemy's propaganda statistically with reference to number of words uttered on each of his major subjects, number of inches of newspaper columns for specified kinds of news, and so on. Percentage charts show which major shifts his

propaganda performs. Audience charts (that is, how much time he spends addressing workers, pacifists, mothers, minorities, etc.) show which groups he is really trying to reach. Emphasis charts for selected topics on which your own propaganda has been active show how much you force him to talk about something which he may not wish to discuss.

Such statistical use is possible only if usable records are maintained. A basic item-by-item file of all important or new items, combined with a worksheet of the amount of radio time or printed space the enemy put into use for a stated period, will provide the materials needed for propanal. Propanal is indispensable to psychological warfare. It sifts ordinary intelligence out from propaganda in one process, processing straight intelligence ready for the intelligence people to use, yet providing analysis for psychological warfare purposes.

For peacetime purposes, it is to be remembered that though enemies may hide their scientists, their launching ramps, or their rockets, they cannot hide the occasion for war, nor their own readiness measures. No government can afford to seem the plain unqualified aggressor. *Propanal* may prove to be one of the soundest war-forecasting systems available to us in a period of ultra-destructive weapons. Psychological mobilization may be disguised: it cannot be concealed.

CHAPTER 8
Propaganda Intelligence

The psychological warfare operator can usually count on two basic interests of his listener. In the field he can be sure that the enemy troops are interested in themselves. In the

enemy homeland he can be sure that the civilians are interested in *their* enemy—himself. He has therefore a certain leeway in which he can be sure of doing no harm, and may accomplish good, if he confines his propaganda to simple, factual and plainly honest statements on these subjects. Pompousness, intricacy and bad taste will recoil against him; it is unwise to employ these even when the situation is well under control. In a developing situation the propagandist can remain safe by confining himself to simple statements as to how strong his country's armed forces are, how realistic and effective their leadership. Elementary information giving the favorable aspects of his economic, strategic and diplomatic situation may also prove valuable initial propaganda.

This interest can be counted on throughout the war. The enemy is always news. The wise enemy realizes this and keeps himself in the news, trusting that in the wider understanding of himself, his politics and culture there is the opening for a more favorable peace in the event of defeat, or for a more docile submission in the event of his own victory. Only unimportant enemies fail to become news. (Few Americans, for example, realize that we were at war with Bulgaria in World War II. Had the Bulgars developed sensational weapons, there would have been a sudden upswing of interest in them. People would have realized that Bulgaria, like Hungary and long-lost Avaria, was once a fierce Asiatic state grafted onto the European system; the fabulous power of the Old Bulgarian Empire would have become known, and the names of Krum, Symeon and the Czar Samuel added to our calendar of hate. But Bulgaria never did enough against the United States to count as an enemy, and even succeeded, by diplomatic ineptitude, in getting into a state of war with all the Axis Powers and all the United Nations simultaneously; Bulgaria escaped the fame which goes with hostility. Contrast this with Japan: thousands of

Americans have learned Japanese; Japanese national character is known to us; war has done in a five-year span what education could not have accomplished in a generation.) The wise propagandist can, when in doubt, play good music on the air, or he can—with equal prudence—give the enemy his own elementary-school history and language texts. These do no harm, and may achieve something.

Figure 28: Nostalgic Black. Soldiers in all wars have gotten homesick. Propaganda appeals to homesickness in many ways. One of the simplest is the device shown in this German black leaflet, which shows the husband turning off the alarm clock while the wife wakes up. The printed message on the reverse makes out a discouraging case for the soldier's opportunity to return home, pointing out that the GI in Europe, even after victory, will face "that nasty jungle war ... in the Far East." No identification of the leaflet is given.

Figure 29: Nostalgic White, Misfire. Figure 30 was carefully adapted to Japanese customs. The mere fact that the Americans knew enough about Japan to celebrate a homey Japanese holiday was probably enough to make the Japanese reader examine the leaflet carefully. Here is a combined nostalgic and surrender leaflet showing how surrender leads the Japanese soldier back to his wife and children. The drawing looks American rather than Japanese, and it is not likely that a genuine Japanese could have been made homesick by use of this leaflet.

Figure 30: Nostalgic White. On March 5 of every year the Japanese celebrate the colorful custom of Boys' Day. Kites in the form of carp are flown over the cities and countryside and millions of families set out to give their little sons an excursion or some other treat. (It is characteristic of the Japanese that there is no Girls' Day.) This leaflet, from Psychological Warfare Branch,

USAFPA, was designed for dropping on May 5. It ends with the appeal, "You must guard the strength of the new Japan, your treasure, your children." Thus it combines homesickness, patriotism, and pre-surrender indoctrination.

News as Intelligence.

Harmlessness is, however, a poor ideal for men at war; the propagandist who keeps out of mischief is doing only half his job. To make his message take effect he must convey to the enemy those kinds of information which tend to disrupt enemy unity, discount enemy expectation of success, lower the enemy will to resist. He cannot do so by means of recorded symphonies or tourist lectures, no matter how well done. He must turn to the first weapon of propaganda, the news.

The official propagandist is not a newspaperman. Since he speaks for an army or a government, his utterance is *officially responsible*. He must be as timely as the peacetime press, but must at the same time be as cautious as a government press agent. He is torn between two responsibilities: his responsibility to the job of propaganda, which requires him to get interesting information and get it out to the enemy quickly; and his responsibility to the official policies of his own government, which requires him to release nothing unconfirmed, nothing that could do harm, or that might embarrass or hurt the government. (A sort of institutional schizophrenia is common to all propaganda offices.)

The sources of news are various. Classified incoming operational reports of the Army and Navy contain material of high interest to the enemy. There are obvious reasons for denying access to such information to the propaganda people. Propaganda men might think of their audience first and security second. If they do not know the secret information, but are advised by military consultants who do,

security will be better maintained and the propagandist will not labor under the handicap of a double standard of information—what they know, and what they dare to tell.

In technically advanced countries, the regular commercial facilities of press and radio continue to do a normal news job, and usually do better work than the drafted amateurs in the government. (What intelligence agency in Washington could compile a weekly report as comprehensive, well edited and coldly planned as *Time* magazine?[32] The author often yearned to paraphrase *Time*, rearranging it and classifying it TOP SECRET, in order to astound his associates with the inside dope to which he had access.) The nature of news is not affected by its classification, and the distinction between news produced on the Federal payroll and news produced off it often consists of the superior professionalism of the latter.

The intelligence that goes into the making of propaganda must compete for attention with the home newspaper of the enemy. It must therefore be up-to-date, well put, authentic. There is no more space in propaganda for the lie, farce, hoax, or joke than there is room for it in a first-class newspaper. Even if exaggerations or nonsense appear in the commercial press of his own country, the propagandist must realize that he is Honorary G-2 to the enemy—a G-2 whose function consists of transmitting news *the ultimate effect of which should be bad* but which should go forth with each separate item newsworthy and palatable. (A little trick of the human mind helps all propagandists in this regard. Most people have a streak of irresponsibility in them, which makes bad news much more interesting than good. There is a yearning for bad news and a genuine willingness to pass it along. Bad news increases the tension upon the individual and tickles his sense of the importance of things; good news relieves the tension, and to that extent has the effect of a let-down.)

The palatability of news is not concerned so much with its content as with its trustworthiness to the enemy, its seeming to deal with straight fact, its non-editorialized presentation. (One of the reasons why Soviet Communist propaganda, after all these years, is still relatively unsuccessful , lies in the incapacity of the Communists to get out a newspaper with news in it. They put their editorial slant in all their news articles. "Man bites dog" would not make the front page in Russia unless the dog were Stalinist and the man reactionary.)

Figure 31: Oestrous Black. Young human beings, especially young males, are apt to give considerable attention to sex. In areas of military operations, they are removed from the stimuli of secondary sex references which are (in America) an accepted part of everyone's daily life: bathing beauty photos, magazine covers, semi-nudes in advertisements, etc. Our enemies tried to use the resulting pin-up craze for propaganda purposes, hoping that a vain arousal of oestrum would diminish morale. This choice Japanese item is from the Philippines. (The best collection of these is kept in a locked file—for experts only—at the Library of Congress.)

The Japanese who obediently hated the Americans when it was their duty to do so nevertheless could not help looking at maps that showed where the Americans actually were. Nazis who despised us and everything we stood for nevertheless studied the photographs of our new light bombers. The appeal of credible fact is universal;

propaganda does not consist of doctoring the fact with moralistic blather, but of selecting that fact which is correct, interesting, and bad for the enemy to know.[33]

On the friendly side of the battle lines, the procurement of our own news is a budgetary matter. The propaganda office can subscribe to the news tickers, newspapers, telegraph services, and so on. How much is a matter of administrative housekeeping. In the field, the communications officer can frequently steal news from the news agencies of his own country or allied countries by the process of picking it out of the air. It would be highly unpatriotic of the news agency to send him a bill in the zone of operations, and he can classify his record copies of his material RESTRICTED so that the owners of the material would have no legitimate business acquiring copies that could later be taken into court to support a claim. (Americans would not do this, of course; the reference is to Byzantines.)

Figure 32: Oestrous Grey. This and the succeeding illustration show a series of four leaflets which the Nazis used against American troops in Europe. Anti-morale in intent, they rely on the illustrations to get attention and then develop their malicious, salacious anti-Semitic story. The series illustrates the strength and weakness of Nazi propaganda.

Figure 33: Oestrous Grey, Continued. Concluding the series begun in the preceding illustrations, these Nazi leaflets tried to lower American morale by combining oestrum, resentment, discouragement and inter-American hatred. The Dr. Mordecai Ezekiel mentioned in No. 2 is a real person, a splendid American and conscientious official. The Nazis used his name because it was so plainly Jewish, hoping that the ignorance of the American troops would permit their lies to spread.

The Need for Timeliness.

Some white propaganda and all black propaganda needs to be written so as to fit in with what the enemy is reading, listening to, or talking about in his home country. The use of antiquated slang, an old old joke, reference to a famous man as living when he died some time ago, lack of understanding of the new wartime conditions under which the listener lives and worries—such things sour a radio program quickly. In radio, the propagandist must be living in the same time as his listeners. Since the propagandist cannot shuttle between the enemy country and his own radio office (unless he is a braver and more elusive man than governments ever call for); he must try to get the up-to-the-minute touch by other means. Without it he is lost. He will be talking about

something that happened a long time ago, not the situation which he is trying to affect.

This need may be called *timeliness*.

It can be served by obtaining all the most recent enemy publications that may be available, by listening attentively to enemy prisoners and captured civilians, and by carefully analyzing the enemy's current broadcasts to his own people. The Nazis made the unnecessary mistake of assuming that isolationism used the same old language after Pearl Harbor. They were right in assuming that there was considerable anti-internationalist and anti-Roosevelt sentiment left in the United States, but they were hopelessly wrong in using the isolationist language of mid-1941 as late as mid-1942. Pearl Harbor had dated all that and the isolationist-interventionist argument had shifted to other ground. When the Nazis went on using the old language, they were as conspicuous as last year's hat at a women's club. Instead of making friends and influencing people, they made themselves sound ignorant and look silly. They lacked the element of timeliness. They could have gotten it by procuring representative American publications in Lisbon and studying them.

Propaganda is like a newspaper; it has to be timeless or brand-new. In between, it has no value.

Figure 34: Obscene Black. One of the wildest adventures of World War II concerns this now rare "Chinese Federal Reserve Bank" one-dollar bill. The bank was a Japanese puppet outfit in Peiping. The Japanese had banknotes engraved by Chinese artists, and only after the new pro-Japanese banknotes had been issued all

over the city did they notice what the "ancient scholar" was doing with his hands. The engraver had disappeared and the Chinese enjoyed a rare, morale-stimulating laugh. Propaganda gestures such as this—spontaneous, saucy, silly—achieve effects which planned operations rarely attain.

Opinion Analysis.

In a favorable intelligence situation, espionage can succeed in running a Gallup poll along the enemy's Main Street. When this is done, the active propaganda operator has some very definite issues at hand on which he can begin work. When it is not possible to send the cloak-and-dagger boys walking up and down the Boulevard of the Martyrs of the Eleventh of July, propanal, properly handled, can produce almost the same result. The opinion of the enemy can be figured out in terms of what enemy propaganda is trying to do.

To be useful, opinion analysis must be systematic. For a while the author had the interesting job of interviewing all the latest arrivals from Tokyo at a certain headquarters. The travelers would usually be pumped up with a sense of their own smartness in having evaded the Japanese and arrived at Allied territory. You could almost hear them thinking, "Oh, boy, if Gendarmerie Chief Bakayama could only see me now!" They were ready, in Army parlance, to spill their guts. The only item on which most of them maintained one-man security was the question, "Why, chum, did you yourself go to Tokyo in the first place?" Outside of that, they were eager to talk. (Some of them had frightfully good reasons to be eager; the adverb is literal.) With such sources of information, the author thought that he could find out in short order what the Japanese were thinking.

He found out, all right. He found out every single time. The refugee engineer said the Japanese were so depressed that there was a bull market in butcher knives. The absconding dairyman said the Japanese were ready to die with gloom.

The eloping wife said she never saw happy Japanese any more. The military school deserter said the Japanese lay awake all night every night listening for American air raids. The reformed puppet said the Japanese had just gone to pieces. Then each of them grinned (the interviews were individual, of course), and expected to be patted on the head for bringing such good news.

Figure 35: Informational Sheet. This British leaflet combines a message for Arabs with instructions for British pilots forced down in the desert. The propaganda content is closely associated with the practical mission of the leaflet.

Their comments were worthless. What the enemy thinks *in general* is worth nothing unless your troops are already in his suburbs. What an informant thinks the enemy thinks is worth even less. What do you, reader, think right now? What do you think you think? See? the question is nonsensical. To work, it has to be specific: What do you think about the price of new suits? What do you think about Senator O'May and Congressman MacNaples? Do you think that we will ever have to fight Laputa? Are you satisfied with your present rate of pay? Why?

What a person thinks—his opinion—is workable in relation to what he does. In practical life his opinion takes effect only when it is part of the opinion of a group. Some groups are formed by the common opinion and have nothing else in common: at a spiritualist meeting you may see the banker sitting next to his own charwoman. Most groups are groups because of things which the people *are* (Negroes, descendants of Francis Bacon, the hard-of-hearing); or things they *do* (electrical workers, lawyers, farmer, stamp collectors), or things they *have* (factory owners, nothing but wages, apartment houses) in common. The community of something practical makes the group have a community of opinion which arises from the problems they think they face with respect to their common interests. Such groups are not only opinion groups, they are interest groups. It is these groups that do things *as groups*. It is these groups that propaganda tries to stir up, move, set against each other, and use in any handy way. (Few individuals belong to just one group at a time; the groups are almost illimitable in number.)

The propagandist should not get the idea that just because a group exists it is a potential source of weakness or cleavage. Workers are not always against employers, nor the aged against the young, nor women against men, nor shippers against railwaymen. In a well run society, groups have interest only for limited purposes. Railwaymen are not permanently hostile to truckers, shippers, fliers, canal operators. At the moment they may be maddest of all at the insurance companies because of some quarrel about insurance premiums and risks.

The poor propagandist tries to butt in on every fight, even when there is none. Often his propaganda is received the way an intervenor is received in most family quarrels, with the bland question, "*What* fight? We ain't mad." Sound propaganda picks only those group issues which are acute

enough to stand a little help from outside. If outside help would be a kiss-of-death to the group that is helped, then black propaganda instead of white is indicated. In any case, sound operating intelligence is the first precondition to the attempted psychological manipulation of enemy groups.

Skorpion
Informationsdienst

Figure 36: Counterpropaganda Instructions. The Wehrmacht in the West had a unit bearing the code designation Skorpion. This unit combined the functions of offensive and defensive propaganda, which remained separate throughout the war in the U.S. Army. The information service sheet shown provides clear, simple leads for counterpropaganda by selecting usable (usable for the Germans, that is) items from Allied sources. From this raw material, morale officers could make up their own leaflets, lectures, or broadcasts.

Profile of Opinion.

Opinion analysis can present a *profile of enemy opinion*. To make a profile, proceed as though assembling a photo-strip map taken by an aerial camera. Take the whole enemy country and divide it into major groups by percentages. Select, particularly, those groups you are interested in addressing. If you have *kamikaze*-minded collaborators, send them in to the enemy country to ask a thousand enemies the

same question, selecting the thousand the same way that the total population is made up. If the country is 32% Catholic, the thousand interviewees should include 320 Catholics. If the country is 36% urban and 61% rural (3% unexplained), get 610 of your interviewees from the country. The questions do not have to be asked in precisely the same form, but they should bear on precisely the same issues. When your agents come back you have a poll. If you do not have agents, then use the percentages from reference books, and try to estimate how many definite groups have what specific grievances. You are then in a position to proceed.

Interrogation.

When processing prisoners of war, it is an excellent idea to deal with them for morale intelligence as well as for general and assorted military information. Questions should not aim at what the prisoner thinks he thinks about God, his leader, his country, and so on, but should concern themselves with those things which most interest the prisoner himself. Does his wife write that the babies have enough diapers? How is the mail service? Is he worried about war workers getting his prewar job? How much money is he saving? How is the food? How were the non-coms—did they treat him right? Did he get enough furloughs? Does he think that anybody is making too much money at home? Most men carry over into military services the occupational interests which they had as civilians. A carpenter in uniform, even though he may be a good infantry top sergeant, is still a carpenter, and information can be obtained from him as to the problems of skilled labor, of union members, of the poorer city dwellers, and so on.

The profile obtained from civilian polls or from propanal can then be paralleled in the field. Set up a graph showing

the entire enemy army. Use several graphs if the army splits along racial, national or plainly sectional lines. On each graph, enter the component groups. From the poll or from the interrogations, list the dissatisfaction in terms of seriousness with which the dissatisfyee attributes to it; it is not what you think he should worry about that is important. It's what actually he does worry about. His weighting counts. Make up a scale, quantitative on the actual count of mentions of particular gripes. (For example, out of 699 prisoners, of whom 167 were union members in civil life, there were 234 separate voluntary mentions of dissatisfaction with the enemy government's labor union policy). When that quantitative count changes up or down, you have a definite guide with which to control your own propaganda policy.

Mitteilungen für die Truppe

Figure 37: Defensive Counterpropaganda. The "National Socialist Leadership Staff of the Wehrmacht" got out this Communications for the Troops as a guidance sheet for company talks. The content includes "Thoughts About the Volkssturm," "The Celebrated American Freedoms," and "Small Requests, but Important." This issue is dated from January 1945.

Or you can proceed qualitatively. List enemy dissatisfaction under terms such as these for any one issue (shoe rationing,

health facilities, minority rights, esteem for government leaders, etc.): Prisoner—

(1) is completely satisfied and has no complaints.

(2) has a few complaints but is generally satisfied.

(3) has many complaints and does not expect improvement.

(4) is despondent about the whole situation.

(5) is definitely antagonistic to home authorities in this matter.

Rate each prisoner or captured civilian according to your best judgment. Then make up percentage lists of the grounds for dissatisfaction of each component group in the enemy society. (This latter figure will be impressive in documents but will not mean as much for practical purposes as will the more specific percentages under each separate head.)

If you feel like showing off, average everything into everything else and call it the Gross Index of Total Enemy Morale. This won't fool anyone who knows the propaganda business, and you won't be able to *do* anything with or about it, but you can hang it on a month-by-month chart in the front office, where visitors can be impressed at getting in on a military secret. (Incidentally, if some smart enemy agent sees it and reports it back, enemy intelligence experts will go mad trying to figure out just how you got that figure. It's like the old joke that the *average* American is ten-elevenths White, 52% female, and always slightly pregnant.)

Specificity.

Good propaganda intelligence provides:

(a) news;

(b) military intelligence which can be released as news;

(c) military intelligence which cannot be released as news, but knowledge of which will prevent the propaganda operator from making mistakes or miscalculations in reporting the news;

(d) enemy news;

(e) up-to-the-minute enemy slang, hobbies, fads, grievances, and other matters of current public attention;

(f) specific grievances of specific groups and of the nation as a whole, should these arise;

(g) information about probable inter-group conflicts;

(h) types and forms of discontent with enemy authority;

(i) identification of unpopular or popular enemy personalities;

(j) all other information that will enable the psychological warfare operator to act promptly and sympathetically in taking the side of specific enemy individuals against their authorities or other enemy groups.

Figure 38: Black "Counterpropaganda." Seeing that the Germans had a good counter propaganda medium, the Allies decided to use it themselves. They issued this "counterpropaganda" sheet, shown in original and facsimile in English. The "blackness" is not very black, since few Germans would consider this to be German in origin, once they had read it.

Enemy opinion cannot be manipulated in general. It must be met on its own ground—the current everyday thoughts of enemy citizens and soldiers. These thoughts do not usually concern grandiose problems of political ethics. They are practical like your own.[34] They must be appealed to in a way which makes the listener really listen, makes the reader stop and reread, makes them both think it over later. Getting the attention of the enemy is not enough. Most enemies will pay plenty of attention to you—too much, at times. Getting sympathetic attention is what counts.

This can be done only with specific grounds. With the news, you and he have a genuine common interest. Using his real troubles as a link, you must create that common interest. The force, the effectiveness of your argument may make him forget that it is the enemy who has brought his attention to this issue. You must leave him with the feeling, "By golly, that fellow is right!"

But to talk about his troubles, effectively, you must know what they really are. You must see it his way before you start showing him that his way is your way, that you think that he is really on your side, and that his bosses' side is wrong, incorrect and doomed to get whipped, anyhow. Propaganda can operate only on the basis of *specificity*. Real persuasion can be sought only on the basis of real sympathy with real troubles. Old, incorrectly guessed, or poorly described issues are worse than none at all.

CHAPTER 9
Estimate of the Situation

In physical warfare, the inherent instability of every situation is concealed by the apparent definiteness of the operation. Panic, revolt or dissolution of regiments is not normally figured into the situation. The assumption is made —and for professional military purposes must be made—that all identical units are of equal quality unless proved otherwise, that all men in a unit will respond with psychological uniformity unless they are reported out physically by medical reports, that the unit will be capable of doing tomorrow what it did yesterday. The terrain comes in as a constant factor and even such variables as weather can be calculated in terms of a predictable risk. Nevertheless, every experienced soldier knows that things do not always work out the way they should, that unexplained or unforeseen factors sooner or later complicate or frustrate the best plans, and that warfare is a huge gamble with a superficial but very necessary coating of exactitude.

In psychological warfare, these considerations apply even more sharply. Combat at least has terrain, order of battle, logistics, estimated capabilities and other concrete factors with which to figure. There is a known degree of difference

between one enemy division and five enemy divisions. There is the possibility of computing the time which the enemy will need to fulfill this capability or that, and the equally good possibility of computing time on our side for countermeasures. Even in such very long-range operations as strategic bombing, economic factors can be figured out to give the operation at least the coloration of precision. With propaganda, none of this is possible.

The propagandist never knows the terrain, because his terrain is the enemy mind in its entirety—a factor beyond the understanding of any man. The enemy can have strongholds of faith to be shaken but the propagandist can never say, "This factor is finished. Therefore we proceed to the next." There is neither victory nor defeat, only the endless seesaw of probable accomplishments or probable blunders. The honest psychological warfare operative will admit that he does not know where he is at any given moment, how far from his start, how near to his goal. Even with surrender of the enemy, propaganda cannot be judged to have met with complete failure or complete success, because propaganda is an interminable stream going on into international affairs and carrying over to the next war. Psychological warfare can be given apparent certainty only by the creation of assumptions on the part of the planner. The assumptions will not stand up if questioned by a clever philosopher, any more than did the basic assumptions of the German General Staff when questioned by the sardonic Trotzky at Brest-Litovsk. Nevertheless, the assumptions can work for planning purposes.

Definiteness of the Goal.

The first assumption to make is this: goals can be sought with some hope of success. The propaganda planner uses the intelligence available to him. He consults with

knowledgeable persons. He defines (1) specific kinds of demoralization and discord he wishes to create, (2) the particular enemy audiences in which he wishes to create them, (3) the types of argument he proposes to use, and (4) the media through which he intends to project his propaganda. He assumes that the kind of discord, depression or surrender which he seeks will hasten the end of the war. In so doing, he is on ground only a little less sure than that of the strategic bombing planner, who also seeks results indirectly.

For field operations, the goal of the propagandist is to sap the resistance of enemy troops. If the troops are moving forward and are not likely to be in a mood to surrender, then other goals, such as conflict between officers and men, encouraging desertion, informing enemy troops of bad news elsewhere in the war, or morale-depression may be sought. In each case, the propaganda must be aimed at a goal, and a goal is as essential to the operation of psychological warfare as is definition of a target for artillery or bombing. No one ever accomplishes anything shooting "somewhere or other"; no one propagandizes successfully unless he seeks the attainment of a state of mind or series of actions which may actually happen. Most times, it is thus impossible to aim at the total surrender of the enemy armies or state. One can aim for concrete operational purposes only at specific enemy troubles or effects. For the field, troop surrenders; for the home front, interference with the enemy war effort—these are about as general as goals can be made.

They can be made very specific indeed. A situation reported by intelligence may provide an almost perfect opening for psychological warfare. If the enemy press reports that twenty-three embezzlers have been detected in food supply and have been shot, it is a perfect opening for the black propaganda goal, "to conduce to enemy mistrust of food control, to increase food spoilage, to lower efficiency of

enemy food consumption through enhancing misuse of food supply." Some of the means might be these. An alleged enemy leaflet could be prepared warning quartermasters to destroy canned foods that have lost labels; another leaflet describing diseases that come from partly spoiled food; an "enemy" allegation (from your side or, better, from neutral territory) that the political chiefs of the enemy country are the biggest food embezzlers of all; getting a black-radio and rumor campaign under way describing the seven hundred and eighty-three people who died last month as a result of eating musty food (even though your own doctors say the mustiness may not interfere with the wholesomeness of that particular food); describing common diseases that actually occur in the enemy country, such as arthritis, stomach ulcers, sinus headaches or infectious jaundice, and blaming them all on the foods the enemy government distributes to the enemy people. On white radio, features could be put on describing the unhappy plight of your own side, where people may get their rashers of bacon for breakfast only every other day, and where nobody can have more than three eggs at a time; point out that the government is worried that food prices have risen 5.3%, without mentioning at that time the fact that enemy prices have gone up 45% or more. The definite goal gives the propaganda boys something to work on. Propaganda to the allies or satellites of the enemy can point out that the enemy government is apt to dump the spoiled food onto the foreign market, that food spoiling in territory of the big enemy will make him requisition more food from his little allies, et cetera.

When the topic has been worked for a while, stop; keep it up only if actual news from the enemy country shows that they are having enough real trouble with food to make your *improvements* on the fact thoroughly credible.

Propaganda cannot function in a vacuum framed by moral generalities. The goal must be defined in the light of

authentic news or intelligence. The operation can be sustained only if there is enough factual reality behind it to make the propaganda fit the case known or credited by the majority of the listeners, counted one by one.

Since no trouble-free, wartime country has been known to exist, the goals should be tailored to the troubles of the particular enemy, and should aim at increasing real difficulties, building up pre-existing doubts, stimulating genuine internal hostilities. Propaganda which invents pure novelty gets nowhere. The Russians did not hesitate to appeal to Bismarck in order to show the professional German soldiers what a rotter Hitler was, and how stupid the Nazi strategy. But if Bismarck had actually said nothing on the subject of the army in general or an Eastern war in particular, they would have been wise to leave him alone. If the Japanese had tried to make the ex-Confederate States secede all over again, they would not have gotten anywhere because they would not have started with a real grievance. But if they had alleged that the Negro units were used for stevedoring because Whites regarded Negroes as unworthy of carrying weapons, they might have hit on a real grievance. The goal must be deeply bedded in reality.

The Propaganda Man.

It has been pointed out that the true terrain of psychological warfare—the private thoughts of the enemy people, one by one—is known only to God. There is, however, a way of finding approximate terrain. That consists of setting up a hypothetical enemy listener or reader, and then trying to figure things out from *his* angle.

The first thing to do with the hypothetical man is to make him fit the kind of person who does get propaganda. In dealing with China, for example, it would be no use to take a statistically true Chinese, who lived on a farm 1.3 acres in

size, went to town 5.8 times a year, had 3.6 children, and never read newspapers. The man to be set up would be the *reachable* man, the city, town or village dweller who had an income 2.1 times greater than that of the average in his county, who owned 1.7 long coats, and who shared one newspaper with 6.8 neighbors. Take this lowest-common-denominator of a man who can be reached by enemy propaganda and by yours. Name him the Propaganda Man. (Realistically speaking, modal and not arithmetical classes should be set up.)

Make up the prewar life of the Propaganda Man. Use your regional experts as informants. What kinds of things did he like? What prejudices was he apt to have? What kind of gossip did he receive and pass along? What kind of words disgusted him? What kind of patriotic appeal made him do things? What did he think of your country before the war? What things did he dislike you and your people for? What myths did he believe about America—that all Americans drove sports convertibles while drinking liquor? that all had blonde sweethearts? that all exchanged gunfire periodically? Of what American things did he think well—food, shoes, autos, personal freedom, others? What is he apt to be thinking now?

To this add what the enemy propaganda is trying to do to its Propaganda Man. That is, size up the domestic propaganda of the enemy in terms of the concrete individuals at whom it is aimed. This may reveal the enemy's vital necessities and his concealed weaknesses. What *are* the leaders trying to do? Are they trying to make the Propaganda Man get to work on time? Are they trying to make him give up holidays willingly? Are they trying to make him think that your side will kill him if you win? Are they trying to keep him from being worried about his city going up in an incandescent haze? Are they trying to make him believe that the concrete shelters are good? Why are they

harping so on the safety of the shelters? Has the Propaganda Man been muttering back about the flimsiness of the shelters? Does he want to be evacuated from target cities? Are the police being praised for their fairness and speed in issuing leave-the-city permits? Are illegal évacués being treated as scum and traitors and cowards?

Then go after the Propaganda Man yourself. He is your friend. You are his friend. The only enemy is the enemy Leader (or generals, or emperor, or capitalists, or "They"). How is the Propaganda Man going to hear from you? Leaflets? Short-wave—and if so, why is he listening to the enemy in the first place? Standard-wave? Speaker planes? Rumors? Get things to him that you know he will repeat, things which will interest him. Make up a list of the things he worries about each month, a list of the things which the enemy propaganda is trying to do to him currently, a list of the things your propaganda is trying to do. Do the three lists fit? Would they work on an actual living breathing thinking human being, with the prejudices, frailty, nobility, greed, lubricity, and other motives of the ordinary human being? If your list fits his real life, if your list spoils the enemy propaganda list, if your list builds up a psychological effect of confusion, gloom, willingness-to-surrender which accumulates month after month, the terrain is favorable. It is in your Propaganda Man's head.

There are no maps of the human mind, but in certain special cases sociology and psychology can provide leads which even the most acute untrained observation would otherwise overlook. During World War II, for example, Mr. Geoffrey Gorer, a British anthropologist, was able to provide character analyses of the Japanese that stood up under the rigorous analysis of experts long resident in Japan. Gorer took as base data the experience of the Japanese infant in the first forty-odd months of life. How was the baby given toilet training? how was it weaned? how was it disciplined

into the family life? how did the small child learn what it was? Gorer found that Japanese domestic life started the child out with a mixture of uncertainty and defiance—that the infant soon learned he was in a definite position in the human queue, where all above him had to be respected on the threat of immediate and condign reprisal, while all below him could be mistreated almost with impunity—that the Japanese had sad dirty little private thoughts about himself to a degree unknown to ourselves or the Chinese—that the Japanese was in adult life the inevitable fulfillment of what he had been made in infancy: arrogant, timid, insanely brave, deferential, fearful of foreigners and overtly cruel to them.

Furthermore, the Japanese identified persons, nations, or institutions as Female (peaceful, possessing enjoyments, subject to bullying) or as Male (fierce, counteraggressive, superordinate). The U.S.A. of Admiral Perry seemed Male; that of Cordell Hull, Female. These findings, applied to propaganda, gave British-American operations an audience unlike the Japanese whom missionaries, soldiers, diplomats, businessmen, and journalists had portrayed in such varied and inconsistent terms. This Japanese Propaganda Man (analyzed at a distance, since Gorer had never been nearer Japan than Indo-China) became a believable person. It was uncanny to see Japanese propaganda movies after reading the Gorer analyses, and to find the Japanese government propagandists, by hunch and instinct, appealing to the same Propaganda Man whom Gorer, by bold but permissible extrapolations, had revealed to Allied propaganda planners.

The Attribution of Motive.

One of the least factual elements in human life is motive. Motive is hard to discern, even in one's own life, and it is difficult if not impossible to prove. It must frequently be

attributed. Motive is therefore easily interpreted; "falsification" is almost impossible because no matter how much probable motive is twisted, it still might fit the case. Motive is therefore excellent material for psychological warfare. (Those propaganda veterans, the Communists, have a formula for showing that the motive of every person opposed to them is unprogressive, illiberal, and greedy, even if the person himself does not know it. Their own motives are always pure because they are "objectively" and "historically correct" according to *science*, that is, according to the historical rigmaroles of Karl Marx. The formula is a poor science, but a superb propaganda weapon.)

War eases the motive-switching operation because the leaders and people on each side derive moral exhilaration from the common effort. Ostensibly, politicians become statesmen; all higher-ranking officers become strategists; ordinary men become heroes, martyrs, adventurers. The lofty process of war is one which psychologists will not explain in our time; it transposes ordinary persons and events to a frame of reference in which individuals are less self-conscious and also less critical. Among European and American peoples, particularly, there arises the assumption that because of war men should be brave and unselfish, women kind and chaste, yet alluring, officials self-sacrificing, and so on, even though the facts of the case in the particular country involved may be very much to the contrary. The cruel futility inherent in war is so plain to all civilized men that when war does come men overcompensate for it. They set up illusions.

This need not be taken as a criticism of war or of mankind. The world would be a more inspiring place in which to dwell if people generally lived up to the wartime standards they impose on themselves. That these standards are felt to be real is attested by the distinct drop of the suicide rate in wartime, and the increase in suicide, murder, and crimes of

delinquency after every war; that the change of role is largely illusory is attested by the fact that no nation appears to have undergone permanent sociological change as a result of improvement during war. Many wartime changes carry on, of course; but they rarely comprise, by the standards of the people concerned, improvements. The upswing is genuine, when it occurs, but it is rarely permanent, and it seldom affects all levels of the entire population with the same degree of exhilaration.

The propagandist thus has an ideal situation. In the enemy country everyone is trying to be more noble, more unselfish, more hard-working. Everyone applies a higher standard of ethics and performance than in peacetime. Businessmen are not supposed to make too much money, politicians are supposed to work around the clock, officials are supposed to cooperate, housewives to save, children to scavenge, and so on. Yet a certain percentage of the enemy population is not taken into this. Sometimes minorities feel themselves emotionally excluded; at other times private temperamental differences make some persons skeptic while others remain believers. The ground is ready for rumor, for tearing down inflated personages, for breaking the illusion by the simple process of attributing normally selfish motives in wartime.

It is easier to attribute bad motives to civilian leaders than to military. The ceremonialized discipline of modern warfare makes the military figure a little mysterious; his normal peacetime obscurity shielded him and his family from exposure, cheap publicity, gossip. The civilian leader does not have this protection. The very process of becoming prominent has involved his seeking publicity, for the one part, and his pretense of avoiding it, for the other. Furthermore, the man who serves his nation serves himself. It is not possible for a man to lead a large country without benefiting himself, since the act of leadership is itself intensely pleasurable. Also, prominence possesses a

characteristic of vice; even when it loses its value for positive enjoyment it retains withdrawal pains. The once-prominent individual hates to leave prominence though he may be genuinely weary of it. He is willing to be tired of the country, but not willing for the country to be tired of him. In wartime old leaders remain and new ones come in. Fame and obscurity shift with even greater rapidity than before. The personality-politics condition of the country is highly mobile. Personalities are tense with interpersonal conflict.

Then comes the propagandist.

First, he attributes normal human motives to the leaders who so obviously possess them. In this job, he is doing what the famous little boy in the Hans Christian Andersen story did when he said of the Emperor, "Mamma, he hasn't any clothes on!" The propagandist need only say what everyone knows: that this man is notoriously fond of money; that another one has been a poor sportsman; that a third has betrayed some old friends; that a fourth has sought power in a selfish, vindictive way. The response which the propagandist seeks is a simple "That's so."

The next step in propaganda is to show that these persons do not measure up to the tragic, heroic, historic roles war has imposed on them. That too is not difficult, especially if the war is not going decisively one way or the other. Defeat or victory serves equally well to make leaders into heroes; Churchill and MacArthur were never more splendid than when they were whipped, the one after Dunkirk, the other after Bataan.

The final approach is the total discrediting of leaders. If the internal politics of the country have been bitter enough, some of the leaders may even come over voluntarily to the enemy. Quisling in Norway; Wang in China; Doriot and Laval in France; Vlassov in the U.S.S.R.; Laurel from the Philippines —such men all possessed a certain amount of standing in

their own countries but through capture, impatience, or seduction decided to continue their careers with enemy backing. The propagandist can now pretend to be tolerant. It is he who believes in peace, in reconciliation, in easygoing live-and-let-live attitudes. He describes his protegés, the quislings, in warm complimentary terms; he lightens the tenor of his attack on the non-quisling enemy leaders. He takes the attitude that war continues because of private stupidity, vengefulness, greed, unreasonableness on the other. For his part, he is willing to let the politicians, both quisling and patriot, "settle it between themselves." Let them form a coalition government.

Personal smearing is effective. If the war situation runs in the enemy's favor, the easing of the enemy position permits the population the privilege of backbiting, and even within the leader-group some leaders may feel more free to destroy the positions or reputations of the others. The impossible and foolishly heroic stances which the leaders have taken in time of strain now make most of them look a little silly. Conversely, in a downgrade situation, the leaders may gain stature in the first tragic weeks of defeat, but soon the ignobility of defeat sweeps over them all. The propagandist need only be a good reporter, and the leaders of the defeated country will provide him with good propaganda material.

In estimating the propaganda situation, the vulnerability of the leaders to personal attack is one of the major elements. Properly handled, it can be of real value. In the American Revolution, the personal character of George Washington was a very substantial asset. A. very rich man, he could scarcely be accused of a gutter revolution. A slave owner, he could not be accused of wanting the overthrow of the social order. An experienced soldier, he could not be attacked as a military amateur. A man of patience, correct manners, and genuine modesty, he was not easily described as a bloody

empire-builder, an immoral sycophant, or a power-drunk madman. British propaganda accordingly went after the Continental Congress, of which there was a great deal to be said. On the other side, the Americans had duck soup when it came to George III and most of his Cabinet—personalities which included boors, fuddy-duddies, too-little-and-too-laters, and conspicuous nincompoops.

A Written Estimate of the Situation.

If, as indicated above, the terrain of Psychological Warfare consists of the private thoughts and feelings of each member of the audience reached; if the mission of Psychological Warfare is the accomplishment of anything from entirely unknowable results (such as an imperceptible change of mood) all the way through to complete success (such as organized mass surrender); if the capabilities of the enemy have virtually nothing to do with one's own Psychological Warfare commitments; and if the decision consists of choices of means and theme—if these peculiarities all apply, the usual "estimate of the situation" has almost nothing to do with military propaganda.

Roughly speaking, this is the case. An attempt to apply the outline given in FM 101-5, Appendix I, would produce only a lamentable parody of a military document.

The *situation* of the military unit possessing Psychological Warfare facilities has relatively little to do with the *capabilities* of the Psychological Warfare unit. The morale of one's own men should have no effect whatever on the output of the radio script writers and the leaflet writers.

In combat operations, military forces *meet*. In Psychological Warfare, they do not. In combat operations, it is impossible for two hostile units to occupy the *same* territory for any length of time without both of them

degenerating into a chaos of armed mobs. In Psychological Warfare operations, both sets of operations can be conducted in the same media, can address themselves to the same basic human appeals, can use the same music, the same general kind of news account, and so on.

Furthermore, no modern army ever went into operation with certain units designated as wholly and exclusively defensive, and certain others as wholly and exclusively offensive. (The Great Wall of China is the world's most celebrated example of purely defensive planning, yet it protected Chinese offensive bases for twenty-one hundred years.) But in Psychological Warfare, the Japanese-language short-wave broadcasts from San Francisco had no imaginable effect on the American forces in the Pacific. The only people who could understand them were the Japanese-language officers in G-2 and ONI offices; their personal vexation did not matter.

The offensive operations of combat troops are predicated upon finding the enemy, effecting contact, and either destroying the enemy or making him yield terrain. The defensive operations of combat troops, contrariwise, are planned with a view to resisting an enemy who has been met.

In Psychological Warfare, operators and enemy do not effect contact. The audience cannot strike back through a radio set; the enemy reader cannot throw a leaflet back at the bomber which has dropped it on him. When American planes bombed German radio stations, they did not do so because the flight commander was trying to get German propaganda off the air; they did so because the Americans were trying to break up the entire German communications network. It is almost impossible to pinpoint radio transmitters and printing presses with such accuracy as to deny the enemy all chance of talking back. In a purely physical sense, there are only two sets of measures whereby

an actual defense can be set up against Psychological Warfare. Each is a measure of desperation; neither is considered effective; the Americans did not bother with either in World War II.

The first physical defense consists of radio jamming and of the planned interception of enemy leaflet raids. Radio jamming is ineffectual except in the case of an enemy possessing hopelessly inferior signal equipment. (The Japanese tried to jam our radio at Saipan, just as the Germans tried to jam BBC. They impeded reception, but they never succeeded in blocking it out altogether.)

The second physical defense consists of destroying reception facilities. It is possible to sweep an occupied territory and to sequester *almost* all the radio sets in use. It is possible to issue a military order that any soldier or civilian found in possession of enemy printed matter will be court-martialed and punished. These measures are useful to dictators having secret police, and among armies having the Prussian level of discipline, with the enlisted men regarded as robots. It is not to be expected that they would work against Americans.

Therefore, propaganda does not meet propaganda. Combat forces *meet*; Psychological Warfare forces pass one another in opposite directions.

In American practice, the forces which countered enemy propaganda were those pertaining to troop information and education—morale or special services. These did not concern themselves with propaganda to the Germans and Japanese. In the German and Russian armies of World War II, but not in the American, British, French or Japanese, there were *political officers* attached to the units under a variety of titles; these often took charge of propaganda to the enemy (offensive) as well as indoctrination of their own troops

(defensive), but the unrelatedness of these two functions let them split apart.

Even here, the parallel between combat operations and propaganda operations breaks down. Rarely does it occur that there is a simple juxtaposition of forces, thus:



The issue is more commonly one in which the propagandist on each side attacks those troops which are retreating, cut off, suffering heavy losses, politically disaffected, or otherwise psychologically promising material for him. Of the factors which can affect troop or enemy morale, the presence of friendly propaganda is a minor one. The result then becomes complicated:



Troops who are starving or are subjected to inordinate losses will not have their propaganda-resistance heightened by pep talks. A chopped-up unit has no means of enjoying USO facilities.

Propaganda vulnerability depends most commonly on the objective situation of the audience. If the objective situation is good or neutral, one's own propaganda can supplement the good morale conditions, but even here, it does not and should not meet enemy propaganda frontally.

In so far as it can be tabulated, the visualizable propaganda situation at any given time would be something

like this.



In each of these instances, the propaganda operators are themselves members of an audience. Furthermore, propaganda leaks, as it were, out of the channels into which it is directed. Additionally, propaganda in all countries has to compete with the normal day-to-day preoccupations of the listener—his food, his health, his hour-by-hour activities, his tangible interpersonal relationships. Save for rare moments of intense crisis, propaganda can expect to occupy only a small fraction of the audience's attention. In dictatorships, the range of propaganda can be widened by polluting all news, all theater presentations, all churches, etc., with the "Party line," but visitors to totalitarian capitals—of both the Fascist and Communist varieties—report that most of the common people have become calloused with apathy, over-all disbelief, or skepticism as a result of overexposure to official indoctrination.

Hence a written estimate of the situation follows *not* from some special Psychological Warfare situation, but from the practical measures available. If desired, it can summarize the following points:

1. DEFINITION OF THE AUDIENCE
    a. Medium through which reached

b. Anticipated attention (including means of getting attention)

c. Pertinent characteristics (from propaganda intelligence report)

2. PSYCHOLOGICAL GOALS TO BE SOUGHT

a. Attention of the enemy

b. Present-goal (if strategic, opinion or sentiment; if tactical, action)

c. Ultimate goal (applicable to strategic only)

3. LIMITATIONS OF POLICY

a. National political limitations

b. Limitation by adverse factual situation

c. Limitations arising from one's own security

4. MEDIA AVAILABLE

a. Kind and quality of media to be used

5. THE PROPAGANDA MAN

a. Descriptive appreciation of a typical audience member

6. COMPETITIVE FACTORS

a. Listener's non-propaganda preoccupations

b. Continuation of adverse indoctrination

c. Effect of news available both to one's self and to listener

d. Competitive effect of hostile propaganda

7. RELATION TO GENERAL (MILITARY) ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

a. Timing relationships

1. Contingency plans

2. Contingency prohibitions

b. Contribution of Psychological Warfare to operations planning

1. Combat operations psychologically advisable

2. Combat operations subject to propaganda exploitation

3. Operations providing adverse propaganda with opportunity

c. Correlation of Psychological Warfare with

1. Public relations programming

2. Information and education plans

3. Medical plans and reporting

4. Countersubversive functions

Such papers might be of use, gathering together in a single document all pertinent facts. In most tactical situations, the situation would have obsolesced before the author of the estimate had finished his document. In strategic situations, it could not normally be made specific enough to be practical—at the operational level—without becoming hopelessly unwieldy. Each skill represented in the estimate does prepare other reports, and the practice of most modern armies indicates that it is better to conduct routine propaganda planning, supervision, and appreciation through liaison than to prepare elaborate documents gathering together the multifarious factors which actually affect Psychological Warfare.

In most American Psychological Warfare facilities—especially in the theaters—the estimate of the situation consisted of a brief résumé of home propaganda by the enemy (taken directly from propaganda analysis), comment on the audience by appropriate representatives from the State Department or other Federal agencies, and discussion of the audience by some kind of Psychological Warfare

operations-planning and intelligence board. Some of the most valuable suggestions came from persons not concerned with propaganda—such as target-intelligence people who could anticipate enemy civilian or military shortages, or economic-warfare people who suggested vexations which the enemy listener was probably experiencing.

The Question of Choice.

An estimate of a combat situation is something like a diagnosis and prognosis in medicine. The estimate sets forth the situation, presenting the difficulties to be faced and the general range of pertinent fact, all in orderly array, like a systematic diagnosis. The plans are then drawn up in the light of the estimate; they are limited by the harsh, immediate facts of the situation; they resemble a doctor's prognosis, which may have room for several choices, but which does not open the way to speculative, creative action. Psychological Warfare situations are usually fluid, save at times of specific tactical emergency (the appeal to an enemy unit, when it is surrounded, to surrender; pre-invasion propaganda for specific points).

Therefore the psychological estimate should not be presented as a propaganda-*versus*-propaganda analysis; if it does, it will end as an unproductive and meaningless duel between the propagandists on the two sides. Nor should the estimate pretend to present choices with the pretense that these choices are definitely prescribed by the situation itself. In any field, an expert can hoax or befuddle a layman. A Psychological Warfare officer should present choices for what they really are—options open to him and his staff as creative writers. Policy issues, in specific cases, can be answered *yes* or *no*. This is not true of propaganda as a whole. The task of the propagandist is to create something which will arouse attention, will induce attitudes, and will eventually lead to

action. It is a task of permanent offense. Its variations are as infinitely diverse as the imaginations of mankind can make them.

Choice is perpetually before the Psychological Warfare propagandist. But it is the wide choice of what he can think up, not the narrow choice dictated by fixed terrain, by specific enemy capabilities, by concrete physical necessities. Adolf Hitler himself, in the near-delirium of his last days of life, recognized this. He told his followers to hold out; German propaganda might still provoke the "inevitable" American-Soviet clash which would save Germany. He said he would choose one side or the other—he didn't much care which. Thus, at the end, the range of propaganda possibilities deceived even the arch propagandist, despite the bold shrewdness he had shown in the past. He knew, as his generals did not, that in the realm of the psychological, the "factor of the unexpected" is always a large one, and hoped to the last to turn it to his ends. His premises were right, even though his conclusion was fatal for him.

Allied Operations.

Estimates become more complex when several nations fight on the same side.

In a particular type of instance, estimates of the antagonist's propaganda capacity form a part of normal military operations. This occurs in the instance of allied operation: when the outside ally fears that the local ally may be subverted. Such was the state of France in relation to Britain in 1940, of Central China in relation to the Americans in 1944, of the Balkan states in relation to the Third Reich in 1945. In such instances, estimate of the enemy propaganda becomes a vital part of the total military estimate. The principles stated below can be applied by changing the direction of their application. Propaganda analysis can, in

situations like this, provide cues for effective action and correct timing. In this type of situation, the outside ally cannot afford to sit by and hope for the best. By black operations he too must prepare to re-subvert the local ally if the local ally goes over to the enemy. In Rumania, Bulgaria and puppet Serbia the Germans were not successful; in Italy they created the Fascist Italian Social Republic and brought a large part of Northern Italy back into the war. In China, Allied pro-Communist sympathizers hoped that the Japanese would subvert the Generalissimo so badly that America would build up Yenan as a precautionary measure; but the Generalissimo stood firm, and the Yenan maneuver lingered on as an unpleasant memory between certain Americans and certain Nationalist Chinese. This type of situation mixes politics, economics, propaganda and warfare to such a degree that no sound estimate can appraise one factor without including the others.

Estimate of One's Own Capacity.

In preparing a routine estimate of one's own capacity, militarily speaking, the measurable factors of space and time provide guides for projecting plans into the future. It is possible to plan, "At 1830 hours, D day plus 8, the Smithforce will have arrived at Tenallytown," meaning that 8 days after the start, this result can be expected. Psychological warfare can be estimated in a loosely comparable way, provided the terms of reference are different.

Naturally, no sane Theater commander would rely on psychological warfare alone for the accomplishment of a military result. It is possible, nevertheless, to allow for planned good luck—good luck which one has created with many months of hard work. When psychological warfare is used in conjunction with invasion, its planned use (to judge

by the results found in World War II) might often justify commanders in using minimum rather than maximum allocations of troops for the protection of lines of communications against guerrilla or civilian attack. If the Nazis had chased the Soviet peasants through the woods with soup kitchens, free movies, and mittens for the babies, they would not have had so many furious partisans sniping at them.

Psychological warfare can be relied upon to a considerable degree to step up enemy panic in the application of a rapid forward movement. The Japanese in China panicked whole regiments of local volunteers plumb out of existence by the use of fast-marching Chinese-speaking plainclothes troops, some of whom may have been air-dropped. In the Nazi establishment of the first salient through to Abbeville, the psychological aspects of the blitzkrieg helped prevent the British and French from re-forming a continuous line and led eventually to the pocketing of the British at Dunkirk.

Psychological warfare can also be counted on, tactically, to speed up the reduction of isolated enemy positions when these positions are clearly beyond hope of rescue. All the psychological warfare people need to do is to go in with map leaflets, surrender leaflets, loudspeakers and a near-by radio. The unit may not give in instantly, but the unit would be superhuman if it fought as well in the face of persuasion as it would have fought without psychological attack. In the mopping-up of Japanese in the Pacific island fighting, psychological warfare teams and techniques undoubtedly eased and speeded the process.

These references are to tactical estimates. Strategic propaganda is beyond estimate. All it can do is to weight the probabilities a little more favorably than would be the case without it. If the United States had not dropped the Japanese surrender proposal in Japanese all over Japan, the Japanese government leaders might have been more inclined to resist

surrendering. If the Germans had not softened up the French before the Great Western Blitz of 1940, they might have needed more time, days or weeks more to reduce France, and thus might have faced a united French overseas Empire even after France-in-Europe fell. The success of a strategic propaganda operation cannot be guaranteed in any plan. It would be foolhardy optimism to think that psychology can assume a major portion of responsibility for direct military results. It would appear that the Soviet Red Army, despite its propaganda-conscious Communist background, never passed the whole buck to psychological warfare. The Russians never appeared to leave the artillery at home in order to take the loudspeakers or leaflet mortars along. They made brilliant, almost terrifying use of pre-belligerent propaganda; they used propaganda tactically with immense success in the taking of prisoners; they used psychological warfare, with a heavy infusion of political warfare, more drastically for consolidation and occupation purposes than did any of the other United Nations. But like everyone else, they seem to have used strategic propaganda for whatever it might bring in—immediate generalized effect, and the ultimate production of windfalls.

Tactical psychological warfare can be estimated, though to a limited extent, as part of a tactical potential of either the enemy or one's own side. Strategic propaganda can be planned and evaluated only in terms of the diffuse general situation, with the reasonable and fair expectation that if properly employed it will better the position of the user. It sometimes achieves results which astound even the originators, but these results cannot be calculated (except by hunch) in advance. Nevertheless, the operation is well worth trying since it has incalculable possibilities and is quite inexpensive in relation to the gross cost of war.

PART THREE
PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 10
Organization for Psychological Warfare

Big jobs require big organizations. Eight *billion* leaflets were dropped in the Mediterranean and European Theaters of Operations alone under General Eisenhower's command. That is enough to have given every man, woman and child on earth four leaflets, and this figure, large as it is, does not include leaflets dropped in all the other theaters of war by ourselves, our allies, and our enemies. It does not include the B-29 leaflet raids on Japan, in which hundreds of tons of thin paper leaflets were dropped. Huge American newspapers were developed, edited, printed and delivered to our Allies and to enemy troops. One of these, *Parachute News* (*Rakkasan*), attained a circulation of two million copies per run; this was in the Southwest Pacific. In parts of the upper Burmese jungle and the Tibetan borderland where no newspaper was ever distributed before, the Fourteenth Air Force distributed a Japanese newspaper, *Jisei*, along with picture sheets for illiterate tribesmen.

In getting at the enemy, the United States printed leaflets, cartoons, pamphlets, newspapers, posters, books, magazines. In black operations enough fabrications were perpetrated to keep the FBI busy for a thousand years. Movies in all forms (commercial, amateur, all known widths, sound and silent, even lantern slides) went out all over the world. Radio talked on all waves in almost every language

and code; loudspeakers, souvenirs, candy, matches, nylon stockings, pistols you could hide in your mouth, sewing thread, salt, phonograph records and baby pictures streamed out over the world. Much of this was necessarily waste. In the larger waste of war it appears almost frugal when taken in relation to the results thought to have been achieved.

Every American theater commander, given the choice of using psychological warfare or not, as he chose, did choose to use it. Every major government engaged in the war used psychological warfare, along with a number of assorted private characters, some of whom later founded governments. (The sacred government of the Dalai Lama, in forbidden Lhasa, undertook a neat little maneuver in limited overt propaganda when it printed a brand-new set of stamps for presentation to President Roosevelt; the Inner Mongols were propagandized by the Outer Mongols; the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg broadcast against the Reich.) Psychological warfare proliferated so much as to change the tone if not the character of war. General Eisenhower wrote, at the end of the European operations, that psychological warfare had developed as a specific and effective weapon of war.

The organization of psychological warfare was as much a problem as the operation. It overlapped military, naval, diplomatic, press, entertainment, public relations, police power, espionage, commercial, educational and subversive operations. Almost every nation involved had extreme difficulty in fitting these new powers and unknown processes into the accepted frame of government, and almost every national solution was different. The British and the Japanese achieved a considerable degree of unification. The Americans, Nazis and Russians were hampered by the number of competing agencies. The French were burdened through most of the war by an excess of governments. The Chinese did things in their own formal but offhand manner; the Nationalist party carried on information functions for the

Chinese government, while the Communist guerrilla authorities carried on functions for the Communist party.

Figure 39: Leaflet Production: Military Presses. The machines shown are Davidson presses, widely used by the Americans in all theaters of war. The unit shown is Psychological Warfare Branch during the Leyte operations. The leaflet being run off is addressed to both Filipino guerrillas and Japanese troops, facilitating a difficult three-way operations whereby Japanese are told to surrender to Filipinos, Filipinos told not to kill surrendering Japanese, and Americans instructed to receive prisoners from Filipinos.

Figure 40: Leaflet Production: Rolling. When round bombs were used, the leaflets had to be rolled into round packages to fit. Forty thousand leaflets could be packed into one bomb, and a Mitchell bomber could carry seventeen such bombs. (Photo by Ninth Air Force Combat Camera Unit.)

Figure 41: Leaflet Distribution: Attaching Fuzes. Packaged leaflets must spread out. Bundles of paper which fall intact make little impact on the enemy unless they hit him on the head. Their subsequent employment is rarely related to propaganda. To be effective, leaflets must scatter. World War II saw the adaptation of various scattering devices, of which the most effective was the barometric fuze, shown here. The others included self-timing packages, slip-strings which unwrapped the package in the air, and a belly-tank which fed leaflets out at any desired speed, either in a continuous stream or in bursts.

The lower down the echelon, the nearer the armies of the world came to standardizing psychological warfare organization. They did this for the same reason that they all organize into regiments instead of centuries, cohorts, or tribes. Modern war is a self-standardizing process if the enemy experience is to be copied, enemy techniques improved, allied assistance accepted, and military practice kept up to world standards. Psychological warfare units needed printing and radio sections; to service these sections they all needed intelligence and analysis offices; to distribute their materials they all needed agents and liaison. Black propaganda organization varied more than did white, but it was amazing to Americans, uncovering Japanese subversive-operations units, to see how much the Japanese organization resembled their own.

Figure 42: Leaflet Distribution: Packing the Boxes. Sometimes boxes were used instead of bombs. These, being square, facilitated the packing process, since the rectangular packages could be used just as they came out of the printshop. The fuze is attached to the package, not to the box.

Figure 43: Leaflet Distribution: Loading the Boxes. Boxes were built to fit the bomb bays. Boxes were opened, one after the other, by a trip lever, shown above at left. Each box can be emptied in turn, giving the pilot the opportunity to select more than one target.

Figure 44: Leaflet Distribution: Bombs at the Airfield. Leaflet bombs, filled with rolls such as those shown in figure 40, are delivered to the bomber. The scene shown is somewhere in England. Officers and men picked up British slang for leaflet operations, and called such missions "nickelling."

Figure 45: Leaflet Distribution: Loading the Bombs. The bombs were loaded as shown. The entire bomb dropped out of the plane and was disintegrated in the air by a small explosive charge. No illustration can do justice to the sight of such a bomb in the actual dropping, since the leaflets tend to look scattered or to disappear under normal flight conditions. Army motion picture films preserve the process for the official record, however.

Figure 46: Leaflet Distribution: The Final Result. Search of prisoners provided a fair, accurate test of how the leaflets took effect. Sometimes surrender leaflets actually came to have black market value. Enemy officers prohibited the carrying of Allied surrender leaflets, since they knew that a soldier who had one in his pocket or hidden in his clothes was halfway or more through the psychological process of surrendering. Here a German hands in a leaflet to his American captor.

National Propaganda Organizations.

At the national level, the psychological warfare facilities were parts of their national governments. Neither the Axis nor the United Nations developed super-national psychological facilities. The closest thing to international agencies were the American-British coordination facilities under authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, along with that mysterious force which in the latter part of the war impelled Russian-occupied countries to sound amazingly much like Moscow. Short of preparing a textbook for political science study, explaining each of the governments and the location of its intelligence and informational functions, it would be impossible to explain in any detail how each of the systems worked. Even between governments having the same general political orientation, the improvised war agencies were different, and in the same government, the practices of World War I were not carried over into World War II. Some description of the American psychological

warfare may be warranted, chiefly as a means of showing how a simple task can be accomplished even with intricate and confused organizations, and the Japanese system (on paper, the best of them all, though weak in field operations and control) may be outlined for the sake of contrast.

Figure 47: Consolidation Propaganda: The Movie Van. Consolidation of friendly, neutral or hostile civilians in an area of operations can become a vitally important function. During the North African operations, this movie van showed newsreels and documentary films to the local people. Similar vans were used in Italy, France, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Austria, and other areas.

American Psychological Warfare Agencies.

The American Army failed to establish its authority and leadership in the field of psychological warfare despite its creation of the Psychological Warfare Branch under G-2. In large part this was a matter of practical politics and of personalities. The United States government as a whole, in the successive administrations of President Roosevelt, acquired tremendous administrative vitality but at the same time permitted the older "constitutional" agencies to lose ground to their newly founded rivals. Had an administrative purist and traditionalist been in the White House, instead of a bold governmental experimenter, the logical creation of a psychological warfare facility would have paralleled the later

creation of SWNCC (State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee).

From the purely theoretical standpoint, it would have been far sounder to put national policy formulation (White House and Congress), foreign policy formulation (State), strategic propaganda (State, War, Navy) into a single administrative entity than to create a new federal agency with improvised procedures, improvised security, and an improvised staff. However, the State, War and Navy Departments (at the very opening of our war) were overworked and understaffed. Many of the senior personnel regarded psychological warfare with downright suspicion and propaganda was regarded as a dirty name for a dirty and ineffectual job. Hence the old-line agencies let pass the opportunity for establishing initial control.

Figure 48: Consolidation Propaganda: Posters. An American soldier pastes American posters over Nazi ones while a French crowd looks on. (The crowd is pretty typical as to size and content, but a thousand such crowds will cover an entire town.) The poster operation shown was conducted by Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF. (OWI-PWD photo.)

Subsequent experience suggests that the use of existing facilities and existing agencies wherever possible instead of new ones imparts stability, discipline, and morale, and lowers the organizational friction common to all new

political agencies, especially to instrumentalities in so controversial a field as propaganda. On the chart shown, for instance, it would not have mattered whether the Psychological Warfare Facility (whatever its name) were put for housekeeping purposes under the State, War, Navy Department, or the Office for Emergency Management. The essential requirement would have been to use State Department men for jobs that involved determining foreign policy, military men for tasks of a military nature and naval for navy work, and to recruit only after cadres had been established. The sponsorship of psychological warfare by one—any one—of the old-line departments might have slowed down the feverish tempo of reorganizations, quarrels, cabals, internal struggles for power and clashes with other Federal agencies which were so characteristic of OWI and its colleague organizations.

Figure 49: Consolidation Propaganda: Photo Exhibit. When newsprint is short, a photo exhibit has great appeal to civilians. In backward countries, people sometimes waited their turn to get a chance to see the American pictures. Even in Cherbourg, the French city shown, these passersby are showing a very real interest in the picture display.

The actual conduct of psychological warfare was shown in Chart I. (No official authority exists for such a chart; the author bases it on his own observation and experience.) Only agencies themselves originating psychological warfare

materials are shown. Relationships between State, War and Navy were stable, but were frequently by-passed; for example, the Zacharias broadcasts, which were our biggest political warfare experiment, did not go to the State Department until after they had started. Relationships between OSS and other agencies were erratic and cloaked in extraordinary but irregular security. The OWI ran for most purposes as an autonomous group, with occasional reference to State, Navy, and War Departments. The President in his individually official capacity was apt to improvise psychological warfare operations of high importance, without warning his subordinates of what was coming (paper knife made of human Japanese bone; the "unconditional surrender" formula). The White House staff sometimes worked through channels, sometimes not; the Harvard professor who advised on inflation was simultaneously involved with psychological warfare on continental Asia. The Secretary of the Treasury openly discussed what *he* would like to do with Germany in terms which the Nazi radio naturally conveyed to its own people. Within the OWI itself, the overseas operation was separated from the domestic, the broadcasters from the planners, the outposts from everybody else, during much of the war.

But the job was done!

Success was not due to the formal structure of the Office of War Information (see charts V, VI). No administrative formula could have transcended such governmental confusion. It was owing to the fact that all the people just described—who went around, with the best will in the world most of the time, minding one another's business—did in the end achieve effective results. The common denominator behind them was not the authority of the President, the discipline of the Democratic Party, or the casually designed, casually overlooked formal lines of authority. The common denominator was American civilization itself. Had we been

deeply disunited, this ramshackle structure would have collapsed into chaos. But there was broad concurrence, a sense of cooperativeness, good will and good temper. A German, Russian or Japanese bureaucrat would have gone mad in the wartime mazes of the Federal system; a Chinese would probably have felt very much at home, but would have polished up the titles and honorifics a little.

The difference between our governmental organization and that of our enemies lay in the fact that to us the T/O were something that could be used when convenient, and could (without breach of faith or law) be short-circuited when convenient. Word was passed around, material exchanged, coordination effected in ways which could not be shown on any imaginable chart. It was neither a merit nor a defect, but simply an American way of doing things.

This characteristic has the effect, however, of making after-the-fact studies quite unrealistic. There is not much from the formal records and the formal charts which conveys the actual tone of governmental operations in terms of propaganda. Study of World War II organization for the sake of research and planning against possible future war would not be very profitable unless it delved into the concrete experience of individuals. The formal outlines mean nothing; they are positively deceptive unless the actual controls and operations are known. (Mr. Warburg makes it plain in his book that he thinks little of Mr. Elmer Davis' conception of his job; but he does not mention that Mr. Sherwood, theoretically Mr. Davis' subordinate, ran foreign operations without much reference to Mr. Davis or to any other part of the Federal government. Since Mr. Sherwood was closer to the White House than was Mr. Davis, this important consideration escapes being recorded on the chart: foreign operations were actually autonomous.[35]) Examples of how things really worked—as opposed to how they looked as though they worked—could

be multiplied forever; but the soundest way of finding out sober, judicious opinion will necessarily await the writing of autobiographies and memoirs by the people concerned.

With these sweeping reservations in mind, it is worth noting the organization of OWI (internal). The Domestic Operations Branch can be dismissed with brief mention. It proved to be the object of profound suspicion on the part of many members of Congress, and its function was to stimulate and assist inward media of public information in support of the war effort. The Domestic Operations Branch never superseded other U. S. government informational services (State, Agriculture, Treasury, War, and so on), so that it was the wartime supplement to the governmental supplement to the regular news and information system, which remained private. This precluded intimate coordination of domestic and overseas propaganda and rendered illusory any hope that domestic propaganda, as eavesdropped by our enemies, could be used as an instrument of war.

The Overseas Operations Branch had two basic missions. Within the United States it was the operating and controlling agency for government-owned or government-leased world-wide short-wave. For actual overseas purposes, it was the rear echelon of both the Navy and Army theater facilities and of its own OWI Outposts. The Outposts were themselves under OWI for certain purposes; for other purposes they were subject to the chief of mission (ambassador, minister or chargé) of the U. S. in the foreign country, and still other purposes under the American military commander having local jurisdiction. (OWI-Delhi, for example, was under the office of the American High Commissioner in India; also under the Rear Echelon Headquarters of the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, China-Burma-India Theater; also under OWI-New York for supply of its printed materials, most personnel and needed presses; under OWI-

San Francisco for supply of its wirelessed news; and under OWI-Washington for general policy, hiring and firing, and everything else.)

In terms of its own global radio, OWI prepared planning and control materials in Washington and relayed these to New York and San Francisco. The radio facilities in these cities then transmitted the material overseas. Through the first three years of the war, the precise nature of the Washington controls was in question, enforcement remained a perplexing problem, and coordination between planning and execution remained unsolved in part. By the spring and summer of 1945, OWI had solved most of these problems, chiefly by means of circulating the Area I, II, and III chiefs to the operating offices. When personal relations were satisfactory (as in the instance of Mr. Owen Lattimore, chief in OWI San Francisco, Mr. George Taylor, chief of Far East in Washington, and Mr. F. M. Fisher, chief of China Outpost in Chungking, all of them China experts) coordination might be difficult but was never exasperating.



Chart V (Source: OWI administrative memorandum. Courtesy of Dr. E. P. Lilly.)

Chart VI (Source: OWI administrative memorandum. Courtesy of Dr. E. P. Lilly.)

In terms of supply, the materials gathered by the other agencies went to the Outpost Service Bureau, which ran a virtual informational Sears Roebuck for the outposts. Foreign demands for American materials were unpredictable. The OWI learned rapidly and effectively, and the material going out of the outposts to foreign audiences very soon reached a high level of quality.

Other psychological warfare agencies at the national level were the CIAA (Coordinator of [later the Office of] Inter-American Affairs) which conducted propaganda exclusively to Latin America and the Caribbean, and the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), which serviced the Joint Chiefs of Staff with intelligence and policy materials, and served as a home base for its own units which operated abroad under Theater authority. No U.S.-based black propaganda operations were reported to the public.[36]

Reduced to the concrete terms of definite policy execution (as opposed to the making of policies that might or might not ever reach their supposed executors) and the routine working of operations, the national level was not important except for the two functions stated above, global shortwave, and source of supply. The decisive choices were made in the theaters or at the outposts, half the time in ignorance of what Washington policy-makers had decided in conclave on

that particular topic. (When the author was in China, he found that the OWI China outpost decoded its week-to-week propaganda instructions only after they were hopelessly obsolete; they were then filed.) The theaters were able to use psychological warfare as and when they pleased. Between the ETO and Washington close politico-military coordination was possible. Between Washington and the others it was impracticable.

The War Department participation in the control and planning of psychological warfare is shown by Chart VII, which represents the situation as of 1945. The Propaganda Branch, attached to G-2 as a staff agency and not to Military Intelligence Service as an operating agency, served to carry out the psychological warfare functions of the War Department.[37] The Chief of the Branch represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff at OWI meetings, along with his Navy confrère; he took care of official messages to the Theaters pertaining to psychological warfare matters, and his office itself performed a few limited functions. (One of these functions required the author to get up at four-thirty mornings in order to digest the overnight intake of enemy propaganda. He was joined in this by Teheran-born, Columbia-trained Edward K. Merat. It was with real relief that he saw the Nazi stations go off the air. He was then able to pass the early-bird business to his Persian colleague.) The Branch also made up propanal studies whenever these were warrantable at the General Staff level. The Deputy Chief (Air) was the vestigial remnant of a short-lived Army Air Forces propaganda establishment; he had direct access to the air staff, and took care of things having a peculiarly air character. (The abbreviations under Theaters are explained below, on page 187, since Theater nomenclature for psychological warfare was never standardized.)



Chart VII (Source: Chart prepared for Colonel John Stanley in Propaganda Branch, G-2.)

With the termination of hostilities, though it was not the juridical finish of the war, both OSS and OWI were swept out of existence. By executive order of 20 September 1945, effective ten days later, OSS was broken up; the scholastic portions were dismembered and reassembled into the Department of State, where they presumably helped collate material for the new interdepartmental Central Intelligence Group (CIG). The operational parts were handed over to the War Department. For all the author knows, some distressed colonel may have a desk full of fountain-pens which explode, transmit radio messages, or can be used for invisible tattooing, along with an edible blotter, a desk telephone which is really a hand grenade and a typewriter which is a demountable motor scooter; such speculations are delightful topics on which to dwell, but the day of black propaganda is over. Obsolescence reduces all things, even OSS, to absurdity.

The OWI perished a more lingering administrative death. It was transferred to the Department of State as an operating unit under the name Interim International Information Service (IIIS) and a new Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. William Benton, took over its sponsorship. Later,

under the abbreviation OIC (Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs), it was coordinated on January 1, 1946, with preexisting State department offices and with certain leftovers from the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA). It retained the global broadcasts on a limited budget; it still served the surviving outposts, which were being integrated with diplomatic and consular offices overseas; and for Korea, Japan, Germany, Austria, and Venezia Giulia, it acted as the supplying service for the Military Government information programs in those areas. The Bureau of the Budget took over limited domestic functions when the OWI passed out of independent existence on 31 August 1945.

The *Joho Kyoku*.

Comparison of this United States system with the Japanese Board of Information (*Joho Kyoku*), as outlined in chart VIII, shows the difference between integrated and disparate systems. The Japanese developed a close-knit system which combined public relations of both army and navy, all domestic government publishing, complete control of book-publishing, magazines, press, radio, and film, propaganda intelligence and over-all psychological warfare. The progress of an item through the Japanese psychological warfare system may look intricate when followed on the chart, but it was in fact much less intricate than the comparable American processing of an item.



Chart VIII (Source: Chart prepared before VJ-day in Propaganda Branch, G-2.)

The only aspect of psychological warfare that does not show on the chart is the Japanese political warfare system—by the test of success, the best developed by any belligerent during World War II. The Japanese very early learned the simple rule: *Political warfare cannot convert a sub-subsistence economy and government into a satisfactory system, but political warfare can convert a subsisting area into one that has the illusions of prosperity and national freedom.* To succeed in the face of economic difficulty, political warfare must be shrewd, simple, insistent, and backed up with a touch of terror. The Japanese moved into the Western colonial areas of the Far East between 1940 and 1942 (Indo-China, Malaya, Indonesia, the Philippines, parts of China, Burma, and areas inhabited by substantial Indian minorities). They organized the following "independent" governments:

The Imperial Government of Manchukuo;

Federated Autonomous Inner Mongolia;

The Reorganized National Government of China, superseding earlier puppets;

Malai (under Japanese military control but promised ultimate independence);

The Republic of the Philippines;

The Empire of Vietnam (later the Vietnam Republic);

A dictatorship in Burma of the Adipadi;

Republic Indonesia;

Azad Hind (Free Indian government-in-exile) and the Azad Hind Fauj (quisling Indian National Army, which put large forces into the field against British-controlled Indian troops and helped to neutralize the entire military potential of India);

The independent Kingdom of Cambodia (made independent by telling the helpless King that he need not let the French come back).

These Japanese-sponsored governments flew their own flags, had enough troops to help Japan police their home areas, developed psychological warfare facilities with intensive Japanese assistance, and went through all the motions of independence. In 1944, some of them even held an international conference at Tokyo, thanking Japan for liberating all the non-White States and adopting high-sounding resolutions. (The Siamese puppet ambassador to this meeting had the unforgettable name of His Excellency, the Honorable Witchit Witchit Watakan!)

Behind the pageantries of Japanese political warfare, economic and social realities were horrid. The Japanese printed money which had far less backing than cigar store coupons. They bankrupted all non-Japanese business so that Japanese carpetbaggers could buy their way in cheap; businesses owned by white foreigners were expropriated out of hand. They cut off communications, spread terror, raised the price of food, put hospitals out of business, degraded schools—and received the devoted loyalty of large parts of the cheated populations. It did not matter to millions of Burmese whether they had lived well under British rule or not; the British did not let them have their

own flag, did not let them send ministers and ambassadors, did not let them run a scow up and down the river with a mortar on it, calling it a navy. The *miranda*, the pageantry of politics, was what mattered—not law-and-order, democracy, security, education, health.[38]

The same story might have been repeated on a larger scale throughout the Far East, perhaps ultimately leading to something like Lothrop Stoddard's old nightmare, *The Rising Tide of Color*. Countervening factors included the presence of Chinese agitation both Kuomintang and Communist in leadership, guerrilla operations throughout Southeast Asia, and the ruinous economic effects of American submarine and Fourteenth Air Force anti-shipping operations. Shipping losses drove the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere below subsistence level and created a condition where even the most fanatic patriot realized the disadvantages of the situation.

The Japanese put all the captured radios to work. They had traitors of all kinds on their side—including, it is shameful to admit, Americans, Russians, British, Australians, and French. (Despite the fact they occupied all of Guam, they never used a single Guamanian traitor—testimony to the simple loyalty to the U.S. of the Chamorro people and to the popularity of the long-established U.S. naval government on the island.)

Japanese psychological warfare failed because the real warfare behind it failed. The Japanese could not whip their over-docile troops into a fighting frenzy without allowing those troops to behave in a way which made deadly enemies for Japan among the peoples she came to "liberate." The Japanese did not have sense enough to be satisfied with 100% return per year on their money, but wrecked the conquered economic systems with inflation, poor management, and excess exploitation. Even the

quislings became restless under the poor occupation policies of the Japanese, and before the war was over a considerable number of the Japanese quislings re-quislinged back to the United Nations side.

Theater Psychological Warfare.

The Japanese had superlative close-knit psychological warfare staff organization within metropolitan Japan. They possessed many first-class field operators, first among them the true-life master-mind Major General K. Doihara, whose dinner guests often woke up the next morning with bad hangovers and high treason on their consciences. But the Japanese did not have adequate channels of communication, supply, and control between their smooth system at the top, and the working propagandists at the bottom. The *Kempeitai* (military-political gendarmerie) structure got in the way; Japanese propaganda lines lost touch with the strategic realities of their slow defeat. They did, instead, what any propaganda system does on the downgrade; they turned to repression instead of counterpropaganda with the inevitable result.

In contrast, the American psychological warfare structure included Theater operating units, usually called PWB (Psychological Warfare Branch), although it became PWD (Psychological Warfare Division) in SHAEF and did not grow beyond TPWO (Theater Psychological Warfare Officer) in China Theater. The supreme authority was, of course, the Theater Commander, on whose responsibility the operation had to be carried out. When propaganda bungled and got into the field of political trouble, it was the Theater Commander and not the subordinates who took the blame. Every theater was under the command of a general, except for Central Pacific (under Admiral Nimitz, and he used an Army colonel as his propaganda chief). In most theaters, the

Political Adviser was the buffer between psychological warfare and the commander himself; in Southwest Pacific and later the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japan, General MacArthur instituted the office of Military Secretary and made this officer responsible for reporting to him personally the developments in the propaganda field.

Subject to local variation, the Theater agencies faced similar problems. They had to serve in turn as a rear echelon to service the needs of combat propaganda, while working as the actual operating agencies for the bigger radio programs and the preparation of strategic leaflets. As the areas behind them became more consolidated, displays and films took their place beside news and leaflets as chores that had to be performed. Communications facilities were a problem. Purely military facilities could not, of course, be overloaded by the lightly coded transmission of hundreds of thousands of words of political and other news and guidance; the psychological warfare establishments had to jerry-build communications facilities out of what they could borrow from Army, or obtain from OWI supplies in the United States, or buy locally.

In most Theater organizations, the chief was a military man and the staff was partly military and partly civilian. Under General Eisenhower, PWD was not only Army and OWI but included OSS, on the American side, along with British partnership, French participation, and other Allied personnel as well. Under General MacArthur, OWI participated under strict Army control. Under General Stilwell, no Theater organization as such was set up; the G-2, the Political Adviser or the General himself handled propaganda matters when they turned up. Under General Wedemeyer, there was a Theater officer. Under General Sultan, the OWI ran itself; the Outpost serviced the Theater. Under General Clay, Information Control Service, OMGUS,

became an integral part of military control. The same thing happened in General MacArthur's reorganized PWB—an organization termed CIES (Civil Information and Education Section) had the organization and personnel not only of the American structure, but the usable purged parts of the *Joho Kyoku* obedient to its command and liaison. Other Theaters had comparable arrangements, each suited to the Theater.

Figure 50: Consolidation Propaganda: Door Gods. One of the most unusual consolidation propaganda operations was the distribution of "door gods." These were small good-looking posters which traditionally displayed figures from the Chinese Pantheon. During the war, farm families who had been accustomed to putting up new door gods each lunar New Year found that they could not afford them. China Division, OWI, then run by F. M. Fisher, Richard Watts, Jr., Graham Peck, and James Stewart, made up new door gods which showed American aviators, thus familiarizing the Chinese peasantry with our insignia and preaching the cause of inter-Allied cooperation.



Chart IX (*Source: History of 2d Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company.*)

The common features of all Theater establishments were:

(1) Liaison or control from Army, State, and OWI, sometimes including OSS.

(2) Responsibility to the Theater Commander.

(3) Direct operation of strategic radio.

(4) Preparation of strategic leaflets, and sometimes of tactical leaflets as well.

(5) Use of local, native, or allied personnel.

Within the Theater staffs, the psychological warfare facilities were to a great extent assimilated for control and movement of personnel, supply, and so on. The G-3's and G-4's of the Theaters normally serviced the PWB's along with the rest of their work. The OWI and other civilian persons were put into uniform and given simulated rank, sometimes wildly disproportionate to their Army counterparts. The Army G-2's naturally worked with the PWB intelligence facilities; in some Theaters the G-2 was *ex officio* the chief of psychological warfare, as was the Assistant Chief of Staff

G-2, War Department General Staff, himself at home. G-1's usually kept out of the way of psychological warfare and the housekeeping of the units was in most cases autonomous.

Responsibility for financing psychological warfare was never established as doctrine. The State Department kept most of it off its budget, leaving the actual payments up to the War Department and the OWI to figure out. Oftentimes this resulted in a curious sort of neo-capitalism within the U.S.-owned socialism of the Army. The two agencies would hold on to property as though it were private property, on the basis of immediate title, without reference to the plain fact that all of it was paid for in the end by the United States Treasurer. (OWI once murmured threateningly about bringing its radio material home from Manila rather than let General MacArthur's people highjack it. Such talk ended when the material was declared surplus or stolen.)

Field Operations.

Field operations were most highly developed in the Mediterranean and European Theaters of Operation. Combat propaganda units came into being, carrying fully equipped mobile radio stations, and high-volume printing presses, along with them. Later, under SHAEF, these units developed further and Army-level organizations were set up which duplicated the Theater organizations on a reduced scale. (See Chart IX for chart of an Army unit.)

The tactical leaflet (page 211) came into its own with such units. It was possible to develop high-speed routines for using intelligence swiftly. Maps were dropped on the enemy in unfavorable situations. Order of Battle became highly important for psychological warfare purposes when enemy units could be addressed by their proper unit designation or by the name of their commanders. Intelligence was brought

into play: bad food, bad supply, poor command, or mishandling of enemy forces in any way brought prompt propaganda comment.

Radio was the least useful for tactical operations simply because enemy troops do not carry private portable radio sets around with them. Radio was of high value in consolidation operations, passing along instructions to liberated populations, and telling civilians in the line of approach about measures which they could take for the common benefit of themselves and of the Allies.

A constant problem, never completely ironed out, was the use of airplanes for dropping purposes. The leaflet producers had, in all Theaters, a tendency to prepare excellent leaflets, bale them, and send them along to the airfields in the expectation that an overworked, unindoctrinated air force staff would automatically pick up the leaflets, develop dropping mechanisms, pack the leaflets into planes, take them out and drop them to the right language-groups at the right time in the right place. This was of course as absurd from the aviators' side as it was, to the civilians, to let their brain-children accumulate in hangars or warehouses. For strategic droppings, systematic arrangements could be made through proper official channels, and a regular air operation detailed to do the job. Tactical dropping did not allow enough time for elaborate staff work in each instance, and recourse was had to psychological warfare liaison officers (either Army officers or civilians with the approximate status of Tech-rep, technical representative, a familiar sight on World War II airfields) to get in touch with the units, help them install dropping facilities, explain the leaflets to the actual pilots and bombardiers, and thus obtain a high degree of cooperation. In almost every theater, this policy succeeded, and a wide variety of leaflet bombs, leaflet dispensers, and other leaflet-circulating gadgets was developed.

Artillery distribution also played a significant part. For front-line situations artillery could do the job better than planes, without risking aircraft in a quasi-combat operation. Leaflet bombs of considerable scope appeared, and could be made to fit almost any appropriate weapon. Circulation was also effected by means of clandestine operations to friendly civilians, frequently combined with air-drop of weapons, medicine, and other essentials.

The organization of all these new functions has changed military organization. A whole new series of units were attached in echelon, each fitted to the appropriate level for its work. The rear-area functions and strategic propaganda work always required a considerable proportion of civilian aid, since some of the best workers in this line were persons who either did not wish to join the Army or whom the Army did not wish to have join it. These psychological warfare organizations were unbelievably cheap, even if measured by the most conservative estimates of their success. It is impossible that the army of the future, whether American or foreign, will overlook this source of assistance. Psychological warfare nowhere replaced combat, but it made the impact of combat on the enemy more effective.

CHAPTER 11
Plans and Planning

With most military planning, it is feasible to work from the top down, define the strategic objective and then work out the actual requirements of the operation in advance. This is not true of psychological warfare.[39] The objectives may be defined, and in the process of definition the general needs of a propaganda agency may be clarified. If a plan calls for a press or a radio, somebody can requisition a Davidson Press

or a Hallicrafter radio and get ready to use it. But the plan cannot define goals, set time limits for the achievement of the goals, relate the goals to one another in a scheduled pre-fixed program of success, establish terms whereby psychological victory can be told from psychological defeat.

Psychological victory exists only in terms of the military victory which it is designed to assist. Psychological defeat, no matter how much critics or the enemy propagandist may allege it, can be proved to exist only when an actual defeat makes it real. Psychological plans are always contingency plans for the assistance of military operations. They are dependent on the military operation and they cannot be checked against fact except in terms of the military operations they ostensibly support.

Unfortunately, they were not always written with these reservations in mind.

Needs of the Operator: Materials and Guidance.

American officers, assisting foreign troops, could not plan logistics until they found out what the foreign troops actually required. How much did they eat, and what? How much could they carry, and for how long? How much tonnage had to be sent them, and how often? Such questions had to be asked about the needs of the individual men before unit planning, not to mention national planning, became possible at all.

Similarly, in psychological warfare, planning can be made realistic if it starts with the individual operation for the control of which the planning is done. Define the operator as anyone having a task in the actual preparation, production or transmission of propaganda materials, whether through electric communications or by print. The operator is not usually a person with a high security classification, yet he

plays his indispensable part in fulfilling the highest and most secret strategy of the war. How can a plan be written that will be useful in carrying out the actual (and highly secret) strategy of the war while meeting the needs of an inexpert individual way down at the bottom of the control system? The answer is, of course, that no such plan can be prepared. Different plans are needed for successive phases.

The operator needs simple but basic materials. If he is a producer of some kind—such as a creative writer, an artist, a singer, a program arranger, a newscaster who does his own scripts and so on—he is likely to be a person with ideas of his own. Individual creativeness cannot usually be turned on and off like a faucet. Low-ranking and disciplined though the hired writer may be, he is still subject to the inward frailties of authors if he is any good. (This particular author sympathized deeply with some poor American Japanese who were given unbelievably dull outlines and told, "Turn this into exciting Japanese material! Give it pep! Make it rock them off their *tatami*! But don't get away from that outline one damn inch!" The *nisei* rolled their eyes; they did a poor job, as they knew that they would.)

The person who has to be told day in and day out how to operate is no operator at all. Psychological warfare is no place for unsuccessful short-story writers or would-be radio commentators. It demands professional standards, and it has more than professional difficulties. Therefore what the operator needs is not technical instruction but general guidance.

He must be told what he can say, what he cannot say. He should whenever possible be given some reason for perplexing or cryptic instructions. He should be helped to become familiar with what we are trying to tell the enemy. There is nothing classified about that, since the enemy is to

be told it as soon as possible. The guidance given the operator should be:

(1) Plain.

(2) Feasible. (This sounds superfluous, but was not so during World War II when operators were sometimes told to attack such-and-such an enemy institution without referring to it directly or indirectly.)

(3) Organized. (The material at OWI was not organized until the last several months of the war, with the result that hundreds of thousands of words of propaganda commands remained in force, technically, but un-indexed and arranged only by weekly form.)

(4) Specific in showing timing. (General controls should not be issued at the beginning of operations; when revised, the revision should supersede the revised section, and not be placed beside it. Other provisions should be given expiration dates, after which they pass out of effect.)

(5) Mandatory. (Control should be expressed in *do* or *don't*; personal advice is better conveyed through informal channels.)

(6) Non-security or low-classified. (This material, for the operators, should be accessible to the operators. Often the most important operator—the best newsman, the most effective leaflet artist—may be a rather doubtful citizen, an alien, or even an enemy volunteer. He cannot follow guidances unless he knows them, and it makes a farce of security for his superior to be able to tell him the guidance, so that he can memorize it, but not able to give him the document itself.)

These rules, though simple, are not always easy to follow. Here is an example of a bad guidance:

CLASSIFIED

Without superseding instructions concerning religion, we may use the occasion of the Sacred Banyan Tree Festival to needle the Provisional President. Make a dramatic story of the President's life. Undermine his use of religion to bolster the dictatorship.

Caution: do not mention religion. Do not indulge in scurrilous personal attacks. Material concerning our information of the President's biography is highly classified and must not be used.

The exaggeration may seem apparent, but it is a fair sample of the worst directives as actually issued and many, though not quite so bad, were near it. The same guidance in more acceptable form would read:

UNRESTRICTED

(Expires 24 September, week following Festival.) Standing instructions make Banyan Tree Festival difficult topic with which to deal. If operators can suggest means of referring to Festival without violating prohibitions against religious offense, encourage them to try. Monitoring and diplomatic sources show that Provisional President is utilizing Festival to consolidate his position. If he can be attacked, do so.

The other need of the actual operator is material. The script writer needs actual texts of everyday enemy speech in order to keep his slang and idiom up to date. The artist needs correct photographs of enemy cities in wartimes so that the leaflet picture he makes will not look as outmoded as a crinoline or a Model T. All of them need all the information they can get about their own country—good handbooks, dictionaries, elementary histories, textbooks in fields which they may not know. It is amazing how hard it is to explain America to foreigners; the American soon finds out how little he knows his own country, and needs information about his own background along with current materials concerning the enemy.

Where radio propaganda is in question, the script-writers and broadcasters will read the enemy radio propaganda if they do not get enough fresh non-propaganda material

concerning their audience. Sooner or later this will degenerate into alternate soliloquies of the radio men on each side, each watching the other to see if he got a rise out of him last time. OWI people frequently expressed idiot glee at having made Radio Tokyo frantic. The OWI men were the first to admit that their glee was pointless, since it was the Japanese broadcaster and not the Japanese audience who responded. But for lack of current information about the enemy the propagandist will refer to his own professional opponent. There is, of course, a very substantial difference between a change in enemy propaganda occasioned by a real inroad which one's own propaganda had made in enemy opinion, and a change that consists simply in angry or smart backtalk. Finding that difference is the responsibility of propanal, not of the operator.

Pre-Belligerent Planning.

Pre-belligerent planning differs from regular planning in that it does not have the substantial context of actual military operations to make it realistic and urgent. Like all plans, the pre-belligerent plan should enumerate the facilities available, the basic course of action to be followed, and the limits within which offensive propaganda will be permitted. In fairness to the planners themselves, as well as to the authorities who will fit this plan into related military, economic, or political plans, the plan should define the proper scope of propaganda as applied to the contemplated situation.

One of the most useful functions of the pre-belligerent plan lies in the periodic exercise which it gives in propaganda discipline. Information and intelligence agencies frequently see their jobs so technically that they lose sight of the need for coordination within the mechanism of an entire government. Press relations people try to get

stories in the papers. Radio people try to maintain listener interest. Educational officers are concerned with the teachability of their materials. Spokesmen of the different agencies in related fields (such as shipping, air transport, currency control, social welfare) are apt to comment on a particular situation without reference to the needs of an inclusive national policy. How much advice was handed out on the occasion of the ultimatum to Tito? The Jugoslav authorities plainly risked politico-psychological pressure from us; they came prepared for the consequences; but both American official and private opinion expressed a wild medley of recommendations, suggestions, and analysis. Federal officials showed no better discipline than did the private citizens. Pre-belligerent planning may be forced on the United States by eventual international crises, but before that stage is reached, private and governmental persons working in the informational field might do well to consider how readily they could offer or enforce cooperation in the event of a real emergency.

Figure 51: Basic Types: Start of War. This leaflet embodies almost all possible mistakes in psychological warfare. It was prepared to explain why war came between America and Japan, but was not

> even begun until many months after Pearl Harbor. The heading and style are official and formal. The message is no more than a footnote to history. Its last fault redeemed it; no arrangements were made for dropping it.

Psychological Warfare Plans.

A general plan for psychological warfare expresses the aims of the portion of the war (either in point of time, or with respect to a stated area) to which it refers. It states the maximum goals which psychological warfare can, with honest realism, be counted on to accomplish if all goes well. It indicates the minimum effect, which (unlike combat operations) can fall precisely at zero.

The general plan then goes on to state the conditions which will govern the operating agencies. The important part of this section lies in guessing where the operating agencies are likely to need coordination and where not. If the plan is to reveal highly important and therefore secret strategy, it should merely sketch the broad outlines of the processes intended, leaving to experts the responsibility of determining specific *do's* and *don'ts*. In such a case, however, the plan should not leave room for inter-agency or inter-personal doubt as to where the interpretive function lies. Too often, highly formal agreements are interpreted out of existence by propagandists who are interested in adding their own proposals to those set forth and agreed upon in the plan. When definition of the plan in operational terms[40] is needed, the location of the sub-definer should be made very plain unless the propaganda establishment itself happens to be remarkably well organized and in no further need of definite prescriptions of function.

The inclusion of actual political and military goals in a propaganda plan is an exceedingly ambitious undertaking. The goal, "To foster a spirit of nationalism and independence

among the Eastern Arachosian people to the end that they may revolt and set up their own pro-Allied government," is a commitment beyond the reach of normal propaganda. It comes closer to requiring all the facilities of the operating state, financial, diplomatic, covert, and paramilitary, to put it into effect. The goal, "To give sympathetic circulation to Eastern Arachosian autonomist sentiments so as to promote interference with the occupying power," is much more nearly attainable. Military goals are often described by propagandists as attainable by means of propaganda alone, but there is no known example of psychological warfare having attained a strictly military goal without assistance by other means of warfare. Goals such as "the defeat of ——," "the surrender of ——," or the "destruction of ——," have no place in practical propaganda planning, since they are pretentious or deceptive. More legitimate are the goals actually obtained by propaganda, such as "encouragement of a spirit of factionalism which may assist defeat ...," "promotion of war-weariness that will make the process of surrender more easily accomplished ...," and "appeals for the destruction of ——." Such points may appear minor, but it is the overstatement of the propaganda case that has many times goaded disinterested outsiders into becoming skeptics or opponents.

Political and military goals can be described only in terms of hopes; effective psychological goals—goals resting in the form of opinion which it is desired to create—are very concrete. If enemy surrender is desired, propaganda leaves to the operator no further scope for revenge themes which will frighten the enemy away from surrender. If the enemy leader is to be discredited on the basis of having poor military judgment, the contrasting good judgment of the enemy general is a necessary ingredient. The psychological goals have to be framed in terms of how much the enemy listener, the Propaganda Man, can stand and can believe.

(See page 153.) Since he listens irregularly, furtively, and half-antagonistically, propaganda will defeat itself if it shifts from goal to goal with logical but finespun dexterity. Psychological goals are attained only by sustained, consistent patterns of propaganda; they have to be plain, repetitive, and insistent. Political and military goals can be anything the planners feel like including as a pious wish. They might as well consist of a current re-statement of political and military aims for the subject or area at the time of planning. They are beyond the reach of practical psychological warfare.

National-level and general staff level plans have to be made up in much the same way. If the plan is good it will provide for its own circulation to all government instrumentalities which do in fact conduct propaganda in the particular field involved. It does no good to adopt a plan for the encouragement of the Filipinos and the inducement of cooperation among the Filipino officials of the Japanese-sponsored Republic (which means a tone of conciliation toward Filipino leaders or officials who hold puppet titles) if a cabinet member keeps calling publicly for the immediate execution of any Filipino who ever had dinner with a Japanese. It is useless to try to cooperate with Communist guerrillas in West K'tai on the argument, "We all oppose the Axis together! Ideologies don't matter when brave men fight side by side"—if at the same time the guerrillas know we have a strong domestic campaign on against Communism. Telling a Communist that ideologies don't matter is like saying to a Jesuit, "Let's skip the superstitions, Father, and leave religion out of it. Get down to business." To some kinds of people, ideology *is* business. The broad propaganda plan should make choices that reflect the judgment of the reviewing officers. If they are made in a vacuum, without taking into consideration the actual opinion of the audience group, they might as well not be made at all.

Propaganda plans must be circulated to non-propaganda agencies in order to make sure that routine public relations or announcements of current or contemplated action, and statements of basic policy do not contradict or neutralize the plan once it is put into effect. Frequently months of propaganda work can be undone by a tactless speech from somebody in the same government but in an unrelated agency. Authoritative circulation of the plan—which means that the plan must be neither long nor over-secret—can help forestall such mistakes. Speech clearance, requiring review of all official and policy-making speeches in advance of delivery, is the surest safeguard against overt collision between different spokesmen. In World War II it was applied with some success, but the exceptions were so conspicuous that the effective coordination passed almost unnoticed.

Strategic and Consolidation Plans.

Advance psychological warfare plans for concrete military operations not only require a statement of the propaganda operation to be performed with facilities and personnel who are expected to remain static, but demand that the psychological warfare personnel, together with the needful gear, be moved right along with the advancing forces. This makes planning more definite, and those parts of the plans that do not require psychological or political prescription of content can be written in standard military form.

Wise consolidation plans give urgent priority to the restoration of the home-grown informational media and recreational facilities of the occupied territory. Definite anticipation of shortages in radio facilities, newsprint, ink, paper, and other supplies can ensure prompt reopening of consolidated facilities under way. The propaganda operators may tell higher echelons that the local people are not competent, cannot be trusted, and so on, but General

MacArthur's experience in Japan would seem to indicate that no army can carry on consolidation propaganda as efficiently as the conquered civilians themselves can, provided the civilians have:

(1) Reasonable though restricted freedom of utterance, so that they can know what they may or may not say;

(2) Prompt liaison for security and policy clearance, so that they can get an authoritative yes-or-no answer on proposed projects, enabling them to maintain operation without intolerable delays;

(3) Friendly professional assistance in meeting material and staff shortages;

(4) A series of phases, marking off the forms and methods of control so that the controlling staff can plan for a first phase of doing its own publishing and broadcasting, a second phase of letting the local people work under license with close supervision and technical help, and a third phase of permitting them freedom within the normal censorship limits of military government. The American DISCC's (District Information Services Control Commands) in the American Zone of Germany did an excellent job in moving rapidly from phase one to phase two in 1945 and 1946.

Contingency Plans.

Frequently the chiefs of government and services know of an operation or danger that may arise, which will change the character of the war. Such were the North African landings, the Italian surrender, D-day itself, the joining of the American and Russian forces in Germany, Hitler's death. For such contingencies, it is desirable to have plans ready stating the reaction of the government to the event. Such

plans can be prepared and distributed to select personnel, and downgraded or released, together with any needed last-minute change, when the first word comes through that the event is officially to be recognized. Profoundly secret contingencies—such as Hiroshima day—do not lend themselves to such treatment.

It must be repeated that plans are effective only when transposed into plain, simple, usable guidances for the actual operatives. When a plan is so secret or so involved that the only people who could carry it out are not allowed to know anything about it, it becomes a sad self-defeating effort.

CHAPTER 12
Operations for Civilians

Plainly, psychological warfare operates against civilians with as much effect as it does against troops. Indeed, under the rather high standards set for modern warfare by The Hague and Geneva conventions, psychological warfare is left as one of the few completely legitimate weapons which can on occasion be directed against an exclusively civilian and noncombatant target. Even though World War II erased most of the distinctions between military and civilian, leaving civilians in the vertical front line of all air war, psychological warfare gained. It became a more useful instrument for bettering war. Civilian interest in propaganda became no mere matter of emotional loyalty or philosophical preference, but a life-and-death matter to its recipients. After fire raids it would be a madman who would disregard an enemy bomb-warning leaflet without trying to figure out its application to himself and his children.

Short-wave Radio.

Short-wave radio is the chief burden-bearer of long-distance psychological warfare. It is more useful as a means of connecting originating offices with standard-wave relay stations than as a direct means of communication. Even in free countries, short-wave sets are not often plentiful. The conditions of reception, from a purely technical point of view, are often undesirable; recreational material does not go through since a short-wave listener will put up with the static when he is receiving vital, vividly presented news, but often will not try to make out soap opera or music over the squawks of the ether, and the use of short-wave reception in wartime implies a deliberate willingness on the part of the listener to do something which he knows to be disloyal or dangerous.

Short-wave does make it possible for advanced standard-wave propaganda stations to pass along material which has been prepared in the homeland. Large staffs can do the work. The news can be put through a large, alert, well organized office. Features can be prepared by real professionals, acted out by a number of actors, put on records, reviewed, and then relayed to the standard-wave station whenever needed. The Americans at Radio Saipan thus broadcast right into Japan, and were able to transmit materials which could not possibly have been put on the air with the staff working on the island. The people at Saipan were mostly telecommunications technicians, engaged in picking up the short-wave from Hawaii or San Francisco and in passing it on into the enemy country on the standard wave length. Millions of Japanese heard our Saipan standard-wave broadcasts, in contrast to the dozens or hundreds who had heard our short-wave previously.

The use of homeland facilities makes possible the advance preparation of a large collection of material ready

for broadcast. In security-sensitive or otherwise dubious situations, four or five alternate programs can be worked out for the same amount of program time. On wire recorders or disc records, the proposed material can be passed around in finished form, reviewed, selected, censored, and approved. This would not be true of a hurried station working far forward in the zone of operations.

Short-wave has its own advantages, however, apart from its utility as a means of getting program material to the relay stations. Short-wave can and will be picked up by the enemy monitors and enemy intelligence systems. It will also be heard by persons of power, wealth, and influence, irrespective of the economic or political system of the enemy. The big shots of any system know how to transcend limitations that awe or defeat the ordinary man. The short-wave transmitter speaks therefore to the enemy government, to the groups which compose the enemy government, and to the individuals in or out of the enemy government who are leaders in their own country. We found that the *Joho Kyoku* and the *Gaimusho* (Foreign Office) in Tokyo were mimeographing a daily summary of our San Francisco broadcasts, and we thus knew that anything we said over San Francisco would be heard by the most influential men in Japan. Captain Ellis Zacharias, U.S.N., spoke Japanese and had known most of the Japanese leaders personally before the war; with government monitoring known to exist he felt free to address the Japanese leaders personally and directly with assurance his words would reach them, and his broadcasts are confessed by the Japanese themselves to have played a contributory part in bringing about the Japanese decision to surrender.

Standard-wave.

The most effective use of radio is that which falls within the receiving capacity of the ordinary receiving sets owned or used by the enemy population. This means the establishment of transmitting facilities close enough to the enemy territory for the programs to get through. As between the United States and Japan from 1941 through 1944, this was very difficult. No Americans ever dared join the Shantung guerrillas, whether Kuomintang or Communist, with transmitters; and as long as we broadcast from the safety of our side of the ocean, we could only hope that occasional freak conditions would echo programs into Japan two or three times a month. With the British and the Germans, it was altogether different; the two countries were virtually touching, and each could cover the entire enemy territory.

With short-distance standard-wave broadcasting to an enemy known to have millions of radio receivers, strategic radio becomes effective. The chance is provided for building up a consistent group of listeners, for influencing their morale and opinions, and for circulating rumors that will reach almost every single person in the enemy population. The temptation to perform tricks, to lapse back to peacetime standards of radio-as-entertainment or radio-as-advertising, is a constant one. The propagandist knows that he is being heard, and he fears that his audience will lose interest if he does not stimulate them with a brilliantly variegated series of programs.

Black radio comes into its own on standard wave. The British could put the mysterious anti-British, anti-Hitler broadcaster *Gustav Siegfried Eins* on the air, with his rousing obscenities, his coarse but believable gossip, his wild diatribes against the Allies and against the Nazi scum who got in the way of the glorious German army. He was so good that for a while even American propanal thought he might be a spokesman for the saucier members of the

Wehrmacht general staff. The Germans could broadcast proletarian propaganda on the *Lenin Old Guard* station, foaming at the mouth whenever they mentioned the crazy vile Fascist swine Hitler, and then going into tantrums because the Communist party needed all the brave glorious leaders who had been murdered by the fat bureaucrat Stalin. Ed and Joe could talk out of Bremen and pretend to be scooting around the American mid-west, one jump ahead of the G-men with their trailer and concealed transmitter, telling the rest of the Americans the low-down about "that goof Roosevelt and his Jewish war," but Ed and Joe were not good enough to fool anybody. Black radio is great fun for the operators, but its use is often limited to a twisted kind of entertainment designed to affect the morale of dubious groups. It leaps to sudden importance only in times of critical panic when it can add the last catalyst to national confusion, precipitating chaos.

The beginning and end of standard-wave transmission is news. News (see page 135) uses standard appeals. It should be factual but selectively factual. Repetition of basic themes is much more important than the constant invention of new ones. The propaganda chief has nothing to do, day in and day out, but to think of his own programs. He becomes familiar with them and bored by them. He visualizes his Propaganda Man as a person who hears all transmissions and is understandably bored by them, overlooking the interruptions that listeners face, the long gaps between the programs they hear, the weather interference, the static, the police measures.

Even with peacetime facilities tremendous simplicity and repetition are needed to convey advertising on the radio. In wartime repetition is even more necessary. It serves the double function of driving the theme home to listeners who have heard it before, while broadening the circle of listeners with each transmission. A point of diminishing returns is

soon reached but even diminished returns are often rewarding. The hardest-to-reach people are sometimes the ones it is most important to reach with a simple, basic, persuasive item. Repetition thus ensures depth of response in the core audience, while adding to the marginal audience with each additional application. What is deadly monotonous to the propagandist himself may, on the thousandth repetition, merely have become pleasantly familiar to the Propaganda Man on the other end. The author has talked to any number of clandestine listeners to our propaganda who have almost wept with rage as they told of listening to jokes, novelties, political speeches and other funny stuff when they hoped to get a clean-cut announcement of the latest military news.

Communication Through the Mails.

In World War II, propaganda was not able to make use of the mails the way that the propagandists of World War I succeeded in doing. The mails were much more intermittent. The channels into Germany through Scandinavia were not kept open except for Sweden, which was reachable, rather perilously, by air alone; Iberia was an inhospitable base. German counterintelligence was more than ruthless; it was effectively savage and made the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm seem rustic by contrast. With Japan, anything would have had to go through Soviet censorship to get there in the first place, and then meet the traditional intricacies of Japanese red tape. Mail propaganda was therefore not heavily developed.

Something was accomplished, however, by use of the Portuguese, Spanish, Swiss and Chinese press. Enemy officials and private persons were known to read these, and it was possible to do a great deal toward influencing editorial content.

Major mail-propaganda operations were conducted against us, however. The Nazis, as part of their prebelligerent planning and operations, sent enormous quantities of propaganda through the United States mail—sometimes postage-free under the frank of Congressmen. The Japanese, down to the time of Pearl Harbor, kept large public-relations staffs running at full speed in New York, Washington, and other American cities. They helped their American friends with money and by heavy purchase of copyright material friendly to Japan—thus making it unnecessary for any author to report himself as a Japanese paid agent, and they offered Japanese "cultural and educational" information to interested persons. It really was cultural and well done. By talking about Japanese poetry, religion and cherry blossoms, and omitting all war propaganda, the handsome little booklets kept alive the memory of a hospitable, quaint, charming Japan. Some of this material was mailed directly from Japan to the United States.

Since mail propaganda depends on the freedom of the mails, it is much more apt to be used by a dictatorship against us than by us against a dictatorship.

Leaflets.

The types of leaflets are described in the next chapter (page 211), in the course of discussing leaflets addressed to troops. Each leaflet designed for a military group has its civilian equivalents. In addition to the military types, overt propaganda leaflets for civilians should include:

(1) Communications from the legitimate authorities (whether government-in-exile,underground, or friendly quisling) of the civilians addressed.

(2) Newspapers in air format, reduced in scale, but with a heavy proportion of the normal peacetime features of the audience's own press.

(3) Novelty materials appealing to children, who are apt to be among the most industrious collectors of leaflets, disseminating them far and wide with less danger of reprisal from the occupying power or the police than adults might face. (Good adult leaflets are as interesting to children as are leaflets especially designed for them. The use of color printing, vivid illustrations, pictures of air battles, how-it-works diagrams of weapons, and so forth, may reach the teen-age audience best if it gives no indication of being aimed at them.)

(4) Gifts—soap, salt, needles, matches, chocolate and similar articles dropped to civilian populations. (This demonstrates the wealth and benevolence of the giver. Countermeasures to enemy use of this type of propaganda consist of dropping a few duplicates of his gifts, containing poison-ivy soap, nauseating salt, infected-looking needles, explosive chocolate, etc. The Germans are reported to have followed this procedure against the American air gifts dropped to Italy and France. With the avoidance or the spoilage of gifts, the propaganda effect becomes so confused that both sides find it worth desisting for a while.)

(5) Appeals to women. (Women, statistically, are around 50% of the population of any country. With the diversion of men to fighting operations the percentage of women in the home population rises and in wartime it may become 60% or 70%. They face social and economic problems much more immediately than do men because the responsibility for maintaining homes and children normally falls on them. Evidence of humane intentions, of reluctance to wage the most cruel forms of war, of

attempts to help civilians escape unnecessary danger, can bring women into the participating enemy group for relaying propaganda.)

Pamphlets.

Where air-dropping facilities are plentiful, leaflets can be supplemented by pamphlets. Pamphlets have the advantage of giving the propagandist more space for texts or pictures, enabling him to tackle enemy arguments in detail or in depth. Pamphlets can present sustained arguments, and thus come closer to meeting the domestic propaganda facilities of the enemy on even ground. They are especially useful in countering or neutralizing those enemy arguments which depend either on formal argument or on misapplied statistics, and which therefore require point-by-point confutation.

The pamphlet shown in figure 6 is an excellent example of the medium. Though it carries a complex message, it can be read by persons at the lowest educational level. It meets enemy propaganda over a whole range of themes. It is apt to be disseminated farther, whether initial distribution be by ground or by air.

Unlike the leaflet, the pamphlet is sometimes hard to conceal. For well policed areas, it must be supplied with a protective disguise if it is to be passed along. One ingenious pamphlet made up by Dennis McEvoy and Don Brown at OWI for dropping on the Japanese, started out with a warning: "*Enemy!* Warning! This is an Enemy Publication, issued by the United States Government. Finder is Commanded to take this to the Nearest Police Station Immediately! *Enemy!*" The pamphlet gave a general statement of Japan's bad war position, *and was addressed to Japanese policemen and police officials*. The cover urged

the policemen not to keep the pamphlet, nor to destroy it, but to pass it on up through channels to their superiors as an instance of enemy propaganda. (We never found out what the Japanese police actually did when they got these.)

One Japanese black leaflet assumed the proportions of a book, and was made up in the familiar format of the pocket-sized twenty-five-cent volumes. With a New York dateline, a copyright notice, and even a printers' union label all neatly falsified, the book expressed opposition to Roosevelt's war. It was circulated by the Japanese as a captured enemy book, presumably, in order to convince their own people and their Asiatic associates that opposition to World War II existed within the United States itself.

Almost all belligerents issued malingerer's handbooks during the war. These started out with statements that the medical control system was inadequate, that each man had to look out for himself, and that feigned sickness was often the only alternative to real sickness. Disguised as entertainment booklets, "instructions" accompanying medicine, or even as official handbooks (of the enemy government) for this and that purpose, the leaflets gave detailed instructions on how to fake tuberculosis, heart trouble, and other diseases.

Subversive Operations.

Propaganda to friendly civilians whose country has been overrun by the enemy can be effectively promoted by collaboration with local patriots—unless political considerations prevent such collaboration. This type of operation requires careful cooperation between propaganda (overt), subversive facilities, and intelligence personnel. World War II saw the type used on all fronts. The Japanese made especially bold use of it during the conquest of

Malaya, the occupation of Burma, and the Chinese Railway Campaigns of 1944. Natives on the enemy side were regarded by us as quislings; the Japanese honored them as patriots and duped them effectively.

Bold black propaganda operations can often embarrass the enemy. The dropping of a few hundred tons of well counterfeited currency would tend to foul up any fiscal system. Peacetime counterfeiters operate with poor materials, secretly, and in small shops. When instructed, a government agency can do an astoundingly good job of counterfeiting. The United States is on the vulnerable side of this operation, because our money happens to be the most trusted and most widely hoarded in the world. Various governments are believed to have run off substantial numbers of United States twenty and fifty dollar bills. A less offensive operation consists of giving the enemy populace sets of ration cards, along with simple suggestions on how to finish the forging job so as to make it convincing. The Nazis were especially subject to this kind of attack, since German methodical bookkeeping required a large number of documents to be in the possession of each citizen. Falsification of any of these made the German officials go mad with confusion.

To a country suffering from too much policing, the transmission by black propaganda of facsimile personal-identity cards in large numbers would be welcomed by many common citizens and would keep the enemy police procedure at a high pitch of futile haste. The essence of this, as of all good black propaganda, is to confuse the enemy authorities while winning the thankfulness of the enemy people—preferably while building up the myth within the enemy country that large, well-organized groups of revolutionists are ready to end the war when their time comes.

If white propaganda is to be compared to incendiary bombing, in that it ultimately affects the enemy armed services by disorganizing the homeland behind them, black propaganda may be compared to the tinfoil strips used in anti-radar. Black propaganda strikes directly at enemy security. It gives him too much to do, and thus increases the chances for agents down on the ground to succeed in their lonely, dangerous work.

Motion Pictures.

In consolidated areas, allied or neutral territory, and the home jurisdiction, motion pictures for civilians can be employed as a major propaganda instrument. The combination of visual and auditory appeal ensures a concentration of attention not commanded by other media. In both World Wars, the U.S. made extensive use of film.

Procurement can be either through direct governmental manufacture of the finished product, or by subcontracting to nongovernmental agencies. Propaganda films normally make a point of displaying the military prowess and civic virtue of the distributor.

Officially distributed films are, however, almost always overshadowed by pure entertainment films. The wartime official movie can penetrate no deeper than can the unofficial picture. Financial and commercial control, plus censorship, limits the periphery into which motion-picture showings can be extended. Often the private film will be shown when a public one would be suppressed. And in time of peace, the propaganda movie has ever sharper competition from its private competitors. Few propaganda movies have ever achieved the spectacular impact of some private films in portraying the American way of life. Tahitians, Kansu men, Hindus and Portuguese would

probably agree unanimously in preferring the USA of Laurel and Hardy to the USA of strong-faced men building dams and teaching better chicken-raising.

Only rarely does the cinema penetrate enemy territory or reach clandestine audiences. Its direct contribution to critical-zone psychological warfare is therefore slight. Perhaps television may in course of time combine attention-holding with transmissibility.

CHAPTER 13
Operations Against Troops

In every instance of systematic American use of psychological warfare against enemy troops during World War II, affirmative results were discerned after the operation had been in effect for a short while. Figure 46 shows the consummation of the troop propaganda program; these Germans are surrendering and they carry the Allied leaflets with them. By the latter phases of the liberation of France, 90 per cent of the enemy prisoners reported that they had seen or possessed Allied leaflets and the most famous leaflet of them all, the celebrated *Passierschein* (see figure 4) came to be as familiar to the Germans as their own paper money.[41] Since every enemy who surrenders is one less man to root out or destroy at a cost of life to one's own side, the sharp upswing of enemy surrenders was a decided military gain.

Two separate types of psychological reaction are to be sought in the enemy soldier's mind. The first consists of a general lowering of his morale or efficiency even when he is not in a position to perform any overt act, such as surrendering, which would hurt his side and help ours. This may be called MO, or morale operations. The second type of

action is overt action (surrendering, deserting his post of duty, mutinying) which can be induced only if the appeal is expertly timed.

Operations against troops must be based on the objective military situation. Suffering and exertion increase realism; plain soldiers are not apt to be talked over by propaganda unless the propaganda is carefully cued to their actual situation. All propaganda should be based on fact; propaganda to troops must be based not merely on fact, but must show shrewd appreciative touches of understanding the troops' personal conditions. Propaganda is not much use to a nation undergoing abject defeat, for the troops on the victorious side will be buoyed up by the affirmation of victory from their own eyes.

Troop propaganda must therefore aim at eventual willing *capture* of the individual—not at surrender by his individual initiative. It must implant the notion that he may eventually be trapped, and that *if* that happens he should give up. The propaganda must not meet the soldier's loyalty in a head-on collision but must instead give the enemy soldier the opportunity of rationalizing himself out of the obligations of loyalty ("true loyalty requires survival and therefore surrender"). The steps, therefore, needed for good propaganda to actual combat troops include the following:

first, the notion that the enemy soldier may have to surrender as his side loses or retreats ("other [named] units have surrendered, with so-and-so many men; you will have to, too");

second, themes which make the enemy soldier believe that an all-out effort is wasted or misapplied;

third, the idea that he or his unit may find themselves in a hopeless situation soon;

fourth, identifying the next authentically bad situation with the "hopeless" situation;

fifth, concrete instructions for the actual surrender.[42]

Figure 52: Basic Types: Troop Morale. Leaflets may be aimed at (1) morale, (2) news, (3) action. Morale leaflets neither communicate news nor call for specific action. Rather, they pave the way for action. Many of the previous illustrations have been of this type. This one is a troop morale leaflet used by the puppet Free India Army on their own men, who were discouraged by the self-evident lack of matériel and numbers. (Singapore, about 1944.)

Morale Operations.

Morale operations in the black field are, for the American record, still a closed book. German black operations against the French included such enterprises as sending French soldiers letters from their home towns telling them that their wives were committing adultery or were infected with venereal diseases, or calling out names and unit designations to French troops facing them in the Maginot Line, or giving away mourning dresses to women who would wear them on the streets of Paris, or intercepting telephone communications in the field and giving confusing or improper orders.



Figure 53: Paired Morale Leaflets. The Christmas card showing the Nativity was dropped by General MacArthur's psychological warfare people on the Filipinos. The Christmas cards with bells were prepared by the Japanese for the U.S. Army. The former were designed to cheer on the Filipinos; the latter, to depress the Americans with the defeatist messages inside the cards.

Morale operations on the white side included such items as the following:

Sending mournful poetry leaflets to Japanese units which were known to be demoralized for lack of home furlough (China Theater);

Dropping beautiful colored pictures of luscious Japanese victuals on starving troops (North Burma);

Showing the Japanese Sad Sack in a cartoon, fighting everywhere while his officers get all the liquor, all the food, all the girls, and all the glory, while the common soldier ends up cremated (Southwest Pacific);

Demonstrating that the Nazi pets on the German High Command have disrupted the splendid German military tradition and have thrown out the really competent professional generals (Soviet-German front);

Pinning the nickname, *Der Sterber* (roughly, "Old Let's-go-get-killed!"), on a German general who had boasted of

his willingness to expend personnel (Anglo-American and Soviet radio);

Telling the German troops they were dying for a cause already lost (Italy);

Reporting back to the Germans the statements made by prisoners, to the effect they were damned glad that they were out of the fighting (France);

Telling the Japanese on Attu and Kiska that just as surely as the *kiri* leaf, symbol of death, would fall in the autumn, they too would fall (North Pacific);

Telling the Japanese homeland and troops that the Japanese Emperor had loved peace but that the militarists had dragged the Sacred Empire into war ("Peaceful is Morning in the Shrine Garden" leaflet; designed for Aleutians, used over Japan);

Telling the Chinese in China that the Americans would soon cut the Japanese conquered empire in two with Asiatic landings, and then dropping the leaflet, written in simple Chinese which could be figured out by Japanese, on the Japanese troops (China);

Congratulating imaginary agents in ostensible code over the voice radio for the excellent work they have allegedly done in the enemy home country (all theaters).

Figure 54: Troop Morale Leaflet, Grey. This German leaflet from the Italian front attempts to remind American troops of the bonus troubles of 1932—a year in which most of the American soldiers were still in school. Only to older men could the appeal carry much weight. The drawing and typography are distinctively German. In terms of source, this leaflet is grey.

Figure 55: Chinese Communist Civilian Morale Leaflet. This leaflet attempts to raise peasant morale while calling in general terms for economic action. It shows a peasant family welcoming home the father, who has been made a Hero of Labor. (Given the author by Political Department, Border Area Government, at Yenan in September 1944.)



Figure 56: General Morale: Matched Themes. The American leaflet and Japanese one both show the same map with the same event—cutting of the enemy lifeline. In each case, the event is alleged to be news. However, the purpose of the leaflet is to depress the morale of all enemies who see it and to raise the morale of all friends.

Figure 57: The Unlucky Japanese Sad Sack. This morale pamphlet was used on the Japanese in South and Southwest Pacific. While it never produced any startling results on them, it did no harm. The pictures are done by a qualified Japanese artist. The pamphlet tells the story of the Japanese common soldier whose

officers get everything and give him nothing except a cremation box and memorial tablet.

The category "morale leaflets" covers all leaflets which neither call for immediate action, nor are designed primarily to convey news as such.

News Leaflets.

Figures 1, 7, 59, 60 and 65 are news leaflets. The propaganda purpose is evident, even to the enemy. But in the best of these leaflets there is a tendency to let the facts speak for themselves, and to show the enemy just what the actual situation is.

Tactical Defensive Psychological Warfare.

Morale operations are designed, therefore, to obtain responses other than immediate action. Several possible goals can be sought, singly or jointly. The commonest is preparation of the enemy soldier's mind for the actual physical act of surrender, the moral act of doing no more for his own side. Whenever surrender requires nothing more than passivity, morale leaflets are even more promising; in such cases all that is asked of the enemy is that he sit tight, fight inefficiently, and put up his hands when he is told to do so. Other purposes of morale operations include the irritation of enemy groups against each other, the general depression of enemy morale, the discouragement of enemy troops, officers or commanders.

Morale operations, to be effective, must be aimed at the actual, specific morale with which they are concerned. Well fed troops cannot be frightened by the remote prospect of starvation. Well officered troops cannot be induced to mutiny. Troops with good mail service cannot be made homesick. However, weak points in the enemy organization

can and do provide targets for morale operations. The defeat situation imposes tremendous strain on both the individual soldier and on officers in positions of responsibility. At such times, disunity rises to the surface, rumors spread more readily, and propaganda operations against morale can have devastating effect. (Allied psychological warfare against Germans in 1944-45 was aimed both at general officers and at the mass of the German troops—operations against the officers being founded on the common-sense premise that if large-scale German surrenders were sought, they could best be obtained by influencing those Germans who had the authority to surrender.)



Figure 58: Civilian Personal Mail. A common stunt in black or grey morale propaganda is the printing of facsimile personal letters. The letter shown at left is given in the original German form, along with its English twin which was—as usual—prepared for administrative clearance, records, and information. (Europe, Allied, 1944-45.)

Figure 59: Basic Types: Newspapers. Newspapers were prepared by almost every belligerent for almost every other. The examples shown above are Luftpost (SHAEF for Germans) and Rakkasan News (USAFPA for Japanese). Each newspaper copies the form of enemy civilian newspapers. The gross circulation of these airborne papers reached in some cases up into the millions.

A curious point developed. German morale in the higher grades was worse than in the lower. In the very last year of the war, despite the terrible air raids on their homeland behind them, the German troops on the Western front underwent only slight morale deterioration—in comparison with what they should have undergone had their morale borne a direct relationship to the strategic position of Germany as a whole. On the other hand, the morale among general officers and staff officers became wretched. The *putsch* of the generals the previous summer was merely a foretaste of the demoralization of the German higher command.

This unusual situation arose from the fact that the National Socialist propaganda machinery was still working on the masses of the troops. The political officers still made speeches. The troops were given pep talks, information about the war (hopelessly distorted information, but information none the less), and promises of privileges and comforts which—while they rarely materialized—were cheering. Simultaneously, German army discipline in the

Prussian tradition, never known to be wishy-washy or weak, was sharply stiffened. Furthermore, the plain soldiers carried over to the months of defeat those propaganda attitudes which they had been taught in the prewar and war years by Hitler's incessant domestic propaganda.

Figure 60: Basic Types: Spot News Leaflets. Spot news often makes better propaganda if handled while still fresh than if carried in newspapers or morale leaflets later on. The examples above were used against the Germans. News is given on one side of the leaflet, and is dropped while the news is still news; the other side has a propaganda appeal reading, in effect, "You must choose for yourself. Die for the Party or live for yourself!"

In contrast with common troops, the officers had the professional skill to understand the advantages possessed by the Allied armies. The officers knew enough about global and continental strategy, about the immediate strategy of the Western front, about economic factors and so on, to see that the situation was genuinely bad. Furthermore, the officer class had been less indoctrinated in the first place—many of them having personally despised the Nazis while welcoming Naziism as a means of getting the "cattle," the common people, into line behind the Wehrmacht—and those of them concerned with propaganda naturally became

critical of all propaganda, including their own government's, and communicated their criticisms to their brother officers.

Figure 61: Basic Types: Civilian Action. Desired civilian action can often be obtained by the use of clear instructions transmitted in leaflet form. This leaflet calls on the people of Alsace, Lorraine and Luxembourg to stay away from German communication lines, not to work for the Germans, and to make careful notes of atrocities which the Germans may commit.

German defenses against Allied psychological warfare worked. The German troops fought on when they had no business fighting, when their own generals thought it was time to quit and held out only because the S.S. and Gestapo promised ready death to any high officer who even whispered the word, "Defeat!"

This German defensive success was based on two factors:

(1) The good condition of the German troops in terms of food, supply, communications, and weapons;

(2) The coordination of all morale services for the purpose of defensive psychological warfare.

A common *Landser*, tough and ready in a whole division full of well fed, well armed men, could not be expected to undergo despair because freight-car loadings hundreds of miles away had dropped to zero. He might see that the Luftwaffe was less in evidence; he might grumble about

mail, or about having to use horse transport, but as long as he could see that his own unit was getting on all right, it was hard to persuade him that defeat was around the corner. In World War I, the German troops at the time of surrender *were* much better off than most of them thought they were; in World War II, they *thought* they were better off than they actually were. The Germans may not have been in perfect shape, but they were incomparably better off than the starving scarecrows with whom Generalissimo Chiang was trying to hold back the Japanese in West Hunan or the Americans who had fought despair, fever and Japanese—all three at once—on Bataan.

Along with their relatively good immediate condition, which masked and hid from them the strategic deterioration of the Reich to their rear, the German troops had the services of morale officers who were actually defensive psychological warfare operators.

In some units (more on the Eastern front than the Western) the Germans had *PK* units—*Propagandakompanie*, or propaganda companies. These were organizationally very interesting. They combined the functions of a combat propaganda company—printing, radio work, interrogation of prisoners, etc.—with the job of morale builders. Their services were available not only for use against the enemy, but for aid to the German troops themselves. Since they were currently informed of Allied propaganda lines, they were able to distribute counteracting propaganda at short notice and were even capable, on occasion, of forestalling Allied propaganda themes in advance.

Defensive psychological warfare in the Wehrmacht and, so far as it is known from Russian articles and fiction, in the Red Army as well, depended on unit-by-unit indoctrination with contempt of the enemy, mistrust of his news facilities, fear of his political aims, and hatred for the whole enemy

mentality. Propaganda officers, countersubversive operatives, public relations men, and information-education officers were either in the same office or were in fact the same men. Combination of functions made possible the use of flexible counteracting propaganda.

Most of this counteracting propaganda was not counterpropaganda, technically speaking. It was not designed against *Allied* propaganda, but for *German* morale. Morale-building was not left to occasional recreational facilities, newspapers for troops, USO entertainment and the like, but was compelled through the use of internal espionage, affirmative presentation of the German case, and unified informational operations. This German tactical defensive psychological warfare was neither a total success nor a total failure; insofar as it helped the Wehrmacht hold out, it aided the last-ditch Nazi war effort.

Figure 62: Basic Types: Labor Recruitment. On occasion, civilian labor becomes a highly critical factor even in an area of active operations. Leaflets can urge labor to strike against the enemy; they can also induce labor to come over and get to work. This leaflet was dropped on the Burmese, Shans, and Kachins, showing all the good things of life, promising high wages and

bonuses and adding that, anyhow, it was patriotic. Come work for the Allies!

The American army did not employ defensive psychological warfare in World War II. Troop indoctrination was extremely spotty. American morale remained good, not because it was *made* good by professionals who knew their job, but because Providence and the American people had brought up a generation of young men who started out well and—since the situation never approached hopelessness—kept on going with their spirits high.

For the future, the American and British armies face the problem of devising arrangements whereby within the limits of a free society soldiers can be affirmatively indoctrinated in the course of operations. USO, Red Cross, public relations, information and education at home, morale staffs in the theaters, Armed Forces Radio Service, OWI, the American press and the overseas military papers—these went their separate and uncorrelated ways without doing any harm, *last time*. If the next war starts, as it may, with an initial interchange of terrifying strategic bombardments, the morale situation may be inherently less healthy. Wise planning would provide, perhaps, a single chain of command for public relations, military propaganda and morale services—extending this all the way down to the platoon, if necessary—to make sure that the "national line" on any given topic is explained, presented, repeated, and (if necessary) enforced.

Such defensive psychological warfare might work against sensational enemy black operations, against attempted political division, and against fabrication of the news—provided it was carried out in an expert fashion. It could not change morale deterioration resulting from practical deterioration within the troop unit itself, except to decelerate the rate of decline. It would not make up for poor leadership. Nothing makes up for poor leadership.

Defensive psychological warfare at higher levels remains a self-contradiction. As pointed out above (page 159), good psychological warfare is never directed merely against other psychological warfare. It is directed at the mind of the target audience, at *creating* attitudes of belief or doubt which lead to the desired action. Getting and keeping attention is one of its major missions, and psychological warfare which starts by fixing attention on the enemy presentation is doomed from the start. One of the most conspicuous examples of this was President Roosevelt's sensational message of 15 April 1939, addressed personally to the German Chancellor, Hitler, asking that Hitler promise not to invade 31 countries which Roosevelt listed by name. Defensive in tone, the message gave Hitler the chance to answer over the German world-wide radio while his Reichstag laughed its derision and applause. President Roosevelt's message was decent, sane, humane; it was inspiring to the people who already agreed with him; but it created no attitude in the Germans to whom it was addressed. A sharp, bullying, implicitly threatening speech from President Roosevelt might have penetrated the German mentality of the time, even Hitler's; reasonable reproach did not work. It was not aimed at creating any specific emotional reaction in the *German* mind.

Finally, it must be mentioned that defensive psychological warfare must include countersubversion and counterespionage. The Cheka—Soviet secret police in its first form—once boasted that "capitalist trouble-makers and saboteurs" could not long function in Russia because the countersubversive police were over a hundred million strong. What they meant was that they had trained and bullied the population into reporting anyone and everyone who seemed out of line. An attitude of popular cooperation with countersubversive agencies can be achieved only when those agencies are efficient, respected, and properly

presented to the public. Psychological warfare can defend its homeland against enemy operations in kind only if it creates an awareness of propaganda and makes the public critical of attitudes or opinions adverse to national policy. Inexpert official tactics, or the general denunciation of dissent, makes the citizen believe, with Mr. Bumble in *Oliver Twist*, that "... the law is a ass, a idiot."

Role of Small-Unit Commanders.

Unless a small-unit commander happens to command a unit which includes a Psychological Warfare team, he will have no active Psychological Warfare role. Psychological Warfare operations require the services of experts, and it would be easy for a small-unit commander to jeopardize the propaganda effort of an entire front by well meant but ill conceived interference in Psychological Warfare operations.

Where the unit does include a Psychological Warfare team, a duality of control arises. This requires good sense to keep in balance. The commander possesses absolute command and responsibility for the movement, protection, and operations timing of the team which happens to be attached to his unit. He should not presume to interfere in the special propaganda instructions flowing down to the team from superior Psychological Warfare echelons. Because of the pressing needs of propaganda operatives for news and for order-of-battle intelligence, it is normally desirable that they have their own signal facilities and that their routine operational communications short-circuit normal military channels. Otherwise, the unit's signal facilities will be overloaded with messages important to the Psychological Warfare team, but useless to the unit as a whole. Such absurdities as the encipherment and decipherment of routine enemy news digests should by all means be avoided. On the other hand, the command and

administrative messages should go through normal military channels. In the Galahad operation against the Japanese in North Burma, in which Merrill's Marauders participated, such a double set of communications channels took a long time to develop.

Where the small-unit commander does not possess professionally trained and equipped Psychological Warfare facilities, he should no more expect to engage in offensive Psychological Warfare than to undertake chemical warfare with improvised materials. It becomes his responsibility to turn to liaison.

Field Liaison.

One of the new roles developed within the Army during World War II was that of "Psychological Warfare Liaison Officer." Such men were either commissioned officers, usually of company grade, who had been given appropriate training, or were uniformed civilians detailed from OWI or OSS. It is the job of the liaison officer to become acquainted, as far down the echelon of command as may be necessary, with the commanders whom he is to service. He must at the same time retain an intimate knowledge of the personnel, procedures and facilities of the Psychological Warfare unit from which he is detached. His position must be compared to that of a salesman, who should know his product, his company, his sales manager, and his customers, all equally well. The liaison officer should be able to explain to small-unit commanders what Psychological Warfare can do for them, and he should learn to discriminate between high-priority and low-priority requests for PW materials.

For example, a well trained liaison officer might receive a call from a regimental or battalion commander. He would find that the commander desired leaflets to be used in a

particular tactical situation. He should be able to explain what standard ready-prepared leaflets were available, what delay would be involved in making up special leaflets, and what quantities of leaflets would be advisable. Turning back to his home headquarters, he should be able to present the commander's case to the leaflet printers or the public-address team, and should help the propaganda people in understanding the commander's problems.

Mechanics of Liaison.

The mechanics of liaison depend in each case on the Psychological Warfare unit. Some had extensive networks of liaison officers; others had virtually none. In China during 1943-44, the most minor tactical request for a leaflet had to be channeled all the way back to Theater Forward Echelon Headquarters, because the political situation was so touchy, the Chinese language so difficult, printing facilities so scarce, and qualified personnel so rare that there was no point in having channels cut across lower down. In France and Belgium, during 1944-45, Psychological Warfare units were established on a considerable scale at the army level, and liaison officers were widely scattered; it was possible for regimental or battalion commanders to make direct requests of liaison officers.

Radio Support.

On rare occasions, it becomes possible for radio support to be given a specific unit. The American standard-wave broadcasting station was set up in the vicinity of Lorient while that French port, still held by the Nazis, was under American siege. The *History of the 2d Mobile Broadcasting Company*[43] describes the operation as being

> ... the first attempt to coordinate artillery, leaflet and radio propaganda. The station had learned the location of the billets of various [Nazi] units in the town, together with the names of their key personnel. With this information, a "game" was arranged with the artillery. One day, at a certain time, these units were addressed by name and their members were told to go outside their buildings and five minutes later they would receive a message. Precisely, five minutes later, leaflet shells released the messages advising surrender. The ability of the Americans to do things like that impressed the German soldiers with their hopeless position more than words.

Obviously, such an operation required close contact with the enemy, plus known possession of standard-wave radio receivers by enemy personnel.

Air Support.

Normal communications channels, such as might be used for air-ground combat liaison, form one of the most valuable aids to the small unit. From time to time it is possible either for the unit to make up the leaflets (if it has a PW team) and to request their dropping by the associated air unit, or else to make a direct request to the appropriate higher Psychological Warfare headquarters, asking that the headquarters not only make up the leaflet but arrange for its dropping at a stated time.

Leaflet-Discharging Weapons.

The airplane was far and away the most important leaflet-distributing device. In the CBI Theater, there was developed a leaflet belly-tank of local design for use on pursuit planes. The belly-tank was converted to a leaflet-throwing machine. Adjustment of the controls could regulate the speed at which leaflets were discharged, so that the pilot could give enemy units or installations bursts of leaflets in precisely the same way that he would strafe them with machine guns. This, however, was exceptional, owing to the tremendous

dispersion of the Japanese in the jungle and the need to conserve leaflets. In most instances, the leaflet bomb or leaflet box was the standard Air Force method of distributing leaflets.

Among the ground weapons used for discharge of leaflets, there are the following:

- chemical warfare shells converted to leaflet use, especially smokeshells;
- almost every variety of available artillery shell (howitzers having proved especially useful);
- rifle grenades converted for leaflets;
- leaflet bundles with a small quantity of explosive, attached to a quick fuze, packed so as to be thrown in a manner similar to the manual throwing of a grenade.

Mortars were probably the chief leaflet-throwing device on both the European and Asiatic fronts; the Germans went so far as to develop a special propaganda mortar. Smoke shells proved particularly easy to adapt.

The firing of leaflet shells is a responsibility of the unit possessing the guns. Psychological Warfare teams were not issued their own guns, save for unit protection. The actual distribution of leaflet shells was effected, taking the Fifth Army as an example, in the following manner:

- The Army Combat Propaganda Team planned, cleared, printed and packed leaflets suitable for the occasion.
- The Team cleared with the Artillery Officer, Fifth Army, an agreement for an order to use the leaflets.
- The Team's own liaison officers transmit the order to the appropriate divisions and lower echelons. The order

itself prescribed the times for picking up the leaflets from the ammunition dumps.

The Team procures the empty shells and packs them with leaflets.

The Army order allots 150 leaflet shells per division.

The Team specifies, in the order, the time-limit within which the shells are to be used.

Corps and/or division selects the specific targets, the general target being all enemy concentrations within range.

In smaller units, the propaganda unit would often be placed in direct communication with a specific artillery unit, which would be charged with the responsibility for discharging the leaflet shells at opportune times. When a requesting unit asks for leaflets, and itself possesses the guns which could fire leaflet shells, it is entirely possible for the supplier to send leaflets ready-packed in the shells. However, even the most rapid shell-packing job takes considerably more time than the readying of aircraft for leaflet distribution. When it is considered that the plane not only discharges the leaflets, but delivers them from the supply point, all in one operation, it will be seen that close air-ground coordination will often do a quicker, bigger job of leaflet saturation than could be achieved by the requesting, preparing, transporting and firing of leaflet shells.

Contingencies of the Future.

This text refers to known experience. Short of turning to the field of futuristic fiction, it is impossible to provide discussion of situations which have not been known in the American Army. The experiences of the Nazis and the Japanese cannot be taken by ourselves as wholly parallel,

since those peoples, under dictatorship and rabid indoctrination, produced a different kind of army from the American. What should a small-unit commander do if his men thought they had been contaminated by airborne disease germs distributed by enemy bacteriological warfare planes? How should he act if his men were told by an enemy broadcast that they would be exposed to radiation which would cause anemia, cancer, or death—if they did not surrender immediately? What should he do if he finds himself cut off from all American supplies, operating a lonely unit in contaminated or dangerous areas, and then discovers that his own men are the victims of enemy black propaganda? How should he behave if his men get the idea that they are never going to be replaced, and if they suspect (either spontaneously or because of enemy action) that the unit has been abandoned by the American government and people?

What could a commander do if a delegation called on him, right out in a zone of operations, and demanded a right to be heard? Suppose that he knew their complaints about food, rotation, danger, etc., to be justified, and knew at the same time that the enemy had subverted some of his men into being either dupes or traitors. Suppose his men protested a lack of deep lead-lined shelters the day after enemy leaflets instructed the American soldiers to ask for such shelters. Should he treat all such enlisted men as traitors? Suppose he is faced with the specter of political treason, subversion, and revolution? American officers have not faced such problems since the days in which George Washington was Commander in Chief. War after war, we have gone into the fight with a profound confidence in our ability to win. Future war may hold forth no such assurance. If America is injured, her troops decimated, their homes exploded or poisoned by foreign atomic attack, brand-new questions of psychological warfare will be posed. No living

American has ever had to face such problems. This is no assurance that they will never occur. Upon the manhood, the fairness, the sheer intelligence of small-unit commanders there may fall the unexpected task of holding their units together in the face of disastrous psychological attack.

Surrender Leaflets.

Surrender leaflets are the infantry of the propaganda war. They go in and finish the job to which the preceding years of radio broadcasts, the demoralization of the home front, the campaigns of news and morale materials to troops, and the actual air, ground, and sea attacks have led up.

Sudden use of surrender leaflets on a victorious or unprepared enemy is not likely to take effect. The Japanese surrender leaflets dropped on the Americans in Southwest Pacific were issued without previous materials readying the Americans. Furthermore, they were dropped when the American situation was plainly improving, and when American soldiers were not likely to be thinking about surrender in order to get individual escape from the war.

The preparation of surrender leaflets calls for the tactical use of printing facilities. This is the job of the combat propaganda unit, with its high-speed press, its liaison with both ground and air forces, its up-to-the-minute intelligence on enemy movements, situation, and order of battle. The enemy should be given leaflets showing him how clearly he is pinned down, identifying him, generally stripping him of the sense of secrecy and the trust in his commanders that make it possible for him to go on fighting. When surrender can be effected, he should be given the simplest, plainest command the circumstances allow. In the case of the Japanese, there were difficulties on the American side about

letting the Japanese come over to surrender; too many of them were suspected of having tucked hand grenades into their *fundoshi*. Many a Japanese started out for the Allied lines and failed to make his peaceful intentions plain enough. The result was a strong deterrent to other Japanese who may have been trying to decide whether they wanted to surrender or not.

Figure 63: Action Type: Air-Rescue Facilities. These leaflets from China Theater were designed to help the work of the Fourteenth Air Force. Action called for from the civilians included the assistance of hurt flyers, the identification of Americans as allies and not as Japanese when they parachuted to the ground, the avoidance of bridges and other bomb targets.

It was found that the bright white leaflet with the identifying stripes on it (figure 69) would be shown to our troops, who could be taught to hold their fire when they saw Japanese carrying that type of leaflet. To the Japanese, the plainness of the surrender formula was a considerable help in coming over.

Figure 64: Pre-Action News. Psychological warfare facilities can be extremely helpful in favorable situations. One of the most important ways of developing a favorable situation is to predispose enemy soldiers toward the idea of surrendering. News of surrender, emphasis on the comforts and relief of prisoners of war, and above all, emphasis on their numerousness can contribute to the actual act of surrender. This newspaper looks like a newspaper, but its chief emphasis is on the extent of surrenders.

Variations on the surrender leaflet include the following devices:

Letters, with signatures blacked out, of prisoners of war who havefound conditions decent and who are enjoying rest, good care, and good food;

Photographs, with the faces blocked out when security procedures or the rules of war so require, showing enemy prisoners actually enjoying the benefits of being out of the war;

Political arguments to the effect that the highest duty of the soldier is to his country (or Emperor) and that if he dies for the sake of some general in a foolish war, he will be denying his country a fine postwar citizen like himself, needed for reconstruction and progress;

A list of the foods available to surrenderees (see figure 13, from World War I);

A statement of the conditions of military imprisonment, reaffirming the rules of the Geneva convention;

The promise that the potential prisoner will be allowed mail communication with home;

Anger-motif, showing scum and profiteers at home, and attempting to induce surrender by telling the soldier that he is being made a sucker;

Obscene pictures, showing naked women, designed to make the involuntary celibate so desirous of women that he surrenders out of bad nerves. (Japanese idea, and did not work; the troops naturally kept the pornography but merely despised the Japanese as queer little people for having sent it. This type cannot be illustrated; the Library of Congress has copies in a locked file.)

Figure 65: Direct Commands to Enemy Forces. As the situation develops against the enemy, it becomes possible to use leaflets to force the surrender of enemy troops by direct command. This kind of appeal is lost when enemy morale remains irrationally high because of a beloved commander or some other unpredictable factor, but in normal situations it either forces the

enemy commander's hand or leaves him with a deteriorating force.

ALLIIERTES OBERKOMMANDO

(Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force)

BEFEHL

AN DIE VERSPRENGTEN
DEUTSCHEN TRUPPENTEILE

Das schnelle Vordringen der Alliierten hat es mit sich gebracht, dass zahlreiche deutsche Einheiten versprengt und aufgelöst worden sind und daher von zuständiger deutscher Seite keine Befehle mehr erhalten können.

Um nutzlose Opfer an Menschenleben zu vermeiden, ergeht daher folgender Befehl:

1.) Deutsche Soldaten, die abgeschnitten oder versprengt wurden, sowie Einheiten, die vom deutschen Kommando keine Befehle mehr erhalten, haben sich beim nächstliegenden alliierten Truppenteil zu melden.

2.) Bis dahin ist der Einheitsführer bezw. rangälteste Unteroffizier für die Disziplin seiner Mannschaft verantwortlich. Die umstehenden Verhaltungsmassregeln für versprengte Einheiten treten mit sofortiger Wirksamkeit in Kraft.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Figure 66: Basic Types: Contingency Commands. Leaflets can be made up in advance to govern typical situations which may arise. This "Command to the Scattered German Troop Units" orders all isolated German remnants to surrender to the nearest Allied force.



Figure 67: Tactical Surrender Leaflets. Enemy troops often fail to understand why they should surrender. Under such circumstances, it is useful to send them a map, showing them

plainly what their situation is. If misrepresentation is done at this point, it will be at the cost of loss of credence later on. These leaflets were prepared to prevent Japanese units in the Philippines from staging last-ditch fights after surrender of Japan. Similar maps had been used for tactical purposes earlier.

The effective surrender leaflet frequently turns language difficulties into an asset. Whole series of leaflets will teach the enemy soldier how to say, "I surrender," in the language of the propagandist. The words, "Ei sörrender," were made familiar to every German soldier; it is simply the phonetic spelling of English for Germans to pronounce. Surrender is not merely a case of transferring loyalties; it is a highly dangerous operation for most infantrymen. It takes nerve if done deliberately. The voluntary surrenderee risks being shot by some exasperated officer or comrade on his own side; he risks court-martial for treason if his surrender is wilful and his side wins the war; he may run into a trigger-happy enemy who will shoot him; he may fail to make himself understood to the enemy. Therefore surrender leaflets try to catch some simple procedure, to indoctrinate the enemy soldier with routine things which he can do when the opportunity arises. Of all leaflets, those most effective (most closely tied in with unconscious preparation for eventual conscious choice) are the ones dealing specifically with concrete treatment of prisoners of war. The surrender leaflet itself can be used as an authorization to surrender. The enemy soldier who carries a leaflet around with him, just in case he may need it, is already partially subverted from enemy service.



Figure 68: Basic Types: Surrender Leaflet. The surrender leaflet shown was not welcomed by the Japanese because it indicated that the Japanese soldier using it wished to surrender. This was very vulgar and depressing indeed, and few Japanese soldiers would accept such a humiliation. Except for its wording, the leaflet is good. As large as a big magazine cover, it is white with red and blue trim and can be identified readily.

Other Action Leaflets.

In World War II there were ample opportunities to surrender on most fronts. In subsequent conflicts, however, it is quite possible that surrendering will be physically unfeasible, because the surrenderee will have no one at hand to whom to surrender (see below, pages 248-250). Recourse may then be had to a type of leaflet only occasionally used in World War II—the leaflet which calls on enemy troops to perform some action other than surrender. The commonest of these is desertion—when it is known that enemy forces are being held in a dangerous spot by their own command, and when there is a fair probability that heavy artillery or air attack can be concentrated on the area which has been strewn with leaflets. (A bluff normally fails, and moreover discredits later operations of the same kind, whereas a

successful and fulfilled threat builds up cumulative credibility among the enemy audience.) When long range weapons are used, it may be possible to address troops by leaflet before the attack, suggesting that they remove themselves, as individuals, to places of safety; such an operation would assist enemy disorganization. The author knows of no case where the Germans did this with their V-l or V-2 bombs, but figure 3 applied to both civilians and troops in the cities marked for destruction by incendiary B-29 raids.

Black action appeals may teach the enemy troops how to malinger, may present political or ethnic arguments to troops known to be members of minorities or satellite nationalities (for example, Poles in Nazi service), with the intent that these mutiny, or may—at the very end of a war—call upon enemy troops as units to cease resistance and to await a later opportunity for organized surrender.

Loudspeaker Units.

The use of the amplified human voice developed slowly in World War II. Improvised units were set up in North Africa, in the Italian landings, at Anzio, and in the Normandy operations. At times these talked over valuable groups of enemy prisoners, but their range did not go beyond two hundred yards, which sharply limited their utility. The Navy was simultaneously experimenting with Polly Planes in the Pacific, which flew at considerable altitudes over islands and talked to the Japanese troops on the ground.

Figure 69: Improved Surrender Leaflet. The new leaflet which did bring the Japanese in was better phrased. It did not mention the nasty word, *surrender*, but said, "I Cease Resistance." It also showed the Japanese how to carry the leaflet so as to persuade the triggery Americans that he was not holding a hand grenade behind it. The back of the leaflet, instead of being left blank, showed happy Japanese prisoners enjoying American captivity, their faces left identifiable as Japanese but blanked out enough to head off individual identification. Compare this with figure 4, the Passierschein we used on the Germans.

Ultimate success came with the development of loudspeakers on tank mounts. These developed a range of two miles with the result that they had real value in combat operations. In April, 1945, a loudspeaker tank with the XIX Corps made an average of twenty broadcasts a day during action. Short talks were given to the enemy troops just before attack. Attacks were then withheld long enough to permit prisoners to come in. The attacks were then launched, lifted after a pause to permit more prisoners to come in, and finally pushed through. This tactic worked particularly well at road blocks where enemy troops were flanked. In the Teutoburger Wald a whole platoon was persuaded to surrender. At Hildesheim two hundred and fifty

prisoners came over together. Elsewhere in the drive into Germany, the Germans came over in even greater numbers, but the situation was then so obviously at its best for us that they probably would have responded similarly to command banners, black words on white background, such as the ancient Chinese imperial forces used to carry around for tactical communication with bandits and rebels.

On Okinawa tank-mounted loudspeakers were ingeniously hooked up. The American tank officers and crews obviously could not speak good colloquial Japanese. The Japanese troops were dug in like rodents, and in a condition of desperation that made them fight cruelly and suicidally. Even if the Americans shelled the openings of their cave mouths or ran armored bulldozers over the holes, burying Japanese alive, there was the chance that the Japanese would run through long underground passages and pop up later, possibly at night, to cause more damage before they were killed. With Americans and Japanese unable to talk to one another, this condition might have led to a severe loss of American life in mopping up hundreds upon hundreds of such minute Japanese strongholds. The American tanks had loudspeakers mounted on many of them; they had radio telephone communication, that could be used between the different tanks on a tank team, or—it was an alternative, and could not be used simultaneously—could be employed for the commanding tank to communicate back to headquarters.

At headquarters, American Japanese, whose American accents had been trained out of their voices in special public-speaking classes, sat ready and waiting.

The tank team would come into the valley, and the American commander would look the situation over. He would cut his radio telephone into communication with headquarters, and would then say:

"Hillside ahead of me. No characterizing features. Five or six holes, but I can't tell which ones have Japanese in them. I can get up the hill. There are two trees at the crest of the hill, and a bunch of these native graves over on the left."

The American-Japanese at headquarters would say: "Regular announcement, sir? Do you want them to assemble by the graves or at the trees?"

"Tell them to stand in front of the graves. That way they'll be coming down hill. Want to be cut in?"

"Yes, sir," says the headquarters man.

The tank commander would then cut his radiophone into a relay, and the tanks which had loudspeakers would automatically connect the loudspeaker units direct with the radio telephone. A voice, loud as the voice of a god, would fill the entire valley, coming from everywhere at once and speaking good clear Japanese:

"Attention, Japanese troops, attention! This is the American tank commander calling. I am going to destroy all resistance in this valley. Attention! I have flame-throwers. These will be used on all dugouts and caves. Attention! Flame-throwers will be employed. Gunfire will close the cave mouths. No Japanese personnel can expect to escape. Japanese personnel commanded to cease resistance. Japanese personnel commanded to cease resistance. Japanese personnel must assemble in front of native burial place, to American left flank, Japanese right flank."

The tank commander would watch, while the loudspeakers blared. First one Japanese, then more would come in small knots to the assembly place as directed. The commander would then cut the American-Japanese back in and say,

"I think they're holding out on the hill crest. Try that. Just a minute or two. If they don't start coming, I'll go after them and cut you in just when I reach the top...."

"Yes, sir. Which part of the hill crest, sir?"

"I can't tell. Anywhere."

An die überlebenden
Soldaten und Offiziere der

7. Armee!

WAS IST ZU TUN?

NUR EINE RETTUNG:

DIESES FLUGBLATT GIBT EUCH GELEGENHEIT, EUER LEBEN FÜR DEUTSCHLAND ZU ERHALTEN. JEDER VON EUCH MUSS FÜR SICH SELBST ENTSCHEIDEN. JE FRÜHER IHR EUCH ENTSCHEIDET, ZURÜCKZUBLEIBEN, DESTO WAHRSCHEINLICHER IST ES, DASS IHR DEN FRIEDEN NOCH ERLEBT.

To the surviving
officers and men of the

7th Army

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

ONLY ONE WAY OUT:

THIS LEAFLET GIVES YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO SAVE YOUR LIVES FOR GERMANY. EVERYONE OF YOU MUST DECIDE FOR HIMSELF. THE SOONER YOU DECIDE TO STAY BACK, THE MORE PROBABLE IT IS THAT YOU WILL LIVE TO SEE THE PEACE.

Figure 70: End of War. This leaflet helped the war to end, just as did the great leaflet which submitted the Japanese surrender terms back to the Japanese people. On one side the leaflet carries news from the Wehrmacht's last defeats; on the other it takes up the future of Germany as determined by the Crimea Conference.

The speakers would be cut back in: "Attention, Japanese forces remaining on hill crest. Japanese forces just behind us under command of Colonel Musashi surrendered last night and are now well taken care of. You are being given the same chance. Attention, I will soon come up the hill...."

A few more Japanese figures, small as ants on a sand dune, would come into sight on the hill and begin clambering down to the point of surrender.[44]

PART FOUR
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AFTER WORLD WAR II

CHAPTER 14
The "Cold War" and Seven Small Wars

The period after 1945 has turned out to be considerably more turbulent than most Americans expected. Though the victory over Fascism and Japanese militarism has proved to be psychologically and historically complete, the struggles between the victors have developed such mistrust and bitterness as to create a present-day equivalent of the Thirty Years' War, rather than a period of peace as it was understood by educated men of the nineteenth century.

Along with many other military and political phenomena, psychological warfare has been thrust into a period of "no war and no peace" which has proved to be extraordinarily difficult for Western men to deal with either emotionally or intellectually.[45] Such phrases as Churchill's term, "the Iron Curtain," and Walter Lippmann's coinage, "the Cold War," have become a part of civilized speech throughout the world. They have obscured almost as much as they have explained. It is entirely conceivable that an adequate description of the present historical period will only be written after the forces now operating have ceased to be significant; at that future time it may be possible for serious and reflective men to determine what happened in the middle of the twentieth century.

Recognition and Delay.

One of the preeminent factors in the psychological and opinion aspect of the turmoil in the mid-twentieth century has been the very sharp contrast between the *time* on which a given event occurred, the *delay* between the occurrence of the event and the final understanding of that event in their own terms by the strategic policy-makers affected, and the successful *recognition* of the event in policy papers looking toward a further future. The political and strategic character of much recent military history has therefore been a grotesque comedy of errors—ridiculous if it were not so deadly serious—involving the lives of the major urban populations of the world.

An event such as the liberation of Indochina from Japanese military occupation in 1945, met competently and reasonably by the standards of an anticipated "world of 1946," which unfortunately never materialized, led to the frustrations, bloodshed, deceit, and warfare of the late 1940s, and by 1954 became partially intelligible as a facet of the free world's struggle against Communism.

New Interpretations of Policy and Propaganda.

Polemic writing has been done concerning the role of propaganda, psychological warfare, psychological strategy, and comparable operations. In many instances the polemics have involved the presentation of two sides, each of which was right—one side maintaining that the old-fashioned world of free, sovereign nations, meeting in a parliament of man as constituted in the United Nations, could and should use the "realities" of traditional power politics as a guide to the present and the future, and should avoid the hopelessness, terrorism, and fanaticism of chronic ideological war; the other side with equal merits has often

argued that the ideological war is here, that its deniers are the witting or unwitting sympathizers or appeasers of Communism, that their "realities" are outmoded, and that the United States must face up to a crusade which will end in annihilation or death for either the Communist system or the constitutional democratic group of states.

What such polemics overlook is the terrifying probability that events may happen so rapidly that no one on either the Communist or anti-Communist side is capable of assimilating a new datum, such as the development of the hydrogen bomb, the death of Stalin, or the appearance of Israel among the nations, *until well after the event has occurred*. The occurrence of public events in all past civilizations has involved a considerable number of public agreements on the major hypotheses concerned; as pointed out earlier in this book, the antagonists in older wars usually, though not always, knew what the war was about. Today the spiritual, psychological, logical, and scientific inconsistencies and paradoxes within each system are so deep as to make the definition of long-range goals almost impossible. Any one goal, such as the establishment of peace, the appreciation of an international system of alliances against aggression, the maintenance of national sovereignty, the protection of a free-enterprise economy, the assurance of self-determination to non-self-governing peoples, or the like, may, *if emphasized*, contradict the concomitant goals which support it.

Communist and Anti-Communist Psychological Events.

Each of the two major systems has strengths of its own. The Communist strengths are sometimes too apparent to Americans, so much so that Americans exaggerate Communist power and overlook serious deficiencies in the

economies and the political character of the Communist group of nations. The Communists can suppress dissidence with a fanatical party line: the price they pay is the abrupt shifting of that line as international situations change. The Communists can appeal to youth by their dogmatic faith that they are the masters of the probable future of the world: they risk much if this faith does not pay off and if the world's youth sometimes turns against them because they promise too much and deliver too little. The Communists operating from an allegedly material basis offer psychological and spiritual values of a perverted kind, but have very considerable propaganda value; they give people a chance to sacrifice themselves, to work for causes greater than their individual personalities, "something to die for," and an apparent understanding of history: yet the Communists also risk psychological exhaustion and cynicism among their élite cadres as well as among their mass followings.

In the next chapter, concerning strategic information operations of the United States Government in the foreign field, there will be further discussion of the psychological strengths of the free world; we will say at this point that in the light of the strategic and military contexts of the postwar period the free world has had the advantages of modesty, relaxation, and elasticity. Among Americans, even among intelligent Americans, it is frequent to find the assumption being made that the chief strength of the free world consists of its legal rights and its democratic political processes, rather than in its actual (not merely formal) toleration of many points of view and its actual relaxation of the populations under its control.

Since the free world is not committed to victory as much as is the Communist world, it can afford more defeats without a corresponding loss of morale. Since the free world has not promised a Utopian future, it can go from the reality

of the 1950s to whatever realities the 1960s or the 1970s may bring without a sharp letdown in morale or widespread heartbreak among its most gifted advocates. In Cold War terms the free world is committed to fighting, but not to victory, while the Communists are committed to the actual though remote promise of triumph for their system throughout the world. The citizens of the United States can therefore contemplate the survival of the USSR or its annihilation and replacement by a democratic Russia with equanimity; their Soviet opposite numbers, group for group and class for class, cannot be as detached from the struggle.

Over all of us there hangs the entirely uncertain future raised by possible use of atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, and other novel weapons—a future about which former Governor Adlai Stevenson felt so gloomy that he said another war would end civilization. (The rejoinder can, of course, be made that if another war would end civilization anyhow, win, lose, or draw, the United States might as well disband its defense forces now and enjoy life for the few short years that remain.)

The Cold War.

In some respects the Cold War is not novel. It resembles the intercivilizational wars of the past in which competing civilizations with definite moral and political foundations fought one another for final survival. This kind of warfare is very different indeed from struggles waged between nations which have a common civilization and which have a common interest in the preservation of that civilization. The Americans of the 1950s are waging a struggle much more like that between the Protestants and Catholics in the years 1618-48 than they are to the Civil War of 1861-65 or the Revolutionary War of 1775-81. In some respects we

Americans are back all the way to the fight between the Aztecs and Cortez or the struggle between Chinese and Chams in ancient Annam. What Mr. Lippmann calls merely a Cold War is something deeper, bigger, and worse than any war Americans have ever known before. The only parallel to it was the struggle between settlers and Indians on our own frontier: our battles with the Indians at least had the advantage of never leaving us with the hideous dread that the American Indians might sweep a White and Christian civilization from this continent.

Nature of the Cold War.

The Cold War is therefore a struggle, the beginnings of which can be found at any one of several dates (1848, 1917 and 1943 are some of those given) which is now being waged between non-Communist states and a Communist group of nations. No one now living can speak with assurance of the outcome. Only the most foolhardy of optimists could visualize a world in which the better aspects of each system would be developed and the factors common to each would be underscored and strengthened as supports for a peace-seeking international system under the UN. The struggle is larger than a war because it comprises pre-belligerent, belligerent, and post-belligerent activities both in global wars and in a possible general war. On the Communist side the techniques include sabotage, revolution, conspiracy, and fanatical organization. On the anti-Communist side a family of para-military weapons is gradually being developed and may or may not be thrown into the struggle. No war was ever as bitter or uncertain as this one because war, whatever its demerits, at least commits the nations to combat and to victory. War has the supreme merit of *decision*. The Cold War does not: people

have to fight it without knowing what it is or what they would get out of it if they could obtain the advantage.[46]

Origins of the Cold War.

In retrospect it is easy to argue that the Communist system has been fighting all non-Communist systems ever since 1848; that the Soviet system has been in a moral condition of war with all other governments since 1917; that the democratic-Soviet alliance against the Fascist powers during 1941-45 was a sham and a fraud covering a three-cornered war; and that therefore attempts at a good alliance between non-Communists and Communists were shams, mistakes, or frauds. This is easy to say in the 1950s; it was not so apparent in the 1940s.

It can even be argued that Yalta, and everything for which Yalta stands, was a tragic mistake and yet a blessed one. If the Western powers had not attempted to deal amicably with the Soviet Union at Yalta the Western peoples, already hypersensitized in matters of conscience, might have attributed to themselves and to their posterity an unbearable burden of guilt. We and our children might have gone down fighting while wondering in our innermost hearts, "Why didn't we make a *real* try to avoid war with Soviet Russia?"

Though the Teheran and Yalta agreements have been violated by the USSR almost from the moment they were concluded, it can be argued that the Western world was wise in experimenting with appeasement because it liberated our consciences for future struggle. No one can possibly argue that we did not try to get along with the Communist system, that we failed to offer the Communists a reasonable share in the world of power politics, or that we threatened the Communists with aggression during the

course of our anti-fascist struggle. For better or for worse, we *did* try to get along with them. We have failed.

Why have we failed?

The failure seems to be much more on the side of the Communists than on the side of the free nations. Though it is possible for Left-liberals or hypercritical intellectuals to find fault with the U.S. and British position in this respect or that, short of extreme nit-picking it must be argued that the Communists jumped the gun on the Western powers in almost every case. Tito, while still in agreement with Moscow, proved implacable toward the constitutional Yugoslav government and the Church as they had existed before 1941. While Roosevelt was still living the Lublin Poles prepared a savage double-cross of the London Poles. Whether Communist action arose from a lamentable fear of our own aggressiveness, or a Machiavellian plan to conquer the world does not, at any time, matter very much; what matters is the almost indisputable fact that in many parts of the world the Communists undertook the initiative against the anti-Communists.

(The first edition of this book, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, was written in 1946 and published in 1948; the second edition is being completed eight years later, in 1954. Any reader who contrasts the two editions will see at a glance that the author, although suspicious of Communism, had no real anticipation of the fury or seriousness of the Communist attack upon the non-Communist world, nor of the strategic arguments and responsibilities which the free world would therewith be forced to accept.)

The Cold War and the Actual Fighting.

As late as 1948, when the talented and bold-minded Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer was Deputy Chief of Staff, the

U.S. Army's psychological warfare facilities at the General Staff level consisted of a few paper assignments to colonels in operations and in training together with your author as a part-time consultant and one girl stenographer to keep the files. By 1953 these numbers were multiplied by the hundreds. Each of the military services has accepted its responsibility so that by 1953 there was not merely one Army PsyWar system, but there were at least five separate organizations in the U.S. Government in different places and at five levels directly concerned with these problems.

Figure 71: Official Chinese Letter. This surrender pass from Korea shows intelligent American use of materials from another culture —The ancient format, in this case, of the traditional Chinese bureaucratic letter.

A curious division of responsibilities not anticipated by the Creel Committee of World War I or the OWI of World War II arose in the Washington of the Cold War period. While the military establishments were given jurisdiction over propaganda activities connected with actual combat, other propaganda activities were kept largely in civilian hands, though simultaneously the direction of civilian policy at its very highest level became para-military through the influence of the National Security Council.

In other words, most of the national foreign-policy decisions at the highest level have been dictated in recent

years by strategic considerations. They have been National Security Council decisions, not Cabinet-type decisions of the kind which might have been made in the years of William McKinley or Warren G. Harding. Yet, even though the decisions have been strategic in type, the propaganda implementation of these decisions has fallen for the greater part on the State Department and on the economic aid program facilities, not on the military. The military have been pretty strictly confined to those aspects of propaganda which directly pertain to combat areas. By 1953 U.S. leaders had begun to understand the situation with which they had been dealing since 1947 and in light of that necessarily belated but correct appreciation of their own position, the William Jackson Committee began to recommend that propaganda policy be written not as something self-contained, but be considered an integral part of every other U.S. Government decision possessing world situation or news impact.

The Cold War and the Home Front.

Among editors, professors, officers, officials, and other experts concerned with foreign affairs, there has been frequent lamentation that the American people did not take the great struggle of our time more seriously. The contrary should be argued, at least by way of contrast.

If it is true that the United States is engaged in a major struggle, if it is further true that this struggle has no visible end, if this struggle threatens all of us and our children as well with lifetimes of tension and violent deaths under ultra-destructive weapons, one may quite reasonably ask the question, *Which is the better reaction for the bulk of the American population: normality, emotional health, mild irresponsibility, and the stockpiling of nervous and physical strength for a time of trial which may lie far ahead; or,*

alternatively, tension now, worry now, responsibility now, fatigue now, all the way through from the uncertain present across the bitter and perilous future to the months of near-Armageddon which may lie fifteen, twenty, or thirty years ahead?

Sadly and seriously, with no attempt at cleverness or mockery, a staff officer could argue today that the American people should leave their worries to their leaders so as to be strong when the time of trouble comes. In the field of civil defense, for instance, it is grotesque to spend billions on offense and little on the saving of American lives. On second glance, this may not be so grotesque after all. The technological advance of fissionable and thermonuclear weapons is so rapid, the development of guided missiles and other carrying instruments so swift and so unpredictable, that a 1955 model civil-defense system might become a fool's paradise by 1960. If this be true, it is better to live as well as we can to maintain the profession of arms at an adequate level, to hope (quite irrationally) for the best, and to let the dead of the future bury their dead as best they may.[47]

Alternatives to Victory and Defeat.

In a cold war, as opposed to a war, the role of the armed services is to deter the enemy, not fight the enemy, and the purpose of the government is to achieve an accommodation (in the sense of an arrangement satisfactory to both sides), not a victory. If this is correct, serious reappraisal must be made of the U.S. PsyWar position as well as of our strategic thinking.

The alternatives to victory and defeat are forms of survival of the competitors. The entire health of each competing civilization matters. It is obvious enough to

Americans that we must remain prosperous, free, constitutional, democratic. It goes without saying that we must, as far as our individual fortunes permit us, retain our belief in God and derive from religious beliefs those spiritual strengths not available to the Communists. What is not often raised is the equally important factor of *the conquest of probability*.

Wars are much more often won by people who are sure they are going to win than by people who know that they would *like* to win, but who think at the same time that they *will* probably be defeated. The over-confidence of a Cortez or a Mao Tse-tung may seem insane to many of us. With the passion for security so prevalent in individual and national lives, both the Western powers and the individuals comprising them grotesquely exaggerate the margin of safety which they need in which to survive.

Part of this springs from the fact that much of our civilization is not forward-looking, that neither young Americans nor old Americans have a clear-cut or hopeful picture of what the world should be, will be, and must be, by A.D. 2055. On the Communist side it is frequent, but not universal, to discover that the best Communist cadres are made up of men who are dead sure that Communism will win, who are equally sure that Communism does not have to be right in order to win, and who are sure that "objectively and scientifically" (whatever that may mean), the Communist system is almost certainly destined to succeed. If Communism cannot get out of succeeding, the responsibility of the individual Communist becomes bearable; he is still seriously and tragically responsible for the expediting or the delaying of the inevitable, but he does not take the mantle of God or Karl Marx and state that this is the world as he wishes it to be and that the world of his desires will come into existence if, and only if, he fulfills his personal responsibilities to the utmost.

In Asia, perhaps more than in Europe, there are many persons who are turning toward Communism, not because they think it is good or just, or even because it is powerful, but simply because it is *likely*. Every individual in his own life has known that he cannot undo the passage of time, the aging of his body, the death of his loved ones, the loss of opportunities which might have been seized, or even his own death; in their individual lives men of all nations perform the feat, characteristic of the human being and apparently shared by no other species of life, of living from day to day in a constant reconciliation of the past and present with their own estimate of the probable future. At times in history, *that which should happen* seems to be unleashed like spiritual lightning and men rally in frenzy around causes which for the year or the decade seem inspiring, terrifyingly beautiful, and within human reach; through most of history, *that which is apt to occur* provides a more sober guide to the future and men prepare to live in accordance with its standards.

In the battle of the probabilities the PsyWar of the Western powers has been weak, high-pitched, and uncertain, while the insistence of the Communist themes has been as monotonous and hypnotic as a jungle drum. For better or for worse, the Communists have broken a path through to what they think to be the future; we of other nations have not.

The chief element of anti-Communist victory—practical, sober expectation of a certain and final downfall of the Soviet system—has thus far been lacking on the anti-Communist side.

The Communists, on the contrary, have unreasonably, provocatively, and untruthfully raved, screamed, shrieked, and lied to bring about that better world which, curiously enough, their most effective cadres considered to be an inevitable world. Thus the UN prisoners held by the

Communists during the Korean war were subjected to a constant bombardment of Communist propaganda concerning their personal responsibilities before history and the opportunities which they would have to serve peace and mankind, as these noble concepts are set forth on the Red side.

The End of the Cold War.

If the hypothesis set forth above (page 251, note 3), namely, that the Cold War may turn out to be unendable war except in terms which no living man can visualize, it may be true that appreciation of the role of psychological warfare (whatever it may later be called) in this struggle may have to wait a few more years. One factor often overlooked on the American side has been the *limitation of the originators*. Propaganda, to be effective among foreign peoples or foreign armies, cannot and should not outrun the strategic capabilities or the political intentions of the issuing power.

It does no good for an American propaganda radio to pledge battle to the death while the U.S. press services amiably discuss an accommodation with the Communists. Comparably, an official propaganda plan to make the people of France feel that the Americans love and admire them is not very realistic if, in terms of column-inches of French press material, unofficial American utterances are related to France to the effect that the French are washed up, their cause in Indochina hopeless, their economy unviable, and their political goals foolish. The years 1950-54, during which the Korea struggle took place and in which NATO and the European Defense Community (EDC) came to prominence, often showed a proclivity on the part of U.S. official propagandists to go far beyond that which their home public

would support. Need it be said that the effects on foreign public opinion were possibly deflationary?

An imaginable end to the Cold War may lie in neither victory nor defeat, in neither accommodation nor reconciliation, but in the development of more, newer, and different quarrels. Hostility of Protestant and Catholic faded out in Europe when the hostility of French, Germans, Spaniards, and other nationalities came to be more important. It is a problem for the psychiatrist and sociologist to answer if they can. Is it possible that semantics of war-causing quarrels can be superseded by anything other than *different* quarrels? A tension-free civilization is imaginable; given the characteristics of most present-day cultures it is scarcely more than merely *imaginable*.[48]

If within the limits of practical possibility one were to list the hypothetical requirements for an end of the Cold War, the following might stand forth:

(1) General war leading to destruction of either the Communist or non-Communist systems; *or*

(2) Prolongation of the present Cold War atmosphere until new and more interesting quarrels arise which make the present ones obsolete; *or*

(3) Reconciliation of the Communist and anti-Communist systems, by some process not now imaginable, along the general lines of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Grand Design;" *or*

(4) Collapse of all major civilizations under impact of fissionable and thermonuclear weapons; *or*

(5) Gradual erosion of the anti-Communist world and an eventual Communist victory by sustained Communist successes short of war—or the alternative of gradual erosion of the Communist world and the creation of a

constitutionalist and libertarian probability of victory, also without the outbreak of general war.

It would be a brave and foolish man who would say which of these the world should expect, but it would be a stupid staff officer who did not anticipate at least one of them and who did not as a military officer or government official do his best to bring about "victory" in a form which his side could define, recognize, welcome, and achieve.[49]

The Seven Small Wars.

The foregoing extensive discussion of the Cold War has been included because it explains a great deal of the apparent contradictoriness, irresoluteness, and uncertainty of the small wars which have occurred since the end of World War II. The seven small wars fall into a threefold pattern, if China is excluded (China is taken up in the next section). This is the first pattern; five of the seven wars were Asian struggles against the Western powers: Korea, Indochina, the Philippines (in which Communist Filipinos regard the United States as their ultimate enemy), Malaya, and Indonesia. In Korea and Indochina the struggle came to be Communist-controlled. In Indonesia the struggle ended in a nationalist victory. In the Philippines the struggle degenerated into petty skirmishes between a native constitutional government and Communist extremists. One war was an expression of European nationalism on the soil of Asia, with the creation of the new state of Israel. The third category is, of course, the special case presented by the Indian-Pakistani fighting which is a struggle between Asian nationalisms without much intervention from either European colonialism or Communism.

The most important of these wars were the five in Korea, Indochina, the Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia. The

Israeli struggle appears pretty well settled as a fighting war and the India-Pakistan issue appears not to be one which will lead to general war between those two countries. The predominant group of wars shows variations of the same components in different quantities.

Each was a reaction to the fall of Japan's short-lived East Asia military empire. Each involved partial or complete resistance to economic affiliation with the capitalist world. Each had an ingredient, though these differed in stress and direction, of local Asian nationalism. Except for Indonesia, each eventually became a part of the world-wide front between Communism and anti-Communism. These wars deserve consideration one at a time for their PsyWar content.

Figure 72: Intimidation Pattern. A Korean-language leaflet maximizes the threat to enemy ground personnel of U. S. air operations. The enemy dug in.

The Special Case of China.

None of the wars mentioned above was as bloody or as tragic as the Chinese civil war between Communists and

Nationalists which ended with a Red victory in 1949. The China situation is too complicated to be summed up in a single paragraph. The political, economic, and propaganda components on each side of that war are as yet not completely assessed.

For instance, one of the major factors in the defeat of the Nationalists consisted of the withdrawal of the Japanese managers and technicians from China as well as of those Japanese troops who had been maintaining a degree of law and order in Manchuria and North China. This withdrawal was not only sought by such "progressives" in the State Department as John Stewart Service and Alger Hiss; it was also enthusiastically endorsed by conservatives such as General Wedemeyer, who shipped the Japanese out and General MacArthur, who received them. No American, right-wing or left-wing, seriously proposed replacing the Japanese with United States or United Nations personnel until the Nationalists had enough trainees to manage a modern, capitalist China. By withdrawing the Japanese the Nationalists and the Allies destroyed the political and economic system under which the Nationalists proposed to operate and were then astonished when the Nationalists met defeat.

In the China policy situation the contribution of Communist covert propaganda within the United States in preventing aid to Chiang in the crucial years of 1947, 1948 and 1949 should not be overlooked; neither should it be overestimated nor considered the sole determinant of events which took place within China.[50]

PsyWar in the Indonesian-Dutch War.

A rapid and talented command of propaganda was shown by the Indonesians in their retention of power in the face of a

Dutch landing in the islands in 1945-46. The Indonesians were readily alert to the necessity for obtaining U.S., British, Australian, and other foreign sympathizers. They opened propaganda offices abroad and did an excellent job of presenting their own case. While Indonesian combat propaganda against the Netherlands troops is not recorded as having had much effect on Dutch morale, their use of global strategic propaganda to support a local war was excellent. Netherlands ships were refused docking and loading services by Australian stevedores. American press and public sympathy ran very largely in the Indonesian favor. Indonesian acceptance of the political concept, "United States of Indonesia," which was dropped as soon as independence was won, may have played a significant role in winning American sympathy.

Figure 73: Communist Wall Propaganda. Wall messages have been ubiquitous in China for many years, leading one wit to accuse the Chinese of "mural turpitude." Here the ancient Chinese device has been turned against English-reading personnel.

Dutch military and strategic propaganda in their war with the Indonesians suffered from uncertainty on the Dutch side as to the goals of the war, the suspicion that a Netherlands victory would be nothing more than a triumph of colonial capitalism, and the insistent interference of United Nations

and United States observers. The Dutch were never able to put across the point that Indonesia derived its nationhood from Imperial Japanese sponsorship and the Netherlands withdrawal was dictated as much by the practical necessity of reconciling world opinion and balancing the home budget as by the militarily untenable nature of the Dutch enterprise.

The Philippine War Against the Huks.

By contrast, the Republic of the Philippines faced a very serious military situation in the challenge of the Huk armies—tough Communist troops concentrated in central Luzon—who waged a cruel and bitter war, rather like the struggle of the Irish Republicans against the Black-and-Tans. By 1950 the Philippine Government was in a serious position. There was at least the remote possibility that if the Government continued to falter, the city of Manila might have fallen to a Communist *coup*.

In this situation Ramón Magsaysay, as Secretary of Defense, developed some of the most provocative and audacious anti-guerrilla operations of the postwar period. To meet the Communist claim that the struggle was one of the landless against the rich, he offered all surrendered Huks resettlement in a new land project; he visited the project himself frequently enough to make sure it remained a valuable demonstration area. To allow the common people to help the Government, without their suffering from Communist reprisals against themselves or their families, he disseminated secret methods whereby the people could communicate with the Government forces. He established a psychological warfare office under Major José Crisol. This office was doing as good a job of tactical PsyWar with leaflets, mimeographs, loudspeakers, light planes, and other field and headquarters equipment as any army installation

which the author has seen. Most of the doctrine and procedures for the operation of the office were American, but the content of the materials was Filipino. Catholicism, Filipino patriotism, Malayan nativism and peasant common sense were some of the factors used to underscore the Philippine Army's appeals. In the following three years the Huks shrank seriously although the danger could not be said to have been eliminated altogether.

Indochina and Political Warfare.

With devotion, often with heroism, frequently with brilliance, the French military forces in Indochina fought a Communist-captured nationalist movement known as the Viet Minh; they fought despite the accompaniments of a wretched and vacillating home policy, incredibly poor psychological relationships with the native élite, and security situations which pass all American belief. (One Vietnamese recently told the author that the pro-Communist Viet Minh soldiers fought as long as they could against the French and then came back to French territory to eat good food, visit their families, rest and relax before returning to the field to murder more French sentries, blow up more French patrols, or attack more French outposts.)

It ill becomes an American to criticize the French for their policy in Indochina since it was by virtue of a U.S. strategic decision and a U.S. logistical action that Indochina was turned first from Japanese hands into the hands of the British in the south and the Chinese Nationalists in the north. The British did not care much about the local situation. The particular Chinese Nationalists in northern Indochina were mildly sympathetic with local nationalism, but chiefly preoccupied with stealing everything that could be put on a truck. After this ill-fated liberation the Americans then assisted the French in transporting forces back to

Indochina. This was after much of the U.S. press and many U.S. leaders had indicated their disapproval of French colonialism and had given indirect but powerful encouragement to Viet Minh's rebellion against the French. Having helped foul up the situation for the French hopelessly, the United States then observed their return (a return which was definitely, though indirectly, made possible only by U.S. aid to France) with uncertainty and disquiet. It took the Americans four years to decide that they were on the French side and even then they were not very much on the French side.

Neither were the French.

The "French side" was an indefinable amalgam of old-fashioned French colonialism, the membership of three small Asian states in a French Union, and anti-Communism. The French made the mistake which the Americans repeated when they invited the Chinese Communist general, Wang Hsiu-ch'üan, to New York to defame the United States through the courtesy of the United States Government, or when they tried dealing with the Chinese Communists, fighting them, dealing with them, and fighting with them again. When the French finally decided to seek an all-out military victory against the Communists they set up local governments which they themselves promptly dishonored, giving them neither prestige nor authority enough to combat the Communist menace in local Asian terms.

That the French should have held the Asian anti-Communist front under these strange political circumstances is a credit to France. The Indochinese war has been dirty, discouraging. It has often verged upon the hopeless. The French have been criticized by the Americans in the early period of the reoccupation of Indochina for not turning the country over to Communist "nationalists" lock, stock and barrel; later the Americans criticized the French

because the French did not annihilate the same "Communist nationalists" whom the Americans had previously lauded. In the end, Dien Bien Phu and Geneva were the inevitable concomitants of Panmunjom. Once we made "peace," the French had to make an equally bad "peace" too.

The United States was adroit enough to obtain the immense psychological leverage of getting the Korean war recognized as a UN war. The Indochinese war was not made a UN war even though it was the same enemy who was being fought—Asian Communists underwritten by Peking and guaranteed by Moscow—in each case.

Amazing though it may seem, practical psychological warfare was almost completely neglected by the French until the Americans supplied the French with printing facilities for French Annamite leaflets in 1950. By 1952 the French had assigned staff officers to carry out psychological warfare responsibilities and were making a serious effort to link up with the other anti-Communist forces in East Asia for the purpose of obtaining psychological warfare know-how. A considerable improvement in tactical psychological warfare was made between 1950 and 1952. The strategic psychological warfare position of the French in the area must be referred back to the "battle of the probabilities," mentioned earlier in this chapter. So long as French, Americans, and Annamites all feel that a French defeat is quite probable and say so both publicly and privately, it will be difficult for the French to make the Indochinese believe that Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos are here to stay as French-protected and anti-Communist nations.[51]

Malaya and the MRLA.

The MRLA, or Malayan Races Liberation Army, is a Chinese Communist guerrilla army operating in the jungles of

Malaya. Malaya (minus the island of Singapore, which is a separate Crown Colony to itself) has been constituted in the postwar period as a federation of Malay sultanates. The British have talked a great deal about the self-government of Malaya, the eventual end of their own rule, and the progress of the people. Everything, or almost everything, which the British say is true—except for the fundamental fact that the Chinese in Malaya can, under British rule, enjoy anything except life, purpose, and honor.

What are "life, purpose, and honor" in basic human terms?

They are the rights to belong to something, to be a part of history, to make one's own world move, to be a human being superior to other human beings, to be vain, to be proud, to be self-sacrificing.

After years of war against the Chinese Communist guerrillas who have small components of Malayans and Indians with them, the British have not yet found a single British brigadier or major general of the Chinese race. The world at large on the anti-Communist side has yet to hear of a Chinese-Malayan hero who served mankind by falling martyr to the Communist terror or by emerging as victor in valiant heroic combat.

The Chinese in Malaya, as the author has observed at first hand, are probably more prosperous than any other Chinese have ever been anywhere in the world. Under capitalism today the Chinese communities in Malaya have achieved a degree of wealth, health, and education which Communist China will be remarkable to have achieved if it survives and succeeds for the next hundred years.

Does this not give the lie to the great Communist myth concerning Asia—the myth accepted by many Western politicians, intellectuals, and newspaper men—that the struggle between Communism and anti-Communism is a

struggle for living standards? that the issue is an issue of "who will provide the best livelihood"?

On the pro-Communist side in Malaya, Chinese who are not religious and who are known for their practicality and secularism, struggle for the chance to go forth and suffer, to serve in an army with bad medical service and no pensions, to face an almost certain death in the jungle, to lose life and property (which they could keep on the British side) in order to gain that other kind of life—life with honor and purpose, on the Communist side.

The British meanwhile progress, no doubt. In many respects the British administrations in Singapore and Malaya are more enlightened than some of the local governments in the United States. But whatever the reason, they do not seem to belong to the Chinese who live there or even to the Malays. They are governments for the people, and not (so far as the local people seem to judge) governments *of* the people.

Is it reasonable to ask in the mid-1950s that decent British officers and civil servants convert themselves into apocalyptic fanatics of a weird composite Asian nationalism? Can the British make revolution in Malaya when they are rather fatigued with their own Labor revolution at home? Can we Americans, who have made nothing, absolutely nothing, out of the heroism and romance and tradition that might have been reconstituted as the ancient kingdom of Ryukyu (Okinawa), be in a position to chide the British for not doing that which we ourselves do not undertake?

The Communist magic is strong, bad magic. In North Korea it created officers in an unreasonably short time, developed fanatics while we were trying to develop gentlemen, and came close to defeating us in the perilous weeks of the Pusan perimeter. In China soldiers of whom many Americans despaired when they fought on the

Nationalist side became desperate assault infantry under Communist training. The timid and quarrelsome Annamites who had given the French so little trouble before Communism organized them, fought like leopards once they read Marx, Lenin, Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi-minh.

Was this why the Communists were able to continue in Malaya? No one has ever accused the British Army of a lack of ingenuity. The forces who developed desert raiders, coastal commandos, air-dropped *banditti*, and a plethora of amusing, shocking, and audacious innovations cannot be accused of a lack of imagination.

The British *did* use psychological warfare in Malaya strategically, tactically, in the field, in the cities, by radio, and by print. When Carleton Greene was directing the British PsyWar effort from the headquarters of that redoubtable gentleman, Malcolm MacDonald, British Commissioner General for South East Asia, he even resorted to the device of writing individual letters to known Communists and leaving these letters scattered through the jungle. The British used white propaganda, black propaganda, grey propaganda; if there had been a purple propaganda they certainly would have tried it. Alex Josey came close to it when he shocked the planters in Malaya by delivering socialist speeches over the Malay radio in an attempt to pull the Left wing off the Communist bird.

Sir Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner of the Federation who was murdered in 1952, was a veteran of irregular warfare. He had faced the Zionist terrorists in Jerusalem and was a man without fear. His approach to the problem of confronting Communism was *hopelessly sane*. The Communists were offering young Chinese the intoxication of craziness, of a mad and heroic righteousness to justify the misspending of their lives. Sir Henry's answer was decency, goodness, security, prosperity, authority,

liberty under law. He offered everything except glamor, terror, inspiration, and romance—

Everything except the chance to join the British side.

What kind of British side?

A British side which, like the Communist side, would welcome the makers of the future, the builders of the next civilization, the arbiters of history.

The Communists have presented a high bid against the U.S. and Britain as well as the other Western powers. We have not yet overbid them. The high bid is the opportunity to join, to belong, really to be equal, not just legally equal, and, above everything, to share, to struggle, and to work under conditions of heroism for a common goal.

The Right to Join.

The West has lost a lot of the Cold War in Asia because the Communist side could be joined and the Western side could not be joined. There is no American party in India, but there is a Communist party. There is no anti-Communist army to which cadres of men from either Soviet-occupied or Soviet-free territories can be made welcome. There is no command point for the anti-Communist struggle. There is the promise of immense U.S. help, even the promise of British, Colombian, Ethiopian, and other help, for Korea or other Koreas. Is there much willingness *to be helped*? Is there any way that we can let ordinary Asians in on our side?

The top levels of this problem are, of course, political. They must be solved in the light of a U.S. home public which eschews crusades and dreads adventures. At a lower level the problem becomes one for the military staffs of the future. How can the United States, the United Nations, or other anti-Communist forces recruit native leaders and

native followers under circumstances of dignity and honor? How can we either learn to love the allies we have or to find allies whom we can love? Until then much of the spiritual and organizational advantage in Asia will fall to the Communists. We may have the better ideals, but if people who are determined to illuminate their own lives with the splendor of risky, heroic, or self-sacrificing action (and who insist on doing something desperate somewhere somehow, so as to relieve the ignominy, poverty, and monotony of their existences) cannot learn how to join us, they will perforce join the other side.

A slight or even a substantial increase in economic welfare in the Asian states seems to the author to favor a sharp increase in Communist strength. When people are desperately poor or sick they cannot worry about causes. When they become moderately well off—well enough off to know that they are despised, poor by our standards, ignorant by our standards—then the point of psychological frenzy comes in.

Propaganda Techniques in the Seven Wars.

Neither in the Chinese civil war nor in the seven other wars listed has there been much refinement of propaganda techniques over World War II. As a matter of fact, it took the Korean war two years to come up to the standards of Normandy. It is amazing how many propaganda techniques had become lost arts between 1945 and 1950. The author himself flew *under* the Chinese Communist forces along the Han River in March 1951 when the voice plane in which he rode as an observer had to hug the valley bottoms in order to get its message to the Chinese ground forces past the sound of its own propellers; instead of ingenious, up-to-the-minute gadgets to dispense leaflets the author joined the young officers in the plane in throwing the leaflets out of the

plane door by hand. He thought ruefully about the leaflet bombs and leaflet dispensers which had been used in Europe and in Burma, and when he returned unharmed to Taegu he submitted one more red-hot memorandum recommending the obvious.



Figure 74: Divisive Propaganda, Korean Model. In this leaflet an attempt is made to show the Asians-die-for-the-Kremlin theme.

The strategic PsyWar self-limitations imposed by the United States on the United States in the Korean war were also crippling. The United States did not desire anything which a professional soldier would recognize as victory. U.S. opinion was divided as to whether all of Korea should be liberated by UN forces. At the policy-making level—certainly among our allies—there was pretty general agreement to remain at peace with the supply dumps and high command of the Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria and China while fighting the forward echelons of those forces in Korea. The United States would not accept defeat nor would it seek a decisive victory because victory might have involved the risk of war.

Under these conditions it must be pointed out that General MacArthur had the first and only PsyWar establishment ready to operate the moment the Korean war began. Col. J. Woodall Greene ably managed the Tokyo headquarters for most of the period of the Korean war. The Department of the Army showed great good judgment in

bringing back Brig. Gen. Robert McClure, who had been Eisenhower's PsyWar chief in Europe, to the new Department of the Army's PsyWar establishment which was created on 15 January 1951 in the Pentagon as a part of Special Staff, United States Army, with the title of Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW). When General McClure departed for Teheran, he was succeeded at OCPW by Brig. Gen. William Bullock. The last period of the Korean war found Korean local PsyWar at the headquarters of Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK) under the command of Col. Donald Hall, who had probably seen more continuous PsyWar service than any other officer in the U.S. Army.

CHAPTER 15
Strategic International Information Operations

From 1776 to 1945 the U.S. system of government managed to survive in a world comprising many types of government without setting up its own propaganda and agitational forces. Propaganda through most of the twentieth century was pretty clearly limited by the U.S. conception of propaganda as a weapon auxiliary to war. "Psychological warfare" became proper, in conventional American terms, only when there was a war to be won. With the coming of peace in 1945 there was considerable uncertainty as to whether the United States should have a propaganda establishment at all.

Even at the time of writing (1954) there is still some doubt as to whether the United States needs propaganda facilities. The William Jackson report of July 1953 indicated that the terms *propaganda* and *psychological warfare* were unsatisfactory. Of course they were. They still are. The world

itself is unsatisfactory—in terms of the traditional, humane, rational U.S. point of view.

The story of U.S. "peacetime" propaganda since the end of World War II is a very complicated one. Quantity, direction, purpose, and quality have shifted with the various turns of the international situation. The subject has become much more difficult to write about since the time the first edition of this book was written in 1946.

In the first place, governmental secrecy has been very sharply restored. Even very routine State Department operations for putting across the U.S. point of view have been shrouded in masses of classified documents. For reasons not always evident to the outside observer, the assumption has become prevalent that the normal operations of the United States Government should be kept confidential, secret, or even top secret. Often it would seem that the attempt to maintain secrecy in non-sensitive functions is not worth the security effort at all or, contrariwise, may even reassure the antagonists of the United States by not letting them realize how serious and how unfriendly our plans or policies with respect to them may be. (This is not the time or place to discuss the problem of secrecy as a protection against domestic criticism—which secrecy, of course, has often become, to the detriment of both the government and the citizens of the United States.)

In the second place, not only have information activities become more hush-hush: they have also become more complicated. It is difficult to do justice to an intricate moving panorama of activities, some of which may not be mentioned or described under existing law.

Demobilization and Remobilization.

The ending of the OWI and the installation of the International Information Service, mentioned above on page 184, in turn changed into the information activities of the Department of State. These were headed from 1945 to 1953 by an Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. In 1953 a Director of the United States Information Agency, *not* under the Department of State but mysteriously attached to the National Security Council, was inaugurated. The overseas operating component of USIA remained the United States Information Service (USIS), transferred from State Department control.

In other words, there were eight years in which the Department of State had primary responsibility for the conduct of peacetime propaganda of the United States. This was the first and only time that the United States Government had in a period of relative peace undertaken a sustained propaganda effort.

The effort had ups and downs because neither the citizenry nor the officials knew whether the country was in a condition of peace or at war and, if at war, at war with *whom*. To some the enemy was Communism, the ideology; to others, Communism the movement; to still others, the USSR; to others, the Korean Communists, but not the Chinese Communists; to others, the Chinese Communists in Korea, but not the Chinese Communists in China; and so on, *ad infinitum*.

The general history of these eight years was, by and large, a first phase in which the United States demobilized or destroyed propaganda facilities which had been built up with great skill and at great cost during World War II, and a second phase in which those facilities were partially rebuilt and the skills rediscovered. The low point in this development was probably the winter of 1947-48.

For a while, the rumor went around Washington that the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, would not tolerate the utterance of the words *propaganda* or *psychological warfare*, and that the Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, refused to have the topic mentioned to him. That may be the exaggeration characteristic of newspapermen, but it epitomized the spirit of that time.

While "psychological warfare" almost disappeared from the Department of Defense and the three services during this low point, the State Department never quite demobilized. For one thing, the State Department had inherited the OWI facilities and the Army facilities in the occupied countries—Austria, Germany, Korea, and Japan. As the heir to substantial informational facilities the State Department kept a certain minimum activity going. Facilities such as American Broadcasting Station in Europe (ABSIE), Radio in the American Sector—of Berlin—(RIAS), the Information Control Commands in the American Sector of Germany, Information and Education (I&E) Section of the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan—these (though sometimes renamed) represented going propaganda concerns which required a Washington command post.

Meanwhile, it became standing operating procedure in the U.S. diplomatic establishment to attach some kind of an informational facility to every diplomatic establishment and to most of the major consulates.

Since there were always advocates of complete propaganda dismantlement, as well as enthusiasts for the maintenance of information programs, the issue of remaining in the propaganda business or getting out was always more or less in doubt. The economy and the demobilization phases of 1947 and 1948 were stimulated by evidence of Soviet bad faith in Europe during 1949 and

brought into sharp focus by the outbreak of the Korean semi-war in 1950.

It is not possible to do justice to all these different systems in a single phrase. Even as late as the present, it is sometimes difficult to determine why the U.S. need have an information program operating in such entirely friendly countries as Cuba, Haiti, Ireland, or Australia. There is some point to the argument set forth by ultraconservatives that what was good enough for Theodore Roosevelt ought to be good enough today; that, in other words, the United States should be known for what it is and not by what a few hired promoters can say about it.

As in so many other fields of activities, however, the past is irrecoverable. The United States can no more return to the pre-atomic age in propaganda matters than it can in defense matters. The world we have built is with us and the only alternative to survival seems death. With respect to the specific field of propaganda, this leads to occasional curious political alliances. Sometimes the conservatives in U.S. politics are so conservative they want no propaganda at all; at other times these same conservatives are so anti-Communist that they want more propaganda. On occasions the Left within the USA has viewed U.S. propaganda with alarm and at other times has demanded that there be more of it and that more of the content be Left.

Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs has been the principal officer of government responsible for the conduct of U.S. propaganda during 1945-53. His successor, the Director of the United States Information Agency, faces very closely related problems. Fortunately, one of these Assistant Secretaries of State has written an excellent book

relating his experiences and the problems of his office in detail. Edward W. Barrett in his *Truth is Our Weapon* (New York, 1953), describes his own experiences with two years in that position. The Assistant Secretary had the help of an interdepartmental committee which, under various labels and with various degrees of secrecy, attempted to coordinate the foreign informational activities of the various departments of the United States Government to common goals.

Later, as will be described, the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs was supplemented by a Psychological Strategy Board outside of the Department of State and still later by a White House assistant in charge of informational policies at the highest level.

What can be said of this first U.S. peacetime performance in the propaganda field?

The Assistant Secretaries themselves have been men of varied capacities and interests. Mr. Barrett was an OWI veteran and a journalist of high standing. George Allen was a tough-minded career diplomat. Howland Sargeant was a distinguished government official. William Benton was the founder of the most successful "canned" music system for restaurants and the most vigorous promoter which the *Encyclopædia Britannica* ever had; later he became a Senator. Men such as these can scarcely be called tight-lipped fanatics emerging from the hidden recesses of a U.S. "Politburo." They and their colleagues did a surprisingly good job.

American travelers overseas were often amazed to find that the U.S. propaganda effort was far more polished and purposeful than an observer within the United States could expect it to be. The activities of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs consisted of supervising the domestic origination of broadcasts directed to the Soviet Union, the

satellite countries, neutrals, and friends. The radio system was generally known as the Voice of America. To this degree he had charge of a propaganda system operated within the United States by Americans, but speaking to foreigners, sometimes by transmitters located within the USA and more often with relay transmitters which picked up programs originating in the continental United States and rebroadcast overseas.

One echelon removed, there were installations attached to the diplomatic and consular establishments of the United States which were usually known as USIS although in some particular cases quasi-private facilities were sponsored instead. In each foreign country there was at the embassy or legation level a Public Affairs Officer (PAO) who was the information specialist for the diplomatic mission and—in theory at least—in charge of all U.S. propaganda or informational activities, whichever one preferred to call them, in the country to which he was accredited.

A complex hierarchy of officials routed, relayed, screened, and coordinated programs from headquarters to the PAOs in the field and proposals or requests from the PAOs back to headquarters.

Other U.S. Facilities.

A complicated element in the State Department's conduct of propaganda was the fact that at no time did the State Department enjoy even a monopoly of the *governmental* mass communications of the United States abroad. (It goes without saying that at no time did the State Department achieve or seek control of private U.S. mass communications such as the international editions of *Time* and *Newsweek*, the circulation of American books and magazines on a commercial basis, commercial American-

owned publications abroad, or the like.) At the very least level of competition the State Department had the Armed Forces Radio Service (AFRS) broadcasting to most of the countries in which the State Department was active—often broadcasting in quite a different tone of voice and with very different content. In many instances, foreigners who understood English preferred to listen to the lively radio programs transmitted for the edification of U.S. service personnel stationed abroad, rather than to listen to "canned" programs made up for the benefit of themselves as a foreign target. (The author has seen Chinese shopkeepers in Singapore listen very seriously to a sergeant giving the news of the day at dictation speed from an armed services transmitter somewhere in the Pacific Ocean area.) In 1948 there was virtually no coordination between the armed services and the Department of State. As time went on, the two sets of U.S. broadcasts took a certain amount of note of each other. Coordination was not as easy as it might seem on paper.

After all, what is one to do? Is it valid to "propagandize" our innocently cherubic service personnel abroad whom so many domestic purity leagues and local pressure groups are anxious to defend? After all, these service people possess fearful weapons. Each has a Congressman to whom he might write. But if service personnel in a foreign country are to be given nonpropaganda materials, how can the same area be given propaganda materials for the benefit of the indigenous personnel? The propaganda from the United States Government must not be too much at variance with the "nonpropaganda" of the United States Government. If the two extremes of communication were too far apart, the United States Government might look like an ass. That would be most unhappy.

Over and above the contradictions and difficulties involved in the operation of at least two governmental

systems and many private systems of U.S. news communication and dissemination systems in foreign areas, there is the further problem of additional U.S. facilities. Sources such as *The Washington Post*, Joseph Alsop, James Reston, and other well-informed Washington journalists often hinted gloomily and darkly that U.S. cloak-and-dagger operations are still going on; Dorothy Thompson was often troubled by what she regarded as the feckless successors of the wartime OSS. Many times Americans resident in local areas concerned seemed never to have heard of the hush-hush operations in their own overseas homes, operations which were denounced with purple prose in Washington; we can say that covert operations, when they have been really uncovered, as in the case of the *Time* story about overzealous U.S. support of a German nationalist resistance group, turn out to be much more pale than the lurid columnists or inside stories from Washington would lead one to believe.

More serious have been the duplication, and triplication, and occasional quadruplication of *official* informational activities. The overseas economic and military aid program, known successively as Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), Mutual Security Administration (MSA) and Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) has not only supplemented the existing leaflet, broadcast, and other informational activities of the State Department and the armed forces with a third set of information programs; it has itself had a fourth rival in the Point Four administration, the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), which was both a part of State and not a part of State, depending upon the particular situation overseas.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Free Asia.

Over and above the Government's operations in this field there have been the quasi-private undertakings of the Committee for a Free Europe and the Committee for a Free Asia. These have been privately sponsored and privately financed by altruistic organizations dedicated to broadcasting those things which the State Department finds it impolitic to put on the air. The degree of governmental contribution or participation is not known, although it is often touched upon in the U.S. press; that the organizations are to a definite extent private is evident in their ability to broadcast local and controversial news to particular Iron Curtain countries and by the fund drives which they have waged with little contribution boxes inside the USA.

The advantage of the RFE and RFA type of operation is that by giving voice to independent nongovernmental resistance to Communism it has often been possible to go far beyond the limits which intergovernmental protocol would impose upon U.S. official broadcasts. That is, the United States can scarcely describe a deputy minister in the Rumanian Government as a scoundrel, thief, pervert, or renegade; Rumanian exiles allowed access to Radio Free Europe stations need have no such limitations. On the other hand, there is the difficulty that Radio Free Europe, because of its U.S.-based finance and management might lend an unnecessary U.S. sponsorship to genuinely independent anti-Communist undertakings. Here again, as in the case of the reconciliation of the State Department and Defense broadcasts, it is impossible to draw a doctrinal rule which would prescribe on one hand that all propaganda broadcasts should be unofficial or that they should all be official. One cannot even say that they should all be coordinated.

The Psychological Strategy Board.

Coordination was nevertheless attempted—at least for the governmental side. In 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board, bringing the versatile and judicious Gordon Gray back to Washington for the purpose. The prescribed role of the Board was to coordinate, plan, and phase all United States information policies so as to achieve maximum effect from the governmental effort; not once did the Board dare reach out for a penny's worth of jurisdiction over private U.S. facilities. The Psychological Strategy Board was only originally under the chairmanship of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, then General Walter Bedell Smith, with the members of the Board consisting of the Under Secretary of State, the Under Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Director of what was at the time known as ECA, later MSA. The Board had a series of able staff directors and small staffs detailed from other Government departments on a permanent basis to serve as a working secretariat. The precise operations of the Board were cloaked in extraordinary secrecy. It cannot be said that U.S. propaganda worsened in the two years following the establishment of the Board; neither can it be said that U.S. PsyWar operations scored any coups so striking as to deserve a position in the annals of international affairs.

William Jackson Report.

After the Republicans came into office in 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower moved to overhaul the information establishment. He appointed a committee under the chairmanship of William Jackson, a former OSS official and investment banker, and under the secretaryship of Abbott Washburn, who had headed the superlatively successful advertising department of General Mills, Inc., which had successfully given away millions of prizes for millions of box tops from cereals consumed by American youth or flours

relished by the American housewife. Some of the liberal press commentators eyed the committee gloomily as it went to work. Nevertheless, that portion of its report which was made public turned out to be a document of remarkable finesse and sophistication.

The report, released in July 1953, pointed out the Psychological Strategy Board had erred in trying to plan informational activities in its own light instead of considering the *informational aspects* of every single U.S. Government activity possessing international significance. The report recommended the replacement of the Psychological Strategy Board by a more realistic policy-coordinating organization which would coordinate not merely propaganda policies, but all policies and, having coordinated all policies, would then resolve upon maximum psychological exploitation of the policies which had been decided.

In a sense this is rather like saying that the United States should have a President, since the powerful chief executive of this government has, since 1789, been the final arbiter of executive matters, both foreign and domestic. In another sense it can be interpreted to mean that the responsibilities of the Presidency are so great that no one man could perform in his head all the staff work necessary to see through the opinion-reactions which might develop abroad to U.S. executive decisions made here at home. If the latter supposition is true, it means that the United States is saddled with one more intricate governmental process made necessary by the closeness, dangerousness, and importance of international affairs in the lives of Americans and their government.

Operations Coordinating Board.

On 3 September 1953 President Eisenhower, then at Denver, Colorado, issued an Executive Order abolishing the Psychological Strategy Board and creating the Operations Coordinating Board. According to informed press comment at the time, it was the intention of the White House to carry out the recommendation to this effect made by the President's Committee on International Information Activities. The new Board was located immediately under the National Security Council. C. D. Jackson was a significant member of the Board, but not as chairman; the chairman was Walter Bedell Smith. Besides General Smith, then Under Secretary of State, the Board included Harold E. Stassen, Director of the Foreign Operations Administration; Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; and Roger M. Kyes, Deputy Secretary of Defense. The President also directed that Theodore C. Streibert, Director of the U.S. Information Service, make himself available.

In so far as this development represented an attempt to coordinate the framing of U.S. Government policy in such a manner as to achieve maximum impact on the rest of the world, it represented a major step forward. The de-emphasis of "psychological warfare" or "psychological strategy" as operations which could somehow or other be efficacious *without* a context of material support through the real-life behavior of the Government issuing the propaganda was a healthy sign indeed.

Psychological warfare is at best a cumbersome and pretentious label for an important modern political and military weapon, the use of mass communication. The definition of empirical "psychological warfare" given in Chapter 3, and reproduced as it was originally written in 1946, makes it perfectly plain that the term acquires specificity which is made plain by the particular individualities involved undertaking the operation at any given time: psychological warfare is not an ancient term

which is so well defined by the usage of centuries that modern men would be ill advised to redefine it or to sweep it aside.[52]

Indeed, the basic weakness of the term *psychological warfare* is its pretentiousness within American civilization of the 1900s. No one now knows whether the United States of the 1960s will turn out to be dynamic, forward-looking, insistent upon its own view of the world. It is difficult in the 1950s to see how the next decade or so could bring forth anything as explosive or violent in the social and political field as the atomic bomb has been in the field of fission. The United States certainly does not seem to be on the threshold of a new Islam. For better or for worse, the U.S. strengths are the strengths of sobriety, calmness, health. They are the strengths of *living* as opposed to the strengths of *revolution*. Revolution may be strong; it may even be pleasurable to some persons involved, but as Denis W. Brogan has pointed out in his *The Price of Revolution* (Boston, 1952), revolution has a cost factor which must be weighed against the results expected from it.

In the context of mid-twentieth century affairs it is almost pitiable and endearing to see us Americans of this time, who are so little given to the drama of fanaticism or the salvation of the world through cruelty, attempting to dramatize our own modest and reasonable operations by giving them melodramatic and pretentious labels. If the Communists torment us long enough they may make us into alert brutes; this seems doubtful now. It seems probable that we will continue to be brave without becoming fiendish in combat, strong without becoming ferocious in peace.

Varying definitions of PsyWar are adopted by official agencies from time to time. The current (1953) Joint Chiefs of Staff definition runs as follows:

"Psychological warfare comprises the planned use of propaganda and related informational measures designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of enemy or other foreign groups in such a way as to support the accomplishment of national policies and aims, or a military mission."

This definition differs from the one given in Chapter 3 in the following important respects: it stresses the *planned* character of PsyWar; it restricts the pertinent measures to those of an *informational* character; and it makes clear the operational goals. It is not clear why it is necessary to stress the element of planning of PsyWar as distinguished from other sorts of war, unless it is a homily to the PsyWar operator to keep his functions in line with those of other national activities. The question of restriction to informational character is more serious; it excludes the interpretation that in essence, psychological warfare depends upon warfare psychologically waged. Thus, substantive operations of a noninformational character, adopted and executed primarily for their psychological effect, could properly be called PsyWar. Finally, the specification of goals is chiefly important for the control of the function, and can largely be taken for granted. Therefore, to preserve an inclusive view of the function which will comprise the range of variation in official definitions—including those of one's enemies—the author stands by the definition stated in 1946.

Limitations of the American Originators.

There are illusions about psychological warfare—illusions spread, in many cases, by the overenthusiastic friends of this kind of operation. Excessive claims have been made for the efficacy of propaganda. Sometimes psychological warfare has even been offered as a substitute for war or for

diplomacy. On other occasions Americans have asked that their government do "as well as" this or that foreign government in the propaganda field, forgetting that the United States is a republic and a democracy, and therefore subject to the sharp limitations which republican, democratic governments possess.[53]

A republic cannot impose a purpose upon mankind.

A democracy cannot enounce a policy and then stick to it for years and decades.

Americans are not Messiahs. The limitations of American civilization over and above our specific political institutions are such as to make it impossible for Americans to lead a fanatical counter-crusade against Communism, or to guarantee to the human race at large that Americans of 1955 promise that Americans of 1975 will perform this or that specific action.[54]

American propaganda is always limited precisely because it is *American*. Even in an age of atomic weapons, to be *American* means, to some degree at least, to be *free*. The people of this country, or at the very least an awful lot of them, *do* have something to do with operating the government. A new election and a hostile House of Representatives can cut off the funds for any project no matter what its merits may be in the eyes of the top-secret planners. The outside world knows this even if Washington politicians and bureaucrats sometimes forget. One can even contradict the title of Archibald MacLeish's famous poem, *America Was Promises*, and state categorically that in the propaganda field, America certainly is not promises. The promise of a tsar or a dictator is usually good for his lifetime, whereas the promise of the United States is good only within the letter of the law—a specific treaty, a definite commercial agreement, a very sharp and very narrow commitment.

There is an American strength in international affairs. This strength does not lie in a propaganda capacity to promise, to threaten, or to commit the United States Government to future courses of action. It lies, rather, in the immense probabilities of American life, in the virtual certainty that the American people will react in such and such a fashion to a new aggression, that the American people will (if attacked) in all probability destroy their attackers, whoever those attackers may be, and that the American people, despite their occasional shortcomings in matters of racial tolerance, political freedom, and economic injustice, will in the long run be solidly ranged behind whatever policies seem to promise equality, prosperity, and freedom for all mankind.

The limitations of the United States as a source of propaganda are sharp. There is no U.S. party line; it is virtually impossible to imagine that within our civilization as we now know it there could be one. There might be an official U.S. line, unanimous and binding upon all federal departments, but the federal government itself is, after all, only one among the forty-nine separate governments operating within the continental USA. The state governments, the cities within them, and the people at large are free to contradict what the federal government may say at any given point.

American strength cannot be sought in unanimity. U.S. propaganda is incapable of pulling the Sudeten rabbit out of a Munich hat. Short of an intimate and extreme danger of war itself, the U.S. Government cannot threaten a foreign government very successfully; too many U.S. citizens would immediately shout at one another, at their own government, and to the foreigners concerned: "Those Washington officials don't really mean it! We don't want war. We're not going to go through with it." If the USA moved against Spain, there are friends of Franco in Washington who would tell him to sit tight; if the USA moved too rapidly against the Communist

world, there are plenty of Americans, both in and out of government, who would say privately, through the press, or by letters that the Indian Government or some other should assure Moscow and Peip'ing that the U.S. would not dare carry through.

Exploitation of U.S. propaganda strength must therefore always be developed from *the probable or apparent* "*center*" *of American opinion at that moment*. It is impossible to find a U.S. policy which can be made compulsory and unanimous upon all Americans both public and private. It is not impossible through an adroit combination of the skills of leadership, foresight, and a keen awareness of intra-U.S. politics to devise foreign-policy programs which will command the decisive assent of the American people.

War and Unanimity.

The less peaceful the world is, the more effective a peacetime information program can be. The attack of the Communist aggressors in Korea, which involved the U.S. armed forces, pushed the U.S. public into line behind the U.S. Government in a way which no degree of propaganda manipulation from Washington could have contrived. In times of danger the American people stick together. In times of relaxation they scatter about. One should not plan a crusade for the American people to carry out unless one is sure that someone on the outside will goad the American people with repeated stings of danger or trouble.

Once war breaks out, the American people have in the past shown a very good capacity to unite in winning and finishing the war. There is no reason to suppose that the situation will be different in the future. What is perplexing, and for the present insoluble, is this: how can the American

people, short of getting involved in war, become so purposeful, so decisive, so nearly unanimous, as to take actions which will prevent a war? The situation in the early 1950s is on the Communist side a major crusade against what the Reds regarded, or pretended to regard, as "aggressive" U.S. capitalist power.

In other words, the Communists of the world had a crusade against the USA. The USA had a crusade against no one. A prominent Washington official long displayed the sign in his office: I AIN'T MAD AT NOBODY. In a very real sense this epitomized one of the very real moods of the American people. How do we defend ourselves against a crusade, especially if we have no desire to have part in a counter-crusade?

U.S. propagandists sometimes forget that they are not speaking for a mere nation, but are the representatives of something which is far bigger than any single nationality—they are the spokesmen, whether they like it or not, for a way of life which is new in the world, for a kind of freedom which, though coarse, is real. Characteristic American strengths have been, are, and will be the strengths of patience, endurance, versatility, and curiosity. It is foolish to ask Americans to be strong in bitterness, strong in hatred, strong in a cruel or proud self-righteousness. We are not Japanese, or Prussians, or Russians; we are not Irish, or English, or French; we are mostly European and yet un-European. Our propaganda will be effective only if it springs from the simplest and strongest aspects of our life at home. Our material prosperity is beyond doubt; what is not so evident to the outside world is the frugality, the kindliness, and the humble foresight which drove so much of that prosperity into being.

The Propaganda of Friendship.

U.S. limitations are nowhere more evident in peacetime propaganda than in the oft-repeated phrase of "winning friends for America." The desire for having a friend is a deep necessity amid the crowded loneliness of U.S. urban society. The necessity to "be liked" leads to grotesquely exaggerated inferences as to what "being liked" may involve. Americans in and out of government often argue that America should "make friends" on the naïve assumption that "friends" are useful to nations in time of trouble.

This is, of course, not true.

The Swedes were very good friends of the Norwegians. Nevertheless, the Swedes saved their Swedish skins by sitting back when the Nazis overran Norway.

Did Lithuania have an enemy? Did Latvia have an enemy? Did Estonia have an enemy? These countries were the good friends of all the Western powers. These countries have disappeared.

The United States was a friend of China, a friendship boastfully and sentimentally proclaimed for more than a hundred years, from the days of Daniel Webster to the finale of George C. Marshall. What use was it to the Chinese to have the United States as a friend? When they fell upon trouble, a U.S. Secretary of State denounced their government as corrupt and told the Chinese how good the United States was.

Friendship does not usually lead to war or peace. War and peace depend upon survival. Any veteran will remember men whom he disliked intensely in his own wartime outfits: he never day-dreamed of turning them over to the enemy just because he was personally antagonistic to them. *A common danger from something*—more complicatedly, *a common interest in something*—is a far more potent

assurance of future strength and strategic action than is friendship.

Friendship operates between individuals, not between the overgrown corporate fictions which are called nations.

If you were a West German, and if you were absolutely positive that all Americans were lovely people, you would be wise to join the Soviet side. That way, if the Russians win, you will have appeased the enigmatic and implacable Muscovites. On the other hand, if the Americans win and you are sure they are lovely people as well as good friends of yours, they will not *really* mind your having joined the other side as a matter of temporary factual necessity. If a man is your best friend he may jump into the river to rescue you, should you fall in; unfortunately, he might prefer to telephone a rescue squad. But if he is handcuffed to you, you are reasonably sure that if you fall in he will be with you.

Call it propaganda, call it information, call it international communication—under any name the major point remains: *Americans can find trustworthy future allies through commitment to common interest or common danger*. Friendship is pleasant, but not of the essence. In some cases it might be desirable for leaders or key groups in important foreign areas to realize that the United States could be a *worse enemy* than the Soviet Union, rather than to realize that the U.S. is a friend. If the French were sure of this—that is, that a Soviet-occupied France would get sixty-five hydrogen bombs dropped on it while a U.S.-occupied France would get only three—they might prefer the Americans whether they liked them or not.

Is this kind of communication consistent with American ideals? Perhaps not. Yet *honesty* has always been one of the American ideals and perhaps honesty may take us in the

future to a stronger and a wiser position than friendliness has taken us in the past.

CHAPTER 16
Research, Development, and the Future

Psychological warfare is part of civilization. Civilization, no matter how one defines it, is not a static thing. It is an immense fermenting, active, often turbulent composite of the *whys* and *hows* of the way men and women think and behave. The short-run factors in a civilization are often as important as the long-run ones. Though the United States from 1860 to 1960 has been a steady part of the west European, predominantly Christian civilization, the United States has undergone immense changes of fashion, belief, appetite, preference, and behavior. With any changing, developing civilization, "war" may seem like a very static term, so that the Civil War and the war of the Western powers against Germany of 1939-45 may to some degree seem comparable phenomena. They are comparable, but only within sharp limits.

The Meaning of War.

Nowhere is the transitoriness and changeability of modern civilization more evident than in the significance which intelligent men and women attach to the term *war*. War was "noble" in 1861-65, but in 1941-45 it was "noble" only for the most perfunctory and most hollow oratory. Push the contrast farther: "psychological warfare" was an unknown element in 1861-65; by 1941-45 it had become fashionable. (One can seriously doubt that President Lincoln ever worried about Northern citizens becoming "un-American" under that rubric, though he had plenty of traitors to worry him.) The

years 1945-53 were momentous. A whole string of new ideas, new terms, and new behavior patterns appeared within the USA in a mere eight years. What the next twenty years will bring is deeply uncertain.

War is coming to mean the effectuation or prevention of revolution, not the half-savage, half-courteous armed conflict of sovereign nations. War is getting to be chronic again.[55] War between entirely comparable states such as the United States and Canada, Mexico and Cuba, Indonesia and India, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, or any similar combination, is getting to be more and more unthinkable. War between ideologically dissimilar states, such as North Korea and South Korea, Communist China and Nationalist China, Viet Minh and Viet Nam, USSR and USA, is getting to be virtual normality.

Research into Tension.

It is true of all people that they solve particular problems, in many cases, some time after the occasion for solving the problem has passed. What is called "decision" in government, politics, and in personal affairs is very often not the selection of one very real course of action as against another equally real course of action, but the confirmation of a commitment already made. If this is true of every-day life, it is even more true of scholars and experts. One of the disabilities of our time in the field of the social and psychological sciences and the humanities lies in the fact that although government officials recognize problems some months or years after they have arisen and finally attempt to deal with them, scholars frequently get around problems decades after any practical occasion for decision has passed.[56]

Nowhere is this more evident than in the discussion of tensions as a cause of war. Tension certainly contributed very much to the outbreak of war in 1914. It is possible that the tensions and hostilities of Europe in the 1930s which allowed Fascism and Communism to become threatening and powerful also contributed in the end to the outbreak of war in 1939. It is difficult, however, to suppose that the coming of war in September 1939 was itself the result of tension except as a very remote and indirect cause. This author believes that tension leads to a perpetuation of a kind of civilization in which wars are possible, but cannot persuade himself that an additional factor of tension within civilization as we know it can be an immediate cause of war.[57]

Research into tensions has been carried fairly far. It may be that the wartime role of tension can be ascertained by scientific methods, so that the psychological warfare of Power A can cause so much more tension than Power B, either among the élite or among the general population, that Power B cannot further continue the war. Alternatively, it is imaginable that Power A may be able to relax tension so sharply among the élite or broad population of Power B that Power B's potentiality for war, or decision to wage war, can be postponed.

For purposes of research it seems worthwhile to suggest that tension appears to be highly prevalent in the two most powerful military civilizations on earth today: the USSR and its satellites, on the one hand, and the cluster of Western powers, on the other. Tension appears to be caused by the complexity of every-day life, the demands made upon the psychophysiological organization of each individual human being, by the technological facilities available, and through the relief offered within each civilization by the opportunity to discharge hatred against members of the other

civilization instead of recognizing self-hatred for the very real problem which it is.

In other terms, it is tough to be modern; the difficulty of being modern makes it easy for individuals to be restless and anxious; restlessness and anxiety lead to fear; fear converts freely into hate; hate very easily takes on political form; political hate assists in the creation of real threats such as the atomic bomb and guided missiles, which are not imaginary threats at all; the reality of the threats seems to confirm the reality of the hate which led to it, thus perpetuating a cycle of insecurity, fear, hate, armament, insecurity, fear, and on around the circle again and again.

Revolutionary Possibilities in Psychology.

It is possible, but by no means probable, that the rapid development of psychological and related sciences in the Western world may provide whole new answers to the threats which surround modern Americans, including the supreme answer of peace as an alternative to war or the secondary answer of victory in the event of war. Nothing in the existing academic literature on the subject of psychology of war, the psychiatry of modern mass behavior, the psychology or psychiatry of present-day power politics, justifies the inference that an applicable solution to our "problems" is at all near. The "problems" are almost all aspects of our entire lives and one cannot solve life like a Delphic riddle or a single scientific experiment.

It would be unwise of U.S. military and political leaders to overlook developing strengths within American every-day talk and thinking, whether academic or popular. Too specific a concentration on the problem of winning a war may cause a leader or his expert consultants to concentrate on solutions derived from past experience, therewith leading

him to miss new and different solutions which might be offered by his own time. Changes need not always be thought of as weaknesses, which they are if past criteria are retained as absolute standards. Men born in the period 1910-20 may have endowments which are not commonly found among men born in the period 1930-40, yet it is entirely possible that the generation born during 1930-40 may have capacities and resistances which the older generation does not altogether appreciate.

Apply this concept to Communism. Communism loses strength every day that it exists: each day deprives it of novelty, each day makes it a littler more familiar, each day makes its leaders one day older. If Americans can learn how to be flexible and imaginative and to understand themselves as they really are, they might find that the real American appeal to the youth of the world would be much greater than the Communist appeal. It was unfortunately characteristic of the United States in the early 1950s of the Cold War that U.S. propaganda was based on ideals and standards *older* than the ideals and standards competitively presented by the Communists, and that therefore in many parts of the world the struggle between Americans and Communists appeared to be a struggle on our side of the old against the young. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The United States army in Korea in 1950-53 was one of the most revolutionary armies in history, an army dedicated to non-victory, pledging allegiance to a shadowy world government of the United Nations behind the practical reality of the government of the United States. Perhaps never before in many centuries have men fought so matter-of-factly, so calmly, so reasonably. They fought well and did not need to be jazzed up with the hashish of "making the world safe for Democracy" or "establishing the Four Freedoms."

The temper of the U.S. forces in Korea in 1951 was demonstrated by a Reserve sergeant who scarcely knew he was in the Reserves until he was on a boat bound for Pusan. He was a practical man, anxious to get home, but willing to do his share in this war as long as he had to. He was given the assignment of testing the voice plane of U.S. headquarters at Taegu. The loudspeaker was not working quite right, and he was instructed to test the plane at 500, 1,000 and 1,500 feet. The plane flew low over U.S. headquarters. The roar of the engines almost deafened everyone within the building, yet even above the roar of the engines there could be heard the bone-chilling hum of the silent loudspeaker—an immense magnification of the noise one hears from a radio set which is turned on without being tuned to a station. Everyone expected the sergeant to say, "This is the EUSAK voice plane testing; one-ah, two-ah, three-ah!" Instead the immense voice came through clearly, through brick, and plaster, and wood, through air and trees. It must have reached four miles. The gigantic voice of the sergeant seemed to roar over half of South Korea as he said, "Why—don't—you—imperialist—sons o' bitches—go—back—to—Wall-Street—where—you—belong?" It was said that fifty colonels grabbed for their phones simultaneously, but the purely American gimmick to the whole story lay in the fact that the sergeant was not punished. No damage was done. The Americans thought their enemies were funny or silly. We had shown that we were not afraid of Communist ideas. Several South Koreans told the author that they regarded the Americans as inscrutable people indeed.

The development of modern civilization is certain to have developments in war both as to the purpose of war and as to the modes of war. It seems likely that in the face of the supreme danger of atomic and thermonuclear weapons nations will resort more and more to small wars and semi-war operations which will offer the opportunity of strategic

advantage without the cataclysmic danger of a world-wide showdown. In a very hush-hush way the U.S. Army is looking into the possibilities of small and irregular kinds of war; security regulations prohibit the author from discussing some of the interesting new developments in this field.

National Research and Development Programs.

The United States Government considered as a whole has developed a very adequate scientific research program. Most of this is quite properly keyed to the physical and mechanical sciences, in which the most tangible results are obtained. Substantial strides are being made in the medical and allied fields. Some research is, however, being carried out in fields pertaining to psychological warfare. These are worth describing, but it must be remembered that research on PsyWar may not affect PsyWar itself as much as research in other fields which, by changing the character of war, will change PsyWar too.

Within the general research field, two basic approaches have been recognized by the U.S. Army as being distinct from one another: developmental research and operations research. *Developmental research* consists of that research which creates new weapons, new methods of war, new devices or procedures, doing so by digging through modern science, investigating its applicability to military problems, and then advancing the frontier of science, when necessary, in the military interest. The goals of *operations research* are more modest and, in some respect, more provocative. Operations research takes operations as they exist and reexamines them from beginning to end to discover how much of each operation is scientifically pertinent to its stated goal, what economies, modifications, or changes might be introduced, and how the operation might be improved.

Developmental Research in PsyWar.

At the time of the close of the 1950-53 phase of Korean hostilities, the PsyWar being conducted by the United States Army in Korea showed little sign of having been influenced by developmental research into this field of activity. The leaflets were not better than the leaflets of World War II, nor even very different. Because of the peculiar political limitations of the war, the radio program was not as good as the performance of ABSIE under Eisenhower. The tactical use of loudspeakers had shown a very marked improvement over World War II standards, but to a non-engineer such as the present writer neither the Communist loudspeakers nor our own seemed strikingly better or different.

Developmental research had a great deal to offer, but the gap between initial scientific advance and practical military application appeared to be too broad to warrant the assumption that the research had transformed the U.S. PsyWar program.

Operations Research in Korea.

Operations research—sometimes slangily called *opsearch*—was applied to the Korean war with highly uneven results.[58]

Among other things, Army officers in the PsyWar field showed, early in the Korean war, that land forces possessed tactical opportunities which combat propaganda could exploit very effectually. Various experiments were tried, none of them so decisive as to affect the outcome of the war, but some of them of real tactical value and others of great importance in obtaining Chinese prisoners.

One of the points examined was surrender as a *process*. Surrendering does not depend upon the disposition of the individual enemy soldier to say *yes* or *no* to the war as a

whole. He could say *no* a thousand times and still be on the other side shooting at us.

The actual physical *process* of surrender is an elaborate one consisting of the psychological processes of getting ready to give up on the other side, the physical capacity to surrender when the opportunity for getting captured presents itself, and the alternative, more difficult process of deliberately leaving the other side and getting to our side alive. In 1951 and 1952 there were considerable developments along this line. Americans learned much about how to teach enemy soldiers to surrender. Late in 1952 and early in 1953 the front had become so static that it took extraordinary heroism for soldiers—outside of a tiny minority engaged in reconnaissance patrols—to get away from their own side and surrender to the enemy without being killed by their friends as deserters or by the enemy as sneak attackers.

The U.S. public did not realize that throughout the Korean war the Communists—Russian, North Korean, and Chinese—enjoyed a distinct radio advantage over the UN side both as to funds available for programs and as to number of station-hours on the air. The language gap between the Americans and Chinese was so extreme that it was hard for Americans to realize that the Chinese broadcasts covered wider audiences and covered them better than did our own. American restraint in this field may have been dictated in part by the fact that the war was a limited war consisting of combat only with those armed Chinese Communists on North Korean territory, but not with armed Chinese Communists elsewhere in the Far East.

Philosophy and Propaganda Development.

In terms of specific literature of PsyWar it is difficult to find many contributions of professional philosophers to PsyWar since the end of World War II. This is curious, in view of the Communist propagation of philosophy, no matter how perverted its form, as a major weapon. The American philosopher, Dr. George Morgan, who became a career diplomat, was simultaneously a Soviet-area expert and a key figure in the Psychological Strategy Board. There were not many others like him.

Philosophy offers an opportunity for the reexamination of cultural values. The indoctrination of those professors who will teach the teachers of the generation after next will influence the capacity of future Americans to have a world-view which will give them the utmost opportunities for action in the military field while retaining as far as possible the blessings of U.S. civilian civilization. That U.S. civilization is still civilian and not military is, of course, beyond cavil.

The William Jackson committee was a voice crying in the wilderness when it asked for new terms and new ideas against which to set U.S. propaganda operations in the world of modern strategy. Philosophers may have had the capacity for finding some of the answers, but philosophers, of all people, do not like to be jostled or hurried. The author has never heard of a philosopher employed on a confidential basis by the United States Government to think through the historical and cultural rationale of a U.S. military victory for the future. Writers such as F. S. C. Northrop and Erich Fromm —to name only two sharply contrasting personalities—have written books which possess high significance for the international propaganda field. The connection appears, however, to be tangential.

Literary Contributions.

Almost all the best propagandists of almost all modern powers have been, to a greater or less degree, literary personalities. The artistic and cultural aspect of writing is readily converted to propaganda usage. Elmer Davis is a novelist as well as a commentator. Robert Sherwood is one of America's most distinguished playwrights. Benito Mussolini wrote a bad novel. Mao Tse-tung is a poet and philosopher, as well as a Communist party boss. Down among the workers in the field, such American novelists as James Gould Cozzens, Pat Frank, Jerome Weidman, and Murray Dyer, have worked on U.S. psychological warfare.[59]

Though literary men have converted their writing to propaganda purposes, few of them have gone on to define the characteristics of a specific conversionary literature or to compile canons of literary style applicable to the propaganda field. The contributions may lie in the future.

The Social Sciences.

The American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAOPR) is the professional league of U.S. propagandists and analysts of public opinion; its quarterly, *Public Opinion*, is the key journal in the field. The members of this association are drawn both from the social sciences and from the psychological sciences, ranging from such practical operatives as Dr. George Gallup and Elmo Roper to austere theorists like Professors Nathan Leites and Hadley Cantril.

A good argument can be presented to the effect that the skills brought from the social-science into the propaganda field are more valuable once they are employed full time in that field than an attempt to apply political science, or sociology, or economics, each as an individual compartment, to the field of propaganda. There is still no book available with the title *The Politics of Knowledge*,[60]

even though the reception, control, prohibition, and dissemination of knowledge is a major factor in all modern governmental processes both in and out of the propaganda field.

Psychology and Related Sciences.

There has been an immense amount of work done by psychologists, much of it classified, on the field of propaganda. Some of this work is refreshing in the extreme and should provide nasty surprises for the Communists in a major war. Other parts are restatements which if translated into operations might or might not prove feasible with the kind of army we Americans have or are likely to have.

One of the most conspicuous developments since World War II has been the application by psychologists, sociologists, and persons in related field of *quantifying techniques*. The introduction of rigorous scientific requirements of *number* into the attempted reportage of propaganda behavior or propaganda results is having a significant effect. Quantification may not obtain everything which its devotees claim for it. There is a wide area of human behavior which is significant to the ordinary person, or even to the expert in descriptive terms, and which loses much of its significance if the descriptive and allusive terms are replaced by measurements, tables, and graphs. There is, however, no danger that quantification will replace description as the sole tool of research in the propaganda field.

What quantification does do is develop a common area of discussion between propagandists and nonpropagandists. In many instances quantification can demonstrate results where allegations of failure or of success would have nothing more than personal authority to support them.

Within our own particular kind of civilization quantification has a special appeal because of the American trust in engineering and in numbers. The conclusions of the Kinsey reports on men and on women seem much more authoritative to the ordinary man because they are presented with an ample garniture of numbers, even though Havelock Ellis's pioneer works in the psychology and behavior patterns of Western sex life may have been much more tangible and much more revolutionary in their time.

Projection and Research.

All propaganda involves a certain degree of projection—the propagandist attempts to identify himself with a situation which he does not face in real life and to issue meaningful communications to persons about situations which they themselves do not face *yet*. Much of the psychological research on tactical PsyWar remains yet to be done, although from the quantitative point of view there have been significant U.S. achievements within the past four years.

Another aspect of projection is left unexplored because of its immense difficulty and its dangerously unscientific character. Consider the problem this way: the United States one day before the outbreak of war with a hypothetical enemy, such as the Soviet Union, will possess a certain group of characteristics. Representative individual lives within this country can be determined to possess certain habits concerning mass communication, trust in mass communication, and response to symbols which may come through press, radio, or other mass devices.

One day after the outbreak of war the United States will change *because* the war has broken out.

One month after the outbreak of war the United States will no longer be the USA_1 which existed on war-day. It may well have become USA_{25} because of the rapidity and variety of change. Three Soviet hydrogen bombs and twelve Soviet atomic bombs might change many of our national, economic, political, and psychological characteristics, and no one, not even an American, could predict this change in advance. The best he could do would be to get ready to study the change as it occurred, to understand the rate and direction of the change, and to assess the meaning of the change in light of the conduct of war.

The same would be true of the USSR; that country, like any other major country, would change under the impact of war. Who could have predicted the renascence of Russian patriotism and traditionalism resulting from the Nazi invasion of 1941? Even if we know where the Russians are as of the outbreak of war, we won't know where they will head or how fast they will head there, once war has broken out.

The scientific problem presented by attempted serious study of a U.S.-Soviet war is therefore very difficult indeed. It is really a problem involving three clusters of moving bodies. The first cluster will be the American people, their behavior, and their institutions; the second cluster, the Russians and allied peoples, their behavior and their institutions; the third cluster, the changing methods of communication existing between them.

It can be said even now, simply by referring to the character of the American people and their past history, that if the Communist leaders of the USSR start a general war, the end of that war is sure (under sets of words and ideas which have yet to be developed in the future) to involve the reconciliation of the inhabitants of the USA with the Russian people. In other words, USA_v and $USSR_v$ can and

must have certain relationships with each other, preeminent among which are attempts at undoing war damage, at political and cultural reconciliation, and the undertaking of the rebuilding of a world which both these great peoples can support with enthusiasm and *hope*.[61]

USA_v and $USSR_v$ are imaginable. USA_1 and $USSR_1$ for the day preceding the outbreak of war, or, alternatively, the day on which the war occurs, will be known elements. American science in many fields can help U.S. mass communications and therewith help our armed forces if we learn how to ascertain how the Soviet leadership changes, how Soviet élite groups change, and how the Soviet population changes during the course of the war. We must not only be able to guess what is happening to them physically, but must try to appreciate and to understand what is happening to them psychologically and semantically. This is an immense task. It is by no means certain that our research and development facilities can give us an adequate research program to handle the problem.

This much can be said: if the Americans understand the Russians before the war and during the war, it will be the first time that a nation has kept its enemy in wide-awake sight.

The usual process in the past has been the acceptance of a few exaggerated stereotypes of the national characteristics of the potential enemy, the ascription of every possible kind of infamy and inhuman characteristic to the enemy during the war, and the redefinition of the enemy as a friend after the war. It would be strange and wonderful if the U.S. Government and the U.S. propagandists (or conceivably as much as a large minority of the U.S. population) could learn how to fight the USSR in order to *help* the Russians escape from a tyranny which has already hurt them much more than it has hurt us.

The Germans suffered a tragic, overwhelming, and perhaps decisive psychological defeat in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and in the Ukraine, when they carried with their field forces such naïve and tragic Nazi misconceptions of Russian and Ukrainian character as to defeat every opportunity they may have had for a serious anti-Communist alliance of Germany with the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. They destroyed themselves not through ignorance, but through what they *thought* they knew. If they had been more calm, less assured, more willing to learn from immediate experience, and less indoctrinated with their own preposterous misconceptions of Russian and Ukrainian character, they might have found Russian and Ukrainian allies who would have joined them in the final extermination of the Soviet system.

The world Communist movement has already suffered very serious setbacks because of its failure to project U.S. behavior successfully from the summer of 1950 onward. If the Russian and Chinese Communists had understood Americans well and had made a correct evaluation of the American response to the invasion of South Korea, they would not have driven the United States from lethargy to alertness, from weakness to military strength, from vulnerability toward Communist and crypto-Communist propaganda to sharp and angry recognition of Communist manipulation of symbols such as "progressives," "people's governments," and "liberation."

Communist Developments.

If the U.S. Government agencies know about the scientific development of Soviet propaganda techniques in the last few years, they have certainly not told this author. What is here presented is therefore derived from first-hand

interrogation of Communists, from escapers in both Europe and Asia, and unclassified materials.

Sociologically it would seem that the Russian Communists attempted definite improvements of the techniques of Communist revolution and that these improvements have in large part failed in the European satellites. The governments of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany have turned out to be poor governments—despite the fact that from the Soviet point of view it was a sharp innovation to leave them in pseudo-parliamentary form instead of creating outright Soviet facsimilies.

At the Chinese end of the Moscow-Peking axis the sociology of revolutionary propaganda and organization appears to have worked out much more successfully than at the Russian end. The Chinese Communists, perhaps because they were Chinese, perhaps because they were tougher and more experienced Communists than the Russians, got their country under rigid control and then undertook social and political experiments on a very audacious scale. They have managed not to be un-Chinese while creating in China the kind of pervasive dictatorship which Communist control appears to require.

In the manipulation of satellites and in particularization of propaganda, the North Korean Communist army, the Viet Minh army in Indochina, and the Malayan Races Liberation Army on the Malay peninsula, appear to have near-optimum localism and particularism without suffering serious deviation from the main Communist world-wide pattern. In North Korea, of course, Chinese intervention and Soviet support have sharply modified the position of the North Korean People's Army, but the Annamite and Malay Communist forces appear to be fighting with high morale and considerable success, despite the duality of control

from Peking and Moscow, and despite the difficulties of reconciling Asian nationalism with Marxian-world doctrine.

Another Communist technique is now known through Edward Hunter's provocative pioneer book[62] by its correct name of "brain-washing." This involves the transformation of a human personality. The author has himself interrogated victims of brain-washing and can attest to the terrifying depth to which this process is carried. The victim of brain-washing is subject to very slight persuasion at the rational level. He is not even given much propaganda as U.S. propagandists of recent years might recognize the product. Instead, the process of brain-washing consists of a frontal attack on all levels of the personality, from the most conscious to the most hidden. The Communists seek through fatigue and sustained interrogation to create a condition similar to what is called "nervous breakdown" in popular parlance. Then they rebuild the personality, healing their victim into Communist normality.

One victim to whom the author talked had been so subject to Communist brain-changing that he thought himself a real Communist even though he had been reared a Catholic. He was completely convinced of the Communist cause and of his own life and place in that cause after the brain-washing had been completed. Unfortunately for Communism, the man got into serious sexual difficulties, difficulties of a kind which any American psychiatrist would recognize as potentially devastating.

As a result of his sexual frustrations he suffered a mild equivalent of the medically recognized phenomenon of the schizophrenic break—that terrible moment of false enlightenment in which the psychotic personality cuts loose with a truth of his own and shuts off most or all communication with normal people—with the consequence that he was walking along Nanking Road in Shanghai, a

normal Communist in one instant of time and (as he put it to the author) in a millionth of a second he suddenly realized he was a Catholic, an anti-Communist, the enemy of every man, woman and child in sight—and at war with his entire environment. As this writer understood it, the poor man, though adjusted to the Communist environment after brain-washing, happened to go crazy—crazy enough to come back to our side.

Who can say which is sane, which insane? When two social and cultural systems are completely at odds with one another it may be impossible to be "normal" in both of them.

Scientifically the Chinese process of personality transformation lacked some of the pharmaceutical features apparent in the Western Communist conversions for purposes of confession. It appears to be a combination of audacious practical experimentation with well-known procedures from textbooks of Pavlovian psychology. It is, of course, an interesting scientific question to ask one's self: could Communist psychological researchers do enough psychological research to understand their own difficulties and to de-Communize themselves in the very act of seeking better psychological weapons for Communism? If the people in charge of Communist psychological techniques were scientists, as American psychologists generally are, there might be a real point of discussion. Unfortunately, most of them appear to be artists, believers, and fanatics. The history of the fanatical religions which have inflamed and ripped so much of mankind across the centuries is not such as to suggest that Communism will de-Communize itself by becoming more Communistic or more scientific.

Logically considered, the United States remains the largest extant revolutionary experiment in the world—the first immense human community which survives without

profound dogma or profound hatred and which attempts to make short-range, practical, and warm-hearted (though ideologically superficial) concurrence the foundation for a political and industrial civilization. If the United States wins a few more wars it may be that the rest of mankind will be persuaded that our kind of practicality is not only humanly preferable, but scientifically more defensible than the philosophies of competing civilizations. It seems unlikely that Communist research can outstrip us in the propaganda field so far as the race is run in purely scientific terms; artistically and gadget-wise the Communists are just as inventive as we are and often more enthusiastic.

Private PsyWar and Covert Techniques.

Another aspect in the development of PsyWar was the inevitable possibility that skills learned in wartime would not be forgotten in time of peace. Many of the background studies made for OWI during World War II have been developed, on the constructive side, into serious scientific contributions to ethnology, anthropology, or psychology. The postwar studies of RAND Corporation have in part been released in unclassified form and add to our knowledge not only of propaganda but of mankind. The RADIR project at Stanford University, the Russian research program at MIT and Harvard, and other governmentally inspired or encouraged undertakings have borne similar fruit for private scholarship and discussion.

On the other side of the coin, it is very hopeful to note that the many and dangerous techniques developed by OSS for covert propaganda, some of which were applied with considerable success in Europe, have not been introduced into domestic U.S. politics, commercial competition, or other forms of private life. After each war there is often a danger that the coarsening of a culture by the war will lead to the

application of wartime skills to peacetime situations. This was emphatically not the case in the Presidential campaigns of 1948 and 1952, even though persons of rich PsyWar experience in World War II were on the staffs of both Stevenson and Eisenhower.

It is often forgotten that some of the deadliest and most effective revolutionary enterprises in the nineteenth century were undertaken without the consent or assistance of the existing governments. Karl Marx was certainly not an invention of Lord Palmerston. Bakunin did not operate out of the French Foreign Office.

In the postwar discussion of USA-Communist rivalry, recommendations were often made on the U.S. side that we should counter Soviet covert operations with our own covert operations against the USSR. What has been forgotten in this context is the fact that such operations have been made illegal and dangerous under United States law. Under Federal law as it exists today no Underground Railway could be developed to assist Soviet escapers in the way that Negro slaves were relayed across the Free States to Canada in the years before Emancipation. One of the chief blocks to U.S. covert operations is the immense growth in all directions of the power, authority, and responsibility of the Federal Government; this growth makes it almost impossible to wage revolutionary or conspiratorial operations from U.S. territory without the prior approval of U.S. authorities—which the authorities, under traditional international law, cannot give and cannot afford to give.

It would seem desirable, if the Cold War situation persists over a long period of time, for Americans to reexamine the restraints which they have placed upon their own citizens and to attempt a revision of the laws which would permit pro-American secret activities to be launched without

permitting anti-American activities of the same kind to be carried on. One immediately comes to the conundrum:[63]

How can the Government say *yes* to the one and *no* to the other without being cognizant of what happens?

The answer would appear to lie in the older body of our law in that a withdrawal of governmental authority from some fields would leave the individual responsible and subject to indictment and trial if his enterprises should prove deleterious to the United States Government, but not subject to punishment if his enterprises hurt the known antagonists of the USA.

Phrased in another way, this means that the USA might, in a long-range Cold War situation, be required to make some domestic recognition of the fact that the Communist states are the antagonists but not the military enemies of the U.S. system of government and that as antagonists of this system of government such states, their representatives, their property, and their organizations, should not be afforded any more protection under our laws than is given to the National City Bank of New York in the laws applicable to the city of Moscow, or the American Telephone & Telegraph Company in the laws which apply in Budapest. For a long time the Communist states have treated even the most innocent business enterprise and social club on our side as though they were attainted with an inherent factor of criminal and subversive intent. The withdrawal of U.S. legal protection from all things Communist might allow the American people—or those among them who so chose—to develop proclivities for adventure and trouble-making against the Communists. These proclivities are now sternly repressed by Federal statute.

The Future of Psychological Warfare.

PsyWar has become an existing art. Where it had no practitioners at all in the United States between 1919 and 1940, it has had a long and distinguished roster of active and reserve officers, civilian consultants, and demobilized veterans interested in the field ever since 1945. A wide variety of military establishments have had PsyWar responsibilities assigned them. Substantial cadres of officers and skilled enlisted personnel have been recruited and trained. Radio and leaflet facilities are ready to accompany our land, sea, and air forces wherever they may have to go. A U.S. strategic center for global propaganda, instantly convertible to wartime use, exists in the Operations Coordinating Board under the National Security Council.

This is not the end of the story.

One of the paradoxical but deeply true factors in the study and conduct of propaganda is this: the more people know about propaganda, the better they can resist it.

Propaganda was a tremendous bogey in the 1920s. It probably seems very ugly and frightening to most people born before 1920. It does not seem too frightening, so far as the author can judge, to Americans born after 1930. Those born in the period 1920-30 appear to be divided in their emotional reactions to mass persuasion situations.

PsyWar is not magic. It is a valuable auxiliary to modern warfare and a useful concomitant to modern strategy. If a particular strategic policy is sanely and effectively devised as a feasible deterrent to war, the PsyWar procedures supporting that strategy will contribute to the prevention of war. Psychological warfare represents a recognition and acceptance in the military and strategic field of skills which grow about us every day.

In so far as ultra-destructive weapons may have increased the tenseness and bad temper of people who must live under the perpetual but remote threat of atomic bombing, one can say that physicists have upset the nerves of mankind and that it is now up to the propagandists to reassure and to reconcile the peoples.

Whatever PsyWar does, it certainly does not and should not increase the bitterness of war. Fighting itself is the supreme bitterness. Radio broadcasts and leaflets even in wartime only rarely should promote hatred. The situation which the world faces is dangerous because of technological development, not because of psychological knowledge. PsyWar ranks as a weapon, but it is almost certainly the most humane of all weapons.

Apart from PsyWar, what military weapon destroys the enemy soldier's capacity to fight by saving his life? PsyWar tries to bring him over alive and tries to send him home as our friend. No rival weapon can do this.

PsyWar, no matter what it may be called in the future, cannot be omitted from the arsenal of modern war. Neither can it outlast war. Its improvement is a cheap, valuable, and humane way of increasing the military potential of any country whether we think that country to be politically right or politically wrong.

Since 1945 we Americans have written more, studied more, and talked more about PsyWar than have any of the other free peoples. This is a hopeful sign. It can be read as an indication that the American love of the gadget, the American quest for a novelty, can be turned to the arena of the soul. The Communists are better liars, better schemers, better murderers than we shall ever be; they start off by being better fanatics. Is it not in the American spirit that we should out-trick them, out-talk them, and out-maneuver them? We have a very creative and resourceful civilization

at our backs. We have no Führer to guide us and no party line to comfort us; we don't even want such things. Hard though it may be, we can live with our own consciences and not seek for keepers.

The Communists have started a fight with us. That fight may go on a long time. If they want to stop fighting we shall certainly try to find peace with them. But if they push the fight to its bitter end—

We shall not fail.

APPENDIX
Military PsyWar Operations, 1950-53

On 25 June 1950, when the invasion of the Republic of Korea began, no real military PsyWar organization was tangibly evident. A planning staff headed by Colonel J. Woodall Greene had been re-created in the Far East Command's GHQ in 1947, but it was hardly prepared to direct full-scale propaganda operations on such short notice, especially with a total lack of field operating units. Yet the staff with hasty augmentation did go into action—in effect, became its own operating unit—two days following the invasion, using both leaflets and radio in a strategic campaign that was continued without interruption for over three years.

At the same time that General MacArthur made provision for the PsyWar planning staff in the Far East Command, the Department of the Army's G2 in 1947 directed the inauguration of a long-range program of extension courses to be administered primarily to the specialists of the Military Intelligence Reserve. One such specialty in the military intelligence career program was psychological warfare.[64]

Parallel with the development of training literature based on World War II experience, the Army experimented with the use of PsyWar in field maneuvers. A special unit, called the Tactical Information Detachment,[65] was formed at Fort Riley, Kansas.

Organization of Field Operational Units.

Less than a month after the 1950 invasion, the Department of the Army announced the approval of a new organizational concept for PsyWar field operational units. The new concept, profiting by the organizational happenchance in all theaters of operations during World War II, established two functional units: one for *strategic* propaganda support, the other for *tactical* propaganda support.

Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group.

Although the concept for new unit organization and function was not conceived overnight, FEC's Psychological Warfare Section (PWS) with its dual planning and operating responsibilities pointed up the urgent need for a unit properly manned and equipped to support full-scale strategic operations in any area. So the Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group was born. Not only was it designed to conduct strategic propaganda in direct support of military operations, but it likewise was created to support the national world-wide propaganda effort when so directed. It was built on a basic framework of three companies:

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, containing the command, administrative, supervisory and creative personnel necessary for propaganda operations.

Reproduction Company, containing intricate equipment and skilled personnel capable of producing leaflets and newspapers of varying sizes and multiple color.

Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, designed to replace or augment other means of broadcasting radio propaganda.

In 1953 a fourth type company was activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina—the *Consolidation Company*. This unit was very flexible and had the job of creating and conducting PsyWar in support of consolidation operations in areas under Military Government control.

Figure 75: UN Propaganda. In some leaflets used in Korea, the United Nations emerged as a major point. Here UN lavishness to South Korea is contrasted with Communist rapacity in the North. The scene does not remind the reader of slums on our side.

Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company.

The Group's junior partner in the conduct of PsyWar support operations was the Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company. This unit specifically supported an army in the field with adequate *tactical* propaganda support. Like the Group, it supported the national propaganda objectives, but it interpreted the directives that came from the theater commander in terms of more immediate objectives. Its targets were smaller, lived under unusual circumstances, and presented highly vulnerable, rapidly changing propaganda opportunities—a real challenge for the L&L Company. Organizationally it was a trimmed-down version of the Group. Its *company headquarters* and *propaganda platoon* were the offspring of Headquarters and Headquarters Company. The *publications platoon* was a smaller, more adaptable version of Reproduction Company. And the *loudspeaker platoon* was the tactical counterpart of the strategic Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company.

Figure 76: Korean Leaflet Bomb, Early Model. An M16A1 cluster adapter being loaded at the FEC printing plant in Yokohama (1 November 1950). The bomb type adapter will contain 22,500 (5″ by 8″) psychological warfare leaflets.

The Tactical Information Detachment, moving from Fort Riley to Korea in the fall of 1950, was reorganized as the *1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company* and, attached to EUSAK, served as Eighth Army's tactical propaganda unit throughout the campaign. It adjusted its location, equipment and propaganda tone to keep pace with the ups and downs of the Korean war.

Psychological Warfare Center.

Paralleling the creation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare in the Department of the Army PsyWar training was started in the spring of 1951. A faculty was collected at the Army General School to start the world's first formal school of military propaganda.

At the same time, reserve officers whose civilian specialties were in or related to mass communications were recalled to PsyWar assignments. Several RB&L groups and L&L companies were activated and trained at Fort Riley. One of these, the *1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group*, was deployed to Japan to become the strategic propaganda

support unit in FEC, thereby relieving the hard-pressed Psychological Warfare Section of its operational functions. The Group left Fort Riley in July 1951 at the height of the Missouri Valley floods, forcing the unit to take emergency detours by bus and train in order to meet its scheduled port of embarkation call. The 1st was the only group to have been used in active operations. Other groups were employed in training missions. In addition, Reserve groups and companies trained periodically at key locations where sufficient specialized personnel were available to keep the units on a ready, stand-by basis.

In April 1952, the PsyWar training activities at Fort Riley were moved to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where the new Psychological Warfare Center was located. This Center not only provided unit training supervision and facilities, but it fathered a new activity, the Psychological Warfare Board, designed to evaluate and test new PsyWar equipment and techniques. And the Psychological Warfare School, an outgrowth of the classes conducted by the Army General School, was formally recognized and established as one of the Army's specialist schools. More than four hundred officers have received diplomas as PsyWar officers at the time of this writing (1953). Most of the graduates have been Army officers, although successfully completing the course have been students from the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, U.S. Information Agency, and from nine Allied nations.

Psychological Warfare Staff, FEC.

For nearly two years, the Psychological Warfare Section operated under the general staff supervision of Intelligence (G2). Since World War I days G2 had been given the responsibility for monitoring PsyWar activity, a practice that was evident throughout World War II. In 1947 the Department of the Army transferred the monitorship and

supervision of PsyWar to Plans and Operations (G3). The shift was effected in FEC in 1952.



Figure 77: UN Themes. This Korean-language leaflet states: "No soldier would attempt to fight 54 men, yet Communist China is attempting to fight 54 nations. Don't fight for Communist enslavement—Join your comrades who have surrendered into safety."

Early in 1953 PWS was transferred to the staff of the commander, Army Forces Far East (AFFE), a paper transaction to put the staff in a closer position to coordinate the plans and operations of the supporting army PsyWar units.

Throughout the Korean conflict, PWS, like its area commander, wore two hats: PWS was also the PsyWar operations coordinating agency for the United Nations Command.

Broad objectives made possible throughout the war years the development of literally thousands of appropriate themes. One theme so prominent in World War II propaganda, that of *unconditional surrender*, was never used. UN policy denied its use, and PWS enforced the prohibition.

Psychological Warfare Staff, EUSAK.

Recognizing the need for PsyWar officers on army and corps staffs, the Department of the Army hastened to make an allocation for these officers to be integrated into headquarters structures. The PsyWar officers finally came to rest in the G3 staff section.

Eighth Army's PsyWar division of G3 had the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company under its operational control. EUSAK's PsyWar officer kept a tight control over the propaganda output of the L&L Company by physically moving the propaganda platoon into his EUSAK staff office.

THE UNITED NATIONS

HAS APPEALED TO AMERICAN FORCES IN JAPAN TO ASSIST YOU PEACE-LOVING CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN YOUR STRUGGLE AGAINST THE UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH. WE SHALL GIVE YOU EVERY SUPPORT. BE STEADFAST. BE CALM. BE COURAGEOUS. RESIST FIERCELY. TOGETHER WE SHALL DRIVE THE AGGRESSOR FROM YOUR TERRITORY.

Figure 78: Home-front Morale. When South Korean communications were interrupted, leaflets such as this provided on early boost to Korean civilian morale.

Each of the corps PsyWar officers had under his operational control one loudspeaker section (with a varying number of teams) from the L&L Company.

Radio Operations.

Radio in the Korean conflict was used jointly as a strategic and a consolidation medium. From the beginning of the war, radio was the voice of our military policy. An ambitious network, supervised in 1950-51 directly by PWS and thereafter by the 1st RB&L Group, became known and

recognized as the Voice of the United Nations Command. The Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) and the Japan Broadcasting System (JBS) transmitted on a cooperative basis, with the U.S. Government buying air time. The 1st RB&L Group's radio unit furnished programming assistance through key stations in Seoul (KBS), Taegu (KBS), Pusan (KBS) and Tokyo (JBS). In addition, the Group furnished technical assistance to KBS in order to keep as many as twelve network stations on the air.

Leaflet Operations.

As in World War II, leaflets were delivered primarily by two means: aircraft and artillery. B-29s of the Far East Air Force ferried leaflet bombs on night missions deep into strategic areas. Light bombers and liaison craft in support of EUSAK dropped both leaflet bombs and bundles on tactical targets. The leaflet bundle was a Korean war development. It was wrapped, tied, and fuzed in such a manner that it would open and release its leaflets in mid-air. The 105mm. howitzer remained the principal artillery piece for placing propaganda-loaded shells on pinpoint targets.

Tremendous quantities of leaflets were printed. The 1st RB&L Group on many occasions averaged better than twenty million pieces of printed propaganda every week. To this, the 1st L&L Company in Korea added an average of three and a half million leaflets per week.

Loudspeaker Operations.

The airborne loudspeaker was the object of experimentation, but the bulk of loudspeaker broadcasts were made from vehicle mounts, such as tanks, and from emplacements. During the static battle situation of 1951-53, most of the broadcasts were of the latter kind. Range of the

voice casts was short, something like two thousand yards under ideal conditions. Personnel and equipment were supplied by the 1st L&L Company, and scripts were prepared by PsyWar Division, G3, EUSAK.

Results of Military PsyWar Operations.

When the question was asked, "Just how effective was PsyWar?" the answer was vague. Clear-cut immediate evaluation of the effects of each propaganda campaign was often impossible to ascertain because of the many intangible conditions that were prevalent in the target area —conditions that were constantly changing.

Some critics of the PsyWar operations in the Far East Command charged that there were exaggerated claims of prisoners of war who surrendered as a result of propaganda. They pointed out that a head count of prisoners is an inaccurate measure of *direct* effects of PsyWar used in support of military operations, because rarely is the taking of prisoners the *sole* goal of any major PsyWar campaign.

Other critics expressed the belief that emphasis had been placed on *quantity* rather than *quality* of propaganda. By quantity they meant propaganda measured by bookkeeping statistics. By quality they meant propaganda that, planned with potent intelligence, was capable of exploiting propaganda opportunities with maximum psychological impact.

Did PsyWar achieve its goal?

The effects of planned persuasion in a thousand days of radio broadcasts, in tens of thousands of loudspeaker appeals, in billions of leaflets, may be measured only in retrospect . The question may be answered when reaction in the target area has reached (or fails to reach) favorable proportion, provided that the tangible results of the military

operations can be clearly separated from those of concurrent and subsequent strategic international information operations.

Figure 79: The Famous Airplane Surrender Leaflet. This is the controversial Far East Command leaflet that in April 1953 offered "the sum of 50,000 U.S. dollars to any pilot who delivers a modern, operational, combat-type jet aircraft in flyable condition to South Korea. The first pilot who delivers such a jet aircraft to the free world will receive an additional 50,000 U.S. dollars bonus for his bravery." The leaflet was printed in three languages—Russian, Chinese and Korean. In this example of the Russian language leaflet, there are added notations in both Korean and Chinese that "this is a message from the Americans to any jet pilot who can read Russian. If you know such a person, please give it to him. It tells him how to escape to the UN Forces."

FOOTNOTES:

1 Histories of warfare, of politics (though there are no good recent ones, Edward Jenks' little book being half a century out of date), of political theory (especially the excellent though dissimilar volumes by G. H. Sabine and by G. E. C. Catlin), of particular countries, of diplomacy, of religion, and even of literature all cast a certain amount of light on the subject. No writer known to the author specializes in the topic of historical propaganda; none takes up the long-established historical role of non-violent persuasion in warfare. Some of the sociologists and anthropologists, such as Karl Mannheim, Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, Geoffrey Gorer, Ruth Benedict (to mention a few at random) have presented approaches which would justify re-evaluations of history in a way useful to propaganda students; but they have not yet persuaded the historians to do the work.

2 7 Judges 22-23.

3 Leon Wieger, S. J., *Textes Historiques*, Hsien-hsien, 1929, vol. 1, pp. 628-633.

4 The author's attention to this reference was drawn by an unpublished undated typescript article in the War Department files by Lt. Col. Samuel T. Mackall, Inf.

5 Lo Kuan-chung, *San Kuo chih Yen-i*, translated by C. H. Brewitt-Taylor as *San Kuo or Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, Shanghai, 1929, vol. 1, p. 46.

6 Recent writers on Genghis, such as Lamb, Vladimirtsov, Fox and Lattimore all credit the Mongols with a higher technological level of warfare than has been the custom among most Western historians. H. G. Wells' simple but compelling description of the Mongols in his *Outline of History* is worth re-reading in this connection.

7 Petis de la Croix, *The History of Genghizcan the Great, First Emperor of the Antient Moguls and Tartars* ..., London, 1722, p. 154.

8 Benedict Figken, *Historia Fanaticorum*, Danzig, 1664.

9 Philip Davidson's *Propaganda and the American Revolution*, Chapel Hill, 1941, is a careful scholarly study of this period. Comparable studies have not yet been written concerning other American wars. Military and civilian historians have a fascinating

piece of research awaiting them in the material concerning Confederate and Federal psychological warfare. Each participant in the Civil War was vulnerable to the propaganda of the other. Subversive and clandestine pro-Confederate propaganda in the North is outlined in George Fort Milton's engrossing *Abraham Lincoln and the Fifth Column*, New York and Washington, D. C., 1942, but no comparable study covering all forms of propaganda on either side is yet available.

10 Various new editions of Paine's chief works are available in popular and inexpensive form. They are worth study as good propaganda.

11 In his *The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen*, Baltimore, 1937, page 17 and following, this author attempted to present some of the relationships of ideology to other methods of social control and, in connection with that enterprise, was furnished by the philosopher, A.O. Lovejoy, with a definition of "ideology" more systematic and more elaborate than the one used here.

12 For example, in the 1920's the Soviet press expressed resentment and amusement over a ruse adopted by the British during the course of operations along the Northwest Frontier. Plane-mounted loudspeakers had told the tribesmen, in Pushtu, that God was mad at them for having broken the pledged peace, with the result that they scattered and gave up. This maneuver exasperated the Russians, who themselves were making equally sweeping propaganda inroads on the other side of the Pamirs. The Russians were attacking religion, and having heavy going; it struck them as improper warfare to make use of local superstition.

13 *Webster's New International Dictionary*, Second Edition, Springfield, 1944.

14 The late Huey Long is reported to have created a new word in the language of rustic Louisiana, the word "damlyingnewspapers." By instilling in his followers contempt for the "capitalist" press, he got them to the point where they *disbelieved* anything which they saw in print, and *believed* everything which "Ol' Huey, the Kingfish" himself told them. This operation was technically competent, since one of the most effective means of putting propaganda across is to draw alarmed attention to unfriendly propaganda and then just "happening to mention" the "truth" (that is, the promoted side). Long attributed to the newspapers a large number of lies which they did not print, along with the "lies" (which were in historical fact true) that they *did* actually print. Since most of his followers either boycotted the press or read it in a hostile frame of mind, they never found out whether the newspapers said what Huey said they said,

or not. You can try this out on your neighbors or friends by making up some idiotic "quotation" (such as, "The Jewish *Vorwaerts* says that pickled onions are a cause of immorality" or "*Le Temps* of Paris says that Alaska is preparing to secede") and the listener will be so busy scoffing at *what* the paper allegedly said that he will take no time to find out whether the paper *did* say it or not. Such attributions occur in everyday life; the smart propagandist attributes plenty of rich, ripe, silly quotations to his opponent. How many people actually *know* what the Communists have said on any given topic? Or bother to check on the actual claims of the Zionist organization? Or the statements of the Arabs in Palestine?

15 The literature in this field is carefully described in two volumes by a three-man team consisting of Harold D. Lasswell, Ralph D. Casey and Bruce Lannes Smith, the first being *Propaganda and Promotional Activities, An Annotated Bibliography*, Minneapolis, 1935, and the sequel being *Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion, A Comprehensive Reference Guide*, Princeton, 1946. The booklists provide material in plenty for any academic-minded inquirer. The essays in the two volumes are well worth reading, although the authors have undergone the professorial delight of inventing a private language of their own. Parts of the latter book, especially, read like proceedings out of an unfamiliar lodge meeting; but there is sound sense and acute observation behind the vocabulary. It must, however, be parenthetically noted that during World War II the key propaganda jobs were held by a radio commentator, a dramatist, a newspaperman, a New York banker, and an absolutely astonishing number of men from commercial radio—along, of course, with a sprinkling of Army and Navy officers in Washington, and a heavy majority of non-specialist officers in the field. The propaganda experts were not, in most instances, called in to do the actual chore of propaganda. Among the exceptions were Leonard W. Doob, author of *Propaganda, Its Psychology and Technique*, New York, 1935, who served in the War Department's Psychological Warfare Branch and in the Washington propaganda center at OWI; C. A. H. Thomson, who served as a propaganda staff officer both in Washington and overseas after being a collaborator with the Lasswell group; and Drs. Edwin Guthrie and A. L. Edwards, whose chapter "Psychological Warfare" in [E. G. Boring, editor] *Psychology for the Fighting Man*, Washington, 1943, pp. 430-447, is a lucid epitome of the topic.

16 This means that if you want to get baptised, you've got to get *all* the way under the water or it doesn't count.

17 See Doob's book, mentioned above, especially pages 71 through 89 and 413 through 417.

18 See the bibliographies by Harold Lasswell and others, mentioned above, for a wealth of literature giving more technical and scientific breakdowns than this. The formula STASM represents what was actually used in preparation of up-to-the-minute propaganda spot analysis for the War Department General Staff by Propaganda Branch during World War II. Some further aspects of this formula are presented in my article, "Stasm: Psychological Warfare and Literary Criticism" in *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 46, No. 3, July 1947, pp. 344-348.

19 See Harold Lasswell's *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, New York, reissue 1938, Chapter II, "Propaganda Organization," for a description of the attempts to coordinate policy and propaganda in World War I.

20 Chicago, 1946. The discussion of what censorship authorities regarded as propaganda material possessing value for the enemy, of the wartime OC-OWI relationship, and of censorship of short-wave broadcasts are of particular interest to the student of psychological warfare.

21 In a somewhat different context, it is interesting to note that Chinese Protestant churches, made up of Chinese church members, like to hire ministers who mouth their Chinese with a strong American accent. The American missionaries established the American accent as part of the liturgical paraphernalia of Protestantism, and the Chinese preachers trained under them accepted the American mispronouncing of Chinese as a part of the religion. It is odd to see a church full of Chinese using absolutely unbelievable tones while singing hymns or making appropriate individual responses. At that, they are no funnier than the Chinese Buddhists, who memorize long Indian sutras without understanding a single syllable.

22 On World War I, see Harold Lasswell's *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, previously cited; George Creel's *How We Advertised America*, New York and London, 1920, the very title of which is an indication of its chief shortcoming; Lt. Col. W. Nicolai, *Nachrichtendienst, Presse und Volksstimmung im Weltkrieg*, Berlin, 1920, by the German general staff officer chiefly responsible for staff work on propaganda and public opinion, a very thoughtful though prejudiced book; Heber Blankenhorn's enjoyable little classic, *Adventures in Propaganda*, Boston, 1919 (Blankenhorn was the only American officer to see field service in propaganda in both wars, as a Captain in I and a Lieutenant Colonel in II); and George G. Bruntz' scholarly monograph *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire* in 1918, Stanford, 1938. Readers desiring

further references should consult the bibliographies by Lasswell, Casey and Smith, cited above.

23 Colonel Nicolai, book cited in footnote 1, pages 160-161.

24 For a pro-Hitler view of the world, see Wyndham Lewis' *Hitler*, London, 1931, if a copy is to be found. The author would probably prefer for the book to disappear. It is an eloquent, very pro-Nazi book, putting the Hitlerite terminology into the English language and—what is more important—infusing into the clumsy German pattern of thinking-and-feeling a lightness of touch which makes Naziism more palatable. The book converted no one in its time, and is not apt to do harm at this late date; but it will make the English-reading reader understand some of the novelty, the revolutionary freshness, the bold unorthodoxy which made millions of people turn to Hitlerism as an escape from the humdrum heartbreak of Weimar Germany. Much of the book is devoted to the problem of power—street-fighting, mass demonstrations, slogans, symbolisms—which so fascinated the Nazis.

25 See Carl J. Friedrich, *The New Belief in the Common Man*, Brattleboro (Vermont), 1945, chapter III, "Independence of Thought and Propaganda," pp. 81-120, for a cogent discussion of this mentality. The present author, in *Government in Republican China*, New York, 1938, pp. 18-23, describes in epitome the method whereby the ancient Confucian leadership of China, while propaganda-conscious, used ideology as an economical, stable method of control and avoided its maleficent features. In one of the few poorly argued passages of a great work, Arnold J. Toynbee overlooks this peculiar characteristic of Confucianism and merely equates the Confucian dogma with those of other "universal churches" (*A Study of History*, London, 1939, vol. V, especially pages 654-5).

26 People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotzkyite Centre ..., Verbatim Report*, Moscow, 1937, page 111. These trials were themselves propaganda; in this particular instance, propaganda of a rather poor order, since they failed to convince the foreign public and presumably persuaded only those portions of the Russian public who were so gullible that they needed no further persuading. For a brilliant illumination of them in terms of a readable novel, see Arthur Koestler, *Darkness at Noon*, New York, 1941; the same author also has a book of essays on the totalitarian mentality under the rather fancy title, *The Yogi and the Commissar*, New York, 1945. On the same subject, see Louis Fischer's *Men and Politics*, New York, 1942.

27 This document establishing the COI, along with the other major documents pertaining to American psychological warfare, may be found in J. P. Warburg's book cited above, *Unwritten Treaty*.

28 In the course of a routine day of work on overseas propaganda in 1942, the author, who was then in SSG of MIS, found it necessary to get in touch with Military Intelligence proper, Naval Intelligence, the State Department, the office of the Assistant to the President, the Office of Facts and Figures, the British Political Warfare group (which was vainly seeking its American opposite number), the Office of Civilian Defense, the Research and Analysis Branch of the office of the Coordinator of Information, the office of the Librarian of Congress, the Foreign Information Service, and the Department of Agriculture. Each of these either operated propaganda, or had policy or intelligence contributions to make. The Board of Economic Warfare naturally came into the field too. This was during a period of German and Japanese victories, so that even if propaganda had been coordinated, it probably would not have been much more effective than it was. From what could be figured out later, no real harm was done at this time. Nor was much achieved.

29 The bibliographies are cited above, on page 38. The journal comes out, as its title indicates, four times a year; it is published by the School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. Every major library has it. The review section provides a good survey of new writing in the field. Journals such as *The American Political Science Review*, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *The Infantry Journal*, and *The American Historical Review* often have significant articles or book reviews in this field. *International Affairs* (Royal Institute for International Affairs, London) has excellent reviews of books arranged by geographic subheads. Opinion and propaganda topics are usually lumped together in academic studies; material on the one is apt to lead to the other.

30 San Tzu Ching, translated and annotated by Herbert A. Giles, Shanghai, 1910, pages 2 and 3. The translation quoted is not by Giles.

31 On the transmitting side, nothing could be more ruinous than mere translation, the more literal the worse, of a single basic broadcast for all audiences irrespective of language or culture. For the text of war communiqués or of official documents, this is permissible, but for news or feature broadcasts, few things could be worse. It is not possible to translate subtle psychological appeals embedded in news or commentary; such materials by their nature must follow forms acceptable to the audience, building up

confidence with familiar allusions and creating a sense of "we-ness" between the actual announcer and his listeners. Equivalents can be worked out. The same basic policies can be transposed. The same source of news and intelligence can be exploited. But the actual program cannot be translated verbatim from one language to another; it must be transposed not only from one language but from one culture to another.

32 Free advertisement.

33 Bad news about his side is not necessarily the only kind of bad news for the enemy to know. Gloomy news about our side can harm the enemy listener if his government is running a propaganda campaign to raise production, promote thrift, etc., by claiming things are worse on *their* side. In such a case, good news about us would be good for him. News must be fitted to the propaganda plan and to the propaganda situation.

34 Walter Lippmann's book, *Public Opinion*, was first published in New York in 1922 but it is still clean-cut as a basic statement of the problems of public opinion. The author's own life as a commentator is remarkable in fulfilling the mission which he implicitly set himself when writing about public opinion: the job of lifting issues into emotional and psychological contexts in which the resulting judgment will be based on socially sound factors.

35 The American newspapers between 1942 and 1945 carried intermittent accounts of these personal and political problems, frequently in the columns of commentators rather than in the regular news sections. (The book by Warburg is of course *Unwritten Treaty*, mentioned above.)

36 For popular histories of the OSS, see *Sub Rosa: The O.S.S. and American Espionage* by Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden (New York, 1946) or Corey Ford and Alastair MacBain, *Cloak and Dagger* (New York 1946). An exciting thriller novel by Darwin Teilhet gives an oblique and guarded description of black propaganda and clandestine polling: *The Fear Makers* (New York, 1945); Teilhet was himself in OSS. For an interesting description of OSS field operations, see Nicol Smith's *Into Siam* (New York, 1946). OSS was picturesque from the very start, and it is likely that other participants in OSS work will from time to time bring out books on their adventures.

37 Bureau of the Budget, *United states Government Manual, 1946, First Edition*, Washington, 1946, says of the Military Intelligence Division, "It has charge of propaganda and psychological warfare" (page 198). The fiat may be a little more precise than circumstances

warrant, but it at least shows where, for the record, psychological warfare belonged.

38 See Charles E. Merriam's study, *Political Power*, Chicago, 1933, and his later works for suggestive approaches to the political setting of propaganda problems. He developed the terms miranda and credenda for modern political science usage.

39 While this statement is plainly a matter of individual opinion, the author considers that his own experience supports his opinion in this instance. He wrote plans on almost every operating level in the governmental and military hierarchy during World War II, all the way from drafting plans for the Joint (American) and Combined (British-American) Chiefs of Staff down to helping field agents in the China Theater work out practical little propaganda plans for their own missions, or planning the writing, use, and classification of leaflets one by one, in collaboration with OWI operators. He found planning to be fascinating at the top, and worthwhile at the bottom of the pyramid, but he found no significant correlation between the top and the bottom, save in the sense which he makes plain.

40 In the pseudo-technical propaganda slang of the OWI people, this was called "spelling out." The same people "stockpiled" "campaigns" to "needle" the enemy.

41 So far as he knows, the author was the first—about May of 1942—to urge that a surrender pass be made to look like an official document, with banknote-type engraving and with formal style. Unfortunately, it was printed in green, instead of the old-fashioned orange-gold of the U.S. Treasury yellowbacks, and was sent to the jungle areas of the South and Southwest Pacific, where everything was green to start with.

42 These suggestions are based on the comment of Major Martin Herz, who prepared the leaflets at Anzio beachhead and subsequently was leaflet expert at SHAEF.

43 No author, publisher, place or date. Issued by the unit. The reference is to page 55.

44 The Department of the Army is understood to be preparing a Field Manual and Technical Manual for Psychological Warfare which will describe the doctrines and the equipment, respectively, to be used in combat propaganda situations.

45 In the postwar period a great many reflective publications began to appraise what had happened in the PsyWar field. One of the best of these is Daniel Lerner's *Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D-Day to VE-Day* (New York, 1949), which covers the

European operation in detail. This was followed by *Propaganda in War and Crisis*, edited by Daniel Lerner (New York, 1951). A heavier work, covering many of the same problems is *The Language of Politics*, by Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites and associates (New York, 1949). Leonard Doob's work on propaganda, long the leading American text in the field, was issued in a revised, postwar edition (New York, 1948); the postwar book does much to put "psychological warfare" in perspective. A simpler text than Doob's, useful for less advanced students, is Frederick C. Irion's *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York, 1950). A manual directly pertaining to psychological warfare is *America's Weapons of Psychological Warfare* edited by Robert E. Summers (New York, 1951); this also contains a bibliography which is helpful to the layman. Three outstanding works summarize the postwar propaganda position of the U.S. Government: Charles A. H. Thomson's *Overseas Information Service of the United States Government* (Washington, 1950) shows the continuity of the problem from war to peace; Wallace Carroll's *Persuade or Perish* (Boston, 1948) argues the necessity of maintaining an opinion offensive; and Edward Barrett's illuminating discussion, *Truth is Our Weapon* (New York, 1953), brings the story down to the Eisenhower Administration.

46 New insights into the nature of the Soviet antagonist were presented by three related monographs originally prepared inside RAND Corporation, the research facility which often works with the U.S. Air Force. Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (New York, 1951), digests Soviet fundamentals of international behavior. Margaret Mead's *Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority* (New York, 1951) applies anthropological and psychiatric methods of analysis; this book, to the military or general reader, should be prefaced by reading her distinguished work, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*, which is now available in an inexpensive, paper-bound reprint (Mentor Books, New York, 1952). Philip Selznick makes the point that organization is itself a Communist power-achieving instrument in his *The Organizational Weapon* (New York, 1952), the third of the RAND group. Lt. Col. William R. Kintner, a Regular Army officer, prepared the challenging study of the specific military content of Communist thinking in *The Front is Everywhere* (Norman, Oklahoma, 1950). Among the many good recent books about the Communist challenge, R.N. Carew Hunt, *The Theory and Practice of Communism* (New York, 1951), is outstanding for its dispassionateness while James Burnham's *The Coming Defeat of Communism* (New York, 1951) is a ringing appeal to our side to meet the challenge. Stefan T. Possony, in *A Century of Conflict* (Chicago, 1953), presents the most coldly damning and

most far-ranging critique of Communist operations which this writer has seen. Willmoore Kendall rendered Americans a service with his careful translation, editing and introduction of A. Rossi, *A Communist Party in Action* (New Haven, 1949), while Bob Darke, in a British counterpart, gives a less intellectual and much abbreviated description of the British Communist set-up and operations in *The Communist Technique in Britain* (London, 1952). Communist revelations of "capitalist" conspiracies which tell more about the haunted, anxious, nasty minds of the Communists than about our own operations are, among others, L. Natarajan, *American Shadow Over India* (Bombay, 1952), and Jean Cathala, *They are Betraying Peace* (Moscow, 1951).

47 Paul M. A. Linebarger, "Communism as a Competing Civilization in Southeast Asia," a contribution to *Southeast Asia in the Coming World*, Philip W. Thayer, editor (Baltimore, 1952).

48 For a contrary point of view, see the works by Harry Stack Sullivan, Brock Chisholm, and others.

49 Problematical in all such attempts of working officers to define "victory" is the serious intellectual issue of avoiding means which by themselves defeat the ends which are sought. If the means are "dangerous" or "immoral" by the standards of the society which applies them, their value becomes low indeed. For the covert side of U.S. operations, see the breezy and popular volumes on OSS: Lt. Col. Corey Ford and Major Alastair MacBain, *Cloak and Dagger: The Secret Story of OSS* (New York, 1946); Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, *Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage* (New York, 1946); and the most vividly concrete narration of the group, Elizabeth P. MacDonald, *Undercover Girl* (New York, 1947). For an astonishing work which seems to violate security on every page, see Commander Roy Olin Stratton, *SACO—The Rice Paddy Navy* (Pleasantville, N. Y., 1950); this is the description of a Navy group in China which the author shows to be more covert than OSS itself. A dry, German view of Anglo-American espionage in Holland is given in that superb, true-life adventure story, H. J. Giskes, *London Calling North Pole* (London and New York, 1953).

50 See the works of Freda Utley, Herbert Feis, the Linebarger-Djang-Burks political science text (New York, 1954), and others, not to mention the contributions by Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i, and other Communist leaders.

51 The author himself pleads guilty to having criticized the French unduly without accepting a reasonable share of U.S. responsibility for the situation in Indochina (Paul M. A. Linebarger, "Indochina: The Bleeding War," *Combat Forces Journal*, March 1951), and was

deservedly rebuked from some French readers for his denigration of French imperialism. The author cannot endorse as wise, shrewd, or kind the French political decisions in Indochina, hut he can say that the Americans who made (or failed to make) basic policy concerning that area have been as irresponsible and foolish as the French. He trusts that, by the time this note reaches print, a more effectual Franco-American understanding will have replaced the previous difficulties.

52 Psychological warfare is, of course, neither very psychological nor is it necessarily warfare. Indeed, within the context of a rigidly purist and scholastic definition, psychological warfare is not psychological, in that most of its operations are very definitely *not* a part of present-day scientific psychology. Neither is it *warfare* because it can be operated before war, during war, after war, or contemporaneously with and apart from war. As pointed out above, war involves the inescapable content of public lawful *violence*. It is hard to ascribe violence to a short-wave broadcast or to a leaflet. In Korea in 1951 the author heard that a Chinese soldier was found dead—mashed by a leaflet bomb which had failed to explode at the proper altitude. If this story is true, that particular soldier was one of the few genuine *war* victims of military or strategic propaganda both so pretentiously called "psychological warfare" by Americans of the mid-twentieth century.

Anthony Leviero, who summarized American PsyWar in *The New York Times* in a series of articles between 9 December and 14 December 1951, is both an experienced general staff officer and a first-class newspaper man. His comment in 1953 on the new Operations Coordinating Board was encouraging or ominous. He stated in his *Times* dispatch of 4 September 1953 that the William Jackson committee had found that "psychological warfare did not exist as such." If this meant that the new OCB was to sweep aside the limitations of top-secret pedantic definitions and move toward a refreshingly concrete manipulation of the world scene, the news was encouraging indeed. If the new Board was, however, to be dedicated to the manufacture of new, complicated and secret definitions of its own, the news was bad. Given the time-lag on the declassification of Government materials, it may be twenty-five years, or 1978, before the precise definitions of 1953 are available to the public. The tendency of the Board to succeed or to fail will be evident by the time this material is in print; given the personalities involved, the prognosis appeared optimistic.

53 This kind of issue has not been neglected in our public discussions or our schools. Two sides of one famous case are given in Owen Lattimore, *Ordeal by Slander* (New York, 1951) and the

bitterly anti-Lattimore book by John T. Flynn, *The Lattimore Story* (New York, 1953). A serious intelligent attempt to answer some of the problems posed by PsyWar and the resulting loyalty issues within a democracy are the works of Nathaniel Weyl, *Treason: The Story of Disloyalty and Betrayal in American History* (Washington, 1950), and *The Battle Against Disloyalty* (New York, 1951). A formidable presentation of what the Communists are doing is offered in Ralph de Toledano, *Spies, Dupes, and Diplomats* (New York and Boston, 1952) and in Major General Charles A. Willoughby, *Shanghai Conspiracy* (New York, 1952). The kind of round-table often intellectually conceived and executed within American schools is well portrayed in the special issue of *Columbia Journal of International Affairs* (New York, spring, 1951), in which the entire issue is given to a synthesis of international problems in the propaganda field under the heading "Propaganda and World Politics." Stefan Possony's magistral *A Century of Conflict* (Chicago, 1953) provides an excellent general framework.

54 Nothing in previous U.S. experience prepared Americans for the invasion of the individual personality which has long been accomplished by the Communists but which was first publicized in adequate fashion after the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. The pioneer book in this field, and still the best, is Edward Hunter's *Brain-Washing in Red China* (New York, 1951). This author has known Mr. Hunter for twenty-odd years and can vouch for him as a man with a sober respect for fact, though he does have a vivid taste in adjectives; he has seen not only Mr. Hunter but has gone over some of the raw material which Hunter used and can testify to the reality and sympathy with which Hunter portrays this rather gruesome process. On a different scale, Wilbur Schramm has given a description of what happens when *The Reds Take a City* (New Brunswick, 1951), in a book of that name written jointly with John W. Riley.

55 A sharp contrast between the old politics and the new is shown by the unfortunate book prepared in the Department of State and now hastily, even guiltily, allowed to go out of print by the United States Government Printing Office because it showed that some Americans were guilty or naïve enough to try to love and trust the Soviet state within the same system as our own. One does not know whether to laugh or to weep at the spectacle of men lamenting the fact that they were once innocent and hopeful. The book, prepared by the late Harley Notter and others, is Department of State Publication 3580, General Policy Series 15, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation* (Washington, 1949). That not all was innocence, even when things so seemed, is amply attested by Freda Utley's

controversial but brilliant summary, *The China Story* (Chicago, 1951).

56 The function of decision-making has been brilliantly though solemnly explored in Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, *Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (Princeton, N.J., 1954.)

57 For a contrary point of view, see *Tensions That Lead to War*, edited by Hadley Cantril (Princeton, 1950).

58 The author had the opportunity of observing opsearch in the Korean war on three different occasions: September 1950, March 1951, and November and December 1952 and early January 1953. He visited Korea itself twice and also spent a great deal of time, part of it in a public capacity and part of it as a free-lance author, in the periphery of that war—areas such as Hong Kong, Indochina, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, and India.

59 Several novels have touched on PsyWar problems. The most hard-hitting of the lot is Jerome Weidman, *Too Early to Tell* (New York, 1946). Covert PsyWar whispering techniques are thinly disguised and much improved, technically, in Darwin Teilhet, *The Fear Makers* (New York, various dates). The covert side of some of these adventures is portrayed, among others, by W. Stanley Moss, *A War of Shadows* (New York, 1952); Ray Franklin Kauffman, *The Coconut Wireless* (New York, 1948); and Chin Kee Onn, *Silent Army* (New York, 1953). As exciting as fiction are Mark Gayn and John Caldwell, *American Agent* (New York, 1947), describing the work of an enthusiastic amateur, and L. C. Moyzisch, *Operation Cicero* (New York reprint, 1952), portraying a first-class professional. Alexander Foote, *Handbook for Spies* (London, 1949), and J. V. Davidson-Houston, *Armed Pilgrimage* (London 1949), are interesting distillations of personal experience which touch on espionage and PsyWar.

60 The author professes he would like to write a preliminary work on this subject himself some day, if no one else essays the task first.

61 V = Victory day.

62 Edward Hunter, *Brain-Washing in Red China* (New York, 1951).

63 If one good book can be mentioned without prejudice to the many other good books in the same field, attention can be drawn to the excellent undergraduate text which explores the present U.S. position on the press, George I. Bird and Frederic E. Merwin, *The Press and Society* (New York, 1951). At the opposite end of the spectrum, see Oleg Anesimov, *The Ultimate Weapon* (New York,

1953). The first book takes the U.S. as it is and does not envisage profound responses coming as the inevitable accompaniment of frightful change; the second book states the outside problem in shocking terms, but asks of Americans things which neither they nor their press are ever apt to approve.

64 The development of this activity was handed to the Chief of Army Field Forces, in whose G2 section Colonel Donald Hall was the PsyWar officer. The first of these courses with its supporting textbook was not ready for release by the Army General School until 1949, just one year before the Korean conflict began. In 1949 likewise appeared the first officially approved Army field manual on the subject of psychological warfare support of military operations.

65 Teams from this detachment, armed with leaflets and loudspeakers, were sent to and participated in major maneuvers in continental United States, in the Caribbean area, and in Hawaii. These teams were attached to the "enemy" forces, and exposed the maneuver troops to military propaganda in action. The Tactical Information Detachment suddenly suspended its planning of simulated propaganda operations for Exercise Pluto in 1950. As the only PsyWar operational unit in the Army, the Detachment was hustled off to Korea.

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(Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941)

A Syllabus of Psychological Warfare

(Washington: War Department General Staff, 1946)

Psychological Warfare in ROTC Senior Manual

(Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1948)

Far Eastern Governments and Politics

(with Djang Chu and Ardath Burks;

New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1954)

Transcriber's Notes:

The following changes have been made:

1. In the context of "the unprofessional guttersnipe Hitler was ruining the wonderful

German Army in amateurish campaigns" stood "raining" instead of "ruining".

2. The list of further works by the same author was moved from the beginning to the end of the book.
3. In the index, the reference for the entry "Indonesia, fighting in," was changed from 257-258 to 257-259, and reference for the entry "Results of PsyWar," from 327 to 307.

Retained error: While the list of charts mentions a "Chart X", no such chart was contained in the book. The entry has been retained, though.

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The Warriors of
FREEDOM
Have Landed !
Patriots of the Philippines :—
American and Philippine forces are liberating your country from Japanese oppression. Enemy air, land and sea forces have already suffered heavy reverses in the Leyte area.
As our landings continue, it is essential that our bombers and fleet prepare the way
We do not want to injure a single Filipino. During the period from the 15th of December to the 8th of January follow these instructions carefully: —
Stay away from the Japanese troops and any place where they are gathered together.
Avoid all buildings, dumps, airstrips, and bridges used by the Japanese.
And most important of all, at the first sign of our landing, move away from the beaches. Move inland as far as possible.
For your own safety compiy with this request.

back

„I ASSURE YOU AGAIN AND AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT NO AMERICAN BOYS WILL BE SACRIFICED ON FOREIGN BATTLEFIELDS."
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, OCT. 31, 1940

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

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Passierschein

(GÜLTIG FÜR EINEN ODER MEHRERE ÜBERBRINGER)

Der deutsche Soldat, der diesen Passierschein vorzeigt, benutzt ihn als Zeichen seines ehrlichen Willens, sich zu ergeben. Er ist zu entwaffnen. Er muß gut behandelt werden. Er hat Anspruch auf Verpflegung und, wenn nötig, ärztliche Behandlung. Er wird so bald wie möglich aus der Gefahrenzone entfernt.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Oberbefehlshaber
der Alliierten Streitkräfte

Übersetzung nachstehend. Sie dient als Anweisung an die alliierten Vorposten.

SAUF CONDUIT

Le soldat porteur de ce laissez-passer a sincèrement l'intention de cesser le combat. Il doit être désarmé et correctement traité. Il doit être nourri et recevoir les soins médicaux nécessaires. Il sera éloigné dès que possible de la zone dangereuse.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Commandant Suprême,
des Forces Interalliées

SAFE CONDUCT

The German soldier who carries this safe conduct is using it as a sign of his genuine wish to give himself up. He is to be disarmed, to be well looked after, to receive food and medical attention as required and to be removed from the danger zone as soon as possible.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Supreme Commander,
Allied Expeditionary Force

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

जरा देखो खाने पीनेके सामानोंका अंग्रेज कैसी बेपरवा के साथ इस्तेमाल कर रहे हैं, पर हिंदुस्तानी खाने पीनेके सामानोंके न होनेसे भूखसे मारे जा रहे।

back

3. Bartania Hindustan ka kaprha pehnta hai
4. Bartania Hindustan se sakht nafrat karta hai.
5. Is Bartania ke khilaf Japan ne jang cherhi.
6. Phir Japan kia hai?
7. Japan naqabil majlise aqwam se bahar nikal aya.
9. Chin ko Bartanwi aur Amriki phande se bachaya.
10 Philippine ko Azadi di.
HAMARA SATH DO

[back]

AAZAD HIND KI AARZI HOKUMAT QAEM HOGAI
BARTANIA AUR AMRICA KE KHELAF ALLAN IANG KAR DIA.
11. Burma ko bhi Azadi ai.
12 Nippon unke sath beth kar khata hai
13 Nippon unke sath milkar kam karta hai.
14. Japan asia ko mushtarka khush-hali ki jaga banae ga jokih Amriki aur Bartanwi iradon ko Khilaf hai.
15 Iske bad Subhas Chandra Bose Rangoon men aae aur Azad Hindustan ki Azad Hind Fauj banai
16. Azad Hindustan ki arzi hokumat bhi banai gai jisko Japan No puri tareh man lia.
17. Jab bohar ka dabao Hindustan ke andar qaumi josh se mile ga.
18. Tab Hindustan ki Azadi asli manim milegi jabkeh Bartania Hind se bahar nikala jega.
19. Apke lie yehi mauqa hai phir kabi na aegi.
20. Azadi ke lie uth khare ho.

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FÜR HITLER UND PARTEI STERBEN—

ODER FÜR HEIMAT UND FAMILIE LEBEN??

ENTSCHEIDET EUCH!!

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FÜR DEUTSCHE TRUPPEN AUF KRETA UND DEN AEGAEISCHEN INSELN

ΔΟΣΤΕ ΤΟ ΕΤΟΥΣ ΓΕΡΜΑΝΟΥΣ

Vertrieb: Die K.A.F. 11.10.1944

CHURCHILL UND EDEN IN MOSKAU

Begleitet von ihren militärischen Ratgebern, treffen Churchill und Eden in Moskau ein, um mit Stalin und Molotov Besprechungen abzuhalten.

WIEDER 1.100 "FLIEGENDE FESTUNGEN" UEBER DEUTSCHLAND. UNTER DEN ZIELEN WAREN: SCHWEINFURT, KOBLENZ UND MAINZ.

AACHEN VOR DER EINKESSELUNG

Durch das grossangelegte Umgehungsmanöver der Alliierten ist Aachen fast eingeschlossen. Den deutschen Truppen in Aachen steht nur noch ein 2½ km breiter Rückzugsweg offen. Im Rahmen ihres Umgehungsmanövers besetzten die alliierten Truppen Schaufenberg, 1½ km östlich von Alsdorf.

GROSSE RUSSISCHE OFFENSIVE IM NORDEN DER OSTFRONT

Die Rote Armee ist im Baltikum auf breiter Front durchgebrochen. Die russischen Verbände rückten auf 300 km breiter Front in den letzten 4 Tagen 100 km weit vor. Die Armee General Bagramyans steht dadurch nur noch 70 km vor Memel während der Durchbruch General Chernichowskis die gesamte deutsche Armee im Norden der Ostfront abzuschneiden droht.

Neue alliierte Landung in der Scheldte Mündung

Im Rücken der an der Scheldte Mündung stehenden deutschen Truppen, in der Nähe von Terneuzen, führten britische und kanadische Verbände eine erfolgreiche Landung durch. Es gelang diesen Truppen, die von der See aus landeten, zwei kleine Brückenköpfe, in der Gegend von Hoofdplatt, 8 km westlich von Terneuzen zu errichten.

THE HOME TELEGRAM

N. 1 A Weekly for American Soldiers

BEWARE! THIS LITTLE SHEET COMES FROM JERRY

It contains pure, pure poison (?) and mostly things which you are not supposed to know - if your superiors back home have their own way. But why shouldn't you get the opinion of both sides in this war? It's good American tradition to listen to both sides. Anyhow, interesting subjects come up for discussion in this sheet, « inside dope » which you might want to know. To render this service in an unbiased form is the purpose of this little weekly sheet.

It is making an effort - across the fronts - to unmask and expose the war propaganda which has set one nation against another for the profit of a few parasites.

If you are a good American, and we have no doubt you are, you will be fair and give the other side a chance to present its case. For after all you are expected to give your life or your health for a certain cause which has been presented to you as a worthy one. What is it? Is it worth fighting for? Is it worth giving your life for, making your wife a widow, your children orphans and leaving sad parents or perhaps a girl who is hoping for your return?

Consider these questions in the light of the information contained in this sheet. As our testimony may still be considered prejudiced, we shall as far as possible cite American and British sources of information and then give - in an impartial way - our comments if necessary.

We hope you will like the little sheet although it comes to you from that much-abused National-Socialist opposite you.

Yours for a better understanding between front line soldiers.

The Editor

New German fighter is jet propelled twin engined

A new German twin-engined jet propelled plane the Messerschmitt 262, has been in action against American airmen.

It is a heavily armoured single-seater fighter with two jet propulsion units instead of screws.

It is the second new type recently encountered by American pilots over Germany.

Allied schedule delayed

« The man in the street » in the United States is confused about the political and military situation and he is quite worried about developments on the Western Front », a Spanish correspondent reported from New York. No information is available so far regarding the fate of the 1st US Army because a rigid censorship has been clamped down on any news about the German offensive. Competent military circles in Washington have stated it was quite possible that the Allied schedule might now be delayed by a quarter of a year, added the correspondent.

The Big Push on the Western Front

(by a German correspondent)

Stockholm, Jan. 6, 1945

The fact of Germany have been occupied for quite some time with the theoretical task of parcelling out amongst themselves the provinces of that country and with Arbeiter about the plan to deport millions of Germa men and women to the prison camps of Siberia and the Russian Arctic Zone as slave laborers.

It seems the Germans meanwhile paid no attention to such schemes but after having succeeded in offering resistance on or near the German border they worked day and night for their offensive which started on December 16th.

The above is the consensus of opinion of the neutral press of the world which naturally is not allowed to appear in print in American newspapers because it does not « fit » into the usual Allied propaganda for home consumption about that « weak German opponent ».

The « Manchester Guardian », however, printed the truth the other day when stating:

« The Germans have succeeded in smashing the starting points of the Americans for their planned Super-Offensive ».

The following pertinent facts are furthermore recognized as true here, in the Swedish capital:

1. The Allied Commander-in-Chief was taken by surprise.

2. The front of the 1st American Army was completely smashed.

3. The Germans were able to employ crack troops and plenty of reserves. All were very heavily armed with the most modern weapons.

These are simple facts and the sooner they are recognized the better it will be for all those who believed not so long ago that they might be on their way home around Christmas time.

As the situation is now the Allied Command still maintains what is termed a « security silence ». Thus the people turn to German reports. Whether they believe them or not, nearly everybody has learned the following facts:

Eisenhower cannot think of starting another offensive on the western front for at least three to six months according to statements highly-ranking American officers in Washington called to newspapers in neutral countries.

Since the 16th of December when the big German offensive began more than 400 guns and 1500 US tanks or armoured vehicles have been either knocked out or captured. Over 25.000 Americans have been taken prisoner and the casualties are well above 50.000 to date.

The Luftwaffe, believed dead long ago, suddenly appeared in the fighting with strong formations of fighters of the latest design. On January 1st strong formations of German bombers and fighters made a number of surprise raids on Allied airfields in Holland and Belgium destroying 300 aircraft. According to the first reports between 400 and 500 Allied bombers and fighters were destroyed on the ground and 100 more heavily damaged. The airfields and their installations were likewise hit very severely in the course of these large scale air raids. German fighters shot down an additional number of 70 Allied airplanes in fierce air battles.

You may perhaps feel inclined to disbelieve these statements because the news isn't good. But from the « New York Times » article according to a Reuter report from New York of Dec. 22nd:

« The United States got so used to the idea being always victorious that the German counter-offensive with all its dangerous possibilities produced a severe shock. We have been taught the lesson that no war is won until the last shot has been fired ».

Belgian population stays put despite American withdrawal

Speaking on the radio from London December 21st, Robert Barr, a correspondent with the American troops on the new German offensive front gave an interesting description of the circumstances attending the withdrawal of the American troops from the Belgian small towns and villages threatened by the German advance.

The description is interesting not only for what it describes but for what it leaves to be inferred. The townsfolk, he said, gathered around the soldiers in bewildered surprise. « It was rather an awkward position for us, having to answer a flood of questions put to us by the people ». The correspondent did not say the people wept and wrung their hands over the impending departure or wished the departing « liberators » a speedy return. He merely said they were « bewildered » and asked « floods of questions ».

The correspondent went on to say he heard an American soldier about to leave the town saying: « I never thought that would happen to us! » The shops and streets had all been decorated with the Stars and Stripes and other American emblems for Christmas. As the news spread that the American troops were leaving, the people began silently and methodically to remove the decorations from the windows and shops. The correspondent's voice was quite bitter as he went on to say « I wondered how soon the Nazi flags would reappear ». He also pointed out that unlike 1940, these were no refugees. « The people » he said « showed a determination to stay put ».

The last two remarks tell us what we Germans have already known for some time and would like you all to know.

Evidently the people of Belgium have learned something since 1940. They no longer fear the German occupation, they have lived under it for four and a half years. They prefer it to the « freedom » they have been enduring for the last six months, in other words, air bombardments, street fighting in the big towns, civil warfare and a waste and fear « everywhere.

Food Shortage in the U.S.A.

Stockholm, December 30th.

According to the report of the New York correspondent of the « Stockholm Tidningen » the food situation in New York is expected to deteriorate during the coming winter. Already a shortage of poultry has become noticeable which has compelled the government to take drastic measures, such as requisitioning supplies arriving by motor trucks, with the object of ensuring the needs of the Army.

The chief cause of the shortage of poultry is the buying up by black market circles of enormous quantities of poultry in the great breeding districts of Delaware, Maryland and Virginia. They gave very high prices and delivered the poultry to the better class restaurants and to specially privileged households.

Many wives cannot obtain their lawful rations of sugar from the dealers. These latter demand coupons for five pounds in return for the giving out of a single pound of sugar. The surplus coupons are then collected and used to do profitable business on the black market.

For quite some time butter has been very scarce, the same with meat. The available supplies of beef are 20% lower than those of 1943 and pork from 15 to 30% lower.

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

l'Empereur Kou-pi-Lai (Koubilai-Khan) dans une Tour portée par quatre Eléphants au jour de Bataille

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THE Sad Estate OF THE KINGDOM,

Being an account of the first years charge of our Reformation.

It is an old Customs in England *among* Tradesmen, *to Cast up their Books at* Christmas: *After their example I have thought fit to draw up the last years Account of the Kingdom, by way of* Debtor *and* Creditor, *so plainly, that he that runs may read it. They that love* England *I am sure cannot like it, but for that reason they should help to mend it. When they know the* Disease, *it will not be hard to find out the* Cure. *If our misery's do not mend our Hearts, I wish, at least, they may our Understandings.*

Kingdom Debtor,

I. TO the loss of three, of the ten *Commandments*, *Honour thy Father: Thou shalt not Steal: Nor covet any thing that is thy Neighbours:* And those of the Gospel, *Do as you would be done by: Don't do evil that good may come of it, nor reward evil with evil, but love one another.*

II. To the loss of the Doctrine of *Passive-Obedience*, and *Non-resistance*, which first recommended the *Primitive Christians* to the mercy and Protection of Kings and Emperours, and has ever since the Reformation been the *Characteristick* of the Church of England.

III. To the *loss* of an *English King* in the right Line, by the new art of *Abdication*, who with all his faults, was Affable, Sober, Just and diligent; and Innocent of the *main matters* suggested against him.

IV. To the *loss* of *Ireland*, by that means, worth *thirty Millions* of pounds sterling, and the Conveniencies of its *Neighbourhood*, *Trade* and *Ports* for our safety and benefit, *unvaluable*.

V. To *five Millions* expended this year to beat the *French* and recover *Ireland*.

VI. To thirteen Thousand *Souldiers* dead in *Schombourgs* Army, without Sword or Gun, in an unusal and lamentable manner.

To three Thousand Men killed, taken and deserted to *King James*.

To the *loss* of *Dundalk*, *Carlingford*, *James-Town* and *Sligo*, with *four Counties* in *Ulster*, which is the only Province of *Ireland*, where the *English Forces* have any footing.

To eleven Thousand *Souls* that perished in *London-derry* besides many *English* and *Scotch* Inhabitants that dyed of the same deseases in the *North*

VII. To six Thousand *Men* that *died* in *Flanders*, out of the nine Thousand, *forced* into the *Dutch* and *Spanish* service last year against the *French* for helping *King James*.

VIII. To seven Thousand *Sea-men* that died upon the Fleet, of strange distempers.

IX. To five Thousand *Sea-men* taken by the *French*, both upon men of War and Marchant men, notwithstanding our Fleet.

X. To twenty *Men of War taken* and lost: the *value* at least *two hundred thousand pounds*, which is more then has been lost in three *Dutch* Wars.

Kingdom Creditor,

I. TO the *pretence* of preserving us from *Popery and Arbitrary* Government, by reforming abuses in *Elections* of Parliament, *setling* Corporations, *limiting* the Prerogative, and *Securing* our Laws and Liberties against a standing Army, specially of *Foreigners* and *Papists*.

II. To the Doctrines of *Might* is *Right*, and the *Jus Divinum* of the *MOBB*.

III. To a *Dutch King*, such an one as he is, with abundance of new *Lords* and *Officers* of both houses of *Parliament*, that are yet to *deserve* their honour, and *learn* their business.

IV. To a *standing Army* of *Foreigners*, brought in and upheld without advice of Parliament, that will Certainly do as *King William* pleases.

V. To *Schomberg's* success against the *Irish* and *Harbert's* against the *French*, such as it was.

VI. To fifteen Hundred men killed and taken, and a *Thousand Shams* and *Stories* to keep up the Spirits of the People, especially of mighty *Victories*, *Slaughters* and *REVOLTS*, that time has detected with a Vengeance.

VII. To the Dutch-friendship, especially in *Trade*, and that of the *Spaniard* and confederates, though good for little else but to *pick our pockets*.

VIII. To poysoned Victuals, or any thing else *but the hand of God Almighty*.

IX. To five Hundred twenty nine *French* Prisoners taken by us

X. To one small man of War, and two Privateers taken by us; the first of which was *retaken*, and other two lately *destroyed* by the storm at *Plymouth*.

XI. To

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XI. To four Hundred Sail of *Marchant-men* taken by the French, & twenty five loſt by ſtorms, of which nine were driven off of our own Coaſts to *France*, whoſe Hulls and Cargo are valued at two Millions five Hundred Thouſand pounds, many of the Ships being as big as our large fourth rate Frigats.

XII. To thirty Thouſand pounds for pulling down and building up one ſide of *Hampton-Court*, and altering the Gardings, and rebuilding what *fell down*.

XIII. To twenty Thouſand pounds for my Lord *Nottingham* and his houſe, and twenty thouſand more to re-build it, with that which *fell down* of the new building; for it ſeems they have built with *untempered Morter*.

XIV. To the *Navy*, *Army* and *Houſhold* for the moſt part three quarters Sallery *unpayd*.

XV. To the loſs of a great part of *Scotland*, and the *hazard* of the Reſt.

XVI. To the loſs of fifteen Hundred Engliſh, *Horſe and Foot*, in that Kingdom; beſides more Scotch.

XVII. To a whole year loſt in *Trade* and *War*, not to be computed.

XVIII. To two Millions that we are yet in Debt.

XI. To twenty five French prizes taken by us, of *ſmall burden* and *mean loading*,

XII. To a more modiſh apartment with convenient *back Staires*, though the old one had ſerved well enough *eight crowned Heads* in better times, beſides *Cromwell*, that loved it of all places.

XIII. To a Good *Receipt* for the *Priſick*.

XIIII. To ſix Hundred Thouſand pounds ſent to *Holland* for fear of the worſt, and as much more to fetch over *foreign Ships and Troops*, for the better perſerving our Rights and Privileges, Engliſh men not being to be *truſted* in a buſineſs that ſo nearly concerns them.

XV. To the Maintaining of the *Prerogative* of the Crown againſt Scotch *Republicans*, in that OLD Antient Kingdom.

XVI. To the exploits of *Mackay*.

XVII. To our *own folly and Gods Judgments*.

XVIIII. To three ſhillings in the pound, and a new Parliament with more *foreign Forces* and *home Levies*, and forty Thouſand *Bagionets* (inſtead of Dr *Oates* forty Thouſand *black Bills*) now beſpoken, and making; and *ſaddles*, *bridles*, and other furniture coming from *Germany*, by the *Jews* means; for all Nations muſt have a ſhare of us.

The total of loſs in Money	l. Money
Ireland	30000000
Taxes	05000000
Merchants Ships	02500000
Men of War	00200000
Hampton-Court	00030000
Nottingham-houſe	00040000
	37770000

The total of men loſt	Men
By death, in *Schomburgs* Army	13000
Killed, taken and deſerted	03000
Periſhed in *Londonderry*	11000
Dead, deſerted & killed in *Flanders*	06000
Dead in the Fleet	07000
Dead, taken and deſerted in *Scotland*	03000
Men taken by the *French*	05000
	48000

To ballance this, we may perhaps have taken and deſtroyed, in all, three Thouſand of our Enemies, got twenty five Sale of ſmall Craft, worth twenty Thouſand pound at the moſt, but remain a moſt ſick Army in *Ireland*, the *aſtoniſhment* of all beholders and *a mutinous*, *tattered* and *diſeaſed Fleet ſtill*.

Hear you ſee the firſt years account of our deliverance. *Vaſt Taxes*, *mighty Loſſes*, *great Mortality*, ſo that we have been delivered of more *Men*, *Money* and *Ships*, then our *Civil* and *Dutch* Wars formerly coſt us, inſomuch as they that ſee not the *heavy* hand of God upon us, are blind to providence; our ſufferings in *Intereſt*, as well as *Reputation*, having ſurpaſſed all remedy as well as example, unleſs we ſpeedily repent of our impiety to God, our Injuſtice to our King and our malice againſt one another.

FINIS.

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Addreſs to the Soldiers.

GENTLEMEN,

YOU are about to embark for *America*, to compel your Fellow Subjects there to ſubmit to POPERY and SLAVERY.

It is the Glory of the Britiſh Soldier, that he is the *Defender*, not the *Deſtroyer*, of the Civil and Religious Rights of the People. The *Engliſh* Soldiery are immortalized in Hiſtory, for their Attachment to the Religion and Liberties of their Country.

When King JAMES the Second endeavoured to introduce the Roman-catholic Religion and arbitrary Power into *Great Britain*, he had an Army encamped on *Hounſlow-Heath*, to terrify the People. Seven Biſhops were ſeized upon, and ſent to the Tower. But they appealed to the Laws of their Country, and were ſet at Liberty. When this News reached the Camp, the Shouts of Joy were ſo great, that they re-echoed in the Royal Palace. This, however, did not quite convince the King, of the Averſion of the Soldiers to be the Inſtruments of Oppreſſion againſt their Fellow Subjects. He therefore made another Trial. He ordered the Guards to be drawn up, and the Word was given, that thoſe who did not chuſe to ſupport the King's Meaſures, ſhould ground their Arms. When, behold, to his utter Confuſion, and their eternal Honour—the whole Body grounded their Arms.

You, Gentlemen, will ſoon have an Opportunity of ſhewing equal Virtue. You will be called upon to imbrue your Hands in the Blood of your Fellow Subjects in *America*, becauſe they will not admit to be Slaves, and are alarmed at the Eſtabliſhment of Popery and Arbitrary Power in one Half of their Country.

Whether you will draw thoſe Swords which have defended them againſt their Enemies, to butcher them into a Reſignation of their Rights, which they hold as the Sons of *Engliſhmen*, is in your Breaſts. That you will not ſtain the Laurels you have gained from *France*, by dipping them in Civil Blood, is every good Man's Hope.

Arts will no doubt be uſed to perſuade you, that it is your Duty to obey Orders; and that you are ſent upon the juſt and righteous Errand of cruſhing Rebellion. But your own Hearts will tell you, that the People may be ſo ill treated, as to make Reſiſtance neceſſary. You know, that Violence and Injury offered from one Man to another, has always ſome Pretence of Right or Reaſon to juſtify it. So it is between the People and their Rulers.

Therefore, whatever hard Names and heavy Accuſations may be beſtowed upon your Fellow Subjects in *America*, be aſſured they have not deſerved them; but are driven, by the moſt cruel Treatment, into Deſpair. In this Deſpair they are compelled to defend their Liberties, after having tried, in Vain, every peaceable Means of obtaining Redreſs of their manifold Grievances.

Before God and Man they are right.

Your Honour then, Gentlemen, as Soldiers, and your Humanity as Men, forbid you to be the Inſtruments of forcing Chains upon your injured and oppreſſed Fellow Subjects. Remember that your firſt Obedience is due to God, and that whoever bids you ſhed innocent Blood, bids you act contrary to his Commandments.

I am, GENTLEMEN,

your ſincere Well-wiſher,

AN OLD SOLDIER.

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
PROSPECT HILL.
I. Seven Dollars a Month. — —
II. Freſh Proviſions, and in Plenty. — —
III. Health. — — — —
IV. Freedom, Eaſe, Affluence and a good Farm.
BUNKER's HILL.
I. Three Pence a Day.
II. Rotten Salt Pork.
III. The Scurvy.
IV. Slavery, Beggary and Want.

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10
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PESOS
WHAT IS IT WORTH?
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PESO
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JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
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THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
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Ginjang Japan ni Myen mung de nga ai shanhte a hpyen ma ni hpe. ip da let, amying jaw tawn ai gaw "Majan oten e, shahpa, coolie hte ra ai arai ni lu na matu sha Nippon hpyen hpung ni gaw maisau gumhpraw hpe dip shapraw nga ai. Mung masha ni hte ndai gumh praw a lam hpe hkum bawng mu. Ra ai hte maren lang mu."
JINGHPAW NI!
JAPAN NI GAW NANHTE HPE JAI LANG SHANGUN AI, NDAI ZAWN MANU N DAN AI MAISAU GUMHPRAW HPE ALOISHA GALAW LU MA AI.
SHAHPA, COOLIE AMU HTE RA AI ARAI NI GAW SHANHTE GUMHPRAW LU LOI AI DARAM, NANHTE LU YAK NGA MA NIT DAI.
MAWP SHA HKUM HKAM MU!
JAPAN GUMHPRAW KOI GAM MU!

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ASSIGNAT
de CINQ livres.
Série 21385.
PROLÉTAIRES DE TOUS LES PAYS, UNISSEZ-VOUS!
PROLETARI DI TUTTI I PAESI, UNITEVI!
WORKERS OF THE WORLD UNITE!
PROLETARIER ALLER LÄNDER, VEREINIGT EUCH!

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Feldpostkarte
für deutsche Soldaten, die von der amerikanischen Armee gefangen genommen werden.

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Geschrieben den _____ 191

Hebe diese Karte auf, schreibe die Adresse Deiner Familie darauf, und wenn Du von den Amerikanern gefangen genommen wirst, gebe sie dem ersten Offizier, der Deine Personalien aufnimmt. Er wird es sich zur Pflicht machen, sie abzuschicken und so Deine Angehörigen über Deine Lage zu beruhigen.

Schreibe nichts auf diese Seite.

Streiche durch, was unzutreffend ist.

Ich bin gefangen { Leicht verwundet. / Schwer verwundet. / Unversehrt.

Seid ohne Sorge um mich. Für mich ist der Krieg aus. Ich habe gutes Essen. Die amerikanische Armee gibt ihren Gefangenen dieselbe Nahrung, wie ihren Soldaten: Rindfleisch, Weißbrot, Kartoffeln, Bohnen, Pflaumen, Bohnenkaffee, Milch, Butter, Tabak, u. s. w.

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

BEWARE!!!

JERRY (the guy you are fighting) is putting on the air

FOUR BROADCASTS DAILY

at 6:00 a.m.:	Medium wave: 420.8 meterband	Short wave: 15 and 31
at 6:30 p.m.:	Medium wave: 221 meterband	Short wave: 39.6 met
at 10:30 p.m.:	Medium wave: 420.8 meterband	
at 2:00 a.m.:	Medium wave: 221 meterband	Short wave: 39.6 me

You American doughboys are duly warned that such broadcasts are only designe and trick you under the cover of entertainment.

Don't listen to Sally, Jerry, George, Pete, Gladys, Oscar, the Swinging TIGERS the rest, but stick to the

BRITISH BUNKING CORPORATION

which will always show you the "Little Things that aren't there" or "My mother didn't raise me to be a sold

here YOU are!

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JERRY'S FRONT

wishes to call your attention to the following BROADCASTS designed to

ENTERTAIN YOU:

From 6:00 to 7:00 a. m.:

Medium wave: 420.8 meterband
Short wave: 15 and 31 meterband

For those fellows who like to get up early and enjoy music as a background to reveille.

From 6:30 to 7:30 p. m.:

Medium wave: 221 meterband
Short wave: 39.6 meterband

The big show with SALLY, JERRY, GEORGE, PETE, GLADYS, OSCAR, THE SWINGING TIGERS, AMERICAN RECORDS, THE LATEST NEWS and whatever the producer feels like unloading on you.

From 10:30 to 11:00 p.m.:

Medium wave: 420.8 meterband

A snappy half-hour of dance tunes with a few news items and practically NO TALK!

From 2:00 to 3:00 a. m.:

Medium wave: 221 meterband
Short wave: 39.6 meterband

Our night-bird's show, with lovely (it's a pity you can't see her) husky-voiced HELEN conducting the proceedings. You boys who suffer from insomnia (?) will feel better disposed towards the German gunners who keep you awake!

Well, be kind to your sets, boys, keep off the BBC station and listen to

JERRY

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AMERICAN SOLDIERS!

Remember those happy days when you stepped out with your best girl "going places and doing things"?

No matter

whether you two were enjoying a nice juicy steak at some tony restaurant or watching a thrilling movie with your favourite stars performing, or dancing to the lilt of a swing band

you were happy.

WHAT IS LEFT OF ALL THIS?

Nothing! Nothing but days and nights of the heaviest fighting and for many of you

NOTHING BUT A PLAIN WOODEN CROSS IN FOREIGN SOIL!

FILL IN THIS BLANK AND KEEP IT

USE BLOCK LETTERS.

TO BE TRANSMITTED BY JERRY'S FRONT RADIO:

Name: _____

Rank: _____

Serial Number: _____

Address: _____ *Street*

Town: _____

Country: _____

In this panel write a short message of not more than 15 words which will be transmitted by radio

back



FREE-PASS

Freipass

The Bearer of this FREE PASS solemnly affirms his belief that to help Bolshevism to victory in Europe would be fatal to Britain's future. As a Patriot he is prepared to face up to the situation by voluntarily ceasing hostilities against Germany and her European Allies. In accordance with a Special Decree passed by the Government of the German Reich, the Bearer of this Free Pass is entitled to receive preferential treatment and special privileges and provisioning from all German military authorities, who have received corresponding instructions. Above-all, he will not be regarded as a prisoner of war or be interned in a prisoner-of-war camp.
To protect the Bearer and his dependents from possible acts of vengeance on the part of his misguided compatriots, the German authorities will undertake to enter his name in the official prisoner-of-war lists forwarded in the usual way to the International Red Cross at Geneva.

Verzeiger dieses Zettels erklärt feierlich, daß er es für England Zukunft vernichtend hält, dem Bolschewismus in Europa zum Siege zu verhelfen. Er steht als unerschrockener Patriot darous die vollen Konsequenzen und stellt hiermit freiwillig den Kampf gegen Deutschland und seine europäischen Verbündeten ein.
Entsprechend den Anordnungen der Reichsregierung werden daher alle militärischen Dienststellen angewiesen, den Verzeiger dieses Zettels bevorzugt zu behandeln, zu verpflegen und ihn insbesondere nicht als Kriegsgefangenen, sondern außerhalb der Kriegsgefangenenlager unterzubringen.
Zum Schutze des Überbringers und seiner Angehörigen vor möglichen Racheakten seiner verbrecherischen Volksgenossen ist es jedoch in den amtlichen Listen als Kriegsgefangener zu führen und eine entsprechende Meldung an das Internationale Rote Kreuz in Genf zu machen.

RADIO
INFORMATION

You will very likely wish to have your relatives informed with as little delay as possible that you are alive and out of danger.

JERRY'S FRONT RADIO

has arranged to announce the names and addresses and their serial numbers. The announcements will be made three times daily.
You will understand how valuable this service is when you consider that your relatives are spared the dreadful feeling of anxious suspense concerning your fate.

Or

USE BLOCK LETTERS

NAME: _____
RANK: _____ SERIAL NUMBER:
ADRESS: _____ STREET
TOWN: _____
COUNTRY: _____

In this panel write a short personal message of not more than 15 words which will be transmitted by radio

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Parce que ils ont compris que cette guerre n'est pas un simple conflit entre nations, mais bien le heurt de deux idéologies. D'un côté, un peuple qui vient d'accomplir sa révolution sociale et de l'autre, l'internationale Judéo-capitaliste qui, non sans angoisse, voit se lever l'aube d'un renouveau qui n'est pas sans danger pour nos intérêts.

Parce que ils vomissent notre race, la race juive, et qu'ils veulent la mettre, une fois pour toutes, dans l'impossibilité de poursuivre son œuvre de corruption et de désagrégation.

Parce que ils veulent éliminer définitivement les ploutocrates et autres parasites qui vivent de la sueur du peuple.

Parce que ce sont des hommes virils, sains et dynamiques qui méprisent les « zazous » qui sont le produit d'une société en pleine décomposition.

Parce que ils ont vu le bolchevisme chez lui et parce qu'ils ne le veulent pas en France; parce qu'ils connaissent la bestialité et l'effroyable asservissement de ceux qui vivent sous notre despotisme.

Parce que ils veulent pour leurs travailleurs le respect auquel ils ont droit, en même temps que l'assurance définitive d'une EXISTENCE DIGNE.

Parce que ils veulent une Europe unie qui ne s'épuisera plus tous les 25 ans dans une tuerie atroce pour les besoins de notre coffre-fort.

Parce que ils veulent pour cette Patrie, à laquelle ils ont voué leur vie, une place de choix dans l'Europe de demain.

Parce que nous sommes des destructeurs et qu'ils appartiennent à la race des constructeurs.

Parce que fiers de leurs traditions et d'un passé glorieux, ils veulent balayer tout ce qui causa leur médiocrité et CONSTRUIRE LEUR AVENIR.

Parce que leur foi est inébranlable et parce qu'ils ne déposeront pas les armes avant le triomphe final.

Parce que ce sont des soldats héroïques, aussi humains dans la paix qu'ils sont courageux au combat.

VOILA POURQUOI J'ACCUSE LES HOMMES DE LA WAFFEN-SS.

ENGAGEMENTS - RENSEIGNEMENTS
Ersatzkommando Frankreich der Waffen-SS
24, Avenue du Recteur-Poincaré - Paris-16e

Autorisation n° 2°.848.

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
STATE DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT
PRESIDENT
WHITE HOUSE STAFF
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC WARFARE
NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
G-2
I & E
BPR
EACH THEATER
OFFICE OF COORDINATOR OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
OTHER CABINET AGENCIES
OTHER WAR AGENCIES
INTER-ALLIED FACILITIES
SEMIOFFICIAL PRIVATE AGENCIES
UNOFFICIAL AGENCIES
COMMERCIAL RADIO
COMMERCIAL (PRIVATE) PUBLISHERS
ANYBODY WHO FELT LIKE TRYING

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

Does not include the functions of voluntary censorship of mass media and of censorship of international communications between civilians which were performed by the Office of Censorship after December 1941.

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

(TRANSLATION)

Propaganda...

10 Commandments for men on leave

(translation of a page of a pamphlet handed to German soldiers going on leave)

1. Just as you are in the fighting line — ready for anything, confident, sure of victory, proud and superior — so should you also appear to your family and anybody else you may meet at home.
2. Should any one ask you: "When will this war at last be over?", answer him: "When we have achieved our victory!"
3. Remember that all wild rumours you may meet at home originate with enemy propaganda, and turn a deaf ear to them!
4. Tell all rumourmongers and professional grumblers to shut up and remind them that they are acting criminally!
5. Pay no attention to the many difficulties war brings to people at home, and will continue to bring, but contemplate the quiet heroism of mothers, of our men and women arms workers and all those toiling for victory!
6. Should you believe that your people are being treated harshly or even unfairly, dont immediately start cursing. Reserve your judgment, go over things a second time, and then turn to the proper authorities (local Party office, Soldiers' Trustee, the mayor, etc.) or report the case to your unit commander. You will receive assistance!
7. Should somebody at home say: "We 've had just about enough of this war!", give him this answer: "If we had talked and acted that way in winter 1941/2 and last winter, the Russians would to-day probably be in Germany!"
8. Encourage your people and acquaintances with simple and sober accounts of the achievements of your unit. You can do this without appearing boastful, yet in such a way as to give your listeners fresh confidence and will to victory!
9. In a friendly but decisive way forbid your people to send you letters full of woe, of petty grievances and senseless complaints and demands!
10. Be conscious every moment of your leave that you are not going home as a private person, but as representative of the men at the front. The whole armed forces will be judged by reports. See to it that the faith of people at home in their soldiers remains unshakeable. In this way you can work for victory even while on leave!

...und Wirklichkeit

7 RATSCHLAEGE FUER URLAUBER:

1. Verheimliche Deinen Angehörigen nicht, wie es an der Front aussieht. Aber sage ihnen dieses: wenn durch das Rote Kreuz die Nachricht kommt, Du seiest in Gefangennahme eingetroffen, können sie beruhigt sein; dann bist Du in Sicherheit und kehrst nach Kriegsende baldmöglichst nach Hause zurück.
2. Leben Deine Angehörigen im Grenzgebiet, rate ihnen, sich nicht evakuieren zu lassen, wenn die Front näherrückt und sie sich irgendwo in Sicherheit bringen können. Sie werden von den Alliierten anständig behandelt werden. Dies ist der beste Weg, die Familie zusammenzuhalten.
3. Sage Deiner Frau und Deinen Eltern oder Verwandten, sie sollen Dir ruhig und sachlich berichten, wie es zu Hause aussieht, und wie es den Leuten geht. Als Soldat hast Du ein Recht, es zu wissen.
4. Sieh Dir gut an, was in der Heimat alles durch Luftangriffe zerstört ist, und ziehe Deine Schlüsse, damit Du den Kameraden berichten kannst, wie es mit den Siegesaussichten bestellt ist.
5. Hab' ein Auge auf solche Parteibonzen, die die Leute drangsalieren und ausländische Arbeiter und Kriegsgefangene misshandeln oder die Zwangsstimmung dazu benutzen, sich persönlich zu bereichern. Merk' Dir die Namen.
6. Wenn Du zuhause dummes Geschwätz hörst über eine plötzliche Wendung in der Kriegslage, über Wunderwaffen usw., dann kläre die Leute darüber auf, dass es sich um Flüsterpropaganda der Partei handelt. Sie will bloss einen Krieg verlängern, der längst entschieden ist.
7. Soldat sein, heisst den Tatsachen klar ins Auge schauen. Fragt Dich jemand im Vertrauen: « Wie lange kann Deutschland den Vielfrontenkrieg gegen solche Uebermacht noch aushalten? » — nun, es steht bei Dir, den Leuten nichts vorzumachen!

[*Jawohl, diese Ratschläge kommen vom Gegner. Aber bedenke, dass sich die Absicht der Alliierten, unnützes Blutvergiessen in einem bereits entschiedenen Krieg zu vermeiden, auch mit Deinem eigenen Interesse deckt.*]

T/61

...and reality

7 SUGGESTIONS FOR MEN ON LEAVE:

1. Dont hide the facts about conditions at the front from your people. But also tell them that should they receive news via the Red Cross that you are an Allied prisoner of war, they can rest assured that you are safe and will return home as soon as possible after the war.
2. If your people live in a frontier area, tell them not to let themselves be evacuated when the front approaches their way, but to stay put if they can possibly find a safe place. The Allies will treat them decently. It's the best way to keep the family together.
3. Tell your wife or your parents or relations to write to you quietly and soberly how things are at home and how people are behaving. You're a soldier, and you have a right to know.
4. Take a good look at all the war damage from air raids at home and draw your conclusions so that you can give your comrades the real information about the chances of victory.
5. Keep your eyes open for Nazi Party bosses who bully ordinary people, or who are maltreating foreign workers and prisoners of war, or who take advantage of compulsory evacuation to enrich themselves. Remember their names.
6. Should you hear silly rumours about a wonderful turn in the war, miracle weapons and the like, explain to people that these rumours are spread by Nazi Party « whispering propaganda » — designed to prolong a war that's already decided.
7. To be a soldier means to look facts in the face. When some one asks you in confidence: « How much longer can we possibly fight on so many fronts against odds? » — well, it's up to you not to spread false hopes.

[*Yes: this advice comes from the enemy. Remember, however, that the desire of the Allies to avoid needless bloodshed in a war that is already decided, coincides with your best interest, too.*]

T/61

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L'heure
de la libération
va sonner...
Faites votre testament
Faites votre testament

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
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
POSTERS
ADVERTISEMENTS
CITY DAILY PAPERS
LOCAL DAILY PAPERS
WEEKLY PAPERS
MAGAZINES
SPECIAL JOURNALS
GOVERNMENT RELEASES
MOTION PICTURE ANNOUNCEMENTS
REPORTS OF SPEECHES
RADIO PROGRAMS
OTHER MEDIA

back

KID FROM THE U.S.

You are fighting in Europe, why?
Why do you risk your life?
To save the Western Hemisphere from a threatening "Nazi invasion"?
You could not possibly believe in that trash propaganda handed out by American bigwigs to keep citizens in a proper frenzy.
With Europe some 2000 miles even beyond the Pan-American 300-miles safety belt you know damned well,
it's not "Hemisphere defense" that sent you over to give a flesh and blood performance.
But then what is it?
Turn around and have a look at the "Friendly Folks back home", those who stimulated the big war boom eager to collect the prosperous profits.—
Your job is easy:
You just got to die to fill their pockets.
See how it works?

I MEAN YOU— FRANKLIN'S BOYS

You are supposed to be fighting for Justice and Freedom;
at least that's the tale they told you.
But did we Germans ever threaten your Freedom?
"I just tends to my national affairs"
that is our tendency,—is it YOURS?
But suppose you WERE "defending U.S.-Freedom"—never challenged.
What would you get out of risking your life in Europe?
Remember the 1917/18 boys' tragedy?
They finally walked up to the White House only asking for a chance at making a living.
Did THEY get their chance?
They were kicked out and treated like tramps, you know.
And that will be YOUR „opportunity" the bigwigs thanksgiving to you.
If you're lucky enough to get through.

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To them it's a Joke!

What's wrong with this crazy war? Now it's the great sensation of the day, at least for the stay-at-homes. They want to get a glimpse of something to make their flesh creep, just a wee bit, by God, enough to get a pleasant shudder down the back, nothing more.

So they put together a film with the title «Roman Romance». Not that it ever entered their heads to make it in Italy, that might be too dangerous. They simply built up Rome in Hollywood and provided the necessary war accessories, as is shown by the following description in the «New York Herald Tribune»:

«A shocking accident has taken place during the making of the new film «Roman Romance». In order to reproduce artillery fire, mines were laid in the ground which were electrically fired. As the results at the first trial did not satisfy the producer, stronger mines were tried in succession. The last experiment was certainly most realistic, but when the smoke of the explosion had cleared away, the «battlefield» was strewn with the bodies of six dead and fourteen wounded. The work on the film had to be interrupted for a few days, as the performers went on strike. Only after Warner Brothers had offered them a risk bonus and an insurance could the work proceed. The film promises to be a great success.»

So this is what the "amusing war" they are making at home looks like.

To those at home it does not matter a damn that in this cursed Italy thousands of your pals are giving up their lives. All they care for is to have their bit of fun and their big business.

They also don't give a damn for the fact that, for their amusement, six young men should lose their lives and several others be crippled for life.

Is it any wonder that the producer's name is Samuel Warner?
He's of course a Jew - did you ever know a Jew who had anything in his mind but his own profit? As a matter of fact it's the Jews who plotted this war and their sole object was to satisfy their greed for gold. It's nothing but

a Jewish war - and an American fight!

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Landung alliierter Divisionen vor Rom!
Deutsche Küstenstellungen durchbrochen.
Die Hauptkampflinie umgangen. Grosse Kesselschlacht beginnt!
Allied divisions land near Rome.
German coastal positions broken through. Main fighting line outflanked.
Big encirclement battle is starting.
The leaflet which we are showing you in the original and in translation on the reverse side was dropped over our lines by order of your command.
Allied divisions landed near Rome?
"There are many roads that lead to Rome," but none for you.
German coastal positions broken through?
Do you still think so to-day?
Main fighting line outflanked?
You don't mean by chance our lines? Numerous of your units have been cut off from their lines of communication and taken prisoner.
Big encirclement battle is starting?
Who is fighting with his back to the sea, surrounded on all sides by a powerful opponent?

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
Soldat!
Ne te laisse pas faire
Suis nos conseils qui sont au dos....
Le Parti Communiste Français
Soldat Français!
Es-tu Content de ta nourriture?
Tes officiers sont-ils bons camarades?
Es-tu bien équipé?
Si oui Fais ton devoir et meurs
Si non? Fais valoir tes droits
Sois courageux
et Gueules!
Le Parti Communiste Français

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
MILITARY authorities demanded a nationwide war on VICE.
They got a sham battle—a polite blood testing campaign which would not alarm ladies-aid societies and parent-teachers associations.
NEVERTHELESS, police raided a large number of cabarets, dance halls and joints in 21 small, medium, and large cities.
These raids showed that of the 20.000 women investigated a staggering proportion had venereal diseases,
OVER 80% had V. D.
21% were prostitutes.
Of the 79% non-professionals
61% were pickups,
18% were girl friends.
17% were girls under 20 years.
84% were wives of men serving in the armed forces ABROAD.
BOTH groups were mostly members of the growing band of "V" girls, who declare that they feel a patriotic compulsion to console troops.
IS YOUR GIRL AMONG THEM?
YOU CAN'T TALK V. D. OUT OF EXISTENCE—IT IS THERE!

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GUARD AGAINST VENEREAL DISEASES

Lately there has been a great increase in the number of venereal diseases among our officers and men owing to prolific contacts with Filipino women of dubious character.

Due to hard times and stricken conditions brought about by the Japanese occupation of the islands, Filipino women are willing to offer themselves for a small amount of foodstuffs. It is advisable in such cases to take full protective measures by use of condoms, protective medicines, etc.; better still to hold intercourse only with wives, virgins or women of respective character.

Furthermore, in view of the increase in pro-American leanings, many Filipino women are more than willing to offer themselves to American soldiers, and due to the fact that Filipinos have no knowledge of hygiene, disease carriers are rampant and due care must be taken.

U. S. ARMY

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
A man's foes shall be they of his own household.
St. Matthew 10, 36
So is it with a country's foes. Of course you know that under the guise of Democratic America, there is the Plutocratic Dynasty of America's sixty wealthiest families, such as the Morgans, the du Ponts, the Rockfellers, the Drexels, the Sloans, the Vanderbilts, the Roosevelts, etc., etc. It is these Dynasty rulers, you may well know, that plunged America into war in order to reap its fruits by the toil, sweat, blood and tears of you American soldiers.

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IT IS DANGEROUS TO READ THE FOLLOWING:

1. Don't pretend lunacy. Your surgeon will detect such deception, and you are sure to be tried by court-martial. Or if you succeed in passing as a lunatic, you will be invalided home, without any more chance to rejoin your comrades at the front.

2. Don't spit freely. If you do, you will be obsessed with the habit of spitting. And remember, it is an early symptom of neurosis.

3. Don't think the reverse of everything you chance to hear. Or it will easily become habitual with you and develop into regular symptoms of neurosis.

4. Don't try to practise sleeping in a fixed posture. This is also one of the symptoms of neurosis. It is contagious to your comrades-in-arms.

5. Don't be so nervous as to feel your heartbeat from time to time. Such a symptom always appears in the early stages of lunacy.

6. Don't worry about the color of your urine or excrement. This is also an early symptom of lunacy.

7. One week's practise is enough to feign naturally the tremor of your hands, shoulders and legs. The tremor of the head, especially, is the most conspicuous sign of neurosis.

8. If you practise to quickly roll your eyeballs horizontally without moving your head, it will soon become habitual. This particular movement of the eyeballs preludes serious neurosis. Even without such a practice, your eyeballs will soon begin to tremor unwittingly if you are constantly worried about it.

9. Don't fall into the habit of glancing sideways at your comrades-in-arms. Your surgeon dislikes such a habit, as it predicts the approaching menace of neurosis.

10. Don't eat your own excrement or drink your own urine in the presence of others. If you do, you are sure to be brand d as a lunatic, however warmly you may protest.

11. Don't mumble the same words immediately after you have spoken them. If you practise it repeatedly, your surgeon's verdict will inevitably be neurosis.

12. Don't try to develop your imaginative power to the extent that all human faces look like animals'. Or you are likely to see no more human faces even on your friends.

13. Don't imitate an epileptic fit. If you practise it for three days, you will certainly have a real one. Then you are on your way to lunacy.

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
ENEMY MENTION OF SELECTED TOPICS. FIRST HALF-YEAR. NUMBER OF MENTIONS PER 10-DAY PERIOD. WITH REFERENCE TO NAVAL WARFARE. FOOD SUPPLY AND SECRET WEAPONS
JANUARY 1
JANUARY 11
JANUARY 21
JANUARY 31
FEBRUARY 10
FEBRUARY 20
MARCH 2
MARCH 12
MARCH 22
APRIL 1
APRIL 11
APRIL 21
MAY 1
MAY 11
MAY 21
JUNE 10
JUNE 20
JUNE 30
200
150
100
50
0
NAVAL WARFARE (SINGLE LINE)
FOOD SUPPLY (CIRCLES)
SECRET WEAPON (DOUBLE LINE)

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賢明ナ兵隊サン

米軍ノ將校サンガ、此人ガリラト住民ニ、地祇ヲ止ダタ日本ノ兵隊サンガ米軍ノ許ニ入ル場合ノ、取扱ヒヲツイテ、イロイロ注意ヲ与ヘマシタ。

善良ナ兵隊サンタチハ、オイシイバカリヽシタ食物トサツヤリシタ着物ト、セレイナ、住ミ心地ヨイ住ミ家ガ与ヘラレマシタ。



日本ノ兵隊サンハ、オデントウ様ノアルウチニ、近クノ村人ノトコロヘ行キマシタ。



病氣ノ兵隊サンヤ、傷ツイタ兵隊サンハ、親切ナアメリカノオ医者サンニ介抱サレマシタ。

ゲリラハ、コノ善良ナ兵隊サンヲ、親切ニ、米軍ノ陣地ニ案内イタシマシタ。

ソシテ、コレラノ兵隊サンタチハ、讀書ヤ、好キナ兵事ヲ覚エナガラ楽シク暮シテ行キマス。

ヤガテ、戰爭ガ終ッタラ、[illegible]ノ恋シイ妻子ガ待ッテヰル故郷ノ家ニ帰ヘルコトガ出來マス。

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Oh, Darling, you say it in the sweetest way...
Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year!

back

The Girl You Left Behind

To-day she is pulling down 60 bucks.....

SAM KNOWS WHAT HE WANTS

Two years ago, comely Joan Hopkins was still a salesgirl behind the ribbon counter in a New York 5 & 10 cts. store getting 12 dollars a week.

To-day she is pulling down 60 bucks as the private secretary to Sam Levy. Business is excellent and Sam is making a pile of dough on war contracts.

FOR HIM THE SLAUGHTER CAN'T LAST LONG ENOUGH.

Sam has no scruples about getting a bit intimate with Joan. And why should he have any? Tall and handsome Bob Harrison, Joan's fiancé, is on the front, thousands of miles away, fighting for guys like Sam Levy.

Joan loves Bob, but she doesn't know WHEN HE WILL COME BACK.

Look for the other pictures of this series

The Girl You Left Behind

Joan is feeling so lonely anyway.....

SAM AT WORK

After his arrival in New York City, cigar-chewing Sam Levy, a steerage passenger from eastern Europe, used to live on the lower East Side not far from the Bowery. Soon he was able to move to upper Broadway. When President Roosevelt took those steps short of war, Sam had already leased a ten room apartment on Riverside Drive.

Slick-haired home-front warrior Mordecai Ezekiel, boss of a government department in Washington, saw to it that his chum Sam would be on the earning end of the war. Rich profits on war contracts let Sam climb up the social ladder, taking two steps at one time. He is now residing in a duplex de luxe apartment on swanky Park Avenue.

Why shouldn't Sam invite beautiful Joan Hopkins, his private secretary, former 5 & 10 cts. salesgirl, up to his place to have dinner with him and cocktails.

Joan is feeling so lonely anyway. More than two years ago, Bob Harrison, the man she wanted to marry, had to leave her for the battlefields of Europe, thousands of miles away.

He is fighting there for Sam Levy and his kind.

Joan is hoping that Bob will return to her safe and sound. But she knows that many of her girl friends are already waiting in vain for their men to return.

Sam knows her predicament and he is trying his darnedest to cheer her up.

Why, Bob wouldn't know it anyway! And what's a little kiss among friends?

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The Girl You Left Behind

Poor little Joan! She is still thinking of Bob.....

THE WAY OF ALL FLESH

When pretty Joan Hopkins was still standing behind the ribbon counter of a 5 & 10 cts. store on 3rd Avenue in New York City, she never dreamed of ever seeing the interior of a duplex Park Avenue apartment. Neither did young Bob Harrison, the man she loves. Bob was drafted and sent to the battlefields in Europe thousands of miles away from her. Through Lazare's Employment Agency Joan got a job as private secretary with wily Sam Levy. Sam is piling up big money on war contracts. Should the slaughter end very soon, he would suffer an apoplectic stroke.

Now Joan knows what Bob and his pals are fighting for.

Joan always used to look up to Bob as the guiding star of her life, and she was still a good girl when she started working for Sam Levy. But she often got the blues thinking of Bob, whom she hadn't seen for over two years. Her boss had an understanding heart and was always very kind to her, so kind indeed, that he often invited her up to his place. He had always wanted to show her his "etchings". Besides, Sam wasn't stingy and each time Joan came to see him, he gave her the nicest presents. Now, all women like beautiful and expensive things. But Sam wasn't the man you could play for a sucker. He wanted something, wanted it very definitely.....

Poor little Joan! She is still thinking of Bob, yet she is almost hoping that he'll never return.

The Girl You Left Behind

It was a rude awakening for her.....

THE MOMENT SHE DREADED

Forgotten are the days when shapely Joan Hopkins was still selling ribbons in a 5 and 10 cts. store in New York City. As private secretary to slick Sam Levy, big money maker in the war business, she rose to be a sugar daddy's darling.

Sam didn't have any cash when he got started, and he doesn't like to be reminded of his early days on the lower East Side. The war was just the right thing for him. Like many other home-warriors he made the grade piling up dough and growing fat on the sacrifices of those young American boys fighting on foreign battlefields.

At heart Joan is not a bad woman. For over two years she had not seen her fiancé, clean-cut Bob Harrison, whom she cares for very much. Bob was shipped to Europe to fight for the cause of Sam Levy and his kind.

Two years is a long time for any girl.

For more than half a year she had not heard from Bob. He seemed to be among the missing.

Some sunny afternoon, however, just when Joan and Sam were stepping out of fashionable Bonwit Teller's shop on Fifth Avenue, she was struck speechless by the sight of a man in uniform.

It was a rude awakening for her. And it was also a dreadful blow to Bob, for it was he who suddenly stood opposite her - on crutches, one leg amputated.

Two lives - lost to one another forever.

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الحكومة البريطانيـــة

BRITISH GOVERNMENT

الى كل عربى كريم

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته وبعد ، فحامل هذا الكتاب ضابط بالجيش البريطاني وهو صديق وفى لكافة الشعوب العربية فنرجو أن تعاملوه بالعطف والاكرام . وأن تحافظوا على حياته من كل طارىء ، ونأمل عند الاضطرار أن تقدموا له مايحتـاج اليه من طعام وشراب . وان ترشدوه الى أقرب معسكر بريطاني. وسنكافئكم مالياً بسخاء على ماتسدونه اليه من خدمات .

والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته ؟

القيادة البريطانية العامة في الشرق الاوسط

To All Arab Peoples — Greetings and Peace be upon you. The bearer of this letter is an Officer of the British Government and a friend of all Arabs. Treat him well, guard him from harm, give him food and drink, help him to return to the nearest British soldiers and you will be rewarded. Peace and the Mercy of God upon you. *The British High Command in the East.*

SOME POINTS ON CONDUCT WHEN MEETING THE ARABS IN THE DESERT.

Remove footwear on entering their tents. Completely ignore their women. If thirsty drink the water they offer, but DO NOT fill your waterbottle from their personal supply. Go to their well and fetch what you want. Never neglect any puddle or other water supply for topping up your bottle. Use the Halazone included in your Aid Box. Do not expect breakfast if you sleep the night. Arabs will give you a mid-day or evening meal. Always be courteous.

REMEMBER, NEVER TRY AND HURRY IN THE DESERT, SLOW AND SURE DOES IT.

A few useful words

English	Arabic
English	Ingleezi
American	Amerikani
Friend	Sa-hib, Sa-deck.
Water	Moya
Food	Akl or Mungarea
Village	Balaad
Tired	Ta-eban

English	Arabic
Day	Yome
Night	Layl
Half	Nuss
Half a day	Nuss il Yome
Near	Gareeb
Far	Baeed

Take me to the English and you will be rewarded. — Hud nee eind el Ingleez wa tahud Mu-ka-fa.

English Flying Office — Za-bit Ingleezi Tye-yara

How far (how many kilos?) — Kam kilo ?

Enemy — Germani, Taliani, Siziliani

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Nr. 77 O. U., den 22. 12. 44.

Skorpion Informationsdienst

In den spärlichen Stimmen des Londoner Rundfunks zur Westfront spiegelt sich in zunehmendem Maße die Angst wieder, die deutsche Offensive könnte noch weitere ungeahnte und unübersehbare Ausmaße annehmen:

20. 12. 44. — 16.00 Uhr: Unser Korrespondent meldet, daß der Höhepunkt des deutschen Angriffes noch nicht erreicht ist.
17.00 Uhr: Es liegen keine Anzeichen eines Nachlassens des deutschen Gegenangriffes vor.
18.00 Uhr: Die deutschen Anstrengungen lassen darauf schließen, daß ein noch stärkerer Angriff zu erwarten ist.

21. 12. 44 — 12.00 Uhr: Man kann nicht verschweigen, daß deutsche Vorhuten noch immer im Vordringen sind.
16.30 Uhr: Aus den Frontberichten geht hervor, daß die Deutschen weitere beträchtliche Fortschritte machen.
21.00 Uhr: Die 1. Armee arbeitet Tag und Nacht, um Widerstandslinien zu errichten, aber dies dauert seine Zeit und die deutsche Offensive kann inzwischen weitergehn.
0.05 Uhr: Die deutsche Gegenoffensive nach Belgien und Luxemburg nimmt aufgrund jüngster Berichte, an Geschwindigkeit weiter zu.

22. 12. 44 — 7.00 Uhr: Der deutsche Vormarsch ist nicht zum Stillstand gekommen. Man muß mit einem weiteren Ansteigen der feindlichen Flut rechnen.

Stimmen zu den Fronten.

„Die gegenwärtige **Schlacht im Westen ist die schrecklichste des ganzen Krieges.** Es wird mit einer Erbitterung ohnegleichen gekämpft. Ehe man ein Urteil über die Lage geben kann müssen neue Nachrichten abgewartet werden". (Berichterstatter Eduard Beek, Radio London)

„Die **deutsche Offensive ist gefährlich für uns.** Es handelt sich um ein Unternehmen großen Stils, um unsere Pläne zu stören und unser Hinterland und seine Verkehrswege in Verwirrung zu bringen". (Radio London)

„Es ist nicht zu vermeiden, daß auch die Alliierten an manchen Abschnitten schwächer sind. Es ist auch normal, daß der Feind Boden gewinnt. Dieser Angriff zeigt aber deutlich, daß man sich, solange der Krieg nicht zu Ende ist, nicht in leichtfertigen Träumereien verlieren darf" — meldet der alliierte Kriegsberichterstatter Paul Levy aus Belgien.

„Die deutsche **Gegenoffensive** im Westen stellt **nur einen Teil eines allgemeinen Planes des OKW.** dar, der darauf hinzielt, die Vorbereitungen der Alliierten für entscheidende Kämpfe um die Ruhr- und Saar-Industriezentren mehr oder weniger auszuschalten". („Roter Stern", Moskau)

„Aus dem deutschen Schweigen und dem alliierten Geschrei läßt sich nur eines ableiten: Die **völlige Verwirrung in den angloamerikanischen Befehlsstellen,** die überrascht wurden und sich noch immer nicht von ihrem Schrecken erholt haben". (Span. Zeitung Informaciones)

Fliegende Bomben über der alliierten Front. „Das anhaltende Feuer der fliegenden Bomben liegt auf den englischen Truppen". (Radio London) — „Fliegende Bomben fallen so zahlreich in die Linien der 1 amerikanischen Armee als im letzten Sommer auf London niedergingen. (Radio London)

„Es ist klar, daß sich die deutsche Offensive noch in vollem Schwung befindet". (Times) — **Es ist doch klar,** daß die feindliche Offensivmaschine auf höchsten Touren läuft". (Radio London)

Tiefe Einbrüche in die amerikanischen Linien. „Tiefe Einbrüche des Feindes bleiben noch wieder gut zu machen". (Daniel Moore, Radio London) — „die deutsche Offensive erzwang größere Einbrüche". (Reuters Sonderkorrespondent William Steen) — „Es wird von weiteren vier Einbruchstellen gesprochen". (Radio London)

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Nationalsozialistischer Führungsstab
der Wehrmacht

Januar 1945 Nr. [illegible]
Zuschriften für die „Mitteilungen"
FP. Nr. 12 [illegible]

Mitteilungen für die Truppe

Die Mitteilungen dienen als Unterlage für Kompanie-Besprechungen

Gedanken zum Volkssturm

Vielen Soldaten ist das berühmte Defregger-Gemälde „Das letzte Aufgebot" bekannt. Es schildert den Aufbruch der Tiroler Bergbauern beim Eindringen der napoleonischen Heere in ihre Heimat. Als durch Führererlass der Volkssturm aufgestellt wurde, mag bei vielen der Gedanke aufgetaucht sein, ob es etwa mit diesem Volkssturm die gleiche Bewandtnis wie damals hätte, ob nun auch die Greise und Kinder als letztes Aufgebot unter die Waffen gerufen werden, ob auch sie nun mit primitivsten Waffen ausgerüstet sich als letztes Aufgebot an die bedrohte Grenze stellen würden, um ihr geliebtes Vaterland zu verteidigen.

Dieser Gedanke findet seine augenblickliche Widerlegung, wenn man sieht, wie der Volkssturm aufgebaut ist, und wenn man darüber Klarheit gewinnt, welche Aufgaben dem Volkssturm zufallen. Zum Volkssturm wurden die 16- und 60-jährigen aufgerufen, und es hat sich gezeigt, dass die überwiegende Mehrzahl der Volkssturmmänner sich aus den Angehörigen unserer besten Männerjahrgänge zusammensetzt. Es sind dies die vielen Uk-Gestellten aus der Rüstung, der Wirtschaft und dem Landvolk, die entlassenen Kriegsverwundeten, die nicht einberufenen Körperbehinderten. Ueber die Altersgrenze der 60 hinaus haben sich viele Männer, alte gediente Soldaten, freiwillig gemeldet.

Der Aufbau des Volkssturms liegt in der Hand der Partei und ihrer Gliederungen, der SA und des NSKK.

Bei der Auswahl der Führer bis zu den kleinsten Einheiten wird von dem Gesichtspunkt ausgegangen, daß nur der in jeder Lage Bewährte im Volkssturm führen kann.

Als die Volkssturmbataillone durch die Städte zur Verteidigung marschierten, konnte man auch die ausgezeichnete Bewaffnung unserer Volkssturmmänner beobachten. Vom neuesten Gewehr und Maschinengewehr bis zu „Panzerfaust" und „Panzerschreck" waren alle Waffen vertreten, und die Lüge vom Dreschflegel und der Sense und der altertümlichen Schrotflinte wurde a d a b s u r d u m geführt. Die Gesichter der Volkssturmmänner sahen absolut nicht wie ein letztes Aufgebot aus.

Der Gegner hat das Lachen über den Volkssturm schnell aufgegeben und sich zu der Erkenntnis durchgerungen, dass der Volkssturm eine sehr ernstzunehmende Tatsache darstellt. Wie sich der Volkssturm schlägt, dass beweist sein erster Einsatz in Ostpreussen. Nur ein einziges Beispiel von vielen sei herausgegriffen, wo ein 16jähriger Hitlerjunge angesichts zweier einbrechender T 34 aus dem Deckungsgraben springt und beide mit der „Panzerfaust" erledigt. Kurze Zeit später wurden dem tapferen Jungen das EK 1 und zwei Panzervernichtungsabzeichen angeheftet.

Die Zeit wird beweisen, daß der Volkssturm kein letztes Aufgebot, sondern im Gegenteil die machtvollste Demonstration einer Stärke darstellt, die auch heute im sechsten Kriegsjahr immer wieder aus dem deutschen Volk erstrahlt. Je harter der Kampf, um so fanatischer die Entschlossenheit, unseren verfluchten Feinden die Stirn zu bieten, und daß der Volkssturm hierbei ein gewichtiges Wörtlein mitzusprechen hat, das liegt in dem harten Einsatzwillen der Volkssturmmänner begründet.

Die berühmten amerikanischen Freiheiten

Vor seiner vorigen Wahl hatte der amerikanische Präsident Roosevelt bekanntlich versprochen, kein amerikanischer Soldat werde außerhalb des Landes eingesetzt werden. Als er nachher das Gegenteil tat, begründete er seinen Wortbruch mit der Behauptung, er müsse der vom Nationalsozialismus geknechteten deutschen Menschheit die amerikanischen Freiheiten bringen, die Freiheit der Gedanken, des Wortes, der Schrift und des Glaubens.

Wie diese Freiheiten in Wirklichkeit aussehen, dafür gibt ein Bericht des Militärkorrespondenten im amerikanischen Europasender vom 20. November 1944 Aufschluß. In der kleinen Stadt Gangelt an der deutsch-niederländischen Grenze trafen die Amerikaner nur noch wenige Leute an. Aber folgende Maßnahmen, so berichtet der Korrespondent, sind getroffen worden:

1. Das Betreten der Straße wurde den Bewohnern nur zwischen 12 und 13 Uhr gestattet.
2. Für jeden anderen Ausgang ist ein besonderer Passierschein nötig.
3. An jedem Haus muß ein Schild hängen mit dem Verzeichnis aller Bewohner.
4. Die deutschen Zivilisten erhalten weder Nahrungsmittel, Medikamente, noch andere Versorgungsgüter usw.

Als Zweck der Militärverwaltung wird bezeichnet, zu beweisen, daß die Amerikaner als Eroberer gekommen sind.

Es ist das gleiche Bild überall. Aus dem Kampfraum Aachen liegen zahlreiche Meldungen vor, wie die Häuser ausgeplündert worden sind. Bei der Vernehmung der Kriegsgefangenen fungierten fast ausschließlich Juden. Die Behandlung der Gefangenen war miserabel, ihre Orden und Ehrenzeichen wurden ihnen geklaut, und man ließ sie tagelang hungern.

Erstaunen können diese Tatsachen niemanden, der die amerikanischen Verhältnisse wirklich kennt und aus den vergangenen Jahren weiß, wie dieses reiche Land mit seinen eigenen Erwerbslosen umsprang. Erst kürzlich las man in einer amerikanischen Zeitung, es sei viel zu viel Aufhebens von den 12 Millionen Erwerbslosen gemacht worden. Warum man sie nicht habe „verrecken" lassen?

Kein politisch geschulter Soldat läßt sich mehr durch tönende Worte über angebliche amerikanische Errungenschaften bluffen.

Von den amerikanischen Freiheiten ist die Freiheit zu hungern den breiten Massen des Volkes am vertrautesten geworden. Würde der eiskalte Dollarimperialismus von drüben je über Deutschland Macht gewinnen, so wissen wir, was dann die Uhr geschlagen hätte. Und darum wird das deutsche Volk das Aeußerste tun, eine Versklavung durch den amerikanisch-jüdischen Hochkapitalismus zu verhindern.

Ein gescheiter und nachdenklicher Brief über das Thema „Muss das sein?"

Ein Frontbrief bringt die folgenden Ausführungen, die uns alle angehen. „Der Krieg bringt zwangsläufig einen großen Verschleiß mit sich, aber wieviel wird sinnlos und leichtsinnig verschleudert! Vater, Mutter, Frau und Schwester stellen im Arbeitsprozeß, um die Abnutzung, die der Krieg nun mal mit sich bringt, wieder

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Für Offiziere!

SCHULUNGSBLATT für deutsche Truppen

Die nachstehenden Auszüge aus dem Wehrmachtsbericht des Monats Februar, im Wortlaut des O.K.W., mit einigen zusätzlichen Erläuterungen, sind für Verwendung in der Wehrbetreuung sowie bei Ansprachen an die Truppe vorzüglich geeignet.

FEBRUAR 1944. Das O.K.W. gibt bekannt:	**BEMERKUNGEN: Die Ostfront im Februar:**
2.2.44 « Der Ort JAMBURG wurde nach hartem Kampf aufgegeben. »	Der Monat Februar begann mit Misserfolgen im Norden der Ostfront.
3.2.44 « Weiter nordwestlich wurden .. die Orte ROWNO und LUZK aufgegeben. »	Zur gleichen Zeit konnten die Russen ihren Vorstoss nach POLEN durch die Eroberung von ROWNO und LUZK ausweiten.
9.2.44 « Der Brückenkopf von NIKOPOL wurde .. befehlsgemäss geräumt. »	In der zweiten Februarwoche verschlechterte sich die Lage der deutschen Armeen im DNJEPR-Bogen. Der unersetzlich wichtige Brückenkopf von NIKOPOL wurde - befehlsgemäss aufgegeben.
10.2.44 « Zwischen ILMENSEE und PEIPUS-SEE setzten sich unsere Verbände .. zur Verkürzung der Front befehlsgemäss ab. »	Auch im Norden musste darauf die Front wiederum (selbstverständlich befehlsgemäss) verkürzt werden. Die ewigen Absetzbewegungen sind ein chronisches Uebel der Heeresleitung und enden regelmässig mit der planmässigen Räumung wesentlicher Stützpunkte.
14.2.44 « Die Stadt LUGA wurde in diesem Zusammenhang .. geräumt. »	Diesmal LUGA ! -- Es ist Mitte Februar. ... Die Schlacht geht weiter.
18.2.44 « Südlich des ILMENSEES wurde .. die Stadt STARAJA RUSSA .. ohne Behinderung durch den Feind zur Verkürzung der Front geräumt. »	Kann man es den Russen zum Vorwurf machen, dass sie die Deutschen an der Aufgabe von STARAJA RUSSA nicht mit lautem Protest hindern ?
21.2.44 « Im Nordteil der Ostfront setzten sich unsere Divisionen in einigen Abschnitten zur Verkürzung der Front planmässig vom Feinde ab. Die nachdringenden Bolschewisten wurden abgeschlagen. »	Was hier vorgeht ist, wie man sieht, nur ein planmässiger, geordneter und zur Verkürzung der Front befehlsgemässe durchgeführter Rückzug, der gelegentlich von ein paar nachdringenden Bolschewisten ganz unerheblich gestört wird.

(Fortsetzung Seite 2)

(Fortsetzung von Seite 1)

O.K.W.:	**BEMERKUNGEN:**
22.2.44 « Die Trümmerfelder der ehemaligen Stadt CHOLM wurden im Zuge einer vorgenommenen Absetzbewegung geräumt. »	Alle Absetzbewegungen sind natürlich durch die Eingebungen der überlegenen deutschen Führung klar vorausgesehen. Und CHOLM geht verloren ..
23.2.44 « Die Stadt KRIVOI-ROG wurde nach erbitterten Kämpfen .. geräumt. - Im Nordabschnitt der Ostfront verlaufen unsere Absetzbewegungen südwestlich und westlich des ILMENSEES planmässig. »	. . . während im Süden, nach dem Mangaanerz von NIKOPOL, nun auch das Eisen von KRIVOI-ROG zum Teufel geht! - Das alles geschieht (wohl verstanden) planmässig, und die Katastrophe im Osten verläuft, wie immer, gleichmässig und regelmässig berechnet durch das O.K.W.
25.2.44 « Der Ort ROGATSCHEW wurde in der Nacht zum 24.2. .. geräumt. »	Unaufhaltsam vollzieht sich gegen Ende Februar der deutsche Rückzug an der Russischen Front. ROGATSCHEW fällt ..
27.2.44 « Im Nordabschnitt der Front setzten sich unsere Truppen .. weiter planmässig ab. »	. . . die Schlacht geht weiter. Plan- und befehlsgemässen, nach dem Willen einer unerbittlichen Führung! -

DIE NACHFOLGENDEN NACHRICHTEN VERDIENEN EBENFALLS DER ERWÄHNUNG:

Washington, den 28. 2. 1944. - Seit Inkrafttreten des amerikanischen Kriegshilfeplans für Russland, im Oktober 1941, wurden laut einer Mitteilung des Wirtschaftsrats 8,5 Millionen Tonnen Versorgungsgut nach Russland vertrachtet und dort abgeliefert. Die Verlustrate an Frachtschiffen betrugt ein Prozent.

Danzig. - General der Flieger Quade erklärte vor einem Danziger Hörerkreis, dass jeder der über die zu geringe Anzahl von abgeschossenen Feindflugzeugen bei Luftangriffen nörgelt, doch selbst einmal versuchen solle, einen Spatz im Flug bei Dunkelheit mit Taschenlampe und Revolver herunterzuholen.

London. - In der Nacht vom 15. / 16. Februar warf die RAF innerhalb von 30 Minuten über 2500 Tonnen Bomben auf Ziele in Berlin ab. 43 Flugzeuge kehrten von dieser und anderen Nachtoperationen nicht zurück. Dieser bisher grösste Luftangriff des Krieges war einmal so schwer wie der schwerste Angriff der deutschen Luftwaffe auf London (am 10. Mai 1941). Damit wurde in 15 während der drei letzten Monate durchgeführten Grossangriffen eine Bombenlast von insgesamt 23500 Tonnen auf die Reichshauptstadt abgeworfen.

Die in diesem Schulungsblatt für deutsche Truppen angeführten Tatsachen und Äusserungen dürften zur Genüge beweisen, dass Deutschlands Lage, bereits beim gegenwärtigen Stande des Krieges, eine hoffnungslose ist.

6-11

FOR OFFICERS!

INFORMATION SHEET

For German troops

The following extracts from the communiques of the month of February, in the words of the German High Command and with certain additional comments, are extremely suitable to be used for instruction of the troops, and for answering any questions which they may ask.

FEBRUARY 1944. The O.K.W. states:	**COMMENTS: The Eastern Front in February:**
2-2-44 " The town of JAMBURG was evacuated after bitter fighting „	The month of February opened with defeats on the Northern part of the Eastern front.
3-2-44 " Further to the NW the towns of ROVNO and LUZK were evacuated„	At the same time the Russians were able to broaden their offensive towards Poland by the capture of ROVNO and LUZK.
9-2-44 " The bridgehead of NIKOPOL was evacuated according to plan „	In the second week of February the situation of the German armies in the DNIEPER bend worsened. The important and irreplaceable bridgehead of NIKOPOL was evacuated according to plan.
10-2-44 " Between L. ILMEN and L. PEIPUS our troops withdrew in order to shorten the front „	In the North, too, it was necessary, (according to plan, of course), to shorten the front still further. These perpetual withdrawals are a chronic illness of the High Command and always result in the giving up of important bases.
14-2-44 " In connection with this the town of LUGA was evacuated „	This time it is LUGA. It is the middle of February. The battle goes on.
18-2-44 " South of L. ILMEN the town of STARAYA RUSSA was evacuated, without hindrance from the enemy, in order to shorten the front „	Can one really blame the Russians for not hindering the Germans, with a loud protest, from evacuating STARAYA RUSSA ?
21-2-44 " In the Northern part of the Eastern front our Divisions withdrew from the enemy in some places in order to shorten the front. The pursuing Bolsheviks were beaten off „	What is happening here, as one sees, is simply a planned orderly and deliberate retreat for the shortening of the front, which is now and then almost unnoticeably disturbed by a few pursuing Bolcheviks.

(Continuation of p. 1)

O.K.W.:	**COMMENTS:**
22-2-44 " The ruins of what was the town of CHOLM were evacuated in the course of a planned withdrawal „	All withdrawals have, it will be noticed, been clearly foreseen by the all-knowing German High Command. And now CHOLM is lost. . .
23-2-44 " The town of KRIVOI ROG was evacuated after bitter fighting in the Northern Sector of the Eastern Front our planned withdrawals West and Southwest of Lake ILMEN are continuing „	. . While in the South, the iron ore of KRIVOI ROG goes the same way as the manganese ore of NIKOPOL. All this, be it noted, is happening according to plan, and the catastrophe on the Eastern Front is taking its course, as always in accordance with the faultless and cold-blooded calculations of the German High Command.
25-2-44 " The town of ROGACHEV was evacuated in the night of the 23rd and 24th February „	. . . As February draws to a close the German retreat on the Russian Front continues without cessation. ROGACHEV falls . .
27-2-44 " In the Northern sector of the front our troops continued their planned withdrawal „	. . . and the battle continues, planned and by order, in accordance with the unmistakeable will of the German High Command.

THE FOLLOWING NEWS IS ALSO WORTHY OF MENTION:

Washington, 28 Feb. 44. Since the coming into force of the American Lease-Lend plan for Russia in October 1941, 8.5 million tons have been delivered to Russia, according to a statement of the Administrator. The rate of shipping-losses amounts to 1%.

Danzig... General of the Air Force QUADE declared to a Danzig audience, that anyone who complains of the small number of Allied raiders brought down, when equipped with a pocket-flashlight and a revolver, should himself try to bring down a sparrow flying in the dark.

London. In the night of Feb 15th - 16th the RAF dropped 2,500 tons of bombs on targets in Berlin within the space of 30 minutes. From this and other operations that night, 43 planes failed to return. This, till now the greatest air-attack of the war, was five times as heavy as the heaviest German air-raid on London (that of May 10th 1941). With this RAF raid the weight of bombs dropped on the Reich capital in 15 heavy raids spread over the last 3 months is brought up to 23,500 tons.

The facts and utterances given in this Information Sheet for German troops should suffice to show that Germany's situation is now completely hopeless.

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

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

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
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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
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Advisory Committees
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Industry Liaison Officer
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PROGRAM MANAGERS
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PROGRAM MANAGERS
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WAR FOOD
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GRAPHICS BUREAU
MOTION PICTURE BUREAU
NEWS BUREAU
RADIO BUREAU
SPECIAL SERVICE BUREAU

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
Organization and Membership of the Review Board
WASHINGTON
Overseas Director
Executive Director
Deputy Directors
(Reg. Specialists)
Liaison Chief
Spec. Adviser Pol
OWI Director (Ex
Assoc. Director \ Off.
NEW YORK
Assistant Chief for Policy
Regional Specialists
Media Specialists
Outpost Representatives
SAN FRANCISCO
Regional Specialists
Spec. Adviser on Policy
Spec. Adviser on Long Range Operations
DIRECTOR'S OFFICE
DIRECTOR
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ASST EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
LIAISON CHIEF
Bureau of Intelligence
AREA ONE
Deputy Director Regional Specialists (Wash. & N. Y.)
AREA TWO
Deputy Director Regional Specialists (Wash., N.Y., San Fran.)
AREA THREE
Deputy Director Regional Specialists (Wash., N.Y., San Fran.)
Outpost Service Bureau
Communication Facilities Bureau
Short Range Control Staff
NEW YORK OFFICE
Chief of New York Office
Assistant Chief for Policy
SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE
Chief of San Francisco Office
MOTION PICTURE BUREAU
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OUTPOSTS
ORGANIZATION, OVERSEAS BRANCH
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

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
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
CHIEF OF STAFF
CG 20TH AIR FORCE
JOINT STAFF PLANNERS
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
A C OF S, G-2
PROPAGANDA BRANCH
ARMY MEMBER OF JCS LIAISON WITH OWI, CIAA (CHIEF OF BRANCH)
DEPUTY CHIEF (AIR)
CHIEF OF BRANCH (USING OPD AND OTHER WD CHANNELS)
O W I
C I A A
O S S
THEATERS
PWD SHAEF
PWB AFHQ
TPWO CHINA
PWB OTHERS
OPERATIONS
RESEARCH
ADMINISTRATION
MILITARY GUIDANCE FOR OWI
LIAISON WITH OWI, OSS, NAVY, STATE, ETC
MORNING FLASH
DAILY REPORT
SPECIAL PROJECTS
SPEECH AND PUBLICATIONS CLEARANCE
SPECIAL STUDIES

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
SECRETARIAT
SOSAI-KAMBO
INVESTIGATION OFFICE SHINGISHITSU
PLANS INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA
SECRETARIAL SECTION · HISHO-KA
DIRECTOR
PROTOCOL SECTION · BUSHO · KA
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AND PUBLIC RELATIONS CONTROL
THIRD DIVISION
DAISAN-BU
DIRECTOR
1st SECTION · DIRECTOR
REPORTS FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS,
NEWS FROM FOREIGN NEWSPAPERS,
DIRECTS OVERSEAS BROADCASTS
2nd SECTION · DIRECTOR
OVERSEAS CULTURAL WORK
AND PROPAGANDA
OUT PUT

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PRODUCTION
of a
TACTICAL LEAFLET
(Army Level)



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日本天皇陛下に捧呈されたルーズベルト大統領の親書



去る一九四一年十二月六日ルーズベルト大統領は天皇陛下に鄭重にして政治家らしい親書を捧呈したが此のメセジは日米國交の斷絶を避ける最後の手段として書かれたものである而して此の親書は通常の外交機關を通じて陛下に捧呈せられたのであるが、陛下からは何の回答も無かつた。

日本人が斯くも禮儀を盡した且つ重要なる親書を無視する程失禮であるとは考へられない。所が日本の海軍は昭和十六年十二月七日布哇を攻撃し、我が米國合衆國に對して戰闘を開始したのであつた。

故にルーズベルト大統領の親書が天皇陛下に傳達されなかつた事が明らかである。若し陛下の風耳に達してゐたならば今日の日米戰爭を防止することが出來てゐたであらう。

ルーズベルト大統領の親書を内側に紹介しやう。

發行所　亞米利加政府

PUBLISHED BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Roosevelt's Unanswered Letter to the Emperor Hirohito

On December 6, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, addressed a courteous and statesmanlike letter to His Imperial Majesty, Emperor of Japan. The letter was written in a final effort to avert war between the two countries and was forwarded to His Imperial Majesty through the usual diplomatic channels. The letter was never answered. It is unthinkable that any Japanese would be guilty of the gross discourtesy of ignoring a polite and important letter. On December 7, 1941 the Japanese armed forces attacked the United States in Hawaii. It is therefore quite obvious that the letter from President Roosevelt was never delivered to the Emperor. Had it not been kept from him, the war might well have been averted. The letter appears within.

His Imperial Majesty Hirohito, Emperor of Japan:

"Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far reaching emergency which appears to be in formation. Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.

"The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations between our two governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion, that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all, and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any nation.

"I am certain that it will be clear to your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seemed essential to the attainment of the high objectives.

"More than a year ago your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement with the Vichy Government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter northern French Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north. And this spring and summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese military forces to enter into southern French Indo-China for the common defense of French Indo-China. I think I am correct in saying that no attack has been made upon Indo-China nor that any has been contemplated.

"During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character.

"Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest corners of that peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions.

"I am sure that your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear, inasmuch as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.

"It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.

"None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

"There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

"I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the governments of the East Indies, the governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

"I address myself to your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries, but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.

May God have your Majesty in his safe and holy keeping. Your good friend,

Franklin Delano Roosevelt."

國際問題に關して陛下に親書を捧呈するのは日米國交非常時の場合のみと考へます。緊局に直面し今特に重大危機を醸もさんとしつゝあるかの如き日米關係を考察する時、陛下に親書を差上げ御協力を仰ぐべきだと考へたのであります。

太平洋の現時局は永年の日米親善によつて齎された繁栄を我が兩國、ひいては全人類から奪ひ、悲惨なる將來を生む可能性を充分に持つて居ります。兩國も榮へ、同時に他國の權利も認め、相互扶助の精神で世界の平和は維持さるべきであると信じてゐる米國民は過去數ヶ月間續行されてゐる日米交渉を熱心に注目してゐるのであります。

我々は日支事變が一日も早く解決されることを望んで居ります。又我々は太平洋に永遠の平和が訪れ人種、文化の相異つた國民が攻撃される怖れもなく安心して生活が營まれ、戰備の重荷から解放され、且つ公平平等を基本とせる世界自由貿易の實現されることを念願してゐるものであります。

御賢明なる陛下には日米兩國が此の重大目的を成就する爲に、その手段として武力を用ひないことが上策であることはよくお分りになることと思ひます。[illegible]これは日米會談成功の必須條件だとさへもかんがへられるのであります。

日本帝國は約一ヶ年以前、南支那派遣軍援助の爲に北佛印へ五、六千の日本軍を駐屯せしめる協定をフランス、ビシー政府と締結されました。更に今年の春と夏、ビシー政府は佛印共同防衛の爲に日本軍の南佛印上陸を許しました。

然し乍ら此の間佛印が一度も他國から攻撃を受けず、且又侵略を考慮してゐた國は無かつたと云つても過言ではありますまい。過去數週間日本の陸海空軍が斯くも多數南佛印方面へ派遣されたことは、その目的が防衛のみの爲で無いと云ふ疑を諸國に起さずに至つたのであります。日本軍の佛印派遣軍が増加され、更に佛印の東西兩南端へ日本軍が進駐したことは、比島、蘭印、マレー、タイ諸國の國民に日本軍の次の目標はどの方面に向けられるであらうかと云ふ不安の念を持たすに至りました。彼等が平和攪亂と國家存亡を憂慮してゐる心持は陛下にもお分りになることゝ存じます。同時に多くの米國民が防衛のみの爲でなく、攻勢な軍事行動を執り得るだけの準備をなしつゝある日本の眞意を知りたいと云ふ氣持もお分りになることゝ思ひます。

斯かる状態が何時までも續くとはかんがへられません。前に申上げた諸國のどの國民だつて何時までもダイナマイトの上に坐つてゐる譯にはいきません。米國が佛印に侵入する計畫を有してゐないことは確言致します。勿論之は日本軍が最後の一人まで佛印から撤退することを前提としなければなりません。蘭印、マレー、タイ諸國からも同様の保證を得ることが出來ると思ひます。御希望ならば支那からも同様の保證を得る交渉に當る準備があります。

斯くの如くかんがへます時、南太平洋平和の鍵は佛印から日本軍が撤去することだと云ふ結論に達するのであります。暗雲に包まれた太平洋に平和の光明を齎らさんとする念願のあまり、余は陛下に此のメセヂを捧呈し、御協力を切望する次第であります。

陛下と余は單に日米兩國民のみならず、全友邦諸國民の爲に永年續けられた日米親善關係を回復し、全世界を今日以上の殺人と破壞から救ふ義務を有すると確信するものであります。

陛下の御健康を祈ります。

陛下の良き友　フランクリン・デラノ・ルーズベルト

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

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
TARIKHI NAZZARA—JAB ECH
AZAD HIND KI ARZI
HAKUMAT KA ELAN
KIYA GIYA
MASHAN PURBI ESHIA KI
JATIYON KI BAITHAK JO
TOKIYO MEN WAQE HUI

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THE Commander-in-Chief, the officers, and the men of the American Forces of Liberation in the Pacific wish their gallant allies, the People of the Philippines, all the blessings of Christmas, and the realization of their fervent hopes for the New Year.

Christmas, 1944

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BUY AN APPLE
BUY AN APPLE
"Brother got a dime for me!"
„BROTHER GOT A DIME FOR ME . . ."
You certainly know that song of 1920.
In those days Ex-Servicemen were selling apples in the streets!
Veterans were forced to organize a »hunger march» to Washington to get their bonus which the politicians had promised to them for twenty years.
Well, all that happened after the »great victory» of 1918. Was it a »great victory» for the »man-in-the-street», the farmer or the Ex-Serviceman?
NO, CERTAINLY NOT!
He was good enough to risk his life a thousand times, but
AFTER THE WAR HE WAS FORGOTTEN.
When the great plants of the war-industry closed on the morning after the armistice, the ex-soldier faced unemployment and misery for many years.
WHAT WILL BECOME OF YOU AFTER THIS WAR?
The very same thing will happen again.
Every war in history was followed by a great depression and widespread unemployment.
Do'nt be a fool and believe the bombastic talk emanating from busy propaganda offices in Washington about »everlasting peace and prosperity» after this war.
Get this through your head:
There is only one class of people profiting from any war:
Wallstreet and the Jews!
They want you to fight because your blood will bring fat dividends to the moneyed gang in Wallstreet. For their profit you are expected to give your life or to return some day as a cripple, only to
SELL APPLES AGAIN!

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

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軍事郵便
11
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20
運哭無藏
果して君は……
陛下のために死んだか
誰が……
母から彼を
奪ったか？
誰が……
彼の生命を
踏基に
したのか？

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

über die Landstraßen, mit einem armselig kleinen Bündel bepackt. Wieviel Tränen mag der Abschied von Haus und Hof wieder gekostet haben, bleibt uns Menschen nichts erspart? Die letzten 14 Tage waren für uns eine Nervenzerreißprobe, und nichts können wir durch einen noch so eisenharten Willen aufhalten. Ich weiß nur, daß der Führer Männer braucht wie z. B. Dich, Paul, Männer, die für ihre Ideen leben und auch sterben. Aber was hier in der Heimat für ein Spiel getrieben wird, ist verächtlich und so feige, daß ich innerlich empört darüber bin. Du kannst dir nicht vorstellen wie jetzt die Frauen um ihre Männer zittern, die in der Partei sind, ganz zu schweigen von den Männern selbst. Was ich dir hier schreibe ist kein Märchen oder eine Lüge, sondern eine Tatsache, die ich selbst miterlebte. Kannst du mir sagen, ob das vielleicht von Charakter zeugt, wenn Parteigenossen, nun, nachdem mal eine Bewährungsprobe an sie herantritt hingehen und Uniformen und Abzeichen und alle schriftlichen Sachen vernichten? Daß die Führerbilder das nächste Vernichtungsobjekt sind, ist ebenfalls nur eine traurige Tatsache. So weit sind wir aber schon gekommen, dann kann man es den Soldaten an der Front, die schon 5 Jahre im Kampf stehen, bestimmt nicht verdenken, wenn sie ein baldiges Kriegsende herbeisehnen. Ich habe bisher noch jeden Menschen geachtet, der seine Ideen und Anschauungen verteidigte, aber wer jetzt nur an sein bischen Leben denkt und gleich den Mantel schwenkt: das ist ein Lump. Ich wünsche manchmal, ein barmherziges Geschick machte diesem Leben ein Ende. Ein ewiger Kampf wird es immer bleiben, und wofür? Unsere Zukunft ist so ungewiß, nirgendwo ein erstrebenswertes Ziel. Es küßt dich

ewig deine

Rita

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

scamps, packed with their pitiful little bundles. How many tears must be shed at leaving house and home. Is no mercy to be shown to us human beings?

The last fortnight has been a nerve-shattering trial for us, and however we steel our wills we can't stave off anything. All I know is that the Führer needs men – men like you, Paul, for example. Men who are ready to live, and also to die, for their ideas. What's going on here is so contemptible and cowardly that I'm seething with rage! You can't imagine how the women are quaking with fear for their menfolk in the Party – not to speak of the men themselves! What sort of people are they? Can you tell me? – Party members who, once they have been put to a little bit of testing, go off and destroy their uniforms, badges and all documents? The fact that the pictures of the Führer are the first things to be destroyed is just one additional sad fact. Things have come to such a pass that one can't think ill of the soldiers at the front, who've been in the war for five years, if they wish for a speedy end to it.

Until now I respected any man who defended his ideas and views, but a man who at this time simply clings to his little bit of life and at once becomes a turncoat – he's a scoundrel.

I wish merciful fate would put an end to this life. It will never be anything but fighting. And what for? Our future is so uncertain. Nothing anywhere is worth striving for.

love and kisses,

Eternally yours

Rita.

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Luftpost AUSGABE SÜD

UND SOLDATEN-NACHRICHTEN

TOTALER ZUSAMMENBRUCH

VOR LEIPZIG

NEUE KESSEL - HARZ UND HOLLAND

DIE Alliierten haben in Holland die Nordsee bei Ternaard erreicht. Im Westen von Dessau vereinigten sich Verbände der amerikanischen 9. und 1. Armee. Zwei weitere Kessel - im Harz und in den Niederlanden - wurden geschlossen. Amerikanische und britische Panzer aber überlassen die Säuberungsoperationen der Infanterie und rasen vorwärts. Richtung Hamburg, Berlin, Dresden, Prag und München.

SCHLAGZEILEN DER WOCHE

ÜBER DIE TRAISEN

ANGRIFF AN DER ODER UND NEISSE

JEDER TAG EIN SEDAN

FERIEN ZUENDE

ESSEG GEFALLEN

UBER DEN SILLARO

OSTERREICH

落下傘ニュース

マ元帥以下聯合軍 廿八日に本土進駐

正式調印は進駐直後

新内閣に望む

朝日新聞の論説要旨

聖旨を奉ぜよ

日本政府各軍に訓令

各戦線の日本軍 降伏手續を開始

日本使節團

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

Am 8. April 42 888 deutsche Gefangene im Westen

In HOLLAND kanadische Panzer 25 km vor der ZUIDER SEE.

In Nordost-Holland Landungen alliierter Fallschirmtruppen.

Britische Panzer 10 km vor HANNOVER, 8 km vor BREMEN.

Die Alliierten in den nordwestlichen Vororten von DORTMUND und 8 km nordoestlich ESSEN.

CRAILSHEIM erreicht.

PFORZHEIM von den Franzosen erobert.

WIEN von Sueden, Suedosten, Westen und Nordwesten eingeschlossen.

Hauptbahnhof und Hafen von KOENIGSBERG in russischer Hand.

Generaloberst der SS Sepp Dietrich, Kampfkommandant von Wien, am Sonntag ermordet

9. April 1945

S - 226

Wer fuer die Partei sterben will, der macht weiter.

Wer fuer Deutschland leben will, der macht Schluss !

AUCH DU HAST DIE WAHL :

Entweder : Weiterkaempfen — fuer ein gewissenloses Regime, fuer die voellige Zerstoerung Deutschlands

Oder Weiterleben — fuer Deutschlands Zukunft.

Seit Juni 1944 haben bereits 1 1/4 Million deutscher Soldaten im Westen gewaehlt. Die sind jetzt in alliierter Kriegsgefangenschaft — die haben sich dadurch ihre Rueckkehr in die Heimat gesichert.

ENTSCHEIDE DICH !

Die Alliierten an der Elbe

MAGDEBURG ERREICHT !

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An all Elsässer, Lothringer unn Luxeburjer
DIE SCHLACHT KOMMT JETZT ZUE EJSCH!
Un all Elsesser, Lothrenger an Letzeburger
D'SCHLUECHT KENNT UN IECH ERUN!
Aux habitants d'Alsace, de Lorraine et du Grand Duché de Luxembourg
LA BATAILLE S'APPROCHE DE VOUS!
L'ÉLIMINATION de la 7ème Armée Allemande, en tant que force combattante a décidé de l'issue de la bataille de France. Les survivants de la bataille de Normandie, ainsi que les quelques divisions qui se trouvent encore au nord de la Seine, peuvent tout au plus entreprendre une série d'opérations de retardement, tandis qu'ils se replient vers l'Allemagne. Par conséquent, les secteurs dans lesquels vous habitez se trouvent déjà en arrière des zones d'opérations militaires. Ils peuvent, d'un moment à l'autre, devenir le théâtre de nouveaux combats. En raison de ces faits, les instructions suivantes ont été publiées par le Commandement Suprême des Forces Expéditionnaires Interalliées:
LES LIGNES DE COMMUNICATION SERONT SOUMISES A DES BOMBARDEMENTS :
SI LES ALLEMANDS ESSAYENT DE VOUS CONTRAINDRE A EXECUTER DES TRAVAUX :
S'ILS COMMETTENT DE NOUVEAUX CRIMES ET DE NOUVELLES ATROCITES :
RUCKSITT LÄSE! DRE'HT EM!

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အလုပ်လုပ်သူများအတွက်
Amu galaw ai ni yawng a matu
တုဂုခင်း လရှိတ်ဂခင်
ငွေအမှန်နှင့်
Gumhpraw Majing
ငိုခင်းလိတ်ငိုခင်းမခင်
စါနပ်ရိကွာများ
Lusha Kaja
ခပ်ခဇ့်တင်းဂိခင်ကခင်လီ

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

Shabrai, lusha rai hte
kumhpa ni sa la ma ru!

Jinghkin ni e! Dai ngwi praw sim sa let,
nang nang a hu ga dum ate de bai nateng wa
lu na shani hpe la nga myit ni? Dai kabu shann
hpe, sa Munzhawng ni hpe karum ai majan
hte dang lu ai re ai.

Tra hte myren, tengmun gumhprawhte lu-
sha kaja na hpe Munzhawng ni bink jaw nga
mai ai. Bink jaw ai lusha ni gaw, atta shandung-
a gu, jumdwi, asumsan, hte jasa ni ran nga ai.
Hungli kaja galaw ai nanhta ni hpe kaga mraun
dap kumhpa mung jai jen nga ai. Jinghkin ni e!
Nankte galaw dang ai hungli ni sawng nga ai.

Munzhawng lakrak ni Japan ei hpe anut
mran kau wa nga ma ai. Mung manka ai hung-
le gaiaw karoop sa mat rai. Japan ni hpe Myan
mung kaw ana nahte rau jawm gawt shaprawe
kau ga. Myit mung akkaram hte sha majan
jawm gaw ga yang, majan loi lut ma re.

Munzhawng ni hpe hungli galaw karum let,
mdai majan hte gui padang jawm dum ga. Dai
ni shabrai hte lusha ni hpe sa la ma rai.

Shabrai ni.	
Kuli ni	Lani ni lap 1
Kali gawng ni	Lani ni lap 1 ga 4
Lakasana ni	Lani ni lap 1 ga 8
Jek sara ni	Shara ni lap 45 nan 90
Burma long hte gawt sana kyaun	Lani ni lap 2

Hapa jai jaw kumhpa ni.

Shara ni hte 25 ya galaw yang .. lap 5
Shara ni hte 30 ya galaw yang .. lap 10

Japan ni hpe jawm gawt ga

ကိုရင်ကြီးနှင့် ဆုတ်ကြီးမြွေ

ဆေးရုံတက်ရသူ – ကိုဦးဆင်းသည် ဆေးခန်းသို့ ရောက်လာသောအခါ ဆရာဝန်ကြီးက ဆေးခန်းတွင် ဆေးထိုးခြင်း၊ ဆေးသောက်ခြင်း၊ ဆေးလိမ်းခြင်း စသည်တို့ကို ပြုလုပ်ပေးသည်။ ဆေးခန်းမှ ပြန်ရောက်သောအခါ ကိုဦးဆင်းသည် ဆေးခန်းတွင် ပြုလုပ်ပေးသည့်အတိုင်း ဆေးသောက်ခြင်း၊ ဆေးထိုးခြင်း၊ ဆေးလိမ်းခြင်းတို့ကို ပြုလုပ်ပေးသည်။ ဆရာဝန်ကြီးက ဆေးခန်းတွင် ပြုလုပ်ပေးသည့်အတိုင်း ကိုယ်တိုင်ပြုလုပ်ပေးသည်။ ဆရာဝန်ကြီးက ဆေးခန်းတွင် ပြုလုပ်ပေးသည့်အတိုင်း ကိုယ်တိုင်ပြုလုပ်ပေးသည်။

ကိုရင်ကြီးနှင့် ဆုတ်ကြီးမြွေ

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Frontpost
AUSGABE SÜD
Nachrichtenblatt für deutsche Soldaten
Nummer 123
16. April 1945

224 306 in 7 Tagen

Russen im Zentrum von Wien

SONDERMELDUNG

(TRANSLATION)

Frontpost
AUSGABE SÜD
FRONTPOST, Southern Edition
April 16th, 1945

224,306 in 7 days

Russians in centre of Vienna

STOP PRESS

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Das ist das Ende:

Patton über den Rhein südlich Mainz

MONTGOMERY ERZWINGT ÜBERGANG ÜBER NIEDERRHEIN

Amerikaner vernichten 7. Armee und 1. Panzer-Armee

Pfalz und Saargebiet überrannt

Über 1 100 000 Gefangene seit der Invasion

Bleibt am Leben!

DEUTSCHLANDS ZUKUNFT

Roosevelt erläutert die Beschlüsse der Krim-Konferenz.

WIR werden in unseren Anstrengungen nicht einen Augenblick nachlassen bis zur bedingungslosen Kapitulation des Gegners. Das deutsche Volk und die deutschen Soldaten müssen sich darüber klar sein: Je eher sie den Kampf einstellen und die Waffen strecken — sei es in Gruppen oder als Einzelne —, desto eher werden ihre gegenwärtigen Leiden vorüber sein. Und weiter muss sich das deutsche Volk darüber klar sein: Nur durch restlose Kapitulation kann es den Anfang damit machen, wieder ein Volk zu werden, das die Welt als gesittete Nachbarn anerkennt. Wir haben es in Yalta eindeutig ausgesprochen, und ich wiederhole es jetzt noch einmal:

Bedingungslose Kapitulation bedeutet nicht die Versklavung oder Vernichtung des deutschen Volkes.

Diesen Teil der Yalta-Erklärung hat die nationalsozialistische Führung dem deutschen Volk in Presse und Rundfunk bewusst vorenthalten. Die Nazi-Führer wollen dem deutschen Volk einreden, die Yalta-Erklärung bedeute Versklavung und Vernichtung des deutschen Volkes. Denn auf diese Weise hoffen die Nazis ihre eigene Haut zu retten, durch diese Täuschung wollen sie das deutsche Volk zu weiterem, nutzlosem Widerstand anreizen.

Roosevelt über die Bedeutung des Begriffs „Bedingungslose Kapitulation".

„Aber wir haben auf der Yalta-Konferenz keinen Zweifel darüber gelassen, was bedingungslose kapitulation für Deutschland bedeutet. Kapitulation bedeutet: Zeitweilige Übernahme Deutschlands durch Grossbritannien, Russland, Frankreich und die Vereinigten Staaten. Eine Kontrollkommission, bestehend aus den Vertretern der vier Mächte mit dem Sitz in Berlin, wird die Verwaltung der vier Besetzungs-Zonen koordinieren.

Bedingungslose Kapitulation bedeutet ferner das Ende des Nationalsozialismus und der NSDAP mit all ihren barbarischen Gesetzen und Einrichtungen. Bedingungslose Kapitulation bedeutet das Ende aller militaristischen Einflüsse im öffentlichen, privaten und kulturellen Leben Deutschlands.

Für die nationalsozialistischen Kriegsverbrecher bedeutet bedingungslose Kapitulation schnelle, gerechte und endgültige Bestrafung. Kapitulation bedeutet auch die völlige Entwaffnung Deutschlands, die endgültige Beseitigung des deutschen Militarismus, die Vernichtung aller deutschen Kriegsgeräte, das Ende der deutschen Rüstungsindustrie, die Demobilisierung aller deutschen Streitkräfte und die endgültige Auflösung des deutschen Generalstabs, der so oft den Frieden der Welt erschüttert hat. Den von ihm angerichteten Schaden wird Deutschland in Sachleistungen gutmachen müssen — durch Auslieferung von Industrie-Anlagen, Industrieller Ausrüstung, rollendem Material und Rohstoffen.

Wir werden nicht wieder, wie nach dem vorigen Krieg, in den Fehler verfallen, Wiedergutmachung in Geldleistungen zu verlangen, die Deutschland niemals aufbringen kann. Wir wollen nicht, dass das deutsche Volk Hunger leidet oder eine Last für die übrige Welt wird. Die Absicht, die wir bei der Politik gegenüber Deutschland leitet, lässt sich in wenige Worte zusammenfassen: Wir wollen kommenden Generationen den Frieden sichern."

Roosevelt über die Aufrechterhaltung des Weltfriedens.

„Die Krim-Konferenz war eine erfolgreiche Aktion der drei führenden Nationen, um eine gemeinsame Basis für den Frieden zu schaffen. Sie bedeutet das Ende des Systems der einseitigen Aktionen, der exklusiven Bündnisse, der Interessensphären, der Gleichgewichtspolitik und aller anderen Experimente, die in den letzten Jahrhunderten versagt haben — und fehlgeschlagen haben.

Wir beabsichtigen statt dieser Systeme eine Weltorganisation zu schaffen, in die schliesslich alle friedliebenden Nationen eintreten können. Ich bin überzeugt, dass der Kongress und das amerikanische Volk die Ergebnisse der Konferenz gutheissen werden, als eine Basis für den Frieden, auf der wir weiter aufbauen können, um mit Gottes Hilfe eine bessere Welt zu schaffen, die Welt der Zukunft, in der unsere Kinder und Kindeskinder — die Kinder und Kindeskinder von uns allen, von der ganzen Welt — leben werden."

Der Bericht Präsident Roosevelts wurde vom amerikanischen Kongress mit überwältigender Stimmenmehrheit gutgeheissen und angenommen.

This is it!

Patton across the Rhine south of Mainz

MONTGOMERY FORCES CROSSING OF THE LOWER RHINE

Americans annihilate 7th Army and 1st Tank Army

Palatinate and Saar overrun

More than 1 100 000 prisoners since the invasion

Hang on to life!

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY

Roosevelt discusses the Crimea Conference Decisions

WE will not decide for one moment until unconditional surrender. The German people, as well as the German soldiers, must realize that the sooner they give up and surrender, by groups or as individuals, the sooner their present agony will be over. They must realize that only with complete surrender can they begin to reestablish themselves as people whom the world might perhaps at decent neighbors. We made it clear again at Yalta, and I here repeat:

Unconditional surrender does not mean the destruction or enslavement of the German people.

"The Nazi leaders have deliberately withheld that part of the Yalta declaration from the German press and radio. They seek to convince the people of Germany that the Yalta declaration does mean slavery and destruction for them, for that is how the Nazis hope to save their own skins and deceive their people into continued useless resistance.

Roosevelt on the meaning of the term "Unconditional Surrender."

"We did, however, make it clear at this conference just what unconditional surrender does mean for Germany. It means the temporary control of Germany by Great Britain, Russia, France and the United States. Each of these nations will occupy and control a separate zone of Germany—and the coordination of the four zones will be co-ordinated in Berlin by a control council composed of representatives of the four nations."

"Moreover, unconditional surrender means the end of National Socialism and the Nazi Party with all its barbaric laws and institutions. Unconditional surrender means the end of all militaristic influence in the public, private and cultural life of Germany."

"For the Nazi war criminals, unconditional surrender means quick, just and severe punishment. Capitulation means also the complete disarmament of Germany, the final extirpation of German militarism, the destruction of all German war material, the end of German war industry, the demobilization of all German armed forces, and the absolute dissolution of the German General Staff which has so often disturbed the peace of the world. For the damage she has done, Germany will have to make reparations in kind—by surrendering plants and machinery, rolling stock and raw materials."

"We will not, as after the last war, commit the error of demanding reparations in the form of money which Germany could never pay. We do not want the German people to starve, or to become a burden on the rest of the world. Our objective in handling Germany is simple—it is to secure peace of the future world."

Roosevelt on the maintenance of world peace.

"The Crimean Conference was a successful effort by the three leading nations to find a common ground for peace. It spells the end of the system of unilateral action, had exclusive alliances and spheres of influence and balance of power and all the other expedients which have been tried for centuries—and have failed."

"We propose to substitute for all these a universal organization in which all peace-loving nations will finally have a chance to join. I am confident that the Congress and the American people will accept the results of this conference as the beginnings of a permanent structure of peace upon which we can begin to build, under God, that better world to which our children and grandchildren—yours and mine, the children and grandchildren of the whole world—must live."

The United States Congress by an overwhelming majority of votes approved and accepted President Roosevelt's report.

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ALLIIERTES OBERKOMMANDO

(Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force)

BEFEHL

AN DIE VERSPRENGTEN DEUTSCHEN TRUPPENTEILE

Das schnelle Vordringen der Alliierten hat es mit sich gebracht, dass zahlreiche deutsche Einheiten versprengt und aufgelöst worden sind und daher von zuständiger deutscher Seite keine Befehle mehr erhalten können.

Um nutzlose Opfer an Menschenleben zu vermeiden, ergeht daher folgender Befehl:

1.) Deutsche Soldaten, die abgeschnitten oder versprengt wurden, sowie Einheiten, die vom deutschen Kommando keine Befehle mehr erhalten, haben sich beim nächstliegenden alliierten Truppenteil zu melden.

2.) Bis dahin ist der Einheitsführer bezw. rangälteste Unteroffizier für die Disziplin seiner Mannschaft verantwortlich. Die umstehenden Verhaltungsmassregeln für versprengte Einheiten treten mit sofortiger Wirksamkeit in Kraft.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Oberbefehlshaber der Alliierten Streitkräfte

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

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
赤山
サコビアル
黄山
深山
投降史
五谷製材所
米軍ココニ在リ
中原
ストチェンバク
パニグ川
クツノ山
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
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待遇ノ受ケ好キ食物清潔ナ食事又
手厚キ医師ノ看護ヲ受ケルヲ證明スルモノ
デアル米國兵士ニ此ノ勧降状ヲ
持参スレバ可ナリ.
I
SURRENDER
ATTENTION
AMERICAN
SOLDIERS
THIS LEAFLET GUARANTEES HUMANE
TREATMENT TO ANY JAPANESE
DESIRING TO SURRENDER TAKE
HIM IMMEDIATELY TO YOUR NEAREST
COMMISSIONED OFFICER
BY ORDER C.G. U.S. FORCES

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ATTENTION AMERICAN SOLDIERS!

I CEASE RESISTANCE

THIS LEAFLET GUARANTEES HUMANE TREATMENT TO ANY JAPANESE DESIRING TO CEASE RESISTANCE. TAKE HIM IMMEDIATELY TO YOUR NEAREST COMMISSIONED OFFICER.

By Direction of the Commander in Chief.

上の英文の内容は「この人は最早や敵でなく國際條約により生命衣食住は勿論醫療等が完全に保証さるべき者なり」と云ふ意味が書かれてゐる。

出来ればこの紙を木の枝にはさみそれと手に持って両手を揚げ我方に接近して来られ我將兵に會へば恐れず安心して手真似に從へばよい。

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An die überlebenden Soldaten und Offiziere der

7. Armee!

Alliierte Panzer stehen jetzt hinter Euch. Während Ihr gegen die überwältigende Übermacht an Soldaten, Panzern, Artillerie und Flugzeugen gekämpft habt, haben alliierte Panzerkolonnen Eure Flanke umgangen:

Argentan, der Verkehrsknotenpunkt hinter Euch, ist in alliierten Händen. Der Grossangriff auf Eure rückwärtigen Verbindungen hat nunmehr begonnen.

WAS IST ZU TUN?

Rückzug wäre daher unvermeidlich — aber Ihr habt keine Rückzugslinien. 6 000 alliierte Flugzeuge belegen die schmale Rückzugspforte hinter Euch mit Bomben, Bordwaffen und Raketen. Jeder Rückzug über diese Strassen bedeutet Rückzug ins Verderben.

Euch wird von den Kriegsverlängerern befohlen werden, den selbstmörderischen Kampf fortzusetzen — weiterzukämpfen ohne Luftunterstützung, ohne Reserven, ohne zureichende Transportmittel, ohne Hoffnung.

NUR EINE RETTUNG:

DIESES FLUGBLATT GIBT EUCH GELEGENHEIT, EUER LEBEN FÜR DEUTSCHLAND ZU ERHALTEN. JEDER VON EUCH MUSS FÜR SICH SELBST ENTSCHEIDEN. JE FRÜHER IHR EUCH ENTSCHEIDET, ZURÜCKZUBLEIBEN, DESTO WAHRSCHEINLICHER IST ES, DASS IHR DEN FRIEDEN NOCH ERLEBT.

back

To the surviving officers and men of the

7th Army

Allied tanks now stand ***behind you.*** While you have fought against an overwhelming superiority of men, tanks, artillery and aircraft, Allied tank columns swept around you :

Argentan, the communications hub in your rear, is in Allied hands. The big attack on your rear has now begun.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

Retreat, therefore, is unavoidable — but you have no lines of retreat. 6,000 Allied planes are pounding the narrow escape gap behind you with bombs, machine-guns and rockets. Any retreat over those roads is a retreat into disaster.

You will be ordered by the war-prolongers, to continue the suicidal fight — to go on fighting without air support, without reserves, without sufficient transport, without hope.

ONLY ONE WAY OUT:

THIS LEAFLET GIVES YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO SAVE YOUR LIVES *FOR GERMANY*. EVERYONE OF YOU MUST DECIDE FOR HIMSELF. THE SOONER YOU DECIDE TO STAY BACK, THE MORE PROBABLE IT IS THAT YOU WILL LIVE TO SEE THE PEACE.

back

美國駐韓第八軍公用信箋

通行證

為發給通行證事特證人及
其同伴自願依照規定解除
武裝中止抗拒並向聯軍投
誠沿途聯軍部隊應予收容
此令

駐韓美軍事代表團
軍司令部

李治威

EIGHTH
UNITED STATES ARMY

"OFFICIAL EIGHTH ARMY SAFE CONDUCT PASS"

It is hereby ordered that accomodations and good treatment be given to the bearer of this certificate and his followers. They have voluntarily disarmed themselves, ceased resistance, and surrender to the UN forces in accordance with proper procedure.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RIDGWAY:

OFFICIAL:
R. L. BUTT Jr
Lt. Col. AGC
Acting Adjutant General

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Maj Gen, GSC
Chief of Staff

EUSAK 8013 CHINESE

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DIE FOR THE
WALL STREET ?
NO ! DEMAND
GIVING UP FIGHTING
AND GO HOME SOON !
THE C.P.V.F.

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

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

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對하여 反抗하는 貴國을 援助하라고 要請하였음으로
우리는 積極的으로 援助하겠읍니다.
堅固·沈着·大膽하며 猛烈히 敵을 對抗하십시요.
우리는 韓國과 힘을 合하여 侵略者를 貴國으로
부터 擊退하겠읍니다.



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HAS APPEALED TO AMERICAN FORCES IN JAPAN TO ASSIST YOU PEACE-LOVING CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN YOUR STRUGGLE AGAINST THE UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH.

WE SHALL GIVE YOU EVERY SUPPORT.

BE STEADFAST. BE CALM. BE COURAGEOUS.

RESIST FIRMLY. TOGETHER WE SHALL DRIVE THE AGGRESSOR FROM YOUR TERRITORY.

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HEADQUARTERS
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СМЕЛЫМ ЛЁТЧИКАМ РЕАКТИВНЫХ САМОЛЁТОВ 20 апреля 1953 года

ПУТЬ К СВОБОДЕ

Товарищи лётчики! Дальневосточное Командование предлагает свою помощь всем смелым лётчикам, желающим освободиться от коммунистического ига и начать новую, лучшую жизнь, с должным почётом в свободном мире.

Дальневосточное Командование гарантирует вам убежище, защиту, человеческую заботу и внимание. Вам дана полная гарантия в том, что ваши имена останутся в тайне, если вы того пожелаете.

Товарищи лётчики! Ваш смелый шаг приведёт вас к свободе и даст вам возможность жить в дальнейшем без страха за своё благополучие. По мимо этого, своим героизмом и решительностью вы поможете другим, указав им путь к свободе.

Дальневосточное Командование вознаградит суммой в 50,000 американских долларов каждого лётчика, который приведёт к посадке в Южной Корее современный реактивный самолёт в боевой готовности. Первый лётчик совершивший посадку на таком самолёте получит в награду добавочную сумму в 50,000 американских долларов за свою смелость.

Ниже даны инструкции всем лётчикам желающим освободиться от коммунистического ига.

Летите к острову Хакурейто (о. Пенген-то), который находится в 50 километрах к югу от острова Чото. От Хакурейто (о. Пенген-то) направляйтесь к авиобазе Кимпо, всё время находясь на высоте 6100 метров. Начинайте спускаться над авиобазой Кимпо и подготовляйтесь к немедленной посадке. Самолёты ОН будут охранять вас всё время летя над хвостом вашего самолёта. Если плохая видимость не позволит вам самостоятельно совершить посадку на авиобазе Кимпо, то направляйтесь к Сеульскому району, и находясь на высоте 6100 метров спустите посадочные колёса. Один из самолётов ОН подлетит вплотную к вашему и летя рядом приведёт вас к безопасному месту посадки. При первом-же контакте с самолётом ОН, или в случае попытки одного из самолётов ОН атаковать вас, моментально спустите посадочные колёса и начните с силой качать крыльями вашего самолёта.

Свободный мир ждёт вашего прибытия.

Mark W. Clark

МАРК В.КЛАРК
Генерал Армии США
Главнокомандующий Вооружёнными Силами
на Дальнем Востоке.

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ТОВАРИЩИ ПИЛОТЫ!

Если вы любите свободу...

Если у вас есть смелость...

Если вы хотите начать новую, лучшую жизнь, то...

Вот Ваша Возможность!

Избавтесь от Коммунистического Ига!

Летите на Своем Реактивном Самолете к Свободному Миру!

Свобода и Вознаграждение Ждут Вас Впереди!



Товарищи лётчики!

Дальневосточное Командование предлагает свою помощь всем смелым лётчикам, желающим освободиться от коммунистического ига и начать новую, лучшую жизнь, с должным почётом в свободном мире. Товарищи! Генерал Марк В. Кларк, Главнокомандующий Вооружёнными Силами на Дальнем Востоке, гарантирует вам убежище, защиту, человеческую заботу и внимание. Вам дана полная гарантия в том, что ваши имена останутся в тайне, если вы того пожелаете. Помимо этого, каждый лётчик, который благополучно посадит на нашей территории современный реактивный самолёт в боевой готовности, получит в награду 50,000 американских долларов. Первый лётчик прилетевший в Южную Корею и доставивший такой реактивный самолёт Вооружённым Силам Об'единённых Наций, получит в награду добавочную сумму в 50,000 американских долларов за свой героизм.

Это фотомартоша молодого лейтенанта Польского Воздушного флота, который жалетел на МИГ-15, реактивном самолете Советского производства из-за Дальнего Дальнего 6 марта этого года и благополучно совершил посадку в Дании на острове Борнгольм. Он получил подлинное убежище и живет сейчас комфортабельной жизнью в Дании.

ИНСТРУКЦИИ, КОТОРЫЕ УКАЖУТ ВАМ ПУТЬ К СВОБОДЕ, ДАНЫ В ПИСЬМЕ НА ОБРАТНОЙ СТОРОНЕ ЛИСТОВКИ. ПРОЧТИТЕ ИНСТРУКЦИИ И СЛЕДУЯ ИНСТРУКЦИЯМ ЛЕТИТЕ К СВОБОДЕ!

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Its Origins

Alfred H. Paddock, Jr.

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US ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE

Its Origins

US ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE

Its Origins

Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952

by

Alfred H. Paddock, Jr.

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FOREWORD

It has been said that the future can only be approached clearly and wisely if the path leading to the present is known. In assessing national security policy choices, decisionmakers often do not have available the clarifying perspective provided by history. Recognizing this problem, the National Defense University has encouraged selected history-oriented research to complement our other topical publications on national security issues. This first volume in our new Military History Series is by Colonel Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., USA, on the origins of the US Army's special warfare capability.

As the most senior of our military services, the Army has undergone many organizational and doctrinal changes since its inception as a small militia force in 1775. But the year 1945 marked the beginning of an era of dramatic change. The new global realities of the post-World War II period suggested the need for an Army able to respond to a spectrum of conflicts. This led to the building of a "special warfare" capability encompassing psychological and unconventional warfare as a response to military challenges at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.

Colonel Paddock traces the origins of Army special warfare from 1941 to 1952, the year the Army's special warfare center was established. While the Army had experience in psychological warfare, the major recent US experience in unconventional warfare had been in the Office of Strategic Services, a civilian agency, during World War II. Many Army leaders, trained and experienced in conventional warfare, hesitantly accepted psychological warfare as a legitimate weapon in the Army's wartime arsenal, but questioned the validity and appropriateness of the Army's adoption of unconventional operations. The continuing tensions of the cold war and hostilities in Korea resolved the ambivalence in favor of coordinating in a single operation the techniques of both types of warfare.

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Colonel Paddock's extensively documented work traces a portion of a brief episode in our Nation's military history, but an instructive one. For the historian and military scholar, it provides the necessary backdrop for understanding the subsequent evolution of the Army's special warfare capability. For the national security policymaker, it suggests the value of the innovative impulse and the need for receptivity to new ideas and adaptability to change.

Thus, this new NDU Press Military History Series will aid us look forward to effect change by reminding us of the lessons of past military efforts.

JOHN S. PUSTAY
Lieutenant General, USAF
President

PREFACE

The original intent of this study was to analyze how the US Army, which was developed to fight conventional wars, attempted to cope with the demands of low-intensity warfare after World War II. The primary focus for the investigation was to be the *evolution* of the Army's John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from its inception in the early 1950's through the Vietnam years. I still intend, as a future project, to accomplish that original goal. My preliminary research, however, revealed that the story of how and why the Army decided to undertake such a quest in the first place has not been adequately told. This study is intended to fill that void in our military history. Specifically, it examines the Army's activities in psychological and unconventional warfare during and after World War II to determine the impetus for, and origins of, the formal "special warfare" capability created in 1952 with the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center (later the Center for Military Assistance). An understanding of these historical roots should provide a more enlightened perspective from which to assess the subsequent evolution of "special warfare" in the Army.

I am indebted to Professor I. B. Holley of Duke University for first suggesting this topic and for his constructive advice. The comments and insights provided on the outline and manuscript by my mentor, Professor Theodore Ropp of Duke, were invaluable. The long talks with Professor John K. Mahon, University of Florida, during his year with the US Army Military History Institute, were most appreciated, as were the comments on the manuscript by Professor Harold Deutsch of the Army War College faculty. For their expert, willing assistance during my research, I am particularly indebted to William Cunliffe and Ed Reese of the National Archives, Miss Hannah Zeidlik of the US Army Center of Military History, Miss Joyce Eakin and Dr. Richard Sommers of the Military History Institute, and Mrs. Beverly Lindsey of the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance. My sincere gratitude goes to my wife, Theresa, for her

patience, initiative, and thoroughly professional typing of the manuscript. Paul Taborn, The Adjutant General's Office, Department of the Army, was most understanding and helpful in the interagency processing of my personal notes, documents from the National Archives, and the final manuscript. Timely completion of the study would not have been possible without the encouragement, assistance, and scholarly environment provided by the Army War College and Strategic Studies Institute.

Finally, this study is dedicated to my wife and three children, who know better than anyone the sacrifices it required.

A. H. P., JR.

THE AUTHOR

Colonel Alfred H. Paddock, Jr, was born 11 February 1937 in Moscow, Idaho; enlisted in the US Army in September 1957; and was commissioned through the Infantry Officer Candidate School in September 1958. He earned his B.A. degree in political science from Park College, and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in history from Duke University. Colonel Paddock is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College.

His military career has included command and staff assignments in Korea, Laos, Okinawa, Vietnam, and the United States. He served three combat tours with Special Forces units in Southeast Asia. He was an instructor in strategy and strategic studies at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; served in the Politico-Military Division of the Department of the Army Staff in Washington, DC; commanded the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; was both a faculty instructor for the Department of National and International Security Studies and a Strategic Research Analyst, Strategic Studies Institute, at the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; and commanded the 4th Psychological Operations Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from November 1979 to May 1982.

Colonel Paddock is the author of "Does the Army Have a Future? Deterrence and Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Vietnam Era" which appeared in the September 1978 issue of *Parameters.* He was a co-author of *Organization, Missions and Command and Control of Special Forces and Ranger Units in the 1980's,* published by the Strategic Studies Institute in April 1979.

Colonel Paddock is Chairman, Department of National and International Security Studies, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

I

INTRODUCTION

In the first half of the twentieth century, American leaders employed US Armed Forces to support American foreign policy in "conventional warfare" against the organized, uniformed forces of enemy nations. Although the size and nature of the forces varied in two world wars and Korea, in each of these conflicts the US Army performed its role with regularly organized divisions and without the use of nuclear weapons. Whether infantry, mechanized infantry, armored, or airborne, the division was the basic formation of the Army, the key organization by which strength was measured in conventional war. After World War II, political and military leaders began to consider other forms of conflict in which US forces might be engaged. Organization, equipment, and doctrine were reexamined in view of the possibility of nuclear war, but in this process the division remained a fundamental military organization. Simultaneously, however, a few thinkers began to consider the possibility of forces capable of operating at the opposite end of the conflict spectrum from nuclear war, below the level of conventional war—to consider, in short, a capability to conduct guerrilla, or "unconventional" warfare. Regular divisions were never designed or equipped for unconventional warfare, so special units, training, and doctrine would be necessary for such a task.

In 1952 the Army created the first formal unconventional warfare force in its history, the 10th Special Forces Group, assigned to the Psychological Warfare Center, an institution created that same year at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. From that year to the present, this institution, known consecutively as the Psychological Warfare Center, the Special Warfare Center (1956), and finally the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance (1969), has constituted the headquarters for Army "special warfare."

Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., defined "special warfare" in 1962 as "a term used by the Army to embrace all military and paramilitary measures and activities related to unconventional warfare, counter-insurgency, and psychological warfare."[1] *Unconventional warfare* primarily encompassed guerrilla operations and subversion to be carried out within enemy or enemy-controlled territory by indigenous personnel, supported and directed by US forces. *Counterinsurgency,* on the other hand, included all actions, military and political, taken by the forces of the United States alone or in conjunction with a legal government to *prevent or eliminate* subversive insurgency. *Psychological warfare* encompassed those activities planned and conducted to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of the enemy, the indigenous population, and neutral or friendly foreign groups to help support US objectives.[2] Unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological warfare, then, comprised the key elements of special warfare, which according to Secretary Stahr included the capability to fight "*as* guerrillas as well as *against* guerrillas and also involves the employment of psychological devices to undermine the enemy's will to resist."[3]

Secretary Stahr's words came from the early 1960's when special warfare, then symbolized by the Special Forces "Green Berets," enjoyed its zenith under the Kennedy administration. During the next decade, the goals of special warfare changed somewhat in form and emphasis, and the concept receded in importance within the Army. The special warfare historian might be excused for noting that that more recent period is reminiscent of the 1950's, when the idea of special warfare struggled for survival. The story of special warfare, then, is a story of the Army, hesitantly and reluctantly groping with concepts of an "unconventional" nature.

To understand the evolution of special warfare, particularly its embryonic existence in the early 1950's, one must grapple with the questions of how and why it all began. An examination of the original organization of the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952 reveals that its major subordinate elements—the Psychological Warfare School (divided into psychological operations and special forces instructional departments), the 6th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, and the 10th Special Forces Group—all involved two of the three components of special warfare; that is, psychological and unconventional warfare.[4] The third component, counterinsurgency, appeared later with US involvement in Southeast Asia. In addition, the 1952 organization of the Fort Bragg center seemed to favor psychological warfare over unconventional warfare; after all, it was the *Psychological* Warfare Center and the *Psychological* Warfare School.

The apparent dominance of psychological warfare was also evident in the official unclassified literature of the day, particularly the semiannual Department of Defense reports for 1952. The 1 January–30 June 1952 report, for example, although highlighting the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center, made no mention of the concomitant creation of the 10th Special Forces Group, the first unit of its type in Army history.[5]

Why, in 1952, did the Army decide, for the first time in its history, to begin a special warfare capability by establishing the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg? What were the roots of psychological and unconventional warfare in US Army experience, and why were these concepts physically embodied in the same location in 1952? Finally, why did psychological warfare achieve ascendance over unconventional warfare? Answers to these questions lie in the history of psychological and unconventional warfare from World War II to creation of the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952.

II

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR II

With the outbreak of World War II, the United States had virtually no organized capability to conduct psychological and unconventional warfare. That situation changed on 11 July 1941, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) and designated Colonel William J. Donovan as the first director. Thus was begun a bold idea: through COI and its successor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the United States began "its first organized venture into the fields of espionage, propaganda, subversion and related activities under the aegis of a centralized intelligence agency."[1]

The Coordinator of Information

Ironically, the creation of COI came largely from recommendations following Colonel Donovan's fact-finding trips to the Middle East and Great Britain. He had been impressed by the British method of combining—in agencies called the Political Warfare Executive and Special Operations Executive—propaganda efforts with the "unorthodox" operations of sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla warfare. He had been impressed as well by the British system of intelligence and counterintelligence, as conducted by their Secret Intelligence Service, and by their ability to coordinate intelligence activities with psychological warfare and special operations. Donovan thus proposed to Roosevelt the creation of a single agency to centralize the intelligence gathered by several uncoordinated offices in Washington, combining the functions of psychological warfare and special operations on the British model.[2] According to Corey Ford, Donovan's biographer, the President welcomed "the sug-

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gestion of a single agency which would serve as a clearinghouse for all intelligence, as well as an organ of counterpropaganda and a training center for what were euphemistically called 'special operations.'"[3]

As often happens to those who recommend measures of a far-reaching nature, Donovan was "invited" by the President to head the agency that he had proposed.[4] Initially COI contained two major divisions, Research and Analysis (R&A) and the Foreign Information Service (FIS), plus secret intelligence and sabotage branches for training. Dr. William L. Langer, a Harvard historian, became director of R&A, the division designed to evaluate all incoming intelligence. Robert E. Sherwood, a playwright and confidant of President Roosevelt, became head of FIS, the psychological warfare division. As William F. Daugherty has written, FIS "undertook to spread the gospel of democracy . . . and to explain the objectives of the United States throughout the world except in Latin America."[5] To carry out these aims, FIS used information from the wire services as propaganda on its 11 commercial shortwave stations, which transmitted in several languages. After Pearl Harbor, Sherwood's organization broadcast more than 300, 15-minute programs a week in Europe and Asia.[6]

Donovan's concept of psychological warfare was all-encompassing. The first stage would be "intelligence penetration," with the results, processed by R&A, available for strategic planning and propaganda. Donovan called propaganda the "arrow of initial penetration" and believed that it would be the first phase in operations against an enemy. The next phase would be special operations, in the form of sabotage and subversion, followed by commando-like raids, guerrilla actions, and behind-the-lines resistance movements. All of this represented the softening-up process prior to invasion by friendly armed forces. Donovan's visionary dream was to unify these functions in support of conventional unit operations, thereby forging "a new instrument of war."[7]

To carry out this concept, Donovan believed that COI should become a supporting agency for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) once JCS had been created in February 1942. The military services' de facto control over personnel and materiel made it necessary, he believed, to place COI under JCS authority. He realized pragmatically that the COI could not carry out secret activities without the concurrence and support of theater commanders, and that those commanders also must coordinate any such secret activities with conventional military operations. For several months he argued with Roosevelt for COI to be brought under the JCS, and for FIS foreign propaganda to be more closely coordinated with the intelligence activities of the military services.[8] But his arguments were unsuccessful.

OSS and OWI

Donovan's comprehensive concept of psychological warfare was not shared by everyone. On 11 June 1942, less than a year after COI's creation, President Roosevelt ordered that FIS be transferred to the newly established Office of War Information (OWI). By the same Executive order, Roosevelt also dissolved COI and supplanted it with a new organization, the Office of Strategic Services, with Donovan continuing as its head.[9] The change, however, did put OSS under JCS authority, as recommended by Donovan on 8 June.[10] In effect, as Edward Hymoff succinctly states, "COI became OSS and FIS became a division of the Office of War Information."[11]

Roosevelt's decision to reorganize the psychological warfare effort was apparently motivated by several factors. First, the increasing number of Government information agencies had created problems of overall coordination, and a need existed to consolidate wartime information and psychological warfare activities.[12] There was also growing recognition that COI had become unwieldy, and the President preferred that US wartime propaganda be separated from, rather than combined with, strategic intelligence and subversive operations.[13] Then there was the problem of personalities. Donovan and Sherwood, Chief FIS, had different views on the role of FIS as a part of COI. According to Corey Ford, "Colonel Donovan believed that, once a state of war existed, the propaganda arm should be exploited as a weapon of deception and subversion, and should be under military supervision," while Sherwood "held that propaganda broadcasts should stick scrupulously to the facts, and let the truth eventually prevail." Sherwood believed that "the American image overseas would suffer . . . if we emulated Axis methods and resorted to lies and deceit." He also believed that FIS should remain under civilian direction, and he clashed with Donovan over his proposals to put COI and FIS under JCS jurisdiction. These differing views were hardening into personal animosity between the two men; since both Donovan and Sherwood had the respect of the President, Roosevelt evidently felt that it would be wise to separate their responsibilities.[14] Perhaps the most important factor, however, was the opposition of Harold D. Smith, Director of the Budget. Smith submitted a memorandum to the President on 7 March 1942, proposing a reorganization of war information services that resulted in the formation of OWI.[15] Thus, for many reasons, the President shifted the major responsibilities for psychological warfare to the newly created OWI.

The creation of OWI, however, neither solved the problems of coordination nor delimited responsibilities for psychological warfare, even with a

highly respected Columbia Broadcasting System reporter like Elmer Davis as its first director. Although most existing information services were transferred to OWI, Donovan's agency continued to keep its fingers in the propaganda pie. Having lost the battle to keep FIS under his direction in COI, Donovan continued to assume some psychological warfare functions for OSS.

Eventually the lines of responsibility were more clearly drawn and accepted by the two agencies. In addition to its intelligence and special operations activities, OSS retained responsibility for "black" propaganda operations, which were essentially covert activities using information issued from a concealed or falsified source to lower the enemy's morale.[16] OWI, on the other hand, controlled all propaganda in the United States and all "white" propaganda—information, official or otherwise, plainly issued from a known source—outside the United States with the exception of the Western Hemisphere; that remained a responsibility of the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) in the State Department.[17] In March 1943, another Executive order more clearly identified OWI's responsibilities for conducting foreign information and overt propaganda operations, and also decreed that its activities be coordinated with plans of the military services.[18]

The Army's Psychological Warfare Branch

When the European war broke out, the Army, like other agencies, was ill prepared to understand psychological warfare, much less plan for and conduct it. During World War I, the Army had given psychological warfare token recognition by establishing the Psychological Warfare Sub-Section of G-2 in the War Department, and the Propaganda Section, G-2, General Headquarters (GHQ), American Expeditionary Forces. However, from 1918 to 1941 no psychological warfare office existed at the War Department. The lessons of experience were lost, and by 1941 only one officer on the War Department staff had had psychological warfare experience in the previous war. He was Colonel Charles H. Mason who, as Chief of the Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence Division (MID) from November 1940 to July 1941, had tried to reestablish a branch for psychological warfare planning and operations. His attempts failed, however, and Mason "complained that his efforts were met with indifference and opposition within the War Department."[19]

The first positive steps toward creation of a psychological warfare capability were a result of the personal interest of John McCloy, who had

recently been appointed Assistant Secretary of War. Influenced by the effectiveness of German propaganda, he suggested in June 1941 that a special study group be organized by Brigadier General Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to plan for future psychological warfare operations.[20] McCloy's action illustrates a theme that recurs at critical points throughout the history of special warfare—important governmental civilians intervene to prod hesitant and cautious uniformed Army leaders into taking action on concepts of an "unconventional" nature.

The special group suggested by McCloy was established on 25 June 1941 as the Psychologic Branch, with Lieutenant Colonel Percy Black as its chief. A great deal of secrecy surrounded its creation. Curiously, the only officer with World War I psychological warfare experience, Colonel Mason, was not even informed of its existence. Black's initial study examined all agencies—official and private—engaged in psychological information or propaganda, and concluded that "there was no effort to study the effect of propaganda on various groups, or relate propaganda plans to the plans of the military high command." This embryonic office attempted the following tasks: liaison with the Foreign Monitoring Broadcast Service of the Federal Communications Commission to obtain daily and weekly summaries of foreign broadcasts, completion of surveys for the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations and for the Council for Democracy, initiation of a weekly telegram service to military missions with a brief summary of national defense progress, and purchase of copies of *Newsweek* and *Life* for distribution to selected missions in Europe to counteract the pictorial propaganda of Germany.[21] These initial efforts by the Army were obviously modest.

To protect its strict security, the Psychologic Branch changed its name to the Special Study Group. An advisory committee of civilian psychologists felt that it was inadvisable to use terms like "propaganda," "control of opinion," and "psychiatry." Thus the name Special Study Group "would be far less revealing than any reference to psychology or propaganda." Later, in March 1942, the name changed to Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2, primarily because the growing number of personnel involved made strict secrecy difficult and because this same secrecy impeded coordination with other offices. Colonel Black was succeeded by Colonel Oscar M. Solbert, who remained chief of the branch until 26 July 1942. His successor was Colonel C. Blakeney, who continued as chief until the branch was dissolved in December 1942.[22]

The Special Study Group/Psychological Warfare Branch expanded upon the activities begun under the Psychologic Branch. One of its most important jobs was to produce a daily analysis of Axis propaganda, over 300 issues of which were circulated for guidance to the Office of Facts and Figures, CIAA, the National Broadcasting Corporation, and the Bureau of Public Relations. Since the War Department did not control radio broadcasting, the branch was limited to making suggestions. These ranged from suggested items for use in speeches by the Chief of Staff, to suggested broadcasts containing definite objectives for use by COI. The branch also helped plan leaflet operations in strategic and combat phases, and developed the *Combat Propaganda Bulletin,* a record of lessons learned and recent activities for distribution in Washington and to the military theaters.

In December 1942 the first psychological warfare units were created with the formation of the 1st and 2nd Radio Service Sections. Each section had an authorized strength of 3 officers and 39 enlisted men. Together the two formed the 1st Combat Propaganda Company. When the Psychological Warfare Branch was dissolved on 31 December 1942, the company was transferred from the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) to OSS, then back to MIS on 2 March 1943. At this point, the company was reorganized into combat propaganda teams, equipped with radio transmitters, sound trucks, and language personnel, and then sent to Europe.[23]

Concurrently, a draft training manual, *Combat Propaganda Company,* was developed in the autumn of 1942. It was based on an existing pamphlet, *Military Intelligence Propaganda—Confidential,* written by Major P. M. Robinett in December 1940. The manual proved useful in organizing propaganda companies in Europe during 1943–45.[24] The activities of the Army's Special Study Group/Psychological Warfare Branch during 1941–42 were varied but certainly not "center stage" at the War Department.

Dissolution of the Psychological Warfare Branch

Dissolution of the Psychological Warfare Branch in December 1942 grew from the problem of defining psychological warfare, a problem that persisted throughout the war, and from interagency battles over responsibilities in this new field. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had created a Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) in March 1942 (JCS 12) to plan psychological warfare in combat theaters and enemy-controlled areas.

The committee was reconstituted on 21 June 1942 (JCS 68), after OSS and OWI were established as two separate agencies. Membership was made up of general and flag officers from the Army's G-2, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the War Department General Staff (WDGS), and the Commander in Chief, US Fleet. Colonel Donovan served as chairman. Established at the same time were a Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee, a Supporting Committee on Psychological Warfare within OSS, and a Joint Psychological Warfare Advisory Committee with Donovan as chairman. This last committee was formed to coordinate the psychological warfare activities of agencies outside the jurisdiction of the JCS, such as Nelson Rockefeller's CIAA, Henry Wallace's Board of Economic Warfare, OWI, and the State Department.[25]

To tackle the problem of defining psychological warfare, a "Basic Estimate of Psychological Warfare" was prepared by the OSS Supporting Committee and approved by the JPWC on 7 September. The fine hand of Donovan is seen in the definition of psychological warfare contained in this Basic Estimate:

> [Psychological warfare] is the coordination and use of all means, including moral and physical, by which the end is attained—other than those of recognized military operations, but including the psychological exploitation of the result of those recognized military actions—which tend to destroy the will of the enemy to achieve victory and to damage his political or economic capacity to do so; which tend to deprive the enemy of the support, assistance or sympathy of his allies or associates or of neutrals, or to prevent his acquisition of such support, assistance, or sympathy; or which tend to create, maintain, or increase the will to victory of our own people and allies and to acquire, maintain, or to increase the support, assistance and sympathy of neutrals.

The Basic Estimate further specified that propaganda, subversion, combat propaganda companies, and intelligence secured by research and espionage were the tools needed to carry out this broad concept of psychological warfare.[26] The OSS Supporting Committee had spent 6 months trying to develop a salable definition. But the JPWC, after having approved it, did not forward the Basic Estimate to the JCS for approval as a doctrine statement.[27]

This difficulty of defining psychological warfare was linked to OSS' groping while trying to find its niche as a new agency. The *War Report of the OSS* states the problem: "A contributing factor to the whole situation

was a definite resentment of OSS, as such, which found its strongest expression in Donovan's colleagues on the JPWC. This resentment seemed to be based, in part, upon the fact that OSS was a civilian agency, and, in part, upon the position of OSS as an agency of the JCS and fear that it might encroach upon the functions of G-2 and/or ONI."[28] At any rate, the existing psychological warfare committee system proved to be ponderous, confusing, and generally unworkable.

Finally, on 23 December 1942, the JCS issued JCS 155/4D, which abolished the JPWC and made OSS responsible for "planning, developing, coordinating, and executing the military program of psychological warfare" and for "the compilation of such political, psychological, sociological, and economic information as may be required by military operations."[29] Concurrent with the reorganization of the JCS psychological warfare machinery, the Army decided to abolish its Psychological Warfare Branch. The decision was announced in Military Intelligence Service Memorandum 147, 31 December 1942, which explained that "since the Office of Strategic Services was responsible for propaganda, there appeared to be no need for the Branch."[30]

At this point the Army's participation in psychological warfare appeared to be minimal. Such was not the case overseas, however, for JCS 155/4D, which had precipitated the demise of the Army's Psychological Warfare Branch, also gave theater commanders control of psychological warfare in their jurisdictional areas.[31] In effect, the War Department, as Paul Linebarger states, considered "the theaters in this respect as autonomous, and [left] to the respective Theater Commanders the definition of their relationship with OWI and OSS, and their use of each."[32]

Theater Psychological Warfare

Most of the Army's operational work in psychological warfare took place at the theater level, where the responsible organization was normally designated a Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB). The largest of these, the PWB at Allied Forces Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ), was activated in North Africa in November 1942 at the order of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and then expanded in February 1944 to the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/ SHAEF).[33] PWD/ SHAEF defined psychological warfare as "the dissemination of propaganda designed to undermine the enemy's will to resist, demoralize his forces and sustain the morale of our supporters."[34] With

this definition, then, and the overall objective of controlling and coordinating psychological warfare in the area of continental Europe controlled by the Supreme Commander, the specific missions of PWD were the following:

1. To wage psychological warfare against the enemy.

2. To use the various media available to psychological warfare to sustain the morale of the people of friendly nations occupied by the enemy and to cause the people of these countries to acquiesce in the wishes of the Supreme Commander.

3. To conduct so-called consolidation propaganda operations in liberated friendly countries. [Consolidation propaganda was that directed toward a military force and designed to insure compliance with the instructions promulgated by the commander of the occupying force.]

4. To control information services in Allied-occupied Germany.[35]

To carry out these tasks, PWD used psychological warfare tools such as British Broadcasting Corporation and OWI transmitters, front-line loudspeaker broadcasts, and large-scale leaflet dropping operations. PWD even provided leaflets to be dispersed by the novel method of specially designed artillery shells.[36]

The basic Army field operating unit for psychological warfare was the Mobile Radio Broadcasting (MRB) Company. Early MRB units had served with the Military Intelligence Service in December 1942 and, after being transferred for a brief period to OSS, went back to the Army in March 1943. The equipment for these units was unlike anything conventional soldiers had seen in the field—public address systems, radios, monitoring sets, loudspeakers, typewriters, mobile printing presses, and leaflet bombs. MRB units were usually divided by the separate Army groups and field armies into small teams, often to work in direct support of frontline conventional combat units. One MRB company commander, Major Edward A. Caskey, described his responsibilities as primarily tactical, or combat, propaganda efforts. His company used short-range radio broadcasts as well as tactical leaflets printed on the spot, then delivered to enemy lines through the use of modified artillery smoke shells. He also maintained prisoner-of-war interrogation teams that worked with G–2. Caskey explained: "Both Germans and Italians (prisoners) stated that the

content of the leaflets had greatly influenced their decision [to surrender]. They all insisted that they were mostly impressed with the veracity of our leaflets."[37]

Five such companies eventually served under PWD/SHAEF. Although these units were the result of improvisation in 1943 and 1944, the doctrinal and organizational concepts they embodied reappeared in the psychological warfare units formed during the Korean conflict.[38]

Taken together, then, several diverse organizations in PWD, both civilian and military, somehow had to be fused into a common psychological warfare organization. According to an account prepared by the PWD staff, PWD/SHAEF "was the first agency, military or civilian, to coordinate successfully in Western Europe the efforts of the numerous military and civilian agencies which had waged Anglo-American psychological warfare since the beginning of the war." The chief of PWD, Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, was assisted by four deputies, each representing a civilian agency that contributed personnel to PWD. Two of those agencies were American—OWI and OSS; two were British—the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information. General McClure's name will reappear, for he was to figure prominently in establishing the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg in 1952.[39]

Not everyone was enamored with PWD operations. It was, by conventional unit standards, a rather strange collection of personnel, equipment, and activities. A survey report in August 1943 by the Inspector General, Major General Virgil L. Peterson, described the PWB in North Africa (forerunner of PWD/SHAEF) as "a heterogeneous group of some 468 writers, psychologists, economists, linguists, and world travelers," whose efforts "were somewhat lacking in coordination and control, until they were all assembled in one building and placed under command of an American Army officer." General Peterson concluded his report with a compliment, stating that his survey group "was much impressed with the industry and enthusiasm of the people engaged in these psychological warfare activities." But he also added a caveat about the new organization: "The survey group does not feel qualified to arrive at any conclusions regarding their value to the Theater, or the Army as a whole."[40]

Professor Saul K. Padover, a PWD combat intelligence officer, was later to recall that "at first PWD was not much appreciated; hard-bitten regular Army men referred to the psychological warriors as 'feather merchants.'" But Padover noted, as the war progressed, the organization's

effectiveness received more respect from "formerly suspicious commanders," particularly at the tactical level. And at the end, even generals like George Patton were asking for frontline support because "it was definitely recognized that the loudspeakers helped to persuade the enemy to come over with arms in the air."[41]

The Propaganda Branch, G–2

The success of the PWB in North Africa provided much of the impetus to reestablish a psychological warfare branch at the War Department. General McClure's deputy, C. D. Jackson, OWI, returned to the United States for a visit in June 1943. During his trip he talked with John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, who in 1941 had displayed the interest in psychological warfare that led to the creation of the Psychologic Branch. Still deeply interested, Secretary McCloy proceeded to staff papers left with him by Jackson. These papers contained a proposal for a central psychological warfare branch at the War Department to direct and coordinate the work of the theater PWB's.[42] The seed had been planted.

Prior to this, on 9 March 1943, the continuing difficulty of clearly defining the propaganda responsibilities of OSS and OWI had resulted in Executive Order 9312. That order gave OWI responsibility for planning, developing, and executing all foreign propaganda activities "involving the dissemination of information" (open, or "white," propaganda). This necessitated a revision of JCS 155/4D, which in December 1942 had given OSS responsibility for military propaganda and which had been the major reason for dissolution of the War Department's Psychological Warfare Branch. The revised directive, JCS 155/7D, issued on 4 April 1943, simply omitted any reference to OWI and propaganda.[43] Thus a major, albeit largely self-imposed, constraint was lifted, allowing the Army to re-create a psychological warfare branch in Washington.

By August 1943, the papers Jackson had left with Secretary McCloy were beginning to have an impact. In addition to proposing a central psychological warfare branch at the War Department, the papers described the system by which propaganda planning and control were being carried out in the North African theater. In a memorandum to the Secretary to the General Staff, Colonel Otto L. Nelson, Brigadier General J. E. Hull, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, and Plans Division (OPD), commented that "although the value of propaganda may not be as great as its proponents claim, it is a recognized instrument of modern war

which can be useful." After this rather ambivalent endorsement, he stated that the principles contained in the PWB North African papers were sound and recommended that they be circulated to theater commanders.[44] A letter dated 20 August 1943 to all major commanders forwarded the papers "in the event you desire to establish similar agencies." One of the papers, signed by Colonel C. B. Hazeltine, strongly advocated a mixed civilian-military team as "a must for maximum results in a PWB organization."[45] Yet, it was this civilian influence and interaction that made psychological warfare and unconventional warfare suspect to many conventionally minded Army officers.

Meanwhile, General Peterson's survey report on the PWB in North Africa was now in circulation, and the report contained the complaint from General McClure "that there was no corresponding agency established in the War Department, through which he could channelize his correspondence." Also at about this time, the JCS began to require theaters to submit plans for psychological warfare. Both of these matters were discussed at the 23 August 1943 meeting of the Army's General Council. General McNarney, the Deputy Chief of Staff, recognized the responsibility of OWI "for most of this work," and was not prepared to decide "whether or not the War Department should establish an agency primarily for dealing with these matters or attempt to coordinate by liaison with OWI." Thus he directed the Operations Division and G-2 to "get together and submit recommendations."[46]

The immediate result of this directive was a report to the Joint Intelligence Committee on 8 September 1943 signed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD. The report outlined the agencies primarily responsible for preparing and disseminating foreign propaganda, and concluded that a War Department agency for control of propaganda should be established and have a direct channel through the JCS to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). Recognizing the Army's deficiencies in this area, the report also noted that "the abolition of the Psychological Warfare Section of G-2 (in December 1942) has seriously reduced the War Department's ability to supply appropriate material to propaganda agencies." Finally, the report included this assessment of the value of psychological warfare:

> Although the proponents of psywar are prone to exaggerate its importance, the military value of propaganda in recent operations involving American Forces has been clearly discernible and propaganda has also been used by our enemies with marked success. It is a powerful weapon for influencing men's minds and, therefore, cannot be neglected.[47]

Again we see a lukewarm endorsement of this new field, but an endorsement nevertheless. Momentum had gathered for a new psychological warfare branch in the War Department.

By the middle of October, Major General T. T. Handy, the G-3, and Major General George V. Strong, the G-2, had submitted a more detailed study to General McNarney recommending the establishment of a central authority within the War Department for propaganda plans, policies, and releases. The report was approved by General McNarney and the Secretary of War on 26 October.[48] The matter appeared to be settled. But neither General Strong nor General Handy wanted the responsibility of the new function. In a memorandum to General Handy on 6 November 1943, General Strong, the G-2, attached a study prepared by G-3 that concluded that the new branch should be in the Operations Division because that division "has the greatest interest in operational propaganda and a direct channel to the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff on all operational subjects."[49] Not to be outdone, General Handy, the G-3, acknowledged on 10 November that G-3 did have an interest in operational propaganda. He suggested that the new branch should be under the G-2's direction because his positions as a member of the Emergency Combined Propaganda Committee and as a Joint Chief of Security Control gave him close touch with War Department coordination and control of propaganda.[50] The matter was finally resolved by referring to the original recommendations approved by General McNarney on 26 October, which had specified that the new propaganda agency be established in the Military Intelligence Division (G-2).[51]

The dialogue between G-2 and G-3 over a new function provides insight into attitudes toward psychological warfare. General staff divisions normally do not avoid or give up a function considered to be important—if it has "high visibility." General Handy's and General Strong's reluctance to accept an activity that was new, difficult to understand, and considered by many officers as a minor side show in the war effort, illustrates a theme that recurs throughout this study—the story of an Army hesitant and reluctant to accept concepts of an "unconventional" nature.

Creation of the new Propaganda Branch in G-2 was formally announced on 15 November 1943 by Military Intelligence Division Directive No. 78. During the General Council meeting held the same day, General Kroner, the G-2 representative, stated that the head of psychological warfare activities in North Africa, General McClure, had indicated that there was no corresponding agency in the War Department to consider

psychological warfare problems "at the proper level." General Kroner concluded that "this is indicated as a need for this very important branch."[52] The seed, planted 6 months earlier by Jackson in his discussions with Assistant Secretary of War McCloy and by McClure's own statements during the intervening period, had finally borne fruit.

The primary responsibility of the new branch was to coordinate propaganda functions for the War Department. It prepared propaganda items for use by OWI, CIAA, and other nonmilitary organizations. It advised the G-2 on all propaganda problems presented by theater commanders. It coordinated propaganda matters brought before the JCS and the CCS by the War Department. It shepherded OWI and CIAA plans through the JCS, and it coordinated with similar branches in the Navy and State Department. Finally, the branch chief served as the Army member of the JCS liaison with OWI and CIAA.[53]

At the end of the war, a few senior officers recognized the need to build upon the Army's experience and retain a capability for psychological warfare. In a December 1945 letter to the War Department, Major General L. L. Lemnitzer, then head of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the JCS, stated:

> To avoid a repetition of the PWB mistakes we made in World War II and to take full advantage of the experience gained in that war, I recommend that a comprehensive study be made of this subject at an early date with a view of:
> 1. Analyzing all available PWB material of World War II, including particularly the PWB reports from the various theaters of operations to establish sound PWB principles, techniques, organization, equipment and procedures for future employment of this weapon.
> 2. Establishing short courses in our staff schools to provide future commanders and staff officers with a general understanding and appreciation of this new weapon of warfare.
> 3. Examining the feasibility of establishing a small PWB section in the War Department to provide continuing study of this subject, or failing that, to assign this responsibility to an existing section or agency best prepared to assume it.[54]

The Propaganda Branch had foreseen the need for such a study. In May 1945 letters had been sent to theater PWB's requesting the appropriate historical materials.[55] The branch continued in existence until January 1947, when the responsibility for psychological warfare activities was transferred from G-2 to the Plans and Operations Division.

Appraisal

It is impossible to discuss the evolution of Army experience in psychological warfare during World War II without acknowledging the impact of the major civilian agencies that had an interest in this activity. First, the Coordinator of Information, then its successor, the Office of Strategic Services, and, finally, the Office of War Information—all influenced the Army's development of a psychological warfare capability as they engaged in interagency struggles to sort out responsibilities in the new field. In many respects, it was the confusion generated by this profusion of agencies that forced the War Department to reestablish a Propaganda Branch in November 1943. Through this office and the theater Psychological Warfare Branch, the Army worked closely with these agencies, and in particular OWI, for the duration of the war.

This reliance on civilian agencies did not sit well with many military professionals. A quotation from the unsigned letter of an officer with Headquarters, Western Task Forces, in 1942 illustrates this attitude:

> I still believe we could get along far better without the OWI. The psychological situation is far too complex to be handled by poets and gentlemen of the press in Washington and even the German Propaganda Machine worked in reverse in the face of actual military operations. The only propaganda which can achieve results is the propaganda of deeds not words. One U.S. medium tank has proved far more effective than all the bag of trick gadgets, which merely offend good taste and give nothing concrete where want is great.

The officer ended his letter with the conclusion, "I believe that such agencies as the OWI and OSS can be profitably eliminated in the future."[56]

Ironically, it was a civilian—Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy—who pushed the Army into developing a branch at the War Department for planning and coordinating psychological warfare activities, initially in June 1941 and again in November 1943. And it was a civilian—C. D. Jackson of OWI—who, as General McClure's deputy, provided Assistant Secretary McCloy with the PWB/AFHQ organizational papers that stimulated resurrection of a psychological warfare branch in 1943. The initiative shown by influential civilians to urge conservative Army leaders to venture into a new and uncertain field is a theme we shall see throughout our investigation of the origins of a special warfare capability for the Army.

Certainly Brigadier General McClure was an exception to this theme. The civilian-military team that he headed, first in North Africa PWB/AFHQ, then later in PWD/SHAEF, served as the model for successful Army psychological warfare operations during the war. The Mobile Radio Broadcasting companies employed in Europe were the first tactical propaganda units in Army history. McClure himself strongly urged establishment of a central psychological warfare agency in the War Department. All in all, he was the most important Army officer in this new field during World War II.

Although small throughout, the Propaganda Branch, G-2—and its predecessors, the Psychologic Branch, the Special Study Group, and the Psychological Warfare Branch—performed a low-key, but valuable service. Its "principal success," states *A History of the Military Intelligence Division,* "was in the guidance it gave to operational units in the field, and as an agency for the coordination of propaganda activities with military operations."[57] While the MID history may somewhat overstate the extent of this success, nonetheless, that such an agency was deemed necessary was demonstrated by the creation of the Propaganda Branch 10 months after dissolution of the Psychological Warfare Branch.

Army personnel employed in psychological warfare in all theaters probably never totaled more than 2,000 at any one time,[58] a minuscule number when compared to many other activities. Despite the often less-than-enthusiastic manner in which the Army embraced it, psychological warfare gained respectability. Formal organizations and procedures were developed that eventually bestowed this new endeavor with a degree of legitimacy.

The impact of psychological warfare is always difficult to assess. But General Eisenhower, at least, thought the European experiment useful:

> In this war [he wrote in PWD/SHAEF's account of its operation], which was total in every sense of the word, we have seen many great changes in military science. It seems to me that not the least of these was the development of psychological warfare as a specific and effective weapon.
>
> The exact contribution of psychological warfare toward the final victory cannot, of course, be measured in terms of towns destroyed or barriers passed. However, I am convinced that the expenditure of men and money in wielding the spoken and written word was an important contributing factor in undermining the enemy's will to resist and supporting the fighting morale of our potential Allies in the occupied countries.

> Without doubt, psychological warfare has proved its right to a place of dignity in our military arsenal.[59]

Thus, World War II saw the Nation—and the US Army—develop the foundation for a modern psychological warfare capability. What it would do with this foundation, so painfully acquired, remained to be seen.

III

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN WORLD WAR II

The task of tracing the origins of unconventional warfare in the US Army is complicated by the fact that in the early 1960's several World War II "elite" units were included in the official lineage of Special Forces. One of these was the 1st Special Service Force, a joint United States-Canadian unit formed in 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana, and commanded by Major General Robert T. Frederick. Also included in the official lineage were US Army Ranger battalions, the first of which was formed on 19 June 1942 at Carrickfergus in Northern Ireland, under the command of Colonel William O. Darby. A similar organization, Brigadier General Frank Merrill's 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), better known as "Merrill's Marauders," was not officially a part of Special Forces lineage but has been informally adopted by Special Forces.[1]

Whatever the "official" lineage, however, none of these units by definition was an unconventional warfare organization. According to the *Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms,* unconventional warfare "includes the three interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion . . . conducted within enemy or enemy-controlled territory by predominately indigenous personnel usually supported and directed by personnel from an outside country."[2] The 1st Special Service Force, the Ranger battalions, and "Merrill's Marauders" did not fit this description; they were primarily long-range penetration organizations that specialized in reconnaissance, raiding, and commando operations. British Royal Marine Commandos and Orde Wingate's Raiders performed similar tasks for the British throughout the Second World War. Yet the author himself remembers standing in a mass formation with the 77th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg in early 1960 when the 1st Special Service Force was

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reconstituted and consolidated with the Ranger battalions, then activated as the parent unit of all Special Forces Groups; it was a memorable day, as retired Major General Frederick came down from Canada to preside over the conferral of 1st Special Service Force and Ranger unit colors, lineage, and honors to the Army's Special Forces.

Looking back on that scene, one wonders why Special Forces felt it necessary to adopt the lineage of units that were not true forerunners of unconventional warfare. An argument could be made that a few individuals from those units became early members of Special Forces, and that some of the tactics and techniques of their former units were incorporated into Special Forces training. But these alone are insufficient explanations. Apparently the answer was simply that the Army had no true unconventional warfare units of its own; therefore, someone in authority took the best alternative and borrowed the lineage of some well-known "elite" special-purpose units of World War II fame. While the lineage of those units undoubtedly adds to the luster of Special Forces, little is served by dwelling on their history as forerunners of a US Army unconventional warfare capability.

OSS and Unconventional Warfare

Personnel of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), however, did participate in unconventional warfare activities during World War II, and the US Army contributed officers and men to this unique organization. OSS bore the stamp of its first chief, William Joseph Donovan, an imaginative, forceful man nearing 60, known since his youth as "Wild Bill." Donovan was a highly decorated World War I hero who had become a millionaire Wall Street corporate lawyer. President Roosevelt selected him, as one critic of OSS expressed it, "to direct the New Deal's excursion into espionage, sabotage, 'black' propaganda, guerrilla warfare, and other 'un-American' activities."[3] Established to meet the special conditions of World War II, OSS was the first agency of its kind in the history of the United States. Largely because of the imagination and foresight of General Donovan, OSS "undertook and carried out more different types of enterprises calling for more varied skills than any other single organization of its size in the history of our country."[4] Such disparate tasks required a potpourri of talent, with Americans from all walks of life participating. OSS strength had been estimated at 12,000 to 30,000; the official *War Report of the OSS*, however, released in 1976, placed the agency's maximum strength in December 1944 at 13,000 personnel, approximately 7,500 of whom were stationed overseas.[5]

Donovan's agency was divided into intelligence, special operations, and training functions. Intelligence and special operations were each further subdivided into several branches: Research and analysis, secret intelligence, and counterespionage, for example, fell under intelligence; and sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and psychological warfare fell under special operations. Psychological warfare bore the deceiving title "Morale Operations" (MO); that branch was responsible for creating and disseminating "black," or covert propaganda.[6]

In January 1943, during one of his several reorganizations of OSS, Donovan established the post of Deputy Director, Psychological Warfare Operations (PWO) to supervise the activities of both the Special Operations (SO) and Morale Operations branches. In May 1943, he organized a third branch, the Operational Group (OG) Command, to direct guerrilla warfare, and placed it under the Deputy Director, PWO. Later, he simplified this title to Deputy Director, Operations, with SO, MO, and OG as subordinate branches.[7] Through all this confusion of seemingly interchangeable organizational titles and activities, Donovan, even after losing the responsibility for overt, or "white," propaganda to the Office of War Information (OWI) in March 1942, continued throughout the war to perceive a close interrelationship between psychological warfare and what in later years became known as unconventional warfare.

OSS and the Army

Although its role in strategic intelligence was important, the aspect of OSS most applicable to a discussion of unconventional warfare was "special operations," a term that covered, according to Harry Howe Ransom,

> espionage, counterintelligence in foreign nations, sabotage, commando raids, guerrilla and partisan-group activity . . . various other forms of psychological warfare and underground operations. In essence, OSS assumed operational responsibility in a field previously ignored and scorned by many diplomats and military professionals.[8]

The last point is significant; OSS was not a military organization, but personnel from the military services did participate in its activities. The Army contributed the most military personnel during the war—4,097 by November 1943 and 8,360 by May 1945.[9]

As early as 10 October 1941, when he had created a "Special Activities" section in the Coordinator of Information (COI), Donovan had

seriously considered the idea of special operations, including the formation of guerrilla units. He had been impressed by the organization and methods of Great Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE). Moving quickly, by December he had proposed to the President that the United States organize "a guerrilla corps, independent and separate from the Army and Navy, and imbued with a maximum of the offensive and imaginative spirit." By early 1942 he had requested training areas from the Department of Interior and instructional personnel from the War Department. Lack of a War Department allotment, however, impeded initial recruiting efforts for the projected guerrilla groups.[10]

Predictably, the military services had misgivings about a guerrilla corps "independent and separate from the Army and Navy." During the period after Pearl Harbor, before the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had been organized, US Forces were in disarray. Furthermore, Donovan had not prepared the bureaucracy for his innovative proposal. As William R. Corson observes: "For Donovan to think, even with FDR's endorsement, that such an organization could be brought to pass in the face of the military's obvious objections was, charitably, an act of lunacy on his part."[11]

Aside from the bureaucratic sensitivities involved, many senior military leaders had serious reservations about the practicality of Donovan's ideas. Major General Strong, Army G-2, commenting on a memorandum from COI in June 1942 (by this time COI had been dissolved and Donovan was Director, OSS) on "Organization of Guerrilla Warfare Command," regarded the proposal as "essentially unsound and unproductive." Strong believed that most of the operations envisaged for such a force should be carried out by specially trained regular troops; therefore, "to squander time, men, equipment, and tonnage on special guerrilla organizations and at the same time to complicate the command and supply systems of the Army by such projects would be culpable mismanagement." Although he recognized the value of sabotage and subversive activities to military operations, Strong questioned the feasibility of directing such forces from Washington. In his opinion, guerrilla warfare, if conducted at all, was a function of regular Army task forces whose operations would "take the form of raids and are practically identical with commando operations."[12] Strong's last statement reveals a fundamental, but not uncommon, misunderstanding of the nature of guerrilla warfare.

Despite the reluctance of the military services, one benefit of placing OSS under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the issuance of JCS 155/4D on 23 December 1942. That directive gave OSS responsibility for the organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare, and specified that

personnel employed in guerrilla warfare be limited to "organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei of guerrilla units."[13] Thus OSS had a charter. While Donovan's initial ideas for a "Guerrilla Group," comprised of 10 "Guerrilla Battalions," did not survive intact, he did ultimately create a variety of unconventional warfare activities that depended heavily on participation by Army personnel.

Probably the best known unconventional warfare operation in which US Army personnel participated was that of Detachment 101 in Burma, commanded by Colonel W. R. Peers. Detachment 101 organized and trained native Kachin tribesmen to conduct successful guerrilla warfare operations against the Japanese in 1943–45. One former OSS member suggested in a conversation with the author that 101 "represented a sort of microcosm of the entire range of OSS capabilities."[14] The Kachins, led by 101, performed a variety of unconventional warfare missions in support of Allied conventional operations. For example, they gathered intelligence, aided escape and evasion efforts for downed US fliers, undertook espionage and counterespionage missions, and attacked Japanese communications lines.[15] Almost 700 US Army officers and enlisted men contributed to 101's operations in Northern Burma over a 3-year period. Total guerrilla strength surpassed 10,000 by February 1945. After the completion of its mission in Burma, Detachment 101 received the Presidential Unit Citation.[16] According to one student of OSS history, Detachment 101 performed "the most successful OSS guerrilla operations of the war."[17]

While Detachment 101 may have enjoyed the most spectacular tactical combat success, the major OSS effort during the war was directed at France.[18] Here, US Army personnel made a significant contribution to the three groups of OSS operational units that worked behind enemy lines in direct support of the French Resistance. The first group consisted of 77 Americans who worked in civilian clothes as organizers of secret networks, as radio operators, or as instructors in the use of weapons and explosives. Thirty-three members of that group were active in France before 6 June 1944, D-day. The second group consisted of 78 Americans who were members of the "jedburgh teams," organized in Great Britain or Algiers and parachuted into France beginning on D-day. Jedburgh teams were composed of a British or American officer, a French officer, and a radio operator. These teams, usually working in uniform, coordinated and legitimatized Maquis activities under the aegis of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), obtained supplies for the resistance groups, reported significant intelligence, and as a secondary role engaged in guerrilla warfare and attacks on German lines of retreat or communication.[19]

The largest OSS group in France consisted of some 356 Americans who were members of OSS "Operational Groups" (OG's). All recruits for the OG's were French-speaking volunteers from US Army units, primarily infantry and engineer (for demolition experts). Medical technicians were procured from the Medical Corps, radio operators from the Signal Corps.[20] Working in uniform, these teams parachuted behind the lines after D-day to perform a variety of missions. They cut and harassed enemy communication lines; attacked vital enemy installations; organized, trained, and sustained the morale of local resistance groups; and furnished intelligence to the Allied armies. Interestingly, Donovan distinguished between the missions of Rangers and Commandos and those of the OG's, even though some aspects of their tactical operations were similar. The crucial difference in his mind was that the OG's "fitted into the pattern of OSS activities behind the enemy lines."[21]

Actually, the mission of the OG's was distinct not only from that of the Rangers and Commandos but also from that of other OSS activities. The OG Branch had been established on 4 May 1943; then, on 27 November 1944, the OG Command was activated as a separate entity within OSS. In addition to basic military training, OG recruits received specialized instruction on such subjects as foreign weapons, operation and repair of enemy vehicles, enemy espionage organizations, communications, demolitions, organization and training of civilians for guerrilla warfare, parachute jumping, and amphibious operations. Their basic function was to organize resistance groups into effective guerrilla units, equip them with weapons and supplies, and lead them into attacks against enemy targets, in concert with orders from the theater commander. As for how the concept of their mission differed from those of other Special Operations activities, an OSS general orientation booklet published in 1944 described it this way: "OG personnel activate guerrillas as military organizations to engage enemy forces. They always operate in uniform as military units and are not primarily concerned with individual acts of sabotage." Clearly, the OG's were primarily designed for guerrilla warfare, and the principles that they embodied were to significantly influence the Army's effort to develop a similar capability in later years.[22]

Another pertinent aspect of the OG concept was its basic operational unit, the section, composed of 2 officers and 13 enlisted men. Eight years later the first formal unconventional warfare unit formed in the US Army—the 10th Special Forces Group—was to adopt this same structure for its basic operational detachment. Also significant is the fact that the first commander of the 10th Special Forces Group was Colonel Aaron Bank, an Army officer who had served with OSS in France. Even the name

"Special Forces" is reminiscent of the combined headquarters formed in 1943 by OSS and SOE which in 1944 was renamed "Special Forces Headquarters" (SFHQ).[23]

"Throughout France," states the *War Report of the OSS,* "before and after D-day, SFHQ supplied, directed, and communicated with the Maquis in the largest resistance uprising in history."[24] A less enthusiastic analysis of the role of SFHQ, and in particular of OSS, was rendered by the G-2 Division, War Department General Staff (WDGS), in a "Summary of French Resistance, 6 June-31 August 1944." The opening paragraph of that summary reads as follows:

> It must be borne in mind that so-called resistance activities in France were the combination of the efforts of the local French themselves under the organization and direction of American, British, and French agents of SFHQ infiltrated from the United Kingdom and North Africa. In the majority of cases, the specific acts of sabotage were committed directly by the local French; and it is to them, for their courage and daring, that the greater portion of credit for the end results accomplished must be given. However, it is not at all out of place for OSS in general, and SO particularly, to take credit for its share in the planning and directing of the overall scheme of sabotage.[25]

Once again, this evaluation reveals more about the low regard accorded unconventional activities in general, and the OSS in particular, by many Army officers, than it does about the value of the resistance itself.

While the success of OSS and SOE efforts in France is difficult to estimate, General Eisenhower, commenting on how effectively the Maquis cut enemy lines of communication in support of the Normandy landings, stated that the French Resistance forces were worth 15 divisions to him in his invasion of the Continent.[26]

Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines

One large unconventional warfare operation not directed by OSS, but in which US Army personnel played a key role, was the Philippine Campaign, 1941-45. When the Japanese overran the islands, several Army officers escaped to the mountains, where they established extensive intelligence networks and guerrilla forces. In Northern Luzon, Lieutenant Colonel Russell Volckmann equipped, trained, and commanded five Philippine regiments that successfully engaged the Japanese in combat both

immediately before and during the landing of US forces at Lingayen in January 1945. On Mindanao, Lieutenant Colonel Wendell Fertig eventually consolidated some 37,000 guerrilla troops and held 90 percent of the island until the end of the war.[27] Both Volckmann and Fertig were to figure prominently in the activation of the Army's Special Forces in the early 1950's.

Attitudes Toward Unconventional Warfare

Near the end of World War II, President Roosevelt had foreseen the need for a permanent strategic intelligence organization for the postwar period, and asked General Donovan to give some thought to its possible structure. Replying with a "Memorandum for the President," Donovan proposed the "establishment of a central intelligence authority," which would report directly to the President, "with responsibility to frame intelligence objectives and to collect and coordinate the intelligence material required by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying out national policy and strategy." Donovan also urged the President to keep the trained, specialized personnel of OSS from being dispersed after the war so that they could contribute to this proposed organization.[28]

When someone in the Federal bureaucracy leaked a copy of Donovan's memorandum, the resultant public furor over what the *Chicago Tribune* called a proposed "Super-Spy System for Postwar New Deal" forced Roosevelt to tell Donovan that he "would wait out the storm and submit the proposal at a more propitious moment." That was in February 1945. In April the President died, and with his death the fortunes of OSS were dealt a severe blow.[29] Whereas Donovan had enjoyed the confidence of Roosevelt, Edward Hymoff charges that Truman "had no concept of OSS as an organization nor what it represented for the future of American foreign policy decisionmaking."[30]

President Truman ordered that the OSS be disbanded on 1 October 1945. One scholar has suggested that Truman was motivated

> apparently because of pressures from the armed services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], the Department of State, and the Bureau of the Budget. Another influence was undoubtedly Mr. Truman's own apparent prejudice against cloak and dagger operations by the United States. To continue an international spying organization in peacetime seemed somehow un-American in the atmosphere of the immediate postwar period.[31]

It is instructive to dwell on this analysis for a moment. First, one must not fall into the trap of exaggerating the success of OSS unconventional warfare operations. It may be true, as one historian has suggested, that the most significant long-range work was done in strategic intelligence by the much less publicized and romanticized "college professors, lawyers, and others who worked tirelessly in the research units, in the analysis of economic objectives, and in other operational analysis and technical groups within OSS." It was these groups who contributed much data on which successful wartime operations were based, and who developed techniques useful to contemporary intelligence research and analysis.[32]

Moreover, the unconventional warfare operations of OSS actually constituted a small portion of the overall US war effort, and many OSS resistance activities were haphazard, poorly organized, and uncoordinated with overall operations. Yet, one World War II participant has written that "unconventional warfare operations (not necessarily those sponsored by OSS) during World War II reaped a substantial strategic harvest," citing as examples the accomplishments of Soviet, Yugoslav, Albanian, and French partisans in immobilizing large numbers of German and Italian divisions.[33] The point of this discussion, however, is not to judge the success or failure of OSS unconventional warfare operations, but to illustrate—as another resistance participant, Charles Thayer has done—that the first American experience with modern, sophisticated, large-scale guerrilla movements took place during World War II, and furthermore, that a civilian-led US agency, the OSS, and not the military services, stepped in to capitalize on the potential for guerrilla warfare.[34]

In providing leadership in that area, General Donovan's infant organization incurred the wrath of other governmental agencies, including the military services. Opposition to the intelligence and special operations efforts of OSS was so intense that Dr. William Langer, head of Research and Analysis, later observed that "perhaps Bill Donovan's greatest single achievement was to survive." Even after being placed under the direction of the JCS in 1942, Donovan insisted on OSS independence and freedom from subservience to any single agency or military service.[35] It was this independence of OSS that was especially resented by "the traditionalists in the armed forces," claims Edward Hymoff in *The OSS in World War II,* primarily because "they had been plagued during the war by citizens in uniform who had become officers only because they were in OSS." In addition, "even more frustrating for the military professionals were the irreverent individuals in OSS who constantly flouted both authority and standard operating procedures."[36] Hymoff himself was a member of OSS,

and perhaps best typifies the attitude of many Donovan "operatives" by his statement that one of the things he liked best about the unorthodox agency was that "it was so unmilitary."[37] Donovan protected his "irreverent individualists" by reportedly often saying, "I'd rather have a young lieutenant with guts enough to disobey an order than a colonel too regimented to think and act for himself."[38]

One of the most consistent and outspoken opponents of OSS, Major General George V. Strong, Chief of Army G-2 (Intelligence), felt from the outset of COI that Donovan's organization conflicted with Army interests. Strong also argued that "Wild Bill's" independence would make him ineffective as a "team player." Later, when OSS came under the direction of the JCS and was struggling for survival, General Strong, according to Corey Ford, "refused to exercise his authority so that OSS could obtain the supplies and personnel of which it was desperately in need." In fact, 6 months passed before the JCS gave Donovan's organization any operational instructions or official directives about its responsibilities. The log-jam broke only after President Roosevelt learned of the delay and told General George C. Marshall, Chairman of the JCS, to "give Bill Donovan a little elbow room to operate in."[39]

In the face of such determined opposition, Donovan survived only because of the personal backing of Roosevelt. As Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden noted in *Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage,* the major adversaries of OSS—the Army, the Navy, and the FBI—"were fully conscious of Donovan's close friendship with Roosevelt," and therefore were aware that "if it came to a showdown, the back door of the White House was always open to William J. Donovan and a special plea."[40] The parallel between Roosevelt's support of OSS and John F. Kennedy's vigorous promotion of Special Forces in the face of reluctant foot-dragging by some senior military leaders[41] will not be lost on students of special warfare history, particularly when one considers that both organizations lost influence after the deaths of the two presidents.

Although the services—particularly the Army—contributed personnel to OSS, some commanders were reluctant to use OSS teams in their areas of responsibility. Detachment 101, for example, was initially prevented from operating in Burma because General Joseph Stilwell, commander of American forces in China, Burma, and India, was "fervently prejudiced against the 'irregular' military activity proposed by OSS," and "disparaged guerrilla tactics as 'illegal action' and 'shadow boxing.'"[42] Stilwell eventually relented and later praised the contributions of 101, but General Douglas MacArthur steadfastly refused to permit OSS to operate

in the South Pacific throughout the war, even when General Donovan offered a plan to support guerrilla operations in the Philippines.[43]

In addition to the personal rivalry, bureaucratic antipathy, and jealousy that were provoked by General Donovan's organization, the operations of OSS may have antagonized military leaders of the "regular" US Army who, by training and experience, were conditioned to think in terms of conventional warfare. Some of these leaders, therefore, may well have looked askance at what they considered the unorthodox and unnecessary OSS guerrilla warefare activities. Charles Thayer, in his book *Guerrilla,* claims that many general officers "harbor a deep-seated aversion to guerrillas, apparently because they fit no conventional pattern and their underhanded clandestine tactics have little in common with the military code of honor and chivalry which career soldiers . . . like to associate with their profession."[44] In another attempt to explain why so many US military leaders opposed unconventional warfare, Franklin Mark Osanka, a student of guerrilla activities, offers this more convincing rationale:

> Guerrilla warfare has not been an American forte because in most its wars . . . the United States has not had to rely upon guerrilla warfare. American experience with guerrilla warfare has been limited by the strength of American arms. The United States has been able to mobilize overwhelming economic and military power and to bring it to bear directly on the enemy, attacking him not where he was weakest but where he was strongest, because we are stronger still. American military doctrine has reflected this experience.[45]

Despite opposition from the military, however, by the end of the war OSS had developed a nucleus of officers trained and experienced in guerrilla warfare. According to Thayer, serious efforts were made to persuade the Pentagon to retain this nucleus for future war, but "these recommendations were to no avail on the ostensible ground that such 'elite' groups were incompatible with the democratic tradition."[46] While this explanation of the Pentagon's refusal may seem extreme, a respected military historian, Russell Weigley, states in his *History of the US Army* that the Army has a "long-standing suspicion of elite forces."[47] Certainly this "suspicion" may explain the Army's reluctance to create an "unconventional warfare" capability in the immediate postwar period, particularly when memories of OSS-Army rivalry were still fresh. Thayer does point out that while most of the personnel trained in guerrilla warfare were discharged, a nucleus of psychological warfare experts was retained, "largely as a result of the newly acquired respectability of this technique in the course of World War II."[48] What Thayer fails to mention is that the Army possessed its own

formal staffs and units charged with the responsibility for psychological warfare. In other words, psychological warfare had an identity, however tenuous, within the Army, an identity that guerrilla warfare did not share because most of the officers and men who operated in that area were assigned to OSS—an organization certainly not considered part of the Army. At any rate, psychological warfare "survived" in the immediate post-World War II Army, although just barely, while the Pentagon apparently gave little consideration to building on the nucleus of OSS-trained officers to create a formal unconventional warfare capability.

Dissolution of OSS

Dismemberment of OSS took place quickly with President Truman's order dissolving the agency in October 1945. By this time General Donovan had retired to civilian life, and the remains of his former organization were dispersed to the unreceptive State and War Departments. Carefully trained personnel drifted away to other jobs outside Government. Portions of the Secret Intelligence and Special Operations branches joined the War Department's newly established Strategic Services Unit (SSU), which, according to Corey Ford, "was nothing more than a caretaker body formed to preside over the liquidation of the OSS espionage network." Brigadier General John Magruder, formerly assistant director of OSS, and head of SSU until February 1946, resigned in protest over the agency's continuing loss of highly trained personnel. For all practical purposes, any formal US capability for guerrilla warfare disappeared. Only a few secret intelligence and analysis personnel remained, and there was little need for their skills in the immediate postwar period.[49]

Appraisal

The only true unconventional warfare organization in the United States during World War II was the Office of Strategic Services, a civilian agency. Although a few Army officers participated in non-OSS directed guerrilla operations in the Philippines, most of the Army's experience in unconventional warfare came from providing personnel to serve with OSS. Of particular note were the OSS Operational Groups that were recruited entirely from the Army and employed extensively in Europe. In terms of organization, training, and job description, the OG's presaged the basic operational detachment adopted by the Army's 10th Special Forces Group upon its creation in 1952. Thus, for the Army the true roots of a modern unconventional warfare capability lay in its association with OSS.

Clearly, the central figure in unconventional warfare during World War II was Major General William Donovan. Edmond Taylor, a former member of COI/OSS, vividly describes in his book *Awakening From History* Donovan's vision of the potential of unconventional warfare:

> The paramilitary and guerrilla aspects of the OSS mission probably interested him more than any other. By combining unlimited nerve, Yankee ingenuity, and self-reliance, the American tradition of frontier warfare, and the most advanced twentieth-century science or technology, Donovan believed that effectively unconventional solutions could be found to almost any strategic problem. Above and beyond his other, sometimes mutually incompatible goals, Donovan, I think, hoped to demonstrate through OSS that the normally untapped reserves of individual courage and resource, and the dynamism of the individual will to win constitute the basic raw materials of victory, and that in an increasingly mechanized world, human dignity is still not only a moral but a strategic quantity.[50]

Taylor, an unabashed admirer of Donovan ("I stayed in OSS, though sometimes attached to it by nothing more tangible than the invisible presence of Donovan in my mind") offers a moving personal opinion about the general's dedication to unconventional warfare: "As far as I was concerned General Donovan's demonstration was conclusive, and it made an abiding contribution to the development of my personal outlook on the unending struggle for survival among nations and civilizations, institutions and ideologies, that we call history."[51]

Without question, Donovan inherited many of his ideas from the British. But only a man of his stature, perseverance, and personal dynamism could have successfully applied those unorthodox concepts in the face of the intense opposition and competing bureaucratic interests that marked US interagency efforts during the war. Thus, while some of the Army officers detailed to OSS were to play important roles in the creation of the 10th Special Forces in the early 1950's, Donovan must be considered the spiritual father of Army unconventional warfare.

Actually, Donovan's influence on the Army extends beyond unconventional warfare; it also embraces psychological warfare. As discussed earlier, the initial idea behind formation of the Coordinator of Information, at least as conceived by Donovan, included combining intelligence, special operations, and propaganda functions in the same agency. Indeed, his all-encompassing concept of "psychological warfare" included all the elements—and more—of what the Army was later to call "special warfare" (with the exception of counterinsurgency). Probably Donovan's

greatest disappointment was losing the responsibility for open, or "white," propaganda, to the Office of War Information in 1942 when COI became OSS. Even after this setback, Donovan continued to stress throughout the war the close interrelationship of psychological warfare and special operations (unconventional warfare). It is the author's belief that this interrelationship, so firmly espoused by Donovan, influenced General McClure's ideas about combining psychological and unconventional warfare functions at both the Army Staff and the Psychological Warfare Center in the early 1950's. COI, then, can be considered a common point of origin for both unconventional and psychological warfare in modern American experience, and William Donovan can also legitimately be considered the spiritual father of a "special warfare" capability for the Army.

Looking at the Army's experience with both psychological and unconventional warfare during World War II, one is struck by the similarities of institutional responses to those two relatively new activities. To many military professionals, both were unorthodox, untried activities, heavily influenced by civilians. Together they never involved more than 10,000 Army personnel at any one time—a minor sideshow, thought many, compared to the overall "conventional" war effort. The military response to both was at times hesitant, skeptical, indifferent, and even antagonistic.

Psychological warfare, however, gradually gained greater acceptance within the Army. The crucial difference was that formal staff sections and units were developed by the Army to employ this weapon. There was still a heavy reliance on civilians, but military men were in command and made the final decisions as to its use, particularly in the virtually autonomous theaters. Thus psychological warfare acquired a measure of legitimacy within the Army and survived as a formal activity after the war.

Unconventional warfare, on the other hand, remained the province of a civilian agency, the OSS. Although Donovan's outfit relied heavily on Army personnel and was subject to JCS direction, it nonetheless remained a separate and distinct organization. The tensions created by this independent, "unconventional" posture are perhaps best described in the final portion of the *War Report of the OSS:*

> An agency engaged in secret and unorthodox activities is peculiarly susceptible to difficulties in its relations with other agencies and departments of its government. Secrecy inevitably creates a psychological attitude of distrust and suspicion on the part of others. In many instances, this attitude is aggravated by the clash with established procedures and regulations which the performance of irregular and unorthodox activities often entails.[52]

As a result of this independence, OSS—and unconventional warfare—did not gain within the Army the degree of acceptance ultimately enjoyed by psychological warfare. Lacking solid institutional roots, OSS failed to survive with the war's end. Its demise meant the disappearance of any formal US capability for unconventional warfare. Only the legacy of William Donovan and the experience of the OSS personnel who remained were left to build on for the future. Both would be drawn upon with the coming of the cold war.

IV

THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART I: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

"It is hard now to remember how menacing the Soviet encroachments appeared," wrote Ray Cline in 1976.[1] Cline, a former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was speaking of the 1947–48 period, during which American concerns about Soviet intentions were gathering in intensity. The situation was such that in March 1948 the Commander in Chief, European Command (EUCOM), Colonel Lucius Clay, cabled Washington: "I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it [war] may come with dramatic suddenness."[2] The Soviet Union's expansion into Eastern Europe; pressures on Greece, Turkey, and Iran; the Berlin Blockade; the fall of China to the Communists; the U.S.S.R.'s detonation of an atomic device in 1949; and the Korean war in 1950—these were just some of the developments that gradually hardened the attitudes of US policymakers and shattered American dreams of a post-World War II peace.

These attitudes emerged from what Daniel Yergin has called the "two commanding ideas of American postwar foreign policy—anti-Communism and a new doctrine of national security." The results, says Yergin, were policies that "included containment, confrontation and intervention, the methods by which US leaders have sought to make the world safe for America."[3] As our policymakers struggled to find effective means to respond to the perceived military and ideological threats, they examined ways to improve US capabilities in intelligence and psychological and unconventional warfare. The first result of this quest was the creation of the CIA, but it was also to have an impact upon the military services, particularly the Army. To understand the origins of a special warfare capability for the Army, we first must sketch the early history of the CIA, for the two are inextricably interwoven.

PRECEDING PAGE B

Creation of the CIA

Three months after he disbanded the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), President Truman on 22 January 1946 created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG)—the direct predecessor of the CIA.Truman had realized the need for a centralized body to gather and coordinate intelligence information and to eliminate friction among competing military intelligence services. By the spring of 1946, the War Department's Strategic Services Unit was transferred to CIG, giving it the remnants of an OSS clandestine collection capability. This led to the formation of the Office of Special Operations (OSO), which was responsible for espionage and counterespionage. By June 1946, CIG had a strength of approximately 1,800, of which about one-third were overseas with OSO.

With the passage of the National Security Act in July 1947, CIG became an independent department renamed the Central Intelligence Agency. The major tasks assigned to the agency were the following: (1) to advise the National Security Council (NSC) on matters related to national security, (2) to make recommendations to the NSC about the coordination of intelligence activities of the departments, (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence and provide for its dissemination, (4) to carry out "services of common concern," and (5) "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC from time to time direct." The CIA also assumed the previous functions of CIG—clandestine and overt collection, production of national current intelligence, and interagency coordination for national estimates.

Although the original discussions about the creation of both CIG and the CIA had focused on the problem of intelligence coordination, within a year of the 1947 act the CIA was charged with the conduct of covert psychological, political, paramilitary, and economic activities. On 14 December 1947, the National Security Council adopted NSC 4/A, which gave the CIA responsibility for covert psychological operations; on 22 December, the Special Procedures Group was set up within the CIA's Office of Special Operations to carry out psychological operations. By June 1948, NSC 10/2 had broadened that authority for covert operations to include political and economic warfare and paramilitary activities (such as sabotage and support to guerrillas). The Special Procedures Group was replaced by the Office of Special Projects, which shortly was renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). Its head was Frank Wisner, the former OSS station chief in Rumania. By the end of 1948, the CIA had a limited covert action capability.

The capability for covert action expanded as a result of the Korean war and the CIA's participation in paramilitary activities in the Far East. OPC's strength rose from 302 in 1949 to 2,812, plus 3,142 overseas contract personnel, in 1952; its budget, from $4.7 million to $82 million; and its number of overseas stations, from 7 to 47 during the same period. Another stimulus for CIA/OPC's expansion was NSC 68, issued on 14 April 1950, which called for a nonmilitary offensive against the Soviet Union, including covert economic, political, and psychological warfare to foster unrest in U.S.S.R. satellite countries. Similarly, NSC 10/5, which on 21 October 1951 had replaced NSC 10/2, again called for intensified covert action and reaffirmed the CIA's responsibility for its conduct. Finally, in August 1952, the clandestine collection and secret intelligence functions of OSO merged with the covert action capabilities of OPC. The resulting amalgamation was called the Directorate of Plans, with Frank Wisner of OPC in charge and Richard Helms from OSO as his second in command. Thus by 1953 the CIA was six times the size it had been in 1947, and the clandestine services had become by far the largest component in the agency.[4]

This brief overview has only highlighted the CIA's early history, but a few points should be emphasized. First, there was the influence of OSS. Corey Ford, Donovan's biographer, states that the CIA "was the direct outgrowth of Donovan's World War II organization, and was based on fundamental OSS principles."[5] Allen Dulles, the first civilian director of the CIA, states in his *The Craft of Intelligence* that Truman based his establishment of the CIA on the controversial recommendations offered by Donovan before Roosevelt's death in 1945, and that "much of the knowhow and some of the personnel in OSS were taken over by the Central Intelligence Agency."[6] In fact, in 1949 one-third of the CIA's personnel had previously served with OSS.[7] In its first year, however, the agency was so intelligence-oriented that people with World War II "special operations" experience were not recruited. But by the latter part of 1948, a growing number of former OSS personnel with guerrilla warfare experience had joined the intelligence agency. That influx continued throughout the 1940's, and when the Korean war began, even more former OSS personnel joined the CIA.[8]

The CIA's first years were also influenced by the preoccupation of US policymakers with the Soviet threat, a preoccupation that is difficult to exaggerate. The impetus of the cold war provided an environment of fear that fostered renewed interest in psychological and unconventional warfare. As the Senate Select Committee's report on intelligence activities states, "Decisions regarding US sponsorship of clandestine activities were

gradual but consistent, spurred on by the growing concern over Soviet intentions."[9] Finally, the growth of the Office of Policy Coordination was important, for it was this part of the CIA with which the Army would have to interact most as it groped to develop its own capability for psychological and unconventional warfare.

Army Demobilization

During 1945–46, Army psychological warfare staffs and units dissipated with the general demobilization of the military establishment. To be sure, a few senior officers recommended that the Army profit from its experience in that relatively new field. In December 1945 Major General Lemnitzer urged that the Army remember its wartime lessons and develop a psychological warfare capability for the future. He also recommended that the service schools include instruction "to provide future commanders and staff officers with a general understanding and appreciation of this new weapon of warfare."[10]

General McClure, the key World War II figure in Army psychological warfare, echoed the sentiments expressed by General Lemnitzer in a letter to the Propaganda Branch, War Department, in early 1946: "I urge that a comprehensive document on the subject of psychological warfare be produced and used in the National War College and the Command and General Staff School." McClure concluded by pronouncing the following verdict: "The ignorance, among military personnel, about psychological warfare, even now, is astounding."[11] And at a higher level, the Chief of the JCS Historical Section, Major General E. F. Harding (USA), recommended in February 1946 that the JCS employ a civilian professional to write a history of World War II psychological warfare. To make his point about the necessity of such a study, Harding reminded the JCS that the Army's World War I experience in this activity had not been recorded, and argued the importance of psychological warfare in modern total war.[12] Despite these entreaties, the nation longed for prompt return to normalcy. The military services, faced with the problems of rapid demobilization, gave little attention to the relatively minor subject of psychological warfare.[13]

Some Army personnel did, of course, have grave reservations about Soviet intentions, even though the U.S.S.R. had been a major ally in war. As a Senate report on US intelligence activities states, "American military intelligence officers were among the first to perceive the changed situation."[14] In a lengthy letter written in January 1946, Major General W. G.

Wyman, the G-2 of Army Ground Forces (AGF), prefaced his views on the ideological threat, both domestic and international, posed by the U.S.S.R. with this statement: "The confusion of mind and the inconsiderate thinking of the soldiers of the Ground Forces in the United States is illustrative of similar thought which exists amongst troops of occupation and the civilian population of the United States." Alarmed about the problems associated with demobilization, he asked rhetorically, "Where is the mental penicillin that can be applied to our loose thinking to insure the wholesome thought that is so urgently needed in our country today?" Launching into a comparison of communism and democracy, he outlined several areas of the world under Soviet domination or pressure—"the tentacles of communism"—and then addressed the domestic scene: "Our troubles of the day—labor, demobilization, the discontented soldier—these things are the sores on which the vultures of communism will feed and fatten."

Having given an overview of the ills, Wyman then turned to his prescription:

> There must be some agency, some group either within or outside our national security forces, which can interest itself in these matters. There must be some weapon by which we can defend ourselves from the secret thing which is working at our vitals—this cancer of modern civilization. . . . A new government policy is desperately needed to implement the psychological effort indicated. . . . We must combat this creeping shadow which is in our midst.

General Wyman concluded his letter by urging that the War Department, "in the interest of national security," recommend to the President that:

1. Federal intelligence agencies concentrate on collecting information on activities subversive to our government at home and abroad.

2. A government agency be selected to wage a psychological war against these activities.

3. A policy be established to publicize such subversive activities and expose them to our people.[15]

This remarkable analysis vividly portrays the mood of the times. While General Wyman's views may today appear somewhat extreme, in 1946 they represented the genuine concerns and fears of a segment of American society, both in and out of uniform. A larger part of the population, however, desired peace and a return to normalcy, and it was these

conflicting pressures that policymakers struggled with in the immediate postwar period. Those same conflicting pressures also affected the evolution of psychological warfare in the Army.

Psywar to Plans and Operations Division

In May 1946 the Intelligence Division, G-2, began work on a recommendation that War Department responsibility for psychological warfare be moved from G-2 to a special staff division created for this activity. However, both the Chief of Information, Major General M. S. Eddy, and the Director, Plans and Operations (P&O) Division, Major General Lauris Norstad, felt that such a special staff division was not justified in peacetime, so the recommendation was withdrawn in late June. General Norstad did express the view that his division should be responsible for the planning and policy guidance for psychological warfare, but only if the propaganda branch personnel from G-2 were transferred to him with the function.[16]

At the same time, General McClure, who was in Germany as Director, Information Control, responded to a request from Colonel D. W. Johnston, Chief, Propaganda Branch, for his recommendations about the proper place for psychological warfare agencies "within the staff structure of all appropriate echelons." Using his wartime experience as an example, McClure argued strongly that psychological warfare should not be under G-2:

> A great part of my difficulty in carrying out what I felt was my mission was with G-2. The G-2's all felt that they had a monopoly on intelligence and were reluctant in the earlier stages to give any of that intelligence to Psychological Warfare knowing that it would be broadcast or used in print.

He believed that an association of psychological warfare with G-3 would be more productive: "My greatest contacts were with G-3 and it was with the operational phases and even long-range operational plans . . . that I feel we did our best work."

McClure's clear preference, however, was for a separate, special staff section:

> I am firmly convinced that an activity as important and as ramified as Psychological Warfare is one which should have the personal attention of the Chief of Staff and that the Director of Psychological Warfare should likewise have access to the Chief of Staff and even to the Commander himself.

Here General McClure found the opportunity to promote one of his favorite themes:

> I had that relationship with the Chief of Staff and the Supreme Commander [Eisenhower] throughout the war and even then it was not as satisfactory as it should have been because of our failure in peace-time to indoctrinate Commanders and Staff Officers with the capabilities and limitations of Psychological Warfare.

He concluded by recommending again that "Psychological Warfare be a separate Staff Section reporting directly to the Chief and Deputy Chief of Staff with the closest liaison with the *G* Sections as well as with other Special Staff Sections."[17] (It was to be another four and a half years before the special staff section that McClure recommended would come to fruition on the Army Staff, and he would be its first head.)

Colonel Johnston realized that any attempt to create a special staff section for psychological warfare at that time would be futile. Nonetheless, he attempted to move the function out of the Intelligence Division. On 22 August 1946, he recommended the establishment of a "Psychological Warfare Group" under Plans and Operations (P&O) in the War Department General Staff (WDGS). Relying heavily on General McClure's arguments, Johnston emphasized that psychological warfare was "primarily operational in nature and does not fall readily within the scope of the Intelligence Division." Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Johnston's rationale for his proposed change was his belief that the new line of authority would eliminate future interference by civilians:

> In the event of a future emergency, while overall political and psychological warfare policies will stem from the White House and the State Department, the existence of a nuclear organization within the War Department possessing a complete plan for military psychological warfare and the technical means for implementation, would avoid the situation of World War II, wherein theater commanders had thrust upon them civilian agencies to conduct psychological warfare within their theaters, with resultant conflict of authority and lack of control over training standards and performance.[18]

Here again we see evidence of the resentment that many regular officers felt toward what they considered unwarranted civilian interference.

A decision on Colonel Johnston's recommendations was delayed until October, and it probably differed from what he had envisaged. The original paper had picked up some additional facets, and what the Acting Chief of

Staff approved on 3 October 1946 was a series of War Department recommendations to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) "to give early consideration to, and make prompt recommendations concerning Psychological Warfare Policy," and to "consider informing the U.S. public of foreign subversive activities within U.S."[19] In those recommendations, particularly those concerning subversive activities, the influence of General Wyman's January letter can be seen. With regard to the initial recommendation to establish a Psychological Warfare Group in P&O, however, the decision was that certain psychological warfare operations would be moved to other divisions and agencies, but that P&O would provide overall planning and policy guidance.[20]

Some footdragging followed until, during an informal conversation on 6 November 1946 between General Hodes and General Lincoln, General Hodes agreed to take over immediately the psychological warfare functions of G-2 and to absorb its Propaganda Branch.[21] The Propaganda Branch was formally discontinued by Intelligence Division Memorandum No. 100 on 29 November 1946, and the branch personnel assigned to the Policy Section, P&O.[22] A minor era in the evolution of War Department bureaucracy thus ended. Psychological warfare, which from 1941 had been a G-2 responsibility, passed to the operations side of the house.

Actually, the responsibility for psychological warfare had been diluted in the process. While War Department Memorandum No. 575-10-1, issued on 10 January 1947, charged the Director of P&O with the responsibility for general supervision of Army psychological warfare activities, several other War Department agencies were given pieces of the pie. These included the Director of Intelligence, who retained responsibility for collection, evaluation, and interpretation of sociological and psychological information, and the analysis of foreign propaganda; the Director of Organization and Training; the Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement; the Director of Research and Development; and the Chief of Public Information.[23] Real centralization of psychological warfare activities did not occur until January 1951, when the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) was formed, with General McClure as its head.

Eisenhower and McClure

At about the time that responsibility for psychological warfare passed to P&O, some interest in the field emerged at a higher policy level. Apparently initiated by the interest of Secretary of War Robert Patterson, dis-

cussions about covert operations as a future form of war took place in SWNCC. As an offshoot, in December 1946 an SWNCC subcommittee formulated guidelines for the conduct of psychological warfare in peacetime and wartime. Then, in April 1946 an SWNCC subcommittee was formed to plan psychological warfare; in June 1947 it was renamed the Special Studies and Evaluation Subcommittee.[24]

In a memorandum dated 19 June 1947 Army Chief of Staff Eisenhower indicated to the Director of P&O his desire for the War Department "to take those steps that are necessary to keep alive the arts of psychological warfare and of cover and deception and that there should continue in being a nucleus of personnel capable of handling these arts in case an emergency arises."[25] At the same time, the former World War II Supreme Allied Commander asked his former Chief of the Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF, for comments on the subject.

McClure emphasized in his reply that "psychological warfare must become a part of every future war plan." He lamented the dispersion of people with World War II experience, and specifically recommended that:

1. A mixed civilian-military group, on a voluntary basis, be charged with studying psychological warfare policies and practices during this war.

2. Research be undertaken, at once, into the effectiveness of PW (psychological warfare).

3. A PW Branch of the Director of Information be established.

4. A PW Reserve, of limited number, be established.

5. Training for PW be undertaken at the General Staff College and the National Defense College.[26]

In light of the strong views that he had expressed earlier about the desirability of a Special Staff section for psychological warfare, McClure's recommendation to put this function under the Chief of Information appears strange. Perhaps he had decided that such a proposal was futile because of the previous resistance to this idea shown by the War Department staff. Perhaps his post-World War II experience in information had convinced him that this was the proper course. As he explained in his memorandum to Eisenhower: "It [psychological warfare] is more than intelligence; it is more than operations . . . it *is* information—secured and disseminated to friend and enemy."[27]

Little resulted from General McClure's recommendations. According to the Director of P&O in the staff reaction requested by Eisenhower, General McClure's first two recommendations had been followed: A civilian historian, Dr. E. P. Lilly, had been employed by the JCS to write a history of psychological warfare for World War II. But the War Department staff believed that the responsibilities for psychological warfare should remain as outlined in War Department Memorandum 575-10-1, and not be a function of the Chief of Information. Nor was the establishment of a psychological warfare reserve believed practical. With regard to McClure's final recommendation, the Director of P&O, General Norstad, simply replied that the subject of psychological warfare was included in the curriculum of the National War College, the Command and General Staff College, and the Air War College.[28]

Another senior officer who was unhappy with the progress of US psychological warfare was General Wyman. He wrote to General Norstad on 14 June 1947, and, with his usual intensity, declared, "I believe that the SWNCC group that has been set up is not sufficiently powerful to accomplish the urgent national requirement in this field. Such a group must have no diverting duties to take them away from this very extensive subject which is so important to us." He went on to state that a national psychological warfare objective must be established, and that the Army needed an interim directive so that it could "bring an aggressive program to bear on appropriate objectives without further delay." He concluded by reaffirming the necessity for action at the highest level: "I am convinced that a national agency must be set up, using SWNCC perhaps, but stirred up and goaded far beyond any present concept to immediate action."[29]

In his reply, Norstad agreed on the need for a national agency, but reminded General Wyman that the overall direction and control of peacetime activities was primarily a State Department function. He informed Wyman that two officers from P&O were members of the SWNCC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare, which was primarily a contingency planning organization that should not engage in the day-to-day business of "selling democracy." He proceeded to draw a distinction between the peacetime activity of "selling democracy," an information function, and "psychological warfare," which "should apply only to wartime or prebelligerency and have as its frank objective the coercion as well as the provision of thought."[30] Wyman agreed with Norstad's distaste for the term "psychological warfare," but felt that there was "a great need for a synonym which could be used in peacetime that would not shock the sensibilities of a citizen of democracy."[31]

The problem was not new. During World War II, agency differences over "open," "white," or "overt," as opposed to "closed," "black," or "covert" propaganda had been a source of continuing difficulty. In fact, those differences had been one of the primary factors in the dissolution of COI and the division of psychological warfare responsibilities between OWI (overt) and OSS (covert). But this was a new kind of war—a "cold war"—in which most Americans desired peace. Many military men wanted to have nothing at all to do with psychological warfare; it was not "real soldiering." Even those who felt that psychological warfare was important were understandably perplexed about the proper role of the military in this multifaceted and unorthodox activity. The correspondence between General Norstad and General Wyman mirrored the dilemma faced by concerned professionals.

Norstad asked the Chief of Information, General Eddy, for his informal views on this sensitive subject. Eddy's reply, in a lengthy memorandum written in October 1947, provides some valuable insights. He began by concurring "in the need to undertake without delay an extensive campaign of psychological warfare, in both overt and covert phases, as a matter of national necessity to offset the effectiveness of the growing PW campaign launched against the United States by the U.S.S.R." But then he discussed the importance of carefully presenting such a campaign to the American public and the role of the military in such an effort:

> Although the success or failure of such a PW campaign will be of the most vital military concern, the political structure of the U.S. precludes making PW a military effort. In fact, the political considerations are so sensitive in this field that the whole program may be defeated at its inception—no matter who assumes the initiative—if the entire question of ways and means of broaching the subject to the President, the Congress, the people—particularly the press—is not minutely examined by the best brains available and handled with the utmost tact, finesse and discretion. Otherwise, the American people and the Congress will misunderstand and disapprove the project at the outset.

Eddy believed that covert psychological warfare would not be accepted by the American people "without a great deal of preliminary education and groundwork," and emphasized that it should be conducted "under the aegis of an agency not directly connected with the armed forces." On the other hand, the public and Congress would probably accept overt psychological warfare, but only if they were fully informed as to its need and methods. That, Eddy said, would require the voluntary cooperation of the

information media. Terms such as "psychological warfare," "propaganda," and "subversion" would have to be carefully explained "so as not to arouse public indignation or fear of 'gestapo-ism' and authoritarianism in our own country." And as for the military's role in this endeavor, Eddy thought that "the entire subject should be sponsored by civilians—not members of the military establishment—both in and out of the government. Publicly recognized military participation should be limited to advice, concurrence, and such performance as may be delegated to it."[32]

General Eddy's views vividly portray the murky and politically sensitive area that was psychological warfare in the early years of the cold war. The extreme caution he advocated undoubtedly contributed to the ambivalent attitudes of many senior Army officers toward this "grey area" activity during the interwar period.

General McClure, however, was not ambivalent, and rarely missed an opportunity to press for a strong Army role in psychological warfare. Responding to a request from Eisenhower for a small number of civilian candidates for a psychological warfare reserve, McClure in early November 1947 recommended a group of eight for policy planning and outlined how they could be used. He then added:

> Although activities of this group would have to be coordinated with other armed services and with the State Department, it appears to me that the Army is privileged to take the initiative in securing U.S. Government coordination of Psychological Warfare activities since the Army is the principal implementing agency in four occupied countries and a contributing agency through its Military Attache and Military Mission systems.[33]

McClure was correct; the Army was heavily involved in civil affairs, information control, and "reorientation" activities in several occupied countries. No one was more aware of that than the former Chief of PWD/SHAEF, who had left that position after the war to become Director of Information Control in Germany, and who was, at the time of this memorandum to Eisenhower, Chief of the War Department New York Field Office, Civil Affairs Division.

One of the men recommended by McClure for the psychological warfare reserve group was William S. Paley, Chairman of the Board of the Columbia Broadcasting System. Paley came to see General Eisenhower shortly after the McClure memorandum and expressed his willingness to help in psychological warfare planning, but said he preferred to do so as a

civilian consultant rather than in uniform. In a memorandum to Secretary Forrestal, Eisenhower agreed with Paley's preference "inasmuch as the sense of the discussion among interested agencies has been to the effect that civilians should control and predominate in the current organization and planning."

Thus having established his acceptance of civilian leadership in psychological warfare planning, Eisenhower then made a case for a strong role for the military in the ongoing process:

> I realize that there are high-level committees considering the subject, but it seems to me that the military must give continued impetus to the organization and realistic functioning of this important activity. Further, the Armed Services should prepare plans now involving enunciation of policy and methods applying to actual war.

The argument for a military role in psychological warfare planning made, Eisenhower tactfully suggested that the Army, and specifically his former PWD/SHAEF chief, could provide the necessary leadership:

> I do not know whether the responsibility for this planning should be referred to the JCS or to an ad hoc committee under your immediate supervision. In the latter event, I could, if you so desire, detail as the head of a combined committee, a brigadier general (Robert A. McClure) who had extensive experience in this field during the war in Europe. He was closely associated with Bill Paley and others of similar qualifications. He is therefore in a position to crystallize the experience and knowledge acquired during the past war and should facilitate the development of a workable plan for the future employment of psychological warfare under conditions of actual war.

Ever the diplomat, Eisenhower closed his memorandum to the Secretary with supreme tact: "This note has no other purpose than to express readiness to be helpful. If the matter is completely in hand through the processes of the high-level committees, my suggestions may not be pertinent."[34]

The Chief of Staff's offer was not accepted, and McClure stayed at his post in New York. Nonetheless, Eisenhower's interest in psychological warfare was evident, and it was equally evident that Robert A. McClure carried some weight with the Chief. But the Army continued to feel its way gingerly in this ambiguous and politically sensitive field.

The Army's Reaction to NSC-4

The task of delineating agency responsibilities for psychological warfare proved difficult. In early November 1947, the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force determined with the JCS that all propaganda—both overt and covert—should be a function of the State Department, in consultation with the CIA and a military representative. Accordingly, President Truman assigned psychological warfare coordination to the Secretary of State on 24 November, a decision that was reversed within 3 weeks. Secretary of State George Marshall opposed taking responsibility for covert actions that might embarrass the Department and discredit US foreign policy. He favored placing covert activities outside the Department, but still subject to guidance from the Secretary of State. Similarly, the military wanted to maintain some control over covert psychological activities without assuming operational responsibility. Unwilling to risk association with covert activities, the Departments turned to the CIA.[35] The result was NSC-4, entitled "Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Information Activities," a directive that in December 1951 "empowered the Secretary of State to coordinate overseas information activities designed to counter communism," and an annex, NSC-4A, which "instructed the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake covert psychological activities in pursuit of the aim set forth in NSC-4."[36] Shortly thereafter, on 22 December, the Special Procedures Group was established within the CIA's Office of Special Operations to carry out such covert operations.[37] Thus, responsibility for covert psychological warfare was fixed, or so it appeared. But much needed to be done to define agency responsibilities for the overt side.

The Army's first reaction to NSC-4 was an attempt to get its own house in order. A study was initiated in January 1948 "to determine what steps are required to strengthen and coordinate all domestic and foreign information measures of the Department of the Army in furtherance of the attainment of U.S. national objectives in compliance with NSC-4 and existing regulations." The study discussed the "insidious and destructive" Communist propaganda that "directly threatened" U.S. national security; advocated strong counterpropaganda measures, both foreign and domestic; and declared that "inasmuch as the use of propaganda as a *weapon* of either war or peace is of fundamental concern to the Department of the Army, it is believed imperative that Army efforts in this field be coordinated and directed."

An assertive posture was taken regarding the sensitivity of psychological warfare:

> The fact that the American people and Congress do not like and/or are afraid of domestic propaganda, is no excuse for us to sidestep our responsibility. The responsibility of accepting the consequence of doing nothing is far greater. The American people have proved too many times that they can "take it" if they are told why.

The study also contained a lengthy discussion of opinion surveys from World War II—a cause for concern because they indicated "a lack of psychological conditioning of the soldier's mind before going to war." Thus the wish: "If the Army could engage in 'white' propaganda for civilian consumption, it would be beneficial as prior indoctrination of the future power of Army manpower."

The study emphasized that three Army Special Staff Divisions—Civil Affairs, Public Information, and Troop Information and Education—were engaged in dissemination of "white" propaganda, but that their efforts were uncoordinated. Furthermore, there was "little or no policy guidance or general supervision from P&O Division," as specified by War Department Memorandum No. 575-10-1, issued in January 1947. Since the study was prepared by Colonel Yeaton of P&O, the last conclusion was a rather candid and surprising admission.

In any event, to remedy the situation described, the study recommended the following:

> That the Chief of Information be directed to supervise all current operations of the Department of the Army in the field of information, public relations, or education which have psychological or propaganda implications.
>
> That all "white" propaganda, domestic and foreign, implemented by the Department of the Army and disseminated by the three (3) Special Staff Divisions (Civil Affairs, Public Information and Troop Information and Education) be coordinated by the Chief of Information.
>
> That for psychological warfare or propaganda purposes, the Chief of Information receive policy guidance from the Director of Plans and Operations Division through appropriate and continuous liaison.

The Chief of Information agreed with the recommendations, but believed strongly that P&O should coordinate the overall psychological warfare effort. He also cautioned against casting the Chief of Information in a psychological warfare/propaganda role. P&O concurred with this, but saw "no danger if handled as suggested." On 18 December 1948, the study recommendations were approved by the Secretary of the Army.[38]

As we have seen, the Army's first reaction to NSC-4 produced little in the way of far-reaching measures, but rather an attempt to improve internal coordination of psychological and information activities. Those modest steps indicated the crosscurrents of uncertainty and caution, on the one hand, and a desire to "do something" about a perceived condition of national malaise and weakness, on the other. They reflected a sense of frustration by some with the lack of strong national direction in psychological warfare, and a feeling of uncertainty about the Army's leadership role in this politically sensitive area.

Another interesting facet of the Army's action was General McClure's role. Colonel Yeaton, who prepared the study for P&O, apparently felt that it was important to note for the Chief of Staff that the paper had been presented to McClure, "who gave complete concurrence."[39] Even from his office in New York, then, General McClure continued to influence the Army's thinking on psychological warfare.

McClure's influence continued to be felt at all levels of psychological warfare. A memorandum for the new Chief of Staff, General Omar Bradley, written in March 1948 by Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer (who had replaced Norstad as Director of Plans and Operations), gave some indication about McClure's stature:

> In the last war this activity [psychological warfare] was not promptly or efficiently developed. Organization and functions were accomplished under duress. During the course of the war, many men became quite proficient in this unusual, but very vital work. I believe that Brigadier General Robert A. McClure should be brought to the War Department for consultation in the premises.[40]

The followup memorandum to that paragraph by the Assistant Chief, Plans and Policy Group, P&O, confirms the key role of McClure in policy matters:

> General McClure visited Washington before and after his trip to Europe. On the occasion of each visit, he spent considerable time in Policy. He was consulted on the provision of SANACC 304/6 and his recommendations are embodied in JCS 1735. He edited and approved our psychological warfare study now in the hands of the Joint Planners.
>
> General McClure now feels that close liaison has been established between P&O and himself. He has been of great assistance in the past, and his opinion will be sought in the future on all major psychological warfare issues.[41]

Further evidence of McClure's stature—and his close relationship with General Wedemeyer—was a June 1948 "Dear Bob" letter from Wedemeyer, thanking General McClure for his comments on an Army pamphlet entitled "Tactical Psychological Warfare" to be used at the Ground General School at Fort Riley:

> Your constructive views make it possible to improve these training publications. I hope that we can send similar material to you in the future, in order to obtain the continued benefit of your knowledge and experiences. Furthermore, I trust that you can find time to put down on paper more of your experiences and reflections on the broader aspects of psychological warfare, because we find ourselves short of seasoned, mature Army writing in this field.[42]

Switching to a higher policy level, McClure, in a "Dear Al" letter to General Wedemeyer in July 1948, laid out in considerable detail his concerns and recommendations for psychological warfare. He began by addressing a recent conversation with General Omar Bradley, who appreciated the value of psychological warfare during wartime but apparently felt that the Army should confine itself to planning and leave overall responsibility to the State Department. McClure had some misgivings about this approach:

> I am sure few people realize that today the Department of the Army is the foremost U.S. propaganda agency of our Government. Why, and how come, would require involved explanation to the uninformed. You and I know the answers. By default, State Department has not taken over its responsibilities in this field for many reasons—particularly appropriations.

Having stated his major theme, McClure supported it by presenting a tour d'horizon of the Army's activities. The Armed Forces radio networks, the *Overseas Stars and Stripes* newspaper, the Troop Education and Information program in Europe and the Far East, the Army's "complete responsibility for the propaganda to four occupied countries," the fact that the Army controlled more worldwide radio broadcasts than the State Department, the US Military Government newspapers published in 3 foreign countries, the 50 to 75 documentary films distributed each year, the world newsreels made in 3 languages each week, the control of all US commercial films shown in occupied countries, the cultural centers established in 60 cities of the occupied areas, the magazines published for foreign distribution ("We, the Army publish five while State publishes one") and the millions of pamphlets and leaflets printed for educational purposes in 4 occupied countries—all of this, and more, prompted McClure

to declare, "I should say today that the Army has five times the outlet for projection of America that State has and probably a greater audience for its propaganda."

McClure also declared that the Army should not take a head-in-the-sand attitude about these activities, because, "Call it what you may, international information, propaganda, or psychological warfare, the responsibilities still rest with us." The responsibility for directing and coordinating propaganda was in line with clearly established US Government objectives and could not be ignored, but, McClure wrote, there was "no Army or National Defense Agency doing so." McClure used his own office—which was responsible for a sizeable portion of the program in occupied areas—to illustrate the lack of central direction and coordination: "In the year I have been in charge of the New York Field Office of Civil Affairs Division there has never been a conference outside of my own office on propaganda policy." That last statement startled someone—perhaps General Wedemeyer—for the handwritten exclamation "Wow!" appears next to it.

Continuing to beat the drum, McClure acknowledged that NSC-4 was a step in the right direction, but that "a great need for unity of purpose and central direction remained." With a touch of assertive pride, McClure added: "The Army has taken a major interest in this field and should be privileged to take the lead, if necessary."

Having laid his foundation, McClure then summarized his pleas to the Director of Plans and Operations:

> The whole purpose of this letter to you is to urge:
>
> 1. recognition of the responsibility of the Army;
>
> 2. an organization in being within the National Defense setup to carry on the operations which the Army has assumed;
>
> 3. an organization to plan for and further psychological warfare;
>
> 4. a study of Psychological Warfare—its capabilities and shortcomings;
>
> 5. utilization of those willing, experienced civilians, who are anxious to help a future Psychological Warfare organization.

Two pages of specific recommendations followed, including one for a national organization to handle both black and white propaganda ("the present separation of black and white propaganda between State and CIA is basically unsound.") Others addressed technical research and various studies needed, psychological warfare instruction for service schools, ways to improve the Reserve program for psychological warfare officers, and, an old theme, the "indoctrination of commanders in the capabilities and limitations of propaganda in warfare."

Apologizing for a lengthy letter, McClure closed by saying that he had written a personal, rather than official, communication since "much of this is outside of the field of my official responsibility."[43]

It was, in fact, an amazing letter, particularly since it was written by a man who admitted that much of what he wrote was outside his "official responsibility." In terms of breadth, scope, and imagination, it was one of the most comprehensive personal communications on the subject of psychological warfare written by an Army officer during the interwar years.

General Wedemeyer acknowledged McClure's dedication and expertise with a thoughtful, but delayed, reply in September: "I am deeply grateful, Bob, for your fine letter and the inclosures. I realize that you are unquestionably our outstanding authority on this very important subject, psychological warfare, and feel deeply indebted for your contribution." As a sidenote, he mentioned that Frank Wisner, Director of CIA's newly created Office of Special Projects (later renamed Office of Policy Coordination), had recently asked about the possibility of McClure "joining up with his team" because he recognized that "you are perhaps the most knowledgeable and experienced officer in the game."[44] McClure did not do so, however, and there is a certain irony in this minor episode in view of the conflicts that later arose between Wisner's "team" and that of General McClure as Chief of the Army's Office of Psychological Warfare in the early 1950's.

The essence of Wedemeyer's response to McClure's main argument for recognition of the Army's responsibilities and the need for a national psychological warfare organization was that the situation was out of the Army's hands. Until the NSC decided on several proposals before it for such an organization, he replied, not much could be done about policy, nor could Army plans for psychological warfare be made firm.[45]

Actually, Wedemeyer had given the subject more thought than his response to McClure may have indicated. In early August he had written

a memorandum to General Bradley, the Chief of Staff, to offer "a few of my thoughts" on psychological warfare:

> Thus far in our planning, both within the Joint Staff and in P&O Division, we have been inclined to think of psychological warfare as a means which we should develop for giving further effect to strategic plans already developed. That is, we have considered it desirable to draw up a "psychological warfare annex" to each strategic plan. I am now inclined to think that this may be an unsound approach. It restricts psychological warfare activities within the narrowed limits of the strategic operations already determined without due consideration of the psychological problem.[46]

This was an important insight. What Wedemeyer was suggesting was that psychological warfare should be integral to the strategic planning process, rather than an afterthought to those plans. The lack of understanding by senior commanders and staffs of the crucial distinction between those two approaches has historically plagued the work of psychological warfare planners. Wedemeyer's tentative recognition of this conflict represented an important doctrinal advance, but one that was not always adhered to by his successors.

With that thought as background, Wedemeyer outlined for Bradley "a new approach" that the P&O was prepared to initiate:

> 1. We will select a small group of experienced, forward thinking, young planners and assign them the task of developing in broad outline a war plan based on the following single war objective: to cause the people of Soviet Russia to overthrow their present totalitarian government and to render them maximum practicable assistance in this undertaking.
>
> 2. It is expected that such a plan will develop to the greatest possible extent the full capabilities of a psychological warfare approach. It may produce a radically different scheme of military operations from that contemplated under the HALFMOON concept.
>
> 3. When this plan is developed, if it appears to have sufficient merit, we will then suggest that you present it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for joint consideration.[47]

Despite its grandiose objective, Wedemeyer's proposal offered another important insight: the importance of assessing, and perhaps acting upon, the potential psychological vulnerabilities of a society.

Bradley's response was guarded, stating that while the proposal was "a good idea," it "might be impracticable as a line of action, but on the other hand it may not." He conceded that, in any event, "it would furnish some ideas for modification of HALFMOON." There is little indication, however, that much resulted from Wedemeyer's proposal, partly because he was unable to pry away from other divisions the caliber of planners needed for the task envisaged.[48]

While not enough to satisfy some like General McClure, some work had been done in Army psychological warfare, both at the staff level and in the field. In June 1947, based on a directive from the Director of Organization and Training, WDGS, an experimental "Tactical Information Detachment" had been activated at Fort Riley, Kansas. The detachment sent teams, equipped with loudspeakers and leaflets, to participate in Army field maneuvers in the continental United States, the Caribbean area, and Hawaii. (The Tactical Information Detachment was to be the only operational psychological warfare troop unit in the US Army when the Korean war erupted in June 1950.) Studies were started by Headquarters, AGF, for a cellular combat propaganda unit to replace the mobile teams of the MRB companies used in World War II. Psychological warfare extension courses were prepared by the Army General School at Fort Riley, primarily for specialists in the Military Intelligence Reserve.[49]

In September 1948, at the Department of the Army, P&O prepared a "tentative Psychological Warfare Plan (Army)" for wartime, which included estimates of Special Staff personnel needed at theater, army, and corps levels, as well as operating personnel needed to serve tactical units down to the level of regimental combat teams. Staffing of this tentative plan followed, but in late December 1948 it was determined that "no action is required or possible since, until higher authority has determined the degree of Army responsibility in PW [psychological warfare], the degree of Army need for TO&E units cannot be determined."[50] At the end of 1948, then, the Army was still gingerly feeling its way, waiting for "higher authority" to decide the extent of its role in psychological warfare.

In early 1949 some movement to provide for national overt psychological warfare planning began. In February, the NSC agreed that an organization for the peacetime planning of overt psychological warfare should be established within the State Department and directed the NSC staff to prepare a proposed directive on the subject. The directive established an organization consisting of a director appointed by the Secretary of State, consultants from the other agencies, as well as liaison from the CIA. The organization was to be charged with planning and preparation

"for the coordinated conduct of foreign and domestic information programs and overt psychological operations abroad in the event of war or threat of war as determined by the President." A similar planning function previously assigned to the SWNCC Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations was to be terminated, according to the directive. While there was some disagreement among the military services about certain revisions to the proposed directive, they were resolved—at least initially—to support it in the interest of expediting the action. As General Maddocks (who had replaced General Wedemeyer as director of P&O) penned on a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Combat Operations, General Wedemeyer: "P.S. The important underlying factor in this matter is to get started. The directive can be amended as need therefor arises, after the group starts work."[51] To this, General McClure undoubtedly would have added, "Amen!"

The Carroll Report

One reason the Army moved rather hesitantly in psychological warfare was that the Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, was himself concerned about Army involvement in this activity. He definitely opposed any association with covert operations, stating in June 1948 that he did not want the Army "even to know anything about it."[52] However, through the combined efforts of two civilian members of his staff—Under Secretary William H. Draper and Assistant Secretary Gordon Gray—and General Wedemeyer, Royall gradually relented at least to the point of allowing more participation by the Army in overt psychological warfare.

Under Secretary Draper started the ball rolling by employing a civilian consultant, Wallace Carroll, to prepare a study about the Army's role in current psychological warfare activities. Carroll's study, forwarded to Draper on 24 February 1949, recommended that a separate "unit" be established to take charge of the Army's psychological warfare responsibilities. The "unit" would be headed by a general officer or qualified civilian, who would coordinate with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations (who at this time was General Wedemeyer).[53]

Apparently, Draper made the results of Carroll's study available to Secretary Royall, because in a subsequent discussion between General Wedemeyer, the Secretary, and Assistant Secretary Gray, Wedemeyer reported that "Mr. Royall has changed somewhat in his view in that he accepts that we in the Department of the Army must participate a little; in fact, it was pointed out to him by Mr. Gray that we are actually

participating in Europe. Mr. Royall wants this activity under a civilian Secretary and has designated Mr. Gray to supervise same."[54]

In this report to the Chief of Staff, General Bradley, Wedemeyer stated that Gray subsequently asked him (Wedemeyer) to propose to the Secretary an organization with Gray as head, a civilian assistant for psychological warfare, and a group of 8 to 10 officers in the Plans and Operations Division. Wedemeyer concluded by reminding the Chief that "Mr. Royall is very desirous that the uniformed services should not be involved too much in psychological warfare, but he does accept certain limited responsibilities in the Department." The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations apparently thought that even this lukewarm endorsement represented progress since Royall had told him a year earlier that "the Army would have no part in psychological warfare and he admonished me definitely not to participate in such activity."[55]

Responding promptly to Gray's request, on 17 March 1949 General Wedemeyer forwarded to Secretary Royall the following memorandum:

> 1. Mr. Gordon Gray asked me to discuss Psychological Warfare with Mr. Carroll, a civilian consultant, whom Mr. Draper employed to investigate realistic and minimum Army participation. Mr. Carroll prepared a study which I have analyzed carefully. Further, I talked to officers who have had experience in the psychological field.
>
> 2. Last Saturday Mr. Gray and I had a discussion concerning Army participation that would be acceptable to you, and also that would insure a realistic and yet not embarrassing role for the Army.
>
> 3. I recommend that Psychological Warfare be supervised by Mr. Gray as a responsibility of his office. A small group of officers could be located in P&O where they would coordinate with the International Group and the Strategic Planning Group of that Division of the General Staff. Mr. Gray should have a civilian assistant whose primary function would be to handle all psychological warfare matters for him and to maintain appropriate contacts with the State Department. This latter Department in the final analysis should be responsible for all Psychological Warfare matters of policy and for the coordination of Psychological Warfare activities. The Army should do nothing except with the cognizance and at the request of the State Department. I had hoped to talk to you personally about the above matter; however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in almost continuous session and it has not been possible to do so. Mr. Gray asked me a few days ago to express my views to you concerning this subject; hence this memo.[56]

It was a masterful example of bureaucratic persuasion. Using the recommendation of an outside civilian consultant to pry an opening in Royall's opposition, Draper, Gray, and General Wedemeyer worked together to tactfully nudge the Secretary toward accepting some increase in Army psychological warfare planning. Royall's sensitivity on the subject undoubtedly influenced the Army's ambivalence toward psychological warfare. His resistance is the one notable exception during the period of this study of an important civilian Army official who adamantly opposed Army activity in psychological warfare. Indeed, the converse was more often the case; civilian officials frequently found it necessary to prod uniformed Army leaders into a greater effort in psychological warfare. Such was to be the case with Gordon Gray, who succeeded Royall as Secretary of the Army on 20 June 1949.

Gordon Gray—Revival of Interest

Not surprisingly, the emphasis on increased Army participation in psychological warfare urged upon Royall near the end of his tenure was continued by his successor. And with this apparent upswing in interest by the Army, again the advice of Brigadier General Robert A. McClure was sought. "Dear Bob," wrote the new Director of Plans and Operations, Major General Charles L. Bolte, on 7 July 1949:

> You will recall that some time ago we talked briefly about the dissolution or disappearance of adequate planning for other measures in the field of psychological warfare, since the war. I recall that you expressed some concern over the fact that this matter was not receiving adequate, if any, attention on the part of the appropriate authorities, at least in the Military Establishment.[57]

In view of McClure's consistent criticism to that effect since the end of World War II, this last assertion suggests considerable understatement.

Bolte continued:

> I think that you will be relieved to know that the matter is being revived and that some measures are to be taken to restore us to a more adequate position. In that connection I have been asked to suggest, or secure the suggestions of, some names of possible candidates for appointment to a civilian position in the Office of the Secretary of the Army. I thought possibly you might have in mind the names of some appropriate individuals.

McClure, who by now had moved from New York to Fort Ord, California, to be the Assistant Division Commander of the 4th Infantry Division, answered Bolte promptly. Grousing about having received unexpected orders transferring him to the Northern Military District of Vancouver Barracks ("The orders gave me only one week to pack up and move which shows the consideration which the Army usually gives to the domestic side of life"), McClure nonetheless applauded the apparent resurgence of interest: "I am very pleased with the contents of your letter and to realize that the D of A [Department of the Army] is at last waking up to the importance of one of its major weapons—a weapon which can be used without repercussions of an atomic bomb category." He went on to recommend several candidates for the civilian position, providing a thumbnail sketch of each person's qualifications.[58]

McClure's letter was en route to General Bolte when, on 11 July, a meeting was held in the Secretary of the Army's office to report on the progress of psychological warfare organization within the Department of the Army. This much was clear: (1) a civilian "supervisor" for psychological warfare would be located in the Office of the Assistant Secretary, (2) a small working group for psychological warfare would be established in P&O, and (3) a nucleus of information operators would be formed in the Office of the Chief of Information.

What was not clear, however, was the relationship between the civilian "supervisor" and the team of officers in P&O. General Wedemeyer's understanding was that the civilian "should not be in a position of authority within P&O nor violate the chain of command . . . but should merely 'monitor' the PW [psychological warfare] functions of P&O along with PW functions of other components of the Department of the Army." The Secretary's understanding of the matter was quite different, as reported in Wedemeyer's memorandum for record:

> Mr. Gray stated the matter more forcefully . . . [he] specifically indicated that the civilian "supervisor" was not merely to monitor but was to take a real part in the work concerning PW and he said, in essence, "if, as things develop, we run into a difficulty six or eight or twelve months from now, and if we *do* operate we are sure to run into a difficulty sooner or later, I want to be able to say that it was not just a military matter but that it was a fool civilian mixed up in it. I am thinking this way for the protection of the military."[59]

Another interesting aspect of this meeting was the advice provided by Professor Paul Linebarger, a civilian consultant and author of a recently

published book on psychological warfare. Linebarger offered his views on desirable qualifications for the civilian "supervisor," suggesting that P&O could not fulfill its psychological warfare responsibilities unless the officers designated were assigned full time and given the opportunity for travel. General Bolte, Director, P&O, was reluctant to endorse this latter suggestion, indicating, "as he had indicated from time to time at other points in the conference, that the responsibility should be written out for P&O in full but that any external attempt to freeze or commit P&O personnel or structure would be unfortunate."[60]

The 11 July meeting provides a valuable snapshot of the state of psychological warfare at the Department of the Army in mid-1949: Gordon Gray, only a month into his new office, intensely interested in psychological warfare and forcefully exerting his authority in terms of organization, yet also alert to the political sensitivity of the subject; General Wedemeyer and General Bolte, interested in the subject but wary about its effect on traditional concerns of chain of command and lines of authority, and perhaps slightly resentful of civilian influence in this field, especially when a myriad of more familiar "purely military" problems competed for their attention (for example, General Bolte's resistance to "external" pressures on him to dedicate officers solely to psychological warfare); Professor Linebarger, the civilian consultant, naturally anxious to see this specialized subject receive greater attention, and perhaps just a little impatient with the less-than-total endorsement of psychological warfare by military leaders. Such was the range of emotions and attitudes on psychological warfare, all of which combined to portray a picture of hesitancy and slow progress within the Department of the Army 11 months before the Korean war would erupt.

Because many Army leaders still considered psychological warfare a new development, such hesitancy is understandable. Even though the Army had used psychological warfare in World War II, the Director of Organization and Training in May 1949 lumped it together with atomic warfare, radiological defense, biological warfare, guided missiles, and subversive warfare as "new developments [of warfare] or modifications of previous developments." General Bolte, Director of P&O, thought it premature to parcel out responsibilities for these topics to specific General Staff agencies until their roles and uses were better understood. Instead, he recommended that all General Staff divisions designate contact officers for discussions of the developments under P&O monitorship.[61]

Further, military service schools also were giving little attention to the subject of psychological warfare. A student committee report prepared at

the Armed Forces Information School, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in June 1949 concluded that there was no course in psychological warfare at any service installation adequate to provide the necessary knowledge for an Information and Education officer.[62] The Ground General School curriculum at Fort Riley offered 9 hours of instruction, the Command and General Staff School, 1 hour; tentative and draft field manuals were being used in schools and for extension courses; no training programs for Reserves were available or planned—all of which led to the admission in a P&O memorandum on 4 October 1949 that "much remains to be done if the Army is to be ready to fulfill its operational and mobilization responsibilities in the field of psychological warfare."[63]

By early 1950, Secretary Gray was beginning to suspect the same. He decided to query the new Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins (who had succeeded General Bradley in August 1949), with a memorandum on 7 February 1950:

> As you know, I am keenly interested in the prompt and effective development of psychological warfare within the Army.
>
> I should like to have a report on the status of this matter by February 15th.
>
> In this connection, I am particularly interested in what consideration has been given to psychological warfare in conjunction with the current reorganization within the General Staff.[64]

There was not much progress to report to the Secretary of the Army. The opening paragraph of "Report on the Army Psychological Warfare Program," in fact, was a classic example of the type of bureaucratic gobbledygook often used to obfuscate an issue:

> While definite progress has been made in the last six months in the development and execution of a psychological warfare program within the Army, much remains to be accomplished. The establishment of a sound, comprehensive program and the effective carrying out of the many tasks and activities under such a program includes the solution of many problems which are interrelated and the solution of which is dependent upon the sequential and systematic development and completion of the more fundamental aspects of the overall program. An effort has been made, however, to meet the higher priority requirements in all important areas of the program as developed to date.[65]

Gray undoubtedly had to reread that paragraph, and even then probably wondered exactly what he had been told. In essence, the report stated that some progress had been made in operational planning, in the preparation of draft Tables of Organization and Equipment for troop units, and in nonmateriel research. Progress had been slow, however, in staff organization for psychological warfare, doctrine and techniques, personnel and unit training, training literature and training aids, materiel, and intelligence requirements. Most of the report, in fact, discussed problem areas and actions that needed to be taken. In this last category was the expressed need for a "school center for psychological warfare at which tactical doctrine, techniques, training literature and tactical studies can be prepared."[66] The Psychological Warfare Center, created almost 2 years later at Fort Bragg, would eventually fill that void.

Probably of greatest interest to the Secretary, however, was the report's statement that an increase in organization and staff personnel for psychological warfare would shortly be recommended—of interest, no doubt, because Gray had been waiting patiently since March 1949 for progress on this matter.

Finally, the report tactfully asked the Secretary to be patient and recognize the difficulties inherent in dealing with a new function: "For an appreciable period of time, the development and execution of a psychological warfare program will be essentially a 'pioneering' effort and will depend primarily upon initiative, constant direction, and follow-up provided by the General Staff and by Plans and Operations Division in particular."[67] The North Korean invasion was only 4 months away at the time of this report, and Gordon Gray was to leave his office within a month.

"Only a Start": Prelude to Korea

If the Army Staff thought that the new Secretary of the Army would lessen the pressure for more progress in psychological warfare, they were soon disabused of that notion. On 29 May 1950, within 5 weeks of replacing Gordon Gray, Frank Pace, Jr., sent the Chief of Staff a memorandum clearly outlining his interest in the subject:

> 1. On 7 February 1950, Secretary Gray requested a report on the status of psychological warfare development within the Army with particular reference to what organizational provision had been made within the Department of the Army for the direction and development of Army capability in this field. It is my understanding

that a plan to authorize the establishment of a Psychological Warfare Branch in G-3, Operations, and to provide adequate staffing was approved on the condition that spaces be provided from within G-3's current personnel ceiling.

2. Like Mr. Gray, whose views on the subject of Psychological Warfare are similar to mine, I believe the prompt development of the capabilities of the various responsible agencies and departments of the government to execute Psychological Warfare operations under terms of reference established by the National Security Council is vital to the national security. The Department of the Army, of course, has a definite responsibility for psychological warfare development insofar as it affects national security and the conduct of military operations.

3. Please keep me advised on the progress being made in the establishment of the contemplated branch to handle this activity for the Department of the Army and in the procurement of necessary personnel.[68]

Some, but not much, progress had been made. Shortly after the status report to Secretary Gray in mid-February, a study forwarded to the Chief of Staff recommended additional personnel for both psychological warfare and special operations, and a separate branch, designated the Subsidiary Plans Branch, in the Plans Group, P&O, for that purpose.[69]

A requirement had been established for approximately 16 officers with specialized qualifications in psychological warfare and special operations for assignment to Headquarters, Department of the Army; US Army, Europe; Army Field Forces (AFF); and to the Command and General Staff College, with the first 5 officers to be available July 1951. The Personnel Division (G-1) was asked to provide a civilian graduate course in international relations to furnish supplemental background in psychological warfare and special operations for the officers selected. A job description was designed, stating that the officers selected "must have had direct experience in, or be thoroughly familiar with, the conduct of psychological warfare or of clandestine and paramilitary operations in support of military operations." Letters were sent to major subordinate headquarters announcing the program.[70]

G-3, Operations (the redesignated Plans and Operations Division) initiated a series of conferences with Headquarters, AFF, in Fort Monroe, Virginia, to discuss delineation of responsibilities for psychological warfare. The first conference was scheduled for 29 March 1950. One of the

items G–3 proposed for discussion at this conference is worthy of note: "Preparation and conduct of specialized school courses for Psychological Warfare student personnel, and of general indoctrination courses for all students, including consideration of the desirability of establishing a 'school center' (preferably as a part of, or as a section in, an existing Army school)."[71] While agreeing that psychological warfare deserved greater emphasis, AFF pointed out that personnel and fiscal limitations presented "a perplexing problem." The Tactical Information Detachment (2 officers and approximately 20 men) represented an encouraging start, as did the psychological warfare extension courses "now nearing completion," and the limited but valuable training material assembled. "But we admit that this is only a start," wrote Major General Robert Macon, Deputy Chief, AFF, to the G–3.[72]

"Only a start" also accurately described the situation at Headquarters, Department of the Army. In answer to Secretary Pace's primary question in his 29 May memorandum, the G–3 replied that the Psychological Warfare Branch would be activated "about 1 August" if necessary personnel savings were effected as a result of an ongoing G–3 survey.[73] Fifteen months and two Secretaries of the Army after Kenneth Royall's instructions to establish such a branch, the Army Staff was still searching for the necessary personnel spaces.

Thus, four-and-a-half years after General Lemnitzer and General McClure had urged continued development of psychological warfare, the Army was ill-prepared in terms of personnel, equipment, and organization. On the eve of the Korean war, it had made "only a start" toward development of a psychological warfare capability.

V

THE INTERWAR YEARS, PART II: UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

If the Army's capability to conduct overt psychological warfare was meager in June 1950, its unconventional warfare capability was nonexistent. It was not supposed to have such a capability in peacetime; NSC 10/2 gave the responsibility for covert paramilitary activities to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in June 1948. This is not to say, however, that the Army did not consider developing such a function. It did—and the story of the Army's tentative first steps in this field during the interwar years is an important link in the decisions that ultimately led to creation of the 10th Special Forces Group in early 1952.

The Airborne Reconnaissance Units

As we have seen, the impetus for the initiation of covert activities after World War II did not originate in the Central Intelligence Group, the forerunner of the CIA. Rather, it came from Secretary of War Robert Patterson in late 1946, prompting discussion among agencies initially on the subject of psychological operations.[1] Within the Department of the Army, Patterson directed in August 1946 that a letter be sent to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces (AGF), indicating that "airborne reconnaissance agents" were successfully employed during World War II under the supervision of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Since the inactivation of OSS, the letter stated, no branch in the War Department was interested in the development of "airborne reconnaissance." AGF was therefore asked to prepare a study and submit recommendations on the desirability and organization of such a unit.[2] The War Department General Staff (WDGS) received the study in February

1947. Included in the study's recommendations was a request for an experimental unit of 6 officers and 35 enlisted men. The Military Intelligence Division (MID) within WDGS recommended approval of the study, noting:

> The airborne reconnaissance units are of a special type which is essential in war time and is one of the types developed by OSS. It is essential that such a unit be maintained in peace time to develop techniques and doctrines of employment and that the knowledge of this doctrine and technique be made known by teaching in appropriate schools.[3]

Concurring with MID's recommendations, the Director of Organization and Training approved the study in April and directed the Commanding General, AGF, to develop tactics, techniques, and training for the proposed unit. A Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) was also to be prepared and submitted to the War Department; the necessary personnel spaces would be provided when activation of the unit was directed.[4]

Events of the next 18 months, however, showed the difficulties that a military bureaucracy faces when trying to create a new entity, especially during periods of fiscal and personnel constraints. By the middle of 1948, staff officers from Headquarters, AGF, were corresponding with Colonel Ray Peers, former commander of Detachment 101, OSS, to seek advice on organizational concepts for "the Airborne Recon Company, or as we have named it, the Ranger Group."[5] The title "Ranger Group" demonstrated the confusion that often occurred when the Army grappled with creating an "unconventional" organization, particularly one with no formal predecessors in Army history. This is borne out in Major Ernest Samussen's letter to Colonel Peers, in which he noted that "we have strayed in many respects from your recommendations. This is largely due to our efforts to make a military organization which can be composed of cells of minimum size, and is thereby capable of being made into a TO&E."[6]

The confusion over what to call the new unit reflected differing ideas about how the unit would be used. A War Department paper discussed adding one "Ranger Group" to the General Reserve Troop Basis, noting that the proposed unit would not accomplish the purpose its author (apparently a Colonel Conrad) envisaged "if approved from an OSS point of view." This was in September 1948; Army Field Forces (formerly AGF) was still working on a TO&E for the Ranger Group that was not expected to be approved before January 1949.[7]

Circulation of the proposed TO&E among the staff at Army Field Forces did not clear up the confusion. The developing unit was a hybrid

organization that combined Ranger and OSS concepts; witness the proposed Ranger group mission "to organize and conduct overt and covert operations behind enemy lines thereby assuming functions formerly performed by units of the OSS." The group of approximately 115 officers and 135 enlisted men would be attached to Army groups or armies or both to perform tactical missions. Its capabilities would include conduct of sabotage and surprise attacks in the enemy's rear areas; "black" psychological warfare and propaganda; collection of information by reconnaissance and espionage; development, organization, control, and supply of resistance groups; recruitment, training, and direction of foreign civilian agents; control of captured enemy agents and assisting intelligence staffs in counterespionage; and the organization and control of escape systems in enemy-held territory.[8]

From an "OSS point of view," this organizational concept should have been unacceptable. It attempted to lump together missions and capabilities of Rangers and Commandos with those of Special Operations and Operational Group elements of OSS. It combined the tactical with the strategic. The mission statement said "OSS," but the title was "Ranger"; the mission statement also said "tactical," but the capabilities belied OSS precepts, and General Donovan himself had drawn a distinction between the missions of Rangers and Commandos and those of the OSS.

Eventually Ranger units were formed and used in Korea, but they were not the OSS-type of "unconventional warfare" organizations that Secretary of War Patterson probably had in mind when he first raised the issue in 1946. The dialogue on "Airborne Reconnaissance Units/Ranger Groups" during 1946–48 clearly showed OSS' influence on Army thinking and presaged similar discussions in the early 1950's prior to the formation of the 10th Special Forces Group.

Another example of early Army thinking on unconventional warfare was a study of special and subversive operations done in late 1947 by the Organization and Training Division, Department of the Army Staff. Its stated purpose was "to study special and subversive operations to determine the desirability of including instruction and study of such operations in the school system."[9] It considered special operations to be the activities of US troops to activate or support both resistance groups and small unit operations behind enemy lines. Secret intelligence, morale operations ("black" propaganda), and psychological warfare were not included in the study.

Relying heavily on OSS historical data, including the seven volumes of the official *War Report of the OSS,* (which had not been approved for release at that time), the study concluded that "special operations of a subversive nature" offered great potential that "no commander should ignore" in his support of wartime military operations. The study's recommendations included providing 4 to 6 hours of instruction on the subject in appropriate service schools, continued study of the capabilities and desirable organization for special operations, and the creation of a "special operations company." That last recommendation was followed by the comment that "this notion should be deferred pending receipt of recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding a proposal to establish a guerrilla warfare corps.[10]

JCS and NSC Activities

The JCS proposal referred to was actually a series of studies on guerrilla warfare that culminated on 17 August 1948 in JCS 1807/1, a memorandum forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. Pertinent aspects of that memorandum were as follows:

1. The United States should provide itself with the organization and the means of supporting foreign resistance movements in guerrilla warfare to the advantage of United States national security during peace and war.

2. Guerrilla warfare should be supported under policy direction of NSC.

3. Agencies for conducting guerrilla warfare can be established by adding to the CIA's special operations functions the responsibility for supporting foreign resistance movements and by authorizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to engage in the conduct of such operations.

4. Primary interest in guerrilla warfare should be that of CIA in peacetime and NME [National Military Establishment] in wartime.

5. *A separate guerrilla warfare school and corps should not be established* [emphasis added]. Instead, NME, in coordination with State Department and CIA, should select personnel, give them necessary training in established Army schools, supplemented by courses in other military and State Department schools.

> 6. The trained personnel should not be permanently separated from their original service. They should be available on call for introduction into countries to organize, direct, and lead native guerrillas.[11]

The JCS was clearly backing away from the idea of establishing a "guerrilla warfare corps" within the military services. Why? Because during this same period the CIA was beginning to establish its position in the field of covert activities. Driven by the impetus of the cold war, the National Security Council in December 1947 gave the CIA responsibility for the conduct of covert psychological operations (NSC 4/A), and in May 1948 expanded that charter with NSC 10/2 to include the following:

> Any covert activities related to propaganda; preventive direct action, including sabotage, antisabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups; and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.[12]

To carry out these activities for the CIA, the Special Procedures Group was established in December 1947. After NSC 10/2 was issued, it was replaced by the Office of Special Projects, which was soon renamed the Office of Policy Coordination.[13] Apparent in all of these JCS and NSC actions during the late 1947–early 1948 period was a shifting of responsibility for covert activities to the CIA.

The Army Staff's reaction to this shift was cold war enthusiasm mixed with caution about jurisdictional prerogatives. For example, in a May 1948 memorandum to the Secretary of the Army about NSC 10, Plans and Operations Division (P&O) made these comments:

> P&O considers that there is an urgent need for a Director of Special Studies [eventually the Office of Special Projects in NSC 10/1 and NSC 10/2] under NSC who has a directive to strengthen and extend covert operations with the objective of defeating communism in the present "cold war." A coordinated national effort can win the "war of words" by proving that our American way of life is approaching that ideal desired by all mankind. However, it is believed that the authority of this Director should not infringe on the wartime prerogatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning plans for the conduct of a war.[14]

And in a 2 June memorandum to the Secretary, P&O suggested changes to a CIA report on NSC 10 to correct portions "which appear to infringe upon the JCS responsibilities concerning training and war plans," as well

as to correct "the implication that similarity in operational methods in covert intelligence activities and covert operations makes the CIA the sole agency to conduct such operations."[15] This latter point reveals a touch of resentment concerning the CIA's movement into the covert operations field.

Secretary of the Army Royall had little doubt on this subject, however. On the following day, he emphatically stated "that despite the recommendations of the Army staff, he did not want a representative of the Army to be a member of the special services group [eventually the CIA's Office of Special Projects], and further that he does not want the Army to get into covert activities or even to know anything about it."[16]

Despite Royall's reluctance, the Army provided an officer, Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton, to represent both the JCS and the Secretary of Defense to the CIA's Office of Special Projects, in accordance with NSC 10/2.1.[17] The new office was to plan and conduct covert operations "in time of peace," under the policy guidance of an operations advisory committee composed of representatives from the State and Defense Departments. Such plans and operations would be "coordinated with and acceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for wartime covert operations."[18]

The NSC 10/2 directive had already assigned responsibility for covert operations to the CIA. The military services agreed to this because of their strong desire to "do something" about the perceived threat of communism and because of their reluctance to openly associate with the "dirty tricks" business. At the same time, the services, particularly the Army, sensitive to their institutional prerogatives, resisted any interpretations that would deprive them of a voice in the conduct of wartime covert operations. The planning and preparation responsibilities for such wartime activities, however, were a potential area for ambiguity and discord, as we shall see later.

Creation of the Office of Special Projects did not mean that the military ceased to think about unconventional warfare. In response to a request from the Secretary of Defense to continue examining "unconventional operations," the JCS formed an ad hoc Guerrilla Warfare Subcommittee to prepare a study on guerrilla warfare. (Interestingly, the subcommittee was part of an ad hoc Psychological Warfare Committee.) The subcommittee's study was essentially an exercise to establish those geographical areas of the world where it would be advantageous to have in place resistance movements capable of waging guerrilla warfare. The study established the following priorities: Central Europe, the Middle East, South Europe, West Europe, Scandinavia, and the Far East. The study also

concluded that the JCS "should retain strategic and broad policy planning functions of guerrilla warfare" within the National Military Establishment, and that the Army "should be assigned primary responsibility for all other guerrilla warfare functions." The Navy and Air Force should have not primary but "collateral responsibilities" for this activity. Finally, a familiar theme: In time of war, the theater commanders should control guerrilla warfare within their areas.[19]

The Office of Policy Coordination

Without question, the NSC 10/2 directive was perceived as a significant escalation of US interest in the covert side of the cold war. As William R. Corson states:

> The intelligence community's reaction to the NSC's apparently unanimous endorsement and support of the "dirty tricks" authorizations was swift. In their view no holds were barred. The NSC 10/2 decision was broadly interpreted to mean that not only the President but *all* the guys on the top had said to put on the brass knuckles and go to work. As word about NSC 10/2 trickled down to the working staffs in the intelligence community, it was translated to mean that a declaration of war had been issued with equal if not more force than if the Congress had so decided.[20]

The principal agent for this increased emphasis on covert activities was to be the CIA's Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), headed by Frank G. Wisner. A lawyer by training, Wisner had served with distinction in OSS, planning and participating in a number of imaginative operations in the Balkans during World War II. At the time of his selection to head OPC, he was serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Countries. Although Wisner appeared by background, experience, and temperament to be an excellent candidate for the new post, Army intelligence leaders opposed the choice on the basis that he was "another Donovan who'll run away with the ball." Nonetheless, Secretary of State George Marshall was confident that Wisner was the right man, and Secretary of Defense Forrestal endorsed the choice.[21]

Since the growth of OPC during the years 1948–52 was to greatly influence the Army's development of its own special warfare capability, it is important to understand Wisner's view of his charter. This was outlined in detail in a memorandum dated 1 August 1949 to Colonel Yeaton of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[22] Wisner explained the mission of OPC in the following terms:

> To plan and to execute special (covert) operations or measures which are designed to reinforce or to accomplish United States foreign policy objectives; in peacetime, to formulate and execute plans to the necessary state of readiness in order that appropriate special (covert) operations may be executed in time of war as considered necessary by competent authority; in wartime, to plan and execute such special (covert) operations or measures as may be appropriate in the discharge of the OPC mission or as directed by competent authority.

Activities of the new organization would set it apart from other governmental agencies principally through an important distinction:

> The techniques and means by which OPC attains its objectives differ from those of the Department of State and the National Military Establishment inasmuch as OPC operations are conducted in a covert or clandestine manner to the end that official United States interest or responsibility is not permitted to appear and if such interest should inadvertently appear, it can be plausibly disclaimed by this government.

Specifically, OPC was responsible for the planning and conduct of the covert and clandestine aspects of these activities:

1. Political warfare including assistance to underground resistance movements and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.
2. Psychological warfare including "black" and "gray" propaganda.
3. Economic warfare.
4. Evacuation, including the paramount responsibility for escape and evasion.
5. Guerrilla and partisan-type warfare.
6. Sabotage and countersabotage.
7. Other covert operations (excluding espionage, counterespionage, and cover and deception for military operations).

Having laid out the mission and responsibilities of OPC, Wisner proceeded to argue the necessity for a "process of mutual education, collaboration and understanding" between OPC, the Department of State, and the military services concerning this "new weapon in the United States arsenal." In particular, he felt that the National Military Establishment should "provide guidance and support with respect to such escape and evasion, countersabotage, sabotage and guerrilla warfare activities *as may be undertaken during peacetime or which must be prepared during peacetime to a state of readiness for wartime execution.*"[23] [Emphasis added.]

This last point is important to highlight because differences of view developed later between the Army and OPC over who was responsible for what and to what degree in both peacetime and wartime preparation. At this point, however, the field appeared to be open to the CIA/OPC, and Frank Wisner was eager for help from the military services to launch his operation.

Army Assistance to OPC

In mid-1949, Wisner asked the Army's assistance for training personnel in guerrilla warfare, for certain logistical support, and for the nomination of an Army officer to be chief of the "Guerrilla Warfare Group" of CIA; the last request was subsequently withdrawn. The Secretary of the Army authorized P&O to contact the CIA directly to determine in detail the assistance required. Lieutenant Colonel John R. Deane, Jr., P&O, was designated the Army's representative for such coordination. Later, Lieutenant Colonels R. A. Baker and E. E. Baker were designated for direct contact in the areas of logistics and organization and training.[24]

By November 1949, a series of conferences between representatives of the Department of the Army and the CIA had resulted in the selection of Fort Benning as a suitable location for a training course desired by the CIA. One of the CIA/OPC representatives who took part in these conferences was an Army lieutenant colonel who had served with Detachment 101 in Burma during World War II.[25]

The officer's former experience in OSS insured him an important role in these Army-CIA conferences. For example, in one meeting a discussion of OSS theater organizations in World War II led to agreement among participants that the most efficient operation was one in which all clandestine organizations were brought under one head. While not committing OPC to a position, this former Detachment 101 member said that he felt "reasonably certain" that all of these plans and projects would be done with the knowledge and approval of theater commanders. He further expressed the view that the proposed joint training endeavor would help train some military personnel in covert activities, thus making the transition of such operations to JCS control in case of war a smoother task.

On this last point, Lieutenant Colonel Deane, P&O, expressed the opinion that if the CIA came under JCS control during wartime, there was no need for the Army to organize OSS-like units in peacetime, because Army resistance operations would conflict with those of the CIA. Thus he

believed that the National Military Establishment would want to insure JCS jurisdiction over the CIA during wartime; in this way the Army, by assisting the CIA in its peacetime training program, would be laying the groundwork for possible future behind-the-lines support for its tactical ground operations. The notes on these meetings show considerable agreement on these issues between Deane and the OPC representative, as well as the other participants. Indeed, the importance of these early conferences between the CIA and the Army was not only the influence of OSS experience, but also the degree of harmony that existed, harmony that would later disappear in jurisdictional squabbles.[26]

As further evidence of this cooperative attitude, the Army provided two studies on guerrilla warfare to the CIA to assist that group in preparing a training program for covert operations. The studies, prepared by Major Materrazzi and Captain West of P&O, were forwarded with a memorandum stating that the studies represented solely the individual views of the officers who prepared them. Nonetheless, the studies acknowledged the potential value of resistance operations in a future war. They also acknowledged the influence of OSS experience on those officers interested in the subject of covert operations. Further, both papers concluded that the Army should organize and train a unit in peacetime for the support of foreign resistance movements in the event of hostilities. Both studies had been prepared in early 1949, however, and with the growing prominence of the CIA in this field, they were apparently overtaken by events.[27]

The Joint Subsidiary Plans Division

The emergence of the CIA in both psychological warfare and covert operations, as well as the growing interest among the services in these activities because of increasing cold war tensions, led to the establishment of the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division (JSPD) in late 1949. The mission of this new joint agency, under the control of the JCS, was the following:

> [To] coordinate the peacetime development of psychological warfare and covert operations capabilities within the Armed Services, coordinate detailed military plans and other agencies of the government, particularly with Department of State and the Office of Policy Coordination [CIA], and, in wartime, [to] become the means by which the JCS would provide continuous direction and guidance in these specialized fields to commanders under their control.[28]

Rear Admiral Leslie C. Stevens was selected to be the first chief of the JSPD, although he had limited experience in psychological warfare and

covert operations. Stevens, assisted by deputies from each of the other services, initially had a small staff of six officers. The Army concurred in his nomination.[29]

Actually, the principal impetus for establishment of the JSPD appears to have come from the CIA. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense in May 1949, the Director of Central Intelligence asked that a staff of service representatives be appointed to "consult with and assist CIA officers in the establishment of a para-military training program." Frank Wisner's request for unilateral assistance from the Army was part of this overall move by the CIA. The JCS considered the CIA's request and determined that a need existed for the proposed training program. Their creation of the JSPD in November 1949, they believed, also provided the staff requested by the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chief, JSPD, was directed to effect the necessary liaison between the CIA and the National Military Establishment.[30]

The Army and Unconventional Warfare Prior to Korea

By early 1950, it was clear that the responsibility for unconventional warfare—primarily as a result of NSC 10/2—was shifting to the CIA. The intelligence agency had agreed to attach liaison officers to the staffs of unified commands to participate in planning for special operations, and the JCS staffed a message to these commands notifying them that such liaison was available if they desired it.[31] Slowly but surely, the "new kid on the block" was becoming more active, and the services appeared willing to accept him.

This is not to say that the services themselves ceased to consider the potential for unconventional warfare in the face of growing US-Soviet tensions. An excellent example of this interest was a letter from Colonel C. H. Gerhardt, G-2, Headquarters, 2d Army, Fort Meade, Maryland, to Lieutenant General Alfred M. Gruenther, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Combat Operations. Gerhardt, who had just attended a conference that included General Gruenther and the Army's Chief of Staff, General Arthur Collins, indicated his concern for both psychological and unconventional warfare in this paragraph:

> Now as to the ideas: About two years back Froggy Reed of the Ordnance was out here and we got talking about new developments. He stated that there appeared to be no new developments planned in sabotage equipment and other material necessary for an underground.

> We then wrote up a short study to fit the then situation as far as doing *something* about equipment was concerned, Europe being concerned after being overrun by the Red Army. The stages being: first, psychological warfare; second, an organized underground. This underground to be planned for now, and particularly development of equipment, new and streamlined explosives, radios, kits of various kinds, etc., that could be stockpiled—some here and some in the countries involved, and an organization put into being that would blossom into a resistance movement in case of invasion.[32]

When General Collins saw Gerhardt's letter, he wrote beside the cited paragraph: "I agree that something definite should be done on a plan and an organization." Both the Director of Logistics and the Director of Intelligence were asked to "investigate the present status of planning on the matter and submit appropriate recommendations." The resultant status report on covert operations summed up basically what has been discussed in this chapter: CIA's responsibility, under NSC 10/2, for planning and conducting covert operations in peacetime; the establishment of OPC to implement NSC 10/2; the work of two ad hoc JCS committees to prepare guidance to OPC in the fields of guerrilla warfare and escape and evasion; the creation of the JSPD to insure "the effective discharge of the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for psychological warfare and covert operations"; and the Secretary of the Army's approval on 28 July 1949 of the provision of unilateral assistance to OPC in the field of guerrilla warfare.[33]

The draft reply to Gerhardt's letter left out much of the sensitive material contained in the status reports prepared by the Army Staff. Nonetheless, the paragraph dealing with covert operations was significant:

> We have been active on the Joint and Service levels for sometime now in the field of resistance movements and other allied covert operations. We are convinced that the utilization of indigenous manpower in covert operations is an important and very necessary adjunct to conventional type operations. We feel that we are making progress in these matters but, of course, we must proceed with considerable caution.[34]

That statement typifies the Army's attitude toward unconventional warfare during the interwar years. Prompted by Secretary of War Robert Patterson, the Army began considering the possibilities for a covert operations capability patterned after OSS units as early as 1946, prior to the establishment of the CIA and OPC. This interest was fueled by a growing suspicion of Soviet intentions, but constrained by recognition of the politi-

cal sensitivity of such a capability during peacetime. Thus it was almost with a sense of relief that the services, and particularly the Army, welcomed the emergence of CIA/OPC to take the primary responsibility for covert operations. During a period of personnel and fiscal constraints, this allowed the Army to concentrate on the "conventional type operations" with which it was more comfortable. Nonetheless, the Army could not entirely evade some responsibility for the embryonic development of an unconventional warfare capability. Thus it agreed to assist OPC in its initial organization and training efforts. In fact, the evidence suggests that some Army leaders saw limited cooperation with CIA/OPC as in their enlightened self-interests; that is, an opportunity to preserve some influence during a period when institutional prerogatives and jurisdictional boundaries in a new field were in a process of flux. At any rate, the Army's attitude toward unconventional warfare during the interwar years was ambivalent. Limited though it was, however, the Army's activity in this field—particularly the doctrinal confusion that marked its tentative thinking on unconventional warfare and its early interaction with the CIA/OPC—is important for a full understanding of the subsequent developments that contributed to the creation of Special Forces. The first of these developments was the outbreak of war in Korea.

VI

KOREA AND THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

A little over 2 years after North Korean armed forces crossed the 38th parallel, the US Army in May 1952 established the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This institution encompassed a school for both psychological operations and Special Forces training, operational psychological warfare units, and the first formal unconventional warfare force in Army history—the 10th Special Forces Group. We have seen that while basic planning took place during the post-World War II years, the Army's capability to conduct overt psychological warfare was minimal in June 1950. Similarly, while embryonic thinking on unconventional warfare took place within the Army during the interwar years, at the time of the outbreak of war in Korea primary responsibility for that activity had shifted to the CIA/OPC, or so it appeared. Thus, an examination of the period between June 1950 and May 1952 is crucial to understanding the Army's unprecedented decision to establish a center in which capabilities for both psychological and unconventional warfare would be combined at Fort Bragg. This chapter examines the impact of the Korean war on those decisions.

Impetus for a Psywar Division at Department of the Army

When the North Korean invasion began on 22 June 1950, a small Special Projects Branch existed in the G-2 Division of Headquarters (HQ), Far East Command (FECOM), that was charged with the responsibility for developing strategic and tactical warfare plans. This

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branch, headed by a civilian, J. Woodall Greene (who had been in the Far East since 1943), was initially confined to radio broadcasting from Japan and to leaflet airdrops, both of which began by 29 June. Its personnel shortages were partially overcome by augmentation from local State Department Information Service personnel. The Department of the Army, of course, was unable to furnish adequate support, due to shortages in trained personnel, units, and suitable equipment.[1]

The situation was such that by 5 June, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr.—who, it will be remembered, had been prodding the Army Staff to get its psychological warfare house in order—showed his concern with a memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

> Events of the current Korean situation further confirm my views on the need for a Psychological Warfare organization in the Department of the Army. Please let me have a report on this matter showing action taken or being taken and, as well, such recommendations as you deem appropriate at this time.[2]

The Secretary was told that action had been taken to activate a branch of 10 officers within the G-3 Division on 31 July 1950 to provide General Staff supervision of all psychological warfare and special operations activities. Additionally, a study to determine how to provide for a nucleus of personnel trained in psychological warfare was in progress.[3] It is interesting that the Army planned to combine psychological warfare and special operations activities in the proposed branch. Even with the CIA/OPC's growing prominence in special operations, the Army apparently wanted to at least keep its hand in the game.

Understandably, Secretary Pace was becoming impatient with the glacier-like movement of the Army bureaucracy on a subject of personal concern to him. Perhaps the most candid analysis of the Army's sluggishness was made in mid-July 1950 by a young staff officer in the G-3 Division:

> With the transfer of primary responsibility of Psychological Warfare from G-2 to G-3 in January 1947, the activity reverted basically to a planning function insofar as the Department of the Army was concerned. Being largely a planning function, the activity consisted mainly of actions on highly classified matters which seldom came to the attention of other General Staff Divisions and the Technical Services. Consequently, because of the relative newness of the activity and because of the high classification placed upon it, a general lack of information gradually developed outside of G-3 (P&O) concerning

> Psy[illegible]logical Warfare. The low priority placed on this activity within G-3 [illegible] 1948, plus the return to inactive duty of most experienced Psychological Warfare officers, tended to accelerate this condition.[4]

The officer went on to state that with the outbreak of war in Korea, the Army again had an interest in psychological warfare operations. He thus recommended that the responsibilities for that field be more clearly delineated among the General Staff, the Technical Services, and the Chief of Army Field Forces.[5]

Within a month of this assessment, that old World War II psychological warrior, Brigadier General Robert McClure, reentered the scene. In a "Dear Al" letter to Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer (who had recently moved from his Pentagon assignment to become Commanding General of the 6th Army, with headquarters in San Francisco), Major General Charles Bolte, the G-3, wrote that the Army's program for psychological warfare was under review to determine "the further organizational steps necessary to meet the operational requirements of the Korean situation or of a general war." He further indicated that the Army's responsibilities in this field were such that the possibility of a permanent staff agency, "preferably in the form of a Special Staff Division," should be considered for the Department of the Army. To develop specific recommendations on psychological warfare organization for the Chief of Staff, Bolte requested the presence of McClure (who was assigned to General Wedemeyer) for a few days because "I know of no one better qualified to assist us in that respect."[6] In less than 2 weeks, Bolte received this message from McClure: "Will report to you for TDY 29 August."[7] Help was on the way.

Despite these steps, by the end of August the Secretary of the Army's patience with the apparent lack of progress in psychological warfare organization came to an end. His displeasure, plainly evident in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, General Collins, is quoted in its entirety:

> 1. I have been following the progress of the development of a psychological warfare program within the Department of the Army with considerable concern. I am not at all satisfied that we are giving this matter attention and support commensurate with the capabilities of psychological warfare as a military weapon and an instrument of national policy.
>
> 2. The discussion of the Army Policy Council meetings of 15 and 16 August and my own review of the Army's effort in this field have indicated that the principal difficulty for well over a year has been

organization and manpower. Although I am aware of the high caliber of work which has been performed, it is of particular concern to me that a psychological warfare organization which Mr. Gray approved in July 1949 has through delay in its establishment cost the Army the services of these spaces which for the past year could have been utilized in developing the Army program to a more comprehensive degree. Nor do I believe that with the establishment of a psychological warfare branch as of 1 August we have in fact assured ourselves of accomplishing desired results, if in so doing we are forced to rely on the Korean crisis to secure temporary spaces to meet personnel requirements for a unit which was not designed or intended to operate under wartime conditions.

3. The establishment of a psychological warfare organization within the Department of the Army indicates recognition of the importance of this activity in military science. Adequate allowance should therefore be made in the appropriate personnel ceilings to afford this field the permanent spaces it requires. I do not believe an organization which has necessitated so many studies and taken so long to set up should owe its final establishment and complement of personnel to an emergency which may well warrant an entirely different type staff unit.

4. I therefore desire that such spaces as have been allocated to psychological warfare on a temporary basis be established on a permanent basis and that the nomination of suitable personnel to bring the recently established psychological warfare branch to required strength be expedited.

5. I have asked Assistant Secretary Earl Johnson to give this matter of manpower for psychological warfare his personal attention.[8]

This letter is important in several respects, First, the blunt tone of Pace's memorandum—unusually so for correspondence between a Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff—vividly demonstrates his exasperation with what he saw as footdragging by the Army on a subject he considered vitally important. Second, the memorandum reveals Pace's desire to have the necessary permanent organization in place during peacetime, rather than rely on a crisis-imposed response to the problem. Finally, the memorandum is further evidence of a theme that we have seen throughout this study—the pressure brought to bear by civilian leaders on an Army somewhat reluctant to grapple with activities of an "unconventional" nature.

What Secretary Pace, and his predecessors, were perhaps less sensitive to, however, were the genuine difficulties that personnel and fiscal con-

straints posed for Army leaders. Most were men who had advanced in a system that gave highest priority to the "conventional," or "regular" units—in infantry, armor, and artillery—associated with combat arms. Even those senior officers who displayed interest in psychological and unconventional warfare capabilities found it natural, with the exception of a few like General McClure, to give lower priority to those activities when faced with the necessity of making choices.

In any event, the Army Staff, as a result of Secretary Pace's prodding and other current actions, struggled in the face of a deteriorating combat situation in Korea to improve its psychological warfare organization. Ironically, on the same day that Pace's blistering memorandum was signed, General Bolte, the G-3, reported in a meeting in the Army's General Council that McClure had arrived in Washington to advise and assist in preparation of recommendations to the Chief of Staff on several important aspects of psychological warfare, including the possibility of a special staff division at the Department of the Army, operations in FECOM, and adequate preparatory measures in the European command (EUCOM).[9]

On the following day, 31 August, General Bolte forwarded a recommendation to the Chief of Staff for immediate activation of the Psychological Warfare Division, Special Staff, stating that "a review of present organizational arrangements indicates that the Army is not prepared to meet its Psychological Warfare obligations," which had greatly increased because of growing cold war tensions and the Korean conflict. The organizational concept and proposed strength of 102 personnel for the new division were quickly approved by the Vice Chief of Staff on 1 September 1950.[10]

McClure obviously had a hand in these moves, because during the period 28 August to 3 September he held conferences with all the Deputy Chiefs of Staff; the Vice Chief of Staff; Secretary Pace; the Assistant Secretary of State, Public Affairs; and members of the Joint Staff. At the 13 September meeting of the General Council, General Bolte reported that General McClure fully supported his proposal to establish a psychological warfare division, and that approval for it had been obtained. To effect an orderly transition, the Subsidiary Plans Branch of G-3 would be expanded to take care of psychological warfare planning. Later the activity would be transferred from G-3 to the new division, after final approval about its functions and acquisition of sufficient personnel.[11]

Creation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare

Despite the sense of urgency, creation of the new division did not occur overnight. First, there was the problem of getting authorization for the permanent allocation of the additional personnel needed. A more serious difficulty was procuring the necessary personnel trained in the specialized skills of psychological warfare. Since there was no basic course in psychological warfare available within the Army—indeed, within any of the services—the G-3 requested that a minimum of 6 officers attend a 13-week course on the subject proposed by Georgetown University and scheduled to begin on 2 October. Admittedly, this was a stopgap measure that would not adequately meet the Army's overall requirement for trained officers.[12]

There were, in fact, only seven officers qualified in psychological warfare on active duty in 1950. One of these, Lieutenant Colonel John O. Weaver, was recruited by the Chief, AFF, to become chief of a proposed psychological warfare department in the Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas. Weaver had served as commanding officer of the combat propaganda team of the 5th Army in Italy during World War II and was a graduate of the British psychological warfare school in Cairo. Brigadier General Robert McClure, in his new position as Chief, Psychological Warfare Division (an obvious choice!), forwarded the request for Weaver's assignment to the Adjutant General. Weaver was ordered to report to Fort Riley by December 1950.[13]

On 31 October, General McClure held his first weekly staff meeting with personnel of his embryonic division. The minutes from this meeting give us valuable insights into McClure's philosophy about psychological warfare and unconventional warfare. First, he stated that he had "backing from the top down" for psychological warfare, and that the division would be granted a considerable number of personnel. But then he issued a warning: "As a general policy, all officers assigned to this work should watch their step as there is an opinion prevalent among individuals not conversant with psychological warfare that anyone connected with the function is a 'long-haired, starry-eyed' individual." Such a pessimistic note at the outset must have been disquieting to the assembled officers, particularly to those who were ambitious. The statement was a commentary on the Army's attitude toward psychological warfare, or at least its attitude as perceived by a "true believer" like General McClure. He hastened to add however, "I think that there is nothing that is not ninety percent common sense," a rather pragmatic approach, perhaps to quell the apprehensions of his new subordinates.[14]

McClure further stated that General Bolte agreed with him that unconventional warfare did not belong in G-3 and should be transferred to the Psychological Warfare Division. The Division, expanded from the Subsidiary Plans Branch, had not yet formally become a separate Special Staff division and therefore was still under the G-3. McClure felt that his new organization could be entitled "psychological warfare" and contain three subdivisions: psychological warfare, cover and deception, and unconventional warfare.[15] We see here not only evidence of McClure's early feelings about the marriage of psychological and unconventional warfare, but also his tendency to give psychological warfare a relatively higher priority. That attitude on his part undoubtedly would influence the subsequent co-location of psychological and unconventional warfare units at Fort Bragg in 1952, and the selection of the title, Psychological Warfare Center.

Finally, on 15 January 1951, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) became officially recognized—but not without difficulty, as expressed in a letter by McClure to Major General Daniel Noce, Chief of Staff, EUCOM, on that same day:

> Orders have been issued effective today, separating this Division from G-3 and setting it up as a Special Staff division. With most of the stops pulled out, it has still taken us four months to get the administrative responsibility from G-3. Even in time of grave emergency the Pentagon moves slowly.[16]

Secretary of the Army Pace would have agreed with that note of exasperation. Nonetheless, a new organization, the first of its type in Army Staff history, had been born. Psychological warfare had evolved from a small section within a branch of G-3 to an office at Special Staff level with direct access to the Chief of Staff.

By early February, McClure had briefed the General Council on the organization and function of OCPW and explained the need for a rapid organization of unconventional warfare. At this point his views on the organization of his new division were firm. Since the division had been recognized and published in orders, he wanted an amendment authorizing special operations activities, and he envisaged three divisions: propaganda, unconventional warfare, and support.[17]

As stated in the special regulation that later outlined its organization and functions, the mission of OCPW was to "formulate and develop psychological and special operations plans for the Army in consonance with

established policy and to recommend policies for and supervise the execution of Department of the Army programs in those fields." To carry out this mission, the office was organized into three major divisions: Psychological Operations, Requirements, and Special Operations. Although the thrust of the organization was on psychological warfare, the words "and special operations" in the preceding mission statement and the existence of the Special Operations Division are highly significant because it was in this division that plans for creation of the Army's first formal unconventional warfare capability were formulated. Both the Psychological Operations and Special Operations Divisions were subdivided into branches for plans, operations, and intelligence and evaluation, while the Requirements Division was primarily concerned with organization, personnel, training, logistics, and research needs to support both psychological and special operations activities.[18]

Clearly, the two major concerns of this unprecedented Army Staff office were psychological and unconventional warfare (or "special operations," as the latter was called at this time). Over the next 16 months—a period of frenetic, diverse activity for General McClure and his staff—plans, policies, and decisions made in the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare were instrumental in the Army's decisions to establish the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, to create the 10th Special Forces Group, and finally, to co-locate the two capabilities of psychological and unconventional warfare at this new center. To fully understand why these decisions were made, we must examine these two capabilities in Korea, as seen from the perspective of OCPW and particularly from that of General McClure.

OCPW and Psychological Warfare in Korea

Shortly after the formal establishment of OCPW, Secretary of the Army Pace reentered the fray to give McClure's embryonic program a well-timed boost of support. In another of his by now well-known memorandums to the Chief of Staff on psychological warfare, Pace referred to OCPW (one can almost sense a between-the-lines "and it's about time!"), then unequivocally presented his views on the subject:

> I am keenly interested in and concerned over the successful development and progress of the psychological warfare program. Its vital importance to national security and defense in the present emergency must be fully recognized by all responsible commanders and staffs throughout the Army.[19]

McClure could have asked for no better entree in the struggle for recognition and influence that any new organization in a bureaucracy experiences. But the Secretary went even further; he also put in a special word for the special operations part of McClure's office. Referring again to OCPW's organization, he stressed that theater commanders should use it as a model to put their own staffs on a sound basis:

> Such a basis should envisage the supervision of a *combination of propaganda and unconventional warfare activities* by staff organizations that will provide for effective integration of those activities in such a way as to insure full support of combat operations now being conducted or contemplated and planned for the future.[20]

Since Pace heretofore had not mentioned unconventional warfare in his prodding of the Chief of Staff, and since he referred in this same memorandum to a recent discussion with the Chief of Psychological Warfare and members of the Army Policy Council, one could conclude that the Secretary's apparent endorsement of combining psychological and unconventional warfare planning functions was influenced at least in part by General McClure's views. The philosophy expressed by Pace's memorandum is significant, for McClure carried it forward in his relationships with the Far East and European theater commands and his attempts to influence their staff organizations, and with Headquarters, AFF, in the US—culminating in the co-location of psychological and unconventional warfare schooling and capabilities under the Psychological Warfare Center established at Fort Bragg in May 1952.

The "present emergency" that Secretary Pace had referred to in his memorandum was, of course, the war in Korea, which had worsened with heightening cold war tensions with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. But Pace believed that the Korean situation offered an "especial opportunity for highly profitable exploitation" of psychological warfare.[21] Indeed, a key feature of this period was the intense personal interest in the psychological warfare aspects of the conflict shown by the Secretary, an interest that was of great help to General McClure.

Examples of the Secretary's preoccupation with the subject are found in his numerous conversations with General McClure and frequent communications with the Commander in Chief, Far East Command (CINCFE), General Matthew B. Ridgeway. In early May 1951, Pace called McClure into his office, reiterated his "keen interest" in psychological warfare, and said that "quality rather than quantity" should be the measure of success in using this tool. He told McClure that he had dis-

cussed psychological warfare with General Ridgeway and expressed his wish for an all out-effort in the field. Pace offered to help McClure with his attempts to get the Air Force to furnish a special squadron of aircraft for psychological and unconventional warfare purposes, and concluded the conference by asking the General to keep him informed of activities in the field and to seek his assistance if any problem developed.[22] Later the same month, the Secretary called McClure to ask whether the Army was prepared for psychological warfare activities "should the military success of the U.N. [United Nations] forces result in routing of the Reds." He also wanted to know if McClure was satisfied with FECOM's performance in psychological warfare, and restated his interest in quality rather than quantity concerning production of leaflets and radio broadcasts.[23] By the end of May, Pace was convinced that the time had come for the maximum use of psychological warfare in Korea, and conveyed his "great personal interest in the matter" to General Ridgeway.[24]

Ridgeway's reply to Pace captures the state of psychological warfare activities in Korea at that time. He stated his plan to materially expand the psychological warfare effort in support of military operations, and indicated that current leaflet operations gave priority to tactical leaflets, "whose themes can be varied on short notice to adjust propaganda emphasis to fit different battle situations." The broad themes used for the tactical operations included good treatment of prisoners, U.N. materiel superiority, and mounting enemy casualty figures. Strategic propaganda efforts included newssheets, troop leaflets designed to depress morale and increase susceptibility to forthcoming tactical propaganda, and civilian leaflets designed to arouse anti-Chinese and anti-Soviet feeling. Plans were underway to double the weekly leaflet effort of approximately 13 million leaflets. Radio broadcasts, totaling 13 hours daily in the Korean language, would be augmented by shortwave broadcasts in Chinese to reach Chinese troops in Korea as well as Chinese civilians and troops in Manchuria. While it was too early to determine how influential psychological warfare had been in the recent heavy increase in the number of enemy prisoners taken, "preliminary interrogations indicate considerable effectiveness, both by leaflets and by loudspeakers." Ridgeway concluded by stating his belief that regular psychological warfare guidance from Washington was of "considerable importance," since activities were "an integral part of the worldwide US effort in this field and should be closely geared to activities in other areas, especially in the Far East."[25]

Pace seized upon Ridgeway's last point. During meetings with members of the Army Staff, he frequently stressed his endorsement of psychological warfare and urged the members to give it their full support. He

believed that it was not receiving sufficient attention, and considered it the "cheapest form of warfare." He emphasized that psychological warfare had to be conducted within the framework of national policy and that the situation during negotiations in Korea illustrated that point. Explaining that he felt a responsibility to "do something" to insure that necessary high-level Government policy views on the subject were prepared and properly coordinated with field psychological warfare, he directed General McClure to prepare a memorandum stating "what he as Secretary of the Army should do" in this matter.[26]

General Ridgeway followed up his desire for "more positive and definitive policy guidance" on psychological warfare in a cable to Pace in August 1951. He also asked for help in providing a few qualified personnel for a psychological warfare planning group in FECOM, adding an interesting note concerning the qualities he most desired in those personnel: "I personally rate integrity and intellectual capacity above experience, for the latter without both of the former is a liability, not an assest."[27]

Pace's "Personal for Ridgeway" reply again demonstrated his interest in this specialized field: "Psychological warfare can and must become one of our most effective weapons in combatting communism. I am anxious to take whatever steps I can to achieve this end." Pace indicated that the recently established Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), headed by Gordon Gray, should be able to provide the national policy guidance needed, and that "every effort is being exerted to make the board fully operational at the earliest possible date."[28] As directed by President Truman, the PSB was created to provide more effective planning of psychological operations within the framework of approved national policies, and to coordinate the psychological operations of all governmental departments and agencies.

The Secretary's attempts to influence the situation in Korea went beyond these communications with FECOM. He sent a copy of Ridgeway's cable to Gordon Gray, together with his reply. McClure also forwarded copies of the same message to the JCS, urging them to emphasize to the PSB that General Ridgeway's request for high-level policy guidance be included "among the foremost of the Board's priority operational matters."[29]

Secretary Pace's intense interest in psychological warfare influenced the attitudes and decisions of key decisionmakers in the Far East Command. Moreover, his enthusiasm for the subject aided General McClure in his endeavors to carve out a niche for OCPW within the Washington

bureaucracy. McClure was to make valuable use of the Secretary's sponsorship of psychological warfare, particularly in his relations with FECOM.

General McClure's attitude toward the Far East Command's conduct of psychological warfare activities was mixed. On the one hand, he often expressed satisfaction with FECOM's progress in this area, publicly complimented its efforts, and enthusiastically attempted to give it assistance. On the other hand, he was privately critical of psychological warfare operations in the Far East and felt that FECOM was not willing to accept the help offered. Undeterred, however, he intended "to put pressure on them to let us help them."[30]

McClure's primary concern was with FECOM's organization for psychological warfare. Initially, the responsibility for psychological warfare resided in the G-2 Division of Headquarters, FECOM. Reflecting his own World War II experience in establishing PWD/ SHAEF and, more recently, OCPW, McClure believed that a special staff division combining both psychological and unconventional warfare functions would enhance its stature and facilitate operations. Thus, he urged in letters, reports, and visits that this step be taken. He also recommended that the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group become the theater operating agency for psychological warfare when it arrived from the United States later in 1951.[31] At this point, in early 1951, the only US psychological warfare unit that the Department of the Army had been able to provide to FECOM was the Tactical Information Detachment, a small unit of a little over 20 personnel.

When the North Koreans attacked South Korea in June 1950, the Tactical Information Detachment—organized at Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1947—was the only operational psychological warfare troop unit in the U.S. Army. Sent to Korea in the fall of 1950, it was reorganized as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company, and served as the 8th Army's tactical propaganda unit throughout the conflict.[32] Tactical propaganda, sometimes called combat propaganda, was directed at a specific audience in the forward battle areas and in support of localized operations.[33] Mobile loudspeakers mounted on vehicles and aircraft became a primary means of conducting tactical propaganda in Korea. One noteworthy example was the use of a loudspeaker mounted on a C-47 aircraft that in 1951 circled over 1,809 Chinese Communist troops and induced them to surrender.[34]

As early as 1947, while there was no real military psychological organization in being, a small planning staff—a Psychological Warfare Sec-

tion (PWS)—had been created in the General Headquarters (GHQ) of FECOM. Although PWS had no field operating units, with hasty augmentation it did begin using leaflets and radio 2 days after the invasion. Obviously, PWS could not efficiently support full-scale strategic operations, so the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group was organized at Fort Riley and shipped to Korea in July 1951.

The 1st RB&L Group was specifically designed to conduct strategic propaganda in direct support of military operations.[35] Strategic propaganda was intended to further long-term strategic aims, and was directed at enemy forces, populations, or enemy-occupied areas.[36] To accomplish these tasks the 1st RB&L Group had the equipment and capability to produce newspapers and leaflets, and to augment or replace other means of broadcasting radio propaganda. The group supervised a radio station network known as the Voice of the United Nations, and often produced more than 200 million propaganda leaflets a week that were disseminated by aircraft or by specially designed artillery shells.[37] The leaflets expressed various themes. Some, for example, offered inducements for enemy soldiers to surrender; others were intended to bolster the morale of Korean civilians by proclaiming U.N. support.

Although the RB&L group was a concept accelerated to meet the requirements of the Korean conflict (plans were initiated by G-3, Department of the Army, in early 1950), it performed functions similar to those deemed necessary to the conduct of psychological warfare in World War II. Its Mobile Radio Broadcasting (MRB) Company bore a direct ancestral linkage with the mobile radio broadcasting companies formed under PWD/SHAEF to conduct propaganda operations in North Africa and the European theater during 1944–45. In fact, the MRB companies were the basic units organized to perform tactical psychological warfare during World War II, although radio later became an essentially strategic weapon that had no place in a purely tactical psychological unit.[38] Both the strategic propaganda concept embodied in the RB&L group and the tactical propaganda idea expressed by the L&L company were to figure prominently in the psychological warfare capability subsequently formed as part of the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952.

By April 1952, when the military situation was at a stalemate along the 38th parallel, three different kinds of psychological warfare were underway in Korea. "Strategic" psychological warfare was carried out by the Psychological Warfare Section, GHQ FECOM, located in Tokyo, the section having made the transition to a special staff section as recommended by McClure. The 1st RB&L Group, whose headquarters were also

in Tokyo, assisted GHQ FECOM in this endeavor. Leaflet operations blanketed North Korea with the exception of a 40-mile zone due north of the military lines; radio operations covered North and South Korea as well as parts of Manchuria and China. "Tactical" psychological warfare was directed by the Psychological Warfare Division, G-3, of HQ 8th Army, eventually located in Seoul. Assisted by the 1st L&L Company, this division directed leaflet and loudspeaker operations within 40 miles of the military line of contact. "Consolidation" propaganda was carried out by the State Department's US Information Service, based in Pusan. Its printed and visual media operations were confined to that part of Korea under the civil administration of the Republic of Korea government. Radio operations in this area were under the control of field teams of the 1st RB&L Group's Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company.[39]

Another concern of General McClure was the failure to use Korea as a profitable testing ground or laboratory. He believed that the campaign there provided great opportunity for both experimentation and testing of methods and equipment, and expressed to the Chief of Staff in August 1951 his disappointment in the results to that point. As an example of what he had in mind, McClure suggested that helicopters be equipped with noise devices for spreading terror.[40]

McClure was particularly critical of the available air support for psychological warfare in Korea and used every means at his disposal to try to improve the situation. In a "Dear Charles" letter to the G-2, GHQ FECOM, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, he unveiled his concerns:

> I only wish that aircraft were assigned for the tactical leafletting and strategic leafletting so that specific targets and timing could be given with an assurance that they would be hit. The New York Times Magazine Section two weeks ago carried a photograph of the interior of a C-47, showing a couple of harassed soldiers attempting to throw out handfuls of loose leaflets which apparently were blowing all over the interior.

Referring to his own experience in World War II, McClure continued:

> I feel that the Air Forces have fallen down badly on us in not using, at the beginning of this trouble, the techniques that we wound up with in 1945, such as: special leaflet squadrons, fibre casings for leaflet bombs (of which there are 80,000 here in the Arsenal), regular operations plans and orders, printing and delivery on call, etc. We are still putting pressures on back here but can do very little unless FEC makes this type of operation a military requirement.[41]

During his visit to FECOM in April 1951, McClure again presented his views on the subject of air support, stating that "unless aircraft demands are made operations requirements, the airdrops will continue on a catch-as-catch-can basis." The C-47, he believed, was inappropriate for leaflet drops; thus, "front line support suffers for lack of delivery by fighter bomber." He recommended that a special squadron be organized for psychological and unconventional warfare purposes.[42]

McClure pursued his basic themes at every opportunity. He told the US Air Force (USAF) Director of Operations in May that "we were using 1918 methods of dropping leaflets over front line troops and that it was both inefficient and expensive," and asked that the special air wings being organized to support CIA activities in Korea be used for psychological warfare. In June, he fired off a memorandum to the JCS recommending that discussions be initiated between the services in order to make maximum use of all tactical aircraft for the support of psychological warfare. He forcefully expressed his views to both the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army, both of whom tried to influence the situation through discussions and correspondence with their counterparts in the Air Force.[43]

Writing to the Chief of Staff, FECOM, on "the question of air support for psychological warfare operations," McClure charged that in actual practice such support was arranged locally, that the theater commander was unable to obtain a specific allocation of aircraft. He observed that the "undesirability of such a haphazard arrangement was apparent in the European theater during World War II and is in great measure borne out by what I saw and covered in my report to General Ridgeway during my recent inspection of psychological warfare operations in Korea." McClure then boldly reiterated his proposal: "The solution we arrived at in Europe, and which I firmly believe is the remedy now, was to place certain specified aircraft under the operational control of the Psychological Warfare Staff of the Senior Commander." But even before doing this, such support "should be determined to be an operational requirement, and this determination should be made now, once and for all." This was rather forceful language to use in addressing a three-star general and smacked of telling the theater commander how to do his job. Perhaps knowing that he had the support of the Secretary of the Army gave McClure a measure of confidence in this matter. At any rate, the point that he was trying to make, McClure believed, was basic to the whole question—psychological warfare must be recognized as *important* by the theater commander. Once that was established, it was "simply a question of the necessity for the theater staff to control its operational tools in order to fulfill its mission efficiently and effectively."[44]

This was vintage McClure. His campaign to improve the air support for psychological warfare in Korea illustrates the strategies and techniques used by this articulate, energetic "true believer" in his attempts to influence events in the theater commands.

Still another example of General McClure's technique was his reaction to "Operation Killer," a phrase used by HQ FECOM in its press releases to describe operations against the North Korean and Chinese forces. The following passage is from a letter written to Major General Willoughby:

> I have personally been disturbed by the comparatively few Chinese prisoners we are taking, either by surrender or by capture. I realize that they are not fighting as the Chinese did in their civil wars in the three-year period that I sat along the Shankiwan Railway line. On the other hand, for two thousand years the Chinese have been induced to change sides, even to that of the Japanese, by considerations of personal gain or creature comforts. Is it possible that the "Operation Killer" and the "Hunter Killer Teams" have been so widely publicized to Chinese forces that they do not believe that they would be allowed to surrender? The wide publicity and constant repetition of the "killer" intent of our operations and the gloating of the press, and apparently even the individuals in the Battle Area, over the numbers killed versus the numbers captured, has led to a good deal of unfavorable international reactions.

Demonstrating that he did indeed understand the perspective of the combat soldier, McClure added:

> I fully recognize that our troops must adopt a tough, hard-boiled killer attitude if they are going to not only survive, but to win these battles. I wonder, however, if that indoctrination, which, I repeat, is very necessary, needs to be widely publicized in the press and broadcast to our enemies.[45]

Willoughby's response to McClure acknowledged that the "unfavorable psychological effects caused by recent publicity of such terms as 'Operational Killer' have been recognized here, and you will note that 8th Army news releases have avoided such phraseology." His reply also indicated that he accepted several of McClure's other suggestions on propaganda themes and techniques.[46] Thus, through personal and official correspondence and discussions with key personnel, adroit use of his relationship with the Secretary of the Army, and visits to the Far East Command—by both himself and members of his staff—McClure kept his

finger on the pulse of events in Korea at the same time that he struggled to staff OCPW and establish a niche for his new organization within the Pentagon bureaucracy.

These efforts by OCPW to help were not always appreciated by HQ FECOM. As an example, in January 1952, Lieutenant General Doyle O. Hickey, Chief of Staff, FECOM, wrote to McClure questioning a United Press story entitled, "Psy War Accounts for Third of POW's." Hickey felt that the story was an exaggeration:

> While psychological warfare has unquestionably been one factor in lowering the combat effectiveness of enemy soldiers and in influencing many of them to desert, it seems evident that in almost all cases the action of our ground troops, supported by other combat arms, remains the strongest and most direct reason for the capture of prisoners.[47]

McClure demonstrated considerable tact in his response, telling Hickey, "I share fully your concern over the tendency to overplay the results of psychological warfare operations as evidenced in the United Press dispatch which you brought to my attention in your letter of 13 January." Never losing an opportunity to sell his wares, however, McClure further elaborated:

> On the whole, I believe that we have been successful in our determined effort to keep psychological warfare in a proper context within the "family of weapons." My views on this point are included in the Secretary's report which states: "Psychological warfare has been firmly recognized as an integral member of our family of weapons. While we realize fully that this mode of operation is not decisive by itself, it is also certain that, in combination with the conventional combat weapons, psychological warfare will contribute materially to the winning of wars."[48]

The report that McClure referred to was the Secretary of the Army's semiannual report, which was included in the Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense—illustrating again the similarity of views between Secretary Pace and the Chief, OCPW, on the subject of psychological warfare. This exchange of letters, however, also illustrates the tendency of conventional commanders to be sensitive to actions that appear to downgrade the "primary role of the combat role of the combat troops in the field," as Hickey expressed it, and thus to consider psychological warfare as strictly an ancillary, supporting activity. As an infantry officer, McClure recognized this tendency, and his reply to General Hickey reflects an attempt both to placate the conventional commander's view—to take a

balanced position, that is—and also to insure that "psywar" received the recognition that he felt it deserved. McClure walked this particular tightrope often.

The Psychological Warfare Section, FECOM, had other criticisms to make about the support received from the home front. These included a serious shortage of personnel with psychological warfare training or experience, particularly during the first 18 to 24 months of the war; the lack of firm, prompt high-level policy guidance and operational directives; the limitations of current printing, loudspeaker, and dissemination equipment; the serious shortage of linguists; and the lack of understanding of psychological warfare capabilities by commanders and troops at all echelons, which FECOM attributed to an apparently ineffective orientation program in the United States. FECOM finally overcame this last deficiency, it claimed, through high-level emphasis on, and orientation by, the Psychological Warfare Section within the theater; at the end of the conflict, "all divisions and corps commanders were enthusiastic supporters of psywar, demanding psywar support beyond ability of psywar agencies to produce."[49]

In spite of these differences of perspective between FECOM and OCPW, it is apparent that General McClure and his staff genuinely strove both to assist FECOM to influence the organization and conduct of psychological warfare in Korea. In large measure, these efforts were successful, due principally to the personal interest and sponsorship of Secretary Pace, to the provision of psychological warfare personnel and units by OCPW, and to the energetic, dedicated leadership of General McClure. Unconventional warfare activity in Korea, however, was another story.

OCPW and Unconventional Warfare in Korea

General McClure's attitude toward FECOM's conduct of unconventional warfare operations was similar to his views on its psychological warfare efforts, and perhaps even more critical. His criticisms focused on two broad areas: overall organization and planning for unconventional warfare by FECOM, and CIA involvement.

When the Korean war started, the minimal psychological warfare organization that existed in FECOM exceeded the one for unconventional warfare. Operations were initiated in the winter of 1950 by the G-3, 8th Army, when it appeared that the potential existed for the use of disaffected North Korean civilian personnel in behind-the-lines activities. Officers and

enlisted personnel—many of them with no previous experience in unconventional warfare—were recruited from within the theater to train and direct these native personnel in guerrilla activities. To control these operations, the G-3 Miscellaneous Group, 8th Army, was formed; later redesignated the Miscellaneous Group, 8086th Army Unit, it finally was called the Far East Command Liaison Detachment (Korea), 8240th Army Unit. According to its Table of Distribution (TD), the mission of the 8086th was the following:

1. To develop and direct partisan warfare by training in sabotage indigenous groups and individuals both within Allied lines and behind enemy lines.
2. To supply partisan groups and agents operating behind enemy lines by means of water and air transportation.[50]

Although tactical conditions dictated that more emphasis be placed at first on operations as opposed to training, by early 1952 the 8240th had three control organizations for guerrilla operations known as LEOPARD, WOLFPACK, AND KIRKLAND; BAKER Section provided air support (C-46's and C-47's). All of the control organizations were based on the islands off the east and west coasts of Korea. While their strengths varied, by late 1952, for example, LEOPARD reported 5,500 combat effectives and WOLFPACK, 6,800. These forces operated as groups from centers within North Korea while others conducted tactical raids, ambushes, and amphibious operations from the U.N.-held offshore islands. Although US personnel often accompanied the tactical operations, they were rarely assigned indefinitely to the guerrilla forces located within mainland North Korea. As an example of their hit-and-run activity, the Far East Command reported a total of 63 raids and 25 patrols launched against Communist forces during the period 15-21 November 1952, resulting in 1,382 enemy casualties, although, as was often the case in such operations, the casualty figures may have been inflated.[51]

WOLFPACK provides an excellent example of the manner in which these unconventional warfare organizations evolved and operated. Established in March 1952, using the standard battalion organization as a guide, the initial force had an aggregate strength of 4,000 North Koreans. At the beginning, the US personnel consisted of four officers—the commander, one officer in WOLFPACK headquarters, and two in subordinate units—and three enlisted men, two of whom were communications specialists. Combat operations were required concurrently with the process of organizing, equipping, and training. Initially, six battalion-type units were organized, each with an operating base on a separate island, and by

June 1952 two more units had been created. By December 1952 the WOLFPACK staff consisted, in US personnel, of a commander, S3, S2, two enlisted radio operators, one operations noncommissioned officer (NCO), and one intelligence NCO. The S3 and S2 were lieutenants without previous unconventional warfare or special operations experience. Only three of the eight subordinate units were commanded by US officers (captains), the others by North Koreans. The captain generally functioned as a commander of a group the size of a battalion. A total of two enlisted men served in these subordinate units as general assistants and, on occasion, as deputies to the captains to whom they were assigned.[52]

The operations conducted by WOLFPACK units were generally divided into three categories: coastal, intermediate, and interior. Coastal operations were planned on a conventional basis with forces of up to 800 men; they often involved the use of air and naval fire support and had as their primary objective the killing and capture of personnel. Intermediate operations further inland were executed by groups of 5 to 10 men over a period of 3 to 5 days, and were generally directed at pinpoint targets such as gun positions, wire lines, and targets vulnerable to sniping and demolitions. Interior operations represented the more classic guerrilla warfare operations; in these operations, a small element made an initial reconnaissance, followed by a larger increment, then by recruiting in the operational area and infiltration of the final group. Planning usually called for these forces to infiltrate in the spring and to remain until November of the same year.[53]

In 1953, a cadre from WOLFPACK and the other organizations subordinate to the Far East Command Liaison Detachment (8240th Army Unit) were used to form what was called the United Nations Partisan Forces in Korea (UNPFK). UNPFK consisted of five partisan infantry regiments and one partisan airborne infantry regiment. It was planned that this "first United Nations Partisan Division" would reach a strength of 20,000 personnel by March 1952. Guidelines to the regimental commanders from the 8240th included the following advice:

> Initiative and aggressiveness tempered by calm judgement will be encouraged. Avoid trying to win the war by yourself; pace the attack in accordance with your advantage; when the advantage has passed, get away to fight another day. Hit and run; these are the guerrilla's tactics. The planning of such an operation should include an escape route and rallying point. Substitute speed and surprise for mass.[54]

Unfortunately, as the organization grew larger and more conventional, according to one participant, the effectiveness of its operations decreased correspondingly.[55]

To oversee these unconventional warfare operations in Korea, HQ FECOM in Tokyo established the Far East Command Liaison Group (FECLG) under the operational control of the G-2. The Documents Research Division, a part of the Special Staff, HQ FECOM (headed by a CIA representative), controlled the CIA's operations. The Joint Advisory Commission Korea (JACK), whose head was a military officer assigned to the CIA, controlled the CIA operations in Korea—both OSO and OPC. Activities of the CIA ran the gamut from covert intelligence to unconventional warfare. The CIA placed agents to collect intelligence and assist downed pilots in escape and evasion. It conducted sabotage and small boat patrols for tactical information on both the east and west coasts. It organized indigenous forces to remain behind for shallow penetration patrolling to augment combat patrolling and gain information for large tactical operations. It conducted some guerrilla warfare. As one might expect, the variety of unconventional warfare activities engaged in by both the CIA and the services resulted in some conflicting and overlapping interests.[56]

In an attempt to eliminate this conflict, an organization for Covert, Clandestine and Related Activities in Korea (CCRAK) was activated in December 1951. Its purpose was to centralize direction of all services and CIA unconventional warfare operations at Headquarters, FECOM, by combining them in one organization to support US forces in Korea. CCRAK was put under the direct command of CINCFE, but continued under the staff supervision of G-2. The Deputy Chief, CCRAK, was an individual designated by the Chief, Documents Research Section, CIA. Colonel Archibald Stuart, US Army, installed as the Chief of CCRAK, soon after was promoted to brigadier general. Essentially, however, the unconventional warfare organization of the services and the CIA in Korea remained unchanged, with continuing lack of coordination between their activities.[57]

It was this apparent lack of coordination of unconventional warfare activities and the relative autonomy enjoyed by the CIA that most concerned General McClure, Chief, OCPW. In early 1951, he had already commented on the "unusual organization" that FECOM had established "whereby responsibility for covert operations and special operations behind the lines is placed in the office of the AC of S [Assistant Chief of Staff], G-2, in addition to its intelligence responsibility." He thought that such

operations should be the responsibility of G-3 or, even better, of a special staff division for both psychological warfare and special operations.[58] As we have seen, McClure had recommended to FECOM that such a division be established, and it was, in June 1951. But the new division's responsibilities for special operations apparently existed in name only. In reality those responsibilities resided within the G-2. Calling the G-3's attention to the apparent contravention by FECOM of its own general order that had established a Special Operations Section within the Psychological Warfare Division, McClure recommended that a cable be dispatched to CINCFE requesting clarification of (1) theater command and staff organization for planning and conduct of overt and covert unconventional warfare and psychological warfare, and (2) the relationship of CIA/OPC to that organization.[59]

Two months later, the recommendation was returned to OCPW without action with the comment, "When the psychological warfare organization within FECOM has been established on a firm basis, it is considered that representatives from your office should go to the Far East Command to discuss psychological warfare activities." While this response from G-3 may have been an attempt to keep an overzealous OCPW from appearing to question the prerogatives of a theater commander, it was also indicative of deeper tensions between McClure's office and those of the principal staff agencies, particularly the G-2 and G-3. These tensions were the result of many factors, including the personality conflicts that often develop when strong-willed men disagree over issues. For example, there was "bad feeling" between McClure and the G-2, Major General Bolling, part of which was due to jurisdictional differences over the staff responsiblity for escape and evasion. Perhaps the major factor, however, was the belief of many staff officers that the relatively new fields of psychological and unconventional warfare were "incidental activities" that demanded an unjustified share of attention and resources in terms of their real value to the Army. This attitude extended particularly to the younger field, unconventional warfare. Unfortunately the single-minded dedication with which some of McClure's staff pursued the creation of Special Forces alienated many of those with whom they had to coordinate policies and activities.[60]

Undeterred by the G-3 rebuff, McClure tried other tactics to emphasize his point on staff organization. Writing to the Chief of Staff, FECOM, in October 1951, he observed:

> I understand that in the setup of your new Psywar Division you have not yet reached a firm decision on the placing of the special operations and particularly guerrilla warfare and similar type activities. I

> strongly reiterate my comment to you on my visit to your headquarters in April, that Psywar and Special Operations are so interrelated that they should be under the same Staff Division.[61]

With perhaps some exaggeration, he added: "We have found the organization here at the Department of the Army level to be working spendidly and in complete harmony with other Staff Divisions, both General and Special."

McClure's principal concern about placing special operations under G-2 was that it might then be given a lower priority:

> While Special Operations has some aspects of intelligence gathering, that is by no means its principal mission, and if it remains under G-2 risks being subordinated to the intelligence field. All our planning here contemplates the separation of the intelligence field from the Special Operations field. . . . I feel very strongly that the Special Operations is as it states an operation more appropriately monitored by G-3 than G-2.

The recommendation had little effect, so, several months later McClure decided to try another tack. He prepared a comprehensive analysis of FECOM's organization for psychological and special operations for General Mark Clark, who had replaced General Ridgeway as Commander *in Chief*, Far East, *in* April 1952. Reviewing his recommendation to Ridgeway in April 1951 to establish an organization to handle psychological and special operations and the subsequent FECOM general order in June 1951 to establish such an office, McClure observed:

> While I have no desire to prescribe or unduly influence the organization which should be adopted by any Theater Commander, I would like to point out the fact that Psychological Warfare Section, GHQ FECOM has to date assumed only those functions pertaining to Psychological Warfare. Special Operations has remained under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.[62]

As a result of a JCS message in August 1951, CIA and Covert Operations in Korea had been placed under CINFE. The activation of CCRAK was an attempt to bring all behind-the-line operations under a single command agency, but CCRAK remained under the general staff supervision of G-2, FECOM, as McClure reminded Clark. Additionally—and this was a particularly crucial point with the Chief, OCPW—CIA, Far East Command, insisted that JACK (CIA, Korea) be maintained as an integral organization and remain under the control of CIA, Far East.

Based on field trip reports by members of his office, their experiences and judgments, plus a comprehensive debriefing of a former member of CCRAK, McClure offered the following conclusions in his analysis for Clark:

1. G-2, FEC, General Staff supervision of CCRAK and all behind-the-line operations have resulted in emphasis on intelligence, rather than adequate developing indigenous forces [guerrilla] in North Korea and in support of 8th Army.

2. To obtain a balance of G-2, G-3 interest, this office is of the opinion that Special Operations functions should be placed in the Psychological Warfare Section, FEC.

3. In order to eliminate duplication of personnel, equipment, and facilities, and to insure efficient coordinated operations, CIA, Korea, should be integrated into a joint task force organization (Army, Navy, Air, and CIA) under the command of CINCFE.

4. The organizational integrity policy advocated by CIA is a basic factor adversely affecting Special Forces operations in Korea.

5. Highly qualified personnel for key positions in Special Operations furnished in accordance with a special FEC requisition are not fully utilized in this field.[63]

These conclusions and their supporting discussion vividly depict the extent of OCPW's disapproval with the autonomous CIA role in Korea. While all behind-the-line operations were ostensibly under the control of CINCFE, in reality, McClure argued, a dual chain of command existed.

The commander of CCRAK took his orders from CINCFE; the Deputy Chief, CCRAK, received his marching orders from Documents Research Division (CIA, Far East), who in turn received its guidance from CIA headquarters in Washington. At the operational level, this meant that JACK (CIA, Korea) did not carry out missions in support of the 8th Army without authority from CIA, Far East. Coordination of the unconventional warfare operations run by CCRAK and the 8th Army was too dependent on the personalities of key individuals, he felt. Ironically, the CIA in Korea integrated military personnel into its organization and often engaged in activities similar to those conducted by the 8th Army, but without proper overall coordination. All in all, McClure argued, CIA's insistence on organizational integrity resulted in an allegedly joint command, CCRAK, that had no authority to exercise command jurisdiction over CIA personnel

and efforts, in unnecessary duplication of personnel and activities, and in multiple channels that complicated the coordination and integration of operations. Together with the lack of overall formal planning and training for unconventional warfare by CCRAK or any other agency and the emphasis placed on intelligence as opposed to guerrilla warfare, these problems added up to a situation where the potential for behind-the-lines operations was far from being realized, McClure and his staff believed.[64] As we shall see, OCPW's differences with the CIA were the harbinger of similar frustrations encountered by OCPW in its efforts to create Special Forces and to plan for their use in Europe, and is a major theme in the evolution of the Army's attempt to create its own special warfare capability.

Shortly after his memorandum to General Clark, McClure reiterated his view to G-3: "I believe that the unconventional warfare organization for Korea, including CIA/OPC participation therein, reflects fundamental and serious defects, specifically for the conduct of guerrilla warfare." McClure criticized the conduct of guerrilla warfare in Korea as "essentially minor in consequence and sporadic in nature" and stated the FECOM lacked "an overall, integrated program of Special Forces in Korea." It is interesting to note that OCPW began to use the term "Special Forces Operations," as differentiated from "special operations," to describe US Army participation in guerrilla warfare activities. "Special operations," through long usage in the Army and as outlined in "Field Service Regulations" (Field Manual 100-5), related to "night combat," "jungle operations," "joint amphibious operations," and similar activities.[65]

Actually, few Special Forces personnel were used for unconventional warfare operations in Korea. The 10th Special Forces Group was not officially created until May 1952, at which time it began training and continued recruiting efforts for personnel. Although OCPW urged HQ FECOM in November 1952 and January 1953 to requisition Special Forces staff personnel and detachments, FECOM did not act until the spring of 1953, when it requested deployment of 55 officers and 9 enlisted men from the 10th Special Forces Group. Some of these personnel became disillusioned with their assignments in Korea, believing that their Special Forces and airborne training were not properly utilized. More importantly, however, there were no Special Forces operational detachments, as opposed to individuals, requested and employed by the Far East Command. An excellent opportunity to test unconventional warfare doctrine and organization was lost, or so General McClure thought because he complained

of his difficulty in getting experience data from FECOM and of his disappointment in FECOM's failure to conduct "laboratory" tests of guerrilla operations.[66]

Although McClure continued throughout his tenure as Chief, OCPW, to have reservations about the Far East Command's organization and conduct of unconventional warfare, not everyone shared his views. A staff visit to FECOM by a member of the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division in late 1951 not only confirmed that the organization for the "covert" aspects of unconventional warfare did not follow the general lines of command and staff responsibility established by OCPW, but also resulted in the observation that there was little inclination to do so:

> There is nowhere within FEC a desire to organize covert activities under a Psychological Warfare Section as in D/A [Department of the Army]. The organization is suitable to the personalities and operations within the theater. It is sound, workable, and has the unqualified backing of both the military and CIA personnel concerned from top to bottom. Officers within the theater are of the opinion, and rightly so, that the theater should be free to solve its organizational problems in its own way; that what may seem ideal organizationally to far-off Washington is not necessarily the best solution to those more nearly under the guns.[67]

The tone of this report indicates that the JCS had some sympathy with FECOM's posture on this matter. Furthermore, as we have seen, the Department of the Army G-2 and G-3 from time to time resisted OCPW's attempts to influence FECOM's organization and conduct of unconventional warfare. The records of this period reveal instances where G-3 in particular tried to stop or "tone down" OCPW's initiatives and proposed cables. In early 1953, for example, G-3 nonconcurred in a cable from OCPW to FECOM requesting information about the status and role of "partisan forces." Observing tartly that "considering the number of G-2 and PSYWAR officers who have visited FECOM within the past few months for the purpose of examining CCRAK organization and activities, there should be no dearth of information on the subject in D/A," the G-3 response went on to conclude: "While the ostensible purpose of the proposed cable is to obtain information, the overall effect tends towards veiled suspicion that CINCFE is on the 'wrong track.'"[68]

This was, of course, exactly what McClure's office suspected, but OCPW efforts to get FECOM to recognize the errors of its ways in unconventional warfare generally came to naught. Although the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, shared some of McClure's concerns about lack of a

fully integrated joint staff in Korea for unconventional warfare, the Far East commander, General Clark, insisted that the CIA's organizational integrity under CCRAK be maintained. And while Clark also instructed his staff to establish closer liaison with OCPW, this did not result in any significant organizational changes by FECOM in its handling of unconventional warfare.[69]

For all practical purposes, both Far East Command and the CIA went their own ways, uninfluenced by General McClure and his staff.

In summary, with the impetus of the Korean war, the Army moved in late 1950 to create an unprecedented staff organization—the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare. The personal interest and persistent pressure that Secretary of the Army Pace brought to bear on senior Army officers, both before and after the outbreak of war, were key factors in this step. With Pace's support, Brigadier General McClure created a staff under which were placed the responsibilities for both psychological and unconventional warfare. While in the process of staffing and organizing this office, McClure energetically turned to the emergency in Korea in an attempt to assist and influence FECOM's organization and conduct of psychological and unconventional warfare—capabilities that the Army had neglected during the interwar years. He was successful with psychological warfare, less so with unconventional. The conflict in Korea, however, is only one part of the story in our quest to determine why the Army decided to establish the Psychological Warfare Center and to create the 10th Special Forces Group. To complete the picture, we must next examine the events that were taking place in the United States and in Europe.

VII

THE ROAD TO FORT BRAGG

Spurred by the war in Korea and the persistent pressure of Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) was created in early 1951—a key link in the chain of events leading to establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, N.C. Under the leadership of Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, OCPW initiated plans that resulted in this unprecedented center and in activation of an equally unprecedented concept and organization, Special Forces. To complete our examination of how and why this occurred—that is, to understand the origins of a "special warfare" capability for the Army—we must look beyond the more obvious stimulus of the Korean emergency to events taking place both in Europe and in the United States.

Psywar in Europe

While the conflict in Korea naturally occupied a major share of OCPW's attention, McClure found soon after arrival in Washington that acquaintances in the European theater would be reminding him of their needs. In December 1950, Major General Daniel Noce, Chief of Staff of Headquarters, European Command (EUCOM) sent him a "Dear Bob" letter:

> I was sorry to hear that you lost your nice billet on the West Coast, but feel that the Army will benefit materially from your assignment as head of the new Psychological Warfare Division in the Department. Certainly, we have no other officer who has the broad experience which you have had in that field.[1]

After this introductory compliment, General Noce got down to business, stating that EUCOM's difficulty in obtaining qualified officers for

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psychological warfare and special operations had substantially slowed progress in planning for these activities. He outlined his needs for trained officers in both fields, indicating that these needs had been discussed recently with Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Deane, Jr., whom McClure had sent to Europe on a liaison trip. Interestingly, in a comment that reflects some of McClure's organizational philosophy, Noce added:

> The organization of your division works in quite well with the psychological warfare and unconventional warfare organization which we have established in this headquarters, since we have placed both of these activities in one branch of our OPOT (G-3) Division.

McClure's reply on 15 January 1951 reflected his frustration in attempting to restore specialized skills neglected in the immediate post-World War II period:

> I fully appreciate your difficulty in obtaining qualified officers for psychological warfare and unconventional warfare activities. We are encountering the same difficulties here. I am greatly embarrassed that we have been unable so far to furnish you the two officers for psychological warfare planning which you requested in a radio message some time ago.[2]

This is precisely the condition that McClure and a few other farsighted individuals had tried to avoid when, just a few years earlier, they had lamented the dispersal of people with World War II experience and had warned about the lack of attention being paid to maintaining a psychological warfare capability. Now their prophecies had been fulfilled. As one of the few senior officers who grasped the complexities and possibilities of this specialized field, McClure struggled to train personnel in both the US and the overseas theaters.

Unable to provide the planners that General Noce immediately needed, McClure offered in his 15 January letter to do "some little work here along that line as suggestions for you." In this same letter, McClure again discussed the valuable contribution made by civilians in psychological warfare, mentioning specifically the forthcoming visit to Europe of C. D. Jackson, his former deputy throughout World War II. He also provided a lengthy illustration of what he called the "practical side of back stopping" psychological warfare operations, emphasizing:

> It is for this reason of thinking the problem through from the leaflets in the enemy soldier or civilian hands back to the tree from which the pulp is produced, that a man with Jackson's experience will be essen-

> tial. God forbid that you go through the growing pains, trial and error, and frustrations that we did in World War II until we finally reached maturity. I can assure you that we will give you all the help possible back here.

And help he did. McClure sent General Noce several guidance materials for psychological warfare planning, including training circulars, program schedules, a draft National Psychological Warfare Plan for General War, the State Department's "Russian Plan," and estimates of logistical requirements for psychological warfare planning.[3] Increased efforts were made to provide the officers EUCOM needed, and by October a small Psychological Warfare Section had been formed in the Special Plans Branch of Headquarters, EUCOM. The 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group, a New York City reserve unit, was recalled to active duty, sent to Fort Riley, Kansas, for training, and shipped to Europe in November, together with the 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company.[4]

The decision to ship the 301st RB&L Group to Europe was itself fraught with controversy and indicative of the competing requirements that OCPW faced during this hectic period. General Willoughby, G-2, GHQ FECOM, felt that assignment of the 301st to the Far East Command would be the most practical solution to FECOM's urgent needs, and McClure initially agreed with this assignment. A decision by G-3 to honor the corresponding and prior need expressed by the European theater forced McClure to backtrack, however. Instead, the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, a prototype unit stationed at Fort Riley, was shipped to FECOM.[5]

In addition to providing such help as it could to EUCOM, OCPW was also involved in numerous planning actions for balancing the perceived Soviet threat in Europe. An example of such actions was a meeting called by the Joint Strategic Plans Division (JSPD) of the military services' psychological warfare representatives. The meeting explored sources of discontent within Soviet satellite services (which could be exploited for propaganda to reduce morale), and means by which the services could furnish the State Department with materials for psychological warfare against the U.S.S.R. and its satellite forces. The Acting Chief, JSPD, agreed to await OCPW's submission of an outline plan for overt psychological attack against Soviet and satellite forces—a plan that would confine itself to military psychological vulnerabilities—before taking further action. The Army could make this contribution because McClure had previously alerted his staff to prepare a draft plan, "EEI [Essential Elements

of Information], Psychological Vulnerabilities of Soviet Armed Forces in Current Period (Draft)." This particular plan was illustrative of many such actions initiated by McClure during this time and reflected both his ability to anticipate needs and his desire to lead the way in psychological warfare planning among the services.[6]

He was to have some competition on that latter score, and OCPW's running feud with the Air Force was indicative of the interservice rivalry that marked these years. While attending a joint EUCOM-USAFE (US Air Force, Europe) conference in Europe, McClure noted somewhat peevishly that while both the Army and Air Force had exhibits at the conference illustrating psychological warfare objectives, techniques, and historical examples, the Air Force exhibit "was an elaborate and expensive one" that had been on tour in the United States and would visit parts of Europe. Moreover, in his eyes the exhibit was misleading:

> It is unfortunate that the air exhibit fails to indicate any joint participation by other services in the field of Psychological Warfare. A false impression is given that Air Force is unilaterally conducting Psychological Warfare even in Korea today. Korean leaflets used in the exhibit and sample ones given to the audience leave the impression that the Air Force determines the content, prints the leaflet, selects the target, and then makes distribution. Quite the contrary, no leaflet has been designed or printed by the Air Force in the Far East command to date. It is an Army operation except for airlift distribution. This is the same practice as World War II.[7]

McClure had been critical of Air Force support of Army psychological warfare operations in Korea, but this statement reveals an even deeper concern that the Air Force, in its organization and activities, was "going into Psywar in a big way, disturbingly so in some respects," as he remarked to his staff.[8] Apparently the Air Force felt that it had claim to a strategic role in psychological warfare beyond that of simply providing the airplanes for leaflet distribution. Not illogically, it argued that in addition to providing the airlift through its special Aerial Resupply and Communication (ARC) Wings, it should also be able to compose and print leaflets.[9] In its staff organization, research projects and training plans, the Air Force embarked upon a psychological warfare program that resulted in what one disinterested Navy observer characterized as "the clash of two growing organizations, Army and Air Force Psychological Warfare."[10] But McClure believed that the Air Force plans, if implemented, would "result in extravagant duplication of the minimal numbers of personnel and items of equipment envisaged for Army propaganda operations."[11] McClure's suspicions of Air Force intrusions into what he considered Army terrain

continued unabated and were intensified by disagreements over responsibilities for unconventional warfare.

Psychological Warfare Activities in the United States

The requirements of the theater commands in both Europe and the Far East, and the concurrent need to develop a training program and supporting structure for psychological warfare ir the United States, placed heavy demands upon McClure's office. The immediate need for a qualified Psychological Warfare officer in each Army headquarters was met by sending selected personnel to a 17-week course at Georgetown University, but this stopgap measure only scratched the surface. A letter from one of McClure's staff to the harried commander of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, being readied at Fort Riley for deployment to the Far East, vividly depicts the situation:

> In order that you will be better able to appreciate the personnel problems facing us here, I would like to give you a little indication of our immediate requirements for officers. We must find 38 officers for your Group, 24 officers for a student body for the first unit officers' course in the Psychological Warfare School, 14 officers for the Staff and Faculty of the Psychological Warfare School, 5 officers for the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, 8 officers for the 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, which is to be activated in the near future, and approximately 20 additional officers for this office. That totals 109 officers needed in the immediate future and there are additional miscellaneous slots to be filled. To meet this requirement, we have so far requested approximately 100 officers. We are finding that we get only fifty percent of those we request. Those now being requested will not be available at the earliest until late April or May. However, we hope to have enough available by Mid-April to provide a minimum staff for the units at Riley, a minimum staff for the School, and a small student body for the first unit officers' course.[12]

As seen earlier, plans to establish the Psychological Warfare Department as a part of the Army General School at Fort Riley began in the winter of 1950 when General McClure forwarded a request from the Chief, Army Field Forces (AFF), to assign Lieutenant Colonel John O. Weaver as the Department's first Chief. Weaver finally acquired enough of a faculty to establish "the world's first formal school of military propa-

ganda" in the spring of 1951. The purpose of his first endeavor, the psychological warfare officer course, was

> to train selected officers for assignment to psychological warfare staff and operational units; to develop in officers an understanding of the nature and employment of propaganda in combat and to make them knowledgeable of the organization's methods and techniques for the tactical conduct of propaganda in the field.[13]

The courses were designed to provide a general introduction to psychological warfare, strategic intelligence, foreign army organization, intelligence, and psychological operations, and lasted 6 to 7 weeks. Between June 1951 and April 1952, 4 officer and 2 noncommissioned officer classes were graduated—a total of 334 students, including Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force students, as well as Allied students from Canada, Great Britain, Denmark, Belgium, France, and Italy.[14]

By April 1951, OCPW had requested the activation of five psychological warfare units: the 1st L&L Company with the 8th Army in Korea; the 2d L&L Company at Fort Riley as a prototype unit; the 5th L&L Company at Fort Riley, but scheduled to be sent to Europe; the 1st RB&L Group at Fort Riley, originally a prototype unit but scheduled to be sent to the Far East Command; and the 301st (Reserve) RB&L Group, to be trained at Fort Riley in May, then shipped to Europe. In addition, OCPW developed organizational concepts and functions for these troop units, as well as for OCPW and a Psychological Warfare Division, Special Staff, for theater command use. Army Field Forces received a directive to establish training programs for the general indoctrination of all military personnel in psychological warfare and to prepare detailed programs for both active and reserve psychological warfare units. In accordance with this directive, all Army schools received a request to include general indoctrination instruction in psychological warfare in their curricula. And by the end of May, McClure began sending out the first of a series of informational letters designed to maintain a close contact between OCPW and Psychological Warfare officers in all Army headquarters.[15]

To conduct nonmateriel research in support of the burgeoning psychological warfare effort, the Army relied almost exclusively upon a civilian agency, the Operations Research Office (ORO) operated under contract by the Johns Hopkins University. Studies by ORO included a three-volume basic reference work for psychological warfare, manuals for use by psychological warfare operators in specific countries, an analysis and grouping of sample leaflets from World War II and Korea to develop classification

schemes, and a large amount of field operations research in Korea. McClure's staff was not entirely satisfied with ORO's work, claiming that their projects were "too general in concept" and not suitable for use by the Army's psychological operators. The Johns Hopkins University also began to have misgivings about the contract, believing that it could not properly perform the development research (as opposed to operations research) required by OCPW in support of psychological warfare. Eventually the Human Resources Research Office was formed to supplant ORO and undertake a general program in psychological research for the Army.[16]

McClure was particularly interested in improving the development and procurement of suitable materiel for the conduct of psychological warfare. He felt that "as a result of the 1945–49 hiatus in psychological warfare and special operations planning," the military "entered the Korean conflict with little more than obsolete pieces of World War II equipment." Examples of equipment under development were a mobile reproduction unit for propaganda leaflets, a newly designed lightweight portable loudspeaker for use in frontline operations, and a completely equipped mobile 5,000-watt radio broadcasting station.[17]

As if these myriad competing requirements were not enough to keep it busy, OCPW soon faced the possibility of a reduction in civilian and military personnel strength, a threat that it avoided by invoking Secretary Pace's views in support of the Army's psychological warfare program. McClure had a hard enough time as it was obtaining the qualified people needed for the specialized skills of psychological warfare and special operations. That, coupled with the fact that many officers were reluctant to become involved in an activity considered "out of the mainstream," meant that he often had to "take what he could get," in the words of one of his former staff officers. Many of the officers assigned to OCPW felt "trapped" by the assignment because of McClure's reluctance to release them for other jobs, which apparently caused considerable discontent.[18]

There was also some disgruntlement among his officers concerning McClure's insistence on special staff status for OCPW, rather than remaining under the G-3 as a part of the General Staff, a position, they thought, of greater stature and "clout" within the Army bureaucracy. Certainly there was some basis for these feelings—under normal circumstances the General Staff does carry more "clout" and an aura of greater prestige. But McClure's World War II experience had firmly etched in his mind the overriding advantages of relative autonomy and access to the top decisionmakers that special staff status afforded. As we have seen, this was

a theme consistently advocated by him, both in the United States and in his relations with the theater commands. Despite these resentments, however, McClure was both liked and esteemed by those who worked for him. "Robbie" backed his subordinates loyally, evinced tremendous energy and enthusiasm about OCPW's role, and displayed more ability to articulate than did most general officers of his time.[19] And he had vision. This vision extended to the field of unconventional warfare.

The Special Forces Ranger Regiment

At the time of OCPW's creation, General McClure had successfully lobbied to have responsibilities for the unconventional warfare function transferred from G-3 to him. While some thinking on the subject of behind-the-lines activities and special units had taken place in the Army during the interwar years, nothing much had been done to follow through on those initial ideas—particularly since CIA/OPC's assumption of the primary responsibility for covert operations. Under McClure's leadership, this situation was to change, for within a year and a half the plans formulated within his Special Operations Division (later renamed the Special Forces Division) to create a formal unconventional warfare capability for the Army came to fruition. But the path to that goal was not easy, nor did it proceed in a straight line.

McClure realized that his firsthand expertise was basically in the psychological warfare field, so early on he indicated to his staff that he was "fighting for officers with background and experience in special operations."[20] He brought into the Special Operations Division several officers with World War II and Korean war experience in guerrilla warfare or with long-range penetration units: Lieutenant Colonel Melvin Russell Blair and Lieutenant Colonel Marvin Waters, both of whom had served with "Merrill's Marauders"; Colonel Aaron Bank, who had fought with the French Maquis as a member of OSS; Colonel Wendell Fertig, who had commanded the guerrillas on Mindanao after the Japanese occupied the Philippines; and Lieutenant Colonel Russell W. Volckmann, who had organized and conducted guerrilla warfare operations in North Luzon and had planned and directed behind-the-lines operations in North Korea.[21]

Colonel Volckmann remembered that General McClure had approached him in the hospital (he had been evacuated from Korea in December 1951 to Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington) with a request to help organize the Special Operations Division, and it was only after being assured that the Department of the Army was interested in

organized behind-the-lines operations that he agreed to take the job.[22] Together, the group in OCPW prepared studies, plans, organizational and operational concepts, and training programs for a formal US Army unconventional warfare capability—Special Forces.

These studies and organizational concepts were inevitably based on the personal operational experience of the officers involved, as well as on research of the past major resistance movements. In addition to his World War II guerrilla warfare experience, Colonel Volckmann possessed a considerable amount of information resulting from more than 6 months of research he had undertaken in 1949 at Fort Benning, Georgia, while preparing the draft field manuals for *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare* and *Combatting Guerrilla Forces.*[23] Colonel Bank, another key figure, had operated as a Jedburgh in southern France, later organized and trained anti-Nazi German prisoners of war for harassing tactics against the Germans in Austria, and still later completed two OSS missions in Indochina.[24]

Bank, who joined OCPW as Chief of the Special Operations Division at the end of March 1951 (to be succeeded by Colonel Fertig in July),[25] gives Volckmann considerable credit for "the development of position, planning, and policy papers that helped sell the establishment of Special Forces units in the active Army." Bank also makes clear that he and Volckmann based their plans for the Army's unconventional warfare capability on their World War II experiences with the Philippine guerrillas and OSS, and that Special Forces units were developed "in the OSS pattern of tiny units with the prime mission of developing, training, and equipping the guerrilla potential deep in enemy territory." To those who would insist on viewing the Army's Ranger units as forerunners of Special Forces, Bank unequivocally states that "actually they [Special Forces] have no connection with ranger-type organizations since their mission and operations are far more complex, time consuming, require much deeper penetration and initially are often of a strategic nature."[26]

The comments of Volckmann and Bank, made in retrospect, may give the impression that a rather clear delineation of roles and missions for Special Forces was clearly understood from the beginning. The evidence suggests otherwise. In actuality, the path that led to the concept for organization and employment of Special Forces was tortuous and marked by controversy. The initial discussions within the Army on this subject, in fact, were reminiscent of the rather confused dialog that took place during the interwar years concerning the "Airborne Reconnaissance units," the

"Ranger Group," and the "Special Operations Company," all of which tended to intermingle OSS and Ranger precepts. The task of clearing up this doctrinal confusion proved to be no easier in 1951 than it had been during the period prior to Korea.

We have seen that in early February 1951, General McClure briefed the Army General Council on the need for a rapid organization of unconventional warfare, and that shortly thereafter Secretary Pace provided strong official support for the combining of psychological and unconventional warfare planning functions. By late March, a few weeks after Volckmann joined OCPW, McClure's new office received a copy of a brief memorandum to the Director, Organization and Training Division, from Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, G-3:

> In consultation with General McClure, please develop the Army responsibility for guerrilla and antiguerrilla warfare within the field of G-3 interests. Having determined what our responsibility is, I should then like to verify that the various elements in the guerrilla mission are clearly assigned to subordinate Army units.[27]

It is interesting to note that Taylor's directive included antiguerrilla warfare. While some lip service was given to this in the studies that followed, it was not considered an important part of Special Forces until the 1960's, when "counterinsurgency" became the third leg of the "special warfare" triad at Fort Bragg.

Up to this point, General McClure had not been able to do much about the unconventional warfare part of his mission. Arrangements had been made for a few officers from Army Field Forces and the various Army headquarters in the United States to attend a staff familiarization course in guerrilla warfare at Fort Benning beginning 5 April 1951. Those attending were generally the same officers who had attended the special psychological warfare course run by Georgetown University.[28] The course in guerrilla warfare was set up after a series of conferences in 1949 between the Army and the CIA had led to the selection of Fort Benning as the site for a training course desired by the CIA. McClure had also requested that his office receive full reports on all behind-the-lines operations in Korea in order to carry out its assigned responsibilities in the field of unconventional warfare.[29] Except for these tentative steps, however, special operations planning in OCPW lagged behind psychological warfare planning, primarily because of a lack of experienced personnel. But when McClure acquired the people he needed, he plunged ahead.

Within 10 days of receiving General Taylor's memorandum, McClure discussed the subject of guerrilla warfare with him and General Bolte, and reported to his staff that both were "very much" in favor of organizing "foreign national units." General Taylor was to do a study on the use of foreign nationals as individuals or in units, while OCPW's Special Operations Division was asked to study the possibility of organizing a Ranger company at Fort Riley with each platoon made up of a different nationality group. One of the purposes of the company would be to work with US aggressor forces in exercises to teach soldiers counterguerrilla tactics. McClure's tentative thinking at this early stage was to propose organization of six Ranger companies of foreign nationals in Europe, each company consisting of a different nationality and attached to a US division. The companies were to be in addition to the "regular" Ranger battalions of US personnel.[30]

Two points need to be noted about this early dialog. First, it was clear that the focus of attention for future possible use of unconventional warfare was Europe, even though the Army was currently engaged in a "hot war" in Korea. The "foreign nationals" referred to were those from Eastern European countries and would be brought into the US Army through the provisions of the Lodge bill (Public Law 597, 81st Congress, 30 June 1950). Second, it was also clear that the principals involved in this dialog, including General McClure, had not sorted out in their minds the type of special unit desired or its primary objective.

Perhaps this was because the Chief of Staff, General Collins, was himself unclear on the subject, as was evident in his visit to the Infantry Center at Fort Benning a few days later. During his conference there, General Collins observed that "the Infantry School should consider the Rangers as well as other troops and indigenous personnel to initiate subversive activities. I personally established the Rangers with the thought that they might serve as the nucleus of expansion in this direction."[31] This statement is particularly revealing when one considers the clear-cut delineation between the roles and missions of Special Forces and Ranger units later insisted on by the Chief of Staff. But such a delineation was neither well understood nor agreed to by key decisionmakers in early 1951.

Lieutenant Colonel Volckmann from OCPW was present at the conference attended by General Collins at Fort Benning, and was asked by the Infantry School to analyze portions of the Chief of Staff's statements. Volckmann's analysis should be examined in some detail, for it is the first evidence within OCPW of the philosophical basis for creation of an Army unconventional warfare capability.

First, Volckmann interpreted General Collins' use of the phrase "subversive activities" to mean what he called "special forces operations." He defined these operations to include those carried on within or behind the enemy's lines, which could encompass the following:

1. Organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare.
2. Sabotage and subversion.
3. Evasion and escape.
4. Ranger and Commando-like operations.
5. Long-range or deep penetration reconnaissance.
6. Psychological warfare (through the above media).[32]

Second, commenting on the Chief of Staff's reference to indigenous personnel, Volckmann offered the following theoretical framework to clarify the overall objective of special forces operations:

> We may visualize the world today as being divided into two major groups or layers of individuals that cover the earth unrestricted by national boundaries. These layers, a red and a blue, are held together by common ideologies. Any future war may well be regarded as an international civil war waged by these opposing layers. The full exploitation of our sympathetic blue layer within the enemy's sphere of influence is basically the mission of special forces operations. It is from the blue layer within the enemy's sphere of influence that we must foster resistance movements, organize guerrilla or indigenous forces on a military basis, conduct sabotage and subversion, effect evasion and escape. We should, through special forces operations, exploit this layer to assist our ranger and commando operations, and as a media for psychological warfare.

Exploitation of the "sympathetic blue layer," stated Volckmann, would enable the West to offset the manpower superiority of Soviet forces in Europe, particularly during the initial stages of their invasion. Similarly, the Allies must be prepared to counter the "red layer" within their friendly sphere of influence, a problem that involved rear-area defense, for the Soviets would exploit their "sympathetic red layer" to the maximum.

To effect the transition from this theoretical framework to reality, at least as far as the Army was concerned, Volckmann advocated concrete

measures: "Through actual command, staff, training, and operations we should pull the overall field of special forces operations out of the clouds, out of the discussion stage, and reduce it to organization, training, and operations." To accomplish this he recommended that the Infantry Center be designed as the focal point for doctrine, policy, and technique, and further advocated the activation of a "Special Forces Command" under the center to "explore, develop and conduct training in the field of special forces operations." Under this command should be placed Ranger training and "all other special forces operations."

Two other points should be noted about Volckmann's analysis. He believed that "special forces operations" should be an accepted field of conventional ground warfare; therefore "we should cease to regard special forces operations as irregular or unconventional warfare." Thus, the ultimate objective of special forces operations would be to "organize and support, wherever possible within the enemy's sphere of influence, guerrilla or indigenous forces on a military basis that are capable of efficient and controlled exploitation in conjunction with our land, air, and sea forces."

Having established that point, Volckmann proceeded to present what he envisaged as the Army's role in this activity in relation to the other services as well as to the CIA:

> To me, it is basically sound that the military (the Army, since this field falls within ground operations) has the inherent responsibility *in peace* to prepare and plan for the conduct of special forces operations and in time of war to organize and conduct special forces operations. Further, I feel that it is unsound, dangerous, and unworkable to delegate these responsibilities to a civil agency.[33]

Volckmann's analysis is important because it contains most of the major elements of controversy attendant to the creation of the Army's unconventional warfare capability. It also provides insight into the philosophy of the man who, probably more than any officer in General McClure's employ, shaped the creation of Special Forces.

Certainly, Volckmann's reservations about the CIA's role vis-a-vis the military services—and particularly the Army—was a major theme during these early years of OCPW's existence, as was his view that among the services the Army should have the predominant responsibility in this relatively new field. (The Air Force, in particular, disagreed with this contention.) His attempt to avoid terms like "irregular" or "unconventional" warfare indicated an early recognition of the need to allay the suspicions

of conventional military men (although the term "unconventional warfare" remains in use to this day). And his advocacy of a "Special Forces Command" and training center was to come to fruition the following year but not at Fort Benning, and not in the form that he intended. While Volckmann clearly advocated the use of indigenous personnel in guerrilla warfare, he apparently intended that a Ranger unit would support and direct these personnel and not the OSS-type of Special Forces organization that he ultimately played such an instrumental role in creating. His use of the words "special forces operations," then, was synonymous with OCPW's understanding of "special operations;" that is, all types of behind-the-lines activities conducted for a military purpose, not just guerrilla warfare.[34] Later he would be more specific in differentiating between Ranger and Commando missions and those involving the organization and support of indigenous personnel in guerrilla warfare.

Another interesting aspect of Volckmann's memorandum was the bureaucratic tactic used to bring it to the attention of decisionmakers. After Volckmann returned from the Fort Benning conference, his memorandum was sent to the Chief of Staff, General Collins, with a request that "the interpretation that has been placed on these statements of General Collins be confirmed or commented on in order that appropriate action may be initiated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, to initiate the directives necessary to accomplish the desires of the Chief of Staff."[35] This proved the impetus for a series of foundational studies by OCPW, including the first one, "Army Responsibilities in Respect to Special (Forces) Operations," written principally by Volckmann and later approved by the Chief of Staff, a classic illustration of the manner in which one achieves "visibility" for a pet project in the Pentagon bureaucracy.[36]

By the end of May, the thinking in G-3 and OCPW had begun to crystallize concerning the utilization of the Eastern European recruits who would be brought into the Army via the Lodge bill. Standards of selection were established, and a goal of 800 set for persons who would volunteer for airborne training and who also possessed specialties related to the conduct of guerrilla warfare. The mission of these aliens would be to organize guerrilla bands in Eastern Europe after war began and attack the Soviet lines of communication, their purpose being to slow, or "retard," the Soviet advance into Western Europe. Plans were under development to train these personnel in increments of 100 in a cycle that included basic combat training, completion of the Ranger course at Fort Benning, and then further specialized instruction in guerrilla warfare, sabotage, clandestine communications, and related subjects.[37]

At the end of this training cycle, the aliens were to be sent to the European theater command. It was here that the planning was less precise. One alternative was the formation of additional "(Special Forces) Ranger Companies" to which could be assigned those Americans and Eastern European aliens trained for behind-the-lines operations, and which would be available to the theater command for commitment on D-day. Another alternative was to move the aliens to Europe for organization into provisional units, so as to be available for such operations upon the outbreak of hostilities.[38] These options evidence McClure's initial ruminations on the subject, but it was clear that nothing definite had been settled.

Approximately a month later, OCPW's thinking on the Lodge bill recruits began to show more specificity. The formation of a "Special Forces Regiment" of 3 battalions, a total of 2,481 personnel, was proposed. Approximately 1,300 of the 2,097 enlisted personnel would be Lodge bill recruits. The force could be trained and deployed to Europe in company-size increments to implement the unconventional warfare section of current war plans and "exploit the estimated 370,000 man potential within the U.S.S.R. and its satellites."[39] That last statement is particularly prophetic because, as we shall see, the subject of resistance potential in Europe was to become a point of contention between the Army and the CIA. Also noteworthy during this period were discussions by OCPW that included the idea that approximately 4,415 personnel organized into appropriate "operational groups" (an OSS term) would be needed in peacetime for commitment in the event of war. The object of this peacetime commitment would be to avoid the mistakes made during World War II: "We must not scatter arms, ammunition and supplies like so much grass seed and hope that they will fall on fertile soil and in turn prove of some assistance to our aims." To direct the forces in Europe, a "Theater Special Forces Training Command" in the United States was proposed, and the basic frame of reference was the Special Forces Ranger unit.[40]

This frame of reference took on a different perspective when the Commander in Chief, Far East Command, deactivated his Ranger companies in July 1951. The Rangers had been reactivated during the Korean conflict as separate companies and attached to infantry divisions. The 8213th Army Unit, known informally as the 8th Ranger Company, was the first to be created. It was formed at Camp Drake, Japan, in August 1950, with volunteers from US forces in the Far East. It was attached to the 25th Infantry Division, took part in the drive to the Yalu, and was deactivated in March 1951. Between September 1950 and September 1951, the Ranger Command at Fort Benning formed and trained 14 Airborne Ranger com-

panies. The 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 8th Companies were assigned to divisions throughout the 8th Army in Korea and were used primarily to perform long-range patrols for specialized missions and to spearhead attacks. The 2d and 4th were also attached to the 187th Regimental Combat Team for the combat jump at Munson-ni. After suffering more than 50-percent casualties, the Ranger companies were inactivated and the remaining personnel assigned throughout the divisions.[41]

At the time of CINCFE's action, the Commander in Chief, Europe (CINCEUR), indicated that he saw no need for Ranger companies in Europe, although he believed that there might be a need for Ranger units of battalion size under certain circumstances. One of CINCEUR's primary reasons for that position was the feeling that "Rangers, as a whole, drain first class soldiers from infantry organizations," a common complaint leveled against elite units, and one that Special Forces would have to contend with.[42] More pertinent to the advocates of "Special Forces Operations," however, were the views of both CINCFE and CINCEUR that the Rangers were not capable of conducting guerrilla warfare missions in their theaters because of racial and language barriers. Instead, they believed, such missions should be conducted by indigenous personnel who were in turn trained, supplied, and controlled by American military personnel.[43]

Voicing a related concern, Army, Field Forces (AFF)—commenting on OCPW's staff study, "Special Forces Ranger Units"— forwarded the view that any reference to Rangers should be deleted because "envisioned Special Forces will in all probability be involved in subversive activities." AFF believed that the concept of Special Forces should focus on the use of indigenous guerrilla groups behind enemy lines rather than American-staffed Ranger units; therefore, Rangers and Special Forces should be kept as separate and distinct organizations.[44]

The result of all this was a meeting on 23 August 1951, presided over by the G-3, General Taylor, from which came a decision to deactivate all Ranger units and convert the Ranger Training Command into a Department of the Infantry School. This department would conduct Ranger training for selected officers and enlisted men who on completion of the course would return to their parent units (a pattern that has continued until the present day). During the meeting the question arose concerning what agency would be capable of conducting "deep penetration activities," at which point, according to Colonel Aaron Bank's memorandum, "General Taylor was thoroughly briefed on the mission and capabilities of a Special Forces organization."[45]

This was perhaps the perfect illustration of the adage, "being at the right place at the right time," because the personnel spaces needed to create the 10th Special Forces Group ultimately became available as a result of the deactivation of the Ranger units. Henceforth there was to be little use of "Ranger" terminology by OCPW in its efforts to sell the concept of Special Forces or in its proposals for the organization to carry out guerrilla warfare. Its initial draft Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) for the "Special Forces Group," for example, presented as the group's mission the following: "To infiltrate its component *operational groups* [emphasis added] to designated areas within the enemy's sphere of influence and organize the indigenous guerrilla potential on a military basis for tactical and strategic exploitation in conjunction with our land, sea, and air forces."[46] The organization and functions of the group and its subordinate operational elements clearly depicted the influence of OSS concepts—particularly the Operational Group command—rather than those of the Rangers.

Ironically, a year later OCPW found it necessary to point out to Army Field Forces that use of the subordinate units of the Special Forces Group on independent Commando- or Ranger-like missions, "while a capability," was "to be discouraged as being highly wasteful of the highly developed skills wrapped up in the operational teams."[47] This was in the fall of 1952, when the 10th Special Forces Group was recruiting and training at Fort Bragg for deployment to Europe.

But Army Field Forces was not the only command in late 1952 whose ideas on the use of Special Forces elements differed from those of OCPW. In his preliminary planning for the utilization of the 10th Special Forces Group, Brigadier General Willard K. Liebel of the European Command envisaged the D-day employment of small groups to strike at close-in targets within a 50-mile zone immediately in front of US tactical divisions. McClure objected strenuously on this question of "basic Special Forces doctrine," telling Liebel that such an activity was a Ranger- or Commando-like action, normally of short duration, that did not require highly trained Special Forces personnel, and that this "was not in consonance with the concept underlying the creation of the 10th Special Forces Group." That concept was clear, thought McClure: "We continue to maintain that Special Forces Operational Detachments have the mission and capability of developing indigenous guerrilla forces, conducting operations behind the enemy lines, and of sustaining these operations for an indefinitely long time." To buttress his case, McClure told Liebel that "the Chief of Staff has insisted that Special Forces shall not duplicate the

training and doctrine of ranger and commando units."[48] This was the same Chief of Staff, General Collins, who in April 1951 stated that he had "personally established the Rangers with the thought that they might serve as the nucleus for expansion in this direction [to initiate subversive activities]."

This apparent turnabout in the Chief of Staff's philosophy illustrates the confusion and difficulties that often accompany the emergence of a new concept within the military bureaucracy, particularly if that concept involves the creation of an "elite" unit. One of the principal requirements for "eliteness" is the possession of a specialized function, one that does not fall within the province of other military organizations. It is difficult to justify the existence of elite units if there appears to be unnecessary overlapping or redundancy of their functions and capabilities with those of other units. This is particularly so during periods of acute manpower shortages. In order to survive, the definition of an elite unit's special mission (and the acceptance of that mission by the bureaucracy) is a crucially important task.[49]

McClure and his staff came to recognize this necessity. With the deactivation of the Rangers, OCPW expended more and more effort to specify guerrilla warfare as the primary mission of the Special Forces organization that they proposed. Part of the confusion that marked this effort was of their own making, however. Their concept of "Special Forces Operations," for instance, was in actuality an all-encompassing heading under which were grouped the many kinds of operations—of which guerrilla warfare was one—whose only common denominator was that they were conducted within or behind enemy lines. One would have thought, obviously, that a Special Forces unit should conduct "Special Forces Operations" that included, by OCPW's definition, Ranger and Commando activities. But as time went on, the architects of Special Forces found it necessary to point out the error, as they saw it, of linking the Special Forces group and its component unit missions with the term "Special Forces Operations," on the assumption that the Special Forces Group was a TO&E unit designed to conduct all such operations. Needless to say, this rather subtle distinction was lost on many. This blurring of roles and missions was not aided, either, by OCPW's initial moves to graft the guerrilla warfare concept onto the Ranger organization, followed by its rather vigorous efforts to dissociate Special Forces from the Rangers.

Eventually, OCPW did answer General Taylor's initial directive to develop the Army responsibility for guerrilla warfare and then to assign

that responsibility to subordinate Army units. The unit that evolved at Fort Bragg in 1952 was the Special Forces Group and its organization was based on OSS concepts, not Ranger. Perhaps Volckmann and his colleagues had OSS organizational principles clearly in mind from the beginning but found it more opportune to gain initial acceptance for their ideas by tagging them onto the Rangers, whose history in the Army was known—particularly since the Chief of Staff initially seemed to favor using the Rangers in a guerrilla warfare role. Or perhaps it was simply that the officers involved were grappling with new ideas and experimenting with the organizational machinery to implement those ideas. In all probability, the answer is that a combination of the two motives was at work during this conceptual period, and the deactivation of the Rangers helped to clarify the situation.

The Road to Fort Bragg

Concurrent with the deactivation of the Rangers, General McClure began to take an interest in establishing a training facility for both psychological warfare and unconventional warfare. To be sure, Colonel Volckmann had campaigned since April for a training command or center that would fully develop the doctrine, techniques, and logistics of special forces operations. And there had been some discussion between the G–3 Division and Army Field Forces in early 1950, before the creation of OCPW, about the need for a "school center" for psychological warfare. That discussion had resulted in establishment of the Psychological Warfare Department at Fort Riley, just then producing its first graduates. But now McClure began to entertain the idea of centralizing the functions of "the whole field of OCPW" at a post other than Fort Riley.[50]

McClure and Colonel Bank visited Army Field Forces in mid-August to outline the Army's responsibilities for unconventional warfare and to stress the lack of organization, training, and planning in that field as compared with the progress made in psychological warfare. The possibility was raised of establishing a "Guerrilla Training Command" at Fort Benning or perhaps Fort Campbell and moving the Psychological Warfare Department from Fort Riley to this new center.[51] Thus began the search for a training center, a search that would end with the selection of Fort Bragg.

It was not an easy journey. First, there was the matter of the CIA. As we have seen, the Army basically welcomed the emergence of CIA/OPC during the interwar years, and in 1949 agreed to provide it unilateral assistance in the field of guerrilla warfare, which included help in setting

up a training course at Fort Benning. After the outbreak of war in Korea, the Army also provided some personnel to the CIA for its activities in that theater.

But then General McClure and his OCPW appeared on the scene. By the spring of 1951, McClure had already expressed his reservations about the relatively autonomous role of OPC in Korea. In subsequent months, the frustration of his unsuccessful attempts to influence the situation in Korea, plus his battle to bring Special Forces into being and plan for its use in Europe, transformed McClure's reservations into outright suspicions about the CIA's motives.

The CIA reciprocated those suspicions. For example, in mid-1951, both CIA/OPC and OCPW entered into a series of conferences to determine means of further collaboration in guerrilla warfare training programs. Even though the study that resulted indicated that the CIA would benefit by sending some of its personnel to the center being proposed by OCPW, the forwarding memorandum sent General McClure stated that "Mr. Wisner [head of OPC] would like it to be clearly understood that this understanding is reached on the assumption that the Army is creating a Special Forces Training Command for its own purposes and not at the request of CIA."[52] The caveat expressed by Frank Wisner was obvious: The CIA was not going to place itself in the position of giving the Army an excuse to justify the creation of its own unconventional warfare capability. Perhaps it was inevitable that two strong-willed men like Wisner and McClure, both eyeing the same "turf" in a relatively new field, would come into conflict in attempting to establish the boundaries within which each would operate.

Not that there were no attempts to define those boundaries and to cooperate with each other. There were. Both men entered into an initial, tentative agreement in July 1951 concerning their understanding of the respective roles of CIA/OPC and OCPW in the field of unconventional warfare. The aforementioned conferences on training programs followed, and in April 1952 the two agencies agreed to an official liaison arrangement to coordinate materiel research activities.[53]

There is also evidence that despite his early reservations about OPC's activities in Korea, McClure took a considerably more broadminded view of the CIA's role in unconventional warfare than did certain members of his staff. After returning from a visit to Europe in August and September

1952, where he had discussed unconventional warfare planning for that theater, McClure chided his staff:

> Putnam [a JCS officer] and I talked at length reference the philosophies I expressed—as I have repeated over and over with you people. Putnam says they are not being reflected by you people at the JSPD level. I believe the Army should be the Executive Agent for guerrilla activities. I am not going to fight with CIA as to their responsibilities in those fields.
>
> Another is the fact that I am fully in accord with supporting the CIA in their peacetime activities in getting ready for war to the maximum extent I can and in wartime will welcome any of their resources to the maximum of their capability.[54]

This was the pragmatic McClure of World War II who, as Chief, PWD/SHAEF, had brought together a number of disparate agencies and nationality groups, civilian as well as military, in order to get the job done. He had learned well from that master of compromise and cooperation, Dwight D. Eisenhower. But as the months and years went by, McClure became less tolerant, gradually adopting in his condemnation of the CIA the phrases of the most virulent critics on his staff. At the end of his tenure as Chief, OCPW, the subject preoccupied him.

What caused this turnabout? Perhaps the most succinct explanation of McClure's change of attitude is found in one of the last letters he wrote before leaving OCPW in early 1953. Writing to his old friend General Bolte, then Commander in Chief, Europe, McClure explained:

> Unfortunately I will not go through Germany on my way to Iran else I would take the opportunity to bring you up to date on the Army/CIA relationship. I feel that the latest paper on command relationship has so much fine print in it that we have committed ourselves to the creation of a fourth service which will effectively tie the hands of the military and require the Theater Commander to lean on and support CIA for all Unconventional Warfare. In recent conferences at CIA, I have heard the statement made repeatedly that, "Since we are now a fourth service many of the activities for which the Army was planning should be transferred to CIA, including the command of military forces designed for guerrilla warfare in time of war." Needless to say I am very unhappy about it both because I question the ability of CIA and second, because I have never believed the Joint Chiefs intended to abrogate their responsibilities for the active command of military operations in time of war.[55]

Here, then, were McClure's key grievances. Aside from the perennial question during these early years of the precise delineation of peacetime and wartime responsibilities for unconventional warfare between the CIA and the Department of Defense, McClure had simply come to believe that the CIA was not capable of holding up its end of the bargain, however it was defined. Imbued with the urgency of preparing the Nation and the Army for a possible war in Europe, McClure was dissatisfied with the CIA's apparent lack of progress in preparation for guerrilla warfare. He reported to the Chief of Staff in early September 1951 that the "CIA has only now initiated planning for the execution of preparatory measures to aid in the retardation of a Soviet advance."[56] He believed, therefore, that the military—and particularly the Army—needed to have unconventional warfare forces in being, and that necessary planning, organization, and training had to be carried out before D-day. In his view, the military services could not leave these preparations to chance or in the hands of a civilian agency. Nor should the JCS allow a situation to develop where the theater commander in an active theater of war lacked full control over all military operations in his area of responsibility, as had happened in Korea, McClure believed.

Underlying McClure's doubts about the CIA's capability to perform the unconventional warfare mission, however, was a difference of philosophy between OCPW and the CIA concerning the nature of resistance potential in Europe. The CIA position on this subject was perhaps most eloquently stated by its Director, General Walter B. Smith, in a letter written to the Army G-2 in March 1952. Smith opened his letter by referring to McClure as follows:

> At certain times in the past we have been importuned by General McClure's people to provide them with detailed information concerning guerrilla groups of which we may have some knowledge. We have consistently declined to furnish this information to General McClure because the information requested impinges directly upon secret operations in which we are currently engaged and for which, at this time, we are solely responsible.[57]

Here was a real source of irritation. The CIA, understandably, was reluctant to share information about its operations that could compromise important intelligence assets and perhaps undermine by premature disclosure the very resistance potential that would be counted upon in wartime. McClure's office—also understandably—was frustrated by its inability to receive the information it believed necessary for proper prewar planning, and the extreme secrecy involved only heightened OCPW's suspicions

about the CIA's lack of preparedness. It was to be a persistent topic of discord between the two agencies.

In his March letter to the Army G-2, the Director of the CIA also questioned "the validity of General McClure's proposal for retardation by guerrilla forces." Expressing both the views of his agency and those of "the leading British experts in this field," Smith explained:

> It is highly doubtful that general resistance forces will develop any substantial offensive capability until at least D plus six months. Enemy controls and reprisals will be extremely severe upon the outbreak of war. Certain underground organizations have even indicated that they will hesitate to go into action until the Allied battle line is stabilized on the continent and the tide is turning our way.

After enlarging upon this theme for several paragraphs, Smith then summarized his position:

> For the reasons outlined above, any program which contemplates that large scale resistance organizations, developed prior to D-day and held in readiness for an indefinite period of time would be willing and capable to deliver major offensive blows within the first few weeks after the commencement of hostilities is considered by us to be unrealistic and infeasible.[58]

McClure had, of course, considered the pros and cons of what he termed the "two different schools of thought on the timing of the commitment of unconventional forces." One school held that the first few days of a Soviet attack were critical, and that even a few hours of delay produced by unconventional warfare forces would be significant. The other school (the "British view") held that guerrilla forces should not dissipate their efforts prematurely and thus did not favor any uprising until regular Allied military forces were in a position to support them. McClure presented his own analysis to the Chief of Staff September 1951:

> To accept the latter view would mean nothing would happen on D-day and not until we were in a position to start liberating over-run countries. To accept the former view would mean attrition might completely dissolve that work and organization which has been created. My personal view is that even with the attrition we have more to gain than to lose, and that if the British can organize after D-day for a future use, such guerrilla forces as desired, obviously we could reorganize in those areas where attrition had taken its toll.[59]

In addition to disagreeing with OCPW about how the resistance should be generated and when it should be committed, the CIA also took exception with OCPW's estimates of resistance potential in Eastern Europe; it called the projected indigenous strength estimates in OCPW's Special Forces Operations Plan for Europe "unrealistic and unattainable." These and other views advanced by the CIA apparently formed the basis for initial JCS disapproval of the plan in late 1952.[60]

These were fundamental differences. McClure's deepest concern, however, was best illustrated by the remark in his letter to Bolte about CIA ambitions to become a "fourth service." He was genuinely apprehensive of allowing too much latitude to the CIA because it could lead to an undue reliance by the military on CIA/OPC for unconventional warfare activities. If that happened, he feared that unconventional warfare might "become regarded among military commanders and planners as a limited, special 'cloak and dagger' function rather than as a basically important, possibly essential military responsibility."[61]

Here again is a reminder of the problem with image as perceived by McClure and his staff—the constant battle to achieve legitimacy for unconventional warfare among "conventional" military officers. If too much responsibility for unconventional warfare was passed to the CIA, it could reinforce the reservations that many officers already harbored concerning the Army's role in unconventional warfare. In a period of budgetary and manpower shortages, such reservations could quickly lead to the conclusion that the Army could not and should not attempt to duplicate the functions of a civilian agency. In short, McClure's primary concern, while well intentioned, was bureaucratic in nature and aimed at the establishment and preservation of an unconventional warfare capability for the Army.

Another threat to McClure's attempts to establish a strong Army role in unconventional warfare was the opposition of the Air Force. We have already seen that he was critical of the Air Force support of Army psychological warfare activities in Korea and was concerned about what he considered the unnecessary duplication of propaganda equipment and personnel in their Aerial Resupply and Communication (ARC) wings. By their support of CIA operations in Korea, these same wings also gave the Air Force claim to a leading role in unconventional warfare. The Air Force list of wartime missions for these ARC wings included introduction and evacuation of agents behind enemy lines, aerial resupply of guerrillas, support of commando-type operations and isolated Army units, printing and packaging of leaflets, and providing trained personnel capable of conducting psychological warfare through other media. In short, the Air Force

claimed the ARC wings gave them the capability to support CIA activities during peacetime or wartime, to conduct overt psychological warfare, and to direct, coordinate, and support unconventional warfare operations.[62]

This close peacetime association with the CIA caused the Air Force, in the eyes of OCPW, to champion CIA/OPC as the agency responsible for planning and preparing the conduct of unconventional warfare, thus taking issue with the concept that the Army had a major responsibility and principal function in this field as part of land warfare. Similarly, the Air Force used this association with CIA/OPC, thought OCPW, to seek a unilateral, preeminent position among the military services for control and direction of wartime unconventional warfare activities.[63]

As one might have expected, General McClure disagreed with the contentions of the Air Force. In his view, the Air Force was essentially a "supply agency" for unconventional warfare activities, "with transportation capable of doing certain things that the Ground Forces are going to require and going to command." He favored Air Force development of special wings to support psychological and unconventional warfare activities, but not to duplicate the Army's capabilities, and certainly not to be used as a license to claim a dominant role in those fields.[64] McClure was particularly disturbed by the lack of joint unconventional warfare planning that he found when he visited Europe in the fall of 1951, and told the Chief of Staff that the Air Force not only disagreed with the Army view on retardation but also "felt they had a major responsibility in the field of unconventional warfare which did not exclude the actual command of guerrillas." Because of the unilateral efforts of the services and what he saw as unnecessary duplication and confusion among them and in their relationship with the CIA, McClure believed that one service should be designated as the executive agency for guerrilla warfare, and that service, of course, should be the Army.[65]

Valuable support for McClure's view of a dominant role for the Army in unconventional warfare came from General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. During another visit to Europe in November 1951, McClure briefed Eisenhower on the command and coordination difficulties that had arisen with respect to unconventional warfare planning for Europe. Eisenhower was "keenly alert" to the potential that unconventional warfare offered, stated McClure in his trip report to the Chief of Staff, and gave McClure permission to quote him on the following views:

> One Service must not only have a paramount interest in this field but also be the controlling authority.

> In my opinion this field is an Army one and . . . in my theater it will be.
>
> All facilities must be put under the Army. The Navy and Air Force will have to support the Army. Air support is essential but in this field the Air Force is only a transport outfit.[66]

Eisenhower went on to speak strongly against extravagance resulting from duplication or individual service jealousies. It was a strong endorsement of McClure's views, but the interservice rivalry in unconventional warfare continued, particularly with respect to planning and command responsibilities in Europe. OCPW eventually did obtain recognition for the Army as having primary responsibility among the services for this new field.[67] But the conflict between the Air Force and Army that marked this process—along with the conflict between the Army and the CIA—was a key feature in the backdrop of McClure's efforts to create Special Forces and establish the Psychological Warfare Center.

In addition to the interagency and interservice rivalry that OCPW had to contend with, there was the not inconsiderable challenge of selling the Army on the concept of Special Forces and the idea of a centralized training command for both psychological and unconventional warfare. In June 1951 General Collins, the Chief of Staff, approved the conclusions of Volckmann's initial study "Army Responsibilities for Special Forces Operations" and forwarded it to the JCS, indicating that until the JCS delineated service responsibilities for unconventional warfare, the Army would use this study as a basis for planning.[68] Although an important first step, this general endorsement by Collins to proceed with investigation and planning on the subject did not provide OCPW with the specific authorization needed.

That came only after the initial discussion by McClure and Colonel Bank with Army Field Forces in August 1951; in mid-September the G-3 concurred with the recommendation of the Army Field Forces that a training center should be established for psychological warfare and special operations. Indicating to OCPW that this center should be established "on an austere basis," the G-3 also directed action "to establish the extent to which the resources of the Army are to be allocated to Special (Forces) Operations." But the following caution was pointedly added:

> In view of the acute manpower situation and the known reluctance of overseas commanders to accept special units within their troop ceiling, in preference to established units, the basic policy in regard to Special

> (Forces) Operations should be the maximum utilization of indigenous personnel for such operations and the minimum use of American personnel.[69]

Following on the heels of the deactivation of the Ranger units, this statement clearly indicates the wariness with which conventional commanders and staffs regarded "elite" and "special" units, particularly during periods of budgetary and manpower shortages.

The opening, albeit narrow, provided by G-3, allowed OCPW to act. A cascade of actions poured from McClure's staff: representatives met with the staff of Army Field Forces to develop an agreed Table of Distribution for a Psychological Warfare Center; Tables of Organization and Equipment for the units of a Special Forces Group (no longer called a Special Forces Ranger Regiment) were developed for staffing; a proposed training circular describing the mission, capabilities, organization, concept of employment, and training of a Special Forces Group was written; a requirement for 3,700 personnel spaces, including 300 spaces for the proposed training center, was submitted; a proposed directive to the Chief of Army Field Forces outlining his responsibilities in psychological warfare and Special Forces Operations, as well as a suggested Army Field Forces training program for these areas, was prepared; and Fort Campbell, Kentucky, was recommended as the site for the new center, with a suggested activation date of 1 December 1951. These actions were reported to G-3 on 5 October, scarcely 3 weeks after OCPW had received the go-ahead from them.[70] McClure wanted to move fast.

Army Field Forces had recommended that the proposed training center be established at either Fort Campbell or Camp Pickett, Virginia. OCPW favored Fort Campbell because it had airborne and parachute maintenance facilities, but recommended to G-3 that a final decision on the location be withheld until a survey of installations was conducted.[71] In the end, though, the personnel spaces requested for Special Forces and the center, the target date for activation, and the tentative location all proved inaccurate. But McClure was making rapid progress toward his goal.

Both McClure and his chief architect for Special Forces, Volckmann, were aware of the suspicions engendered among many officers by these efforts to introduce into the Army new ideas and a new organization to carry out those ideas. Both men took steps to dispel those suspicions. In a paper written in late October 1951, Volckmann analyzed the problem this way:

> The question of assets, capabilities and support that must be diverted to behind-the-lines operations brings us to a final major problem. So many strictly conventional military minds "flash-red" at the mention of anything "special" or at the diversion of personnel and equipment to any channel other than conventional regular forces. In a way, they are justified in safeguarding the diversion of personnel, equipment and support that will in any way tend to weaken the capabilities of our regular forces. For the most part, however, their fears are without foundation. If they will but take time to view the problem of any future war as a whole, their initial reactions should be modified and their fears dispelled.[72]

Volckmann believed that World War II behind-the-lines operations had fallen far short of their potential. He blamed this on the failure by the military to regard these activities as an integral part of conventional warfare. Proper emphasis, in other words, had been lacking at both staff and operating levels. The result, in his view, was guerrilla warfare conducted as a "sideshow" on a "shoestring," uncoordinated with the operations of conventional forces. To prevent this from happening again, and to convince military men of the importance of behind-the-lines operations in modern warfare, he advocated general indoctrination on the subject in service schools and specialized training in appropriate centers, such as the one for "special forces operations" that he had advocated 6 months earlier.[73]

Similarily, in a briefing prepared for the Secretary of Defense in early November 1951, General McClure voiced his concerns about the adverse image that unconventional warfare had among some military men:

> I have been told that the dynamic manner in which my office developed led to apprehension on the part of some that the Army was seeking to enter fields not properly a part of ground warfare. This is furthest from our intent. We have sought and will continue to seek to prepare ourselves and the Army to discharge those responsibilities which are proper and appropriate Army functions. . . . This broad field of unconventional warfare must be planned and conducted on a Joint and National basis. No one Service can "go it alone."[74]

While he was proud of what his office had accomplished, McClure told those present at this briefing that he was also "deeply apprehensive over the future." Typifying the cold war fears that imbued so many senior officers with a sense of urgency, he stated that "none of us in this room today knows how much time we will have" because "we face an enemy who is prepared to take the field tomorrow morning." His summation: "In Psychological

Operations we are fast approaching a state of readiness," but in Special Operations, "we are years behind."[75]

An ironic footnote concerning the term "special operations" should be mentioned. It was about this time—the fall of 1951—that the Army began to use the term "special forces operations" as opposed to "special operations," the reason being that the latter term was defined through long usage in the Army and as set forth in Field Manual 100-5 as relating to such activities as "night combat," "jungle operations," and "joint amphibious operations." OCPW argued that to adopt some other term for those operations "would only lead to confusion or result in costly expenditure of funds . . . to modify existing literature and doctrine already published."[76] Later, the term "special forces operations" itself would be dropped by the Army, and replaced by "unconventional warfare" (which encompassed guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion and sabotage) as the primary mission for Special Forces units. The irony is that during the 1970's, Special Forces would again adopt a version of "special operations" (with the official definition still relatively unchanged in JCS and Army literature) as one of their primary missions, a move that contributed to the perception that they were duplicating functions and capabilities of Ranger units.[77]

A few days after McClure's briefing for the Secretary of Defense, a discussion took place during McClure's weekly staff meeting on the forthcoming survey of Army posts to select a site for the Psychological Warfare Center. Of the posts to be visited—Fort Benning, Fort Campbell, and Fort Bragg—McClure had a definite preference. He stated to Colonel Bank: "Make it Bragg if you can."[78]

And Fort Bragg it was, but not without difficulty. The surveys conducted in November by representatives of OCPW, Army Field Forces, and the 3rd Army, revealed some resistance to that site. The Infantry Center at Fort Benning did not want to allocate space and facilities to any activity not directly related to its mission, an ironic position in view of the direct support being provided to infantry divisions in Korea by psychological warfare teams; and there were other objections as well. The 3rd Army opposed establishing the center at Fort Bragg on the grounds that other conventional combat units scheduled for activation there would have to be organized at a less desirable post. They suggested Camp Rucker, Alabama, as an alternative, but that site offered little for airborne and amphibious training and had no housing for dependents—a potential morale problem. Of the sites considered, the representatives from OCPW and Army Field

Forces clearly favored Fort Bragg: the necessary personnel spaces could be accommodated; buildings, with some modification, were available; and it offered superior training advantages and facilities for both psychological warfare and Special Forces units.[79] But first the impasse had to be broken.

This was accomplished by Colonel Glavin, the Army Field Forces representative recently transferred from OCPW, who arranged a conference between General Leonard, General Bradford, and General Hodge in an attempt to break the deadlock. Colonel Fertig, Chief of OCPW's Special Operations Division, urged McClure to personally brief General Hodge on the desirability of Fort Bragg, which he apparently did because on 4 December Glavin obtained approval for the North Carolina post.[80]

Still to be obtained were the exact facilities needed at Fort Bragg, so another survey trip was planned for this purpose. General McClure's guidance was clear: "I want these requirements to be modest. We have to go on a very austere basis at first."[81] He was very aware of the precarious position of these new ideas during a period of budget cutting and did not want to jeopardize their chances of survival by appearing to be too greedy in his demands.

The minutes of the OCPW staff meeting for October-December 1951 also depict continuing efforts to identify personnel on active duty with experience in behind-the-lines activities. OCPW requested the Adjutant General to prepare a roster of officers with OSS, Commando, Ranger, and guerrilla backgrounds, and sent an officer to visit General Donovan, then practicing law in New York, to examine his personal files in an attempt to obtain a list of Army officers who had served in OSS. This last effort resulted in a roster of 3,900 names, which were then screened to identify those still on active duty.[82] Certainly this is still another indicator of the pervasive influence OSS had on the thinking of the architects of Special Forces during this crucial formative period.

The survey team that returned to Fort Bragg to select the exact location decided upon an area known as Smoke Bomb Hill. Its buildings, left over from World War II mobilization, were suitable for barracks, mess halls, administration halls, classrooms, and a library. Estimated cost for rehabilitation of the facilities was $151,000, an exceedingly modest sum. Even this minimal estimate, however, caused some agitation; the 3rd Army representative stated unofficially that his headquarters had no funds available; thus Army Field Forces would have to allocate the necessary monies in order to get the project under way. Despite this minor maneuvering

between headquarters to fix fiscal responsibilities, Lieutenant Colonel Melvin Blair from OCPW reported to McClure that "in general, the area is exactly what we wanted."[83] At the end of 1951, only two major tasks remained—to obtain the necessary personnel spaces for activation of both the center and Special Forces, and to get the Chief of Staff's blessing for the whole project.

General McClure personally involved himself in these tasks. After a busy January—during which he made a major presentation before the Psychological Strategy Board on the Army's activity in psychological warfare and guerrilla warfare, pursued the question of funds for his proposed center, and investigated a security breach concerning the activation of Special Forces[84]—he continued the campaign to bring his goals to fruition. In an early February 1952 memorandum to the G-3, McClure urged that the activation of new psychological warfare and Special Forces units "be expedited by every feasible method." His rationale was convincing: no Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group existed in the United States to function as school troops, to train replacement personnel for similar units in Europe and the Far East, or to meet emergency requirements; and units of the proposed "Special Forces Group (Guerrilla Warfare)" were needed for planned D-day actions in Europe. Clearly establishing that, in his view, the activation of psychological warfare and Special Forces units was closely intertwined with the concurrent action to approve and authorize spaces for the Psychological Warfare Center, McClure also asked that the latter project be expedited. Recognizing the vulnerability of his plans in the hands of budget cutters, McClure made an eloquent plea:

> At times when the Army as a whole is faced with a reduction in the number of authorized spaces, it becomes necessary to determine areas which can absorb "cuts" without unduly impairing overall efficiency. A new activity faced with an across-the-board cut, or with a "cut" made on a fixed percentage basis, can be crippled to the point where its existence is seriously threatened. This is particularly true in the case of Psychological Warfare and Special Operations activities which are already on an austere basis. I recommend that these factors be considered when an Army-wide reduction in space authorization is contemplated.[85]

The G-3's response to this plea was terse. McClure's request for early activation of the psychological warfare and Special Forces units desired would be acted on after the "implications of the reduced FY [fiscal year] 1953 budget have been fully weighed." On a brighter note, the G-3 did

indicate that it was preparing a summary sheet for the Chief of Staff recommending approval of the Psychological Warfare Center.[86]

Sure enough, on 3 March 1952, the promised summary sheet was sent to General Collins. The sheet stated that implementation of the conclusions reached in the study "Army Responsibilities in Respect to Special Forces Operations," previously approved by Collins, required a "Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Center" in peacetime to train individuals and units to support theater Special Forces operations. (Again we see the importance of Volckmann's initial study as the underlying rationale for this concept.) The memorandum also indicated that the proposed center would consolidate psychological warfare and Special Forces training activities at a single installation. Three weeks later, on 27 March 1952, the Chief of Staff gave his approval that such a center be established.[87]

Within 10 days, General McClure proudly provided the details of the Chief of Staff's decision to the JCS. A Psychological Warfare Center would be activated on or about 1 May 1952, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The administrative staff and faculty for Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Departments and a Research and Development Board would total 173 personnel on an austere basis and increase to a full strength of 362 officers and men. The Psychological Warfare School and units at Fort Riley, Kansas, would move to Fort Bragg once the new center was activated. A total of 2,220 spaces had been authorized for activation of Psychological Warfare and Special Forces units for fiscal year 1953–54.

A Special Forces Group would be activated at Fort Bragg in 3 increments of approximately 600 men and officers each, commencing about 1 May 1952.[88] General McClure's dream of centralizing the functions of "the whole field of OCPW" was near reality. The long journey to Fort Bragg was soon to end.

VIII

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CENTER AND THE ORIGINS OF SPECIAL WARFARE

After receiving the Chief of Staff's formal approval in late March 1952, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare moved quickly to get the Psychological Warfare Center on its feet. The formal order establishing the center at Fort Bragg, under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, 3rd Army, was published on 14 April 1952. Copies of the Table of Distribution (TD) for the center were hand-carried by General McClure's staff to 3rd Army, Army Field Forces, and Fort Bragg during the period 16–18 April. The mission of this unprecedented center, as explained by the TD, was:

> To conduct individual training and supervise unit training in Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Operations; to develop and test Psychological Warfare and Special Forces doctrine, procedures, tactics, and techniques; to test and evaluate equipment employed in Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Operations.[1]

Movement of equipment and personnel from Fort Riley to Fort Bragg began by late April, and on 29 May 1952 the Chief of Army Field Forces at Fort Monroe, Virginia, formally announced the activation of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. The same order officially transferred responsibilities for the development and teaching of psychological warfare doctrine from the Army General School at Fort Riley to the newly formed Psychological Warfare Center.[2]

Organization of the Center

As originally established, the Psychological Warfare Center consisted of a provisional Psychological Warfare School, the 6th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, a Psychological Warfare Board, and the 10th Special Forces Group.[3] Colonel Charles N. Karlstad, former Chief of Staff of the Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia, was selected as the first Commander of the center and Commandant of the Psychological Warfare School.[4] In the foreword to an administrative booklet prepared for visitors participating in a psychological warfare seminar during 1952, Colonel Karlstad offered some thoughts on the role of his new command:

> The PsyWar Center represents an effort unique to the military history of the United States. For the first time, the techniques of attacking both the minds and the bodies of our enemies have been coordinated in a single training operation. The Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Departments [of the Psychological Warfare School], closely linked, instruct in the unconventional weapons and tactics with which our modern army must be equipped to function effectively against enemy forces.[5]

(Karlstad's comments are strikingly reminiscent of General Donovan's all-encompassing concept of psychological warfare when he organized the Coordinator of Information 11 years earlier.)

One may wonder why the Psychological Warfare School was initially given a provisional status. The G-3, Department of the Army, disapproved of its activation as a formally designated Army service school on the basis that such a school was not necessary to the accomplishment of the center's mission and that the establishment of a formal school would require additional funds.[6] This must have been particularly perplexing to the personnel at Fort Bragg; even as an element of the Army General School at Fort Riley, the Psychological Warfare Division had been given service school recognition. Formal service schools enjoyed obvious advantages over the informal schools such as those often set up by divisions and regiments. These advantages included increased prestige, funding, and equipment procurement as well as the opportunity to attract quality faculty personnel. The Psychological Warfare Center, in a letter signed by Colonel Karlstad and addressed to the Chief, Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army, made a strong case for reconsideration of the decision, an appeal that received the strong support of General McClure.[7] Apparently the appeal was effective, for on 22 October 1952 Department of the Army General Order No. 92 officially established the Psychological Warfare School as a service school.

The purpose of the Psychological Warfare School was to "prepare selected individuals of the Army to perform those psychological warfare and special forces duties which they may be called upon to perform in war."[8] The school was organized into a small headquarters staff and two instructional divisions: the Psychological Operations Department and the Special Forces Department. In terms of longevity, the senior element in the school was the Psychological Operations Department; it was a direct descendant of the Army General School's Psychological Warfare Division, which had been transferred and integrated into the Psychological Warfare Center in early 1952.[9]

Lieutenant Colonel Otis E. Hays, Jr., who had been Deputy of the Psychological Warfare Division of the Army General School, became the first director of the Psychological Operations Department. The mission of the department was defined as the following: The instruction and training of selected officers in the duties of psychological warfare operations staffs from Department of the Army to field army and corps levels; the instruction and training of selected individuals, officers, and noncommissioned officers as specialists in propaganda operations and as key persons in psychological warfare operational units; and the preparation and revision of extension course training literature, and field manuals on psychological warfare organization, operations, and doctrine.[10] The importance of the Psychological Operations Department's activities certainly was enhanced by the Army's needs in Korea, as evidenced by this statement from the 1 January–30 June 1953 report of the Secretary of Defense:

> The role of psychological warfare as a support weapon in combat was highlighted by improved psychological warfare operations carried on by the Army during the year, stimulating the development of the program at the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. . . . Schools and units have been established there to train officers and enlisted men in all phases of this speciality.[11]

The Secretary's report made no mention of the activities of either the 10th Special Forces Group or its counterpart in the Psychological Warfare School, the Special Forces Department. Nor was there any mention of these two elements—or of the Army's attempts to develop an unconventional warfare capability—in the 1 January–30 June 1952 report of the Secretary, although that report did note the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg "to provide comprehensive courses of instruction in all phases of psychological warfare."[12]

The lack of publicity given to Special Forces was due largely to security considerations. Because the mission of Special Forces was

classified, little reference to its organization and activities initially appeared in press releases concerning the Psychological Warfare Center.[13] The center continued this caution with security in its own publications, much to the consternation of the Special Forces enthusiasts among McClure's staff. They complained that the student handbook published by the Psychological Warfare School was "slanted heavily towards Psychological Warfare to the detriment of Special Forces," and feared the result would be "that the Special Forces student, therefore, will look upon himself as a 'country cousin' to the Psychological Warfare Center." Lieutenant Colonel Melvin Blair, who had been on the road attempting to "sell" Special Forces in a recruitment program, was particularly miffed and recommended that OCPW take action "to revise the handbook along more impartial lines."[14] (In later years—particularly during the 1960's, the heyday of the "Green Berets"—psychological warfare would be considered the "country cousin" at the center, an ironic turnabout in perceptions.) While these complaints may appear trivial, they were evidence of a resentment that went beyond the security restrictions on publicity for Special Forces; some of McClure's staff simply did not believe that unconventional warfare units should be associated with psychological warfare, and certainly not in a subordinate role.

In any event, the junior member of the Psychological Warfare School was the Special Forces Department, which, unlike the Psychological Operations Department, had no predecessor in US Army history. With Colonel Filmore K. Mearns as its first director, the missions of this department were outlined as follows: the conduct of regular Special Forces courses for officers and selected enlisted men; the conduct of Special Forces orientation courses for designated personnel; the preparation and revision of literature and lessons for Special Forces extension courses; and the preparation and revision of training literature, field manuals, circulars, and special texts on Special Forces operations.[15] Essentially, the department concentrated on teaching the fundamentals of unconventional warfare, with emphasis on the conduct of guerrilla operations, to personnel being assigned to Special Forces.

Another unique organization created as part of the center was the Psychological Warfare Board, which was to "test, evaluate, and compile reports on materiel, doctrine, procedure, technique, and tactics pertaining to and for Psychological Warfare and Special Forces."[16] By early 1954, the board had completed over 40 projects, among them the operational facets of psychological warfare transmitter and receiving equipment, loudspeaker equipment, mobile reproduction equipment, and different types of leaflet dissemination techniques such as the use of mortar and artillery shells,

rockets, light liaison planes, and balloons. It appears that in the early days of 1952–53, the Psychological Warfare Board devoted its activities almost exclusively to the support of units like the 6th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group, rather than to Special Forces.[17]

The nucleus of the 6th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group began on 14 September 1951, with the formation of a provisional Psychological Warfare Detachment at Fort Riley. That unit soon achieved status as a permanent organization, and on 2 May 1952 it became the 6th RB&L Group. The Group consisted at that time of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, the 7th Reproduction Company, and the 8th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company. In June 1952, it moved to Fort Bragg to become a part of the Psychological Warfare Center. That month, the 2nd Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company was attached to the 6th RB&L Group, and on 27 May 1953 the 12th Consolidation Company was activated and attached to the Group. As previously mentioned, the RB&L organizational concept was first employed in Korea and the Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company's ancestry could be traced to World War II, when several of these companies were used in the European theater. The 6th RB&L Group was designated as a strategic psychological warfare operational unit, and its primary purpose was to assist the national psychological warfare program during wartime within the theater of operation to which it was assigned. In addition to conducting theater-wide strategic propaganda, a further mission of the 6th RB&L was to support tactical operations.[18]

The 10th Special Forces Group

Even before activation of the 10th Special Forces Group, Lieutenant Colonel Blair and Colonel Volckmann from the Special Operations Division, OCPW, began visiting Army installations and schools throughout the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, the Far East, and Europe to promote interest in the "new concept" of war. Volunteers had to be at least 21 years old, be airborne qualified or willing to become so, and undergo a series of physical and psychological tests. Enlisted men accepted into Special Forces acquired one or more of five basic occupational specialities: operations and intelligence, engineering, weaponry, communications, and medical aid.[19]

The material used by OCPW for orientation and recruitment specifically drew a distinction between Special Forces and Ranger units:

> Ranger units are designed and trained to conduct shallow penetration or infiltration of enemy lines. They can remain in the objective area for a limited time only. Primarily, they execute missions of a harassing and raiding nature against targets close to friendly front lines. Ranger missions are performed solely by US personnel; they do not utilize indigenous personnel in their objectives. Special Forces units have the capability of conducting long-range penetration deep into the objective area in order to organize, train, equip, and control indigenous guerrilla forces.[20]

Indeed, not only did OCPW make a distinction concerning the missions and capabilities of Special Forces and Rangers, but the term "Special Forces operations" itself underwent a metamorphosis. Volckmann's original definition in early 1951 established that Special Forces operations were behind-the-lines activities that could encompass guerrilla warfare, sabotage and subversion, evasion and escape, Ranger- and Commando-like operations, long-range or deep-penetration reconnaissance, and psychological warfare. From January to late September 1952, OCPW recruiting material used the term to embrace the following: organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare; subversion and sabotage; political, economic, and psychological warfare as it pertains to behind-the-lines activities; infiltration and/or organization of agents within the enemy's sphere of influence in support of actual or projected Special Forces operations; Commando-type operations; escape and evasion, as effected through Special Forces operations; and antiguerrilla warfare in areas overrun by friendly forces.[21] Both "Ranger operations" and "long-range or deep penetration reconnaissance" disappeared during this transformation; only "Commando-type operations" remained as a hint of the earlier conceptual confusion. By November 1952, the focus became even more precise, and potential volunteers for this new elite unit were told that Special Forces operations included guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and "other behind-the-lines missions, which are within the capabilities of guerrilla warfare."[22] The lack of reference to Ranger *or* Commando operations is evident; shortly thereafter, General McClure chastened General Liebel for contemplating using the 10th Special Forces Group for those types of activities in Europe.[23] In effect, "Special Forces operations" were now synonymous with "unconventional warfare."

The Special Forces came to life formally on 19 May 1952 with the establishment of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 10th Special Forces Group, constituted and allotted to the Regular Army for activation and organization under the Commanding General, 3rd Army. One hundred and twenty-two officers and men were to perform these activities:

> To furnish command, supply, and organizational maintenance for a Special Forces Group located in rear areas and, when provided with the necessary augmentation in personnel and equipment, for subordinate units committed in the objective area; to furnish administration for a Special Forces Group.[24]

Initially, the Headquarters and Headquarters Company was basically a "paper organization," for when Colonel Aaron Bank left OCPW to join the 10th Group on 19 June 1952 as its first commander, he had a total complement of only 7 enlisted men and 1 warrant officer present for duty.[25]

If Bank expected volunteers to swamp his new unit, he was to be disappointed. By early July he complained that the flow of applications for Special Forces was slow, attributing this to less-than-enthusiastic Army-wide support for the program and to the security classification of Special Forces activities.[26] A month later Colonel Karlstad reported to General McClure that the total assigned enlisted strength of the 10th was 259, of which only 123 were "operational unit" volunteer personnel. The arrival rate of volunteers was, he felt, "wholly unsatisfactory."[27] Another factor inhibiting a rapid buildup was the slow progress in attracting foreign nationals through the Lodge bill. As originally passed, the Lodge bill provided for the enlistment of 2,500 aliens in the US Army. By mid-1951, the Army raised this ceiling to 12,500 but actual recruitment fell far short of expectations. By August 1952, of 5,272 men who had applied for enlistment, only 411 received the necessary security clearances, and of that number only 211 actually enlisted.[28] Concerned, McClure's office reported that "the need to increase Lodge bill enlistments remains a vital problem affecting the accomplishment of missions assigned to OCPW."[29] At the end of November 1952, however, only 22 Lodge bill personnel had been assigned to the 10th Special Forces Group.[30] Despite this disappointing start, by April 1953 the strength of the organization designed to implement a "new concept" had increased to 1,700 officers and enlisted men.[31]

The "new concept" is best illustrated by the training objective proposed for the newly activated 10th Special Forces Group:

> To infiltrate its component operational detachments to designated areas within the enemy's sphere of influence and organize the indigenous guerrilla potential on a quasimilitary or a military basis for tactical and strategic exploitation in conjunction with our land, sea and air forces.[32]

Clearly, Special Forces were designed for unconventional warfare, with emphasis on guerrilla operations. This is significant, because in 1952 little

attention was given to counterguerrilla, or counterinsurgency, operations. That portion of the special warfare concept was to come later, in the late 1950's and early 1960's, initiating a doctrinal battle about the proper function of Special Forces. At this early stage of its history, however, Special Forces served unconventional warfare requirements. The framework for the 10th that resulted was a unique blend of Army organizational traditions and conventions with the prominent ideas and principles of guerrilla warfare.

Essentially, the Special Forces Group represented a pool of trained manpower from which units or combinations of units could be drawn to execute specific unconventional warfare missions. The heart of the original group organization was the Operational Detachment, Regiment, a 15-man unit established along the same lines as the OSS Operational Group. Commanded by a captain, with a first lieutenant as executive officer, the Operational Detachment, Regiment, contained 13 enlisted men and was capable of infiltrating behind enemy lines to organize, train, and direct friendly resistance forces in the conduct of unconventional warfare. Depending on the size and makeup of the guerrilla forces in a specific area, the Operational Detachment, District B (commanded by a major), or the Operational Detachment, District A (commanded by a lieutenant colonel) could also be employed, as could be a combination of three types of teams. In other words, these detachments, called "teams," were to be utilized singly or in various combinations, depending on the size and complexities of the specific guerrilla organization involved. The team, in whatever combination necessary, would come under the direct control of the specified theater command for briefing and infiltration into the objective area, then remain in radio communication with the theater headquarters so that the activities of the guerrilla organization could be directed to support operations of friendly conventional forces most effectively. In short, the Special Forces Group was not designed to be employed as a tactical entity—as, for instance, a conventional division or brigade might be—but rather was constructed around a cellular concept in which each area, district, and regimental detachment was viewed as a separate and distinct operating unit.[33]

Colonel Bank had assumed command of a unique organization in June 1952, one that required special training to fulfill the missions envisaged for Special Forces. Based primarily on the wartime experiences of a few former OSS officers in the unit, the 10th Special Forces Group developed a training program that was entirely new to the Army. Early training stressed the individual skills represented in the basic Operational Detachment, Regiment: operations and intelligence, light and heavy weapons,

demolitions, radio communications, and medical aid. Each man trained thoroughly in his particular specialty, then participated in "cross-training" to learn the rudiments of the other skills represented in the detachment. The communications and medical aid specialists received the longest training courses since they required the most technical skills. Clandestine operations training in activities such as the formation and operation of intelligence, sabotage, escape and evasion, and security also was stressed, since, as Colonel Bank remarked, "these are easily neglected in favor of the more exciting guerrilla tactics."[34] Detachment training at Camp McKall, North Carolina, followed the individual and cross-training phase. Finally, a lengthy group-level maneuver in the Chattahoochee National Forest, Georgia, completed the initial training cycle for this new organization.

And so blossomed Special Forces, the first formal US Army capability for unconventional warfare, co-located with, but yet a junior partner to, psychological warfare at Fort Bragg. Was this marriage between psychological and unconventional warfare one of choice? Apparently not. Colonel Volckmann remembered:

> Those of us who had worked on . se programs were primarily interested in Special Forces and not Psychological Warfare and were very much opposed to have Special Forces associated with and under the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. We felt that there was in general a stigma connected with Psychological Warfare, especially among combat men, that we didn't care to have "rub off" on Special Forces. Behind-the-line operations and the "dirty-tricks game" had enough opposition amongst conventional military minds that had to be overcome without adding the additional problems inherent in Psychological Warfare. However, we lost that battle.[35]

Colonel Bank had similar misgivings. Shortly after taking command of the 10th, he differed with the Psychological Warfare School faculty concerning the "position of Special Forces in relation to psychological warfare." He discovered that the concept being taught in the Psychological Operations course was that Special Forces operations were a part of psychological warfare. Bank objected to this interpretation in an early organizational meeting at the Psychological Warfare Center:

> I don't believe that, as far as Special Forces is concerned, that is correct. All the time that I was on the staff of PSYWAR (OCPW) I never saw any paper of any kind that indicates Special Forces operations is a part of psychological warfare. It is our concept that Special Forces operations is a part of unconventional warfare. Just because OCPW is responsible for the monitoring and supervision of planning

> and conduct of psychological warfare and special forces operations does not mean that they have to be the same.[36]

Interestingly, at about this same time a Reserve officer doing his annual 2 weeks' training at the Department of the Army took issue with the notion of even combining the two fields within the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare. Colonel Oliver Jackson Sands' view was that the kinds of background, education, training, and experience required were inherently different from those necessary for the conduct of special operations; thus "rarely . . . is a person who is suitable for one of these activities qualified for the other." He also argued that the planning, execution, facilities, equipment, and support required for the two operations were "totally different." Because these activities were, in his view, "widely divergent in type and character," he recommended divesting OCPW of the Special Forces function. The latter could then become part of the G-3.[37]

As might have been expected, General McClure did not agree with Sands' analysis, particularly since the special operations function had been moved from G-3 to OCPW at his request. There is evidence, however, that other psychological warfare officers also had misgivings about the Army's organization for psychological and unconventional warfare. Writing in 1954 on tactical psychological warfare during the Korean conflict, Colonel Donald F. Hall expressed this view:

> Many psychological warfare officers experienced in combat propaganda operations have never subscribed to the placement of psychological warfare and special forces under the same controlling staff agencies. Some have felt that a great error was made when the two functions were placed under the same agency at Department of the Army level, and there has been a growing concern about the tendency to combine the two on down through the echelons to the Army in the field.
>
> The doubt as to the justification for this concept has been an honest one although few have had the capacity to question the decision in high places. As a matter of economy in meeting training requirements, most have gone quietly along with the development of the two functions as "twin activities" at the higher levels, and particularly at the center [The Psychological Warfare Center]. But it is difficult to conceive of guerrilla-type operations as true psychological warfare; they seem to be much more closely allied to straight combat operations within the jurisdiction of G-3.[38]

Believing, as did Colonel Sands, that there were few individuals who would have wide experience and capabilities in both psychological and

unconventional warfare, Colonel Hall feared that if the two fields were combined under one head, one of them "may suffer as a result of particular emphasis given to the function in which the controlling personnel are especially interested and experienced."[39] This, of course, was part of the anxiety suffered by Special Forces adherents in 1952; at that time the "controlling personnel," both at OCPW and at the Psychological Warfare Center, were those with psychological warfare backgrounds. (In later years, the situation would be reversed, especially at the center.) From early 1951 on, Volckmann and others in the Special Operations Division had spoken primarily in terms of a Special Forces Training Center, not a Psychological Warfare Center in which Special Forces would be relegated to a subordinate role. But, as Volckmann admitted, "We lost that battle."

Indeed they did. But why? Could it have been because there was an even greater "stigma" attached "by conventional military minds" to unconventional warfare than to psychological warfare? Staff representation for psychological warfare had existed at the Department of the Army and in overseas theaters during World War I, World War II, and Korea. In addition, a definite lineage of formal Army units existed from both the Korean war and World War II, when the Army had staff sections and units designed exclusively for the planning and conduct of psychological warfare. To be sure, as Daniel Lerner has shown in his *Sykewar*, psychological warfare in World War II had its share of "characters" who tended to alienate military professionals.[40] But the major point here is that the Army had staff sections and units designed exclusively for the planning and conduct of psychological warfare, an activity that gradually gained respectability in both World War II and Korea. Such was not the case with Special Forces and unconventional warfare in the Army; unconventional warfare's only real ancestry—and that indirectly—was with the civilian-led OSS in World War II, an organization not held in the highest esteem by many senior military leaders.

Viewed from a historical perspective, it seems clear that Special Forces emerged as an unprecedented entity within the Army under the protective wing of an established, ongoing activity—psychological warfare. General McClure's foresight in organizing a Special Operations Division in the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, and his selection of personnel for that division, gave unconventional warfare advocates like Bank and Volckmann the official platform from which to "sell" the Army on the need for Special Forces units. McClure's rationale for including unconventional warfare with psychological warfare can reasonably be linked to his World War II experience with PWD/SHAEF, his knowledge

of General Donovan's insistence on the close interrelationship of psychological warfare and special operations, and the fact that the other services—as well as the JCS—had the same organizational philosophy in their staffs.[41] Although it is apparent that key officers in the Special Operations Division wanted to dissociate unconventional and psychological warfare, without McClure's stature and backing as a general officer heading a special staff division at Department of the Army Headquarters, it is improbable that Special Forces would have become a reality at the time that it did. Special Forces and unconventional warfare arrived through the back door of the psychological warfare house. While the marriage of psychological and unconventional warfare was probably a union of convenience (as Colonel Volckmann suggested) rather than choice, it was certainly one of necessity for the Special Forces adherents.

Thus was created the Psychological Warfare Center and the 10th Special Forces Group—the origins of special warfare.

IX

SUMMING UP

Our quest to determine the origins of a special warfare capability for the US Army has led us to investigate the pre-1952 roots of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. In doing so, we have traced the modern historical antecedents of American experience with psychological and unconventional warfare. These two elements had a common point of origin with the establishment of the Coordinator of Information (COI) in 1941; indeed, General William J. Donovan's all-encompassing concept of psychological warfare included all the aspects of what the Army was later to call "special warfare" (with the exception of counterinsurgency). With the dissolution of COI in 1942 and the parallel creation of Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and Office of War Information (OWI), psychological and unconventional warfare took separate paths. They did not formally unite in the Army until the formation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) in 1951 and the founding of the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952.

Between 1941 and 1952, psychological warfare developed a formal lineage in the Army traceable through units and schools in World War II, the Korean conflict, the Army General School at Fort Riley, and the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. Additionally, there had been Department of the Army staff representation for psychological warfare during World War I, and, again, almost continuously since 1941. Psychological warfare, in other words, had a tradition in the Army.

It was a civilian—Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy—who pushed the Army into developing a branch at the War Department for the planning and coordination of psychological warfare activities, initially in June 1941 and again in November 1943. McCloy's interest illustrates a theme seen throughout our investigation of the origins of special warfare:

the initiative demonstrated by influential civilian officials to prod somewhat conservative Army leaders into venturing forth in new and uncertain fields.

Certainly Brigadier General Robert A. McClure was an exception to this theme. The civilian-military team that he headed first in North Africa and then later in PWD/SHAEF, served as the model for successful Army psychological warfare operations. The Mobile Radio Broadcasting companies employed in Europe were the first tactical propaganda units of their kind in Army history and influenced the development of similar units during the Korean war. And McClure himself had a strong hand in urging that the War Department establish a central psychological warfare agency. All in all, General McClure must be considered the most important Army officer to emerge in this new field during World War II.

Contrary to the official lineage of Special Forces, unconventional warfare, in its strictest definition, did not have a traceable formal history in the Army. The Office of Strategic Services, to which the Army contributed personnel in World War II, was the first American agency devoted to the planning, direction, and conduct of unconventional warfare, but it was not a military organization. Nevertheless, it left a legacy of organizational and combat knowledge that, together with a few key officers who had World War II experience in guerrilla warfare, was instrumental in the creation of Special Forces in 1952. This gave the Army a formal unconventional warfare capability for the first time in its history.

During the interwar years, the Army's psychological warfare capability languished, but staff planning activity did not cease entirely (contrary to the claim of one prominent psychological warfare text).[1] This activity was kept alive by growing concerns about Soviet intentions, by the interest of a few senior military officers like General Lemnitzer and General McClure, and by the pressure brought to bear by several Secretaries of the Army. In fact, a great deal of planning went on during that period that carried over to OCPW, more so than was later acknowledged by General McClure even though he substantially contributed to that effort from his posts outside the Army Staff.

Similarly, the impetus for the initiation of covert activities after World War II did not originate in the Central Intelligence Group (forerunner of the CIA); it came from Secretary of War Robert Patterson, whose interest in developing an OSS-type "airborne reconnaissance" unit led the Army to study an organization that combined both OSS and Ranger precepts. Although interest in the subject waned after the growth of the responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency/Office of Policy Coordination

(CIA/OPC), the studies and dialog that took place—limited though they were—clearly showed the influence of OSS on Army thinking and presaged similar discussions in the early 1950's prior to formation of the 10th Special Forces Group.

Notwithstanding that more planning activity in both psychological and unconventional warfare took place during 1945-50 than is generally acknowledged, on the eve of the Korean war the Army was ill-prepared in terms of personnel, equipment, and organization to conduct psychological warfare operations; its unconventional warfare capability was nonexistent.

With the impetus of the Korean war, the heightening cold war tensions, and the persistent pressures of Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., the Army moved in late 1950 to create an unprecedented staff organization—the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare. With Pace's support, Brigadier General McClure created a staff with responsibilities for both psychological and unconventional warfare. It was largely as a result of McClure's status and foresight that the Army developed its first capability to conduct unconventional warfare; the inclusion of a Special Operations Division in OCPW and McClure's selection of the key personnel for that office gave officers like Colonel Russell Volckmann and Colonel Aaron Bank the opportunity to form plans for unconventional warfare and the creation of Special Forces. Despite a "hot war" in Korea, the primary influence behind the Army's interest in unconventional warfare was the desire for a guerrilla capability in Europe to help "retard" a Soviet invasion, should it occur. (In fact, the development of Special Forces came too late to play other than a minimal role in the 8th Army's behind-the-line activities.) After some initial experimentation with the organizational machinery to conduct this "new concept" of warfare, the unit that emerged was clearly designed to organize, train, and support indigenous personnel in behind-the-lines resistance activities, and it was based primarily on Donovan's OSS Operational Group concepts—not those of the Rangers or Commandos. In order to provide the necessary training, materiel, and doctrinal support for both Special Forces and psychological warfare units, McClure was able to sell the Army on a separate center at which the functions of the "whole field of OCPW" would be located.

Roughly the same cold war tensions fueled interest in both psychological and unconventional warfare, but there was a crucial difference in the receptivity to each by the Army. Despite some of the "characters" associated with "sykewar," psychological warfare organizations gradually attained increased respectability in the Army during World War II and Korea. On the other hand, the Army continued to view unconventional

warfare with a certain distaste. This reluctance to accept Special Forces resulted from the legacy of OSS-military rivalry during World War II, a lack of appreciation for unconventional warfare by officers trained for conventional war, and a continuing suspicion of elite forces by the Army, as well as from the fact that there was no formal precedent in the Army's history for Special Forces units. Most important of all were the constraints of manpower and money in what was, despite the cold war, a peacetime Army. New ideas, particularly those that require an increase in personnel and funds, are understandably difficult to sell to leaders who must make decisions on the basis of essentiality. (In this regard, it is instructive to note that the spaces finally made available for the formation of the 10th Special Forces Group came from the deactivation of the Rangers, another elite concept.)

In the face of resistance, both within the Army and from the Air Force and CIA, Special Forces nonetheless became a reality largely through the support of General McClure and the persistent efforts of Colonel Volckmann and Colonel Bank. But the bargaining position of unconventional warfare advocates was weak in 1951–52; those in OCPW who wanted a separate existence for Special Forces found it necessary to compromise. Because psychological warfare had a formal lineage and a tradition—and unconventional warfare had neither—it was expedient to bring Special Forces into existence under the auspices of, and subordinate to, psychological warfare. This, plus the security restraints placed on the publicizing of Special Forces activities, explains the apparent ascendancy of psychological warfare over unconventional warfare at that time.

General McClure's rationale for combining these two activities within OCPW in 1951 and at the Psychological Warfare Center in 1952 can be partially attributed to the heritage of General William Donovan's organizational philosophy, and to the fact that the other military services and the JCS had the same combination in their staffs. In allowing McClure his way, the Army may simply have found it convenient to lump these two relatively new out-of-the-mainstream (thus "unconventional") activities together while it attempted to sort out both ideas and weapons. The resultant package could well have been called "miscellaneous warfare" instead of the eventual, more glamorous "special warfare."[2] Thus, the combining of psychological and unconventional warfare under the Psychological Warfare Center was a marriage of both convenience and necessity, but one that nevertheless gave the Army the beginnings of a "special warfare" capability.

The person most responsible for achieving this feat was Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, clearly the central figure to emerge in this study. From World War II until early 1953, he alone provided the continuity, expertise, and guidance at the general officer level that was so essential to the ultimate establishment of his dream—the creation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Special Forces, and the Psychological Warfare Center. At every crucial point in the unfolding of events leading to these accomplishments, particularly after World War II, one finds his personal imprint; indeed, the story of the origins of special warfare could almost be told through a biography of this dedicated, energetic visionary. Today his name is recognized by few; the achievements of Volckmann and Bank are more familiar. One searches in vain for McClure's picture on the walls of the Center for Military Assistance or in its museum. But if any one man can be called the father of special warfare, surely that man was Robert A. McClure.

Even after its birth, the Psychological Warfare Center, along with Special Forces, led a precarious existence.[3] And McClure himself left the OCPW in March 1953 an embittered man; the implication was that he had been in a specialized activity too long.[4] But his legacy is clear; the foundation he laid was built upon in the 1960's when special warfare was expanded to encompass counterinsurgency, and to this day Special Forces and psychological warfare units exist, albeit uneasily, under the Center for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg. Ironically, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare has not survived. The manner in which psychological and unconventional warfare evolved from 1941 until their union as a formal Army capability in 1952 suggests a theme that runs throughout the history of special warfare: the story of a hesitant and reluctant Army attempting to cope with concepts and organizations of an unconventional nature.

NOTES

Archival collections cited in notes are abbreviated as follows:

CMH	Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.
National Archives	National Archives, Washington, D.C.
USAJFKCMA	US Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, N.C.
USAMHI	US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
WNRC	Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md.

Some files are designated Top Secret (TS), Secret (S), or Confidential (C).

For other abbreviations and acronyms appearing in the notes, see the glossary.

Chapter I Notes

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Chapter V Notes

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Chapter VI Notes

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32. Lt. Ernest Conine, "New Horizons in Psychological Warfare," *Army Information Digest* 7, no. 12 (December 1951):22; Letter, Col. Otis E. Hayes, 5 May 1969, USAJFKCMA (Public Affairs Office); Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare,* pp. 301, 303.

33. Psychological Warfare Division, "Operations in Western European Campaign," p. 13; Propaganda Branch, "Syllabus of Psychological Warfare," p. 2; Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare,* p. 45.

34. US, Department of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 January through 30 June 1951,* p. 92.

35. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare,* pp. 301-2, 304.

36. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare,* p. 45; Psychological Warfare Division, "Operations in Western European Campaign," p. 13; Propaganda Branch, "Syllabus of Psychological Warfare," p. 2.

37. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare,* pp. 301-2, 304, 306-7.

38. Psychological Warfare Division, "Operations in Western European Campaign," p. 19; McClure, "Trends in Psychological Warfare," p. 10; Daugherty and Janowitz, *Casebook,* p. 132; The Intelligence School, Fort Riley, Kans., "Tactical

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44. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Letter to Lt. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey, Chief of Staff, Far East Command, 13 July 1951, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Psy War Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 360-370.64, box 19, Psy War 360 (13 July 1951), National Archives.

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12 March 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, box 6, Psy War 091.412 (10 March 1951), National Archives.

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51. Interview with Robert Bodroghy, 15 May 1979; Psy War 091 Korea (31 December 1952), Weekly Summary from Korea of Items of Operational Interest for Period 16-22 December 1952, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, SECRET Decimal Files, 091-091.412, box 7, National Archives; HQ Far East Command Liaison Detachment (Korea), 8240th Army Unit, Guerrilla Section, Guerrilla Operations Outline, 1952, to Commanders of LEOPARD, WOLFPACK, KIRKLAND, and BAKER Section, 11 April 1952, by Lt. Col. Jay D. Vanderpool, OIC Guerrilla Division, filed with Staff Visit of Col. Bradford Butler, Jr., March 1953, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives.

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53. See note 52 above.

54. Headquarters, Far East Command Liaison Detachment (Korea), 8240th Army Unit, Guerrilla Operations Outline, 1953, by Lt. Col. Jay D. Vanderpool, OIC Guerrilla Division, 22 January 1953, filed with Staff Visit of Col. Bradford Butler, Jr., March 1953, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives.

55. Interview with Robert Bodroghy, 15 May 1979.

56. Headquarters, Far East Command, Letter from Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby to Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, subject: Covert Intelligence Activities, Korea, 12 January 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal files, box 5, 091 Korea, National Archives; Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, JCS, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Chief, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, subject: Report on Trip to FECOM, 26 November-17 December 1951, by Col. W. H. S. Wright, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, 323.3-333, box 9, Psy War 333 TS (20 December 1951), National Archives.

57. See note 56; also, interview with Robert Bodroghy, 15 May 1979.

58. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, subject: Reports on Special Operations in Korea, 15 March 1951, by Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, 1951-54, 091, box 6, Psy War 091 Korea (15 March 1951), National Archives.

59. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, subject: CINCFE Organization for Covert Operations and Clandestine Intelligence, 3 August 1951, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 2, Psy War 040 CIA TS (20 July 1951), National Archives.

60. See note 59; response from G-3 was dated 2 October 1951; also, interview with Col. John B. B. Trussell (Ret.), at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 7 May 1979; a review of the OCPW, G-2, and G-3 files reveals numerous instances of policy differences.

61. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Letter to Lt. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey, Chief of Staff, GHQ, Far East Command, 25 October 1951, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, 091.412 Far East, National Archives.

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63. See note 62 above.

64. See note 62 above.

65. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, subject: Revised Discussion of Queries Concerning Guerrilla Warfare, 23 May 1952, by Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (23 May 1952), National

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66. Headquarters, 10th Special Forces Group Airborne, Fort Bragg, N.C., Letter to Commanding Officer, Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C., subject: Situation of Special Forces Officers in FECOM, 19 May 1953, by Col. Aaron Bank, Commanding Officer, filed with Psy War 220.3 (14 May 1953), Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Letter to Maj. Gen. Riley F. Ennis, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, FECOM, from Col. William J. Blythe, Chief, Special Forces Division, 24 November 1952, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Message DA 927709 to CINCFE, 2 January 1953, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, box 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (13 December 1952), National Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum for Record, subject: Conversation with Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor reference Special Forces Operations in the Far East Command, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 319, Psy War 337 TS (26 December 1952), National Archives; interview with Robert Bodroghy, 15 May 1979.

67. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Chief, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, subject: Report on Trip to FECOM, 26 November-17 December 1951, by Col. W. H. S. Wright, US Army, 20 December 1951, filed with Psy War 333 TS (20 December 1951), Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, 323.3-333, box 9, National Archives.

68. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Disposition Form to G-1, G-2, G-3, subject: The Status and Role of "Partisan Forces," 18 February 1953, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure with G-3 response, 20 February 1953, by Maj. Gen. C. D. Eddleman, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, 383.7-385, box 20, Psy War 384 FE TS (18 February 1953), National Archives.

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Chapter VII Notes

1. Headquarters, European Command, Letter from Maj. Gen. Daniel Noce, Chief of Staff, to Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 13 December 1950, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 6, Psy War 091.412 TS (13 December 1950, 15 January 1951), National Archives.

2. Department of the Army, G-3 Operations, Washington, D.C., Letter to Maj. Gen Daniel Noce, Chief of Staff, EUCOM, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 15 January 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 6, Psy War 091.412 TS (13 December 1950, 15 January 1951), National Archives.

3. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., letter from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure to Maj. Gen. Daniel Noce, 12 June 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 6, Psy War 091.412 TS (12 June 1951), National Archives.

4. See note 3 above, Headquarters, European Command, Letter from Lt. Col. R. G. Ciccolella, Chief, Psy War Section, Special Plans Branch, Operations, Plans, Organization and Training Division, to Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 15 October 1951, Psy War 337, National Archives; Letter from Lt. Col. R. G. Ciccolella to McClure, 14 November 1951, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 385.2-400, box 24, Psy War 400 (14 November 1951) S, National Archives; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Progress Report—1 April 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Psy War 319.1, National Archives.

5. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Letter from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure to Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, G-2, General Headquarters, Far East Command, 10 March 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Psy War 091.412, National Archives; also Psy War 322 (19 February 1951), Request for Increase in Authorized Strength of Psy War Units, Psy War 322 (28 February 1951), RB&L Group for FECOM, and Psy War 322 (5 March 1951), Reduced Strength RB&L Group for EUCOM, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 322-326, box 13, National Archives.

6. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Record, subject: Meeting called by Colonel Hopkins, JSPD, by Lt. Col. Richard Hirsch, Intelligence and Evaluation Branch, 2 August 1951, Record Group 319 Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 6, Psy War 091.412, National Archives.

7. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Staff Meeting, 6 December 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 2, Psy War 020 Staff Meetings, National Archives; Memorandum for Chief of Staff, US Army, subject: Psychological Warfare Conference EUCOM, 27-28 November 1951, by Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 6 December 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Psy War 334S (6 December 1951), National Archives.

8. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Record, Weekly Staff Meeting, 8 March 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 2, Psy War 020 Staff Meetings, National Archives.

9. Interview with Col. John B. B. Trussell, US Army (Ret.), at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 7 May 1979. Colonel Trussell, as a lieutenant colonel, was a staff officer in OCPW during the early 1950's.

10. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum from Captain Hahn, US Navy, to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, subject: Air Force Views Relating to Retardation (of Soviet Advances), 20 October 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 15, Psy War 381, National Archives; see also Psy War 350.001 TS (7 January 1952), subject: Psychological Warfare Presentation for PSB, TS Decimal Files, 1951-54, box 13, and Psy War 385 TS (29 August 1951), subject: Appraisal of Capabilities of Psychological Operations in Department of Defense, TS Decimal Files, box 20, National Archives.

11. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Chief of Staff, US Army, subject: Psychological Warfare Conference, EUCOM, 27-28 November 1951, by Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 6 December 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Psy War 334 S (6 December 1951), National Archives.

12. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Letter from Maj. Kenneth B. Stark to Lt. Col. Homer E. Shields, 12 March 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives.

13. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare,* p. 304; Letter, Col. Otis E. Hayes, Jr. (Ret.), 5 May 1969, to Office of Information, John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare, USAJFKCMA (Public Affairs Office); Army General School, Fort Riley, Kans., "Program of Instruction, Psychological Warfare Unit Officer Course," January 1951, p. i, USAJFKCMA.

14. Army General School, Fort Riley, Kans., "Program of Instruction for Psychological Warfare Officer Course," August 1951, p. 12, USAJFKCMA; Letter, Col. Otis E. Hayes, 5 May 1969, to Office of Information, USAJFKCMA (Public Affairs Office). Colonel Hayes was recalled to active duty in 1951 as Deputy of the Psychological Warfare Division at Fort Riley. After the Psychological Warfare Center was activated at Fort Bragg in 1952, he became the first Director of the Psychological Operations Department (in the Psychological Warfare School) and remained in that position for 18 months.

15. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Progress Report, Personnel and Training Division, 1 April 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Psy War 319.1, National Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Letter to Lt. Col. John W. White, G-3 Section, Headquarters, 1st Army, Governor's Island, N.Y., from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 24 May 1951, Psy War 320.2, National Archives.

16. Department of the Army, Operations Research Office, Washington, D.C., Letter from Ellis A. Johnson, Director, to Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, subject:

Research for Psychological Warfare, 8 May 1951, Psy War 400.112; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum for Chief, Psychological Warfare, subject: Non-materiel Research Program, 7 February 1951, from Lt. Col. Jerome G. Sacks, Research Branch, filed with Psy War 400.112 (29 February 1951); Office of the Secretary of the Army, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, subject: Appraisal of Capabilities of Psychological Operations in Department of Defense, from Secretary Frank Pace, Jr., 21 September 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 20, Psy War 385 TS, National Archives.

17. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., "Briefing for Secretary of Defense on OCPW Activities," 5 November 1951, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 334-337, Psy War 337 S (5 November 1951), National Archives.

18. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum to Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, subject: Reduction of Military and Civilian Personnel in the Chief of Staff area, 27 August 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, SECRET Decimal Files, 1951-54, 092-230, box 9, Psy War 230 (17 August 1951), National Archives; interview with Col. John B. B. Trussell, 9 May 1979.

19. Interview with Col. John B. B. Trussell, 9 May 1979.

20. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Weekly Staff Meeting, 8 March 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 2, National Archives.

21. Letter, Brig. Gen. Russell W. Volckmann (Ret.), 21 March 1969, to Office of Information, John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare, USAJFKCMA (Public Affairs Office); Letters, Col. Aaron Bank (Ret.), 17 February 1968 and 3 April 1968, to Office of Information, John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare, USAJFKCMA (Public Affairs Office).

22. Letter, Volckmann, 21 March 1969 (see note 21 above).

23. Letters, Volckmann and Bank (see note 21 above).

24. Letter, Col. Aaron Bank (Ret.), 23 February 1969, to Office of Information, John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare, USAJFKCMA (Public Affairs Office).

25. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Minutes of Staff Meetings, 29 March 1951 and 19 July 1959, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 2, National Archives. These frequent changes of division chief designations were probably due to the relative date of rank, or seniority, among the colonels brought into the Special Operations Division.

26. See note 24 above.

27. Department of the Army, Office of the G-3, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Director, O&T Division, subject: Responsibilities of Army with Respect to Guerrilla Warfare, 20 March 1951, by Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, 370.2-370.64, box 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (20 March 1951), National Archives.

28. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Minutes of Weekly Staff Meeting, 8 March 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 2, National Archives.

29. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, subject: Reports on Special Operations in Korea, 15 March 1951, by Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, 1951-54, box 6, Psy War 091 Korea (15 March 1951), National Archives.

30. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Minutes of Weekly Staff Meeting, 29 March 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 2, National Archives.

31. Headquarters, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., Memorandum to the Commanding General, Infantry Center, subject: Analysis and Suggestions re Gen. J. Lawton Collins' Conference, 5 April 1951, from Lt. Col. Russell W. Volckmann, 9 April 1951, filed with Psy War 337 TS (16 April 1951), Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 12, National Archives.

32. See note 31 above.

33. See note 31 above.

34. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, subject: Definitions Relating to Psychological Warfare, Special Operations and Guerrilla Warfare, 17 April 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Psy War 370.64 (17 April 1951), National Archives.

35. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Summary Sheet of Chief of Staff, subject: Gen. J. Lawton Collins' Conference at the Infantry Center, 5 April 1951, from Col. Edward Glavin, Acting Chief of Psychological Warfare (summary sheet prepared by Lt. Col. Russell W. Volckmann), 16 April 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, Psy War 337 (16 April 1951), National Archives.

36. See note 35 above; see also Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Briefing Notes, Conference with G-1, -2, -3, -4, and AFF re Training in the Field of Special (Forces) Operations, 21 June 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 12, Psy War 337 TS (21 June 1951), National Archives. The studies resulting from this action, in addition to "Army Responsibilities in Report to Special (Forces) Operations," were "Theater Special Forces Command and (Z.I.) Special Forces Training Command"; "Special Forces Ranger Units—and—Special Forces Ranger Units, Recruiting and Training of Personnel"; "Rear Area Defense"; and "Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Matters Pertaining to Guerrilla Warfare."

37. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Gen. C. D. Eddleman, subject: Utilization of Lodge Bill Recruits in Special (Forces) Operations, 23 May 1951, from Brig. Gen.

Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, 370.2–370.64, box 15, Psy War 373.2 TS (23 May 1951), National Archives.

38. See note 37 above.

39. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum to Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, subject: Staff Studies, "Special Forces Ranger Units" and "Special Forces Ranger Units, Recruiting and Training of Personnel," 12 June 1951, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, 270.2–370.64, box 15, Psy War 370.64 (12 June 1951), National Archives.

40. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Briefing Notes, Conference with G–1, –2, –3, –4 and AFF re Training in the Field of Special (Forces) Operations, 21 June 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, box 12, Psy War 337 TS (21 June 1951), National Archives. Additionally, Lieutenant Colonel Volckmann had earlier reiterated to McClure the conclusion "that a need exists for a training command or center that will bring together the many segments of special (forces) operations under a program that will fully develop doctrine, policies, techniques, and tactics . . . and that will develop equipment and supplies." This came after a trip, directed by McClure, to observe training and instruction at the CIA's "School Number One," the Ranger Training Center, and the Infantry Center—all at Fort Benning. Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, subject: Findings and Recommendations re Special Operations Training, Fort Benning, Ga., 24 April 1951, by Lt. Col. Russell W. Volckmann, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, 370.2–370.64, box 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (3 May 1951), National Archives.

41. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, subject: Ranger Units, 17 July 1951, from Col. Wendell W. Fertig, Chief, Special Operations, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951–54, 322–326, box 13, Psy War 322 S (17 July 1951), National Archives.

42. See note 41 above; see also Eliot A Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies* (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), pp. 56–58.

43. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare.

44. Adjutant General, Army Field Forces, Letter to Adjutant General, Department of the Army, subject: Training of Individuals and Units of the Army in Special (Forces) Operations, 23 August 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, box 6, 091.412 TS Propaganda (23 August 1951), National Archives.

45. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Record, subject: Conference to Resolve Ranger Program, 24 August 1951, by Col. Aaron Bank, Special Operations Division, Record Group 319, Psy War 337 (24 August 1951), National Archives. The

principals attending the conference were General Taylor, General Bradford, G-3, AFF, and General McAuliffe, G-1.

46. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, subject: Request for Spaces in the Active Army, 28 September 1951, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 311.5-319.1, box 11, Psy War 320.2 (28 September 1951), National Archives.

47. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, subject: Table of Organization and Equipment 33-510 (proposed) for Special Forces Group (Abn), 13 November 1952, with draft 1st Ind letter to OCAFF, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 8, Psy War 320.3 TS (30 September 1952), National Archives.

48. Headquarters, European Command, Letter to Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 12 November 1952, from Brig. Gen. Willard K. Liebel, Chief, Support Plans Branch, J-3, Psy War 240 (12 November 1952); Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Letter to Brigadier General Liebel,8 December 1952, from McClure, Psy War 290 (8 December 1952); Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Letter to General Liebel from General McClure, 19 December 1952, Psy War 290 (19 December 1952); all filed in Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 6, National Archives.

49. Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians,* particularly his discussion of "The Specialist Function," pp. 30f.

50. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, subject: Findings and Recommendations re Special Operations Training, Fort Benning, Ga., from Lt. Col. Russell W. Volckmann, 24 April 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal files, 370.2-370.64, box 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (3 May 1951), National Archives. Volckmann had been directed by McClure to visit Fort Benning to review the training and instruction at the CIA's "School Number One," the Ranger Training Center, and the Infantry School, with emphasis on the special operations instruction, then report to him his findings and recommendations (see memorandum from McClure to Volckmann, 19 March 1951, filed with above reference). See also General McClure's and Colonel Bank's discussion with AFF concerning a training center, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Minutes of Weekly Staff Meeting, 16 August 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, 020 Staff Meeting, box 2, National Archives.

51. See note 50 above, especially Minutes of Weekly Staff Meeting, 16 August 1951.

52. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Policy Coordination, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, through the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, JCS, subject: Joint CIA-DA Guerrilla Warfare Training, from Kilbourne Johnston, Deputy Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, 17

August 1951, Record Group 319, Psy War, Decimal File (C), 1951–54, 360–370.64, box 19, Psy War 370.64 (21 August 1951) S, National Archives.

53. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Agreement between Frank G. Wisner, Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, and Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Chief of Psychological Warfare—Staff, DA, on the Respective Roles and Responsibilities of CIA/OPC and Psy War Division, Special Staff, Department of the Army, in the Field of Unconventional Warfare, 17 July 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, box 2, 020 CIA, National Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum for the Chief, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, JCS, subject: Coordination of Army Psychological Warfare Materiel Research Activities with CIA, 25 March 1952, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, and reply from CIA, 23 April 1952, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, box 25, Psy War 400.112 (25 March 1952) C, National Archives.

54. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Minutes of Meeting, 5 September 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, box 12, Psy War 337 TS (5 September 1951), National Archives.

55. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Letter to Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 1953 undated (probably late February or early March 1953), Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, 1951–54, 020–40, box 3, Psy War 040 CIA (undated) 53, National Archives.

56. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Summary Sheet for Chief of Staff, subject: Staff visit to Europe, 13 September 1951, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, 323.3–333, box 9, Psy War 333 Europe TS (12 September 1951), National Archives.

57. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director, Washington, D.C., Letter to Maj. Gen. A. R. Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Department of the Army, 10 March 1952, from Walter B. Smith, Director, filed with Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, box 15, Psy War 370.64, Guerrilla Warfare, National Archives.

58. See note 57 above.

59. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, subject: Staff Visit to Europe, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure,10 September 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, 323.3–333, box 9, Psy War 333 (10 September 1951), National Archives.

60. The CIA's statement appeared in a memorandum dated 6 June 1952, an enclosure to JCS 1969/73, Memorandum for Chairman, JCS, subject: Overseas CIA Logistical Support Bases; see Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum for the Chief of History, subject: Summary of Major Events and Problems, Psy War 314.7 TS (15 August 1953); see also Psy War 314.7 (6 January 1953), History of DA Activities, for OCPW's explanation of why the JCS disap-

proved its Special Forces Operations Plan for Europe; both are filed in Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, 311–319.1, box 7, National Archives.

61. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, subject: JSPC 808/112, Command Relationships between the CIA/OPC Organization and the Armed Forces in Actual Theaters of War Where American Forces Are Engaged (29 December 1952), from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Chief of Psychological Warfare, 30 December 1952, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, 000.1–020, box 1, National Archives. General Harkins was the "Army Planner," a senior officer responsible for presenting the Army's position on JCS actions.

62. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Air Force Presentation to the Psychological Strategy Board on 10 January 1952, filed with Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, 337–350.05, box 13, Psy War 350.001 TS (7 January 1952), National Archives.

63. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Discussions of Questions by the Under Secretary of the Army concerning Army Role in Guerrilla and Unconventional Warfare, in response to a Memorandum to the Vice Chief of Staff, subject: Guerrilla Warfare, 11 April 1952, filed with Psy War 320.64 TS (3 May 1952) (12 May 1952), TS Decimal Files, 1951–54, box 15, National Archives.

64. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Minutes of Meeting, 5 September 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, box 12, Psy War 337 TS (5 September 1951), National Archives.

65. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, subject: Staff Visit to Europe, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 12 September 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, 323.3–333, box 9, Psy War 333 (10 September 1951), National Archives.

66. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, US Army, subject: Unconventional Warfare (Special Forces Operations) Discussions Held at EUCOM and SHAPE, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 5 December 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, 370.2–370.64, box 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (5 December 1951), National Archives.

67. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum to the Chief of Military History, subject: Summary of Major Activities of OCPW for Period 9 September 1951 to 31 December 1952, 7 April 1953. JCS Decision 1969/18, 27 March 1952, Responsibilities of the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Guerrilla Warfare, assigned to the Army primary responsibility for guerrilla warfare in combat operations on land. The decision also assigned to the Army primary responsibility for developing, in coordination with the other services and subject to JCS policy direction, the doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment employed by guerrilla forces in

combat operations on land, and for training these forces with the assistance of the other services. Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal File, 311–319.1, box 7, Psy War 314.7 (6 January 1953), National Archives.

68. General Collins' directive remained in effect for 9 months until March 1952. At that time, after considerable interservice battling, the JCS assigned the Army primary responsibility for guerrilla warfare. See note 67 above; see also the briefing by Brig. Gen. Bullock (McClure's replacement as Chief, OCPW) to the Chief, Army Field Services, at Fort Monroe, Va., 5 October 1953, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, 337–350.05, box 13, Psy War 337 TS (2 October 1953), National Archives.

69. Department of the Army, Organization and Training Division, G–3, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for the Chief of Psychological Warfare, subject: Training of Individuals and Units of the Army in Special (Forces) Operations, 14 September 1951, from Brig. Gen. D. A. D. Ogden, G–3, 370.2 TS (23 August 1951), filed with Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, 370.2–370.64, box 15, Psy War 370.2 TS (14 September 1951), National Archives.

70. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Response to G–3, 370.2 TS (14 September 1951), subject: Training of Individuals and Units of the Army in Special (Forces) Operations, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 5 October 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, 370.2–370.64, box 15, filed with Psy War 370.2 TS (14 September 1951), National Archives. The minutes of the 13 September 1951 weekly OCPW staff meeting show that a plan for a Center for Psychological Warfare and Special Operations Training was being worked on, with the intent of making the necessary suggestions to AFF, who in turn could recommend to G–3 that such a center be established—an interesting, but not uncommon, bit of bureaucratic maneuvering for a pet project; Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, box 2, Psy War 020 Staff Meetings, National Archives.

71. See note 70 above, OCPW response to G–3, 5 October 1951.

72. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., "Special Forces Operations," by Col. Russell W. Volckmann, 26 October 1951, filed in Psy War 372.2 Operations, National Archives.

73. See note 72 above.

74. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., "Briefing for Secretary of Defense on OCPW Matters," 5 November 1951, by Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951–54 334–337, box 15, Psy War 337 S (5 November 1951), National Archives.

75. See Note 74 above.

76. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Col. D. V. Johnson, Assistant Chief, Plans Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, subject: Responsibilities of the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Unconventional Warfare, 26 October 1951, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of

Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, 370.2–370.64, box 15, Psy War 370.64 TS (26 October 1951), National Archives.

77. Department of the Army, Training Circular 31-20-1, *The Role of US Army Special Forces,* 22 October 1976. In *Commandos and Politicians,* Eliot Cohen states that "the US Army contributed to the downfall of Special Forces by creating two Ranger battalions [in 1974–75]. These units fit the specialist model: They are relatively small forces trained for such missions as the rescue of hostages (along the lines of Israel's Entebbe Raid)" (Cohen, p. 88). These types of missions, as well as other unilateral (no indigenous personnel) Ranger or Commando-like "direct action" activities, have, however, become part of the Special Forces' growing repertoire of capabilities (Cohen somewhat inelegantly calls Special Forces "guerrilla/commandos, preparing for a variety of military odd jobs," p. 25). Cohen discusses the desire among elite units to acquire new missions and additional personnel, and concludes: "The mission of elite troops must be as rigorously defined as possible: a niche must be carved out for them and they must be kept within it" (p. 97).

78. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Minutes of Weekly Staff Meeting, 8 November 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, box 2, 020 Staff Meetings, National Archives.

79. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for the Record, subject: Survey for Psychological Warfare Center, 19 November 1951, by Col. Wendell W. Fertig, Chief, Special Operations Division; Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, subject: Status of Special Forces Training Center, 3 December 1951, by Col. Wendell W. Fertig; both filed in Psy War 322C (3 December 1951), Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal Files (C), 1951–54, National Archives. The personnel who made the initial survey of Fort Benning and Fort Bragg during the period 13 to 15 November 1951 were Col. Aaron Bank and Maj. Kenneth B. Stark of OCPW, Col. Edward Glavin of AFF, and Maj. Taylor of the G-3 Division, Psy War Section, 3d Army.

80. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, subject: Status of Special Forces Training Center, 3 December 1951, by Col. Wendell W. Fertig, Psy War 322C (3 December 1951), Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951–54, National Archives; see also OCPW Minutes of Weekly Staff Meeting, 6 December 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, box 2, 020 Staff Meetings, National Archives.

81. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Minutes of Weekly Staff Meeting, 6 December 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, box 2, 020 Staff Meetings, National Archives.

82. See note 81 above; see also Minutes of Weekly Staff Meetings, 25 October 1951 and 8 November 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, box 2, 020 Staff Meetings, National Archives.

83. Office of the Post Engineer, Fort Bragg, N.C., Memorandum for Record, subject: Establishment of Psychological Warfare Center, 12 December 1951, by A. W. Hart, Division Chief, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, File 123 Money and Savings, National Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum for Record, subject: Fort Bragg Survey, 17 December 1951, from Lt. Col. Melvin R. Blair, Special Operations Division, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, File 061.2 Army and Military Surveys, National Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Minutes of Weekly Staff Meeting, 20 December 1951, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, 020 Staff Meetings, National Archives. The survey team that selected Smoke Bomb Hill consisted of Col. Edward Glavin, AFF; Lt. Col. Melvin R. Blair and Maj. Kenneth B. Stark, OCPW; Lt. Col. John O. Weaver, Psychological Warfare Division, Army General School, Fort Riley; and Lt. Col. Brock and Maj. Taylor, 3d Army.

84. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, subject: Psychological Warfare Presentation for PSB, 7 January 1952, from Col. Wendell W. Fertig, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, TS Decimal Files, 337–350.05, box 13, Psy War 350.01 TS (7 January 1952), National Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, subject: Funds for a Psychological Warfare Center, 14 January 1952, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Psy War 123 (14 January 1952), National Archives; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, subject: Compromise of Classified Information, 22 January 1952, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951–54, 370.64–380.01, box 20, Psy War 380.01 C (22 January 1952), National Archives. The breach of security that annoyed McClure was the following sentence from the 21 January 1952 issue of *Newsweek:* "The Army will soon open a secret guerrilla warfare and sabotage school for military personnel and CIA agents at Fort Bragg, N.C." McClure insisted that this information had been handled within OCPW as a TOP SECRET matter, with dissemination on a "need-to-know" basis, and he therefore requested an investigation to determine the source of the leak. Although the G–2 refused to follow through on the request, the incident reveals the sensitive manner in which Special Forces activities were being handled by OCPW at this time and helps explain in part why so little publicity was given to Special Forces, including no mention of this activity in the title of the proposed center at Fort Bragg.

85. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, subject: Utilization of Active Army Spaces Allocated for FY 1952 and FY 1953, 6 February 1952, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 319.5–320.3, box 12, Psy War 320.2 (6 February 1952), National Archives.

86. See note 85 above, Comment No. 2 from Brig. Gen. G. J. Higgins, Chief, Organization and Training Division, G–3, 15 February 1952.

87. Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Washington, D.C., Summary Sheet for Chief of Staff, US Army, subject: Establishment of Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Center, 3 March 1952, from Maj. Gen. C. D. Eddleman, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 8, Psy War 322 TS (3 March 1952), National Archives. The total personnel needs for the center itself were stated as 362, of which 312 would be military and 50 civilian. Twenty-nine spaces (27 military and 2 civilian) from the Psychological Warfare Division, Army General School, Fort Riley, would be transferred to the new center at Fort Bragg.

88. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for the Chief, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, JCS, subject: Activation of Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, N.C., from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 319.5-320.3, box 13, Psy War 322 (7 April 1952), National Archives.

Chapter VIII Notes

1. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, subject: Activation and Mission of the Psychological Warfare Center, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, 22 May 1952, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 322-326, box 13, Psy War 322 (22 May 1952), National Archives. Department of the Army General Order No. 37, 14 April 1952, established the Psychological Warfare Center as a Class I activity and installation, effective 10 April 1952 (extract filed with above reference). A copy of the Recommended Table of Distribution for the Psychological Warfare Center can be found with Psy War 320.3 (16 April 1952), National Archives.

2. Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, Va., Letter, subject: Psychological Warfare Doctrine Development and Instruction, 29 May 1952, USAJFKCMA; Letter, Col. Otis E. Hays, 5 May 1969, USAJFKCMA (Public Affairs Office). An advance party from the Psychological Warfare Division, Army General School, consisting of Lt. Col. John O. Weaver with five officers and seven enlisted men was scheduled to arrive at Fort Bragg on 27 April 1952; the remainder of this division (eight officers and four enlisted men) was scheduled to move not later than 15 May 1952. See Army Field Forces letter, subject: Psy War Center, 30 April 1952, to Commanding General, 3d Army, filed with Psy War 322 (1 May 1952), National Archives.

3. Headquarters, Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C., Memorandum No. 14, "Organization and Functions Manual, Headquarters, Psychological Warfare Center," 12 November 1952, p. 3, USAJFKCMA.

4. Letter, Col. Otis E. Hays, 5 May 1969, USAJFKCMA (Public Affairs Office).

5. Headquarters, Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C., "Administrative Information Handbook, Psychological Warfare Seminar, 17–19 December 1952," December 1952, p. 2. USAJFKCMA.

6. Department of the Army, Organization and Training Division, G–3, Washington, D.C., DF to Psy War, subject: Establishment of the Psychological Operations School, 27 August 1952, G–3 352 (6 August 1952), filed with Psy War 322 (25 September 1952), National Archives.

7. Headquarters, Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C., Letter to the Chief of Psychological Warfare, subject: Activation of the Psychological Warfare School, 12 September 1952, USAJFKCMA; Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, subject: Establishment of the Psychological Warfare School, 25 September 1952, Psy War 322 (25 September 1952), National Archives.

8. The Psychological Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N.C., "Guide for Staff and Faculty," April 1953, p. 10, USAJFKCMA. Additional detail on the mission of the school can be found in the Psychological Warfare Center's Memorandum No. 14, "Organization and Functions Manual," and "Administrative Information Handbook," USAJFKCMA.

9. Letter, Col. Otis E. Hays, 5 May 1969, USAJFKCMA (Public Affairs Office).

10. Headquarters, Psychological Warfare Center, Memorandum No. 14, "Organization and Functions Manual," p. 52, USAJFKCMA.

11. US, Department of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 January through 30 June 1953,* p. 140.

12. US, Department of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 January through 30 June 1952,* p. 92.

13. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for the Chief of Information, subject: Proposed Contingency Press Release Regarding Psy War Center, 17 June 1952, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Psy War 000.7 (16 June 1952); and Memorandum for G–3, subject: Proposed Press Release Regarding the Psychological Warfare Center, 1 July 1952, from Col. Wendell W. Fertig, Acting Chief, OCPW, Psy War 000.7 (1 July 1952); both in Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, 1951–54, box 1, National Archives. General McClure told the Chief of Information in his 17 June 1952 memorandum that the mission of Special Forces was classified confidential; thus it was "considered unwise to make any reference thereto in the proposed contingency release." When Col. C. H. Karlstad assumed command of the center, the story noting this event in the Fort Bragg newspaper made no reference to Special Forces operations. Later, the Chief of Information suggested that the press release include reference to Special Forces "to prevent undue probing by the news services into Special Forces activities at Fort Bragg, N.C." By late August 1952, after several weeks of correspondence between G–2, G–3, the Chief of Information, OCPW, and Army Field Forces, a specific policy on the matter still had not been resolved. Nor had the problem been solved by January 1953, when the Special Forces Division initiated action to downgrade from Confidential to Re-

stricted certain aspects of the Special Forces Program (see Psy War 380.01, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951–54, 370.64–380.01, box 20, National Archives.

14. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum for the Chief, Special Forces Division, subject: Student Handbook—"The Psychological Warfare School," 13 August 1952, from Lt. Col. Marvin J. Waters, Operations and Training Branch; Memorandum for Col. Wendell W. Fertig, subject: Psy War Center Student Handbook, 14 August 1952, from Col. William J. Blythe, Chief, Special Forces Division; Memorandum for Colonel Blythe, subject: Student Handbook—"The Psychological Warfare School," 21 August 1952, from Lt. Col. Melvin R. Blair; all filed under Psy War 332, Army Service Schools, National Archives. Colonel Blair complained that "not a single word is devoted to the role of Special Forces" in chapter I of the Handbook, although "approximately 50% of the Staff and Faculty personnel and student body will be Special Forces personnel."

15. Headquarters, Psychological Warfare Center, Memorandum No. 14, "Organization and Functions Manual," p. 49. USAJFKCMA.

16. See note 15 above, p. 34; see also the Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C., *Psy War,* 1954, p. 1, USAJFKCMA.

17. Psychological Warfare Center, *Psy War,* USAJFKCMA. Apparently the Board gave little attention to Special Forces operations: In the above publication, which outlined activities of the Board since its inception, there was no mention of any unconventional warfare projects, nor were there any Special Forces members on the Board as of early 1954. *Psy War* purports "to tell the story of the US Army's Psychological Warfare Center," but nowhere in the 99-page book is any reference made to the Special Forces Group or instructional department that constituted integral elements of the center. Undoubtedly, this was again the result of security-consciousness, perhaps carried to an extreme, concerning Special Forces activities.

18. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., Training Circular No. 13, "Military Aspects of Psychological Warfare," 8 June 1953, pp. 6f., USAJFKCMA; Psychological Warfare Center, *Psy War,* pp. 35–69, USAJFKCMA.

19. Melvin Russell Blair, "Toughest Outfit in the Army," *Saturday Evening Post,* 228 (12 May 1956): 40–41; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Orientation Conference for TI&E (Troop Information and Education) Officers, subject: "Current Developments in the Field of Special Forces Operations" (15 January 1952), by Lt. Col. Melvin R. Blair, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951–54, 334–337, box 15, Psy War 337 (C) (10 January 1952), National Archives; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Letter to the Chief, Army Field Forces, subject: Special Forces Orientation for Training Directive and Reception Centers, 24 June 1952, Record Group 319, Psy War, Decimal File (C), 1951–54, 352.16–354.2, box 18, Psy War 353 (24 June 1952), National Archives; also OCPW letter, subject: Orientation Conferences for Service Schools and Selected Headquarters and Installations, to Chief, Army Field Forces, 1 August 1952, Record Group 319, Psy War, Decimal

File (C), 1951-54, 352.16-354.2, box 18, Psy War 353 (1 August 1952), National Archives.

20. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Orientation Conference, "Current Developments in the Field of Special Forces Operations," to be presented to service schools, Army Headquarters, and selected installations during the period 1 October 1952-March 1953, by Lt. Col. Melvin R. Blair, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C) 334-337, 1951-54, box 15, Psy War 337 S (24 September 1952), National Archives; also Psy War 353 (6 November 1952), Orientation Material for Use in Connection with Selection of Volunteers for Special Forces, Record Group 319, Psy War, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 352.16-354.2, box 18, National Archives; and Psy War 335 C (10 January 1952), Orientation Conference for TI&E (Troop Information and Education) Officers, subject: "Current Developments in the Field of Special Forces Operations" (15 January 1952), by Lt. Col. Melvin R. Blair, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 334-337, box 15, National Archives.

21. See note 20 above, Psy War 337 TS (16 April 1951), Psy War 337 C (10 January 1952), and Psy War 337 (24 September 1952), National Archives.

22. See note 20 above, Psy War 353 (6 November 1952), National Archives.

23. See note 20 above, Psy War 290 TS (8 December 1952) and Psy War 390 TS (19 December 1952), National Archives.

24. Department of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, D.C., Letter, subject: Activation of a Unit of the General Reserve, 19 May 1952, AGAO-I, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., TO&E 33-2 (proposed), 14 April 1952, cited in US Army Combat Developments Command, Special Warfare Agency, Combat Developments Study: Organization for US Army Special Forces, August 1964, USAJFKCMA; Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Special Forces, Washington, D.C., DF to G3, Organization Branch, subject: Activation of Special Forces Units, 2 May 1952, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 322-326, box 13, Psy War 322 (1 May 1952), National Archives.

25. Letter, Col. Aaron Bank, 17 February 1968, USAJFKCMA (Public Affairs Office).

26. The Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C., Comments by Members Attending Organization and Training Conference, 9 July 1952, USAJFKCMA. Attendees included representatives from OCPW, AFF, 3d Army, and the Psychological Warfare Center. Colonel Bank strongly urged that the Special Forces Group TO&E's be declassified; present classification restricted publicity in Army publications, and the men could not even tell others their correct unit designation, other than the Psychological Warfare Center—which limited their pride in their unit, Bank believed.

27. Headquarters, The Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C., Letter to Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure from Col. C. H. Karlstad, Commanding Officer, 12 September 1952, filed with Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, Psy War 322, National Archives. Karlstad asked McClure for assistance in getting the 7 US training divisions to fulfill their allotted quotas of 35

volunteers per month for Special Forces. McClure followed through on the request rapidly and wrote back to Karlstad on 22 September that the situation should soon improve.

28. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Staff Study to Chief of Staff, US Army, subject: Staff Study on Intensification of Lodge Bill Recruitment Program, 8 August 1952, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. MClure, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-56, TS Decimal Files, 337-350.05, box 13, Psy War 342 TS (8 August 1952), National Archives. The reasons for this low rate were many: The many married people and German nationals who applied were not eligible; the citizens of NATO member nations who applied were not eligible; many applicants were disqualified on mental and physical grounds; and many applicants changed their minds during the long time required for security checks.

29. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum to the Chief, Legislative Liaison, subject: Program for Liaison with the Congress, Tab A, "Intensification of Lodge Bill Recruitment Program," from Col. Wendell W. Fertig, Acting Chief, OCPW, 15 August 1952, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 2, Psy War 032.1, National Archives. Tab A, prepared by Col. William J. Blythe, Special Forces Division, projected the overall need for Lodge bill personnel as 4,875 for Special Forces and 40 for psychological warfare units.

30. Headquarters, The Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C., Letter to Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, from Col. C. H. Karlstad, 25 November 1952, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, National Archives.

31. Letter, Col. Aaron Bank, 17 February 1968, USAJFKCMA (Public Affairs Office).

32. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Training Circular, Special Forces Group (Airborne), 13 May 1952, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 322-326, box 13, Psy War 322 (13 May 1952), National Archives.

33. Special Warfare Agency, "Organization for Special Forces," pp. II-10-II-13.

34. Letters, Col. Aaron Bank, 17 February 1968 and 3 April 1968, USAJFKCMA (Public Affairs Office).

35. Letter, Brig. Gen. Russell W. Volckmann, 21 March 1969, USAJFKCMA (Public Affairs Office).

36. Headquarters, The Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C., Comments by Members Attending Organization and Training Conference, 9 July 1952, USAJFKCMA.

37. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Memorandum to the Chief, Plans and Policy Branch, OCPW, from Col. Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., US Army Reserve, 7 July 1952, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951-54, TS Decimal Files, box 6, National Archives. Colonel Sands' memorandum forwarded a study that he had undertaken during his 2 weeks of duty in OCPW, the subject of which was "to study the position of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare in the National Estab-

lishment." Recognizing the limitations of time and breadth in his endeavor, Sands suggested that the study "be used to stimulate thinking among those who are more closely connected with the problem."

38. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., "Tactical Psychological Warfare in the Korean Conflict: An Informal Commentary on Propaganda Operations of the 8th US Army, 1950–51," by Col. Donald F. Hall, 1 April 1954, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, 1951–54, Secret Decimal Files, 091–091.412, box 7, Psy War 091 Korea, National Archives. Colonel Hall was the Psychological Warfare Officer for the 8th Army in Korea from 9 November 1952 to 14 January 1954, then later served in that capacity at Headquarters, Army Field Forces. Most of the comments and recommendations in his report were limited to the tactical aspects of psychological warfare.

39. See note 38 above.

40. Daniel Lerner, *Sykewar: Psychological Warfare against Germany, D-Day to VE-Day* (New York: George W. Stewart, 1949), pp. 67–93.

41. See note 37 above, Psy War 090.412 TS (7 July 1952). McClure's handwritten comment regarding Colonel Sand's report is instructive: "This is an interesting report although I do not concur that Propaganda and Special Forces Operations are so completely different as to require separation particularly when (a) all other services have same combination, (b) JSPD has dual responsibility, (c) black covert and white propaganda are split between State and OPC."

Chapter IX Notes

1. Daugherty and Janowitz, *Casebook*, pp. 137f., write: "In the military establisment in Washington, staff planning activities involving psychological warfare ceased with the end of World War II hostilities." The authors infer that nothing was done at the Department of the Army until creation of the OCPW. McClure himself was prone to exaggerate somewhat the authorship of OCPW's achievements. As an example, planning for both the Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group and Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company concepts was under way in G–3 before the outbreak of war in 1950 and before the creation of OCPW; but McClure would claim later that those ideas, based on World War II experience, originated in OCPW.

2. I am indebted to Prof. Theodore Ropp, Duke University, for this insight.

3. In an economy move, Army Field Forces recommended in October 1953 that the Psychological Warfare Center be deactivated and the responsibility for psychological warfare training transferred back to the Army General School at Fort Riley. Under this plan, all Special Forces schooling would have been conducted within units, rather than in a separate school. After a long and impassioned appeal by OCPW the result was a Psychological Warfare Center that survived, but

at reduced strength. See Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, Va., Letter to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Department of the Army, subject: Future of Psychological Warfare Center, 12 October 1953, filed with Psy War 322, Psy War Center C (30 October 1953), Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, Decimal File (C), 1951-54, 322-326, box 13, National Archives.

4. A letter to his friend Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte expressed McClure's feelings about leaving OCPW: "To my unexpected surprise and with no little consternation, I have received orders transferring me to Iran to lead the Military Mission. After 10½ of the past 12 years in this particular field and with the added emphasis being placed thereon by the White House, I fail to appreciate G-1's policy. I asked the Chief if there was anything behind it and he assured me there was not. The inference is that I have been in this field too long and there was no future for me as long as I continue in a specialized activity. There are already some rumblings in Defense and across the river but nevertheless I am selling my house and packing up." Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Letter to Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe, 4 March 1953, Record Group 319, Psy War Admin Office, Records Branch, 1951-54, 020-40, box 3, Psy War 040 CIA (undated) 53, National Archives. Ironically, McClure had decried the scarcity of general officers in the Army with psychological warfare or special operations experience. He tried to increase the number of general officers assigned to these specialized activities, including a general officer to head the Psychological Warfare Center. But he was unsuccessful in these attempts, and now he—probably the most experienced general officer in any of the services—was being forced to leave the field that he had devoted so much of his career to building up. See Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, subject: Assignment of General Officers to Psychological Warfare Activities, 30 October 1952, from Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure; McClure's Memorandum for Record, subject: Conversation with General McAuliffe reference General Officers, 26 December 1952; and Memorandums for Record, 2 March 1953 and 6 March 1953, subject: Selection of Commander for the Psychological Warfare Center, by Lt. Col. William Trabue, Executive, OCPW; all filed with Psy War 210.3, Record Group 319, Army-Chief of Special Warfare, National Archives.

SOURCES

Section I—Research Aids

The research for this study began, naturally enough, at the US Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, N.C. The center's archives were found in three separate locations: the Institute for Military Assistance Library, the center G-1, and the center Public Affairs Office. Within recent years, the G-1 files have been transferred to the Public Affairs Office, and are maintained there by the center historian, Mrs. Beverly Lindsey. Mrs. Lindsey also has a file of correspondence with many of the key officers at the center in the early 1950's, and and keeps some historical documents in her private collection. The personal files of Mr. John Farrell, Combat Developments, Institute for Military Assistance, were helpful. The Institute library is small but specialized in its collection of special warfare secondary sources. While important materials about the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center were uncovered, the primary sources of the center's archives are not well organized and pertain primarily to the post-1952 years. One must search elsewhere for more detailed information about the center's historical roots.

At the US Army Military History Institute (USAMHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pa., key staff personnel who were most helpful to the author were Miss Joyce Eakin, Assistant Director, Library Services, and Dr. Richard Sommers, Archivist. Miss Eakin has special MHI bibliographies for US Rangers and Special Forces in her files, is knowledgeable about institute holdings, and can provide valuable contacts at both the Center of Military History (CMH) and the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Dr. Sommers maintains the papers and oral histories of numerous senior Army officers; those of Robert A. McClure, Ray Peers, and William P. Yarborough were particularly useful for my work. The MHI Special Bibliographic Series, number 13, volumes 1 and 2, Oral History, contain references to these and other officers, as well as a cross-index of key topics. The institute also has a complete set of the Army General Council Minutes for the period 1942 to 1952. The council met weekly, was composed of the senior War Department leadership, and was chaired by either the Chief of Staff or Deputy Chief of Staff. These minutes were particularly useful in providing an overview of the major decisions and events leading to establishment of the Office of the Chief of Psychological

Warfare (OCPW) in 1951. Similarly, the War Department's *History of the Military Intelligence Division, 7 December 1941–2 September 1945,* which can be found in the MHI, provides some useful leads to the Army's psychological warfare activities during World War II.

Miss Hannah Zeidlik, General Reference Branch, Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., provided CMH special bibliographies on psychological warfare and Special Forces, as well as assistance in locating materials on these topics in the CMH card catalog and files. Of note were copies of OCPW semiannual and annual historical summaries for the early 1950's, which provided valuable leads to pursue in the Department of the Army records, National Archives.

At the National Archives, William Cunliffe and Ed Reese, Modern Military Branch, were the key archivists who helped to ferret out information on US psychological and unconventional warfare from 1941 to 1952; John Taylor was most helpful with Office of Strategic Services (OSS) records. Indeed, these collections in the National Archives provided the foundation upon which this study is based. Foremost in importance were the records of the War Department General and Special Staff (Record Group 165) and those of the Army Staff (Record Group 319). Records of the following staff agencies were instrumental in tracing the history of psychological and unconventional warfare activities within the Army: the Military Intelligence Division (MID), G–2 (Special Studies Group), 1941; the Psychological Warfare Branch, Military Intelligence Service, G–2, 1941–42; the Propaganda Branch, G–2, 1943–45; the Psychological Warfare Branch, Plans and Operations Division (P&O), 1947; the Psychological Warfare Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, 1950; and the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Special Staff, 1951–54. These last records were crucial in determining policies, key personalities, and decisions leading to the formation of Special Forces and creation of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. The footnotes for each chapter of the text provide more comprehensive reference to all of the records.

Section II—Primary Sources

National Archives

Records of the Army Staff (Record Group 319).

G–3 Operations, March 1950–51, 091.412 series, boxes 154–58.

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Army Operations, 1948–52, 091.412 series, Top Secret "Hot Files," particularly boxes 9 and 10. Includes Plans and Operations Division and G–3 Operations records on psychological and unconventional warfare and interface with the CIA.

Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, 1951–54.
Unclassified and Confidential Decimal File, 13 feet, 40 boxes.
Secret Decimal Correspondence File, 6 feet, 30 boxes.
Top Secret Decimal Correspondence File, 6 Feet, 22 boxes.
Army Intelligence Decimal Files, 1941–48, Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md., particularly series 370.5 (1–31–42) to 373.2, box 874; series 322.001 (10–31–42) to 322.03 (1–1–43), box 576; series 091.4 (9–20–43) to 091.412 (1–1–47), box 262; series 091.412 (121.31–46) to 091.412 Counterpropaganda, box 263.

Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Record Group 218). See series 385, 1946–53, boxes 147–56, for information on psychological and unconventional warfare.

Records of the War Department General and Special Staff (Record Group 165).
Military Intelligence Division (G–2), Propaganda Branch Correspondence, 1939–45, boxes 326–44. Contains reports, directives, bulletins, and other papers dealing with psychological warfare and propaganda activities in overseas theaters. 6 feet.
Office of the Director of Intelligence (G–2), 1906–49.
The Psychologic Section contains classified propaganda manuals and other records relating to propaganda and psychological warfare, 1918–26. 2 feet.
Operations and Plans Directorate (OPD), OPD 000.24 Section I (Cases 1–39), OPD 000.24 Section II (Cases 40–61), September 1943–January 1944, and OPD 000.24 Section III (Case 62–), February 1944-December 1945. Contains excellent material on interaction between OPD, G–2, and other offices, establishment of Propaganda Branch, G–2, and organization for psychological warfare in the War Department General Staff (WDGS).

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Headquarters, The Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C. Letter to Chief, Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army, subject: "Activation of the Psychological Warfare School," 12 September 1952. The center's appeal to the Department of the Army to give the Psychological Warfare School a formal service school status rather than a provisional status.

Headquarters, The Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N.C. Memorandum No. 14, "Organization and Functions Manual, Headquarters, The Psychological Warfare Center," 12 November 1952. The earliest formal document published by the Psychological Warfare Center that I have been able to find—the basic organizational directive for the center.

The Institute for Military Assistance Library, Fort Bragg, N.C. "Examples of UW." A folder of reports and speeches on various aspects of unconventional warfare. Includes the 1956 speech by Ray Peers to the Special Warfare School, one of the most comprehensive speeches I have read on the details of a guerrilla warfare organization (OSS Detachment 101, Burma).

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"Origin and Development of Resistance in France: Summary."

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Col. Aaron Bank (Ret.), 17 February 1968, 3 April 1968, and 27 February 1973.
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GLOSSARY

AFF	Army Field Forces
AFHQ	Allied Forces Headquarters
AG	Adjutant General
AGF	Army Ground Forces
ARC	Aerial Resupply and Communications (Wings, USAF)
CCRAK	Covert, Clandestine, and Related Activities
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIAA	Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
CIA/OPC	Central Intelligence Agency/Office of Policy Coordination
CIG	Central Intelligence Group
CINCEUR	Commander in Chief, Europe
CINCFE	Commander in Chief, Far East
CMH	Center of Military History
COI	Coordinator of Information
CSUSA	Chief of Staff, US Army
DA	Department of the Army
EUCOM	European Command
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEC/LG	Far East Command Liaison Group
FECOM	Far East Command
FIS	Foreign Information Service (COI)
FM	Field Manual
GHQ	General Headquarters
GHQ FECOM	General Headquarters, Far East Command
HQ	Headquarters
HQ FECOM	Headquarters, Far East Command
JACK	Joint Advisory Commission Korea
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JPWC	Joint Psychological Warfare Committee
JSPD	Joint Subsidiary Plans Division
L&L	Loudspeaker and Leaflet (Company)
MHI	US Army Military History Institute
MID	Military Intelligence Division
MIS	Military Intelligence Service

MO	Morale Operations
MRB	Mobile Radio Broadcasting (Company)
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NME	National Military Establishment
NSC	National Security Council
O&T	Organization and Training (Division)
OCPW	Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare
OG	Operational Group (Command)
OG's	Operational Groups (OSS)
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
OPC	Office of Policy Coordination
OPD	Operations and Plans Directorate
ORO	*Operations* Research Office
OSO	Office of Special Operations
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OWI	Office of War Information
P&O	Plans and Operations (Division)
PSB	Psychological Strategy Board
PW	psychological warfare
PWB	Psychological Warfare Branch
PWB/AFHQ	Psychological Warfare Branch, Allied Forces Headquarters
PWD	Psychological Warfare Division
PWD/SHAEF	Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
PWO	Psychological Warfare Operations
PWS	Psychological Warfare Section
R&A	Research and Analysis (COI)
RB&L	Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (Group)
SANACC	State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
SFHQ	Special Forces Headquarters
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
SO	Special Operations
SOE	Special Operations Executive (Great Britain)
SSU	Strategic Services Unit
SWNCC	State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
TD	Table of Distribution
TO&E	Table of Organization and Equipment
UN	United Nations
UNPFK	United Nations Partisan Forces in Korea
USA	US Army
USAF	US Air Force
USAFE	US Air Force, Europe
WDGS	War Department General Staff
WNRC	Washington National Records Center

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